Multiple Sources Already Answered This Question

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  The Independent Accountability Review Board

  The Independent Accountability Review Board, led by Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Admiral Michael Mullen determined that the "inadequate security platform" resulted from “[s]ystemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department,” including the following:
  
  Stove-Piped Decision Making:

  “Simply put, in the months leading up to September 11, 2012, security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a ‘shared responsibility’ in Washington, resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security.” The Board also determined that: “Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field, there appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.”

  Leadership:

  “The DS [Diplomatic Security] Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high threat post were met. At the same time, with attention in late 2011 shifting to growing crises in Egypt and Syria, the NEA [Near Eastern Affairs] Bureau’s front office showed a lack of ownership of Benghazi’s security issues, and a tendency to rely totally on DS for the latter. The Board also found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with their own staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special need for increased security for Benghazi.”

  Temporary, Residential Facility:

  “Special Mission Benghazi’s uncertain future after 2012 and its 'non-status' as a temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the working-level in the field, with very limited resources.” The ARB noted that the temporary nature of the mission “resulted in significant disconnects and support gaps.”

  Short-Term, Insufficient Staffing:

  “The Board found the short-term, transitory nature of Benghazi’s staffing to be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in Benghazi. Staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering post’s security posture and high risk, high threat environment.” The ARB further explained: “As it became clear that DS [Diplomatic Security] would not provide a steady complement of five TDY [temporary duty assignment] DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered by the daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an ever-shifting DS personnel platform.”

  Dependence on Local Security Forces:

  “[T]he SMC’s [Special Mission Compound] dependence on the armed but poorly skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for security support was misplaced.”

  
  Source: Accountability Review Board, Dec. 18, 2012
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  Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Bipartisan Report

  The bipartisan Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee report found that: “The Department of State did not adequately support security requests from its own security personnel in Benghazi”, explaining: "In the Department’s late 2011 plan describing a transition to 'locally staffed operations,' one of the reasons given for that transition was that 'DS does not have sufficient resources to sustain the current level of the security assets in Libya.' [Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Charlene] Lamb commented on this issue in her interview with the Committee, stating that it was hard to sustain large numbers of DS agents on short-term tours because there is not a floating pool of agents so that to fill a gap in Libya she needed to create a gap elsewhere."
  Source: Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Dec. 30, 2012
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  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Bipartisan Report

  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s bipartisan report found that “the uncertain future of the Mission facility … contributed to a lack of continuity for security staff and constrained decision-makers in Washington regarding the allocation of security enhancements to that facility.” The report also explained that: “Although the cable following the August 15 Emergency Action Committee [interagency security meeting held in Benghazi] stated that requests ‘for additional physical security upgrades and staffing needs’ would be submitted separately to the Embassy in Tripoli, the Committee has not seen any evidence that those requests were passed on by the Embassy, including by the Ambassador, to State Department headquarters before the September 11 attacks in Benghazi.”
  
  The bipartisan report also found that the Department of State made the decision to withdraw a 16-person Defense Department Site Security Team (SST), which had been based in Tripoli: “State Department headquarters made the decision not to request an extension of the SST’s mission in August 2012, approximately one month prior to the attacks, because State believed that many of the duties of the SST could be accomplished by local security forces, DS agents, or other State Department capabilities.” The report further stated: “DoD confirmed to the Committee that Ambassador Stevens declined two specific offers from General Carter Ham, then the head of AFRICOM, to sustain the SST in the weeks before the terrorist attacks.”
  Source: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 15, 2014
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  House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Democratic Staff Report

  The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee’s Democrats issued a staff report that found that “Benghazi lacked adequate security in part because it was a temporary post,” explaining that “[i]ndividuals interviewed by Committee staff agreed that temporary deployments and personnel turnover were an ongoing challenge.” According to the report, witnesses also confirmed that ”Benghazi, as a temporary post, was ‘excepted from office facility standards’ and ‘was not eligible’ for security upgrades” from the bureau responsible for overseas construction.
  Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Democratic Staff Report, Sept. 19, 2013
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  Accountability Review Board Vice Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen

  During his transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committee, Admiral Michael Mullen stated: “That then all goes back, from my perspective, on to Mr. Boswell [Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security] and Ms. Lamb’s [Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security] lap in terms of making sure security is all right, and yet it was, in fact, over the next many months that she fought it, didn’t resource it, bureaucratically didn’t answer, made it incredibly difficult on those who were trying to improve the security to achieve any kind of outcome they deemed favorable, and she just beat them down over time.” Admiral Mullen also faulted Ms. Lamb with the decision not to extend the Defense Department Site Security Team (SST), a 16-person team that had been based in Tripoli: “In the end it’s my view that Ms. Lamb won that debate, didn't want to extend it [SST], wanted to -- to quote her at one point in time -- didn’t want to be embarrassed by having DOD continue to provide security.”
  Source: Transcribed Interview, July 19, 2013
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  Accountability Review Board Chairman Ambassador Thomas Pickering

  During his deposition with the House Oversight Committee, Ambassador Pickering, Chair of the ARB, explained that Charlene Lamb, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, “had the responsibility for making the decisions” on the requests for more security. He stated: “[S]he explained that she felt that it was important to build up local staff; that the ratio of security personnel to substantive personnel in Benghazi was extremely out of sync; that the people who were assigned as security officers were doing jobs which local staff could have done, drivers, and they could have arranged a workaround for taking care of classified communications devices that they had to look after. And so it was a combination of advice on ways to make better use of the people they had and/or to supplement those with local hires, all of which had been done in other places.” He further stated that Ms. Lamb was not making her decisions based on a policy or direction from above, but instead “[s]he said on several occasions it was related to her feel for the situation.” Ambassador Pickering also explained that in more than one case, the Embassy in Tripoli “was not effective in following up and not strong in pushing forward the Benghazi concerns that it received from Benghazi.”
  Source: Deposition before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, June 4, 2013
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  Bureau of Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb

  On October 10, 2012, Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs, testified at a hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that “we had the correct number of assets in Benghazi at the time of 9/11 for what had been agreed upon.” She further explained: “When Mr. Nordstrom [Regional Security Officer in Tripoli] and I discussed the duties of the agents out in Benghazi, they were using one agent to drive the vehicle, and they were using another agent to watch classified communications equipment 24/7. So these are not normally duties that are assigned to DS agents. So I just—I asked Eric [Nordstrom] to review that. … And Eric worked closely with post management, asked them to hire a driver, and we hired a driver, trained a driver. And then the driver took the place of what the DS agent was doing. And then they came up, through technical security means, a way around the need to have the 24/7 coverage.”
  Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Oct. 10, 2012
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  AFRICOM Deputy Commander for Military Operations

  In a transcribed interview with congressional staff, Retired Vice Admiral Charles “Joe” Leidig, Jr. recalled why the Site Security Team (SST) was not extended: “My understanding was is [sic] that the situation had improved in Libya, and the Ambassador was comfortable with getting security from local Libyan sources, and he no longer needed the SST.”
  Source: Transcribed Interview with Congressional Staff, March 20, 2014
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  Commander of Special Operations Command Africa

  In response to a question on whether Ambassador Stevens declined offers to extend the Site Security Team (SST), Rear Admiral Brian Losey responded: “I have no idea, but I do know this: The State Department was in control of whether they were going to have an SST or not. And it’s because -- the State Department made the decision on declining the SST. If Ambassador Stevens wanted to reinstate the SST, he could have so stated. There is no ambiguity on the notion that he wanted a reduction in the footprint.”
  Source: Transcribed Interview with Congressional Staff, March 14, 2014