BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE

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MEETING

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FRIDAY MAY 13, 2011

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The Commission convened at 9:00 a.m. in the New Hampshire Ballroom at the Renaissance Dupont Circle Hotel, 1143 New Hampshire Avenue, Northwest, Washington, DC, Lee Hamilton, Chair, presiding.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

LEE HAMILTON, Chair
MARK AYERS
VICKY BAILEY
ALBERT CARNESALE
SUSAN EISENHOWER
JONATHAN LASH
ALLISON MACFARLANE
RICHARD MESERVE
ERNIE MONIZ
PER PETERSON
JOHN ROWE
PHIL SHARP

ALSO PRESENT:

TIM FRAZIER, Designated Federal Official

LAWRENCE KOKAJKO, US Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

JENNIFER UHLE, US Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

GLENN PODONSKY, US Department of Energy JAMES O'BRIEN, US Department of Energy MARY WOOLLEN, consultant to the Commission

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COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 PUBLIC COMMENTERS:

ROBIN READ, NFWL

TOM COCHRAN, NRDC

DAN BROWN, Securad, Inc.

JUDY TREICHEL, Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force ARJUN MAKHIJANI, IEER

KATHERINE FUCHS, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

GEOFF FETTUS, NRDC

KARA COLTON, Energy Communities Alliance MICHELE BOYD, PSR

MICHAEL McLAY, MJM Ocean Industries MICHAEL CONLEY, Thorium Energy Alliance

ROBERT ORR, JR., Thorium Energy Alliance BRYAN L. BENNET, formerly of the USAF

PARKER GRIFFITH, Thorium Energy Alliance
DIANE D'ARRIGO, NIRS
ALEX CANNARA, Thorium Energy Alliance

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

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Opening Remarks: Honorable Lee Hamilton4
Briefing on Agency Task Force - Near-Term Evaluation of the Need for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan: Lawrence Kokajko, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Briefing on US Department of Energy Review of Nuclear Facility Safety Following the Events in Japan: Glenn S. Podonsky, Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer, US Department of Energy
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Review of Draft Recommendations of the Transportation and Storage Subcommittee: Commissioner Meserve
Lunch
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

9:01 a.m.

MR. FRAZIER: I'd like to welcome you to the meeting of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future.

My name is Tim Frazier. I'm the Designated Federal Officer for the Commission. I want to welcome you here. And I know that more commissioners are on their way in. We've got a busy day. So we're going to try to stay on schedule.

Congressman Hamilton, sir, whenever you're ready.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Well, good morning to everyone. Thank you all for coming.

Let me first simply observe that General Scowcroft has been ill. I understand he's recovering now, and we wish him godspeed in that recovery. It may be that he is joining us by telephone. I am not finally informed on that. But in any event, we fully

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understand his absence today, and we wish him well.

The purpose of this meeting of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear is twofold. Our first Future two reviews presentations will cover being conducted by the federal government response to the natural disaster and resulting nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan.

Please note that the purpose of today's presentations is not to get into the myriad details of what happened and why. The staff has prepared a background memo on the details of the event. That memo was provided to all commissioners and is posted on the Commission's website.

The purpose of today's briefings is to hear from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the United States Department of Energy about what steps are being taken to review the safety domestic nuclear of

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facilities in light of the events in Japan.

After those presentations, we will then ask the co-chairmen of the Commission's three subcommittees to deliver presentations to describe the recommendations that are emerging from their work. We will discuss our plans for the subcommittee reports and the draft report of the full commission later today.

As always, we will end our meeting by hearing from any member of the audience who wishes to speak up. A sign-up sheet for the public comment period is available now. It will close at 2:00 p.m.

We've allowed an hour for public comment, and we look forward to hearing what people have to say. Speakers will be limited.

Of course that will depend on the number of speakers and the amount of time that we have.

Before we get started, I'd like to say a few words about the tragedy that has struck our friends in Japan.

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Commissioners Ayers, MacFarlane, Peterson and General Scowcroft visited Japan in February just a few weeks before the earthquake and the tsunami struck. They were, they have told us, deeply impressed by the hospitality of our Japanese hosts and by the time and effort they devoted to our visit.

We know that many of the same people who were so generous with their time during that visit are now struggling to get the situation under control and to minimize the public health impacts of the accident. Our hearts go out to them, to those who perished in the earthquake and tsunami, and to those whose lives have been forever changed by that disaster.

I open the floor for just a moment to see if any of the commissioners would like to further comment.

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: If not, we will proceed with the speakers of the morning. Our

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first speaker will be Lawrence Kokajko, the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I'd ask him to take the podium, if he would.

As many of you know, the Chairman of the NRC has directed that a review be conducted of the - excuse me - conducted of the safety of U.S. commercial nuclear facilities in light of the events at the nuclear power station in Japan.

We recognize that the review is still ongoing, and the complete results of the review will not be available until this summer. But we have asked the NRC to share what information they can today, particularly as it relates to the storage of spent nuclear fuel.

Mr. Kokajko, thank you for joining us, and you may proceed.

MR. KOKAJKO: Well, thank you, sir.

My name is Lawrence Kokajko. I'm the Acting

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Deputy Director for the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The reason I'm acting is because Dan Dorman, who is the Deputy Director for the Office, is on the Japanese Response Task Force and could not be here today.

Also, my real job is I'm the Division Director for the Division of High-Level Waste Repository Safety in that same office.

And you'll have to forgive my edit typo here, but we all know that the tragic events in Japan was one of the largest ever recorded off the eastern coast of that country. And the power plants did shut down as they were designed to do. And Unit 4, of course, was the fuel at the time, with all the fuel in the spent fuel pool.

The plant diesel generators did come on, and then it was inundated by a tsunami which disrupted all power to the

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facility. And as the BRC staff memorandum to the BRC Commission points out, the batteries eventually died and of course the event took a much more serious tone.

We are missing many important pieces of information about the event of what quite happened at the facility. And as the situation continues to stabilize and the emergency response phase begins to wind down, we expect more time and attention can be shifted toward obtaining the missing information.

And I know there are many questions here today regarding the performance of the facility itself, including the spent fuel pools at Fukushima Daiichi. Until we have a more complete understanding of the event sequences and specific systems' responses, many of the questions must remain unanswered for now.

Although many important details are missing, there is enough information about the

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event to warrant specific actions by the NRC.

On March 11th, the NRC began a monitoring phase of the emerging events in Japan. And that monitoring is continuing to this day.

This group in the Operations Center does provide advice to the U.S. government, including the U.S. Embassy in Japan. provide advice to the government of Japan, and only here have NRC experts not we headquarters, but also on the ground in Japan who are experts in reactor systems, as well as protective measures. And they are assisting, again, the Japanese government and as well as other stakeholders such as the IAEA.

On March 18th, we did issue Information Notice and provided this information essentially provided a high-level discussion of the earthquake as we knew it at the time. And it essentially allowed the benefit of licensees to have the our information so that they could consider it for other actions that they may need to take

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also provided in We that Information Notice, discussion of the а regulatory requirements pertinent such Station Blackout, as well as what we call B.5.b, which is Advanced Accident Mitigation.

For our inspector staff, and we do have inspectors on site, we issued The inspectors were temporary instructions. required to look at independently - to look at and independently assess the adequacy of the licensee, actions taken by the capabilities to mitigate conditions beyond design basis, as well as do additional factand-data-gathering in case we need to take future regulatory actions.

The second temporary instruction asked the inspectors to determine if the severe accident mitigation guidelines were available, and how were they being maintained, and then determine the nature and the extent of the licensee implementation of those

guidelines in training, as well as in exercises.

significantly two But more issued NRC Bulletin 2011-01. ago, And bulletins NRC address significant at the issues requiring great urgency, and usually require actionable responses by the licensee. And this is the first bulletin that the NRC has issued since 2007.

The events in Japan highlight the importance and potential versatility of mitigating strategies for potential loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires.

Therefore, the NRC sought comprehensive confirmation that the licensees are maintaining equipment and strategies to regulatory requirements satisfy the to maintain and restore cooling to the core, fuel pools containment or spent due to explosions or fires.

In this bulletin, we are requiring

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that within thirty days, information to verify that the equipment necessary to execute mitigating strategies available are and capable of performing their intended function, operating staff well as that the as appropriately trained and available to implement the mitigation strategies in the current configuration of the facility.

Separately, we are requiring within 60 days that the licensees must respond to a specific set of questions. These questions concern the maintenance, testing, and availability of equipment relied on for mitigation, updates of guidance on mitigation strategies, as well as the availability of all site support.

Based upon the information that is provided, the NRC may determine additional efforts are needed to ensure compliance with existing regulatory requirements and whether enhancements to the regulatory framework is necessary.

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On March 23rd, the Commission authorized an establishment of a senior-level task force to review the available information on the events in Japan. This task force will conduct a methodical and systematic review of the regulatory requirements, programs, processes and their implementation. They will determine if the NRC should make additional its regulatory system improvements to provide recommendations to the Commission for policy direction and implementation.

The task force will recommend nearterm actions, as well as identify framework and topics for longer-term review.

with several specific things that are outlined in its charter. They will independently study the events at Fukushima, identify relevant and important topics for application to the U.S. reactors, including spent fuel pools, consult with agency experts, interact with domestic and international stakeholders, identify a

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framework and topics for review and assessment of the longer-term effort, and formulate these recommendations and provide it to the Commission, to the NRC, in a report that is due in July 2011.

And yesterday Dr. Charles Miller as the task force leader, presented its initial briefing to the Commission in a public meeting, and that material will be available for public review.

The review approach will focus on Fukushima exclusively and all those issues that are known to date. And it will include insights from past lessons learned efforts such as Three Mile Island.

They will take a defense in depth approach looking at the prevention, mitigation and emergency preparedness of a facility. And they will look at protection from natural phenomenon, including design basis natural events and consideration of beyond design basis natural events.

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They will look at the mitigation of the long-term station blackout, including single or multiple-unit failures and events, emergency preparedness, and the implications for our programs. And one of the goals is to assure that any new requirement that comes out of this review is done in an organized and thoughtful way.

One of the focus areas of the task force is the methods used to evaluate protection from natural-occurring hazardous phenomenon.

In doing so, they will assess the design basis derived from the likely and unlikely events, as well as those appropriate safety margins evaluated for plant performance for beyond design basis events.

They will also include an evaluation of external challenges that could lead to station blackout, including seismic activity, tsunamis, storm surges, upstream dam failures, as well as precipitation and

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internal flooding. They will consider related and sequential external events such as an earthquake and tsunamis.

In particular, the task force is asked to examine survivability of emergency AC power for those things that are beyond design events, as well as include the evaluation of alternate sources of AC power for safety equipment in case the normal sources are lost.

The task force will also review steps that can be taken to mitigate effects of long-term station blackout such as strategies to prevent damage to the core, or spent fuel, or spent fuel pools, and prevent the releases of radionuclides, as well as look at the procedures and training for making appropriate emergency response personnel available and to ensure that their response is effective and protective.

Although much of the task force will focus on primary reactor systems, the performance of the spent fuel pools will also

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be evaluated and it will consider additional strategies to prevent the damage to the fuel located in the pools. And these strategies could include assessing heat removal capability such as water and air cooling, enhancing air coolability by relocating spent fuel, and assessing instrumentation availability.

Mitigation strategies use combination of procedures, some of which are voluntary by the industry. They will consider whether additional integration among procedures is necessary and would enhance the training increase the capability and implement overall mitigation. This require review of the emergency operating procedures, which are required, severe accident mitigation guidelines, and extensive damage mitigation guidelines.

In addition to the prevention of damage to the fuel in the pool, they will also consider strategies to mitigate the releases

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from potentially damaged fuel in the spent fuel pools. These could include filtration monitoring and scrubbing of potential releases, hydrogen control measures, pressure control in secondary containments in fuel pool buildings, and instrumentation availability. Similarly, as I noted before, the procedures will be assessed as well.

And one final point about the task force, they have also been asked to look at cross-cutting issues that may be relevant such incident emergency planning, decision control, making, command and radiation monitoring during the event, and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide.

The current assessment, and this was provided to our commission yesterday in its 30-day update, was that based upon the initial review of the available information, the task force has not yet identified any issues that undermine our confidence in the continued safety and emergency planning of the

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U.S. commercial nuclear power plant fleet.

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The task force review is likely to make recommendations to enhance safety and preparedness, but we will not know the outcome of that until later this year.

The task force has several next If there is any information of course that derives from the review of the Fukushima Daiichi event which indicates a concern with existing safety requirements, the NRC has a full range of regulatory options to require licensees make immediate to changes existing procedures or systems. They will continue its review and consider their implication for the U.S.

We will continue to evaluate the results from the instructions that we've given to our inspectors. A 60-day update is due on June 16th, and a final task force briefing is scheduled currently for July 19th of this year, and the report will be made public in July after - probably after the briefing.

1 The task force in its report will identify those 2 actions that the NRC 3 undertake for long-term effort to better understand the implications and the lessons 4 5 from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. 6 I'd like to close my presentation and ask for questions. Thank you. 7 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Are there 8 questions from commissioners at this 9 any 10 point? Phil. 11 MEMBER SHARP: Thank you very much 12 13 for your report. My question is about the dry cask storage. 14 15 We've seen in the media very little onsite 16 about what was there. And my presumption is that so far we're unaware of 17 any real damage to it. 18 19 But I guess I would like to - I 20 think we should know, and especially before we come out with our report, whether there are 21

any damage to the cask, whether they sustained

1	a hit by the water, as well as the thing and
2	what do we know about them. I'm sure that was
3	not the first order of business given the
4	nature of the accident.
5	MR. KOKAJKO: Yes, sir. My
6	understanding that there was dry casks onsite.
7	I don't recall the number, but I understand
8	it's about 400 or so fuel assemblies are in
9	dry cask storage.
10	They have the location of where
11	their dry - vertical dry casks were was
12	further back from the shore and elevated
13	higher.
14	They were, I understand, impacted
15	by the tsunami, but they were not impacted - I
16	don't even think they were knocked over. They
17	may have been moved, but I don't think they
18	were knocked over.
19	That's about all I know about that
20	at this time. But that is something that we
21	clearly have an interest in, and we are very

interested in the robustness of their dry cask

1	storage systems.
2	MEMBER SHARP: Well, I - just a
3	little - it would be very useful, I think, for
4	our report since we are likely to conclude
5	like as widespread conclusion about the high
6	safety value of dry cask storage and to know
7	whether or not there really was any
8	discernible damage.
9	So whether somebody is really going
10	to go in there and inspect those carefully, I
11	don't know what that would take. But I just
12	hope that that is on the agenda of - for the
13	Japanese in particular, but for us as well.
14	MR. KOKAJKO: We clearly all have ar
15	interest in that. And we have identified that
16	as an area we're interested in exploring
17	further.
18	Where it exists on the priority
19	scheme for Japan -
20	MEMBER SHARP: Sure.
21	MR. KOKAJKO: I think is a
22	little lower.

1 MEMBER SHARP: I can imagine. 2 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Richard. 3 MEMBER MESERVE: Thank you. You obviously 4 have а large number of 5 underway. 6 I have two questions for you. 7 is you did emphasize that the issuance of a bulletin is a rather unusual event. 8 unprecedented, but you haven't done one for 9 10 several years. And I'm curious whether you could 11 say something whether the pressure or reason 12 13 for issuance of the bulletin was a result of early inspections and what 14 your you 15 discovered as to the adequacy of the state of 16 the equipment to deal with severe accidents. MR. KOKAJKO: I don't know all the 17 information input that went into that, but 18 19 it's my understanding that some of the initial 20 inspections did lead to this, as well as the Institute of INPO, the Nuclear 21

Operations, and NEI assessing internally what

may have transpired. And they thought it was, you know, provided that input to us.

The Information Bulletin which went out almost, you know, relatively quickly also alerted the licensees that they needed to take a look at this.

And the TIs, I think, the results of some of the TIs did give us a view that we felt we needed to ask for this information.

And we, as you know, the 30-day and 60-day response is a pretty quick response. And other things could grow out from those reports.

MEMBER MESERVE: I wonder if you could say a little bit more about what the NRC understands the situation is at Unit 4 at the Fukushima plant.

There were early reports of a complete drain-down event and possibility of very major fuel damage. Subsequent reports have been that they've taken some samples, as I understand it, from the water that's in the

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1	pool, and it doesn't reflect as extensive
2	damage as one would have expected if that
3	event had occurred.
4	I'm quite curious as to whether
5	there are any lessons about risks from spent
6	fuel pools that your - well, I'm interested in
7	the status in whether there's anything you can
8	say about accident progression and
9	particularly the spent fuel pool.
10	MR. KOKAJKO: I don't have a lot of
11	information about that. I will say that I
12	have a lifeline here today with me, and I will
13	_
14	(Laughter.)
15	MR. KOKAJKO: Jennifer, do you have
16	information on Unit 4? You never go anywhere
17	without a lifeline.
18	MEMBER MESERVE: I'm laughing
19	because Jennifer used to work for me in my
20	office. She was my lifeline then, too.
21	(Laughter.)
22	MS. UHLE: We have - there have been

differing understandings along the way about Unit 4 spent fuel pool. As you're saying, occasionally they - people were surmising - and, again, I want to say this is all presumption because there's going to be a lot that's going to be learned as the Japanese further pursue the recovery and then the final dispositioning of the site.

There were some concerns that there was a partial, if not full, drain-down. There were obviously some - if anyone had seen photos that have been publicly available, there were some emissions, I would say. Was it smoke? Was it steam coming from the building? That wasn't quite clear.

So at this point I think the Japanese, if you do go online, the Japanese are concluding that there was no fuel damage and that if some of the fuel were damaged, it would have been because of mechanical damage, perhaps something falling into the pool.

But, again, this is all conjecture

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at this point until we can actually -- or the Japanese can get into the pools and verify for themselves. Although they have tried to use imaging by putting in a camera. And at this point, the images online are showing that the pool is completely filled at this point and the rods look intact. So I don't think that answers your question because we don't really have the

final answer.

MEMBER MESERVE: I think it is very important for us to understand the progression of the events -

MS. UHLE: Yes.

MEMBER MESERVE: -- in Unit 4.

MS. UHLE: Right. Yes, we have analyzed the events in the spent fuel pool. We've probably done about six or seven studies on the spent fuel pools over the years. recently the study that was done for aircraft-impact analysis after 9/11, that was completed National Academies in 2004.

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followed up with a report on that.

And so we do - NRC does have a very good understanding of the progression in a drain-down event. Now the probability of inducing that drain-down where at the site, where the hole - the penetration maybe failed, where that location is, how large that is, is obviously something that has to be analyzed in terms of a probability. So, there's uncertainty there.

But given a certain flow rate out of the pool for whatever reason, we have a very high confidence in our technical ability to analyze the event. It's based, in part, on some zirconium fire studies that were done at the Sandia National Laboratory. We have done that for BWR assemblies, and we're following up with PWR assemblies right now and validated our codes to ensure that we can predict the heat transfer.

And then under certain circumstances, zirconium fire and propagation,

but that's only - that zirconium fire propagation only occurs under certain conditions.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. The Chair has Per, and then Allison. Ernie, did you - and Ernie, and then Jonathan.

Per.

MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions, I want to pull on a couple of technical threads.

Before doing that, it's, I think, useful to note that this commission is comprised to be a policy commission, not a technical commission. So we're interested in learning about the technical details of what happened, but the policy dimensions are also important.

I'd just like to note that in - as these events have unfolded, the value of having an independent and scientifically technical - scientifically and technically capable regulatory agency available to monitor

this accident, provide advice to us and to the Japanese, I think, should be emphasized.

Because indeed what the NRC has been doing these last two months has been very positive in terms of reducing and mitigating the consequences to Japan and also giving us the opportunity to learn lessons here.

So a couple of the technical dimensions that I'd like to dig into just a little bit more relate to the nature of this accident. The Three Mile Island accident was one that was internally initiated by equipment failures and human failure or human error. And we've learned a lot from that. And a number of measures that we have taken have greatly reduced frequency of those types of initiating events in our own plants.

This is our first experience with an extreme externally-initiated - extreme external event initiated type of accident, and there's two areas where I'd like to learn a little bit more about lessons. One is I think

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we've been finding that our capacity to measure things inside plants is not that great, the instrumentation available, particularly for water level measurement in spent fuel pools. So where are we going with that type of lesson?

And then the second dimension is the tremendous value of defense in depth that comes from having the capability to hook up portable equipment to recharge batteries, to inject water, and where are we going with that type of lesson as well?

If you could just - those two areas, maybe say a little bit more about what's happening.

MR. KOKAJKO: First, many of the technical details that I think you may be interested in we're still assessing ourselves.

And, again, we - there's a lot of information is still speculation. And until that gets a little more known, I'm not sure - quite sure we can - how much we'll be able to talk about

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that for now.

Given what we do know, a number of things have arisen that we would - gives us pause to question. For example, the location of the switchgear, why did Japan site it where they did and that it was susceptible to such an event? Yes, they did plan for a tsunami, but that could be of something very simple that we would need to factor into our planning for future reactors, for example.

In terms of - and, in fact, that's also one of the things we're looking at internally in the U.S. is to understand the location of equipment.

In terms of the comparison to, say,

TMI, I'm hesitant always to make comparisons

because I don't want to sound like I'm piling

on, there was a lot of operator error issues,

as well as equipment malfunctions, at TMI.

We don't see right now anything that would say that Fukushima Daiichi operators did anything wrong. And as -- I

think I've heard that there's up to three deaths there, which are tragic.

One of the - I guess the things that apply to us right now is have we thought through the planning, the benefit of the planning? Have we trained the operators to handle things that are unforseen?

It's easy to have a simulator to say, well, I'm going to plan for a large-break LOCA and everything is geared toward that. It's a little different when you plan for multiple natural phenomenon happening at a multiple-unit event and everything - the whole world is falling around you.

I'm not quite sure we've asked for that simulation yet, but it's something that I think we're going to have to think about. And that's why the Information Notice went out, that's why the Temporary Instructions went out, and that's why the bulletin went out is to look at what could be done beyond design basis.

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1	Does that address your question,
2	sir?
3	MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you.
4	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Allison, please.
5	I'm sorry, did you have a further -
6	MR. FRAZIER: Come to the
7	microphone, please.
8	MS. UHLE: I can add some
9	particulars about the instrumentation
LO	capability at the U.S. plants -
11	MR. FRAZIER: Thank you.
12	MS. UHLE: if you'd like me to
L3	do that.
L 4	MR. FRAZIER: Yes, please.
L 5	MS. UHLE: Okay. There are several
L 6	requirements in our regulations about
L7	instrumentation capability looking at accident
L 8	situations and also going into what we would
L 9	say unforeseen accident situations or beyond
20	design basis accidents.
21	If you look at the general design
22	criteria, General Design Criteria 13, 19, and

64 all relate to having instrumentation available. After - certainly after TMI, the focus on the robustness of that instrumentation and its range of measuring capability was looked at.

IEEE started with a standard that NRC adopted, as well as ANS, NRC adopted and turned into Regulatory Guide 1.97, which is looking, again, at that instrumentation capability.

So there are requirements in our 10 CFR under 50.34 which is our - if anyone's interested in that particular one, 50.34(f) indicates what the post-TMI action items were. And there's a whole slew of instrumentation, including the ability to monitor activity in the core.

That's been replaced by more updated methods of being able to infer core damage through hydrogen measurements in the containment. And, of course, you know, temperatures, water levels, there's

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temperature measurements and water level measurements in the sumps.

And all of these are of these range of - measurement range have -- are increased so that they are - well, I shouldn't say increased. That they are large so that they go beyond what the design basis would be, and they are required to be robust to handle these design basis accident conditions and, also, to have an extended range of conditions for beyond design basis as well. So there is quite a bit of instrumentation available.

What happened at Fukushima, whether or not Japan had these same requirements, well, again, at this stage, like Lawrence was saying, we don't know for sure.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Allison and then Ernie.

MEMBER MacFARLANE: Okay. I have a couple questions. The first set has to do with Fukushima, and the second set has to do with the U.S. situation.

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So let me start with the Fukushima.

And, Jennifer, I don't think you should go very far.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER MacFARLANE: All right. So starting with Fukushima, I wonder if - in the past few days I've seen pretty amazing video images of Pool 3, which looks pretty terrible in terms of all the debris that fell into it. I wonder if you guys have any more status updates on that, or Pool 1 or Pool 2.

And then if you could also say something about if you have any thinking on why these pools seemed to run into trouble earlier than expected.

MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of why they came earlier than expected, the plant did suffer a severe, catastrophic earthquake which was, we know, beyond design basis. I think the magnitude -

MEMBER MacFARLANE: Actually, the ground shaking wasn't quite beyond design

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1	basis, but -
2	MR. KOKAJKO: I think it's unknown,
3	and I think we've made the assumption that it
4	was.
5	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Okay.
6	MR. KOKAJKO: And the plant did
7	behave generally as we thought it would. It
8	shut down.
9	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Right.
10	MR. KOKAJKO: The diesels came on,
11	and it began to respond. We ourselves
12	couldn't believe some of the pressures that we
13	were seeing within the primary containment.
14	And it was pretty severe.
15	The pools themselves as well,
16	having this pool that's sort of up in the air,
17	it was, you know, this design was geared
18	toward a refueling operation. It wasn't meant
19	for long-term storage.
20	It was meant for refueling. And it
21	was meant to help convey that from the, you

know, you take off the drywell head, you flood

1	it up, you refuel, you take the spent fuel and
2	you put it to the refuel spent fuel pool, and
3	there was a view that we would have some
4	availability, get it out when it was necessary
5	to - the government would take it.
6	The pool at Number 4, as you
7	probably know, had - was offloaded.
8	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes.
9	MR. KOKAJKO: And it had fresh used
10	fuel, which has a very high heat load. That
11	wasn't so much true in Units 1, 2, and 3. And
12	some of that fuel had been taken to dry cask
13	storage at that time.
14	Again, I don't have the numbers,
15	but I believe your BRC report does -
16	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes.
17	MR. KOKAJKO: have that in
18	there.
19	MEMBER MacFARLANE: I know the
20	numbers.
21	MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of what the
22	other pools are, again, I think there's much

1	less heat load. There's older fuel that's in
2	there.
3	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Right. Yes, but
4	there was still water loss in those pools.
5	MR. KOKAJKO: There still was water
6	loss.
7	MEMBER MacFARLANE: So -
8	MR. KOKAJKO: But the severity of
9	that was not as great as 4.
10	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Right, but it
11	maybe wasn't quite what was expected. So it
12	was more than what was expected. So that's
12 13	was more than what was expected. So that's what I'm trying to know - understand whether
13	what I'm trying to know - understand whether
13	what I'm trying to know - understand whether you guys have addressed that issue yet.
13 14 15	what I'm trying to know - understand whether you guys have addressed that issue yet. MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of Japan, the
13 14 15 16	what I'm trying to know - understand whether you guys have addressed that issue yet. MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of Japan, the answer is we're aware of it. And Japanese
13 14 15 16	what I'm trying to know - understand whether you guys have addressed that issue yet. MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of Japan, the answer is we're aware of it. And Japanese government and the NISA, as well as Tokyo
13 14 15 16 17	what I'm trying to know - understand whether you guys have addressed that issue yet. MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of Japan, the answer is we're aware of it. And Japanese government and the NISA, as well as Tokyo Electric, are trying to handle that. What we
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	what I'm trying to know - understand whether you guys have addressed that issue yet. MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of Japan, the answer is we're aware of it. And Japanese government and the NISA, as well as Tokyo Electric, are trying to handle that. What we want to do is get the information from them

1	So this National Academy study that came out
2	in 2005-2006, were all their recommendations
3	instituted at all U.S. reactors?
4	MR. KOKAJKO: The National Academy
5	study?
6	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes.
7	MR. KOKAJKO: I'm not sure I could
8	say that.
9	MEMBER MacFARLANE: This is about
10	the spent fuel pools.
11	MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of the heat
12	loading, we know that it depends upon a number
13	of things, the design of the refueling
14	systems. And the spent fuel pools may or may
15	not be safety related. It depends upon the
16	design and its framework in the facility.
17	We do know that typically the spent
18	fuel pool cooling has - is tied to the
19	diesels, but it's not one of the initial loads
20	that would come on in a post-accident
21	situation. Again, that's something that we're

going to be assessing. And I know that

1	Charlie Miller and his team are working on
2	that.
3	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Well, you know,
4	one of the - a couple of the recommendations
5	in that National Academy report were to
6	redistribute the spent fuel in the pool so
7	that you didn't have all the hot fuel next to
8	each other.
9	And the other - another one was -
10	MR. KOKAJKO: Yes, they do that.
11	MEMBER MacFARLANE: to install
12	sprinkler systems. If the roof caves in, I
13	don't know how your sprinkler systems help
14	you, but anyway.
15	MR. KOKAJKO: I don't know that - I
16	don't know of many plants, if any plants, have
17	a sprinkler system. I do know that there is
18	cooling standard spent fuel cooling systems
19	at the facilities. I will say that there is a
20	checkerboard pattern approach -
21	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Right.
22	MR. KOKAJKO: to try to move the

warmer fuel away from the cooler fuel.

MEMBER MacFARLANE: And so - and another thing I think that the National Academy report recommended, although I may be wrong about this, but I'm pretty sure that it recommended additional studies. It sounds like they weren't carried out because if your last study on water loss in the pools was in 2004, then -

MR. KOKAJKO: Yes, I don't know how much studies were done. I do know that, as Jennifer pointed out, there were fire studies that the NRC had done in relation to spent fuel pools and had been doing them for some time.

MEMBER MacFARLANE: So then my final question is why not just move - why not get ahead of the curve here and just go back to low-density racks? That would - that would ameliorate a lot of these problems.

MR. KOKAJKO: That's certainly something for consideration. But in order to

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1 do that, you may have to take warmer fuel out and put in dry cask storage sooner. 2 3 MEMBER MacFARLANE: Right. And, you 4 know, some of these new dry cask storage systems are pushing it to three years after 5 6 discharge. So -7 MR. KOKAJKO: Three to five, know, where one draws the line -8 MEMBER MacFARLANE: There's a lot of 9 older fuel in these pools. And this is not a 10 - this is not a complicated problem. 11 sticking point is the price tag, which isn't 12 13 really that high relative to losing a reactor and the consequences that follow along with 14 15 that. 16 So it just seems to me that it's fairly straightforward to carry this out. 17 just figure out who you attach that cost to 18 19 and move on. 20 MR. KOKAJKO: The NRC is taking a look at what could be required in that domain. 21 22 I know that the utilities have thus far said,

1	you know, if they moved, you would have a cask
2	that's only geared for a certain heat load.
3	If you put warmer fuel in there, it
4	may only be half full.
5	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes, I know, but
6	you don't have to put the warmer fuel in
7	there. You can put colder fuel.
8	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Ernie, go ahead.
9	MEMBER MONIZ: Yes, I have two
10	questions, but the first is to go back just to
11	make sure I understand, try to clarify the
12	discussion earlier on Pool Number 4.
13	So I guess about a month or so ago
14	I thought I heard a definitive statement from
15	the NRC that Pool 4 had been drained. What I
16	understood now is that that's unclear?
17	MR. KOKAJKO: The information that I
18	have, and I think as Jennifer has pointed out,
19	that they're still wondering about whether or
20	not it was fully drained or not. There's still
21	some uncertainty.

MR. MONIZ: And then - well, it's a

1	couple system, obviously. And then what do
2	you think we understand, or not, about
3	explosion in Pool 4 Building, and to what
4	extent did the having the fresh core in
5	there drive whatever combination of water
6	loss, explosion, et cetera, took place?
7	MR. KOKAJKO: That's something that
8	is - I know that has been discussed
9	internally. And right now it would be
10	speculative to try to say we understand the
11	entire sequence of events that happened at
12	that time. And that's - but I will say that
13	is something that we're highly interested in.
14	MEMBER MONIZ: The simulations at
15	Sandia and Oak Ridge, I think, are addressing
16	this. Are those integral to the NRC study?
17	MR. KOKAJKO: The NRC is evaluating
18	the need for additional studies as well. I
19	understand that that will be factored in - or
20	elements of it will be factored in.
21	MEMBER MONIZ: Okay. And then a

question that goes a little bit beyond the

specific investigation, but how is the investigation, the ongoing investigation intersecting with license extension considerations?

MR. KOKAJKO: That's a very interesting question. As you know, there was a facility that was granted renewal around the time of the event. It's my understanding that that will have to be assessed and that will be addressed by the task force for what longer-term actions may occur. I do not know what the outcome will be yet, though.

MEMBER MONIZ: Because, again, I mean, I've heard some statements, some definitive statements made that then don't seem to stick, to be perfectly honest.

MR. KOKAJKO: In terms of, you know, the intersection of this event and license renewal, we will have to wait and see what the task force recommends. Because I view that whatever the task force recommends may impact current operating fleet regardless of their

1	renewal status.
2	MEMBER MONIZ: But in the meantime,
3	carrying on as usual?
4	MR. KOKAJKO: No, sir. We've issued
5	a bulletin to get information and try to have
6	them assess material. We will consider
7	further action as a result of the responses
8	and the task force report.
9	MEMBER MONIZ: Okay. I did not
10	understand that.
11	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I have Jonathan,
12	and then John.
13	Jonathan.
14	MEMBER LASH: I have a question at a
15	more rudimentary level going back to
16	Commissioner MacFarlane's last question.
17	Two parts. How densely was the
18	spent fuel racked in Fukushima compared to
19	what is the case in the US, and how important
20	is that in determining survivability in these
21	kinds of incidents?
22	MR. KOKAJKO: I will call on

Jennifer for this.

MS. UHLE: At this point, it's not altogether clear how densely packed the pools were. So, unfortunately, my answer is probably not going to satisfy you. We don't know.

The density of the packing is important in heat transfer. And it also is a function of how long the fuel has been removed from the core, because of course you're decaying. You don't want to have, obviously, all the hot fuel in one location.

We have done a great deal of studies - great deal of study in this area and have made licensees through requirements, rerack their pools to enhance the cooling to, again, ameliorate any of the concerns associated with a drain-down.

We do also have sprays that are after the B.5.b requirements. If you've heard, they are now codified in 10 CFR 50.54(hh). That was after 9/11.

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There is a requirement for licensees to have sprays, and it's a portable. So that if, for instance, there was a problem with the sealing, there is a portable - the ability to have a portable system brought in, at least for injection. And then also the thought would be that spargers would available for the sprays. I don't know if that answers your question completely, or not.

I don't know if that answers your question completely, or not. We also have requirements on hydrogen control internal to the containment building.

And the concerns about the damage to the spent fuel pools was - and the explosions that occurred from the Units 1 and 3 - so, 1, 3 and 4 had damage - it's thought at this stage to be hydrogen detonation.

Now, obviously, you don't have hydrogen if you had a full spent fuel pool at all times.

So, they are -- these units are located next to each other. They do share

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some walls in some cases. There is a question, again, this is just at this point conjecture, whether there was some leaking of hydrogen into certain areas. Or when they were venting, if the venting system had leaks that caused hydrogen to accumulate in areas they didn't expect, potentially the Unit 4 Reactor Building, which encloses the spent fuel pool.

So, all of this right now there's a big question mark. Again, the location of the hot assemblies with respect to the colder assemblies is very important in the heat removal in the situation where you're going to be relying on air cooling.

MEMBER LASH: I have a follow-up, but it may be to Commissioner Moniz rather than to you.

Will you at some time, Ernie, talk to us about the bearing of all of this on the need for interim storage and what we saw in Sweden where hot fuel is moved pretty quickly

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1 away from the reactor into a storage pool? 2 MEMBER MONIZ: I don't know. 3 (Laughter.) CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: John. 4 MEMBER ROWE: This may be either to 5 6 you or to Jennifer. I don't wish to choose. 7 Stay handy, Jennifer. Over the course of the last several 8 TMI, after 9/11, decades after after 9 the 10 earlier series of Japanese earthquakes, actions NRC number of 11 has taken а to strengthen the ability of the existing nuclear 12 13 fleet to cope with events that weren't fully anticipated in the original design bases, and 14 I wonder if you could just summarize some of 15 16 those actions for the Commission. MR. KOKAJKO: You know, I will turn 17 this over to Jennifer as the Deputy Director 18 19 in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, 20 since they were the lead for that. Really, the 21 MS. UHLE: NRC 22 looking at what we call a whole spectrum of

events, really, from all the time we've looked at risk studies, probabilistic risk assessment studies or PRA studies, is what I'll call it from now on.

And those started with WASH-0740, I think is the number. And then of course the more famous WASH-1400 study was around 1978 or so by Norm Rasmussen.

So, those risk studies look at the whole - the whole envelope of possible accident scenarios to the degree that we postulate them and we know them.

Obviously in the model, there won't be something that we haven't anticipated that, or we feel is such a low probability like a meteor crashing into a plant that we feel is beyond the probability of -- realistic probability.

So, after those events - I mean, excuse me, after those studies, we recognized the importance of some systems that are - would be needed to mitigate an accident if

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that accident were very low probability and those accidents were outside the design basis.

So we have, therefore, based on risk information, focused our regulatory attention on some systems that would not be of importance during a design basis event.

And I would continue on with our risk insights. We have required Station Blackout rule which requires emergency diesels in addition to the emergency diesels they already have to be able to withstand station blackout situations where you have loss of offsite power and loss of all AC power from the diesels.

We looked at the probability of anticipated transient without scram, which is a very low probability event. But we felt the consequences could be potentially high, so we have regulatory requirements for the ability to withstand an ATWS event.

I would continue on to say after - certainly after 9/11, there was obviously an

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event that we hadn't anticipated with aircraft impact.

We looked at aircraft impact and recognized it was prudent to develop requirements to have the ability to bring in portable equipment, just like the spent fuel pool sprays, that could be there to mitigate an extensive damage due to fires or explosions.

So, the NRC isn't only focused on design basis events. If people are familiar with the regulatory vernacular, design basis events are those that are required to be analyzed. And they are spelled out in Chapter 15 of our Standard Review Plan.

But we do go beyond that and look into risk insights to see if there's any vulnerabilities.

The licensees were required, based on Generic Letter 88-20, to look at the risk profile of their plants. And they performed independent plant examinations for both

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internal event and external events. So that's where the external events were considered.

And after those completed were after about - the external event work earlier '90s. completed in the Ιt was determined that there were no undue - that no plants were causing undue risk to public health and safety.

So we haven't just focused on the standard design basis. We've looked at all - a whole host of range of accidents.

We're continuing that work in our State of the Art Reactor Consequence Analysis, which will be, hopefully, going out for public comment in the near future. That, as luck would have it, looked at station blackout as well as other scenarios that could lead to release from plants.

It focused on a couple of plants that volunteered to participate with us to provide requisite data needed to do the analyses.

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One is the Peach Bottom plant, and that is a Mark 1 containment, which is exactly what the Fukushima plants - or one of the Fukushima plants - or several of the Fukushima plants are.

And so, we have an analysis or we're working on analysis of the probability from those external events that would be possible at those particular sites.

Now, when you talk about external events, you have to be very site-specific, very site-focused.

If you're sited like Cooper in Nebraska, you're not going to have a tsunami to worry about. It's just physically impossible.

So, external events are very site specific. And so, the State of the Art Reactor Consequence Analysis has focused on two plants; Peach Bottom and Surry, looked at external events and has concluded certain things about the transients and the ultimate

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release. And we'll be looking at going out for public comment as soon as we can.

We are finding that our conclusions from SOARCA that we have formed so far which have showed that the sequences tend to take much longer to evolve in the source term, that could be released as much, much lower than previous studies have shown.

we're about through here in time, but - excuse me for interrupting, but I am impressed with the testimony. It's very tentative and it's very process-oriented, what you've told us. And all of that is appropriate.

And certainly the tentativeness of your judgements is appropriate, but here we are two months after this accident occurred.

The American people are deeply concerned about the safety of nuclear plant operation in this country.

Has the NRC reached any firm conclusions, clear conclusions two months

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after this accident that you convey to the American people saying you're making these plants safer?

MR. KOKAJKO: Sir, as I pointed out in my conclusion, I think as the penultimate slide, this is what Charlie Miller had stated to our Nuclear Regulatory Commission yesterday. At this time, we do not have any information that would cause us to doubt the safety of the current operating fleet.

We are taking all of this into consideration and we do anticipate that we may make changes to the regulatory framework, as well as require plants to do additional measures.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: But at this point, you have nothing to say to the American people about steps that are necessary to improve the safety of nuclear plant operations in the United States.

MR. KOKAJKO: Beyond what we've said in the Information Notice, in the Bulletins

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1	and what inspection guidance we have given to
2	our onsite residents, we -
3	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: What was that?
4	I mean, that doesn't mean anything to me at
5	all.
6	MR. KOKAJKO: Yes, sir, I
7	understand. It will take time to assess, and
8	it will take time to look at very complex
9	systems and understand their interactions with
10	one another.
11	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Well, I
12	understand the tentativeness of your position,
13	and I'm not the technical expert that we have
14	around this table, but it does seem to me
15	sixty days after this accident you ought to be
16	able to reach some very firm conclusions about
17	what, if anything, is necessary.
18	And if nothing is necessary, then
19	that's a very important conclusion.
20	MR. KOKAJKO: Yes, sir, I
21	understand. At this time, we've not
22	identified any issues that undermine our

confidence in the current fleet. 1 2 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: So you're saying 3 at this time that as a result of the Japanese accident, there is nothing that needs to be 4 5 done in the American nuclear reactors across 6 this country. 7 Is that your position this morning? MR. KOKAJKO: My position is that we 8 have asked the utilities to reevaluate their 9 We've asked them to --10 emergency measures. 11 our inspectors to inspect those activities to 12 date. We've asked licensees our 13 additional information. And we are studying the complexity of this event to understand 14 15 whether should impose or not we 16 requirements, which I suspect -17 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. MR. KOKAJKO: -- will, but it will 18 19 not be out until the task force does 20 initial report in July. 21 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I see. 22

John.

MEMBER ROWE: Mr. Chairman, I too share the sense that the answer is even more tentative than it needs to be. But as the operator of 17 nuclear plants, I'd like to add the worm's perspective on the bird.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER ROWE: It is one of the reluctant geniuses of American nuclear regulation that it has never said that the search for enough is enough is over.

In the forty years that I have been dealing with nuclear power regulation in this nation, the NRC and even before it, the sometimes maligned AEC, were always willing to take into account new information to study and to impose new requirements.

What I think has happened in the sixty days, and like you, I would wish that it were even more unequivocal, but what has happened is the NRC has said through its chairman, through its operating officers, through its reports to Congress, that it

continues to believe the American nuclear fleet is safe, but it's slowly and patiently looking for ways to make it even safer.

There is no doubt whatsoever that one of the things that it will consider is Commissioner MacFarlane's suggestion on redistributing the spent fuel sooner.

I'm quite certain this also adds to the argument for Commissioner Lash's point that an interim storage facility would be a better way to do that. It will also be looking at a number of other things.

As the operator, I cannot tell you today exactly how the NRC will prioritize such new requirements as it may find necessary. But one thing I know is that the NRC will continue to try to evaluate and rank-order new requirements.

Jennifer, and I apologize for not remembering your last name, you know, listed some of the things that have been done over decades to impose requirements that go beyond

the original design.

We utilities are always a little troubled by that because, like an airplane, we like a design to be affirmed once it's done.

But this industry in this country has stayed safe in significant part, because the NRC has been willing both to make conclusions that it is safe, but also to continue to seek new requirements where it thinks it's appropriate.

And that is a process at least as frustrating for the utility as it is for the independent commission or the congressional committee chairman, but it is a process that's delivered a great deal of safety to the American public.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I am delighted to hear your judgement about the NRC. I really don't have a judgment about the NRC. I have not dealt with them enough to know one way or the other.

But I am interested in what your

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firm conclusions are as a result of the Japanese accident and how it affects the American people and the safety of these plants. And I don't think you have forever to answer that question.

MR. KOKAJKO: No, sir.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I think it has to be coming out of you fairly soon, as quickly as you can.

Now, obviously these are very complex matters. Far more complex, I'm sure, than I appreciate.

On the other hand, I'm impatient, I guess. And I think the American people are impatient. And I think you folks have to understand the result of the impact of an incident like Japan on nuclear power in this country.

But not just in this country.

Germany, as I understand, decided they're going to back away from nuclear power completely because of what happened in Japan,

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1	at least in part.
2	I don't think we're at that point
3	in the United States, for reasons John has
4	stated very well. But on the other hand, I
5	don't think it's a situation where you can
6	just ignore it.
7	I think the Nuclear Regulatory
8	Commission is under a spotlight and the
9	pressure is on you. The American people have
10	confidence in you, I hope and I trust.
11	They're expecting you to perform well.
12	MR. KOKAJKO: Thank you.
13	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I think - yes,
14	Al.
15	MEMBER CARNESALE: It's really just
16	to pick up on the timing question, I
17	understand that the first priorities have to
18	be about reactor safety. And that makes
19	sense.
20	It does sound, however, like you're
21	getting much of your information from the
22	Japanese government and, therefore, do not

really have control over the pace at which you're making progress.

This is particularly important to us. We've been asked to make recommendations about the back end of the fuel cycle, all right? And we're going to hear today tentative recommendations.

We all understand that we would like, before we make final recommendations, to know as much as we can that is germane that's been learned from Fukushima.

And without more information on what happened with the spent fuel and why, whether in the pools or the dry casks, it is extraordinarily difficult for us to say with confidence the kinds of things that we would have said with confidence two months ago.

And so, this concern about the timing is not simply the concern about - or not solely the concern about assuring the safety of nuclear power in the United States, but it also reflects upon the question the

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President has asked us about the back end of the fuel cycle because a portion of the back end of the fuel cycle is at Fukushima.

So do you have any sense of what the timing might be - I understand it's not entirely in your control -- of what the timing might be as to when we might feel with some confidence that we understand what went on with the spent fuel at Fukushima both in pools and in dry cask storage?

MR. KOKAJKO: The task force that is currently considering this right now, I know has outlined an extensive report that they're trying to address and of which spent fuels are a particularly large part of that, as well as the reactors.

I wish I could give you more clarity. They will brief the Commission on July 19th. And the report will be out that month. It will be made public.

And we will have probably the best understanding then as to what recommendations

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1	for storage and spent fuel pools and dry cask
2	storage, for the power plant sites at that
3	time.
4	And I wish I could give you some
5	more certainty on that - more clarity on that.
6	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: We'll conclude
7	this with Ernie. Did you want to say
8	something?
9	MEMBER MONIZ: Yes, I just wanted to
10	follow up really on the Chairman's earlier
11	questions.
12	First, on this question of
13	confidence in the Commission, etcetera, I just
14	note that, I mean, I had the pleasure of
15	testifying a few weeks ago and it was very
16	clear that there were signals coming out of -
17	this was in the Senate - that a different form
18	of review might very well be sought.
19	And I think that's where a crisper
20	approach in the NRC could help have a more
21	streamlined, shall we say, approach.

The absence of it, I think, will

1	lead to multiplicity of reviews that may not
2	clarify the situation.
3	Secondly, the you made an
4	intriguing statement. You said that the pool,
5	the spent pool design at Fukushima is, roughly
6	speaking, you said it was made for refueling,
7	not for storage.
8	Doesn't that then suggest a certain
9	line of inquiry and conclusion on the
10	Commission's part?
11	MR. KOKAJKO: I can only speculate
12	what the Commission might do with information
13	like that.
14	As you well know, the pools
15	MEMBER MONIZ: It's not information.
16	It was a statement of fact.
17	MR. KOKAJKO: Yes.
18	MEMBER MONIZ: In fact, a fact
19	that's been around for a long time.
20	MR. KOKAJKO: Yes, sir. The fuel
21	for many years built up, and they had to re-
22	rack, as I know you're aware. And the density

1	in the pools became more and more, I
2	understand.
3	I think we'll have to deal and
4	assess that as part of this future study.
5	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
6	much, Dr. Kokajko.
7	MEMBER MESERVE: That's not like
8	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I'm sorry,
9	Richard.
10	MEMBER MESERVE: Allow me to come a
11	little bit to the defense of the NRC, if I
12	may, here.
13	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I'm not
14	attacking it. I'm just trying to get them to
15	do something.
16	(Laughter.)
17	MEMBER MESERVE: Well, it's not -
18	the problem I think we confront is that the
19	capacity to assemble the engineering
20	information to enable a thorough assessment
21	may not dovetail well with the political need
22	to be able to say things about what that

assessment will yield.

We controlled the information at Three Mile Island, and it was a couple years until we got into the reactor and understood the extent of the fuel damage, which was a very important factor in understanding the sequence of events.

So I think that there is a need to do - to go as far as you can and as fast as you can. But I think we all have to recognize that a full evaluation of this accident may be a year or two before we have all the information that we need to actually have a complete understanding.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Richard, I was not asking for a full and complete statement.

I just said it's sixty days, and I wanted to know if any conclusions had been reached.

That's all I wanted to know. Any conclusions.

And the only conclusion I hear is that so far as you know at this point, nothing needs to be done with regard to the safety of

1	American reactors as a result of what we've
2	learned from Japan. That's what I take from
3	your testimony today, and that's my concern.
4	You're absolutely right, of course,
5	about deliberation, and that I fully
6	appreciate the tentativeness of what you have
7	to say. You don't want to be too dogmatic
8	here.
9	MEMBER MONIZ: But may I also add
10	that I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.
11	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: That's okay.
12	MEMBER MONIZ: I would like to add
13	to go back to my question and Dick's point:
14	there are some decisions that can be addressed
15	without complete information about the
16	accident. Some not, but some there are.
17	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Per, you're
18	going to have the final word.
19	MEMBER PETERSON: I appreciate that.
20	(Laughter.)
21	MEMBER PETERSON: I do think it's
22	important to point out that the most important

action that has already been taken with respect to increasing safety based on lessons learned from Japan, is to review the US addressing this procedures for type of accident from the perspective of hooking up portable equipment and getting coolant injection initiated and power connected in a timely way.

Because the fact that that did not happen in a timely way in Japan, contributed greatly to increasing the severity of the accident.

And that action has been taken.

And of all of the things that can reduce risk

for this type of external event, that's

probably the largest one.

And so I would say that there have been actions taken which address major elements of the risk based on these lessons. So things have been happening that make a difference.

Other questions such as whether or

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1	not the density of racking is an issue, that's
	not the delisity of facking is all issue, that s
2	going to take a longer time to figure out
3	because there's very incomplete and
4	contradictory information about what has
5	actually happened to fuel that might have
6	uncovered.
7	But the most important near-term
8	actions, I think, have been taken already.
9	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Dr. Kokajko,
10	thank you very much for your presentation.
11	You and your colleagues, I know, have done a
12	lot of work for this.
13	We are deeply appreciative of that.
14	So we thank you. We also thank Jennifer for
15	her comments here today as well.
16	Now we go to Vicky Bailey who will
17	introduce the next speaker.
18	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you.
19	MR. KOKAJKO: Thank you.
20	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you, Mr.
21	Kokajko.
22	We would now like to hear from Mr.

1	Glenn Podonsky. Is he here? Mr. Podonsky is
2	the US Department of Energy's Chief Health,
3	Safety, and Security Officer.
4	Mr. Podonsky's organization is
5	coordinating the Department's review of the
6	safety of DOE nuclear facilities in light of
7	the events at Fukushima Nuclear Power Station
8	in Japan.
9	So, this morning we will hear about
10	the ongoing safety review and any preliminary
11	results.
12	Mr. Podonsky, thank you for being
13	here today.
14	MR. PODONSKY: Thank you and good
15	morning.
16	It's my experience in Washington,
17	that most witnesses or presenters in front of
18	commissions or the Congress, start off with
19	"thank you for inviting me to speak." And I
20	will do that in a minute, but I want to tell
21	you why I really mean it.
22	In my almost three decades at the

Department, I've actually worked with many 1 2 members of the Commission, directly 3 indirectly with your staffs. For example, Senator Domenici over 4 the years, had many issues with the Department 5 6 of Energy. And I worked with Clay Sell, Pete 7 Lyons. General Scowcroft when he had his 8 staff of nuclear command and controls looking 9 10 at the security of the NMSA, I worked with their staff. 11 Congressman Hamilton, when you and 12 Senator Baker conducted the security review of 13 the lost hard drives at Los Alamos, I worked 14 15 with your committee then. 16 Commissioner Ayers, in the last five years I've been working with the Labor 17 Force on worker health and safety. 18 19 Commissioner Moniz, when he 20 Under Secretary, I worked for him and with him on many projects. Commissioner Bailey, when 21

you were Assistant Secretary, I worked with

your staff.

And when I look at the backgrounds of all the Commission serving, I harken back to Senator Domenici's opening comment last March at the first meeting that this will not be a commission where the report sits on the shelf.

While you do not need my endorsement, I'm just saying I have firsthand experience over three decades that I believe that the members of this Commission will, in fact, produce a report that won't sit on the shelf.

And that is why this morning I thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the subject of nuclear safety at DOE sites and what the DOE is doing in response to nuclear accidents.

While I'm here representing the Department as a whole, I actually serve as the DOE's Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer.

My organization is unique in the entire Executive Branch as we are responsible for independently assessing the performance of the Department in terms of environment, safety health, safeguard security, emergency management, cyber security.

My organization is totally

My organization is totally independent from management responsibilities for production or mission or site budgets.

This enables us to report unbiasedly to the Secretary and to congressional committees on how effective or ineffective DOE is performing its function.

Nuclear safety is a priority at DOE today and it has been, actually, for the last 15 years. DOE has implemented a cohesive, integrated safety management program to strengthen the Department's nuclear facilities and operations.

In light of the recent events in Japan, we're not resting on what we've already done. We're actually currently reviewing our

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nuclear safety policies, our standards, our practices to ensure a robust culture of safety throughout all the aspects of the Department's nuclear facilities and operations.

We've embarked on a new era of proactive nuclear safety within the DOE. One that even more than ever before embraces fundamental importance in nuclear safety and recognizes that DOE cannot succeed in its mission without first protecting our workers, the public and the environment.

before the Even events at DOE leadership Fukushima, under the of Secretary Chu and Deputy Secretary Poneman, enhancing the safety of our facility and operations.

We have an integrated approach to safety management, and particularly over the past few years we have taken numerous steps to strengthen oversight of the nuclear facilities and ensure a culture of safety throughout the complex.

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Wе have also adopted a graded safety with а higher risk approach to consequence to facilities and activities to provide a higher degree of protection of oversight than lower-consequence activities.

Most recently on February 8th, 2011, Deputy Secretary issued a revised Nuclear Safety Policy applicable to all departmental elements with a responsibility for nuclear facility safety.

This covers expectations for the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of our nuclear facilities in a manner that would ensure adequate protection of the workers, the public and the environment.

The Department's nuclear enterprise is vast. It's complex. We own or operate nearly 200 nuclear facilities throughout the United States, and these range from complex facilities with multiple nuclear processes, to inactive facilities or structures.

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The breadth of these activities have demanded an integrated strategy that I've just mentioned to identify development and implement management and safety initiatives appropriate to the given site.

In looking at DOE as a whole, it's important to understand that DOE nuclear facilities are very different - I want to repeat that -- they're very different from commercial nuclear reactors and face different safety issues.

Of the nuclear facilities that I just mentioned, nearly 200, only four are nuclear reactors, and only two of those four are what we call Category 1 nuclear facilities.

Hazard Category 1 is a nuclear facility in our vernacular that means that they could conceivably cause a release offsite.

In contrast, all commercial nuclear power reactors in our vernacular would be

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considered Category 1 facilities.

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Additionally, the reactors at DOE, you should know, are a much lower power level or residual heat level than are experienced in the commercial nuclear industry.

The remaining 190-plus nuclear facilities are what we call Hazard Category 2 or lower.

It's important to understand that these facilities do not represent the same potential hazard to the public.

Nevertheless, we thoroughly analyze all of our DOE nuclear facilities to ensure we understand and can mitigate potential actions and hazards, such as fires, that could cause release of radioactive materials, to mitigate these events.

high-quality put in safety systems which are verified to be working rigorous testing through and maintenance programs.

The Secretary and the Deputy

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COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 Secretary bear the ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety at our department.

Line managers are responsible for establishing, achieving and maintaining stringent safety performance expectations and requirements at these facilities.

We currently have three under secretaries. They serve as what we call the DOE Central Technical Authorities and are responsible for ensuring effective understanding and implementation of nuclear safety requirements.

The Central Technical Authorities are supported by the Department's Office of the Chief Nuclear Safety and the NMSA Office of Chief Nuclear Safety.

That may sound confusing, may sound bureaucratic, but what it actually does is creates offices that provide nuclear advice to senior line managers. And they provide their own oversight to ensure consistent execution of field level nuclear safety

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responsibilities.

The DOE contractor management, they are also responsible for rigorous implementation of the safety expectations and requirements set forth by the Department.

A crucial independent check of these efforts comes from my office as being responsible for policy development, independent oversight, and regulatory enforcement to ensure that every DOE nuclear facility adheres to the highest levels of nuclear safety.

Recently, we have elevated the Office of Nuclear Safety to be a separate office reporting directly to me.

Completing this internal safety and oversight is the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, the DNFSB.

That is an independent agency established by Congress in 1988, to provide recommendations to the Secretary regarding establishing and operating in accordance with

highest nuclear standards.

The Board reviews the content and implementation of standards relating to design, construction, operation and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities.

Through improvements from our ongoing interface with the DNFSB, I can tell you that the Department has materially improved the safety of our defense nuclear facilities over the last 23 years.

Now, since 2008 in response to a very critical GAO report about the Department, and the title was "Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its Independent Oversight of Nuclear Facilities," DOE undertook a number of actions that started with the previous administration and has continued with the current administration.

These actions include the following: We have created and implemented a site-lead approach to prioritize key oversight

activities for each site; we've conducted
targeted inspections and continuously monitor
site performance; we revised inspection
selection practices to prioritize oversight of
safety bases and higher hazard nuclear
facilities; we've created a tracking system
for monitoring and evaluating the safety
status of higher nuclear facilities; we added
more nuclear engineers to both my independent
oversight group, as well as the nuclear safety
offices; we've improved the National Training
Center's training programs by incorporating 23
safety bases courses into the curriculum; we
have prioritized enforcement practices to
devote more attention to the most serious
events; we've increased the DOE program
management engagement in enforcement
proceedings to enable prompt action and
ownership by what we call the line; we've
increased the transparency of all that we are
doing by making inspection reports publicly
available on our web; and we have created a

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new dedicated web page to share DOE nuclear safety information.

We have a good safety record for nuclear. It's instilled a degree of rigor in our nuclear facility operations through the issuance of regulations, development of safety bases, enhanced line oversight, training and qualification programs, and enhanced conduct of operations.

While the Department has already done a lot to advance nuclear safety, we will not be complacent.

In particular, the accident in Japan stands as a global reminder for the need of continuing vigilance and the commitment to nuclear safety that cannot be ignored.

These events highlight the importance of a robust safety culture and compel DOE to ensure the primacy of safety throughout our complex.

The Deepwater Horizon spill which occurred last year at this time, also teaches

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us about the importance of a positive safety culture and how a series of things can go wrong in any complex system.

We're also taking other actions to strengthen our nuclear safety program. I just talked about what we're doing for nuclear safety oversight. Let me now talk about what we're doing for the nuclear safety program itself.

Generally along the lines of mission performance accountability, strategy, oversight, training, and infrastructure, just some of these are we're reassessing our nuclear safety metrics to ensure that they clearly track safety performance, critically assessing of their performance, monitoring trends and sharing best practices.

The newly-appointed Assistant Deputy Secretary, Admiral Mel Williams, just established a Nuclear Safety and Security Council.

This council is a group of nuclear

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experts who will assist in the performance of metrics trends and lessons learned. And this was just created last week.

We have an issuance of revised guidance associated with what we call integrated safety management, and oversight of high-hazard nuclear facilities that will provide additional information on approaches for managing safety at our nuclear facilities.

We've increased our effectiveness of oversight activities by focusing the independent oversight on more on the nuclear operations as the GAO appropriately pointed out in 2008.

We've established a training program to provide a continuum of training throughout nuclear safety professional's career.

This is an area, I must say, that has been elusive to the Department all the way back to Secretary Watkins when he wanted to have a training program, he wanted to combine

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training efforts. We never did.

We are doing that now. We have reached an agreement. This is bureaucratic, but it helps you understand. We reached an agreement to bring all these disparate groups together under one group at our National Training Center.

And the individual that is going to run that for the Department is coming out of the Albuquerque Service Center. And again, for everybody here, that doesn't mean a lot, but it's a high-level position. And people are coming together to finally do what we haven't been able to do for close to twenty years.

We're also seeing staffing gaps and hiring needs on technical personnel to assure that they are properly trained, qualified, and certified to perform nuclear safety duties.

Now, in response to Fukushima, we have taken a number of actions specifically in regards to what happened.

Within 12 days of the event, Secretary Chu, who is the first secretary to ever issue a Safety Bulletin; that normally comes out of my position, but he wanted to make sure that the DOE elements understood its importance. And the Safety Bulletin that I believe you all have seen, requires all DOE higher hazard nuclear facilities to step back and perform a self-critical review of their safety analysis.

While DOE continuously analyzes the safety of all of our facilities, it's devoted its significant resources to upgrading the facilities to meet seismic protection standards. We want to reexamine these areas in light of what we're hearing about Japan.

discussed As in my advance technical provided paper that Ι the Commission, we have begun to receive the We actually have the responses for responses. Category 1 facilities. And two facilities, responses for Category 2 the

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coincidentally, are due today.

At this time, we do have results for the highest category of facilities. Of particular note, the site contractors had reverified that all the safety systems and controls are functioning as intended and are operable. But being part of DOE, we just don't trust the contractors to tell us so.

The line management at the site has reviewed the results, and they report them to be accurate and reliable, but now the headquarters, my organization, together with the other nuclear functions, are looking at what was done.

So, yes, we have checkers checking the checkers, but you need to do that with something as important as this.

Our review of the hazard category facilities will be starting today as they come in. And we believe that taking the additional step of systematically evaluating the hazard at Cat 2 facilities is a prudent one.

We understand that the public and our stakeholders will and should expect that DOE should do everything it can to prevent any nuclear incident.

The review of nuclear facilities is not a paper exercise. DOE line management, together with my office as the DOE safety organization, we're carefully reviewing the results. And we're serious about taking actions as exemplified by the Secretary's personal involvement.

DOE will be looking at the results from two perspectives. We will look individually at the results for each site to determine what makes sense at that site.

We will also look collectively at the results to determine if we need to make more global changes, such as changes to requirements or guidance.

We will review vulnerabilities related to beyond design basis events in response to what we are learning from the

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Japanese situation.

Now, there's something else I want to come forward with and tell you that the Deputy Secretary is hosting a nuclear safety workshop on June 6th to the 7th here in Washington. Actually, Crystal City.

And this is to address nuclear safety issues related to the accident in Japan specifically and to gather information from other agencies such as NRC, INPO, DNFSB, and from various experts, such as experts in seismic events.

We have senior government level officials at all levels participating from NRC, from Defense Board, from FEMA, from EPA.

Our expectation is that it's an important workshop that will be able to have tangible recommendations that DOE will look at to see if there's any further actions we need to take.

I'd like to invite the Commission to attend, participate in whatever capacity

while it's closed to the public and the press because we want to make sure that we can have total candor discussion about the nuclear situation and make sure we understand what we're doing.

And since we have so many of the top-level nuclear experts as well in government, we think that would be a very interesting and very dynamic activity for everybody who's interested in the nuclear business.

Next steps, the Safety Bulletin and workshop are only the first ones, not the last.

We're committed to follow the events from the Japanese accident, and we will evaluate the responses to the Safety Bulletin.

As we learn more, we may well identify additional actions that would further reduce risk or improve our ability to respond to severe natural disasters.

I will be traveling to Japan in two

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1	weeks - three weeks to meet with the Japanese
2	officials to learn more ourselves. And also
3	to meet with a program that we have, which is
4	the Radiation Effects Research Foundation,
5	which studies the effects of radiation from
6	Nagasaki and Hiroshima. And I will be meeting
7	with that panel of governors as well.
8	Now, I would like to say that my
9	NRC colleagues had a lifeline. I'd like to
10	have DOE call a friend, and I would like to
11	start right off and invite the new Director of
12	the Office of Nuclear Safety, Dr. Jim O'Brien,
13	to join me so that we can be responsive in a
14	timely way to any of your questions.
15	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you, Glenn.
16	And we'll have your friend come up alongside
17	of you.
18	Can you say his name again? I want
19	to make sure I -
20	MR. PODONSKY: Dr. Jim O'Brien.
21	MEMBER BAILEY: O'Brien.
22	MR. PODONSKY: He is the Director of

1	the newly-created Office of Nuclear Safety.
2	MEMBER BAILEY: Okay. All right.
3	Questions from commissioners? Per and Mark,
4	and Allison.
5	MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you.
6	In the questions that you received
7	and were asked to answer, they focused on
8	safety of DOE nuclear facilities.
9	I'd like to expand a little bit to
10	ask you a couple of questions related to DOE
11	activities to support NRC, and in particular
12	the Japanese, in responding to the accident.
13	One thing that strikes me, having
14	seen the photos from the Unit 3 spent fuel
15	pool that is filled with debris, is that it
16	looks a lot like actually the K Basin pool
17	that was successfully cleaned up.
18	So, in fact, there's precedent for
19	having gone back and mitigating these sorts of
20	things. And that knowledge and expertise
21	resides in the DOE.
22	So, maybe could you discuss a few

1	of the things, perhaps, that DOE has been
2	doing to help others with respect to the
3	consequences of this accident?
4	MR. PODONSKY: Sure. I'll start,
5	and I'll ask my friend to continue.
6	Immediately DOE stood up a nuclear
7	command control center from Under Secretary
8	Tom D'Agostino to be responsive to anything
9	that they might need for emergency operations.
10	And Admiral Krol dispatched radiological
11	teams to monitor the area.
12	Additionally, Assistant Secretary
13	for Nuclear Energy, Pete Lyons, has been in
14	constant contact with the NRC.
15	And I want to harken back to this
16	workshop that we're putting together. This is
17	just not a normal DOE or government workshop.
18	This is a workshop that we are looking for a
19	sharing of specific lessons learned that we
20	have from our experiences in our own
21	facilities like Rocky Flats, Mound, Fernald,

and our experiences at Savannah River still in

the early stages.

Because as you may have realized, NRC, I'm sure, is getting a lot of assistance from INPO and others.

Jim, anything to add?

DR. O'BRIEN: Just this, and I know everybody knows this already that, you know, the United States as well as other international communities are working together to help the Japanese in their recovery. And we'll certainly continue to do that in any manner that we can.

And I know Secretary Chu is dedicated to do that and had put together and still has, I think, a group of five senior scientist leaders with the Department of Energy that have been working with him and the Japanese officials to see where we can help out.

MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you.

MEMBER BAILEY: Mark.

MEMBER AYERS: Thank you.

You know, I want to start out by saying, and I've said this more than one occasion, that although the DOE takes some hits once in a while from a lot of people, I want to say again that DOE is the best friend that construction workers have, that maintenance workers have, and operations and security workers have.

We have the confidence that when our workers go to work in the morning, they're going to return to their family in the same shape they went to work. And a lot of that is due to the good work of your offices. So, I want to thank you.

Back when we met in September, I asked for a review to determine how safe workers are in the US nuclear industry. And I suggested if workers are well protected, it is more likely that the public will be well protected as well.

Now, in light of the events in Japan, this has become pretty much a central

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issue. And it would appear that at least at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the emergency response workers have been placed at very significant risk.

I look forward to hearing more about that today. But in response to my request, the staff contracted with StoneTurn Consultants for a study of occupational safety and health throughout the fuel cycle, and to examine past history since Three Mile Island, the current state of safety and future risk.

They produced a pretty remarkable study in terms of its scope, and, I would say, depth, especially in light of the short time available to complete it.

The report is full of data, and I encourage all of you, all of my fellow commissioners to take a look at it, but they found that safety in the nuclear industry is very good.

Radiation safety in the nuclear industry has improved greatly since Three Mile

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Island.

The occupational safety and health risk in nuclear power plants are eighty to ninety percent lower compared to fossil plants and hydro plants even though nuclear plants run at a capacity of over ninety percent compared to 65 percent in fossil plants, and forty percent in hydro plants.

However, they also found that there have been numerous near disasters in nuclear plants over the years, and they characterize the risk underlying these events in very different ways than I have heard discussed here.

According to this report, the main risk in this industry - the main risk in this industry are inexperience with the operations of complex technologies or external risk, and, therefore, failure to effectively address operational failures that arise from such circumstances.

Also, overconfidence in

technologies and in probabilistic assessment - too often a good risk assessment is interpreted as something being fail-safe when it's not ___ complacency or negligence performing particularly terms of in operational monitoring and maintenance, intentional risk-taking to cut corners cost.

So, see, the risks as you can described here are not SO much about earthquakes or tsunamis or terrorism or the They are about the people who work in the industry and how well they operate it, which is why investigators took a look at the safety culture and how oversight is performed.

They provide many favorable findings, but they also find many areas where there is room for improvement, including stronger labor-management collaboration, which I know the Department is very supporting.

They make many other findings that in the interest of time that I won't go into

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now, but importantly they do not see
unmanageable risk in the back end of the once-
through nuclear fuel cycle.
Finally, they note that all the
sources of electricity generation pose very
high risk. They are just to judge this issue
according to the relative risk of each of
these sources and how well these risks are
managed.
Nuclear power may be high
technology, but its development and operation
are still very clearly human endeavors. And
the human factor has to be an important part
of our deliberations.
There are very many good thoughts
in this report that I hope that we will
consider very carefully. And it was a very
worthwhile report.
I don't know if you've seen it, but
I think you'll find it very interesting. It's

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So, again, I want to thank you and

posted on the BRC website.

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1	I want to make it clear that the report
2	clearly shows that the nuclear industry is the
3	safest industry in my industry, in which we
4	lose - four workers die every single day they
5	go to work in this country. Thank you.
6	MR. PODONSKY: May I comment on
7	Commissioner Ayers?
8	Worker health and safety is a
9	priority of the Department of Energy. It's
10	not just cheap talk.
11	When my office was created five
12	years ago, it was pulling all the worker
13	health and safety programs together, the
14	security programs, the environmental. And
15	what we've done for sustainability, is to make
16	sure that we also reached out, as you all
17	know, to all the national labor unions.
18	And it first started under the
19	Republican administration. It's continued
20	under the Democratic administration. And the

importance of that is communication

quarterly basis with all the major unions.

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So, we get feedback directly as the independent safety office, to find out what the issues are at the worker level, not to take away the lion's responsibility, to make sure that the workers feel a sense that people really are watching over what the contractors are doing. Because we agree, and Secretary Chu has in one of his major principles, is that our human resources are our most valuable asset. And we take that to heart.

We can't get our mission done if we don't have the people to do it and if they don't feel that they have the sense that the Department will take of them.

And while this is not part of this commission, one of the things that we are also responsible is taking care of the former worker program, those Cold War warriors who were responsible for the nuclear weapons program in the '40s and '50s. And we make sure that they get their medical screenings. We make sure that they get their benefits the

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1	best as they can with the Labor Department.
2	And the reason I mention that is
3	because it's the whole picture that you have
4	to understand.
5	And if the workers are going to
6	feel safe in not only the nuclear, but also
7	just the industrial safety side of the house,
8	they have to feel that they have safety
9	culture that management believes in and
10	follows.
11	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you,
12	Commissioner Ayers.
13	Commissioner MacFarlane.
14	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Thank you
15	Commissioner Bailey.
16	Okay. A couple technical
17	questions. So, the two Hazard Category 1
18	locations that you've identified, the Advanced
19	Test Reactor and the High-Flux Isotope
20	Reactor, only one of them has a spent fuel
21	pool; is that correct?
22	DR. O'BRIEN: No, they both have

1	them.
2	MEMBER MacFARLANE: They both have
3	spent fuel pools, and are the - is the spent
4	fuel in the pools in a dense-packed
5	arrangement?
6	DR. O'BRIEN: I don't know the
7	answer to that question.
8	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Okay.
9	DR. O'BRIEN: They're totally
LO	different type of fuel. So, I don't - we
11	don't - as far as I am aware, we don't
L2	differentiate between the dense-packed and
L3	normally packed because we don't have that
L 4	issue that we are dealing with.
L 5	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Okay.
L 6	DR. O'BRIEN: Like I said, it's a
L7	total different type of fuel. A lot smaller.
L 8	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Right. Right.
L 9	Yes, okay. It's metal fuel.
20	DR. O'BRIEN: That is aluminum.
21	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes, okay.
22	DR. O'BRIEN: Aluminum clad.

1	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Right, aluminum
2	clad.
3	MR. PODONSKY: Since we didn't
4	answer the question, does that mean I need to
5	phone another friend?
6	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Well, I'm just
7	curious as to the situation in those pools now
8	that you brought them up.
9	MEMBER MONIZ: We can get you a
10	follow-up answer.
11	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes, a follow-up
12	answer would be - you don't have to find out
13	right away, but, you know, it would be
14	interesting to know and put it on the record.
15	And then the other question I have
16	is that, okay, so, you've got these three
17	categories of hazard facilities.
18	The thought that occurs to me is,
19	well, you have a couple of facilities sitting
20	on a riverside in Hanford in particular where
21	you have these very large containers of liquid
22	high-level waste.

1	And were either facility to
2	experience perhaps a large seismic event where
3	those containers were severely disrupted, you
4	would lose all of that material. And it would
5	get into the groundwater which would go
6	offsite, but those facilities are not listed
7	as Category 1. Why?
8	DR. O'BRIEN: The main pathway of
9	concern that we have is the airborne, which
10	would cause the more immediate impact to the
11	public and require the emergency - quick or
12	emergency response.
13	So, that is the reason that these
14	are at that different category of level as far
15	as -
16	MEMBER MacFARLANE: So, water-borne
17	transport is not as much of a concern.
18	DR. O'BRIEN: It is a concern. And
19	the tanks are, you know, larger sites in areas
20	where the release is not expected from those
21	design basis events to get there.
22	And we are looking at the beyond

1	design basis events to see exactly what is our
2	vulnerabilities and what we need to do to
3	reduce those vulnerabilities.
4	MEMBER MacFARLANE: And will that be
5	part of the studies that you're doing now in
6	response to the Fukushima accident?
7	DR. O'BRIEN: Yes, it will be.
8	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you,
9	Commissioner MacFarlane.
10	Commissioner Moniz.
11	MEMBER MONIZ: I have a number of
12	questions. Maybe I'll have to divide it up
13	into sessions, but one is to follow on
14	Allison's comment just now.
15	I am a little bit surprised about
16	the Category 1 not including the waste tanks.
17	And I mean for airborne release.
18	First of all, I remember when we
19	were working together, the charms of dealing
20	with hydrogen burping of tanks. I do invoke
21	actual data arguably the biggest offsite
22	release in Russia may have been Mayak, a waste

1	tank. There's the issues of a bomb in a waste
2	tank.
3	So, I just - I really don't
4	understand how this is not a Category 1. And
5	if you have any comment on that, great.
6	And similarly I would - now, it
7	depends upon whether it's obviously DOE or
8	NRC, etcetera. But fundamentally in this
9	context, I'd be curious about your reaction to
10	the possibility that a large aqueous
11	reprocessing plant would not be in that same
12	category.
13	Any comments on that, then I'll
14	come back to a second question.
15	MR. PODONSKY: Well, in both areas,
16	Commissioner Moniz, I think clearly they are
17	good questions. And I'm hoping that our
18	review will ask ourselves why are we doing and
19	not categorizing the tanks, because we do know
20	how volatile those have been over many, many
21	years.

And one of the things that I've

challenged our Nuclear Safety Group, is to literally think out of the box.

We've gotten - when I said in my opening statement that we are far different than the commercial reactor world, that doesn't mean that we don't have safety issues that we need to really consider and reevaluate.

I'm looking for the out-of-the-box thinking at the workshop, and I'm also looking at this newly-created council that the Admiral set up to talk about these issues because clearly the line functions are the ones who help determine.

But as a safety organization, we need to also challenge the line functions. So, my answer is those are good questions and I don't have a cogent answer as to why. And I don't think - I don't know whether Jim does or not.

DR. O'BRIEN: I can just add one thing.

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1	The requirements that are related
2	to both Haz Category 1 and 2 are, in essence,
3	the same as far as your analysis and the
4	control sets that you derive from them.
5	So, the protection provided for the
6	facilities whether they're designated Haz
7	Category 1 or Haz Category 2 are, in essence,
8	the same.
9	MEMBER MONIZ: The messaging is very
10	different, however.
11	DR. O'BRIEN: That is correct.
12	MEMBER MONIZ: And I don't believe -
13	well, I would suggest you look at it.
14	MR. PODONSKY: We fully understand
15	and agree.
16	MEMBER MONIZ: Fine. May I ask a
17	second question, Madam Chair?
18	And here, Glenn, for purposes of
19	your self-protection, I'd invite an answer of
20	yes, no or no comment.
21	(Laughter.)
22	MEMBER MONIZ: You mentioned DNFSB

1	and I put that in a broader context for our
2	concerns here. I mean, congress seems to have
3	a particular affection for DOE in wanting to
4	be very helpful with special oversight bodies
5	on top of the generic ones like GAO. So, it's
6	DNFSB, it's TRB, etcetera.
7	Do you find this helpful to have
8	these additional layers?
9	(Laughter.)
10	MR. PODONSKY: We -
11	MEMBER MONIZ: Yes, no, or no
12	comment?
13	(Laughter.)
14	MR. PODONSKY: When Chairman Dingell
15	asked me to give him just a yes or no, I had
16	to say in a hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I say,
17	Mr. Commissioner, I have to give you a little
18	broader answer because the yes or no will get
19	me into trouble.
20	And the truth of the matter is as a
21	career civil servant for over 36 years, I have
22	learned that it's not wise not to take help if

it's offered in the spirit of truly helping. 1 2 And the Defense Board, I will tell 3 you, over the last 23 years that I've been 4 working with them, actually does help the Department, and has done 5 so in the past. 6 Congressional hearings actually help at times This commission is helping 7 as well. Department take a look. 8 So, I think it's a resounding yes, 9 10 but it has to go as qualified. MEMBER MONIZ: And finally the 11 thank for that informative 12 you 13 illuminating answer. (Laughter.) 14 MEMBER MONIZ: My understanding is 15 16 that the Secretary kind of assembled for Fukushima, an inside/outside kind of technical 17 SWAT team similar to the Gulf of Mexico thing. 18 19 I'd just be curious if 20 could say a little bit more about that and what its implications are for addressing then 21 22 safety issues.

1	MR. PODONSKY: He has formed a loose
2	group of folks from the National Laboratories,
3	from DOE headquarters, Bob Budnitz from
4	Berkeley, Steve Aoki and others you may recall
5	from your previous incarnation and external as
6	well.
7	And as you might expect from
8	Secretary Chu being the inquisitive nuclear
9	scientist or scientist that he is, he wants
10	people to just think out of the box.
11	And he's invited our nuclear safety
12	community to also work with them so that we
13	can see what they're developing and see what
14	might be applicable to the Department of
15	Energy.
16	So, it truly is, as he would say,
17	almost like a Bell Labs gathering of different
18	expertise to think about what are we not
19	thinking about.
20	For example, the infusion of -
21	MEMBER MONIZ: Specific outputs.
22	Specific results of -

1	MR. PODONSKY: As of right now, I do
2	not know if there are going to be any specific
3	outputs, but I do know that they are advising
4	our Nuclear Safety Council. We've been
5	invited to participate.
6	I started to give you a pseudo
7	example that I actually got from Secretary Chu
8	himself early on, and that was the infusion of
9	saltwater.
10	That went in not as a criticism,
11	but an observation. What was going to happen
12	to the mechanisms afterwards? Was everything
13	going to work? Was there going to be
14	corrosion? You know, who's thinking about
15	that?
16	So, like he did with the Deepwater
17	Horizon event, he brought in folks to advise
18	and think not in the moment, but think longer
19	term.
20	And so, that's what he's doing
21	here, which is - and they are advising, I
22	believe, both the NRC and the Japanese.

I	
1	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you,
2	Commissioner Moniz. And thank you, Glenn, for
3	that very artful answer to that question.
4	Commissioner Eisenhower, you have
5	the last line of questioning.
6	MEMBER EISENHOWER: Thank you very
7	much for this very informative presentation.
8	You indicated, of course, that the
9	Department is instructed by the Secretary to
LO	undergo a self-critical review. And you have
11	rightly emphasized the importance of human
L2	resources at the Department of Energy
L3	especially around these critical issues.
L 4	I was wondering if you could tell
L 5	us a little bit about the training process.
L 6	We've heard a lot about the analysis of safety
L7	events, but what kind of training are you
L 8	putting people through at this particular
L 9	stage, and will your training activities vary
20	at all based on the events in Japan?
21	MR. PODONSKY: Specifically, when we
22	hire the people that we hire for the

Department, we hire them for their already training and experience that they have in both the private sector, as well as other operations coming from the NRC.

What we started, and you may have heard me say that we're standing up a new training process, and we're just - just yesterday the individual that accepted the job was in agreement.

So, we're just in the middle of starting that up and identifying what needs to be done.

Where the Department is deficient, and has been for a number of years, is having — instead of counting option, and Commissioner Ayers knows this, is that we have a lot of training programs out at the sites for the workers, for subcontractors, but they're not all under one umbrella to make sure that they're standardized.

So, one of the things that we're doing is making sure that we have standardized

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training, that we make sure that we understand where we're deficient.

We know the capabilities that we currently have on board with our technical and nuclear safety experts, but what we're trying to do is make sure that we continue them being at the cutting edge.

We hope that what we gain in knowledge from the Japanese experience, will advise that effort as we build this.

And remember, as I said, again, not being bureaucratic, but this is the first time that this agency has ever had an attempt to co-exist all the training efforts in one location more like a training czar. And it's my position that this entity should not report to me, but should report to the head of human capital.

I'm not about mergers and acquisitions. So, it's not about the typical build up your own organization. This is something that we want to do corporately.

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1	I realize this is a rather
2	expansive answer, but we're right at the early
3	stages of what more do we need to do that we
4	haven't already done.
5	MEMBER BAILEY: All right. I saw
6	Commissioner Moniz' hand go up.
7	MEMBER MONIZ: Thank you for your
8	kindness, Madam Chair.
9	I have one more question. And it
10	goes a little bit outside of your remit,
11	clearly, but it does have safety implications.
12	And this also may be a case, however, where a
13	response from the Department later on might be
14	merited, and it involves the question of
15	commingling defense and civilian waste.
16	It strikes me at this stage, as
17	there being at least two reasons to reverse
18	the mingling decision.
19	One is that I think by the
20	Department's own statements, we're probably a
21	minimum of twenty years away from a civilian
22	repository.

Since that decision was made, there have been agreements with states which would provide another 1998 moment when there is no way to agreement and SO meet an defense waste out and perhaps, therefore, developing a separate repository which would have safety implications would seem to make sense.

Secondly, in terms of reaching a civilian repository, there is an argument that, okay, we did WIPP. Our next easiest, meaningful step would in fact be a high-level waste defense repository older and colder, smaller amounts.

No argument about whether it's an energy resource or a waste. It's a waste, etcetera. And that could provide valuable experience in a timely way than for subsequent civilian repositories.

Any position or comment on that?

MR. PODONSKY: I'm going to go back
to your earlier question and say, yes, I would

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1	like to take that back to the Department and
2	come back to the Commission with an answer
3	because that will involve multiple program
4	offices.
5	And while I have an opinion, I
6	think the Department needs to give you a more
7	cogent answer as to what it's currently doing
8	between EM, Science and NMSA.
9	MEMBER MONIZ: And following the
10	Chairman's impatience, will that be an answer
11	soon?
12	MR. PODONSKY: Yes.
13	(Laughter.)
14	MEMBER BAILEY: All right. Thank
15	you, Commissioner Moniz.
16	Mr. Podonsky, and your friend, Dr.
17	Jim O'Brien, thank you very, very much.
18	MR. PODONSKY: Thank you.
19	MEMBER BAILEY: We will be taking a
20	ten-minute recess coming back at 11:15.
21	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
22	matter went off the record at 11:02 a.m. and

1	resumed at 11:15 a.m.)
2	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: May I ask the
3	commissioners to return to their seats,
4	please?
5	MR. FRAZIER: Yes, if we could get
6	everybody to take a seat, we will get started.
7	Commissioners, please be seated. The rest of
8	you sit down. Thank you, Sue. Jack and Betty
9	in the back, sit down. Okay.
10	Congressman Hamilton, sir.
11	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Thank you
12	very much, Tim.
13	We've heard a lot about the
14	accident at Fukushima and what steps are being
15	taken by our government to try to learn from
16	that. We've appreciated the testimony that we
17	have had.
18	General Scowcroft and I would like
19	to assign to the Transportation and Storage
20	Subcommittee to take the lead for the
21	Commission in following the situation in
22	Japan, and making recommendations later this

year regarding those matters that fall within 1 2 the scope of the Commissions review. 3 I presume, Dick and Phil, you're prepared to take that responsibility. 4 5 you very much. 6 (Laughter.) 7 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Your eagerness impresses the Chairman a great deal. 8 (Laughter.) 9 10 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: In just a moment we will turn to the presentations by the co-11 chairmen of these subcommittees who will brief 12 13 us on the recommendations that are emerging thus far from their work. 14 And we'll ask the co-chairmen of 15 16 these three committees over the period of the next few hours to speak from their seats so we 17 can promote the discussion. 18 19 Before do that, Ι want we 20 express my thanks and the thanks of General Scowcroft for the staff report on what we've 21 22 heard.

The staff prepared and issued that report at the direction of the Commission so that we could be confident that we understood the major concerns of our different stakeholders and the public before we issued our draft report to the Secretary of Energy at the end of July.

We've had a lot of feedback to that report. We're deeply appreciative of those who have responded. We found their comments helpful and useful to us, and I think they will strengthen the work of the Commission.

Now, as we move into the subcommittee reports, I want to say that the subcommittee co-chairs and the members of the subcommittees have really done remarkable work thus far investigating the challenging issues that each of them confronted.

The co-chairs of the three committees have done outstanding work in bringing the subcommittees together. And the subcommittees appear to be working together

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1	very nicely. That's a testament to the
2	leadership of the subcommittee co-chairs.
3	I believe we are moving towards an
4	agreement of a meaningful set of
5	recommendations for the full commission to
6	consider in a few weeks. So, I express my
7	thanks to the subcommittee chairmen and the
8	members of the committees.
9	We've asked the subcommittee co-
10	chairs to brief us today on the
11	recommendations that their subcommittees will
12	offer for consideration by the full
13	commission.
14	Following today's discussion, we'll
15	ask that the subcommittees adjust their
16	recommendations as they see fit, and prepare
17	their draft subcommittee reports for release
18	by the end of this month.
19	Today's presentations and the draft
20	reports of the subcommittees will be posted on
21	our website for public review and comment.

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1	reports and the comments we receive as the
2	basis for the draft report of the full
3	commission, which is due to the Secretary of
4	Energy at the end of July.
5	I want to remind everyone that the
6	recommendations emerging from the
7	subcommittees may or may not be adopted by the
8	full commission.
9	In any event, the work of the
10	subcommittees will help inform, but not
11	substitute, for the report of the full
12	commission.
13	After today's discussion, we will
14	integrate the work of the subcommittees and
15	the views expressed here today into a coherent
16	and actionable draft report for public release
17	at the end of July.
18	We will announce our plans and
19	schedule for receiving comment on the draft
20	report of the full commission shortly after we
21	release the report.

Depending on the

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1	receive, we may decide to hold meetings of the
2	full commission or of subcommittees to further
3	investigate a particular issue.
4	We will ask our subcommittees to
5	finalize their reports later this year, and we
6	will issue our final report by January 2012,
7	the deadline established by the Secretary.
8	The public can chart these and
9	other developments through our website which
10	has recently undergone a series of
11	improvements intended to better communicate to
12	all who are interested. The site may be found
13	at www.brc.gov.
14	With that, we'll ask Commissioners
	With that, we'll ask Commissioners Meserve and Sharp to review the
14	
14 15	Meserve and Sharp to review the
14 15 16	Meserve and Sharp to review the recommendations that are emerging from the
14 15 16 17	Meserve and Sharp to review the recommendations that are emerging from the work of the Transportation and Storage
14 15 16 17	Meserve and Sharp to review the recommendations that are emerging from the work of the Transportation and Storage Subcommittee.
14 15 16 17 18	Meserve and Sharp to review the recommendations that are emerging from the work of the Transportation and Storage Subcommittee. Richard, you're going to begin?

1	I were the co-chairs of this effort. And
2	we're going to be - we plan to share the stage
3	here this morning.
4	I'll start us off, and then we'll
5	pass the baton to Phil. And of course I'll
6	allow him to answer all the questions.
7	(Laughter.)
8	MEMBER MESERVE: My intention this
9	morning is to basically explain how we've gone
10	through our work. And let me emphasize at the
11	outset, that these are the draft
12	recommendations.
13	We anticipate that they will be
14	illuminated by consideration among the full
15	commission and by the public comments we hear
16	today.
17	So, our function here today is to
18	solicit comment in what clearly should be seen
19	as drafts, and ones that could be evolved as
20	we go forward.
21	This is just a quick reminder of

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subcommittee. This has been a hard-working group that we very much appreciate all of the input that they provided to us.

And I think that after Phil and I are finished, we invite the other members of the subcommittee to augment our comments as they deem appropriate.

The central question that we have tried to address is whether the United States should change its approach to storing and transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste while one or more permanent disposal facilities are established.

In a certain sense, we've been doing this basically accidentally or maybe without conscious decision, for over fifty years.

There have not been places to move the material, and we've been doing both storage and transportation over this time.

And I guess the question that we've been addressing is whether this sort of accidental

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strategy is one that ought to be augmented and enhanced in particular with regard to the possibility of interim consolidated storage.

In order to complete our work, we have had a variety of meetings. We went to Wiscasset, Maine. You may wonder - some of the audience may wonder why, but it is the location of the former Maine Yankee power plant where the complete reactor has been decommissioned. And all that's left there is a facility for the dry cask storage of the fuel.

We had two meetings here in Washington at which we heard extensive testimony as we had, as well, in Wiscasset.

We had a meeting in Chicago. Chicago was a very logical location for us to discuss and focus on transportation because it is a transportation hub. And we had a deliberative session in January.

We did have the benefit of other meetings. Obviously the various Commission

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1	meetings were not ones where storage and
2	transportation escape notice.
3	And we had the benefit of a
4	classified briefing for those members of the
5	Committee that have had clearances to deal in
6	particular with the security issues that are
7	associated with transportation and storage.
8	So, our input has included
9	information from dozens of witnesses, a lot of
10	comments that have been submitted. There are
11	Commission papers that have come to the group.
12	And let me say for the benefit of
13	the audience if you're not aware of it, and as
14	the Chairman indicated, there is a website
15	that has all of this material that is on it.
16	So, all of the input that we have
17	received other than the classified input, is
18	available for public review.
19	I'm going to spend a fair amount of
20	time on our draft recommendation which really
21	I think is the central recommendation that
22	comes out of our group, which is that the

United States should proceed expeditiously to establish one or more consolidated interim storage facilities as part of an integrated, comprehensive plan for managing the back end of the fuel cycle.

There are a variety of reasons I think that support this draft recommendation. First, creating this kind of a storage capability preserves options. It enhances the flexibility to be able to adapt to circumstances and to respond to other aspects of an integrated waste management system.

As we'll be discussing later today in connection with some of our other reports, there will be consideration of whether we ultimately should view the spent fuel as a waste or as a resource, whether we perhaps should recycle it.

While that is being determined, storage helps to preserve the option of going in either direction depending on what we learn.

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We have demonstrated that we can store this material safely and securely so that preserving that option doesn't present untoward risks.

And as it happens, storing the fuel makes the ultimate disposal decision somewhat easier in that the fuel is cooling. And so, it reduces the siting challenge for disposal facility or provides the opportunity to increase the capacity of a given disposal site.

The second factor that I think that supports this recommendation is that consolidated storage allows the removal of fuel from decommissioned sites.

I mentioned that we had gone to Wiscasset and we heard testimony from the local citizenry there. In a certain sense, it felt that a breach of an understanding they had had when it was an operating reactor had been achieved.

There's nothing there but fuel.

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They've lost the tax benefits of jobs that came with the facility. It was not part of the bargain.

There are nine such sites for just decommissioned fuel sites in existence
today where similarly the benefits to the
communities have been substantially reduced.

Removal allow those communities to make beneficial use of that land. And as it happens, there are efficiencies that arise in moving the fuel to a consolidated interim site. And that after you stop being able to piggyback on the security capacity that exists at the nuclear power plant, then there are very large costs associated with just the security that now has to be carried by just the spent fuel facility.

So, there are some efficiencies that could be achieved by centralizing the material. And in fact it may well turn out - and we have some studies that are on our website to show this - that in fact you can

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save money by building a site at which material could be consolidated because of the reduced aggregate cost for chiefly security.

The third factor that supports this recommendation is that consolidated storage would enable DOE to start to meet its obligation with regard to spent fuel.

The standard contract that DOE has with all of the generating companies, has a term in it that required the DOE to start removing fuel in 1998. This was actually a provision that was inserted in that contract as a requirement from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

The liability for that as estimated by the Justice Department because they've not been fulfilling the contracts -- so there's been an impartial breach of the contracts and DOE has been forced to pay damages as a result.

The liability for that is estimated to be about \$13 billion by 2020. And it has

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been estimated that that will increase for - by 500 million per year if -- for every year of delay thereafter in having someplace to move this material.

So, there are - there is an issue here of just the cost issue associated with that, but there's also an issue here about the failure of the government to fulfill its contract and the breach of trust with the public that has resulted from that.

Fourth, let me say that this particular recommendation may offer some benefits as we learn more from Fukushima.

Obviously, as you heard this morning, we're examining issues associated with spent fuel disposition after the Fukushima event. There's a lot of evaluation that's been going on.

As I understand the NRC position, is that they are confident that things are safe as they are now, but perhaps they could be improved, and that there is a need to

1	consider whether some possible requirements
2	might come out of that.
3	Among them might be moving
4	materials of course from the spent fuel pools
5	into cask storage, which could be onsite or
6	offsite.
7	But beyond that, a consolidated
8	storage facility enables you to move material
9	away from the reactor site into areas that
10	might be less vulnerable to extreme events.
11	Reactors need a heat sink. And,
12	therefore, are near oceans or lakes or rivers,
13	for example, and that is not necessary for dry
14	cask storage.
15	So, there are conceivably out of
16	Fukushima, there could be some benefits from
17	the pursuit of this recommendation.
18	Fifth, we think that a storage
19	facility could be a very helpful adjunct in
20	connection with a disposal facility.
21	And let me emphasize something I
22	should have said at the outset is that we're

making this recommendation not with any idea that there shouldn't be a full pedal-to-themetal effort to site a disposal facility. That this is something that should be done anyway, and it's in conjunction with this that we think there are opportunities to be able to have a disposal facility - excuse me - a storage facility.

Among the things that you could do if you had a storage facility is you'd have basically some buffer capacity to be able to move spent fuel from sites on a very predictable schedule without having to stuff it someplace into a repository immediately. Have the capacity, perhaps, enhance the smooth functioning of the disposal facility by having an intermediary facility that could take the material and hold it for the period that is necessary.

And of course if there were delay in the installation of a disposal facility, a storage facility would serve the benefits that

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I had mentioned earlier.

And sixth, and the final support for this recommendation, is that I think there are some technical opportunities that arise from it.

There's an enhanced capability for long-term monitoring and testing that could arise that may be necessary.

The consolidated facility unlike some of the decommissioned sites, could have a pool so in the event that one needed to open a canister to evaluate the material.

There's lots of - there'd be some advantages for the monitoring and research associated with spent fuel that could sensibly be done in a facility that had not only just storage, but the associated research facilities that are associated with understanding the phenomena effect behavior of spent fuel over a period of extended storage.

So, this is really our principal recommendation that comes out of this report.

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And we don't seem to be able to get to our further recommendation.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER MESERVE: You've heard enough already, I gather. Oh, there we go.

The subcommittee has concluded there do not appear to be unmanageable safety or security risks associated with the current methods of storage at existing sites, but rigorous efforts will be needed to ensure this continues to be the case.

Lots of information on this issue was submitted to the Committee initially before Fukushima. A lot of information was submitted on hardened storage. More recently in Fukushima, there have been concerns about issues associated with storage. And particularly with spent fuel pools.

And these need to be taken seriously. They need to be evaluated carefully. And as I understood this morning, Phil is going to take care of that over the

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next several months on behalf of this committee.

But in any event, this - there is although we're not aware at the moment of any
unmanageable safety and security risks
associated with storage, they could well arise
and a very careful evaluation of them is
necessary.

And let me say that over the longer term, and this bears on the last sentence, that there is research on degradation phenomena with spent fuel that really does need to be seriously examined.

The database on that is thin. We have information on the behavior of spent fuel. It has lower burn-up than is typical in reactors today and has been in storage for shorter periods of time than we now contemplate may well be necessary.

And so, it's not to say that this is anything that's going to move quickly or that now we anticipate will be a huge problem.

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But evaluating it is necessary, and taking action as necessary is going to be appropriate.

The third recommendation is that spent fuel currently being stored at the decommissioned sites should be first in line for transfer to a consolidated interim storage facility as soon as such a facility is available.

Let me just mention there may be safety reasons to get material out of spent fuel pools. Safety should be the highest priority. That can be done in dry cask storage that's on a site, or it could be done at a consolidated site.

But we say for moving materials from existing reactor sites to the consolidated site, it should go - the material that should move first is the materials at these decommissioned reactor sites.

These are the sites that as I mentioned earlier, have been waiting for this

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1	material to be moved. They have land that
2	could be put to better use.
3	It's expensive to store this
4	material at the decommissioned sites because
5	we can't piggyback on the security that exists
6	at an operating reactor.
7	And there's even potential for
8	reduced cost by getting these as a result of
9	moving this material to a centralized
10	facility.
11	So, there's lots of reasons why we
12	think that the decommissioned reactor sites
13	should be first in line for the movement of
14	the fuel so that those sites can be brought to
15	greenfield status at an early-as-possible
16	moment.
17	So, let me pass the baton to Phil
18	and give him an opportunity to adjust,
19	correct, or modify any of my comments.
20	MEMBER SHARP: I certainly have no
21	modification. And as anyone who knows us
22	individually, knows the superior experience

and brain power rests with my colleague. So, I would never want to get into a debate with him.

just quickly However, I might reinforce something. First of all, I don't think there's any doubt among the subcommittee members that this is a very important central recommendation nobody and misunderstand the intensity with which approach this as an important step taken.

I would simply add to what Dick has said, that this is already envisioned under current law of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

This proposal of consolidated interim storage is not at all new. It has been studied extensively for decades in this country, and multiple organizations and commissions have recommended that this should be a part of an integrated strategy for the United States.

So, this is not something that was

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suddenly coming up with in this commission as such. And it has gone under different names.

And so, that leads to confusion sometimes in the debate about this.

Let me turn quickly to the last three or four recommendations that we have. This recommendation gets at the point of having a new organization manage our strategy and the implementation of the strategy for nuclear waste disposal.

Now, let me quickly say that our subcommittee did not do the work on this, and indeed you're going to hear about it - so, I'm going to say very little about it -- from the Disposal Subcommittee which had - that did extensive work on this. And Jonathan Lash, and I don't know if the senator is going to be here or not, will be raising that at one o'clock.

So, I'm going to have very little to say about it here, other than to say we anticipate that it should have -- the new

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entity to manage the integrated strategy, should have responsibility for storage and transportation, as well as for the permanent disposal site kind of proposition.

However, a work in progress still in our subcommittee is what do we do between now and the time that we hope to get in place such a new entity. And I think a number of us strongly feel we should not wait.

It could take three to five years depending on the speed with which an administration and a congress decide to act on the proposals or are able to get agreement on proposals. And it will probably take at least a year to stand up any new organization once it is put into law.

So, given the incredible work and study that has gone on in this, numbers of inquiries from communities around the country for different reasons on nuclear facilities, there is no reason to say "wait until this is in place."

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And we're trying to work out how to more specifically identify that, but certainly the Department of Energy under current law and under current facilities, can engage putting together all kinds - bringing together all kinds of important information and advancing the capacity for the siting of such one or more facilities.

Secondly, we want to be aware that indeed we want to do nothing to inhibit any communities around the country. And when the Department of Energy went out looking for volunteer sites for another purpose over the last three years, they actually found a number of communities that stepped forward.

And so, we would not want to do anything to inhibit communities that thought they might have an interest in this facility from being able to step forward and begin.

But, again, let me suggest to you this is a work in progress as to how we might specifically go about this.

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Let me turn to - I think to the fifth - did I push the right -

(Off-record comments.)

MEMBER SHARP: Here, we turn to the - simply an expression of again making use of the incredible work done by the Disposal Subcommittee. So, I'm not going to go through it because you are going to get that yet this afternoon.

But essentially what we're saying is that the siting principles and the process used for siting a consolidated interim facility probably should be designed very much like what you would use for the ultimate disposal site.

However, we want to be very clear we do not see these as similar facilities. They have quite different requirements, and they have quite different technical requirements that you might have in place. And so, it is not a matter of having uniform requirements.

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When you're going for thousands of years of disposal, that is quite different than when you're looking at a century or more proposition as what we call here as interim, means interim. This will not become the permanent disposal site for nuclear waste.

Nobody believes that any design that has been discussed is adequate to that task. And so, that is quite - to be kept quite separate.

The sixth recommendation has to do with our transportation recommendation. And here, in a sense, what we have done is made a major finding that we have in place and we have experience that would suggest that we have a very good record of how to go about transporting spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear materials.

And, indeed, the record is very extensive. Again, this has been studied and we have a lot of experience going all the way back to 1957 where we had over 800 shipments

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by the nuclear Navy of spent nuclear fuel.

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We've had thousands of shipments in the last decade of transuranic waste into the WIPP facility in New Mexico.

And we've had thousands and thousands of other kinds of transportation go on over many decades here and abroad, and the safety record is exceptional.

However, recognizing that record is not sufficient for where we need to get. And, indeed, it's very important.

I would simply say here and what's will important, in the report be the extensiveness with which we try to cover this, is that we have learned from this experience a lot of important principles, including need for extensive planning, including need for considerable regulatory oversight by actually multiple state and federal regulatory entities.

Where we have training in place not only for the drivers of the trucks, but for

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local responders through which - the communities for which this may go.

We have in place monitoring systems in transit. And we have multiple ways of testing not only the casks that are going to store, but other parts of this.

And so, this leads to the recommendation that as you begin to site an interim storage facility, once it's in place, it will actually step up the volume of what is in transit we assume of nuclear spent fuel.

And that planning should start very early because it's going to take time; one, because of the extensive coordination that is because needed, but; two, of the communications and the education the and interaction only not with government officials, but with communities.

Because we recognize this is one of the most politically sensitive issues for in many parts of the country where people understandably do not have experience with

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1 nuclear waste, the casks or any of 2 oversight activities that we have in place. 3 so, they naturally raise And 4 questions, and they should be raising 5 questions. And so, one must allow that time. 6 And so, we strongly recommend that 7 you start this planning process early on and includes things like providing financial 8 folks assistance the local whose 9 to 10 cooperation and training to make this safe is needed. 11 Let me turn to Seven. And this 12 13 goes to the question of financing the interim facility. 14 15 Here again we're relying for heavy-16 duty work on the Disposal Subcommittee, which looked at this broader issue of 17 has financing mechanisms that we have in place. 18 19 Our central point here is simply 20 that - the Nuclear Waste Fund should the interim storage facility. 21 cover 22 indeed it's important to recognize this is

already anticipated in the current law.

So, this is not a brand new concept. It is a matter of making use of a facility you have.

I'd like to take this moment just to articulate two major fundamentals of American nuclear waste policy that we are simply assuming go forward throughout this commission.

The first is that the users and the beneficiaries of nuclear power, they are paying now, paying as we go for the cleanup costs that we anticipate, the storage and, by the way, the cleanup at the nuclear reactor site.

The reactor as not a part of our discussion, have to have these decommissioning funds to set aside. But to pay for the nuclear waste disposal, we have in place the Nuclear Waste Fee. And that of course has been building up in the US Treasury.

And, by the way, remains the legal

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obligation of the American government in my view, and I think most people's view, to be utilized solely for the purpose of covering these expenses.

In other words, we are not putting the financial burden of nuclear waste disposal on future generations. We are - we took that on as an obligation starting in the 1980s.

The second half of that policy was the federal government would be the entity responsible for the disposal of the nuclear waste. And of course we've had lots of delay in that and we're not meeting that obligation yet as was anticipated under the contracts and the law. And that is costing federal taxpayers money. And part of the reason for getting on with interim storage is to address that.

But, excuse me, I sort of went beyond Recommendation 7. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Off-record comments.)

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1	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Following
2	Dick's recommendation, let me ask first if
3	members of the subcommittee have a comment.
4	And I think Al does have - he's a
5	member of the subcommittee, yes.
6	MEMBER CARNESALE: I had a question
7	which I think will be illuminating.
8	We distinguished we have two
9	subcommittees. One recommended a consolidated
10	interim storage facility, and we also have one
11	on disposal.
12	I think most people have a
13	reasonable idea of what we mean by disposal.
14	We mean permanent, we mean forever, or at
15	least we mean no intention of ever moving it
16	again.
17	Interim, people have very different
18	ideas of what interim means. We sometimes
19	hear numbers like five years before it goes
20	off to reprocessing, or we hear a hundred
21	years depending upon when the disposal
22	facility is available.

162 I wonder if you could do anything 1 2 to elucidate what is meant by "interim" in 3 this context. MEMBER MESERVE: I'd be happy to. 4 well understand, the 5 you As original concept was 6 that the fuel would 7 remove from the reactors and relatively promptly would be removed and go elsewhere, 8 perhaps to reprocessing, and that obviously 9 10 has not happened. The - we're talking about storage. 11 12 We're talking about something more on the

order of a century than is conceivable than the five years.

The NRC has been examining this matter and has a so-called Waste Confidence Rule. Just that's the sort of order of magnitude.

Of course, there are other options that may arise. It may move sooner, but we ought to contemplate that there might be some of the fuel that would be stored for those

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sorts of durations.

MEMBER SHARP: I might add one of the theories here is Dick outlined the flexibility to the broad system that having it gets. The facility itself has a great deal of flexibility.

Our presumption is it may be you begin with one size which may be expanded and shrunk as you begin to shift this system.

It is likely to have the characteristic of being simply store in dry cask. It may also have a pool. It may also be a facility where if we discover twenty years from now, that in fact the dry casks are starting to deteriorate.

We do not expect that, but we could all then repackage if we had to. But "interim" does mean it's not permanent. And it means that - so, it may be a facility that reaches a peak and then shrinks back and then disappears, but one should not - a community should not assume it's thirty years.

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1	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Two questions
2	for you.
3	One of the phrases that jumped out
4	at me was "one or more" in your first
5	recommendation.
6	What is your thought about that?
7	Do we need to be thinking of two, three, four,
8	five of these things, or do you seriously
9	think only one is necessary, or have you given
10	that -
11	MEMBER SHARP: Physically for what
12	you have to do, one would certainly do the
13	trick in terms of volume.
14	But in terms of transportation and
15	where things are located, one could easily
16	argue it might be wiser to have several
17	regionally located.
18	But, frankly, I think the siting
19	difficulty will govern that as much as
20	anything.
21	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: The other
22	question I had related to these litigation

1	costs. I don't know an awful lot about this,
2	but it's very frustrating, I think, to the
3	American taxpayer to see that they have to
4	continually pay litigation costs here.
5	And I think you mentioned 500 - you
6	anticipate 500 million a year or something
7	like that.
8	MEMBER MESERVE: After 2020, yes.
9	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: After 2020.
10	What can we recommend, what can we do about
11	that to cut out these litigations costs?
12	MEMBER MESERVE: Well, it turns out
13	that these matters have been extensively
14	litigated already. That most of the legal
15	issues, I think, have been resolved.
16	Although, lawyers always can be clever to find
17	new issues, but the guidelines that should
18	govern these matters are largely resolved.
19	There is going to be a continuing
20	liability on the government and these until
21	it's able to rectify its breach, but there are

to do

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certainly ways

more

much

1	efficiently than we are than the traditional
2	scorched-earth sort of litigation in the
3	courts.
4	We do have this and it wasn't one
5	that has rose to the level of a
6	recommendation, but I would anticipate that we
7	would strongly urge the creation of either
8	settlements that would resolve these matters,
9	or failing that some kind of an arbitration
10	mechanism which would be a lot more efficient
11	and avoid the costs that have to be incurred
12	by both sides on resolving matters where the
13	legal issues are now extraordinarily narrow,
14	if not fully resolved.
15	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. I've got
16	three commissioners. Per, Ernie and Allison.
17	Per.
18	MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you, Mr.
19	Chairman.
20	I think one of the important points
21	that needs to be emphasized is that the

standard contracts between DOE and utilities

do create constraints. And you can't abrogate those constraints without being subject to potential penalties. In fact, that's why there's this large amount of money that's being transferred from taxpayers to rate payers right now to pay for onsite storage.

There are three important types of constraints that the contracts generate. The first is that the contracts do limit the purposes for which the Nuclear Waste Fund fees can be used. And this is important, for example, for reactor fuel cycle technology RD&D, it's quite clear that these monies cannot be used for that purpose.

And we need to work within the limitations of these legal agreements in terms of how these monies can be used and how they're restricted.

The next important element is that the contracts do require full cost recovery.

That is as long as the DOE and federal government perform, all costs associated with

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these activities are supposed to be recovered through prospective increases in collections.

And, therefore, utilities should be interested in this system working at least somewhat efficiently in comparison particularly to what the performance has been up to date.

The final part is that the courts have determined that in order to meet the obligations in the contract, spent fuel has to be delivered at a rate that the DOE thought they could achieve back in 1987. And it's a huge rate. It's 2700 metric tons per year.

So, my question for the subcommittee is, it may not actually make sense to try to achieve that rate. And, in fact, once you've moved fuel from shut down reactors, in many cases the more logical thing to do with the system could be to use onsite storage at operating reactors for perhaps a fairly large fraction as opposed to moving it to consolidated.

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But it would seem to me that utilities will be penalized. They still pay the same fee, yet then they have these costs to do the onsite.

How do we get around this problem that there's a perverse disincentive not to send your material to consolidated storage even once it's available?

MEMBER SHARP: Well, let me suggest,

I don't have the exact answer. We've had

discussions at other subcommittees about this,

and so - but I'm just going to give you a

partial possibility here.

And that is you have to remember that going forward if we can get a clear policy in place, there are going to be real opportunities to renegotiate these things. You just mentioned the possibility that DOE can raise to pay cover cost the fee.

Well, it might be that the utility finds it in its interest to renegotiate as opposed to another high-cost fee that goes on

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to some system that has ordered to pay them to keep it thin.

I'm not saying that's a good idea.

I'm just simply saying that do not think

contracts are forever and more permanent than

this nuclear waste is.

The fact is that that is subject to negotiation, but obviously the federal government, to abrogate the contract, would have to pay penalty to do it.

But it may find that that's worth doing, by the way.

MEMBER PETERSON: Very good answer.

MEMBER MESERVE: Let me supplement that with, just to come back to one of your points about the purposes that under the existing litigation because storage was not a part of the system, these various judgments that are being issued against the government for its failure to comply with the obligations of the standard contract, are being paid by the taxpayers. It's from the judgment fund.

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One of the implications of recommendation would be is if we actually start to fold storage mechanism in as part of the overall scheme that leads to the ultimate disposition on the material, then, and as Phil indicated, part of the statute actually contemplates when you use storage in that way, then these recoveries would be borne by the people who benefitted from the power. Namely, they get - the support would come from the fund and rather than from taxpayers.

So, there are some fairness issues that are associated with this. And we have had conversations as part of our subcommittee deliberations with the nuclear industry. And they have indicated that they very much favor getting these issues resolved.

And the fact that some of these costs would be transferred to the Waste Fund from the judgment fund would actually, from their point of view, be certainly a fair trade for having these issues resolved in a fashion

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1	that gets these issues associated with the
2	back end of the fuel cycle off the table.
3	MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you. And I
4	do think it's important just as a matter of
5	policy. And it is in the Nuclear Waste Policy
6	Act, that these costs are internalized into
7	the rates that electricity payers pay.
8	So, the waste costs are
9	internalized, which actually is in stark
10	contrast to fossil fuels where massive costs
11	are external to -
12	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Ernie, and then
13	Allison.
14	MEMBER MONIZ: Thank you, Mr.
15	Chairman.
16	First of all as a member of the
17	subcommittee, I want to say that I certainly
18	endorse the recommendations. I have a number
19	of comments both on them, and on some of the
20	discussion up to now.
21	One is on Phil's answer to the
22	question of a few versus one possible regional

consolidated storage site.

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I just want to emphasize at least in my view, it's not obvious which way it cuts in terms of public acceptance, the question of one versus several.

It's not, obviously, I think in favor of one because of equity issues, transportation issues, etcetera.

Secondly, I just wanted to reemphasize on the liability discussion that occurred, discussion with had Glenn we Podonsky that - to not forget there are now there's another date which is the date for the agreements on the defense sites to move waste. And we need to keep that in mind as another liability - looming liability issue as we once again find that we will be violating the laws of physics to meet the law.

Three, I think on the question of Al's question on interim, I think we should remember that when we say "century scale," we're talking about a planning horizon, and

not a commitment to keeping it for a hundred years. Because we may decide earlier that it's a waste and we have a place to put it. We may decide earlier it's an energy resource and do something with it, something that will be certainly more towards the century timescale.

Fourth, we've had a number of discussions here today, and many of the recommendations raised the issue of both what Per mentioned in terms of contracts, but also statutory changes.

And I think we need to be frankly in this subcommittee, but overall, much more explicit on statutory and contract change requirements. And perhaps go more into specifying what some of those statutory changes should be.

Fifth, I think on the transportation recommendation, we would do well to emphasize the European experience.

I mean, I think in the disposal we

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take advantage very much of experience elsewhere. And here, similarly, the simple fact that Europe has already moved fuel on the scale that we are talking about for 70,000 tons, I think, is an important point to keep always in the foreground.

We're not inventing a transportation system that hasn't been already invented elsewhere.

Sixth, on the question of the new organization, while having access to the Waste Fund is critical, I don't want us to lose sight of the fact that it needs a lot more authorities than just that to be successful.

example, this issue For ordering, of taking fuel. If it's stuck with the current arrangements, that doesn't help it its job. But also looking forward do especially in the context of potentially other fuel cycles, it's got to have a say in what kind of waste forms and what kinds of waste streams are created, and not just say here it

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is, take it, and figure out what to do with it.

And seventh, as the chairs go ahead on their own to incorporate the Fukushima lessons -

(Laughter.)

MEMBER MONIZ: -- I do think that there should be explicit consideration as to whether and how the Waste Fund is used for all or part of the additional costs in terms of storage that might be - that might ensue.

MEMBER SHARP: This co-chair, and I suspect I speak for my other one, have no intention to go ahead on our own without a conversation with you and the subcommittee and the full commission.

And secondly, as you know, I think you've rightly raised the question on the new organization. I didn't mean to brush over that too lightly except to say that really is - there's a whole package of authorities and responsibilities and whatnot that a lot of

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1	time has been spent on by the other
2	subcommittee.
3	So, I was simply incorporating it,
4	but I see what you're saying is there are some
5	related to storage and transportation.
6	MEMBER MONIZ: Well, and it
7	certainly goes very strongly to this issue of
8	what is - what does or does not require
9	statutory action.
10	MEMBER SHARP: Absolutely. Well,
11	that new organization unquestionably requires
12	_
13	MEMBER MONIZ: And as far as your -
14	as far as your future work plans, we'll be
15	right behind you.
16	(Laughter.)
17	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Allison.
18	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Thank you, Mr.
19	Chairman. Just a couple questions.
20	Let me just start where Ernie left
21	off and say, you know, considering the
22	discussion we had this morning with the NRC

about Fukushima and spent fuel pools, I just want to get on the record that you guys are going to consider the advantages of moving from the dense rack configuration that now exists in the US pools to an open-cage low-density design in the pools. And so that's one question.

And then the second question has to do with the size of these interim storage facilities. And I don't think you mentioned that, Dick, when you were talking about them, but I'm just trying to get an order of magnitude.

Are we talking 5,000 metric tons, or are we talking more like the PFS size of 40,000 metric tons? What are you guys envisioning?

MEMBER MESERVE: Let me say with regard to the - exactly where we go with the spent fuel pools, this is an issue that is being evaluated as we speak.

We don't know, in fact, what's

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happened in the spent fuel pools in Japan, as we heard this morning.

Initially it appeared that there was, you know, a complete drain-down event and presumably hydrogen reaction with that fuel that caused that Unit 4 to have an explosion.

Obviously if they didn't lose the water, the hydrogen didn't come from that unit. And so, what exactly has happened - so, what exactly happened with that event and what its implications for spent fuel pools is a more general matter. Something I think that we just need to watch.

Obviously if there are implications for us, we'll deal with them, but I don't - I would be hesitant in promising that we're going to have very clear answers on that over the next month or two because of the - we don't understand the accident sequence let alone the implications.

But certainly on the table for consideration that is very clearly something

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that people are talking about, is going to getting material out of the spent fuel pools into dry cask storage for safety reasons. And that's very much on the agenda that we should follow.

As to the size of the facility, I think that we envision that, as Phil indicated, that, you know, initially we have fuel that's at nine sites. It's a relatively small volume of fuel. That's the material we'd like to move early and we ought to have a storage facility that's capable of that.

MEMBER MacFARLANE: Just to clarify, that's the orphaned fuel. That's at the five decommissioned - I mean the nine decommissioned sites.

MEMBER MESERVE: They're not orphaned. It's not orphaned. There are owners. There are people watching them very carefully, but they are ready for adoption. Exactly right.

(Laughter.)

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MEMBER MESERVE: So that fuel - but then, you know, we start to get out to the sort of the end of the next decade. There's going to be a large number of plants that are decommissioned. And so, you ought to anticipate there's going to be substantial volumes of fuels that need to be moved at that time if we're going to allow them to get the fuel off the sites as they decommission the reactor.

So, I would envision an interim storage facility that starts out relatively modest in size, perhaps. But then over a period of a decade or two, we'll have to grow to be able to accommodate the accumulated inventory.

MEMBER MacFARLANE: Well, just one caveat on that that I think we should take into consideration is that, you know, it depends on the agreement I imagine that you have with the community and the state as to some communities and states may say, okay,

1	we're happy to have an interim storage
2	facility here. We're going to limit the size
3	of it though, and that's going to be bad. And
4	you're not going to grow.
5	So, I think we have to take those
6	kinds of potential outcomes into
7	consideration.
8	MEMBER MESERVE: We certainly do.
9	But let me say that I think that part of the
10	discussion with any community should be
11	completely transparent of what we know and
12	what we don't know and what optionality needs
13	to be preserved.
14	And that there's got to be much
15	clearer understandings and commitments on both
16	sides that each side lives with and fulfills.
17	And that's been one of the problems that is
18	in this area is that people have made promises
19	they have not kept.
20	MEMBER SHARP: If I could just join
21	a little bit in dampening expectations that my

colleague just did about what to expect us to

recommend out of Fukushima, I think there is a general, common way in which we're approaching many of these highly technical questions in which we are not making technical recommendations at the end of the day.

Some of you on the commission have expert and technical knowledge, but many of us do not. And it would be inappropriate for us to declare we know exactly how to manage certain technical things.

So, while we may talk about direction or we may talk about this is an imperative that the NRC should examine and come to a public conclusion about, it's not clear how far we will go in actually saying do X, we know exactly how to manage that pool and what the configuration ought to look like and at what time you ought to get the stuff out of there.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay, John, also a member of the subcommittee.

MEMBER ROWE: Just as a member, I

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certainly agree with the recommendations. And in spite of Chairman Sharp's humility, both he and Chairman Meserve have put a great deal of wisdom into this work.

I would simply like to add that painful though it is to conclude, you know, the recommendations of this subcommittee are inherently conjoined with the recommendations of the Disposal Committee in ways that simply cannot be separated.

As somebody who really does like clear, linear solutions, the emphasis we have here on an open consultative, consensual process isn't entirely a happiness to me, but I'm absolutely convinced it's essential.

And more than that, it will only work if it's combined with an equally persistent and effective process for getting an ultimate disposal site.

Because one of the things that makes finding an interim site so hard as every member of the subcommittee, certainly the co-

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chairs are keenly aware, is that people are afraid there will never be the other shoe dropping.

And the problem we have here is that citizens in various states, even relatively insensitive people like utility executives, are suffering the pangs of what they feel to be fifty years of betrayal.

And so, it is terribly important that we understand that this is a very important part of a constructive process, but it's a part that cannot stand alone.

Ιt ties Disposal the to Subcommittee's recommendations insofar as the new federal corporation or whatever it is, is concerned. It ties in that this part of the process only has credibility if there is a newly credible process for getting the ultimate disposal site.

And like all things in a democratic society which has its element of sausage making, it requires a process that is both

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1	honestly scientific and, to some extent,
2	commercially interactive with the potential
3	host sites.
4	People who may get these facilities
5	have to see benefits that they see as being
6	commensurate with the burdens. And that turns
7	out to be a negotiation, not an argument.
8	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay, John.
9	Thank you very much. Pointing out the
10	linkages between the subcommittees is an
11	important observation.
12	Chairman Scowcroft and I kind of
13	wrestled with that when we set up the
14	subcommittees and we recognized the overlaps,
15	if you will. And, therefore, the cooperation
16	among the several subcommittees, which has
17	indeed taken place, has been very
18	constructive.
19	Well, thank you, Dick and Phil.
20	Thanks to the members of the subcommittee for
21	an excellent report on the work. The

recommendations of course we will cover in the

1	afternoon sessions, the review of the draft
2	recommendations of the Disposal Subcommittee,
3	and then the Reactor and Fuel Cycle
4	Subcommittee.
5	We will stand adjourned until one
6	o'clock.
7	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
8	matter went off the record at 12:12 p.m. and
9	resumed at 1:04 p.m.)
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6	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
7	1:04 p.m.
8	MR. FRAZIER: Okay. We are now
9	getting dangerously close to getting started
10	again. 1:04.
11	I know that Dr. Meserve is on his
12	way back. There's Phil. Susan is also on her
13	way back.
14	Vicky, Commissioner Bailey, it's
15	entirely your call.
16	MEMBER BAILEY: All right.
17	Commissioner Lash will be the first presenter.
18	Most of your committee is here, I think -
19	subcommittee, all right.
20	We will now ask Commissioner Lash

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to present the recommendations of the Disposal Subcommittee. We understand that Commissioner

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1 Hagel had a longstanding commitment 2 west coast, and he regrets that he cannot join 3 us today. We'd like 4 to extend а special thanks to Commissioners Lash and Hagel because 5 6 their subcommittee volunteered to dig deeply 7 into several of the key cross-cutting issues facing the commission, including the facility 8 siting process, the roles of tribal, state and 9 10 local governments, the governance of the waste management program and funding considerations. 11 These are all very big issues, and 12 13 we thank you and your subcommittee for your work. 14 So, Jonathan, please proceed. 15 16 **MEMBER** LASH: Madam Chair, thank Hagel did 17 you. And Senator ask to communicate to all of the members 18 of the

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I think aside from Senator Hagel,

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commission that he really very badly wanted to

be part of this and strongly believes in this

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set of recommendations.

1	all of the members of our subcommittee are
2	present here. And I'm grateful to all of you
3	for your work.
4	I will aspire to achieve the level
5	of clarity that Commissioner Meserve and
6	Commissioner Sharp achieved in presenting
7	their recommendations.
8	I do want to offer a couple of
9	cautions before I get into the
10	recommendations.
11	This draft is a very good
12	reflection by the staff of a set of
13	discussions among the commissioners over a
14	period of eight months, but it isn't a
15	finished work.
16	First of all, it does not reflect
17	all of the comments of the members of the
18	subcommittee after the draft was prepared. We
19	simply haven't had time to incorporate all of
20	those comments, let alone the comments of
21	other members of the commission.

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Secondly, there

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some

still

ongoing work that we are having done to help us answer some of the questions about structures of the new entity that we recommend and so forth.

In a sense, that's good because it offers us both the opportunity to get your comments, and particularly to respond to public comments.

We know we have further work to do, and we want to do that in light of the comments we get from the commissioners and from the public.

We do recommend a set of changes that will require statutory action. And I'll try to be mindful of what several of you said that we ought to be clear where we're making those recommendations, because they will require both time and significant effort to achieve.

Okay. Here we go. The members of our committee - there we go. We had one fundamental question to answer since it was

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1	the Disposal Committee. How do we go about
2	establishing appropriate facilities for
3	disposal of high-level wastes, and how do we
4	do that within a time frame and in a manner
5	that is feasible economically and technically,
6	but also politically and socially acceptable?
7	We looked at that in terms of is
8	there any scenario under which a disposal
9	facility would not be needed? And what could
10	we understand about the processes that were
11	most likely to result in successful siting
12	after - John, how did you describe it - fifty
13	years of broken promises?
14	We have not mastered the
15	technology.
16	(Laughter.)
17	MEMBER LASH: What makes it
18	confusing is it works sometimes. I think when
19	Pavlov did those experiments, the most
20	effective training was when you kept the dogs
21	confused, right?

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(Laughter.)

MEMBER LASH: We had a number of open sessions. We heard from a long list of witnesses. We had а number of closed deliberative sessions. Some members of the subcommittee participated classified in а briefing.

We also made trips to facilities both in the United States and in I think we Europe and in Japan. particularly struck by what we saw in Finland and in Sweden. And members of the committee influenced by the also successful operation that they saw at WIPP in New Mexico.

each of the cases where In visited a facility, we went out of our way to not only with officials, but with meet representatives industry, of the and representatives of the communities and interested non-governmental organizations.

First recommendation is an unequivocal answer to the first part of the main question. We do need disposal.

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Under any set of circumstances that we can imagine, we will need disposal. There is no scenario under which the United States will not have substantial amounts of high-level waste to dispose of.

Even if we change our strategy with regard to the operation or expansion contraction of the industry, even changes technology and move toward we reprocessing, we will still need permanent disposal for substantial amounts of high-level waste.

And although we looked at a variety of alternative means of disposal, as of now a - talking about digging deeply, a geologic disposal, a mined repository, is the most promising, the best accepted. is Ιt option on which there's the most information. It is the option which is moving ahead in those countries that are moving most quickly establishment of long-term toward а repository.

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We also felt it important to make the point that there is an ethical obligation to disposal.

The United States has benefitted from both the creation of electricity from reactors that created some portion of the wastes, and also from the security that we got from the production of weapons that generated other portions of the waste.

It is our waste. It is largely in our generation that these wastes were created.

And we have an obligation, therefore, to provide for the safe disposal of the waste as best we can.

In this context, nothing that we have seen from Fukushima suggests any change in that sense of obligation. If anything, it makes it appear more urgent that we move ahead with the creation of a permanent mined repository.

So, before I leave this recommendation, I just want to be unequivocal

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here.

We endorse the recommendations of the Storage and Disposal Committee, but those recommendations as Commissioner Sharp said, do not in any way vitiate the need for long-term disposal.

Second, and another very important recommendation as mentioned by Commissioner Sharp earlier, we recommend the creation of a new single-purpose entity to take responsibility for the siting and operation of a waste facility, and the responsibility for the creation of interim storage and oversight of the transportation of wastes.

We reached that conclusion because we think that a single-purpose entity is most likely to be successful in achieving this mission.

It is a difficult position that we've put the Department of Energy in as a generator of waste responsible for technology research to promote the industry and think of

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the path forward, and trying to create a waste repository.

Other countries have taken a different path in relying on a single-purpose entity. We think that would be beneficial.

Secondly, we think that it is most likely that a new single-purpose entity can develop the culture that I'll describe in a moment of transparency, inclusion, engagement that we think is essential to build trust in order to have the best hope of successfully siting a facility.

And that such an agency can begin to develop the relationships that will be necessary to make and have communities rely on long-term commitments surrounding a repository that is designed to be safe for hundreds of thousands of years.

We think it is that the precise form of the entity is less important than the approach that it takes. Although we've done a good deal of work looking at examples that

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exist within the federal government now like the Valley Authority, Tennessee other independent federal corporations, we would emphasize that the most important aspects are not so much the structure as the attributes of the organization, including particularly a commitment to transparency, to full-scale ongoing participation by all affected interests, to responsiveness to the concerns of communities, state agencies, agencies, civil society organizations, accountability for its actions and ability to maintain and live up to commitments, to the underlying notion that building trust and confidence is important a part as of process as technical excellence.

Technical excellence is essential, but it won't accomplish the purpose without trust and confidence. And we think all of that can be built around an organization that has a strong mission orientation.

We have a number of recommendations

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about how the entity will go about its process. I'll come to those a little later.

We think it would be important for it to set up a widely representative siting council. Of course its relationship with state, local, regional and tribal government will be important. I'll get to that a little later.

There will be important questions about the role of congressional oversight with regard to this entity.

Obviously, Congress has the responsibility to assure that this program is operated in a way that protects the interests of the American people and their safety and to intervene if this entity begins to diverge from its statutory mandate and its mission.

At the same time, it has to be able to make very long commitments and live up to them. And so, constant political intervention is entirely inconsistent with that.

We are working on how you define a

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level of oversight that achieves that obligation of protecting the safety and interests of the American people without resulting in the kind of constant interference that makes it impossible for an agency to make hard decisions.

On this, I particularly wish that Senator Hagel were here, because he has very strong views and is quite cogent on this issue.

But without access to the funds, which I'll talk about in a moment, and without ability the to operate with general congressional approval and make long-term plans, none of this can work. The rest of it really becomes quite irrelevant.

The last relatively minor point about this entity, we view it as primarily an operating entity, not a research entity.

There would be some research issues on other forms of disposal that it ought to have responsibility for. But in terms of the

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1	rest of the back end of the fuel cycle, that
2	should remain with DOE, not be part of the
3	responsibility of this organization.
4	So, Number 3. Look at that.
5	Money. I can only reiterate what Commissioner
6	Sharp said earlier. The producers of waste,
7	really the consumers of electricity, have paid
8	and are paying for the disposal of waste.
9	The program committed to execute
10	that disposal of waste has not had consistent
11	or adequate access to the funds that are paid
12	there by the producers of waste.
13	The reasons are complicated. We've
14	done quite a good deal of work on how that
15	happened and the set of decisions that led to
16	that, and I'm not going to talk about them,
17	because I'll get confused - but the
18	recommendation is relatively simple.
19	Congress should make changes that
	11

assure that the new entity has access to those funds so it can operate in a predictable manner. And there is the opportunity for the

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administration through executive action, to reverse some of the most serious decisions that limit the access of the entity to the Waste Fund.

There is a very good paper on how that could be done, essentially by a set of decisions by the Office of Management and Budget, which will be posted on the website soon.

And I suggest that members of the commission may want to look - this is about money. It does have an impact on the federal budget, the set of decisions that we would urge the administration to make, but it would be an enormous gesture of good faith and of conviction on the part of the administration that they wanted to move ahead with a robust program to create both interim storage and disposal facilities.

But just to emphasize, again, the current situation isn't working. It doesn't provide consistent funding. We have to do

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something about that in addition to creating sufficient authorities as Commissioner Moniz pointed out for the new entity to be able to operate.

Recommendation 4 is about how we would like the new entity to approach its task. And it is a distillation both of the experience of the past fifty years, and of what we saw in Finland and Sweden and discussing the issue with our colleagues from Canada, we believe that siting is most likely to succeed.

And John has said repeatedly to us what he said earlier this morning, that some of these recommendations cause some concern, but they seem necessary to create a successful siting process.

We believe that a community chosen for a site should be able to decide to withdraw from the process. That this has to be consent based.

That that consent is most likely to

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be secured if the process is entirely transparent. Transparent beyond just information is there and to the point of actively trying to make information available, help people understand what the issues are.

Everything we have learned suggests that it is important that the process be a learning process. That's essentially what we mean by phased and adaptive. That it be possible to make decisions over a sequence of time and learn from each stage what might contribute to making the next stage more effective.

And, finally, it has to work according to established general, not site-specific, science-based standards that are understandable and available to all of the participants in the process.

That is the rules have to be clear and the rules have to be general, not created for specifically one site or one purpose.

We noted that when the commission

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visited Carlsbad, when we had conversations with those involved in the WIPP process, there was a general agreement that the process had been sufficiently open that all of the players thought that they knew what they needed to know to make informed decisions.

That funding was available for state agencies in order to be able to effectively oversee the process. And that the state was given a role as a regulator as it would have under EPA statutes applicable to other facilities as well.

And that arrangement in which the state was a regulator, the process was transparent, everyone had the capacity to participate, seems to have led to a good outcome.

I missed one thing I wanted to say with regard to this recommendation. One of the most difficult issues is thinking about the role of state and tribal governments in this process.

It's clear that they have both a capacity and reason to participate effectively. And they should have a forum through which they can actively engage in a set of decisions around siting and design.

At the same time, we do not recommend the creation of a state veto. While we think local communities should be in a position to withdraw from the process if they choose, we think that it's more effective for states and tribes to have a regulatory role than have a veto, and that the pressures on states to exercise a veto, if they have a veto, may simply be too great.

We hope to get comments from states and local governments and tribes on our draft.

We have not - we don't have a clear set of recommendations from those entities yet.

We're trying to fashion something that workably and fairly reflects the responsibilities of state governments and communities, but still retains a process that

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might lead to successful siting.

The current arrangement as we all heard in testimony before the full commission I think last summer, is that EPA issues performance standards, and NRC makes a set of key regulatory design decisions.

It is a divided responsibility that I would say, personally, initially struck me as not very efficient. And our subcommittee ended up after spending quite a good deal of time looking at this saying it may not be very efficient, but we actually can't think of anything better.

It seems workable. The NRC has enormous technical expertise that is appropriately applied to the specific licensing decisions that will be necessary for licensing of a deep geologic repository.

The EPA has long experience and effective processes for the development of broad performance standards.

And we think that arrangement can

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be made to work. And can be made to work, in fact, better than it has in the past if there's more coordination mandated between the agencies, if to the extent possible they rely on regulatory negotiation, and if they effectively use advisory committees to oversee the process.

We also would note that current regulation is not sufficient. The current rules were created for a specific purpose, and it will be necessary to go back and create site-independent safety standards.

And we think that that can be done consistently with the pace at which it will be possible to move forward to create a new agency and begin to collect information on sites, but it needs to be done promptly.

We heard a number of recommendations in this area, but the ones we found most compelling were those that suggested that a negotiated process and the application of the principles of transparency

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1	would be effective in moving ahead in this
2	area.
3	This is going back to the specifics
4	of the roles of tribal government, state
5	government, local governments. This
6	recommendation is not as specific as we would
7	like ultimately to be with your help.
8	And this decision, as I said
9	earlier, will be key to the workability and
10	also acceptability of the standard. Much of
11	it will depend on the extent to which the new
12	entity develops an effective relationship with
13	affected state, local and tribal governments.
14	Again, if the rules are clear and
15	consistent, if the process is sufficiently
16	open and inclusive, we believe that this
17	arrangement could be made to work.
18	All levels of government have to
19	feel that they will have a full opportunity to
20	represent the interests of the people who have
21	chosen them in participating in the process.

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Finally, we wanted to be clear that

1	we think the Nuclear Waste Technical Review
2	Board is a valuable source of technical advice
3	and independent review.
4	We would like, if anything, to see
5	it strengthened and to assure that its
6	membership reflects a broad range of
7	professional skills and expertise. And that
8	its mandate is clear that it is to be
9	independent.
10	And that will help the new entity
11	in operating effectively. It will be useful
12	to them, not an interference to have a set of
13	expert independent critics of its work.
14	We have not - again in this area,
15	it may be that we will come up with more
16	specific recommendations based on your
17	comments.
18	That was a quick rendition of 130
19	pages of recommendations and hundreds of hours
20	of work by my colleagues on the committee and
21	the members of the staff.

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addition. We fairly quickly coalesced around the essence of these recommendations. That is the need for disposal, deep geologic disposal, a new entity, a new process that is open, inclusive and consent based.

There's a great deal of detail surrounding those recommendations and we have a lot of work to do still on that detail.

Thank you.

MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you, Commissioner Lash. We will use the same process that we used earlier with members of your subcommittee asking questions, and then the fellow commissioners expanding it from there.

And I'm going to open it with the first question, and I think Commissioner Moniz mentioned it earlier. And that's the issue of defense and civilian waste.

And I know we did talk about that, the issue of commingling it or not commingling it. And I'd like to hear the views of your

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thoughts, Commissioner Lash, and those on your subcommittee as to that issue.

MEMBER LASH: Madam Chair, as you know having sat through these discussions, we discussed the issue. I'm not sure we reached a clear conclusion, and I certainly don't feel technically well enough informed yet to reach a conclusion.

I know a number of members of the subcommittee have strong views and I've read comments from non-subcommittee members as well. So, we know we have to go back and dig into this one again.

MEMBER BAILEY: And I think it's the thought, maybe, of the real two co-chairs that they would like the Disposal Committee to look at that issue and maybe come back, do a little deeper dive into that and come back and give us - investigate that matter maybe over the next few months and report back in the fall.

All right. Other comments, questions. All right, I've got to take these

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1	I've got to get to work here.
2	Okay, Per. Commissioner Peterson.
3	MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you. I have
4	one general observation, and then three
5	specific questions.
6	The first is just to note that when
7	we entered into this process, I was actually
8	skeptical that voluntary processes could work.
9	I thought that we would likely be
10	in a position of having something that would
11	look like Base Reauthorization and Closure
12	type of process.
13	I can report that based on the
14	opportunities to travel to Finland, to Sweden,
15	to other parts of the United States to discuss
16	with people, that I am now quite confident
17	that if we enter into this type of process,
18	that it is likely to be successful and that it
19	is likely to generate much better outcomes.
20	In particular, if we note that by
21	developing in parallel both some consolidated
22	interim storage and disposal capabilities,

that we're not going to stuff the entire problem onto a single state and isolate them as the only state carrying the entire burden.

And I think that if we do that, that I have confidence that we can be successful. And I did not come into this process believing that. So, I think that it's important to note that my thoughts on that have changed.

I have three specific points to raise. The first is on this question of defense versus civil waste, I had a chance to speak with Commissioner Moniz a little bit after this. And I don't think that people here want to have a firm division between defense and civil waste.

For example, there is a small amount of civilian high-level waste stored at the West Valley plant in New York. And I don't think it would make a lot of sense to prohibit that from going into a repository that was developed, say, principally for high-

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level waste from defense.

Likewise, we have civilian Three Mile Island-damaged fuel in storage at Idaho National Lab. And it probably would not make sense to prohibit that material from going into repository that the naval spent fuel from Idaho National Lab might go into.

So, I would think that perhaps we can have - we can think about the question of specializing the purpose of repositories, but maybe not to divide it strictly by the origin of the materials.

The next thing I'd like to note is that I also believe that it's critically important to develop a new safety standard for repositories, geologic disposal facilities, that is site independent.

I think that we also should strive to assure that it is sufficiently flexible that in fact it could also be used to license a facility based on, say, deep borehole technology in addition to mined geologic

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repository.

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If you develop it that way, it will be a performance-based type of standard and that you will not - you will not have a standard that ends up actually inadvertently prescribing the method for achieving the performance as opposed to prescribing what the performance needs to be.

third thing that I'd think about, and this is also a rather specific point, but I think it's important, one of the elements of being successful important siting is provide appropriate to and substantive incentives to those communities and states that would take on responsibilities for hosting facilities.

The current Nuclear Waste Policy
Act actually would direct research funds
preferentially. And I think - and there's
been discussion with members of the commission
that it's not a good idea for research awards
to be awarded on criteria other than merit and

capability, but I would point out that I think that it is entirely inappropriate that research facilities, national user facilities infrastructure could be directed in this way.

And the example was mentioned, for example, of facilities to study the long-term performance of dry cask storage. And I'd like to see us recommend that that detail in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act be fixed. Because as a matter of philosophy coming from a career of performing research, I do think it's important that we maintain this requirement that research really - funding for research should be awarded based on merit and on capability as opposed to where you are.

Infrastructure, on the other hand, that is something that is a very different item. These are the three things that I would note.

MEMBER LASH: Just a quick comment I meant to emphasize, and you've reminded me, that that is one of the things that we've

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1	found consistently not just in the US, but
2	globally that communities that receive
3	technical facilities, research facilities
4	have, in general, been more receptive to the
5	location of waste facilities.
6	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you,
7	Commissioner Peterson. And he is a member of
8	the Disposal Subcommittee.
9	Another member, Commissioner John
10	Rowe.
11	MEMBER ROWE: I got to the
12	conclusions this subcommittee reached for
13	differing reasons than Commissioner Peterson.
14	I still am not as optimistic as he is, but I
15	am painfully convinced that we have tried
16	shortcuts many times. And it's the effort to
17	make the shortcuts that is causing at least a
18	large portion of our problem.
19	And, therefore, I think we have no
20	choice in these matters but to trust
21	consensual process and to try to work through

it in great detail.

1 And recognizing that it is a mix of 2 good science, good advocacy and, in the end, 3 just plain old-fashioned dealing. I was very moved by the number of 4 people from Nevada who said we wouldn't have 5 6 been so angry if you'd have negotiated with us 7 instead of telling us and if we'd had some chance to bargain. 8 I can't help - Per, this is mostly 9 10 just to tease. It is clear that R&D is too 11 important not to do on merit. But plain old infrastructure, that 12 can do on we 13 principles. (Laughter.) 14 MEMBER ROWE: And for those of us 15 16 who think that professors are very mobile and iron and steel quite difficult to move, 17 would submit that talent can be found in many 18 19 places and they're not confined locationally. MEMBER PETERSON: Point taken. 20 21 BAILEY: Thank MEMBER you, 22 Commissioner Rowe.

1 Another member of the subcommittee, 2 Commissioner Mark Ayers. 3 MEMBER AYERS: Thank you. You know, 4 I just want to say, and Jonathan already made the point, but I guess I want to take it a 5 6 little bit further. 7 You know, there are SO talented and dedicated and technical and every 8 other kind of person you could ever want on 9 10 this subcommittee, but I have to tell you that the really talented people are the staff that 11 put these reports together. 12 I mean, they're massive. 13 It took read them, but they're very 14 me a week to 15 comprehensive. So, I just want to give kudos 16 to the staff because I think they really effectively captured the issues 17 that was explored by this subcommittee. 18 19 MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you very much, 20 Commissioner Ayers. That is important to say. And that is something I think we all truly 21

feel, and thank you for saying it.

Another member of the subcommittee, Commissioner MacFarlane.

MEMBER MacFARLANE: Thanks, Madam Chair.

I guess I just want to chime in and say that I think, you know, Jonathan, you did a great job leading us in this subcommittee.

I don't know that we'd be here without your direction.

But also, I think just one sort of question or observation, I think that the actual process of siting which really isn't discussed in these recommendations, is something that we still need to elucidate further in our thinking, including whether you look for a voluntary community or whether you approach communities or you do both, or you fail one and what's your Plan B. You better have a Plan B this time, because we don't have a Plan B now.

How you bring the public in, where the public participates, how they actually get

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1	to be part of this whole process, you know,
2	yes, it's good to say it's consent based, but
3	what does that actually mean? How do you
4	operationalize that?
5	What kind of technical criteria?
6	What kind of compensation you provide not just
7	to the community or the state, but also to
8	groups to do their own analyses.
9	This is all something that we have
10	been thinking about, I want to make that
11	clear, and that we'll put a finer point on.
12	MEMBER LASH: Yes.
13	MEMBER BAILEY: I can attest to
14	Commissioner Lash's leadership. I think he -
15	was it in Sweden or Finland that he had us in
16	the back of the bus going over these issues?
17	(Laughter.)
18	MEMBER LASH: You were captive.
19	MEMBER BAILEY: I was captive,
20	right.
21	We now have - okay. We have
22	Commissioner Meserve.

1 MEMBER MESERVE: First of all, thank 2 the report. the you for I was not 3 subcommittee and it important was interesting to get the report from it. 4 5 A couple of minor points. One is, 6 is that I'm quite comfortable with your 7 recommendations. just point out that 8 Let me recommendation about having a process for the 9 10 facility that is adaptive and flexible 11 allows you to learn and change over time is something that's encouraged. 12 been National Academy of Sciences report, that's 13 emphasized some time ago. 14 15 important to recognize, Ιt is 16 however, and perhaps deal with the reality that that is going to require some changing 17 thinking by the NRC about how it proceeds in 18 19 licensing.

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requirements that are met. And the licensee

reactors, there's

It's very accustomed, in the world

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says, oh, he's going to meet them. And you meet them. And they inspect against them. And you do what you said you were going to do when they verify you've done it, having a more flexible, adaptive process is going to be quite foreign to the way they think about how they fulfill their regulatory responsibility.

And so, there is quite an interesting and licensing challenge for them that does require a different mode of how they approach licensing. And I just sort of flag that for the subcommittee as something that does need to be worried about if you haven't already.

Second comment I just - a point that I think I should say that there are site-independent licensing standards that exist. The NRC has them in Part 61, for example, but the idea of revisiting them I think is very important.

They were written a long time ago, you know. We've learned a lot. Since then

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there's been a lot - technical advance has been a considerable policy advance, including policy advance that I think that is embodied in your recommendations that does require this to be reexamined, but there is an existing set of regulatory requirements that I think that definitely ought to appropriately be revamped.

The third point I make is really quite a minor one, but you emphasize in your presentation that R&D related to disposal should be something that's funded and done by DOE and would be disconnected from the new entity.

And I can understand that that would be a valuable thing from the perspective of husbanding the Waste Fund to assure that there is a narrow set of purposes that are fulfilled.

But I guess I do worry somewhat about the entity that is dependant on the research and has the research problems being disconnected from the process that goes out

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1	and defines the projects to be performed and
2	the performers, and is not in the direct
3	receipt of the research results.
4	MEMBER LASH: I'm sure that there
5	would be a willingness on the part of the
6	subcommittee to respond to a set of
7	recommendations of how to solve that problem.
8	So, the desire was not to have the
9	new entity get diverted off into long-term
10	research on reprocessing.
11	But at the same time if you have to
12	explore whether boreholes are an adequate
13	option, of course the entity should be
14	involved. And we're open to thoughts about
15	how to define all that.
16	MEMBER BAILEY: Let me go back and
17	get Commissioner Eisenhower who is a member of
18	the subcommittee.
19	MEMBER EISENHOWER: Being a member
20	of the subcommittee of course I endorse the
21	findings that were possible with Jonathan's
22	leadership in both Sweden and Finland, and

many other places.

I think I would just like to say that I think one of the big challenges of our big idea which is to establish an independent entity for the management of nuclear waste, one of the most challenging aspects of this is going to be access to the Nuclear Waste Fund.

All you have to do is read the headlines in the paper every morning about the country's deficit reduction problems in our national debt.

And so, I think it's going to be the challenge of this commission in the final report and also as we go out to sell the ideas that we feel very strongly about, to emphasize this notion of an adequate and stable source of funding.

And to make the case that actually efficiencies and cost reduction will be possible by actually putting in place a system that is predictable.

And so, this is going to be a net

1	savings for the United States of America, not
2	a raid on the federal treasury whether or not
3	this money was always designated for this
4	purpose or not.
5	There is of course a breach of
6	trust idea which is huge, and this is what
7	this commission's been trying to address not
8	only in the Waste Fund aspect, but also in
9	making siting recommendations.
10	But at the end of the day if we
11	can't sell this as not only critical for the
12	continuation of a well-run nuclear program in
13	the United States, we can't make the case that
14	there are also going to make cost savings,
15	then we're going to have difficulty making the
16	larger case that this is a national energy
17	security issue.
18	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you,
19	Commissioner Eisenhower.
20	Chairman Hamilton.
21	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I just want to
22	follow up on what Susan said, because I think

it's important.

Phil and I, and Pete and Chuck have listened a thousand times to people who come to the Congress and say I want assured access to a fund.

Every manager in the federal government wants an assured access, and you can't get it. You cannot get it because any congress, even if they set it up, can invade it or will invade it under budgetary pressures.

So, I think I'd like to hear from Pete Domenici, he's had a lot of experience on the budget, and maybe some real congressional budget experts here, which I'm not one, of the best way to do it.

Now, Susan makes the point that if we make that recommendation, we've got to put in there very, very persuasive reasons as to why it should be an assured fund.

And that will give you some protection against invasion, but it doesn't --

it's not permanent.

Because what happens is that as the budgetary pressures mount, you're looking for funds of money that you can use somewhere for another priority or to meet budget goals of some kind, cash and all the rest of it.

So, I think all we can do probably,
Jonathan, is what Susan suggests. And that is
say that it's terribly important for reasons
of efficiency, national security, whatever the
reasons are that you have such a fund, and
make that case as persuasively as you can.

But there's no guarantee here. No permanent guarantee.

MEMBER BAILEY: All right. Thank you, Chairman.

Commissioner Sharp.

MEMBER SHARP: Just to follow on, on that issue, I think it's very important that we distinguish two major issues here. The first which I indicated earlier, but I would love for us to put clearly on the record, the

money collected has been collected for this purpose. It is there in the treasury. It is to be spent for this purpose in the future, and not let people get away with the idea that somehow that was collected and since it didn't get spent at the time, you know, that's all water over the dam.

This is an obligation that the U.S. government has like it has under Social Security. And, therefore, it is there.

Now, the other issue we're talking about here is how do you get access in a timely way for the operation of the entity, and that's a tougher one.

But, by the way, I also have some faith that you're more likely to get timely access even if you don't get it guaranteed in advance.

If you in fact are producing real plans, real actions, real consequences, it is a lot easier to go sell to anybody in the private or public sector as opposed to just

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saying, well, give us money and we'll think about it, and maybe next year we'll get it done. That doesn't sell anywhere.

And so, one of the issues for this new entity is behavior, its behavior in terms of how it approaches this.

Well, I didn't mean to get off on the finances, but I'm like Lee. Everybody wants a guarantee. Everybody wants an independent Federal Reserve until they see one or they have a financial crisis, but I'm all for the general proposal.

Let me turn to this question of public engagement. And I think they're absolutely right on target with the principles laid forth. And clearly the mistake we made in 1987 was jamming it down the throat of Nevadans. And one might even hope they would be interested in negotiating in the future on one or more of these possible propositions.

And, indeed, there will be political turnover there as throughout

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America, and so who knows.

But my point is I - we should recognize that this has not been all for naught for the last 25 years.

The Department of Energy used to get an extremely bad rap. Well, I can tell you when we went to Hanford, when we went to South Carolina, when we went to WIPP, we heard a different story.

Now, not everybody is happy with everything, but what has happened either at the initiative in the Department or because of court suit or because of governor negotiations in each of these places, there had been procedures and processes and panels developed as techniques to assure public oversight and public engagement.

And I would urge us, and I think we were about - we were doing this, I had suggested this at a previous thing that in this chapter or somewhere, we catalog those real-world ways in which public engagement is

1	occurring now at least as information for this
2	new entity or whomever has to do the siting.
3	There is no need to reinvent the wheel here.
4	But also recognizing while we have
5	general principles applicable everywhere, the
6	truth is different communities want different
7	ways of doing it. And they have different
8	governmental structures.
9	So, it isn't a one size necessarily
10	fits all. The principles do, but the
11	procedures - and we have experience in that.
12	Let's not lose it.
13	MEMBER LASH: Madam Chair, just a
14	brief response.
15	Your last point is a very important
16	point, and I pull up a quick anecdote.
17	In Sweden, we learned that the
18	president and chief operating officer of the
19	corporation went home by home in one of the
20	communities where they ultimately facilitated
21	the site, and sat at kitchen tables to listen
22	to people's concerns. And he learned in that

1	process, the concerns were completely
2	different than they expected.
3	They were not about radiation
4	safety. They were about the fact that
5	thousands of workers would be brought in to
6	construct this facility and they might be from
7	other parts of Europe. And people were
8	concerned about the safety of their community.
9	Well, legitimate or not, they were
10	able then to understand the issues they had to
11	deal with, and began responding in a way that
12	was considered by the community to be real
13	instead of just a flow of propaganda.
14	MEMBER SHARP: I might add perhaps
15	you have another recommendation there that
16	utility CEOs ought to go door to door with
17	their customers -
18	(Laughter.)
19	MEMBER SHARP: to understand
20	what their needs are.
21	(Off-record comments.)
22	MEMBER BAILEY: All right. I have

Commissioner Moniz, Commissioner Carnesale and I think, Commissioner MacFarlane, did you have another - Commissioner Moniz.

MEMBER MONIZ: I regret to say that I have a number of points again, Madam Chairman, but actually on - by the way, on that last point of Jonathan's, these concerns being surprising, I might just add that in a very different context, the famous fracking issue, for example, it turns out actually one of the major concerns is simply all the heavy truck movements that comes with that kind of surface industry activity. So, it's a very important point, I think.

So, a bunch of comments. Okay. One is I would urge that as you complete the report, that one goes from Recommendation 1 back to finding Number 0, which is to, you know, based upon existing literature, especially the Academy, to reinforce underpinning of scientific long-term geological disposal.

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Because if you don't emphasize that, the recommendations I think don't quite have the appropriate weight.

I think in doing that, a second issue comes up that I think we need to capture maybe it's not in a recommendation, I don't know, but that is that you say geological disposal and mined repositories, dot, dot, dot, and that's true, but I think we have to emphasize that not every mined repository is the same. They have different geochemistries that relates to the fuel forms, et cetera, the general idea that we need integrated decisions and not separate decisions.

Now, I don't know if that works into a recommendation, but I think it's a very, very important issue which is ultimately connected to the scientific underpinnings there.

Dick mentioned the NRC and a possible need to reevaluate kind of a regulatory approach in a more responsive

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system. And I agree, but I would like to go back to the NRC EPA separation.

And I don't know if we want to get into this, but a reminder, the EPA regulations for a repository are a jury-rigged bunch. And I think we might consider at least the issue of going back to that.

As you know, 10,000 years got pieced onto a couple hundred thousand years and, you know, the left leg is connected to the right arm or something. I don't know. So, that's another point.

Ι think another point that missing which is critical for disposal is the completely redo need to our waste classification scheme. It - this is a case where there really are orphans already. And there will be a lot more orphans running around if we change fuel cycles.

We need to go to a risk-based system, and I think that belongs here in the disposal section. And I think should be some

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recommendation which will require statutory 1 2 actions eventually. 3 You mentioned in the first slide, I'm all for ethics, but -4 ethics. (Laughter.) 5 6 MEMBER MONIZ: -- only to a limit, 7 you know. We're dealing with nuclear waste, after all. 8 But, no, the serious issue is that 9 10 we had, I thought, a very good presentation to the Commission on intergenerational issues. 11 12 And what we don't want to do is to promulgate 13 the simple-minded view that intergenerational responsibility means putting the waste into a 14 hole in your generation. 15 16 Now, it doesn't say that, but I think it's an issue that we need to be very 17 in defining consistent with 18 careful 19 storage recommendations and with the idea of 20 providing options to other generations, 21 fact.

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Fifth, I think the - you mentioned,

Jonathan, that we discussed this morning briefly the idea that the new organization needs responsibilities or authorities, rather, beyond the access to the Waste Fund.

I agree. I think it needs to be I think it deserves a higher elevation. I
think you have two words, institutional means,
in 2B, which may be interpreted that way, but
I do think we need more of - I think it's
absolutely critical that we will not have a
meaningful organization if all they have is
access to the Waste Fund.

With regard to access to the Waste Fund, Chairman Hamilton raised an issue about congressional predatory instincts and capabilities, and this is absolutely - oh, he didn't? I thought he did.

Just as a note that I think there's another analog today, actually, about the value of having statutory language to kind of protect something.

And that is, again, to the natural

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gas arena there's something called the Royalty

Trust Fund, which is a statutory assignment of
a small part of federal oil and gas royalties
to support research. It's in statute.

The Bush administration and the
Obama administration have both proposed

zeroing it out, save \$50 million a year. But, frankly, the statutory language then allows

the supporters to much more easily protect it.

Now, it's still not bulletproof, but I think if we had statutory language, it could go a long way towards protecting it particularly with Phil's caveat that the organization has to perform.

In that context, you know, there's a leitmotif through many of the discussions about DOE performance with regard to spent fuel management.

I think we have been remiss in assigning - in sharing the credit with the Congress for what has happened over the years.

And I think it's very important because,

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1	again, I think the fundamental error, we've
2	discussed this, is that it provided a
3	straightjacket for actions. And that's
4	exactly what we cannot afford for a well-
5	functioning system.
6	MEMBER SHARP: I think it's really
7	critical we nail that down. It's been said
8	several times this morning, but setting rigid
9	deadlines and designating one spot turned out
10	to have been not a shortcut.
11	MEMBER MONIZ: Right.
12	MEMBER SHARP: But ended up
13	jeopardizing us and putting the Department and
14	putting other players in a position where they
15	could not perform in a way that was expected
16	or at least we thought was the way we wanted
17	things to happen.
18	MEMBER MONIZ: And add to that the
19	financing games.
20	MEMBER SHARP: Oh, yes.
21	MEMBER MONIZ: Add to that even the
22	research restrictions on looking at

1	alternatives. I mean, it was an absolute
2	narrowest set of options you could ever
3	construct within which one had no chance of
4	success.
5	MEMBER SHARP: If you don't mind,
6	Chairman, just a moment because it's not as if
7	everybody was stupid in making these
8	decisions, it may seem like it now, but the
9	fact is that it was driven by the sense that
10	we were not able to ever politically push the
11	noodle and get decisions made.
12	And so to help push not just the
13	bureaucracy, but the industry and everybody
14	else, that's why this was done as a technique
15	to try to get decisions made.
16	MEMBER MONIZ: Right.
17	MEMBER SHARP: Now, that didn't turn
18	out the work the way we wanted.
19	MEMBER MONIZ: Right.
20	MEMBER LASH: Madam Chair, could I
21	just - oh, are you finished, Ernie?
22	MEMBER MONIZ: No, but please go

1	ahead. Do you want to go now? I have more.
2	MEMBER LASH: I have brief responses
3	to several of them, but please finish.
4	MEMBER MONIZ: Oh, well, then hold
5	your powder.
6	MEMBER LASH: Yes.
7	(Laughter.)
8	MEMBER MONIZ: Number 7, just as a
9	comment on Recommendation 4, I strongly
10	support this idea of a consent based, et
11	cetera, but we also have to acknowledge that
12	the political structures in the comparison
13	cases is a lot simpler than the one we're
14	talking about here and not sugarcoat it to
15	make it quite so easy.
16	MEMBER LASH: Right.
17	MEMBER MONIZ: Eighth, this is the
18	TRB recommendation. As I probably hinted
19	earlier, I am concerned about layer upon layer
20	upon layer both outside and inside the
21	Department at the moment.
22	But I just wonder the extent to

which this was really considered especially in the context of a new quasi-government organization. And I would just at some point, like to hear the analytical reasons why that would be supportive.

And finally, Per raised the issue

And finally, Per raised the issue of the boundaries of a defense waste repository. I think that's - there are reasons for wanting a clean definition similar to WIPP, let's say. There are also good reasons for what you raise in terms of other waste and spent fuel particularly as it sits on defense sites subject to the same arbitrary dates that we have.

So, I think that's an open discussion. And if the Committee would like a kibitzer on that issue, I would be happy to support.

Thank you.

MEMBER LASH: So, it will take me not more than sixty seconds. I'm not going to respond on geology, but I think your next-door

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1	neighbor may want to at some point, but there
2	certainly was no misunderstanding in the
3	subcommittee that all holes in the ground are
4	the same.
5	On EPA if I didn't state strongly
6	enough that we think that -
7	MEMBER MONIZ: Might I just say even
8	going back beyond that, I think we just need
9	to have a banner about the status of
10	scientific understanding.
11	MEMBER LASH: No, no. I completely
12	take your point. And most of the points you
13	made we will just take on board. They're very
14	good points.
15	I just didn't state as strongly as
16	I know the Committee - the subcommittee feels
17	about the need to go back to the EPA
18	regulations and concern about the million-year
19	standard and so forth.
20	On ethics, we did have - we do have
21	a good discussion of those issues in the
22	context of retrievability, but didn't apply it

1	more broadly in the context of storage.
2	You're entirely right. I suspect
3	there's complete agreement with what you said.
4	We will try to better articulate the powers
5	that are necessary.
6	I think the report, the full draft
7	of the Committee report is pretty clear that
8	Congress shares the parentage of the problems.
9	But if not clear enough, we'll work on it.
10	MEMBER MONIZ: It's buried.
11	MEMBER LASH: It's buried. That's
12	correct. We will go back to the issue of the
13	Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and
14	either be clearer or back away.
15	MEMBER BAILEY: Okay.
16	MEMBER MONIZ: And may I just repeat
17	I think this issue, I don't know if the
18	Committee addressed it, but the issue of the
19	need of a sensible waste classification
20	scheme.
21	MEMBER LASH: Oh, I'm sorry. I
22	skipped over that one.

1 Apparently, your committee's draft, 2 the Reactor and Fuel Cycle Committee, will 3 material on that rather than have our 4 committee. MEMBER BAILEY: All right. We're 5 6 going to move on to Commissioner Carnesale. 7 (Off-record comments.) MEMBER CARNESALE: In the interest 8

MEMBER CARNESALE: In the interest of time and to differentiate myself from Commissioner Moniz, I'm only going to do my 73rd point. And it relates to what you passed over that you hadn't yet decided about the question of the veto of the states.

I'd like to get a little clarification. Looking at the Nevada experience, I could understand where this might have arisen. And I can understand with regard to a disposal site.

But the transportation question is one that raises itself, and I think of the WIPP case that was just raised. Carlsbad might have been happy, but you may not have

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1	somebody on this end if they can get the money
2	to build a rather substantial road to bypass
3	your equivalent of Santa Fe.
4	And I don't know what other
5	communities might be affected in that way.
6	And so, it seems to me that somehow other
7	communities that would be strongly
8	represented, that need to be represented that
9	might otherwise be represented by their state,
10	have to be represented somehow. And if not by
11	the state, then by whom?
12	MEMBER LASH: Your point is noted.
13	MEMBER BAILEY: All right.
14	Actually, Commissioner MacFarlane had an
15	additional comment.
16	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes, just a
17	quick response to Commissioner Meserve's
18	excellent point that it's going to be
19	difficult to continue the usual NRC type of
20	evaluation if you're doing this phased, staged
21	approach.

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That's exactly right, and it's

1	going to be difficult to do any kind of
2	quantitative - fully, entirely quantitative
3	assessment because you need to know all the
4	design features and everything ahead of time.
5	And you're not going to necessarily know that
6	if you do a staged approach, which makes a
7	strong argument for developing a safety case
8	instead of just relying on performance
9	assessment.
10	MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you,
11	Commissioner MacFarlane.
12	Commissioner Rowe.

MEMBER ROWE: I apologize for adding what I'm afraid is merely whimsy, but I've been sitting here in frustration over the obvious relevance of Chairman Hamilton's comments about the difficulty of binding one Congress with another.

It seems to me that there ought to be institutional vehicles whereby Congress could put money it has collected from my customers in a box and make it at least hard

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1 for individual appropriators to get back at 2 the box. 3 And it occurred to me that this 4 mission is not to talk about putting nuclear waste into Yucca Mountain, but perhaps we 5 6 could put the money in Yucca Mountain. 7 (Laughter.) MEMBER BAILEY: I think that's an 8 excellent note to end on. 9 10 All right. Commissioner That's the last one. 11 MEMBER SHARP: Just a reminder of a 12 13 lot of testimony that we got as it's critical to have local input, we were reminded over and 14 15 over by a number of people we should state clearly this is in the national interest, this 16 is a national problem in which the national 17 government must take a lead and which we must 18 19 find a solution. 20 And so, this is not to override states and not to override local communities, 21

but this stuff has to transport through lots

1 of geography now or at some point 2 future. 3 And so, we must not fail to state 4 the importance of this as а national proposition in hopes of also appealing to the 5 6 general patriotism and understanding of people 7 which actually exists in many communities. MEMBER BAILEY: Thank you, Jonathan. 8 Please extend our thanks to Chuck as well, 9 10 and we will look forward to your full report. 11 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Let me express my appreciation to Vicky. I have asked her to 12 13 fill in here on very short notice, and I think she's done an excellent job. 14 15 Vicky, we thank you very much for 16 that. And then we will take a five-minute break and then go to Chairman Peterson. 17 For the public comment, there are 18 19 16 people on the list. They will be given 20 three minutes each. And then we will conclude as several of you have emphasized to me, at 21

4:30.

1	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
2	matter went off the record at 2:17 p.m. and
3	resumed at 2:23 p.m.)
4	MR. FRAZIER: Okay. If everybody
5	would come back in and take their seats, we
6	will get started posthaste.
7	Hey, Mary, look out there and see
8	if there are commissioners wandering around,
9	please.
LO	MS. WOOLLEN: I'm sure there are.
11	MR. FRAZIER: I'm sure there are,
12	too.
13	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Jonathan will
L 4	not be here.
15	MR. FRAZIER: I see Jack and Betty
L 6	are back.
L7	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: May I ask the
18	commissioners to please take their seats and
L 9	we'll get underway?
20	(Off-record comments.)
21	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I think we can
22	go ahead. We'll turn now to Commissioners

1	Domenici and Peterson for our final
2	presentation on the recommendations of the
3	Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology
4	Subcommittee.
5	Per, I understand you will make the
6	presentation. Senator Domenici is not able to
7	be with us, but we thank him as well as you
8	for the work that you've done.
9	And you may proceed, sir.
10	MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you, Mr.
11	Chairman.
12	As you can see by our subcommittee
13	membership, we were fortunate to have a highly
14	qualified and prestigious group of people to
15	work on the important issues that we were
16	charged with.
17	Senator Domenici is my co-chair.
18	Our subcommittee also consists of Al
19	Carnesale, Susan Eisenhower, Allison
20	MacFarlane, Richard Meserve, Ernie Moniz and
21	Phil Sharp.
22	I really am saddened that - well,

it's too bad that Senator Domenici has not been able to join us today. He became ill and was not able to travel - make the travel back from New Mexico, and wish him a speedy recovery.

I just want to say that it's been a unique opportunity to be able to work with him. And I think that he has a deep belief in the capability of this nation to solve problems.

And he has expressed that consistently, and I'll try to do that as best as I can here, too, and to represent the things that he would also, I think, say. But, again, I regret that he's not here to join in with us.

This subcommittee was formed to answer the call right here of the charter specifically to evaluate existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs in terms of multiple criteria.

And our charter then goes on to say

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1	that the criteria of evaluation should include
2	cost, safety, resource utilization and
3	sustainability, and the promotion of nuclear
4	non-proliferation and counter-terrorism goals.
5	I'd also like to note that our
6	commission is clearly not comprised to be a
7	technology commission. Instead, we are
8	comprised to be a policy commission.
9	So, we're not making
10	recommendations for any specific reactor
11	technology or reprocessing technology or
12	anything of that nature.
13	Instead, we focus our efforts on a
14	policy framework under which these
15	technologies might, in the future, be
16	developed. And so that's the principal goal
17	that we have.
18	Now, additionally this commission's
19	focus on policies for managing the back end of
20	the fuel cycle. In addition to that, we have
21	also addressed closely related question of

whether any currently available reactor and

fuel cycle technologies or any commercial technologies that are now under development, have the potential to change the fundamental nature of the nuclear waste management challenge that we confront over the next several decades.

Given these key questions, we went about our business in a combination of ways holding public meetings and deliberative meetings, and embarking on several site tours.

We held three public meetings to hear from invited speakers and to receive input from interested members of the public.

One in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and two in Washington, D.C.

Our first meeting was held in Idaho Falls where we heard from the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Pete Miller, where he discussed the DOE's nuclear energy R&D roadmap and several of the DOE's nuclear R&D programs.

We also heard from EPRI regarding

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the status of nuclear R&D programs in the private sector.

At our first meeting in Washington, D.C., we covered a variety of topics from commercial technology options for reactor and fuel cycle technologies, to the role of local communities and government should play in the development and demonstration of new nuclear technologies and their key safety, environmental and security concerns.

We also covered issues with the U.S. manufacturing sector and the labor force's ability to support new reactor and fuel cycle technologies.

Our last meeting in Washington,
D.C. focused on waste management implications
of fuel cycle technologies and the
international non-proliferation and security
implications of these fuel cycle choices. We
did have classified briefings on some of the
key topics there.

In total, we heard from more than

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1	fifty different witnesses. And all their
2	testimonies and presentations along with the
3	videos of the meetings, are posted on our BRC
4	website.
5	We also held three deliberative
6	meetings of the subcommittee, one was a
7	teleconference, and two in D.C., where our
8	members were able to voice their opinions and
9	concerns and debate the big issues at hand.
10	And I look at Ernie right now
11	because he has contributed consistently with
12	many helpful suggestions.
13	I think it's also a good point to
14	mention the what-we've-heard report that was
15	issued and the value of the feedback that we
16	have received from that.
17	And repeating back what we have
18	heard and then checking to see if it's largely
19	correct, is one of the fundamental things that
20	has improved nuclear plant safety because it
21	is a practice which now occurs routinely.

called

It's

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three-way

1	communication, and I think that it's important
2	that we've attempted to do it here as well.
3	Now, members of our subcommittee
4	also towards several nuclear sites of interest
5	and got to learn not just about the
6	facilities, but also about the people and the
7	communities that have been involved with them
8	for years as well.
9	Okay. The sites we visited
10	included Hanford, Savannah River, Idaho
11	National Laboratory and WIPP.
12	Members even visited fuel cycle
13	facilities and met with politicians, community
14	members, NGO representatives and government
15	representatives in France, Japan and Russia.
16	So, in the process of our work, we
17	came to two central conclusions that set the
18	context for the recommendations that I'll
19	present in a moment.
20	Our first central conclusion is
21	this: Advances in nuclear reactor and fuel
22	cycle technologies may hold promise for

achieving substantial benefits in terms of broadly held safety, economic, environmental and energy security challenges.

capture these benefits, the should continue to pursue United States program of nuclear energy RD&D both to improve the safety and performance of existing technologies, and to develop new technologies that could offer significant advantages in terms of the multiple evaluation criteria listed in our charter, those things that are important to our society.

Our second -- if I can get - there we go. That's good. Oops. Oh, boy. Conclusion 2. There we go.

conclusion Our second central be phrased actually can in а couple One way, the first, is that different ways. currently available reasonably no or foreseeable reactor and fuel cycle technologies, including current or potential reprocess or recycle technologies, have the

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potential to fundamentally alter the waste management challenge this nation confronts over at least the next several decades.

Second, put another way, we do not believe that new technology developments the next three to four decades will change the underlying need and requirement for integrated strategy that combines safe interim storage of spent nuclear fuel with expeditious progress towards siting and licensing permanent disposal facility.

There is no doubt we're going to need a disposal facility regardless of what we decide to do on the fuel cycle side. And this is particularly true of defense high-level waste and some forms of government-owned spent fuel that can and should be prioritized for direct disposal at an appropriate repository.

It is important to note that our central conclusions stand independently of any conclusion one might reach about the desirability or feasibility of closing the

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nuclear fuel cycle in the United States. The subcommittee simply could not reach a consensus on this issue.

As a group, we concluded that it is premature at this point for the United States to commit irreversibly to any particular fuel cycle as a matter of government policy, rather there is a benefit of preserving and developing new options.

RD&D should continue on a range of reactor and fuel cycle technologies that have the potential to deliver societal benefits at different times in the future.

If and when technology advances change the balance of market and policy considerations to favor a shift away from the once-through fuel cycle, that shift will be driven by a combination of factors, including, but hardly limited to, its waste management impacts.

In fact, safety, economics and energy security are likely to be more

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important drivers of future fuel cycle decisions than waste management concerns per se.

Given what we've just said about our central conclusions, our subcommittee makes the following recommendations:

The first one being that the U.S. should provide stable long-term RD&D, that is development research, and demonstration, support for advance fuel - advance reactor and fuel cycle technologies that the have offer substantial benefits potential to relative to currently available technologies in of terms safety, coast, resource utilization, sustainability, the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation counter-terrorism goals, and waste storage and disposal needs.

I should also mention that while our recommendations are focused towards the federal government, that industry also performs a very important role in research and that we should note that the Electric Power

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Research Institute, for example, also should continue its efforts in supporting research on these types of technologies.

We believe that a well-designed federal RD&D program should be attentive to the opportunities in two distinct areas. One being on near-term improvements in the safety and performance of existing Light Water Reactor technology as a part of a once-through fuel cycle, and in technologies available for storing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste.

The second being on the longer-term efforts advance potential game-changing to technologies and systems that could nuclear achieve very large benefits across multiple criteria evaluation compared to current technologies and systems such as fast spectrum reactors capable of continuous actinide recycling and that use uranium efficiently, high-temperature reactors supply for hydrogen can process heat

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production or other purposes, small modular reactors with novel designs for improved safety characteristics, and the potential to change the capital cost and financing structure for new reactors just few as examples of several that merit effort.

Our second recommendation is one of concurrence with the recommendation of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology on the US energy R&D funding.

I note that Commissioner Moniz is on the President's Council and has been deeply involved in developing these specific recommendations.

We agree about the need for better coordination of energy policies and programs across the federal government, for substantial increase in federal support of energy-related research, development, demonstration and deployment, and for efforts to explore new revenue options to provide this support.

Specifically, the recent PCAST

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report endorsed an earlier proposal by the American Energy Innovation Council to provide 16 billion in annual federal support for energy technology innovation. An increase of 10 billion per year over current funding levels with all of that increase coming from new revenue sources.

It is important to note that the subcommittee is not making a specific recommendation regarding the federal funding levels -- regarding future federal funding levels for nuclear energy RD&D.

And also I should again note that the industry role in RD&D investment is also very important and I would believe merits increase as well.

Our third recommendation is a portion of the federal nuclear energy RD&D resources should be directed to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that is the NRC, to accelerate development of regulatory frameworks and supporting anticipatory

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research for novel complements of advance nuclear energy systems.

We believe that an increased degree of confidence that systems can be new successfully licensed is important for lowering the barriers to commercial investment.

We recommend that this effort receive five to ten percent of the total federal funding for reactor and fuel cycle technology RD&D.

While five to ten percent would represent actually a relatively small fraction of the total federal investment in nuclear energy RD&D, it would amount to a large increase in the amount of funding devoted to developing an improved regulatory framework for new nuclear energy technologies.

And if we look at things that have been happening recently with small modular reactors, the value of having a regulatory framework in advance is very clear. And we

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think this should apply also to more advanced technologies for reactors and fuel cycle.

Again, it is important to emphasize that this funding would not come from licensee fees, but be received as a portion of the total federal RD&D funding for nuclear energy.

Our final recommendation is that the United States should continue to take a leadership role in international efforts to address global non-proliferation concerns.

This could include, for example, support for multi-national industrial scale fuel cycle facilities, joint efforts with other countries to improve security, accountability technologies and protocols for nuclear materials and capabilities, and improvements in existing multilateral agreement frameworks.

Our subcommittee also heard a variety of views on whether and to what extent U.S. fuel cycle decisions and policies have influenced fuel cycle decisions made by other

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nations over the last several decades.

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Whatever view one has about the past, the subcommittee believes that it is important for the United States to play a leadership role the technological in diplomatic efforts overseas both by the U.S. nuclear community's involvement international fuel cycle RD&D and commercialization efforts, and through participation in international proliferation and nuclear security regimes and initiatives.

Additionally, the subcommittee recognizes the importance of continued development of modern safeguards and security technologies for application in existing facilities and in combination with safeguards, design approaches for new facilities.

That being said while our subcommittee did focus on fuel cycle and associated technologies, we clearly recognize that the goals of non-proliferation in nuclear

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security cannot be achieved by primarily technological means. Rather, success in this depends the effectiveness area of on diplomatic arrangements to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime such broader adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol, promoting policies, technologies, and fuel cycle choices that reduce proliferation risks, while also taking steps to improve the security of in facilities, and more nuclear materials effective of bilateral use and nuclear cooperation agreements.

These are the major recommendations from the subcommittee. And I would, again, like to thank all of the subcommittee members who have participated constructively. And more so, even, those members of the staff that have provided tremendous support and worked in developing the draft report material.

And finally to all of the members of the public and the other stakeholders who

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provided an enormous amount of helpful input to us. I'll open the floor.

much, Per. An excellent report. I'll ask if any of the subcommittee members have any comments to supplement - Ernie.

MEMBER MONIZ: Yes, just a couple of comments.

is that just a One put exclamation point on what Per said in terms of Recommendation Number 1 that this does include, you know, research in terms of LWR reactors, et cetera, and new fuel forms that -I mean, the text will elaborate that. The recommendation itself does not highlight it. So, I think we just need to emphasize that.

And then in that context, I would just add the one thing that, again, I think the chairs should carry the burden is that I think we do need to have a little reexamination post Fukushima as to how the portfolio might shift somewhat.

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1 CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Thank 2 Any other subcommittee - Susan. 3 MEMBER PETERSON: I agree. 4 MEMBER EISENHOWER: Well, speaking for myself here, I would just add one thing. 5 6 I have served on this committee, but I note 7 that U.S. leadership since this commission on the United States' position, 8 tends to focus on continued leadership and 9 non-proliferation efforts. 10 I personally would like to speak up 11 for US leadership and innovation, and in the 12 13 research and development phase of this. MEMBER PETERSON: Thank you, Susan. 14 15 I think that it's important - we 16 know that in many areas the US has slipped behind other countries in terms of nuclear 17 energy technologies. But it's interesting to 18 19 note, for example, in the area of reactor 20 technologies, the technology that that emerging 21 to be the most commercially

any,

would

arguably of

successful

passive safety technology.

And certainly in the post Fukushima environment, we'd love to see plants that have that type of capability to operate without external source of power or heat sink.

This is a technology that emerged out of the United States and arguably only the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission could have licensed this technology because of the fact that it requires a high degree of scientific technical capability to perform the independent evaluation of that type of system.

And this is one of the reasons why a principal recommendation from the subcommittee is that we need to invest more directly into NRC to develop that type of capability further for these more advanced technologies that we're looking at.

And that may be one of the things that could contribute to reestablishing US technical leadership in these areas.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I see Dick, and

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then Ernie again.

Dick.

MEMBER MESERVE: Two quick points that are really intended to just reinforce some things that Per covered, but didn't emphasize.

One is on his Recommendation 1, which I think is the crucial one for this report, he emphasized that one should be thinking about these technologies in terms of safety, security, economics, sustainability, terrorism issues, waste storage.

That's all true and certainly I concur in that. One thing that isn't explicitly stated in the recommendation that I think will be in the report, that it's important to look beyond the isolated - in making that evaluation, it's important to look beyond an isolated segment.

As often we talk about reactors and their benefits in one way or another in these various dimensions, we need to think about

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1 them in an integrated system that the reactors 2 are not in isolation. 3 There's a whole fuel production 4 system. Maybe there's reprocessing. Certainly disposal. 5 That all has to work 6 together. And so, you need to look 7 optimizing on these various characteristics across the whole scope of the activities. 8 So, it's complicated. But if you 9 10 suboptimize, if you look at just one piece of it, you're going to miss the whole picture and 11 maybe hurt yourself in terms of the other 12 13 components. The second comment I'd make was on 14 15 the fourth recommendation is that it sort of 16 reinforced one point which was to look at this in terms of the non-proliferation objectives 17 across the fuel cycle. 18 19 There's a lot of conversation about 20 efforts, important efforts, on dealing with the proliferation of enrichment facilities 21 22 which - because of concern that the enrichment

facilities if scattered around the world, would themselves give you the access to at least the technology that could be used for producing weapons-usable material.

There is the same problem on the back end of the fuel cycle with regard to reprocessing facilities in that - because of the separation of plutonium that could be used for weapons.

And those two things are And, in fact, there's advantages in together. tying them together in that a country sees that there's an integrated system where it doesn't need to worry about fuel cycle, therefore, is given some extra incentives to not engage in them. And that does help in achieving our non-proliferation objectives.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Al.

MEMBER CARNESALE: I'm a member of the subcommittee as well. I have a question about Recommendation Number 2.

I agree in general, but it does

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strike me as one of these things is not like the others.

This is a recommendation about general investment in energy technologies, and I don't - it's not that I can't see any connection, but I don't understand why we would be recommending more or less investment in wind or solar or coal or anything else.

Why is it no specifically about nuclear technologies?

MEMBER PETERSON: I think it harkens to what Dick just observed that we should think of this as being a system. The nuclear part as being a system, but it's certainly not a system that operates in isolation of all other energy sources.

So, in some sense, I think that one of the reasons why the subcommittee has not really coalesced around a specific recommendation for nuclear RD&D is that it makes sense probably to view nuclear energy in the larger context of other energy sources and

their environmental problems, sustainability problems and safety problems as well.

I certainly personally feel that it's a good thing to do, but I think your point is important in that it merits additional work and consideration as we work towards the final draft.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Any further comments?

Yes, Ernie.

MEMBER MONIZ: Yes, two. One is and actually may fit into this last exchange is -- in some way, but especially in the context of the DOE leitmotif of the day, I think we should emphasize that it's not in the recommendations, but I think the subcommittee as a whole felt that the 2009, I guess it was, DOE technology roadmap was - while it may lack some implementation details, was a step in the right direction. And it really brought in the agenda to be much more strategically aligned, including things like LWR work, waste-form

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work, all the things that, frankly, had been missing for quite some time in the program.

And I think that the subcommittee was uniform in that.

The second point I would make is going back to this proliferation discussion, I think there's, frankly, a bit of a gap overall in terms of how the Commission as a whole can discuss some of the institutional and policy issues of proliferation more broadly since, again, we - this subcommittee was more on the technology side.

We heard a presentation at one of our meetings from the Department of State I found rather unsatisfactory with rather a set of ad hoc actions that do not add up to a policy. And I do think that does impact our charge.

And so, I don't know what the solution is, Mr. Chairman. A little rump group or something, but I do think we need somehow to grapple with these broader issues

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1	of proliferation.
2	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Yes, I would
3	second that.
4	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you.
5	Anything further?
6	(No response.)
7	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Per, I think
8	you got off a little easy, myself. It was a
9	very, very good report.
10	We thank you, and please extend our
11	thanks to Senator Domenici as well.
12	MEMBER MONIZ: Mr. Chairman, I think
13	it's because nobody told him that he was
14	supposed to have seven recommendations.
15	(Laughter.)
16	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Thank
17	you, Per. That completes our formal agenda.
18	We'll turn now to the public comment.
19	Before we do, I want to remind
20	everything that the recommendations that have
21	been discussed here this afternoon and this
22	morning may or may not be adopted by the full

1	commissions.
2	And we will now integrate the work
3	of the subcommittees and the views expressed
4	here today into a draft report for public
5	release at the end of July.
6	We will now turn to public comment.
7	We're very pleased that we have sixteen
8	persons who have indicated they want to make a
9	statement to the Committee.
LO	The first one will be Robin Read,
11	NFWL. And I'll ask her or him, is it? I'm
12	not sure.
13	ROBIN READ: Shall I do it from
L 4	here?
15	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Yes, would you
L 6	do it from the podium?
L7	ROBIN READ: Yes, sir.
18	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: We can hear it a
L 9	little better, I think, if you do it from the
20	podium and it's connected to the video.
21	And she will be followed by Tom
22	Cochran of the NRDC Please proceed You

1	have three minutes.
2	Now, may I emphasize to you that we
3	will be keeping a clock on you here? And when
4	the yellow comes on, they have how much time
5	left? When the yellow comes on here, you have
6	one minute left. And when the red comes on,
7	your time is expired.
8	ROBIN READ: I'll be very careful
9	about my time, for goodness sakes.
10	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay. Thank
11	you.
12	ROBIN READ: Good afternoon,
13	everyone. I'm Robin Read, president and CEC
14	of the National Foundation for Womer
15	Legislators, now a 73-year-old organization of
16	over 2,000 elected women officials.
17	I'm delighted to be here. Our
18	energy and natural resources and agricultural
19	policy committee last year passed a resolution
20	that I'd like to share with as many of you as
21	are interested.

We did mention the fact that the

1	current administration is committed to
2	restarting America's nuclear power industry
3	although they terminated Yucca Mountain
4	Repository project, but we did want to - we
5	were very pleased about the Blue Ribbon
6	Commission, of course.
7	And we wanted to provide
8	recommendations for safe, long-term policies
9	and programs for managing the nation's
10	commercial and defense use of nuclear fuel and
11	high-level radioactive materials.
12	We support the nuclear power and
13	are based on sound scientific and technical
14	analysis.
15	We support innovative technology
16	that will enable the United States to once
17	again lead the work in these technologies.
18	We did send our resolution to the
19	President of the United States, and I did have
20	a response from him about that.
21	The Secretary of US Department of
22	Energy, members of the Blue Ribbon Commission,

1	and all the leadership in congress, I do want
2	you to know that within 12 hours of the Gulf
3	Oil Spill I had 72 calls from among our fifty
4	states, of women who wanted to be on the Blue
5	Ribbon - our own Blue Ribbon Task Force to
6	work on energy policy.
7	We feel that this is very, very
8	important for all of our states. And whereas
9	many of you think that perhaps some of our
10	women are not as supportive in nuclear energy,
11	I beg to differ with you.
12	Perhaps you can look at our
13	resolution, and you'll understand how
14	supportive we are.
15	I hope this will be helpful to some
16	of you in your - as you'd like to report out
17	about how women of the United States, women
18	leaders of the United States feel about
19	nuclear power.
20	I leave this with you. I think I

to hurry, but is there anyone that would like

was under my three minutes, right?

21

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I did try

1	a copy of our resolution for their own uses?
2	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Yes. Thank you
3	very much. We will indeed take the
4	resolution.
5	ROBIN READ: I do want to say many
6	of you know that Ann Rydalch, State
7	Representative Ann Rydalch from Idaho chose
8	our commission. Many of you may know her as
9	well. She's been very involved in energy
LO	policy. Thank you.
11	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
L2	much. The next speaker will be Tom Cochran.
13	TOM COCHRAN: Mr. Chairman and
L 4	commissioners, your three-minute time limit
15	prevents me from telling you what I like about
L 6	your findings.
L7	(Laughter.)
L 8	TOM COCHRAN: So, I'll tell you what
L 9	my problems are.
20	The Fukushima accident raises more
21	than a dozen serious concerns about
22	operational reactors and their safety and the

management of spent nuclear fuel.

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You were asked by the President to address how the nation should manage and dispose of spent fuel.

You've ducked several of our recommendations and rejected one. And as I understand it, this is primarily on the basis that you claim to be a policy committee and not a technical committee.

Thus you, in your familiar address these technical issues, you essentially left it to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to resolve these issues such as how fast we should move spent fuel out of pools and into dry cask storage, whether you should have hardened dry cask storage or not, whether you should move spent fuel from operational reactor sites to consolidated interim storage.

Contrary to at least some of you, I have no confidence in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ability to review its past practices with respect to the lessons learned

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from Fukushima. And I could go into some detail about that, but not in three minutes.

Therefore, I'm asking you as a committee to call upon the President, to write the President and ask him to establish a Technical Review Committee to review the lessons learned from Fukushima independent of the NRC staff and commission review.

I support the Commission's review, the NRC staff's review, but you cannot expect them to review their past practices and come up with the best recommendations for this country.

And I think in particular with regard to spent fuel management, the Waste Confidence Rule gets in the way it's used by the NRC and Licensing Board to prevent the public from raising issues related to spent fuel management and licensing of existing and new reactors. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very much, Tom Cochran.

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1	Dan Brown will follow - excuse me.
2	Ernie.
3	MEMBER MONIZ: May I ask a
4	questions?
5	Tom, on this question of reviews,
6	there have been in congress a number of calls
7	for other kinds of reviews including, like,
8	for example, National Academy.
9	Can you comment on that vis-a-vis
10	your own proposal you just made?
11	TOM COCHRAN: Well, I think the
12	Academy would be useful if that's all - if
13	that's the only option.
14	We've asked for a commission along
15	the lines of the Kemeny Commission. As you
16	recall after Three Mile Island, there were two
17	independent reviews established, both the
18	Kemeny Commission and a review by the
19	congressional staff. And I think both of
20	those served a very useful service.
21	And I think the nation would be
22	better served if we followed that example with

respect to Fukushima.

I'd simply point out we had three core melts at Fukushima. And there are 23 reactors in the United States that are of similar design. Eight others have a Mark 2 instead of a Mark 1 containment. So, thirty percent of our fleet is similar to these Japanese reactors.

This was a serious problem, and it deserves serious national attention. And if you're going to duck the technical issues, we need a Technical Review Committee independent of the NRC to review these lessons learned.

We're not going to get the service we need from this commission or the staff alone.

MEMBER MONIZ: Any other comment on EPA rulemaking?

TOM COCHRAN: Well, we've had this discussion on siting repositories. I would urge that as part of your recommendations, that the licensing criteria for the repository

1	has to come before the selection of the sites.
2	Otherwise as we saw in the past
3	with respect to Yucca Mountain, the agencies
4	that are concerned, EPA, DOE, OMB, Justice go
5	into the back room and they massage the
6	criteria to -
7	MEMBER MacFARLANE: Tom, we actually
8	say that in the report.
9	TOM COCHRAN: Okay.
10	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
11	much, Mr. Cochran.
12	Dan Brown is the next speaker.
13	DAN BROWN: Good afternoon, ladies
14	and gentlemen. I'm going to blow through this
15	as quick as I can.
16	In your second meeting last year,
17	this commission was originally empaneled as to
18	deal with US nuclear, US-used fuel.
19	And in your second meeting, I made
20	some brief comments and I said we really
21	should look at the global issue, because
22	global events affect America. And I think

1 Fukushima has amply proven that was wise. 2 It's affecting our environment. 3 Shortly after the incident at Fukushima, 4 people were reporting low levels of radioactivity detected on the west coast. 5 6 It's affected our industry. The 7 popularity - the public opinion in the United States dropped. When there had been something 8 like seventy percent support for more nuclear 9 10 power, it dropped 25, 30, 35 points within two 11 weeks. And the nuclear industry had been 12 13 working for years to build up that confidence, and it just went "poof" like that. 14 15 have to deal with climate 16 change. We need a relative value of how much conventional sources of energy are costing us 17 and the risk that they entail compared to 18 19 nuclear power. 20 And, for instance, the ash spill down in Tennessee, there's more radioactivity 21

in that ash spill than there would be in a

nuclear accident.

We got - Abu Dhabi is developing new reactors now built by South Korea. And there's no plant that I know of to dispose of the spent fuel. And that could be a problem for us here in the United States.

And more than anything else, the public opinion issue is driving silly decisions like the German government deciding to shut down their whole nuclear industry.

I doubt if they're going to get hit by tsunamis or 9.0 earthquakes in Berlin. So, it was a political decision not based on science.

And most of the opposition in the United States has been, over the years, has been based on public opinion more than scientific validity.

Somebody mentioned earlier that, you know, with Siting Commission, you have to have an approval from the local community.

It's not just a matter of the local

community, you know. Fukushima is affecting us here.

Yucca Mountain, there was more opposition from people that didn't want the stuff shipped through Chicago or St. Louis or Omaha on the way to Yucca Mountain. There as more opposition from the transport question than there was from the people of Nevada.

Bruce Power in Canada attempted to ship parts of a decommissioned reactor through the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway over to Sweden a few months ago. And they didn't notify and get the approval of intermediate communities. And the result was that those communities went berserk when they heard about it. And every newspaper, every reporter in Canada put it on headlines that, you know, nuclear waste shipped through St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes.

And then the media went out and interviewed people that knew nothing about the issues, all of whom were anti-nuclear. And

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1	I've talked to people in the industry in the
2	states here that were really angry at Canada.
3	On the question of revenue, of
4	funding, I'm not sure the funding really
5	exists. The fund has - the money has been put
6	into the general fund, and I don't think it's
7	readily available. We should try and find a
8	way to pay for used fuel through future
9	revenue.
10	I don't think after Fukushima, I
11	don't think the American people will approve
12	any waste facility or interim facility
13	anywhere in Canada - in the United States,
14	rather. We need a pragmatic solution that the
15	public will support.
16	Okay. That's it. Thank you very
17	much.
18	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
19	much, Mr. Brown.
20	Next will be Judy Treichel, and she
21	will be followed by Mr. Markhijani.
22	JUDY TREICHEL: My name is Judy

1	Treichel. I'm from the Nevada Nuclear Waste
2	Task Force.
3	I'm concerned that when you had
4	your reports about Fukushima, that they were
5	sort of downplayed with what's going on.
6	I know that the news has sort of
7	dropped the issue, but I disagree with Mr.
8	Kokajko that there was increasing and growing
9	stability. I don't think there is.
10	And one of the questions that I
11	wished that you had asked or that I would like
12	you to take up is, why the release standards
13	or the allowable doses have been raised to the
14	point where schoolchildren can receive the
15	same or greater dose as a nuclear worker.
16	I think this is going to lead to
17	huge problems in the future. And I think it's
18	one of the things that you need to look at
19	because it certainly does show that the
20	problem is a very, very large one.
21	I also don't think that we should
22	be referring to this as an accident. It may

1	be in this case, but certainly nothing after
2	this case.
3	As Tom Cochran noted, we have the
4	same kind of reactor here. We have the same
5	sorts of problems here. There are problems
6	that have been pointed out for a long, long
7	time and nothing was done about them.
8	So, if something happens in the
9	future, it's not an accident. It's that we
LO	weren't careful enough and we didn't do what
L1	we should have done before that accident
12	occurred.
13	And I guess as a final point, we'd
L4	be more than happy to take all the money in
L 5	Yucca Mountain, but we do require that every
L 6	truck coming in be examined very carefully.
L7	Thank you.
L 8	(Laughter.)
L 9	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
20	much.
21	Mr. Markhijani, and he will be
22	followed by Mr. John Parry, Jr.

1 ARJUN MAKHIJANI: thank you 2 much, Mr. Chairman. 3 I'm Arjun Makhijani, president of Institute for Energy and Environmental 4 the Research. 5 6 I must say you could have a little 7 better served by your briefings about Fukushima. I was a little bit shocked to hear 8 that the NRC did not know how much spent fuel 9 10 there as at Fukushima and couldn't give you a relative assessment of what there is here. 11 So, let me give you a little vignette, anyway. 12 13 This information is public by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum since March. 14 15 Roughly 50 tons in Unit 1. Roughly 90 tons in 16 Unit 2 or 3, hundred tons - I got Unit 2 and 3 mixed up. 240 metric tons including the core, 17 in Unit 4. 18 19 When you add all those up, it is 20 less than in the spent fuel pool of Vermont Yankee alone, which was re-licensed without 21

requiring dry storage, in the middle of this

crisis.

I think the NRC is doing a shocking job. And I think their response to your questions about dry storage - well, since I can't think of any kind, polite ways to say it, I won't.

I think the public is not being well served. There are many obvious lessons that could have been learned on Day 3.

I issued a spent fuel pool warning on the 15th of March or the 14th of March, I think, before TEPCO. There are lots of lessons to be learned.

One among them that is obvious, that about one out of every hundred Light Water Reactors that have ever been built, has now suffered core damage.

That's a shocking number. And I think you ought to take into account before you recommend that we ought to continue making plutonium just to boil water, because that's what we're doing.

All right. I was disappointed that documents were not public before this. So, we couldn't read your reports and comment on them, and had to rely on slides and impromptu especially as we are restricted to three minutes.

I was happy to see - let me say something positive. I was happy to see that waste classification is proposed to be revised. I do agree. As a Hindu, I can tell you I'm well qualified to say we don't have a classification system, but we have a cask system for waste according to origin.

(Laughter.)

ARJUN MAKHIJANI: So, I'm glad that it is proposed to be revised.

I am not confident that performance standards will be properly implemented.

Performance standards are very flexible. In regard to depleted uranium, the NRC staff did a performance assessment in which they said there would be no erosion at

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an unspecific generic site for one million years.

And then during the public discussion of which a transcript is available, the author of this report essentially said it was silly to do that.

And the NRC's own expert also said it was silly. And then we all agreed that "silly" wasn't an appropriate regulatory term, or something equivalent to silly. I can't remember the exact word.

I can tell you that in the licensing technical document for the Utah Energy Solutions waste site, there is a number that says that Utah can dispose of more uranium than the weight of the earth per gram of Utah soil.

I testify to this under oath in 2004 at the same time as the government, NRC, and the company said, the licensed applicant, said that it was a scientifically sound report. And to date, it has not been

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1	corrected, nor have I been corrected.
2	I believe nuclear engineers are or
3	the site. You can see how many kilograms ten
4	to the 37 picocuries is and arrive at the same
5	conclusion of uranium 238.
6	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Your time is
7	expired Mr. Makhijani.
8	ARJUN MAKHIJANI: I think I have
9	zero confidence in the ability of the
10	establishment to do sensible performance
11	standards given that for seven years they have
12	not changed a document that says we can
13	dispose of more uranium than the weight of the
14	earth per gram of Utah soil.
15	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
16	much, Mr. Makhijani.
17	I understand Mr. Parry is not here.
18	Call to the microphone Katherine Fuchs. And
19	she will be followed by Geoff Fettus.
20	KATHERINE FUCHS: Hello. First, I
21	just want to thank the Commission for the
22	concern they've shown over the incidents at

Fukushima. I'm heartened to hear that a lot
of these recommendations are going to be
further investigated in light of what's
happening in Japan. And I wish that I got
that same feeling from the NRC.
So, I am representing the Alliance
for Nuclear Accountability, which is an
organization of 36 groups around the country
who live downwind and downstream of weapons
production facilities, waste storage sites and
reactors.
I cannot claim to represent
everyone in the communities affected by
nuclear waste and spent fuel, but we do have a
very diverse coalition, geographically
diverse, economically diverse and different
backgrounds.
And they all function on a
II
consensus process and have decided that

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I just wanted to reiterate why we

to go until we find a solution for disposal.

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1	see this as the way to go. First, there is
2	the realities of consolidated interim storage.
3	Is it fair? I'm not sure that it
4	can be because if waste is being produced all
5	over the country, brought to one location, is
6	it really the responsibility of that one
7	community to accept the waste created
8	elsewhere?
9	We don't think it is. We think
10	that the communities that create the waste
11	have a responsibility to deal with it.
12	Additionally, I'm not sure how it's
13	politically possible to get a community to
14	take interim waste when there's not a plan for
15	a permanent solution.
16	We, you know, I know that we're
17	just trying to put a way forward and not
18	specific details, this isn't a siting
19	commission, but this is a reality that we're
20	going to continue to run into.
21	So, perhaps the permanent disposal
22	and interim storage really do need to be

1	looked at together.
2	Finally, I just wanted to mention
3	the cost of transporting waste. Earlier
4	someone mentioned that we can look at the
5	European model and how safe they've been able
6	to transport waste.
7	I think that's great that they
8	haven't had an accident, but I would like to
9	point out that the European railroad system is
10	much more advanced than the United States
11	railroad system.
12	There's never been a single
13	fatality in all of France's railroad
14	operations. We may not have the same record.
15	So, there will be a lot of investment
16	required for transportation if we decided to
17	go with interim consolidated storage.
18	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
19	much, Ms. Fuchs.
20	The next speaker is Geoff Fettus.
21	He will be followed by Kara Colton.
22	GEOFF FETTUS: Thank you for having

me. I've set my stopwatch so I can stay under the three minutes, and also see if I can have time to say something more supportive like my boss, Tom Cochran.

Commissioner Lash stated that his subcommittee coalesced around the four basic concepts, need for disposal, a geologic repository with a new process and a new entity. That, I am supportive of, and as is NRDC.

However, Commissioner Rowe also noted that shortcuts are what's gotten the process into trouble. And we might express it a bit more bluntly, but we also agree with that.

Let me suggest a key and specific recommendation that must be in your July report, and certainly in any final report. If you want to achieve what you've set out to achieve, which is a transparent, workable process that arrives at siting and development of a geologic repository, which importantly

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isn't just a geologic repository by fiat, but engenders public trust in confidence, amend the Atomic Energy Act to no longer treat radioactivity as a privileged pollutant.

Specifically, I'm talking about the exemptions of radioactivity from our clean water and hazardous waste laws.

As several of you have noted in your questions today throughout the process, the current situation is not working and not just in terms of funding, although that's its own discussion, even more importantly in terms of authority and process.

And Commissioner Lash specifically noted that the subcommittee struggled with the idea of how it defines meaningful oversight for states in our federal system to protect public health, but also to avoid what he termed, and Ι wrote this down, constant interference with whatever new entity created.

And I don't really know what that

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meant, but, you know, we only have three minutes.

suggest new methods or You can ideas on public engagement all you want. And while it's welcome and we certainly will appreciate it, any consulting process that states have in what you suggest in forward is going to remain, at best, the half a loaf or, really, I would suggest, a quarter of a loaf that what Nevada had and what they ran into trouble with.

Until such time as states can set cleanup and other protective standards for water, land and air that they can enforce via RCRA, the Research, Conservation and Recovery Act, or the Clean Water Act with the attendant citizen supervisions, you won't get that public trust and buy-in.

Let me be clear I'm not suggesting a state would be the licensing regulator of a geologic repository, or the EPA would not be setting radiation protection standards,

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1	because I agree with that basic division of
2	resources.
3	Rather, once there is - rather, I'm
4	suggesting the states can actually say, for
5	example, there is a disaster along a
6	transportation line or in an operating nuclear
7	facility or at, God forbid, a proposed nuclear
8	facility.
9	Until such time as those states can
10	actually set cleanup standards and regulate
11	them, you will never get the buy-in until they
12	can regulate such releases are and will never
13	know what the bargain is.
14	So, in conclusion, unless and until
15	you recommend that congress do away with these
16	anachronistic exemptions, you're not going to
17	get the public trust that you're looking for.
18	Thank you.
19	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
20	much, Mr. Fettus.
21	Ms. Colton, and she will be
22	followed by Michele Boyd.

MS. COLTON: Hi, my name is Kara Colton from the Energy Communities Alliance. ECA is the organization of local governments that are adjacent to or impacted by DOE activities.

Many of our members are some of the communities that have expressed an interest in hosting future nuclear facilities.

Thank you for the opportunity. It's been great today to hear words like inclusive, transparent, open, consent based, negotiate, clear rules that there's an interest in defining "interim" and what that means, and that there was a recommendation to take the time and provide resources to ensure that the concerns of the communities are heard from the communities directly from themselves rather than just assumed.

I want to speak to you very briefly and submit for the record a letter that ECA submitted earlier this month to Secretary Chu.

We asked that DOE review the safety

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and security of defense-related high-level waste and spent fuel storage in light of what happened in Japan and as the NRC reviews domestic nuclear power facilities and spent fuel storage practices.

More specifically, we've asked Secretary Chu to review the impacts on local communities of long-term storage of defense-related spent fuel and high-level waste, and to analyze the cost and impact of cleanup budgets on storing and securing this waste at DOE sites.

In order to ensure the health and safety of local communities, the safety and security issues must be reviewed not only because of what happened in Japan, but regularly.

The findings should be reported publicly. This would be helpful to build trust amongst DOE, local communities and with the public.

In regards to the impact of cleanup

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budgets at DOE sites, ECA is concerned that cleanup funding is being used to store and secure the defense-related high-level waste and spent fuel. This could prevent essential cleanup activities from being completed.

Funds used to manage high-level waste at DOE sites were cut in 2011, and may be cut further in 2012.

The costs associated with storing and securing waste can be significant and may well grow, and they're coming out of the cleanup budget.

To ensure future storage needs are met while these issues are being discussed, the disposal issues, new facilities are likely to - need to be built. For example, storage facilities at Savannah River site and Hanford the vitrified to store waste that originally destined for Yucca Mountain. Securing these new facilities are going to add an additional cost.

Another example of the impact of

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1	budget cuts after WIPP's budget was recently
2	cut, the Carlsbad City Council voted
3	unanimously in an emergency session, to return
4	3.5 million in DOE infrastructure funds in
5	order to help protect about eighty jobs at
6	WIPP.
7	This leads to another ECA
8	recommendation, and that's that the
9	administration consider - I'm sorry, excuse me
10	- begin the dialog with communities now on
11	developing interim storage especially while we
12	have, and before we may lose, experienced
13	workers due to these budget constraints.
14	Thank you, and I'll submit the
15	letter.
16	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
17	much.
18	Ernie.
19	MEMBER MONIZ: A question because
20	I'm not sure I understood something at the
21	beginning of your remarks.
22	Did you say your organization

1	includes a number of communities interested in
2	hosting sits?
3	MS. COLTON: That may be understood
4	in hosting future facilities, yes.
5	MEMBER MONIZ: Can you name them?
6	(Laughter.)
7	MS. COLTON: I could name them. I'm
8	not sure I should name them. But, I mean,
9	Carlsbad is one of our members, for example,
10	that has expressed interest in possibly
11	hosting future sites. Thank you.
12	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: The letter you
13	referred to will be part of the record.
14	Michele Boyd is next, and she'll be
15	followed by Michael McLay. Thank you.
16	MS. BOYD: My name is Michele Boyd.
17	I'm with Positions for Social Responsibility,
18	and I presented to you in your very first
19	meeting the very first day that you all met.
20	And what I presented was the
21	principles for safeguarding nuclear waste at
22	reactor sites. And I'm highly disappointed to

1	not see any reference of this in your summary
2	of what you've learned from all the public
3	input.
4	This document calls for
5	safeguarding the waste, hardening the waste at
6	the waste sites. It's signed by a hundred -
7	over 170 organizations from all fifty states.
8	This is what the communities that
9	live near these sites want. They do not -
10	they do not - let me repeat. They do not want
11	to move the waste to some - willy-nilly to
12	some interim storage site.
13	There is disagreement. There isn't
14	agreement about permanent disposal and how we
15	go about doing that. And I think that's a
16	really important piece that your commission is
17	looking at.
18	But to try to claim that the lesson
19	from Fukushima is let's move this stuff faster
20	than ever, is completely missing the point.
21	It took nine years from the time
22	that the agreement for PFS was signed by the

1	leader of the Goshute Tribe, to the time that
2	the NRC gave the license. Nine years.
3	Are we going to wait nine years to
4	deal with the lessons of Fukushima which is
5	that over-packed pools are dangerous?
6	That lesson we know. We don't need
7	to wait for a final NRC 90-day review to know
8	that that is a serious problem.
9	And so what the communities around
10	these sites want, is for this waste to be
11	dealt with. We want the security threats to
12	be dealt with now.
13	And that should be your number one,
14	absolute, your number one recommendation. And
15	we're very disappointed to see that it's been
16	completely glossed over.
17	And then earlier this year we sent
18	a letter and we presented to you on February
19	2nd with another seventy subgroups laying out
20	the reasons why we oppose interim storage.
21	If you continue down this path, you
22	will have a lot of community groups fighting

you tooth and nail every step of the way.

If you go down the path of saying, okay, let's deal with the real security threats and let's involve the public in that process, you will have more cooperation.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very much, Michele Boyd. And now, Michael McLay.

MR. McLAY: I'd like to call the attention of the Committee to the report from Oak Ridge National Laboratories on molten salt reactors, history status and potential, that was published in 1969.

If you read the last concluding paragraphs of the intro of this report, it basically talks about how the molten salt reactor technology could be configured as either a converter or a breeder, which means that you could use it to actually burn nuclear waste, turn it into something other than - something less toxic and has a shorter half-life much more easily disposed of, and also

much smaller.

So, instead of looking at the waste fuel just being piled up as a waste, we can move it back over into the fuel column and fuel these kinds of reactor technologies.

These reactors are basically passively designed. So, they automatically shut down if something goes wrong with the system.

As a matter of fact, the way that works is there's a tube that has a piece of frozen dissolvent that is in the liquid reactor. It's frozen in a tube at the bottom.

If the power goes out, that tube dissolves and the liquid all just goes down into a tank below the reactor. So, it's a very nice design.

And, in fact, the engineers at Oak Ridge who designed this, and physicists, basically did this every weekend because they didn't want to stay around for the reactor on the weekend. So, they turned the switch off

1 on the fan, the plug would melt and the stuff 2 would go into it. 3 So, it's been tested thousands well, hundreds of times, anyway. 4 It's a very nice, simple system. 5 6 Now, this research was conducted -7 well, this report was from 1969. So, we've been sitting on this technology for forty 8 And now what's happening, China is 9 years. 10 investing a billion dollars in this technology because they got our reports off of, well, a 11 website that has all the reports on it. 12 13 they're going off to implement this technology. 14 So, we could replace the current 15 16 technology with breeder -- converter reactors that could be converted into breeder reactors 17 and burn up the fuel that's sitting as waste 18 19 right now. Burn it up as fuel instead. 20 So, that's basically the - oh, and one other thing I wanted to mention. 21

missed a really great opportunity yesterday.

1	The Energy Thorium Alliance had a meeting, a
2	conference here where we talked about this. I
3	think, Per, you were there.
4	And it was a really interesting
5	meeting of - it's a really vibrant community.
6	Kirk Sorenson is in the audience. He's got a
7	website called Energy from Thorium. I think
8	he's given a talk, a presentation before this
9	committee before.
10	And I emphasize this is technology
11	that could solve problems instead of having
12	everybody sit here saying, well, what are you
13	going to do about the problems.
14	Build these reactors to burn the
15	fuel. We get more energy out of it instead of
16	putting it in a hole. Thank you.
17	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
18	much, Mr. McLay.
19	Mr. Michael Conley to be followed
20	by Mr. Robert Orr, Jr.
21	Mr. Conley.
22	MR. CONLEY: Good afternoon. I

1	wrote something. I'm just going to read it.
2	I'm not a public speaker. So, please bear
3	with me.
4	Nuclear power isn't the problem.
5	the problem is with the reactors we've been
6	using to produce it.
7	Had the reactors of Fukushima had
8	the liquid fluoride thorium reactors, they
9	wouldn't have had a disaster on their hands.
10	Liquid fuel reactor technology was
11	successfully developed at Oak Ridge National
12	Labs in the 1960s.
13	Although the test reactor worked
14	flawlessly, the project was shelved, the
15	victim of Cold War technology - excuse me - a
16	victim of Cold War strategy. I said I'm not a
17	public speaker.
18	A LFTR is a completely different
19	type of reactor. For one thing, it cannot
20	melt down. It is physically impossible for a
21	LFTR to melt down.

And

since it's air cooled, not

1 water cooled, it does not have to be located 2 near the shore or near any water source. 3 Ιt be placed can even in an 4 underground vault. A tsunami would roll right over it like a truck over a manhole cover. 5 6 A LFTR uses liquid fuel, not solid 7 fuel, nuclear material dissolved in molten fluoride salt. Fluoride salt is like table 8 salt, only different. It's a salt. You melt 9 it, you put in the thorium, you now have a 10 liquid fuel. 11 Conventional reactors are 12 13 pressure cookers. They use solid fuel rods to super heat water. That means there's the 14 15 constant danger of high pressure, ruptures, 16 and steam leaks, but liquid fuel can always expand and cool off. 17 It's walk-away safe because LFTRs 18 19 don't use water or steam. Instead they heat a 20 common gas like CO2 to spin a turbine for generating power. 21

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So, if a LFTR leaks, it is not a

catastrophe. The molten salt spills out and cools off quickly becoming an inert lump of rock.

The entirety of the fuel can be recovered and put back in the reactor once the reactor is repaired. It does not go into the environment.

Uranium is water soluble. It can be carried away by river or the moisture in the air. But the fluoride salts in the reactor, do not react with water or air. They are inert. It can be recovered. Big, big difference. Think about it.

LFTRs burn thorium, a mildly radioactive material as common as tin, is found all over the world. We've already mined enough thorium to power this country for 400 years. That is not an exaggeration.

It's the waste of our rare earth element mines which, by the way, are closed now because China is mining rare earth and refining it and selling it to us.

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1	We go hat in hand to them for our
2	rare earth to run our missile systems. That
3	doesn't sound very good to me.
4	LFTRs consume fuel so efficiently
5	that they can even use the spent fuel from
6	other reactors. Ma'am, the spent fuel from
7	other reactors, LFTRs can burn them and
8	utilize it as fuel.
9	Spent fuel is unutilized fuel.
LO	Will these work? Let's build one and see.
11	That's all I'm asking. Let's build one and
12	see.
13	And those that say we shouldn't
L4	build it, they should advocate us building it
15	so we can make fools out of ourselves in front
16	of the whole world.
L7	So, let's just build one and see.
18	Thank you.
L 9	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
20	much, Mr. Conley.
21	Mr. Orr.
22	MR ORR Mr Chairman ladies and

gentlemen, my name is Robert Orr, Jr. I'm a retired attorney from Franklin, Tennessee, a member of the Thorium Energy Alliance. I was here for the same conference that's been referred to. A lot of my thunder has been stolen, which makes my job a lot easier.

I've represented clients in front

of judges and juries for 35 years. And now as a retired attorney, I only have one client.

And it is by far, the most important client that I have ever represented or ever expect to represent.

And that client is clean, safe, cheap electric power for the future, furnished by molten sale reactors, specifically the LFTR that's already been referred to.

I don't have time to go through the manifold benefits and superiorities of molten sale technology, because we're not given enough time.

Senator Alexander, our senator from Tennessee, in July 2009, proposed something

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that he calls a blueprint for 100 new nuclear reactors over the next twenty years.

That is a marvelous, marvelous idea. He has it right. But as Mr. Conley pointed out, he is advocating existing solid fuel technology that is -- which, by the way, is in every nuclear reactor on earth. And that's what has given us Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and now it's given us Fukushima.

The difference is between solid fuel reactor, the reactors of the past, the 60-year-old technology that's done pretty well, but not well enough, and the new old technology which is only fifty years old as we've heard about with Alvin Weinberg and his brilliant scientists at Oak Ridge, and that's molten salt technology.

It will address virtually every problem that you can identify associated with solid fuel reactor is solved, and solved forever by molten salt technology, the LFTR.

Now, the reason we are members of

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this organization is to spread the word to People against educate. who are LFTR technology either don't know about it, and that's what we're trying to solve. they do know about it and they're not in favor of it, then it's everyone's job to ask why. Why are you not in favor of it? And then listen very, very, very closely to the answer, analyze the answer.

I can virtually guarantee that the answer that you hear will not solve the electricity problems for the rest of the world and for the rest of history in a clean, safe, abundant, cheap way.

LFTR technology will do that. The Chinese are developing it. While you all are sitting right here, the Chinese are working vigorously and aggressively to take this technology away from us.

And then as Mr. Conley pointed out when they do that, we're going to have to go to them hat in hand to get it back.

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1	It's our technology. It's sitting
2	on a shelf. There are scientists at the
3	University of Tennessee today who would like
4	nothing better than to dust that technology
5	off, start where it ended. And I think
6	sincerely within ten years, we could shut down
7	every coal plant on earth. Thank you.
8	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
9	much, Mr. Orr.
10	Mr. Bennet, Bryan Bennett is next.
11	And he will be followed by Parker Griffith.
12	Mr. Bennet.
13	MR. BENNET: Thank you, Mr.
14	Chairman, and I appreciate being here today.
15	And I appreciate those kind words about
16	staffers.
17	Having been a staffer, I'm a
18	retired colonel in the Air Force with four
19	assignments at the Pentagon which is more
20	assignments than any self-respecting pilot
21	would want to admit to. But it was important
22	work and I believed in it.

1	It seems to me that this commission
2	has worked hard and worked honestly and openly
3	dealing with the problems that you have. And
4	that is dealing with the nuclear material
5	waste that is out there.
6	My concern is that I didn't see
7	anything in the report that addresses trying
8	to avoid that much nuclear waste.

I too am astounded by what I have LFTR, heard and learned about the liquid fluoride thorium reactor. And I saw some of you kind of smile when it brings up, and that does concern me a little bit. I'm not sure what you've heard.

study endlessly various can things. My first assignment out of Air Command and Staff College was in doctrine, concepts, and objectives.

And were known for these we esoteric pieces that had a four-year followed by a five-year study followed by a few nuances here that went on to something,

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but also they came out with new leadership out of that.

General John Pustay came in with a make-it-happen kind of an attitude. And out of the doctrine shop came the A-10, the airplane the A-10 which we have in the inventory today for close air support. It's been a tremendous asset. So, there are things that studies can do if there's a focus put to it.

I would like to see if this commission to recommend to DOE or DARPA or someone, to take some hard looks at the liquid fluoride thorium reactor. Prove it wrong.

I've heard some others say that.

What are you hearing about LFTR that's not what are you hearing about the molten salt
reactors that's not there?

But what I am also hearing, and if you haven't heard this, that a Ph.D. out of Drexel University, a fine school, is heading up the Chinese LFTR program, molten salt

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reactor program. And he's very well connected with a Chinese family.

If I know that and you don't, I would be concerned especially if we're talking about American leadership in something.

If LFTR consumes 99 percent of the nuclear material, consumes 99 percent, it only has one percent left over.

Instead of a Light Water Reactor that consumes one percent and has 99 percent left over, that would certainly seem to me to make the problem of finding safe nuclear storage a smaller problem at least in volume, if not anything else.

I would ask this commission to please take a look at something that is safe, something that operates in one atmospheric pressure. It's not going to blow up on you. That is passively safe. And that if it does lose power to it, the freeze plug and the thing that blows out and it just melts into a vessel of salt, it's passively safe, in other

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1	words.
2	There are a lot of attributes that
3	there are people who can talk to you and
4	perhaps challenge some of the other things you
5	may have heard about it.
6	And I would ask that that be done
7	and DOE take a look at it. Thank you.
8	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
9	much, Colonel Bennet.
10	We now have Parker Griffith. He
11	will be followed by Diane D'Arrigo. I'm not
12	sure I pronounced that correctly, but I
13	apologize if I mispronounced it.
14	Mr. Griffith.
15	MR. GRIFFITH: Thank you, Mr.
16	Chairman, and committee. I'm Parker Griffith.
17	I'm a radiation oncologist by training. And
18	a former Congressman in my district, was the

When I listened to the Committee

district that created the Saturn V.

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we believe that America can solve this nuclear

problem that we have.

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And so,

today, it reminded me of all the seminars I sat in on lung cancer. And then we went out in the hall and smoked.

(Laughter.)

MR. GRIFFITH: I think that - I think we've got to get a hard, hard, hard look at the technology that's available out there.

I think the molten liquid and the thorium technology is in fact workable, but I do think we have to take a Sputnik attitude toward it in the sense that we're not now on a global stage communicating with China, India, and others. And so, there's not a lot of time for us to be king of the hill and assume that China is going to wait on us or allow us to catch up with them.

So, we need - we need direction.

We need - we need an executive command to put

- I think in 1962 when Dr. Seaborg responded

to President Kennedy about nuclear power, he

mentioned thorium.

And I believe that it's an answer.

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1	And I think we have to put a full-court press
2	on to prove it or disprove it. Because right
3	now - right now we're turning our nuclear
4	energy resources into a chronic sore or a
5	chronic illness.
6	We need to look for a cure. We're
7	putting band-aids and band-aids and casts on
8	and we're responding to a crisis in Japan, and
9	we'll have another crisis down the road.
10	We are a nuclear community. Browns
11	Ferry came through the massive tornadoes very
12	well. I compliment TVA. And, you know,
13	they've been under the gun quite a bit.
14	We know we can do this, but we
15	cannot do it unless we really feel threatened.
16	Sputnik threatened us. We're being
17	threatened now.
18	If China becomes energy
19	independent, they rule the world and we will
20	still be in the Mideast ten years in a country
21	- 11 years in a country all about hydrocarbon.

Thank you. Appreciate it.

1	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
2	much, and now Diane D'Arrigo. And the final
3	speaker will be following her, Alex Cannara.
4	Diane, I'm not sure I pronounced
5	your name correctly.
6	MS. D'ARRIGO: You got it.
7	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Okay.
8	MS. D'ARRIGO: It'S Diane D'Arrigo
9	and I'm with Nuclear Information Resource
10	Service.
11	And I wanted to express
12	disappointment with the failure of any of the
13	committees, particularly the Disposal - or the
14	Transport and Storage Committee, to
15	acknowledge the agreed upon statement form
16	over 170 organizations for hardened onsite
17	storage that would be an interim storage step
18	that could be taken without transport.
19	When the technical concerns were
20	presented, we expressed our technical
21	opposition to this in a presentation in
22	February. But the message today that we're

hearing, is that that was completely ignored.

And part of the problem with proceeding with what to do with nuclear waste has been ignoring what the public legitimately cares about and is concerned about.

And so, I would repeat what others have said, but reemphasize that if you want to involve the public, if you want public support, you can't take our advice and then completely ignore it, not even address it.

So, this is just a draft. So, maybe in the final we'll see some expression of an opinion about the concern -- the recommendations that we've made.

about the -- we are concerned about the lack of balance on the Committee. And what this recommendation appears to do is to simply provide a way for the liability for the irradiated fuel to be shifted clearly to the taxpayer. All it does is to set up another site that's a target that's another facility

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1	that would have a risk of environmental or
2	safety or security risks.
3	And add to it the transport risks
4	and there's no real advantage. In fact,
5	there's the disadvantage of the transport
6	risks and the additional site or sites that
7	would be the interim sites.
8	So if you proceed with this, you
9	are simply repeating the same mistake as has
LO	been made over and over in nuclear waste
11	siting.
12	And we will have more comments when
13	we review in more detail.
L 4	MEMBER SHARP: Mr. Chairman?
15	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Yes.
L 6	MEMBER SHARP: Could I just make an
L7	indication I appreciate the comments, and it's
18	true in our verbal comments we did not
L 9	reference the document that so many of you
20	worked so hard on.
21	MS. D'ARRIGO: Yes.
22	MEMBER SHARP: But in fact, and

1	unfortunately this is we're ahead of
2	ourselves in terms of what we've released.
3	But in the draft report already, I assure you
4	there is both reference to your document and
5	reference to the arguments that you folks make
6	about the transportation question if you go to
7	consolidating storage, as well as to the HOSS
8	proposal.
9	And while you may or may not we
10	did not reach the same conclusion you reached.
11	We clearly, and I'm sorry we didn't say so
12	verbally, acknowledge both the arguments and
13	the document itself.
14	MS. D'ARRIGO: Okay. The point
15	really is
16	MEMBER SHARP: Although, I
17	understand you really care about the
18	substance, but
19	MS. D'ARRIGO: Well, no, I certainly
20	care about the substance, but also part of
21	this is dealing with the public. And so,
22	okay, so you'll dismiss us later in writing

1	and you didn't dismiss us yet today in
2	writing.
3	I'm just -
4	MEMBER SHARP: No, no, I
5	MS. D'ARRIGO: expressing that
6	this is something that was hard pressed, hard
7	fought for.
8	I was one of the biggest dissenters
9	myself to some pieces of it, but we are in
10	agreement on it that you can't - we've got an
11	immediate danger at our facilities. And we've
12	got a faster way to deal with it than having
13	any kind of siting program.
14	MEMBER SHARP: I understand. I'm
15	not going to argue the content with you, but I
16	want to be very clear that we more than heard
17	you, we actually addressed some of the things,
18	but I regret we didn't say anything so that
19	you and others could actually know that fact.
20	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Per.
21	MEMBER PETERSON: Could I add one
22	additional question?

1	One of the major elements of the
2	recommendation is the need to focus on trying
3	to move material from shutdown reactor sites
4	where you have nine, and consolidate it to a
5	number of sites.
6	And in your comments, you did
7	mention, you know, and emphasize the fact that
8	you have multiple targets and this would in
9	effect reduce the number of targets.
10	I think it would be very -
11	MS. D'ARRIGO: How would it reduce
12	it?
13	MEMBER PETERSON: Going from nine to
14	a smaller number is a reduction, but -
15	MS. D'ARRIGO: Yes, but you're not
16	stopping making more of any of them.
17	MEMBER PETERSON: But again, of
18	course, the Commission's recommendation is to
19	focus the effort on the shutdown sites and to
20	move that material.
21	I think it would be helpful to have
22	some better understanding of the arguments for

1	and against that. Because to me at least it's
2	not -
3	MS. D'ARRIGO: For the closed
4	reactors?
5	MEMBER PETERSON: For the closed
6	reactors.
7	MS. D'ARRIGO: Okay.
8	MEMBER PETERSON: Why material
9	should remain at those sites rather than being
LO	consolidated.
11	And, in fact, I'm also skeptical
L2	about the wisdom of moving large amount of
L3	stuff from operating reactor sites. But the
L 4	closed ones, at least I can't figure out why
L 5	it doesn't make sense to try to consolidate
L 6	that material.
L 7	And it would be helpful to have at
L 8	least those arguments worked out in better
L 9	detail because it to me, at least, I think it
20	seems to make sense that if you consolidate
21	the material to a smaller number of sites, it

does generate less risk.

1	MS. D'ARRIGO: Well, some, you know,
2	I'm not going to speak for the whole group of
3	170, but our argument would be that if you
4	close them down, you're going to have a lot
5	more interest and willingness of people to do
6	something else with it.
7	But to just move it from a facility
8	that's continuing to generate it is - it's not
9	solving the problem. It's exacerbating it.
10	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
11	much, Ms. D'Arrigo.
12	And the final speaker will be Mr.
13	Cannara.
14	MR. CANNARA: Hello. Pardon my
15	dress. I had to walk across town to find this
16	place. I'm from California. So, I don't know
17	much about D.C., but I do know how D.C. takes
18	time to do things.
19	How many people here, including in
20	the audience, have read the AEC report given
21	to John F. Kennedy at his request in 1962?
22	(Show of hands.)

1	MR. CANNARA: Good. Someone has.
2	Very rare event. It's only entitled Civilian
3	Nuclear Power and it addresses directly the
4	fears that they had at the time that we would
5	fall behind in having energy sufficient for
6	economy and safety and world power in 1960s.
7	And it specifically outlines what we should
8	have done, and we have not done it.
9	What we should have done according
10	to the report, was to start with the Light
11	Water Reactor that Hyman Ricover put in his
12	submarines that Alvin Weinberg helped design.
13	And then as we move ahead with the
14	breeder reactor program, we would substitute
15	and eliminate these water-based coolant
16	systems which are giving us all the trouble we
17	now experience, which actually is not that
18	very much trouble.
19	Nuclear power is probably the
20	safest form of mass energy generation than any
21	- that humans have ever invented.

Certainly the invention of fire

1	400,000 years ago or control of it has not -
2	has a large number of casualties.
3	So, what I want to know is if the
4	Commission is actually going to take account
5	of what was said at taxpayer expense to John
6	F. Kennedy in 1962, and review the
7	recommendations which said by the year 2000 we
8	should have 700 gigawatts of safe nuclear
9	power based on breeder reactors.
10	At the time, they weren't afraid to
11	make plutonium. So, they would breed from
12	regular uranium, spent fuel, whatever.
13	We don't' have to do that. We have
14	a thousand years worth of thorium in one mine,
15	1,400 acres in Idaho, Lemhi Pass between
16	Montana and Idaho.
17	And so, we can do the thorium
18	breeder reactor which Weinberg and the ORNI
19	team worked on for twenty years and perfected
20	and operated for four years in the 1960s.
21	And that reactor is exactly what

the son of the president, the former president

1	of China now has a billion dollars to develop
2	using our plans, all our research, everything
3	that we did as an American research
4	institution 49 years ago.
5	So, even if Washington does operate
6	slowly, 49 years does sound to be a little
7	excessive. And that's the point I think we
8	need to make to this Commission, to whoever is
9	going to listen to this report.
10	Thanks.
11	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Thank you very
12	much, Mr. Cannara. I thank all of our
13	presenters for their statements this
14	afternoon. I thank the commissioners for
15	their participation today.
16	And, Vicky, I want to thank you
17	especially for helping me on the chairing.
18	MEMBER BAILEY: That's all right.
19	CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: That adjourns
20	the meeting. Thank you very much.
21	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
22	matter went off the record at 3:50 p.m.)

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