CONTRACTOR TRAINING OF AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2009
United States Senate,
Commission on Wartime Contracting,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays, Co-Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
Present: Commissioners Shays, Green and Tiefer.

[NOTE: Several editorial clarifications appear in square brackets.]

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHAYS

Chairman Shays. Good morning. I would like to call
the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan to order, our hearing.

I am Christopher Shays, Co-Chairman of the Commission
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thank you
for attending this hearing on contractor training of Afghan
National Security Forces.

This opening statement is made on behalf of my Co-
Chairman, Michael Thibault, who is not here because of a
family emergency, our fellow commissioners and myself. The
other commissioners at the dais today are Grant Green to my
right and, to my left, Charles Tiefer. Also participating
is Robert Dickson, the Executive Director who heads our
staff of 50 and deserves your sympathy for having 8
commissioners who are his bosses.

Our hearing could not be more timely. Eight years after entering Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime that had sheltered al-Qaeda terrorists, the United States has about 70,000 troops in the country. Our President has decided, after consulting with military leaders, to send another 30,000 Americans there. It is hoped our allies will send collectively an additional 10,000 troops.

We want to note with respect and gratitude that the men and women of America’s armed forces have paid a heavy price for their service in both Iraq and Afghanistan. As of December 17th, the fatality count since the start of U.S. combat operations in Southwest Asia stands at 5,287, with 931 of the deaths occurring in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, more than 40 other countries operating under United Nations authority—the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Poland, Australia and others—have over 30,000 troops in Afghanistan and have suffered casualties as well.

By the end of 2010, therefore, there will be more than 140,000 U.S. and Allied military personnel in Afghanistan. As of September, 2009, there were 104,000 contractor employers working for the Department of Defense in Afghanistan. The Congressional Research Service estimated just this week that the troop surge in Afghanistan could raise the number of DoD
contractors working there to between 130,000 to 160,000.

We would note that those numbers, striking as they are, do not include the thousands of Department of State and USAID contractors in Afghanistan. Conservatively speaking, then, the total warfighter and contractor workforce in that country will likely exceed 300,000 by the end of 2010.

The UNsanctioned military presence in Afghanistan is large and growing, but we must note the challenge there is also large and becoming more acute. Afghanistan is nearly the size of Texas, but, unlike Texas, is mostly mountainous and subject to brutal extremes of weather.

The Afghan population is estimated at 29 million. They are mostly rural, mostly poor, mostly illiterate.

These conditions and a mounting insurgency pose great challenges to military operations, as well as top the governmental, nongovernmental and contractor organizations that provide security, reconstruction, logistical and humanitarian assistance.

It is safe to say none of the countries assisting Afghanistan in its struggle against hardline insurgents and terrorists wants to have a long-term military presence there. Certainly, the United States does not. That is why building a well trained, well led and law-abiding national security force in Afghanistan is a vital mission.

That mission is daunting. Afghanistan's military was
severely degraded during the Soviet occupation and the civil war that led to the Taliban regime. Today, the beleaguered Afghan National Army numbers about 105,000, about half the size of Iraq's army, even though the two countries' populations are nearly equal.

The Afghan National Police and border police have their own problems. The Congressional Research Service said in an August report, the Afghan National Police are riddled with corruption and short of equipment. And no one could argue with that.

In September, the Washington Post published a confidential commander's summary from General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, that depicted broader problems. The General wrote of the weakness of state institutions, maligned actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, as well as errors by the international forces.

Despite all these challenges, the United States and other countries with a presence in Afghanistan are working to promote a stable and democratic Afghanistan while preventing al-Qaeda or other terrorists from resuming operations from havens in that country. From that perspective, training the Afghan National Security Forces is the ballgame. Regardless of the issue under debate, the end game must be creating self-sufficient Afghanistan army,
national police and border police forces that are free from corruption and are able to provide adequate security.

From fiscal year 2002 through 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense will have spent nearly $30 billion on training, equipping and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces. As a point of reference, this effort is exceeded only by the theater-wide LOGCAP logistics support program. This Commission does not want a program of this size, with its various contracts, to get mired in the same welter of problems that the Commission has documented in LOGCAP.

Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement has obligated more than a billion dollars for counter-narcotics and basic police training.

Unfortunately, as the General Accountability Office reported last month, Afghanistan's security situation has deteriorated significantly since 20055, affecting all aspects of U.S. and Allied reconstruction operations. Increased insurgent activity combined with weaknesses in Afghan National Security Forces has caused delay or abandonment of some reconstruction projects, disrupted already tenuous supply lines, undermined anti-narcotics programs and hindered training of Afghan government forces.

All of these facts show the growing importance and the growing challenge of training effective Afghan army and
police personnel.

The Department of Defense is committing the 4th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, a company of military police, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team to the training effort, and will be taking over the national police training mission from the Department of State, but there are not enough military trainers to do the training. Contractors like Xe, MPRI and DynCorp play a significant role in the U.S. training effort in Afghanistan. And, as we noted earlier, contractors' role is likely to grow as the buildup of Afghan army and police ranks continues.

Considering all these facts, we need to ask:

How well are the training contracts being drafted and awarded?

How effective is contract management and oversight?

How good are the results, particularly for key metrics like recruitment and retention?

What mix of military and contract trainers is optimal?

And, from a broader perspective, how appropriate is it to have armed force training administered by contractors, however much military experience and instructional skill they may have?

These questions converge in large part on the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, commonly called CSTC-A. CSTC-A works with the Afghan government and
international forces and organizations to promote security and stability in Afghanistan. This includes managing a $404 million contract to train and support Afghan National Security Forces.

To understand the critical role of CSTC-A in theater, this Commission has met with both its former commander, Major General Richard Formica, and its new commander, Lieutenant General William Caldwell, who also commands the new NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. We are grateful for the cooperation provided by these fine officers.

Unfortunately, the July 30th, 2009 report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said, CSTC-A does not have the capability to ensure that U.S. funds are managed effectively and spent wisely. The SIGAR report, in which CSTC-A concurred, noted that the single contracting officer's technical representative in-country for the contract had limited experience and had been unable to make field visits to check performance.

More resources have since been applied to this problem, but significant questions remain to discuss in this hearing, not only for CSTC-A and DoD but also for the Department of State and for the holders of Federal contracts.

We are fortunate to have the assistance of three panels of expert witnesses to help us assess the challenges of
training Afghan security forces.

Our first panel has a single witness, Ambassador Kenneth Moorefield, Assistant Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations, Department of Defense.

The second panel has three witnesses: Major General Richard Formica, U.S. Army, former Commander of Combined Security Transition Command, in other words, CSTC-A, Afghanistan; David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; and Michael Strain, Program Executive, Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, Department of Defense.

Our third panel, offering a contractor perspective, also has three witnesses: Don Ryder, Vice President, Civilian Police Programs, DynCorp International; Fred Roitz, Executive Vice President, Xe Company, formerly known as Blackwater; and Nick Nickerson, Program Manager, Afghan National Security Sector Development and Fielding Program of the MPRI division of L-3 Communications.

Although the contractor panel is last on our schedule, contractors are not last in our thoughts. As a member of Congress, I have traveled to Iraq many times and returned 10 days ago with other commissioners, from Afghanistan. We are aware of the challenges in the U.S. contracting process and have previously highlighted instances of waste, fraud and abuse by some contractors. But we have also observed that
contractors supporting American military and reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan get high marks from our troops in the field and that contractor employees include a large number of experienced, hardworking and patriotic Americans. Their work is vital.

We have met contractors who have been in-theater five years or more, providing continuity and institutional memory that is difficult to sustain in a six-month or one-year deployment by U.S. military or civilian employees.

We are aware that many contractor employees have died in support of the mission in Afghanistan. It is troubling that no one can provide specific reliable numbers to document the deaths and injuries they have suffered, as if somehow their deaths and injuries do not matter as much.

Let me say for the record that this Commission deeply respects the work and honors the sacrifice of government contractors and appreciates hearing their views of the situation on the ground.

Today’s distinguished witnesses have been asked to summarize their testimony in five to seven minutes. We will allow it in some cases to go over, in order to ensure adequate time for questions and answers. We also ask that witnesses submit responses within 15 business days to any questions for the record and any additional information they may offer to provide. The full text of their written
statements will be entered into the hearing record and posted on the Commissions' web site.

On behalf of my fellow commissioners, we thank all of today's witnesses for participating in what we view as a very important hearing. After the swearing-in, we will begin by hearing from Ambassador Moorefield.

And let me just state for the record, we encountered somewhat of a perfect storm with some of our members when we rescheduled this hearing, not able to come, and particularly for my Co-Chairman who this morning was planning to come except for a family emergency.

[The prepared joint statement of Chairman Shays and Chairman Thibault follows:]
Chairman Shays. So, with that, if you would, Ambassador Moorefield, would you stand? And I understand that two others may respond to questions, so if they would stand, raising your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Ambassador Moorefield. I do.

Mr. Baker. I do.

Mr. Myer. I do.

Chairman Shays. Note for the record that our primary witnesses responded in the affirmative. If the other two are called to testify, we will make sure their names are given for the record.

So, Ambassador Moorefield, I understand your statement may take about seven minutes. If it runs over a little bit, I will just let you know, but I think you will be able to give it in the fashion you want.
Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you. Chairman Shays, distinguished members of the Commission, good morning. Thank you for this invitation and the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General.

I would like to share this morning our experiences and views, at your request, regarding the challenges and risks associated with contingency contracting in support of the training and mentoring mission specifically in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

As Commissioner Shays pointed out, contractor assistance has provided the U.S. Military an indispensable resource in building Afghanistan security forces. Contract personnel have played many roles, augmenting the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan or CSTC-A. For example, contractor support of management systems development and senior leader development has been key to the institutional development of the Ministries of Defense and Interior who, respectively, are responsible for the
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

In addition, U.S. contractors are embedded in the Afghan army at the corps level and below, and provide mentoring and training teams that rove across the entire Afghan army command.

They manage, in addition, police basic training centers, serve with police mentoring teams assigned to the provinces and district headquarters, and there they develop civil policing skills and provide a positive role model for their Afghan counterparts.

Contracted companies are also essential in constructing training and basing facilities across the country.

In addition to contributing specialized skills, many contract personnel have been in Afghanistan far longer than their military or civilian counterparts. Their continued presence has provided a significant degree of continuity and stability in support of the training and mentoring mission.

But the mission to develop an effective ANSF faces uniquely complex problems because of Afghanistan's remarkably difficult--uniquely difficult, I should say--operating environment. Illiteracy is in excess of 70 percent. Extensive poverty and related endemic corruption are a pervasive reality.

Outside of the national and regional capitals of Kabul, Kandahar, Heart, Masar-e-Sharif and Gardez, there is still
relatively little infrastructure to support widely dispersed army and police operations. Buildings, if they exist at all, are often little more than mud huts.

The transportation system is marginal, and severe weather conditions make building, or even accessing, remote mountain bases virtually impossible during the winter. When roads can be built to supply military and police bases and outposts, much of the construction material, including cement, has to be brought in from outside the country.

Any piece of land suitable for construction, for a new army or police facility or base, first has to be de-mined, and then conflicting claims of ownership among sometimes numerous competing individuals and families can delay projects for over a year.

Increasingly, moreover, improvised explosive device attacks by Taliban insurgents on the main roads have disrupted construction convoys. Taliban extortion, kidnapping and murder of construction personnel have discouraged contractors from operating in many areas formerly considered secure.

Since realistically there are few Afghan companies with the infrastructure construction experience to meet contractual timing and performance requirements, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has had to rely primarily on U.S. and third country contractors for construction support.
Even then, projects are often delayed or stopped altogether, especially in areas found to be insufficiently secure.

Earlier this year, our Deputy Inspector General gave congressional testimony, stating that the size and skill of the DoD acquisition workforce in Southwest Asia had not kept pace with the growth of its contract oversight responsibilities. Expeditionary military operations have placed extraordinary demands on the DoD contracting system, which was, you may know, significantly reduced in the 1990s. The result was a relatively small number of DoD contracting personnel had been assigned responsibilities for an unreasonably large number of contracts.

A report the Office of the Inspector General issued this September validated that concern with respect to Afghanistan, particularly with respect to the training and mentor mission. It found that the lack of sufficient, well trained and experienced contract oversight support for CSTC-A and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had resulted in an ongoing failure to ensure that contractors selected had the expertise to meet performance standards. Moreover, rapid turnover of contracting officers and contracting officer's representatives, after three to six-month tours, had prevented oversight continuity and hindered effectiveness.

DoD contract oversight is progressing, however. In response to concerns expressed in this Office of the
Inspector General report, the Defense Contract Management Agency reports that it has realigned its resources in-theater, significantly increasing personnel assigned to Afghanistan. The Afghan Engineering District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also has increased staff to provide additional quality assurance oversight for its growing construction project responsibilities. Additionally, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan has had its own personnel surge to adequately support contracting in Afghanistan, including for the buildup of the ANSF.

If I could now please turn to the issue of the pending transfer of responsibility from the Department of State to DoD for the police basic training program contract in Afghanistan. Since 2005, the State Department has managed basic police training through its contract with DynCorp International, the funding for which DoD provided.

Earlier this year, the Senate Appropriations Committee requested a contract audit of the administration and expenditure of DoD appropriated funding. The joint DoD/State Department team conducting this audit anticipates concluding its final report by the first of 2010.

However, the State Department has already agreed to transfer responsibility to DoD for the police training contract once it expires. We understand that this decision was based on a mutual recognition that creating a single
unified chain of command responsibility for police training would enhance more flexible program implementation.

To facilitate transferring contract responsibility, the audit team recommended establishing a joint transfer oversight working group, formed in August of this year, which is currently addressing transition issues, among them, government property disposition, training center management, logistics support and future contracting.

In closing, let me please note that providing oversight support for DoD's mission in Afghanistan, including to build the capability of the country's security forces, is a top priority of our Inspector General. We are currently deploying additional OIG personnel to the region, and to Afghanistan specifically, to reinforce on-the-ground oversight capability, including for contingency contracting and support of training and mentoring of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Thank you, and I would welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Moorefield follows:]
Chairman Shays. Thank you very much.

We are going to start questions with Grant Green, and we are going to do 10 minutes or less.

Commissioner Green. Thank you, Ambassador.

I think everyone in this room and in our Country recognizes the value and the necessity of using contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan for a variety of functions, not the least of which is training, which will undoubtedly increase as we expand both the Afghan National Army and the National Police.

I would like your thoughts on the influence of tour lengths of our military in pushing us more and more toward reliance on contractors in the area of training.

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you, Commissioner Green.

The issue of tour lengths by our service personnel in Afghanistan was addressed in our September report on the progress being made in the train and equip mission in Afghanistan. It was our view then and our recommendation in the report that tour lengths be extended to a minimum of one year for all military services.

In addition, I noted in my remarks that contracting officer’s representatives had been serving only three to six-month tours, which created less than stability in their carrying out their oversight responsibilities.

So we have been on record, and are on record, for
maintaining that longer tour lengths and consistent tour lengths amongst the military services has significant value in such a complex operating environment, where, particularly if you are in a training and mentoring mode, just getting to know your counterparts is a very challenging process and developing a relationship is everything. That takes time. It takes an investment up-front, and the results are seen down the road.

So we have received some favorable response to this from the military services. I believe the Air Force has already indicated that they, at the request of CSTC-A and CENTCOM, will increase their tours to one year. I cannot speak yet for the Navy and the Marine Corps.

On the contracting oversight personnel side, I have no specific information as to commitments to extend tours, but we are mindful that these are civil servants, not military personnel primarily, that are performing these functions, and they cannot be ordered to serve longer tours. But we understand that incentives are being built into their assignments to make it more attractive to serve longer, and that there is a trend towards volunteering to serve longer than three to six months.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Do you see the incentives that have been developed so far and adopted so far have any impact on civilian tour
Ambassador Moorefield. I cannot give you any concrete response, Commissioner, as to how many personnel are now serving longer tour lengths. It is our understanding, however, that there is a general trend, a positive trend, in terms of willingness to serve longer tours because of the various range of incentives that have been put on offer.

I would defer to other speakers this morning, other panelists perhaps who are better qualified, or will, in any event, certainly take your question onboard and get back to you with a written response.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

What do you view as the benefits and the limitations of using contractors in a training role, aside from tour length?

We have already from Commissioner Shays that we have run into a number of contractors who have many years in-country, and obviously that is a benefit. That continuity is a benefit. But what are some of the limitations and benefits in your mind of using contractors in this role?

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you. In terms of benefits, I would note that, for example, in the police training mission, they bring uniquely necessary skill sets to the table.

Obviously, our military personnel do not generally,
although some may have in the Reserves or Guard, have
civilian police experience. But these individuals, in the
police mentoring teams for example, are uniformly drawn from
retired civil policing personnel from the United States, and
civil policing is one of the critical functions that is
being trained and mentored to build up the Afghan National
Police.

And, moreover, their very presence there and the way
they conduct themselves provides an appropriate professional
model, if you want, an ethical model of how a police officer
should conduct himself in performing civil policing
operations.

At the Ministries of Defense and Interior, I believe
that the government contractors that we have worked with
discussed various issues related to the development of those
ministries over the last three years and are exceptionally
well qualified in terms of systems development. These are
major challenges, of course, in terms of building up these
ministries--is for them to have the capability to manage
themselves and to manage the army and police respectively.

Without getting into any specific company names,
clearly, they are capable of mobilizing this special
expertise, these unique skills sets to perform a critical
mission such as that.

I was about to just add one. There is a limitation, I
understand, in terms of the embedding of police trainers, and it is due to the security requirements or limitations in the way their contracts are written and the way they perform their duties. Therefore, it may well be that they will not always be there with the rest of the police mentoring team, for example, and not there in the performance of every aspect of their duties. So they may not be able to go that extra mile. Nonetheless, I believe they still have been performing a very important mission.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Last question, if you were king, how would you build this training force today? With unlimited resources, how would you build it?

Ambassador Moorefield. I hesitate to jump into the breach on that question, Commissioner, because it suggests an on-the-ground operational experience that I am not sure that we can bring to the table. I have no doubt that the CSTC-A former commander could respond much more precisely to that.

But I will say this, we have been looking at the train and equip mission for at least three years that I can remember. In fact, let me go back, five years in terms of my own experience.

And it was very clear in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 that this was the other war, and, in fighting the other war, the
train and equip mission, and mentoring mission, did not get the first pick of resources. They were under-resourced. It was very evident that CSTC-A did not have sufficient personnel to deal with the scope and complexity of their challenges.

In that context of course, fortunately, they had access to contractor resources, but NATO had not really stepped up the plate either. I believe they are going to make, at the margin, a significant difference with the commitment under the new NATO training command, and I am sure that they will be well used from the most senior levels, down, throughout our training and mentoring mission.

But it is probably true that it is not well understood generally how difficult and how vital that mission is, even though it was underscored in the President's recent policy strategy statement with respect to Afghanistan, that we must develop an ANSF capability to operate independently and secure the country. It is little known how many casualties mentors have taken, including contract mentors in that country. Therefore, it has probably been underestimated the quality and extent of resources required to accomplish that mission.

And going forward, even though I am fully well aware the CSTC-A command is cognizant of the degree of challenge that they face as the ANSF expands, and we are not sure the
full extent of that expansion yet. But already you can see it over the horizon, and there are already bottlenecks that they are having to contend with, in growing the army to 134,000.

Chairman Shays. Let’s continue that thought with maybe a response to other questions where you can bring that in.

Ambassador Moorefield. Okay.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Tiefer has the floor.

Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do want to pick up on this note that for the last several years the training program, and my focus is particularly for the Afghan National Police, has been under-resourced. I am looking in particular at a finding you made. It is on Page 125 of your September 30th report, about just how far back we are and how long it is going to take, and I am going to ask you why. Why?

What you said was you took one of the major programs, the Focused District Development program, the FDD program. And you said that to date, of the 365 districts in Afghanistan, and you may explain a little about this program. Basically, it takes them one by one and goes through all the districts. So, of the 365 districts, only 56—that means 56 are done and over 300 still to go—had so far entered or completed that Focused District Development process.
Now what you found was that this process will not be completed until late 2012, and I think you are talking about how it will be completed even if we were not expanding the force. Is that right? Are we that far behind?

Is it because we have been under-resourced?

And will it really take that long even to process if we were not growing the police force?

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you, Commissioner.

I think it is the case that the ANP has been significantly under-resourced in terms of their development.

There was an army, so to speak, in Afghanistan to build upon. In fact, the army is probably the most respected institution in the country today.

The police, on the other hand, have largely been created from whole cloth. It does not have the background, the tradition, the doctrine and the performance standards embedded yet--institutionalized, if you will.

The emphasis was on, as I understand it, on growing the army initially, and not the police. DoD took over this responsibility, lead responsibility, I believe in 2005. At that time, it was recognized it was going to take a much more comprehensive and resource-intensive effort to get the police up to speed, and that they were critical in the counterinsurgency fight at the front lines with the population as it were.
The FDD program, which has been producing superb results to the best of our knowledge, is intended to provide very high quality, intensive training or retraining as the case may be for police at the district level, and I believe that the provinces have also been getting some attention in that regard. Also the border police have a focused development program.

We made our projection in that report based on the resources that were known to be available or soon to be available in Afghanistan to CSTC-A at that time, and we were there in March of this year. The report was issued in September. So I cannot say that the planning has not progressed with respect to being able to ramp up the FDD program since there, to the best of my knowledge, has not been a determination of the actual size in the next phase of expansion.

I think there is somewhere around 96,000, 98,000 right now. So are they going to go to 160 as you suggested? Is that an actual firm commitment? I do not know. But I do believe that CSTC-A has been planning for a number in that range, and I would be very surprised if, at least in the planning aspect of this, it has not already been taken into consideration what kind of resources will be required.

Once again, I refer back to the NATO training mission augmentation which I do believe is going to have an impact
on our capabilities to grow the police and grow them more rapidly.

Commissioner Tiefer. I was particularly interested that you noted that the goal of the FDD program, and I might say--correct me if I am wrong--of our training program for the Afghan National Police in general, is to produce a very high quality force.

I would like to ask you both to recap. I think you went over some of this in your opening statement. What are the huge problems in the way of producing quality graduates of either the basic training or of the FDD program? What are the big problems in the way and what kind of pressures on the training program achieving a high goal might produce?

Ambassador Moorefield. Well, I may need to take your question, if I may, backwards. I do believe there is a risk in over-expediting the buildup of either the army or the police. The issue is not just quantity, of course; it is quality, which is why the FDD program was created, to go back and raise the level of quality and professionalism of the police to an appropriate standard and hopefully to work to sustain that standard.

So there is a risk that if you try and go too far, too quickly, you are going to compromise building quality and professional in an effort to get more police on the beat, so to speak.
You spoke of challenges. I mean one of the challenges is the police are taking three to four times the killed in action rate as the Afghan army. It is a high-risk profession, so to speak. Even though salaries have recently been increased to I believe basic $250 a month, which is certainly much more attractive than it was, but nonetheless if you are killed in the performance of your duty you are not going to be able to support your family.

So there are tradeoffs there, and unless and until they are better capable of defending themselves in a tactical sense, and equipped appropriately, they are going to remain as vulnerable as they recently have been.

In addition, Commissioner Shays mentioned the high rate of illiteracy. This is a significant problem. To train people who cannot read or write, even in their own language, is a real challenge.

Commissioner Tiefer. Let me just interrupt and ask you there, my understanding is that not only is illiteracy a huge problem with the basic police at the bottom of the hierarchy, but isn't it the case that even the officers, the police officers, although it is nominally required that they be able to read and write, even they are sometimes illiterate?

Ambassador Moorefield. I cannot to any specific knowledge about the percentage of illiteracy amongst police
Commissioner Tiefer. Okay, go ahead.

Ambassador Moorefield. Certainly, there is a standard in the army, including for the NCO corps, regarding literacy.

But I will tell you that there are at least two programs that CSTC-A has, one for the army and one for the police, two contract programs to develop literacy, that it is considered to be, frankly, a national priority. I spoke with the Minister of Interior last spring, and he said that this was one of his primary objective--is to get the police literacy levels up--because he recognized that to produce a more professional and responsible police capability, they had to be able to read and write.

Commissioner Tiefer. Let me come back to the point that you took the two points in second, and then let's come back, and let me ask you. Let's take one proxy for the quality of the training, and that is the length of the program of instruction which currently is eight weeks.

Obviously, there are many aspects of quality other than that. I teach at the University of Baltimore Law School, and I would not want the quality of our teaching to be determined just by the number of weeks we have, but it is one proxy of what we are doing.

How would you view it if the pressure to get to high
numbers of police on the beat, as you say, get them on the beat regardless of quality, was so great that the program of instruction was shortened from eight weeks to some shorter number?

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you. Well, I think one of the considerations, and this is a debate that has been ongoing for some years, is what are the responsibilities of the police. If you define them to be both civil policing and, increasingly, the need to conduct themselves appropriately, defend themselves at a minimum, if not the population in some respect, against Taliban extremists and al-Qaeda, then they have to have training that also includes creating that tactical capability, similarly to what basic army recruits receive.

So I think that that is a pretty densely packed program as it is. Cutting it, I think, would be probably--this is just my gut feeling, mind you--may be ill-advised and would have to seriously be looked at because you may be compromising a capability that is core to their being able to perform effectively, perform their roles both in terms of law enforcement and maintaining civil order, and also in the counterinsurgency sense.

Commissioner Tiefer. My time has expired. Thank you, Ambassador.

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you.
Chairman Shays. Thank you.

We are going to go to Mr. Dickson. Mr. Dickson has the floor.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Ambassador Moorefield, good morning. I want to begin by thanking you for your distinguished service in the military, the foreign service and your current responsibilities.

I want to come at this subject from a little bit different standpoint in terms of program management and contract accountability.

We recognize that the military in CSTC-A, that the Joint Contracting Command in Afghanistan and Iraq and the other contracting agencies have a tough job. The commanders basically have to strike a balance between achieving results, measuring performance, but at the same time ensuring accountability and following the rules. This involves simultaneously managing programs in the field under the difficult conditions that you describe and at the same time guarding against fraud, waste and abuse, and dealing with audit issues and so forth.

I want to go back to the September 30th report that you noted earlier in terms of what you noted, what DoD noted, as a lack of appropriate oversight for CSTC-A contracts that has been reflected in an ongoing failure to ensure that
contractors were basically meeting standards.

The concern that I have is, as Mr. Shays noted in his opening remarks, we just returned from Afghanistan. What we saw there was the President announced the plus-up, as we were there, of some 30,000 troops in the next year, we saw the NATO training mission stand up as a three-star command, and we saw the ISAF, the International Security Forces joint command, standing up. So it was a tremendous amount of change, a tremendous amount of growth.

Basically, the framework that you described in your September 30th report dealt with conditions prior to September 30. So the question is: Is the current framework adequate, from a program management and contract management standpoint, to sustain the kinds of increases and changes that we are talking about?

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you. That's a tough question.

When we were last on the ground, and in our follow-up work during this year, it was clear to us that there were already bottlenecks that were developing, if I can call them that, in terms of expansion of the security forces, the training, mentoring and equipping mission. They were probably manageable, but they already suggested that additional contract oversight management personnel were required.
As I pointed out in my remarks, a number of the organizations involved, such as DCMA and Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and others, have attempted to get ahead of the curve here. But, for one thing, I do not think they know exactly where the curve is going, and the goal posts are going to move. So they are, no doubt, doing notional planning, trying to prepare for that.

There was testimony here before the Congress yesterday in which Department of Defense and Department of Army speakers spoke to the preparations that were being made to substantially increase the size of DCMA for anticipated future contracting oversight responsibilities.

So, conceptually, I believe that the challenge is out there and recognized, but the full extent of it and the complexity of it is difficult to grasp, and it is going to take a lot of vigilance and consistent attention. I do not think it will be possible to declare victory precipitously in this respect.

Mr. Dickson. You mentioned in your earlier remarks the challenges or almost the dangers involved in over-expediting, that was your word, in terms of trying to do too much, too soon. Yet, the timelines and the program plans that we see are ambitious under any circumstance.

So I want to kind of get your view on the ability of commanders to strike the right balance while they are trying
to, on an urgent basis, stand up and meet ever increasing demands, and then to reach back to the increases for DCMA and the other agencies that are needed in the field to provide the contract oversight. It just does not seem to square, that in the timelines that we are projecting for our operations, that we can match it with the framework for acquisition, management and accountability.

Ambassador Moorefield. Well, there is unquestionably a dynamic there between meeting the needs of the warfighter in a war zone, making the right operational decisions on a day to day basis in that respect, and also maintaining a longer view in terms of ensuring that appropriate accountability and controls are put in place and are maintained--whether they are construction programs or equipment or maintenance, personnel services, across the board.

We have spoken earlier in this hearing about the challenges that this expeditionary force situation has posed to the oversight system of the Department of Defense and that it was under-strengthened initially and outgunned, if you will, in terms of meeting it, that Afghanistan was a secondary priority to Iraq. So, in a sense, there is a need to dig out of the hole. I think a lot of effort is being put into that, and a lot of thought and attention.

As to what kind of efficiencies could conceivably be gained by reviewing the current contracting oversight
requirements and procedures that the military commands and their civilian counterparts have to meet in Afghanistan, I would defer to the Commission on what might and ought to be done as a result of any comprehensive review there.

Certainly, our priority in the DoD Inspector General is to make sure that fraud, waste and abuse are detected and hopefully prevented, and that program performance, operational performance meets DoD's needs. But that having been said, we understand that there is a constant struggle over very limited resources in an extremely complex and high pressure environment, and that needs to be taken under consideration.

Mr. Dickson. Just one final question, you made reference to a Defense Department/State Department task force associated with overseeing the transition of the program for basic police training, from State to Defense. I assume that also includes the contract management transition as well. Do you have any visibility on the current status of that program in terms of is that task force achieving its intended objectives?

Ambassador Moorefield. The short answer is no. I will say that we have been in contact with our audit team on the DoD Inspector General side of this joint audit effort, and we are fully well aware, having been in contact with CSTC-A, that the oversight is taking place and is ongoing and, to
the best of our knowledge, has not hit the wall in terms of, yet, on the transition of the contract.

What may be going on behind the scenes in this reporting process, I cannot speak to because of course it is only a draft report at this juncture. But it will soon be issued, and I am sure all will be transparent at that point in time.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you very much.

Mr. Shays, that concludes my questions.

Chairman Shays. Thank you.

Ambassador, you have had an interesting career, and you are in a great position to be able to provide us helpful information. My understanding is you started out with the military, then you went in foreign service, and now you are basically under the payroll of the military again. And we thank you for your service. I would like to take advantage of your knowledge in addition to your responsibilities.

There is the general theory that you need 20 security per 1,000 population. We thought at one time that Afghanistan was about 34 million, but it is about 29, and my math says we need about 580,000.

There is the general concept we had in Iraq that we have in Afghanistan as you stand up, we step down, we leave.

While it is a policy issue, and we are not going to get into the policy part of it, it does raise some interesting
points because we do not appear to be training enough security for us to ever be able to step down. That is what it appears.

My point in asking the question is it seems to me that we will continually have to be ramping up how many we actually train.

So I want to first look backwards, not dwell on it too long. We, and the Brits, we basically invaded Afghanistan because of their failure to stop the harboring of al-Qaeda. That was in October, 2001. We have been there a long time. Why has it taken us so long to train the pitiful number that we have trained, and why have we not done a better job in training them?

Ambassador Moorefield. That sounds like one of those career-ending questions.

Chairman Shays. I do not want it to be a career-ending question. You know, that is funny. That is an interesting way to approach the answer.

I do not want to bear the burden of ending your career, but what I do want is a candid dialogue.

What are some of the things that have made it--you have said why it is difficult. But has it been we have not put enough resources? We rely too much on contractors? We did not rely enough on contractors?

I mean the question deserves an honest answer, and I
think your superiors will respect your honesty.

Ambassador Moorefield. Right, and I will attempt, at least as to own personal view.

As I mentioned previously, it has been my observation and many others, over the last five years at least that I have been engaged in providing some oversight with respect to Afghanistan, that we were significantly under-resourced. I cannot over-emphasize that because at the same time we were discovering the incredible complexity and difficulty and challenges inherent in trying to create an army, a professional army and police force.

Chairman Shays. So one is under-resourced.

Ambassador Moorefield. Yes, absolutely.

I think you are going up against certain historic and cultural challenges too. I do not want to make too fine a point of this, but this is a very top-down bureaucratic model, authoritarian model of governance, whether it is the army, the police or in the civil service or anywhere else in the country. The Soviets helped reinforce that.

To get them to even accept and understand the concept of delegation as we understand it, and responsibility being taken at lower levels in the chain of command, impacts everything--decision-making, logistics, the entire capability of the organizational culture to perform in what we would consider an effective and responsive way, to meet
the security challenges.

Chairman Shays. Okay. I am not quite sure I get why top-down is a negative.

Ambassador Moorefield. Let me give you an example, their supply chain. At the end of the day, the whole purpose is to get bullets, food and medicine to the front line troops.

Chairman Shays. Right.

Ambassador Moorefield. But there is a history of leaders, if you will, influential people, being measured in their importance in terms of how much stuff they have accrued, how much material they have under their control. Relinquishing that and delegating it and passing that down the supply chain does not happen.

Chairman Shays. So my inference from what you are saying is it took a lot of delegation. People are unwilling to delegate, unwilling to give up some authority and power, and that affected the mission of training properly.

Ambassador Moorefield. I think it infects the mission because the leadership, the current leadership, is still the older generation, and this is the way they think.

Chairman Shays. Right. You triggered something I will just say parenthetically. Our hope, it seems to me, in Afghanistan is what we are able to do with the youth, that the elders want to hold on to the past, and the youth can
see the advantage of learning to read, see the advantage of a better life if they did things differently.

Harder to train police or harder to train their military? In other words, which is more difficult?

Ambassador Moorefield. I think the military culture is better established, more professional and more ethical on balance, also more literate, and has been considered a more attractive profession if you are going to go into a security service.

Chairman Shays. The cost of the difference in training the military is should we have military train military or contractors, who are former military, train contractors?

Is there an inherent benefit or is it a combination? Is there a negative in having contractors train their military?

Ambassador Moorefield. Well, I believe that, and again this is my own view. I have never really thought this through to this extent, but now that you have posed the question.

You know there is an inherent responsibility for our military to manage all aspects of the training and mentoring mission. Therefore, I believe that our military personnel have to be there, and need to be ultimately running and responsible for the operation.

But a fusion of our military professionals and
contractors who have specialized skills and provide unique resources that they bring to the fight, including increasingly, hopefully, NATO personnel, is probably a model that we are going to want to use because it gives us the best mix of capabilities.

Chairman Shays. How about with police?

It seems to me that we have to be even more reliant on contractors for training of police, given there is a difference. Even with national police, there is a difference between police responsibilities versus military responsibilities.

Ambassador Moorefield. I am not sure.

Chairman Shays. Is it intuitive? Is it just logical or is it not logical that you need people with expertise that relates closer to police training; therefore you are going to have to rely maybe on MPs, but you are going to have to rely contractors more to train the Afghan police than you would have to rely on contractors to train the military?

Ambassador Moorefield. Yes, I understand.

Well, I am not sure it is either/or because the police responsibilities in Afghanistan, it has become increasingly apparent, need to not only include civil policing capabilities, law enforcement capabilities. But in addition, because of the brunt of the insurgent attacks that
they have been having to contend with, because they are the most vulnerable, if you will, aspect of the security forces, and have to interface with the population, they have to have a capability--a tactical, I will call it, capability--to defend themselves and, to a certain extent, defend the population.

So you are going to need an army training model, if you will, to develop that tactical capability. At the same time, you need civilian police experience, real experience.

Chairman Shays. So you need the combination.

Ambassador Moorefield. Yes.

Chairman Shays. Tell me, if you could, an example of where someone not being literate makes the job more difficult to train.

Ambassador Moorefield. Well, you know there are relative degrees of illiteracy.

Chairman Shays. Well, let me be really blunt. When we use 30 percent literacy, it is closer to 20 percent, and I am told the 20 percent is you may be talking fifth or sixth grade capabilities, not ninth or twelfth capabilities. So we are talking about a few folks that have real literacy capabilities.

So what is the challenge?

Ambassador Moorefield. Well, I think the challenge is that in any normal training model, at least that I am
familiar with, you rely heavily on written materials, presentations on a blackboard or in a slide presentation.

I mean the police in particular have an exceptionally high degree of illiteracy in their own languages, whether it is Pashtu or Dari or others. Therefore, their ability to communicate even in their own language with literate Afghans is significantly limited, and that places a special challenge. They are not going to be able to go back to their barracks, so to speak, and look at their training book.

Chairman Shays. Yes, I get the answer to that. Let me just ask one or two more questions.

Are we going to be able to reach the numbers that we are hoping to, given the capabilities we have now? Do you think that we will reach the numbers?

First off, what do you believe the numbers to be again, in terms of police, by when, military by when, and do you think we can reach those numbers by those dates?

Ambassador Moorefield. Well, the only decision that I know that has been made is with respect to increasing the army to 134,000 by August of 2010.

I am not aware of any decision regarding an increase in the size of the police. I believe our military command has requested certain numbers. I have heard 160,000 for the police and high as 200,000, 240,000 for the army.
Chairman Shays. By when?

Ambassador Moorefield. I, frankly, do not recall what-

Chairman Shays. Is it by like 2013?

Ambassador Moorefield. --for those projections, but I
am not trying to avoid your question.

Chairman Shays. No, I understand.

Ambassador Moorefield. It depends in part on how
quickly you want to produce these forces and at what level
of quality, and what resources you are capable and willing
to commit to accomplish those objectives.

Chairman Shays. Well, that begs the question. Can you
describe to me the level that you think, a minimum level
that you think needs to be obtained, and do you think we can
reach that number even with the minimum level? Let’s take
the military, 134,000.

Ambassador Moorefield. I can only speak to the general
perception that I have detected amongst both our senior
military personnel, including ISAF, NATO, but also among the
senior Ministry of Defense and joint staff officers in the
Afghan army, that they need to be made sufficiently robust
to be able to take the lead in the fight, and especially in
the most threatened parts of the country. They are not
capable of doing that now.

Chairman Shays. Would you counsel this Commission to
be a little skeptical about our ability to do it, given the resources we are using to date?

Ambassador Moorefield. At the current level of resources, I would say it is highly unlikely they will be able to accomplish that mission.

Chairman Shays. All right. Let me ask if any commissioner has a question or two.

Yes, Mr. Tiefer.

Commissioner Tiefer. Ambassador, what we are hearing this morning, and I am looking actually at the incumbent contractor, the current contractor, DynCorp, and their recommendations. They have their own reasons for making their recommendations. We are not endorsing in any way their position, but they do have recommendations as the current contractor. One of them is focus on quality of police being trained and not simply on quantity produced.

What we are hearing is that, correct me if I am wrong, there is a risk in over-expediting expansion of the force, a risk to quality, that we might be compromising their core capabilities, that we might be sacrificing quality and professionalism.

I am going to ask you this, but I am also going to ask at the same time, and of course DynCorp's position is that we are sacrificing competition over quality, competition about quality. But also there is a simple bricks and mortar
issue which you covered in your report.

They have a recommendation, DynCorp, the current contractor, to increase the capacity of the central and regional training centers, and expand commensurately the number of Afghan instructors and U.S. mentors and advisors.

Did you not study this question yourself and find that there was a substantial impediment in the capacity of the places, the buildings, the facilities in which we do the training?

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you. I think our observation was that the training centers at the time we were there, which was last March, were operating at full capacity, so to speak. This, of course, begged the question of if you were to significantly increase the basic police training program, what infrastructure growth would be required to reach what level of expansion of the police in what timeframe. So those were serious issues that I understood CSTC-A was attempting to grapple with.

As far as the sacrifice in quality, it is our understanding that the transference of responsibility for this basic police training contract has in part to do with an effort agreed to by both the State Department and Defense, that there needed to be unity of command and unity of effort in terms of police training, to provide sufficient flexibility in implementing the training program, and
tailoring it to the variable needs in the war. So, hopefully, those efficiencies will be gained with appropriate oversight of the contract.

I am not sure it is necessary at all to sacrifice quality. Indeed, I think the effort, at least from our understanding of DoD's vantage point in CSTC-A, is to increase quality and their capacity, their capabilities.

Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you.

Chairman Shays. Ambassador Moorefield, you will still be monitoring this program?

Ambassador Moorefield. Indeed, we are planning on going back in 2010 to Afghanistan.

Chairman Shays. That is 12 months. Are you going to go in the first part?

Ambassador Moorefield. Oh, first half.

Chairman Shays. I would just request that you stay in touch with us on this issue.

We are all working out of the same play book. We want this to succeed. So we are looking to find ways that we can help them, those who have to administer the program, do it as well as possible because I think you would agree, this is the ballgame. You are nodding your head in affirmation.

Ambassador Moorefield. I am, and I agree, and we look forward to that cooperation.

Chairman Shays. Great. Thank you so much for your
testimony. We appreciate it.

Ambassador Moorefield. Thank you.

Chairman Shays. We are going to get to the second panel. Our second panel is Major General Richard Formica, U.S. Army, former commander of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan; David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; and Michael Strain, Program Executive, Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, Department of Defense.

If you would come to the dais, and I will swear you in. Is there anyone, gentleman, that might respond to a question that we should swear in, or are we all set?

Okay, if you would raise your right hand, it is the custom of the Commission to swear our witnesses in.

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

General Formica. I do.

Ambassador Johnson. I do.

Mr. Strain. I do.

Chairman Shays. Note for the record, our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

It is my understanding, Mr. Strain, you do not have a written statement, which is disappointing. My understanding is that you had one prepared, but it has not been submitted.
But you will be giving a statement, correct?

Mr. Strain. Sir, it is my intention to.

Chairman Shays. Give a statement, yes, good.

So we will start with you, General, and then we will just go down the line. Thank you.
General Formica. Good morning, Chairman Shays.

Chairman Shays. Is your mic on, sir? It may be.

There we go.

General Formica. How about now, sir?

Chairman Shays. That is great.

General Formica. We would say, comm check.

Chairman Shays. It is great, and it is great to have all three of you here. Appreciate it a lot.

General Formica. Good morning, Chairman Shays and members of the Commission.

As introduced, my name is Major General Richard P. Formica, and I am the former commanding general of the combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. I was in command from 18 December, 2008 until just recently, 21 November, 2009.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Commission, and I thank you for the work that you are doing to assess the appropriate alignment of wartime contracting with mission objectives during this very challenging time.

We appreciate your visit to Afghanistan and to CSTC-A back in August, and I am aware that you made a second trip
there recently. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and civilians of CSTC-A work tirelessly and faithfully to fulfill their mission and to be good stewards of our Nation's resources. We appreciate that you came out to see that for yourselves.

I have provided the Commission with a written statement for the record. I would like to address five points from that statement.

First, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is a complex command. It operates in a challenging environment, and it is not Iraq. I am not suggesting that Iraq was easy, but just making the point that Afghanistan is uniquely complex and different than Iraq.

Second, CSTC-A's principal task is to build sustainable capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces: the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

When I left command on 21 November, the ANA or the army was 96,000 soldiers and programmed to grow to 134,000 by the end of October, 2010. The ANA is a solid, and it is a respected institution. While it has its share of problems, it is on track to achieve its goals. We have proposed to grow the ANA to 240,000 by the end of 2013.

The ANP was at about 40,000 personnel and is authorized to grow to 96,800. We expect the Minister of Interior to
achieve this by the end of December, 2009. Our approach to ANP development is to reinforce good policing, to reform or eliminate corrupt and/or poor performing police, and to grow, and we have proposed to grow the Afghan National Police to 160,000 by the end of 2013.

Our approach for the 12 months that I was there was to accelerate the momentum of the development of the ANA while we added significant focus to the ANP.

Third, we are keenly aware of the importance of good stewardship of the resources provided by the American people to support this mission. Good stewardship is critical to mission success and is of strategic importance.

Fourth, over the past several years, the mission to generate and train Afghan National Security Forces has been generously supported with funding by the United States Congress. However, the high demand for military personnel has outstripped the supply of properly trained military forces, which creates a demand for contractors to fill gaps in training and training support. Today, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan requires the support of contractors in our mission accomplishments, in the development of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Contractors augment existing military capabilities. They bring unique skills, and they provide continuity to the
mission.

And, fifth, over the last few years, as the size of the Afghan National Security forces continued to grow, the number and size of contracts increased, but our capacity to manage those contracts did not. This dynamic situation created a challenging contract management and oversight environment which required continuous efforts to improve management of contracts funded by Afghan security forces funds.

That said, we have steadily improved our stewardship and oversight of contracts. Measures and controls that we have implemented to improve accountability, and management controls, were partially in response to the Department of Defense IG reports and their visits, SIGAR, and findings and observations by this Commission. They are delineated in my written statement.

In summary, we acknowledge that more work needs to be done to enhance our overall contracts management effort. But through determined leadership and accountability, I am confident that the improvements in our contract management and oversight program that we have implemented will lead to more effective development and fielding of capable Afghan National Security Forces and, ultimately, operational success in this critically important mission.

It was my sincere honor and privilege to have served,
and to have served with, the many brave and dedicated men
and women in the Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan, and I am privileged to have had this rare
opportunity to work so closely with the brave and dedicated
men and women of the Afghan National Security Forces.

We are grateful for the support of the American people
and the United States Congress.

I look forward to answering your questions, and I thank
you for your efforts to make us a better, more efficient and
effective command.

[The prepared statement of General Formica follows:]
Chairman Shays. Thank you, General.
Ambassador Johnson.
Ambassador Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman, and thank you to the rest of the Commission for the opportunity you are giving me today to testify regarding the use of contractors by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, to mentor and to train Afghan National Police.

INL initiated our police programs for Afghanistan in 2003. We currently support a Department of Defense led civilian security force development mission funded through the 050 account.

Since October, at the request of our partner in Afghanistan, CSTC-A, INL has been working with DoD to transition responsibility for the contract that deploys civilian law enforcement officers to Afghanistan to train and mentor the ANP. INL has cooperated with, and fully supports, transitioning this contract to DoD.

The United States is working to help the Afghan government develop a 96,800 strong professional police force capable of providing public security and enforcing the rule of law. The development of the ANP is challenging due to a variety of factors already mentioned, such as lack of
capacity, knowledge, skills, literacy and security, as well as poor infrastructure. The police training programs INL initiated in 2003 are aimed at addressing these issues.

Building on INL’s established police training program and in light of the need, more comprehensively, to build all Afghan security forces, the Defense Department was given authority by a multi-agency agreement in 2005 over all U.S. Government efforts to organize, train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces.

Then, in 2007, Congress responded by funding Afghan security forces funding exclusively through appropriations to the Department of Defense. In this arrangement, DoD, through CSTC-A, determines overall program requirements based on policy guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission.

To execute the State Department’s assigned portion of this overall objective, DoD transfers funds to State, which INL then uses to provide qualified U.S. civilian police trainers and advisors. These advisors have developed core curriculum and provided instruction and daily mentoring of ANP to build institutional capacity as well as individual skills.

Defense and State have worked together to address the challenge of helping Afghanistan establish its own professional police corps. We have deployed and supported approximately 800 U.S. civilian police advisors and train
and advise the ANP as well as the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Right now, hundreds of former civilian police officers from the United States are embedded with our military units, helping local police improve their skills.

To streamline management of ANP training, contractual responsibility is scheduled to transfer from INL to CSTC-A as early as March 31 of next year. After this transition, Ambassador Eikenberry, as Chief of Mission, will continue to provide overall police program policy, oversight and direction. INL and DoD are currently assessing future requirements in advanced training classes and training mentoring for gender-specific programs where INL may continue to play role.

The transfer of contract responsibility for police training is an effort to eliminate a management layer, so that we may speed program execution. The Department of State will continue to play a role in Afghan law enforcement training through program policy, oversight and overall direction for the police program through Ambassador Eikenberry.

We are working closely with DoD to achieve an efficient transition and working toward a comprehensive transition plan. State's plan also takes into account a demobilization effort that we have required of our contractor, DynCorp International, as well as transitioning all assets and
inventory used in the police training program to the follow-on contractor, to be chosen by the Department of Defense.

The plan also outlines efforts to demobilize trainers and advisors hired by DynCorp, and integrate trainers and advisors hired by the follow-on contractor into the 10 training and resident sites currently run by DynCorp for INL. While some number of trainers currently employed by DynCorp will likely be employed by DoD's follow-on contractor, we cannot predict how many that will be.

Demobilization and transition of life support at each of the 10 sites, including termination of DynCorp subcontractors, also are laid out in State's plans.

Finally, the plan addresses the need to transition static and mobile security services at each training site to the follow-on contractor.

All these efforts will lead up to a master transition plan that INL will develop with DoD and its contractors, once DoD identifies and awards the follow-on contract. We are committed to supporting a smooth transition process. We will not authorize DynCorp to terminate performance on any aspect of the contract until a follow-on contractor is in place and prepared to assume responsibility.

We have a fully staffed program management office in Kabul and in Washington to support this transition. INL and DoD, in both Washington and Kabul, have weekly coordinating
conference calls, and INL and DoD personnel work together on a daily basis in Kabul.

State’s comprehensive approach to program and contract management oversight has provided a sound infrastructure for managing our Afghan police programs as well as others. As in Afghanistan, INL uses contractors worldwide to implement police, corrections and justice sector programs. Because we often need to mobilize or demobilize quickly, contractors allow us to meet mission requirements, flexibly and rapidly.

Further, they enable us to rapidly hire large numbers of former police officers with recent law enforcement experience. This allows them to return to jobs in the U.S. community police departments when their work is completed.

In addition to our personnel in Afghanistan, three experienced INL program officers located in Washington provide program oversight. These officers coordinate with interagency partners and routinely meet with senior level contractor management to promote effective program implementation.

Officers based in Kabul and Washington are further supported by a team of contract oversight staff. We currently have seven in-country contracting officer's representatives. Five of these ICOR positions are now filled, with two more arriving in January. Additionally, we are working to add four more ICORs to be approved through
the NSDD-38 process, which would bring the full complement of ICORs to 11.

The contracting officer's representative is located here in Washington to minimize the number of staff at post. Twenty-eight U.S.-based staff currently support the contracting officer's representative by reviewing invoices prior to payment.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. I look forward to addressing your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Johnson follows:]
Chairman Shays. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Strain.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL STRAIN, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE, COUNTER NARCOTERRORISM TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Strain. Chairman Shays, Commissioner Green, Commissioner Tiefer, Mr. Dickson, good morning. I thank you for the opportunity to be here and to represent the organization within which I work.

My comments this morning will be limited in the fact that we are currently within the source selection process for the incoming contractor to support the efforts for CSTC-A in conjunction with the Afghan National Police, and, as such, I am limited on what we can discuss with respect to that.

In addition to that, we are also in the midst of the GAO protest that has been filed, and DoD is currently working on the response to that, and, as such, until the response has been fully vetted, I cannot respond to anything with respect to that.

As such, I am happy to answer any of the questions that you have consistent with what I have outlined above, and I look forward to our discussion this morning. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Strain follows:]

/COMMITTEE INSERT
Chairman Shays. Thank you, Mr. Strain.

Mr. Strain, I would like to say I think it would have been advisable for you to have a written statement that would have allowed you to talk about other elements. And I realize this is not your decision, but I want to go on record as saying I think it is unfortunate that you were not able to come with a statement because the statement is in writing. Therefore, you do not get yourself in trouble because it is approved, and you could have covered a number of areas.

You make our job more difficult by not having a statement because we cannot feed off the points that you could have logically made in your statement. So your superiors have not done you a favor, and they have not done the Commission a favor.

We appreciate the times you have met with the Commission. You have been very cooperative. It is not a reflection on you. I just want the record to note our disappointment that you do not have a statement. It makes our job more difficult, not easier.

With that, we will just start with Mr. Green.

Excuse me, Mr. Green, before you go, I just want to clarify some numbers, just so we do not work on different numbers. We hear so many different numbers.

General Formica, I want to be clear as to what I am
hearing you say. With the military, the goal is to have 134,000 by October, 2010, and then to have another 106,000 by the end of 2013, for a total of 240,000. That is the goal that you stated in your statement. Is that correct?

General Formica. If I could just be clear in wording, the program is 134,000 by the end of October, 2010. That is an approved number.

Chairman Shays. Right.

General Formica. We in CSTC-A propose and it was included in General McChrystal’s strategic review a proposal to grow the Afghan National Army to 240,000 by the end of 2013.

Chairman Shays. Okay.

General Formica. That has not been decided.

Chairman Shays. All rightly. Then the goal is, by the end of this year, with the Afghan National Police to be at 96,800 by the end of this year. Then you have it has been proposed that we reach a total number of 160,000 by the year 2013, but has not yet been approved.

General Formica. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Shays. Okay. We will have fun talking about that. Thank you.

Mr. Green.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

General Formica, first of all, thank you for your
service, particularly this last year on an assignment that I know had to be extremely challenging and maybe frustrating at times, and congratulations on your upcoming promotion and your move to beautiful Huntsville, Alabama.

General Formica. Thank you.

Commissioner Green. We have danced around this issue of quality/quantity, particularly as it applied to the basic police training, but I would like to take it the next step. A counterinsurgency is very leader-centric, and there are many who believe that we should do more to improve the officer NCO corps of the ANA in particular, as opposed to growing them too fast.

What does this have to do with training? Obviously, we create additional kandaks [Editor’s note: A kandak is the Afghan equivalent of a battalion.]. It creates a need for additional mentors and so forth.

I would just like your ideas on the rationale behind the decisions, if those decisions are final, in creating additional kandaks as opposed to increasing the size of those in existence?

General Formica. Thank you for your question.

As you allude to, the challenges associated with growing and developing the Afghan National Security Forces include the challenges with developing leaders, and we have focused on developing leaders, officers and noncommissioned officers as part of our development program.
When we made the recommendation to grow the Afghan National Army to 134,000 by October, 2010, we took into account 4 areas that are of a concern in growing the force: the development of leaders, the ability to provide equipment, the ability to build the appropriate infrastructure and the appropriate number of mentors.

To get 134,000 by October, 2010 is, no doubt, a challenge to achieve, but we think it is achievable. The approach that we took, working with the Minister of Defense, who also has asserted that it is achievable, but the approach that we took was first to grow in strength without additional structure. So, in that growth to 134,000, 7,500 were soldiers without additional structure, to reinforce the unit readiness of the existing units, much like the 22,000 that was recently approved by the Congress for the United States army to improve readiness. Soldiers without structure, that requires fewer leaders, fewer demands on equipment and no additional challenge to infrastructure.

The second thing we did to get 134,000 was to build small units in the existing kandaks. So, in the 44 kandaks, or battalions, that are resident in the South and in the East, each of those will get an additional company. That company, that fourth company, again gives you more end strength, improves the readiness and capability of the existing units. It puts a reduced demand on leader
development, equipment and infrastructure, and on mentors because you are putting a company in a kandak that already has existing mentors.

Then it was in the subsequent of the growth that we would grow the kandaks required to create two additional brigades. We think that by doing that as the third phase in this growth to 134,000, it gave us the ability to ramp up the manning that would be required to grow those units. And, frankly, to add those two brigades was an operational requirement, to have the right number of brigades in the battle space.

The other thing that was key to this was the decision was made to build an infantry-centric force at this point, up to the 134,000, and again, in so doing, you reduced the requirement for equipment. You reduced the training burden because you are not going to do the more complex training associated with some of the combat support skills—artillery, engineering, et cetera. We were going to delay that, and that simplified leader development.

Commissioner Green. Okay. Thank you.

There has been discussion, and I do not know how far it has gone, about creating some entities: an Afghan public protection program, the community defense initiative, local militias, et cetera, the latter particularly in the western part of the country. How far have those progressed?
And how are they going to be trained, if we are going to have a training requirement with them, or do we just issue them an AK-47 and say, your mission is to protect your village?

General Formica. At the risk of sounding defensive, I am a little dated, and some of those initiatives were pretty well being developed as I was leaving. So I certainly cannot speak to where we are today and would prefer not to. I would rather that be taken for the record and be provided by the ISAF and/or CSTC-A because I am really just not current on it.

Commissioner Green. Okay.

General Formica. I would only say that during the time that I was there, there was no effort to create local militia, but there were efforts to use an experimental approach with the Afghan public protection force in one province. That was being developed over the course of the late spring and summer. It had different levels of success in different districts, and that was being reevaluated by ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan as I was leaving.

Commissioner Green. Is your sense, though, that there would be a training component by either us or allies with whatever is put together?

General Formica. It depends on the mission that they would have, but there is some responsibility to either train
or mentor them in the execution of their duties, whatever that was going to be.

Commissioner Green. One last question, how would you characterize the level of coordination between CSTC-A and INL in the transfer of responsibility for basic police training?

General Formica. I would say that we were working very closely with INL, as we did throughout the course of the time that I was there. We continued to work hard to build and sustain that relationship. Brigadier General Macdonald, who is responsible for police development, met regularly with INL. We had INL representation on our staff. There was already a complete inventory done of property. I would characterize it as good and getting better.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Tiefer.

Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you, Chairman Shays.

I appreciate the members of the panel who represent the highest levels, who have been managing this program. The problems you face in this program are not of your own making. You bring great skills to coping with them.

General Formica, you have commented, and I am going to quote, that the army, the Afghan National Army, "the army is, I would say, five or six years further along in development than the police."
You are not alone in saying this, but why? Why are the Afghan police five or six years behind the Afghan Army?

General Formica. I would just say simply the first part of my response is the resources and the attention and focus that we had dedicated to the army preceded the resources and dedication and attention that we provided to the Afghan National Police. It was for that reason that we made the judgment to carry on a decision made by my predecessors.

But to characterize our approach, it was to sustain and now accelerate the positive momentum that we had with the army, but add significant focus to the police. In my judgment, it required more focus, and in order to try to catch up.

I would submit that some of the challenges associated with the development, we really focused on developing an institutional base, an institutional training base for the Afghan National Army, and that takes a long time. Decisions that were made by my predecessors, three or four removed, are just now coming into fruition. We had not made the same kind of focus on building the infrastructure in the Afghan National Police.

Commissioner Tiefer. General, let me ask something, a similar question in another way. Let me put this chart up. The quarterly report form SIGAR, the Special Inspector
General for Afghan Reconstruction, found that out of 559 units in the Afghan National Police, 437 got his lowest ranking as far as their capacity of accomplishing operational missions and only 24 got the highest rate, that they were capable of operating independently.

Why is it that after all these years of seeming to train, the vast bulk of the units in the Afghan National Police are getting the lowest rating?

General Formica. I think that goes back to the conversation you were having with Ambassador Moorefield in the training of the Afghan National Police. The Focused District Development program was created by my predecessor to create a training forum for the Afghan National Police, a district at a time.

I say a district at a time. We would, in any one cycle, train between five and ten districts, depending on the resources available to us. It was a result of that Focused District Development effort that we then aligned mentors, police mentor teams to a district, and were able then to make some requisite judgment as to their capability milestone, using the system that we had in place at that time.

What this really reflects is, as to your question to Ambassador Moorefield, the number of districts that had not been through that training.
If I could just add on, I know you did not ask me the question, but to carry on from the conversation you were having with Ambassador Moorefield. If the decision were to grow the number of Afghan National Police, the number of districts does not change, and so it does not add to the problem of Focused District Development as training districts. That has its own challenges because probably I think it is at more like 64 today, with 20 in training as we speak.

But that said, adding policemen does not necessarily change the number of districts. They would come in, trained, and join their districts.

Commissioner Tiefer. All right. Ambassador Johnson, I am going to ask if you are aware of something that we knew had taken place at a subordinate level in INL. I do not know whether it came to your attention. Has there been a discussion, not a decision, not a recommendation—and for that matter, the matter may be passed over to your successors in the Department of Defense—but was there a discussion of possibly shortening the program of instruction for the Afghan National Police, currently at eight weeks, to six weeks?

Ambassador Johnson. I understand there have been frequent discussions of how the program might be reshaped and improved. One of the things under consideration at one
point was whether it could be shortened in order to increase the number of individuals going through. My recollection is that after consideration of that issue, some of the things that would have to be removed in order to compress were thought too essential, and so the eight-week program has stayed in place. Even that is relatively abbreviated compared to other training programs around the world.

Commissioner Tiefer. You supervise in Iraq a training program. I do not mean, of course, you personally. In Iraq, the training program for police is 12 weeks. I am not testing you on that.

Ambassador Johnson. That is correct.

Commissioner Tiefer. So the Afghan program, which deals with a lower level of literacy of recruits, is only eight weeks. The Iraq program, which has a higher literacy of recruits, much higher, is 12 weeks.

Ambassador Johnson. That is correct. In other parts of the world, it can run into months. But the challenge we face in Afghanistan is in addition to creating capacity and skill is also pulling, moving individuals through the program and getting them deployed as rapidly as possible.

Commissioner Tiefer. By the way, and again I do not mean to test you on a closed-book exam on the spot. My students at the University of Baltimore Law School would have too much sympathy for you if I did that.
The program, it is the Civilian Police, or CIVPOL program, under you in INL, in the different countries you are talking about, that does police training, yes?

Ambassador Johnson. That is correct.

Commissioner Tiefer. Besides DynCorp, which currently handles the Afghan National Police training program, are there other contractors in the CIVPOL program which do that kind of major training and could, if they were allowed, compete for it?

Ambassador Johnson. Yes, there are currently three contractors that hold I believe what we describe as an umbrella contract, and we allow those three to bid on individual task orders under the various contract opportunities.

Commissioner Tiefer. What are those three?

Ambassador Johnson. This is a closed-book test. Civilian Police International and PA&E, I believe, Pacific Architects and Engineers, are the other two.

Commissioner Tiefer. Civilian Police International and, I am sorry, the second one was?

Ambassador Johnson. PA&E, it generally goes by its initials. Pacific Architects and Engineers I believe is currently a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, although that is a relatively recent development.

Commissioner Tiefer. Okay. Mr. Strain, I am trying to
figure out what your people mainly do. The contract that is going to be given is done by the Space and Missile. The handling of the contract for the next contractor to do, the contractor training for the Afghan National Police is going to be done by the Space and Missile Defense Command in Huntsville. What do they mainly do there?

Mr. Strain. Sir, the Space and Missile Defense Command Contracting Office, the Contracting Acquisition Management Office actually does the actual contract work itself. The senior contracting officers there as well as-

Commissioner Tiefer. No, no, I am not making myself clear. Substantively, what type of contracts do they mainly do there?


Mr. Strain. Sir, beyond the contract that I currently have with them, I am not aware. I do not have a good familiarity with the kinds of contracting efforts that are ongoing in the command.

Commissioner Tiefer. Well, you yourself, your office is called CNTPO. The T in CNTPO is not for Training. It is Technology. Counter Narcotics Training [sic; “Technology” was intended.] Program Office, yes?

Mr. Strain. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Commissioner Tiefer. Well, you in CNTPO, what do you
mainly do?

You have like 164 task orders there, yes. What are they mainly about, substantively?

Mr. Strain. Sir, those task orders are used in conjunction or to support counter-narcotics and counter-narcoterrorism activities around the world. We support the various combatant commands. We support the Office of the Secretary or the Counter-Narcotics or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-Narcotics and Global Threats. We support some of the military services. We provide support to drug law enforcement agencies, both domestic as well as foreign, both in terms of acquisition support as well as in terms of technology development.

Commissioner Tiefer. Well, Mr. Strain, I think everyone knows generally that at Huntsville they do like rockets, missile defense. My impression was that in terms of what you handle as to training programs it is mainly aviation and technology, that that is the heart of it. It would make sense as to why you are working with Huntsville, yes, of the 164 task orders?

Mr. Strain. Sir, aviation is a part of what we do, yes, but that is not a majority of it, nor is the technology development a majority of it.

We have done a variety of activities in support for training, as well as for the technology development which we
referred to previously. We have done straight procurements of equipment.

Commissioner Tiefer. Excuse me. Let me ask about the training, and I am not talking about the limited number. I am not going to go into it. There is a limited number of your task orders that are in debate, involved in the current protest. I am not partial to DynCorp. We are not taking sides in it. We are not investigating it.

Apart from the limited number in debate, in the discussion involved there, which is a very small fraction of the total of 164, mostly your training programs do not have to do with things like cops on the beat. Basically, they have to do with training in connection with aviation technology, counter-narcotics and terrorism, yes?

Mr. Strain. Sir, right now, we currently have 17 task orders that are related to training, ranging anywhere from the Afghan border police training, which we are currently conducting at four sites in Afghanistan, down to the border task force, down to training that we have done in Colombia, et cetera.

Commissioner Tiefer. I have gone way over my time.

Chairman Shays. Thank you.

Mr. Dickson.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, sir.

I have questions for all three of our panel this
morning. I think it is noteworthy that we have a panel comprised of military, foreign service and civil service to be followed by a panel of contractors because in the end all of us have to work together in order to achieve our national security objectives. I would like to start, though, with General Formica.

General Formica, we have been meaning for some time to talk to the warfighter in this kind of a setting, to ensure that first of all we thank you for your service to our Country, and again congratulations on your promotion, and to certainly thank the service members of CSTC-A, the men and women of CSTC-A for their service to our Country under extraordinarily challenging circumstances.

The one question that we need to ask of a warfighter is how contractors at historic levels, in a theater where actually contractors exceed the numbers of military people on the ground as of right now, how did that affect your planning and operations as a member of the military? And how did it make your job easier or harder to have contractors involved in the mission?

General Formica. Thank you for your question, sir, and thank you for your kind comments.

The development of the Afghan National Security Forces, as you suggest in your comment and in your question, in fact requires this blend of military, police, civilian, and we
used international civilian police and are providing us with expertise in our headquarters, and contract trainers. We require the blend of those. As I said in my statement, the contractors really augment our capacity, and they bring unique skills. So, when we would identify the kinds of, the ways that we would apportion military trainers, we would take into account those strengths that the contractors would bring.

For instance, contract trainers are particularly good with training support, the development of program instruction, lesson plans, fact and development and systems. So having the right contractors in the right place enabled us to take advantage of their strength and reduce the burden on the military, so that we could use them in places where they would be most effective.

There are obviously some considerations with contractors, integrating them in the battlefield and ensuring that, as Ambassador Moorefield referred to in his testimony, having the right level of embedding, so that police mentor team, for instance, would have the right mix of military soldiers that can train those tasks that are common to both military and policing, and to have that police professional, that law enforcement professional that the contractor brings. One of the things that we had to deal with was getting them embedded in the right place and
at the right level, and ensuring that they were, and that was one of the challenges we were wrestling with even as I left.

Mr. Dickson. General, from your perspective, the Afghans themselves or our allies that are there, does the fact that we are using contractors so extensively change the way that you interface with the allies or the Afghans?

I mean in our recent trip in Afghanistan, I bring this up because the Afghans basically, to them, the contractors or the military, we were all Americans. So they were not making the distinction so much if we were helping them. It seemed to be a team effort.

General Formica. I think the distinction for the trainee is the quality of the training that they are provided. Whether they were getting that from a military professional or a law enforcement professional who happened to be there as a contractor, I think that they were interested in was the quality of training and the ability to deliver that training in the environment in which they needed to learn it.

Mr. Dickson. Right. Thank you, General.

Ambassador Johnson, you mentioned a significant transition plan that will be enacted upon the award of the follow-on contract, and there seemed to be some suggestion in your comments that in fact some things cannot be done
until that decision is made. I am just curious about whether or not, why would there not be a full transition plan in place now, or if not, then what factors need to develop with the award of the contract in order to complete your planning?

Ambassador Johnson. I think the plan is largely in place, but in order to have a plan where one partner is handing a task to another, you have to have the other partner and work out the details with them. But the aspects the General mentioned in response to a previous question, all of the things that have been done to prepare, the inventories and things of that nature, the joint work between us and his team in order to lay out every single thing that we can devise ahead of time--so we are doing everything possible, and it is not as though we are waiting for the other partner to be identified.

But I think there has got to be some closing efforts that will take place when the other partner is identified and just how things will go over, what the tasks they will be undertaking and what sort of requirements they might have of us that we might not be aware of.

Mr. Dickson. Is there anything in particular that stands out as a major obstacle or issue that needs to be addressed more so than others?

Ambassador Johnson. Well, one of the things I referred
to is just who among the individuals that are employed by the current contractor might be required or desired by the future contractor, and that will be decisions that they have to make. And how that is integrated, I think fully will require the identification of a follow-on contractor and the individuals that are going to execute that contract.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Strain, when the time comes and you award your follow-on contract, I would like to talk about how you plan to manage it to ensure accountability, oversight, control and basically ensure that the transition is handled with all of those things in mind, under what I understand are without a doubt extraordinarily difficult circumstances in-country.

Mr. Strain. Thank you, sir. First, understand we have been working with CSTC-A hand in hand in the development of these task orders, to ensure that we have a full understanding of all of the requirements as well as an understanding of how that is going to impact on our ability to manage the oversight of that.

As such, I recently established an office in Kabul to do some work on some other things that I have going on over there. That office, I will ramp up significantly in order to provide the oversight that is necessary.

That oversight is really going to be at four levels:

It is going to be at a level where CSTC-A is providing
personnel within the embedded training teams, within each of the sites, who we will be working with in order to ensure proper oversight and execution of the contract.

Second, I will have a series of in-place personnel who will be focused strictly and solely on the execution of the contract. I will have individuals at each of the camp sites.

And I will also have at a third level, roving contracting officer technical reps and subject matter experts who will then be going around from camps to camps, and places to places, to ensure again that there is the proper management and oversight.

Then I will have a COR and a COTR sitting in Kabul as well as back in Dahlgren.

I expect that on my own I will probably put some 25 or so people in the country to do nothing more than contract management in support of this effort.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

Sir, that is the end of my time.

Chairman Shays. Thanks.

General Formica, I am going to go over the numbers again because I really want to be as clear as I can be.

Presently in November, 2009, we have about 96,000 army. By October, 2010, we think we will have 134,000. That is the projected. That is what has been approved. That is the
goal.

It is proposed by 2013, it is the word, by the end or by the beginning?

General Formica. By the end, sir.

Chairman Shays. Okay. With police, we now have 94,000, December, 2009, 96,800. And proposed 160,000, and that is by the end as well?

General Formica. Yes, that is correct, sir.

Chairman Shays. If we ramp up for--what is the goal of police by October, 2010? Is there a goal?

General Formica. Well, sir, there is not at this point because we do not have the approval, and I do not have the number in my head. But if we get approved to go to 160 by the end of October, 2013, then there would be a ramp that would get you to October, 2010.

Chairman Shays. Let's talk about Army.

General Formica. Okay.

Chairman Shays. To go from 96,000 in November, 2009 to October, 2010 to 134,000, that is a ramp. If you kept that ramp in existence, what would your numbers be by the end of 2013?

Do you want me to say it again?

General Formica. I understand the question. I do not know that I know the answer.

Chairman Shays. Okay, 96,000, November, 2009, 134,000
by October is ramp. Does that line get us if we did not add any more, just continue to use whatever we are going to use between additional from November, 2009 to October, 2010? Would that ramp get us up to 240,000 or would we actually even have to add more resources?

General Formica. The ramp to grow the army would need to be increased to achieve the number that we propose.

Chairman Shays. I am going to say it differently, and I will spend a half hour if we have to on this. I know you are trying to help out here.

We presently have 96,000, November. By October, 2010, you will get to 134,000. That is an increase of 38,000. You have had to ramp up to get to that, correct?

General Formica. That is correct.

Chairman Shays. If you use that same ramp line, what would that line get us by the end of 2013?

General Formica. Sir, I do not know the number that would get us to, but I think my answer is that in order to get to 240,000 by the end of 2013, we would need to increase the ramp of growth.

Chairman Shays. Okay, so what you are saying is that we would even have to do more, add more people to get to the 240,000 from the 113,000, but you would acknowledge that if you kept the same progression that you would be higher than 134,000 by the end of 2013.
General Formica. If we kept the same progression, we would be ahead, more than 134,000.

Chairman Shays. By the end of 2013. You just do not know what that number is.

General Formica. That is correct.

Chairman Shays. I would like to get that number. The reason I am asking is I want to know how many resources have to be added.

We are a commission on contracting. We know that in today's military we have like now one for one. We know that in order for the warfighter to be at the tip of the spear we need contractors: contractors to build things, contractors to move things, contractors to train, contractors to guard. Therefore, our military does not have to do that. We know that, and we value it. But what we are wrestling with is our capability and the implications of getting to a higher number.

Speaking now as a former member of Congress, and I will be delicate with this because I do not do policy anymore, we do know that we need more than 134,000. So there has to be some higher goal.

The question we are looking at is, okay, what kind of contractors are you going to need to get whatever that higher goal is going to be agreed to, both for the army and police?
Going back to the number of 20 security for 1,000 populace, we need, in theory, over 560,000, somewhere in that range, of security forces in order for them to have the full number of complement that they need.

Let me ask you, I would like to ask all of you this question. It is generic. What are the pros and cons of allowing a contractor to protest in time of war?

In time of peace, there is one implication. What are the implications of allowing a protest?

And let me ask you, Mr. Strain, walk me through the process of a protest, not talking about who should get it, whatever. Just walk me through what is publicly known about a protest.

A protest is made. How long do they have? What is the process? How does that delay the ultimate efforts to get to the numbers we want?

So what is the protest?

Mr. Strain. Sir, thanks for the question. To be honest with you, my understanding and knowledge of the protest is somewhat limited, the protest process. The contracting office at the Space and Missile Defense Command actually received the information from the GAO.

Chairman Shays. So you do not deal with protests at all?

Mr. Strain. I deal with protests in the sense of the
delays that it will inherently cause because of the work that we are doing.

Chairman Shays. Well, then let me talk about that. What does a protest do in terms of the numbers that you have told us, the numbers that we need to get to?

Mr. Strain. I am sorry, sir. I am not sure I understand what you mean by the numbers that we need to get to.

Chairman Shays. Let me just first put it this way then, and let me get into it in a different way. We will get to the answer.

Mr. Strain. Yes, sir.

Chairman Shays. We are moving the responsibility of training the Afghan police from State to DoD. Ambassador Johnson has stated in his statement, "The transfer of contract responsibility for police training is an effort to eliminate a large management layer, so that resourcing, funding and other management issues for this large-scale training mission are more efficient, but the transfer is not intended to alter the type of training provided. The Department of State will continue to play a role in Afghan law enforcement training through program policy, oversight and overall direction for the police program through Ambassador Eikenberry."

That is his statement. Do you concur with that
statement?

Mr. Strain. Sir, as far as I understand the situation, yes. My dealing with this is really strictly related to the work we are doing with CSTC-A and how they interact with INL and the external activities to do with that. I am not privy to--

Chairman Shays. You are taking over the responsibility of training the police, correct?

Mr. Strain. I am taking over responsibility as CSTC-A has laid it out for us in the requirements that they have given us, yes, sir.

Chairman Shays. Yes, the responsibility to train the police is your responsibility, correct?

Mr. Strain. Yes, sir.

Chairman Shays. Okay. In training the police, it was done by State. How often have you met with State?

Mr. Strain. Sir, the first time we met with State was in October, that I personally met with the State Department was in October of this year. We went over to their office that maintains the contract and began that process of working with them. Then I had my two program managers, which have been working full-time on this, have been working with the State Department representative with respect to the transition on a contractual level.

Chairman Shays. How often have they met?
Mr. Strain. Sir, I do not have the answer to that question at this time. They have been engaging in regular conversations. I do not know the extent to which they have met or the frequency to which they have met.

Chairman Shays. How does the program work when it becomes the responsibility of the Ambassador again? In other words, there is a point to which DoD will no longer be responsible for training police because it will come under the jurisdiction of the Ambassador again, correct?

Mr. Strain. Sir, as far as I know, yes, sir, based on the testimony that has been provided.

Chairman Shays. Can you respond to that, Ambassador?

Ambassador Johnson. We certainly hope that we will get to a point in the security situation in Afghanistan where the need to have a combined effort between the military and the police will be that we will have achieved such security on the ground, and then, yes, you would anticipate. But trying to put a dot on a calendar for that is, I think, impossible.

Chairman Shays. Candidly, what is causing this question is when we were in Afghanistan this last time, we did not get a warm, fuzzy feeling that there was a good relationship between State and DoD in this transfer, and I would say, quite frankly, we got the feeling that State's
nose was a bit out of joint. They did not see the logic to it. They did not give us a sense that there was very good coordination.

There is the issue now that we have given the existing contractor two more months at what, $34 million per month. Is that the right amount, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador Johnson. I do not have that figure in front of me, but I would be glad to get that to you. It is a significant number.

Chairman Shays. General?

General Formica. I think that is the correct number.

Chairman Shays. Okay.

General Formica. Or pretty close.

Chairman Shays. So their view, what we got from DoD was they did not need this contract to continue for two months. The view we got from State was you need it. There was not this feeling like you all were in agreement.

Would you say, Mr. Strain, that you all see eye to eye on this or are there disagreements that still need to be worked out?

Mr. Strain. Sir, with respect to the extension that was added on to extend the day down to 31 March, it might work with CSTC-A in developing the requirements to ensure we had a solid requirement base upon which we could develop sound proposals and put good people in place to do the work.
It was me that actually started pushing the extension. I asked for it because I wanted to ensure that there was in fact enough time to do this thing correctly and to make sure that we had a sufficient transition time, looking for an approximate 90 days of transition between the incoming and the outgoing, so that we would be able to address the issues, of any that arose. We knew the complexity of this, and we wanted to make sure that we had addressed the issue, so that at the end of the day the Afghan students are not impacted by the transition.

Chairman Shays. Okay, I am going to come back in my next round of questioning, to talk about the impact during wartime of protest. I would like one of you to be able to tell me this, and, if you cannot, it is pretty shocking that you would not be able to because I would be thinking that you all would be thinking about the impact.

Mr. Strain, you are the one who has to run this program. I would like to think you could tell me the impact, how long it should take. I would like to think you have asked those questions, so you would know.

Mr. Green.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Ambassador Johnson, please describe as best you can what the continuing role of INL will be in training specialized police, to include footprint and funding, to the
degree that it has been resolved.

Ambassador Johnson. I think at this point this is a not totally, but somewhat, speculative discussion. As we have engaged with our colleagues in CSTC-A as to how this program will be handed over and whether and what aspects will be they would prefer for us to retain or even to expand our presence in. We have had some back and forth.

At points earlier in the discussion, the desire by our colleagues in CSTC-A was that they handle everything totally. I think as we have had our continuing engagement they have looked at a couple of things where they are continuing to review. They have asked us to take over the family centers which were part of this, and we are making provision to do so.

And, as I mentioned in my remarks, there may be some higher end training, some training that is specifically related to gender issues, where they might want us to retain a role as the discussions continue. Those are not finalized. We are open to that. As I hope I have conveyed, we want to be a responsive partner to our military colleagues, and that is the spirit in which we have extended this effort as well.

Commissioner Green. Has the footprint and the funding been resolved?

Ambassador Johnson. The footprint and the funding have
not been resolved because the entire scope of the effort has not been resolved, but I would anticipate that setting aside the footprint, that the funding would continue to come from the Department of Defense and that we would not, at this point, alter the way the funding is managed.

Commissioner Green. What is your best guess as to when these issues that are unresolved will be resolved?

Ambassador Johnson. I think they are quite early in the new year if we stay on track for the award of the new contract.

Commissioner Green. Okay. Thank you.

I do not know if this is more directed toward General Formica or Mr. Strain, but in agreeing to this vehicle, this contract vehicle for basic police training, was any consideration given to the DoD IG’s criticism of Space and Missile Defense Command's ability to manage and administer CNTPO IDIQ contracts?

Mr. Strain. Sir, I will answer that question. The IG report that you are referring to, dated 25 September of 2009, the actual audit actually occurred during August of 2008. During that time period, they not only looked at SMDC, but they also looked at CNTPO itself. It was the beginning of the contractual, the use of that contract.

There were a number of discrepancies identified, most of which revolved around the lack of personnel that were
onboard in order to do all the functions that needed to be accomplished. That has been addressed. My own organization has increased by about 250 percent in size. The contracting support for the contractors we have here has increased by almost 300 percent.

Chairman Shays. Could you give the actual numbers?

Mr. Strain. Yes, sir. I have gone from 11 government personnel to 30 with CNTPO. The contract support for the CNTPO contract has gone from 3 to 13, a significant increase which was designed, which was done specifically at the identification of the discrepancies that were identified. So that is how we have addressed that.

Commissioner Green. Okay. General Formica, you may not know this since you have been gone a while, but do you know what percentage roughly of the surge, the 30,000 surge of U.S. Forces, will be involved directly in training and mentoring?

I am not talking about as an ancillary duty while they are conducting combat operations, but how many of them will be devoted to training?

General Formica. Thank you for the question, Commissioner, and I do not know the exact number, and it may well have changed from the time that I left.

But I would just say that the approach that General McChrystal is taking with embedded partnering is more than
just ancillary training while you are conducting combat operations. It is really a mission statement for the units that are involved in embedded partnering and mentoring. So I would suggest that most of those forces that are going to go over there, especially the brigade combat teams, will have a role in the training and development of the Afghan National Security Forces in the same battle space in which they are operating.

Commissioner Green. But not necessarily in the same way that the 4th/82nd and the 48th Brigade Combat Team have.

General Formica. Actually, how the 48th and the 4/82’s role will evolve in the embedded partnering concept again was something that was the IGAC was wrestling with even as I left. I know that they will continue to provide dedicated police mentor teams, but most of the brigade combat teams have been given a mission to do embedded partnering, and they will partner with army and will partner with police in a way that we had not done in the past.

Commissioner Green. I just saw something recently that referenced the artillery. This is nothing against field artillery, obviously, but the field artillery battalion--

General Formica. I appreciate that, sir.

Commissioner Green. My dad was a field artilleryman, so I can--but referenced the artillery battalion of the
101st-BCT I guess--that is going in, who would be directly involved in training.

General Formica. Again--

Commissioner Green. Yes, this is something very new.

General Formica. And the regional commanders are going to use the assets that are available to them, but they are all providing embedded partnering. If you are a brigade combat team, and you are operating in a corps commander's battle space, that brigade combat team is going to partner with not only the Afghan National Army unit in that battle space, but the police districts that are in that battle space as well.

Commissioner Green. One thing we need to understand better than we do, and that is kind of what is the difference, and I know it is probably driven by the situation, the commander's desires and all of these other things. But what is the difference in what units like the 48th and the 4/82 are doing as opposed to what those operational brigade combat teams are doing? We need to just understand that better, and I do not expect to resolve it today.

One last question for all of you, Commissioner Shays's opening statement referenced the significant increase, potentially, of contractors in-country related to the surge. And when we first were formed, one of the very basic
questions is we got too many contractors, and comparing it to all sorts of wars in the past. Whether we do or not is not what we are here to solve today. But have you seen any attempt to reduce the number of contractors? Yes?

General Formica. So I would be happy to take a first cut at that answer. First, I would like to use this question to make the point that we absolutely value the role of the contractor.

Commissioner Green. We do too.

General Formica. I will not judge whether there is too many or not enough, but I know that in terms of providing logistics and security and base support, and in providing the trainers to enhance our capacity, and to bring those law enforcement skills, we absolutely value the role of the contractor.

We scrubbed line by line the number of mentor trainers that were required in each of the ministries and the number of trainers that would be required out in the battlefield. And the results were actually mixed because as we increase the number of units that are doing embedded partnering and would now partner with police, there was a requirement to increase the number of contractors, police contractors, so that we could provide law enforcement professionals down to those units at the platoon level or whatever, at the level that the commander chose to organize police mentor teams.
So we had to increase the number of police mentors to accommodate that.

At the same time, we looked hard, especially in the ministries, in how we could eliminate any duplications that occurred as they evolved over time, as we took advantage of the increased number of Coalition provided police mentors. And we actually did reduce the number of police mentors, contracted mentors, and there was some reduction as a result of the role of 4/82 and the trainers that they were going to provide.

Commissioner Green. Okay. Thank you very much.

General Formica. Yes, sir.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Tiefer, we are going to do 10 minutes. Mr. Green was given 11 minutes, and we are going to do 10 minutes. So here we go.

Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Strain, you mentioned and you had briefed us previously on the very rapid rate, maybe even we could call it a crash growth program, that your office had to go through. You said it expanded 250 percent, 11 to 30 officials and so forth, to accommodate the Afghan National Police training.

Is it true that in terms of how, in terms of it being a crash program, that you only found out of the transition to
this program from INL to the Defense Department in July, and that it was only formally approved at the end of August?

Mr. Strain. Thank you, sir. The first time that I personally found out about this particular transition was on 24 June of 2009, followed up by my first conversation with CSTC-A on 30 June.

Commissioner Tiefer. If it had stayed at State Department with the help of Ambassador Johnson, I have the impression that if it were on the CIVPOL contract vehicle that they have back at State, there would be at least two other sort of major competitors, DynCorp and CPI, Civilian Police International. Why has this been given to you and why not open competition, to the extent that you can explain those in general terms? I am not interested in the legal answer.

Mr. Strain. Sir, in answer to your first question, I simply received the direction to work with CSTC-A on this from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter Narcotics and Global Threats Office. That is who I respond to on a day to day basis. They asked that I go back and work with CSTC-A to make this a reality.

As it relates to your question on open competition, that goes back to the acquisition strategy.

Commissioner Tiefer. We will skip that.

Mr. Strain. Okay, sir.
Commissioner Tiefer. Ambassador Johnson, I am trying to find the highest level in the two departments that made the decision, this major decision to shift the training program from INL over to the Defense Department. By the way, if the answer is that you were the highest official in State who dealt with it, I mean no disrespect. You would just say that.

But this was a high-level decision, no? I mean this is not the kind of thing that is decided at the ground level, yes?

Ambassador Johnson. I should know the answer to that, but I do not, and I may in fact be the highest level official who "decided". But the senior levels of the Department were made aware by me of the discussion that was going on.

As I have tried to make clear in both my written testimony and in response to previous questions, we are working as an active supporting partner to our colleagues in CSTC-A. So this is not the kind of thing that we push back against. It is the kind of thing we seek to find out whether we can continue to play a helpful role and where we can respond to their desires for perhaps a more adroit way of accomplishing this task.

Commissioner Tiefer. So were you aware of the participation of higher levels in the Defense Department?
Ambassador Johnson. I was not personally, no.

Commissioner Tiefer. Okay. Would there have been a decision document of some making its way, that would explain the justifications for the decision?

Ambassador Johnson. The documents that I can recall now were in the form of memoranda and cables coming from Embassy Kabul that were making known to us the desires of our colleagues in the military and how they wish to shape this, and responding to them from Kabul.

Commissioner Tiefer. I may have questions for the record on that subject and for the entire panel. We are admonished to note this.

Mr. Strain, in the attempt to meet the current target of 160,000 that comes over to you, there will be decisions on the program of instruction, the current 8-week program of instruction. As the matter goes forward, would you expect that there will be modifications in that program of instruction?

Mr. Strain. Sir, thank you. From a personal perspective, I would in fact expect there to be modifications to the program. Based on my own experience and my own history in the military, I cannot envision as we would continue to run along the same program of instruction without pulling in lessons learned.

That being the case, one of the requirements that CSTC-
A provided to us, as we began the development of this particular effort, was the flexibility and the ability of the contractor who comes in to help with and execute changes into the POI, and then we did as such.

Commissioner Tiefer. So CSTC-A has left room for lengthening or shortening the program of instruction in the requirements that it gave you for the program.

Mr. Strain. As far as lengthening or shortening, sir, all they asked is that we just have flexibility to change.

Commissioner Tiefer. Well, they could change it to the same thing, it is true.

Are you familiar with the issue of what would happen if the program of instruction were shortened, considering that everyone has said, and there is no doubt, that in order to meet the fact that there is such a terribly high level of casualties among the police they have to receive more weapons training, more paramilitary style training than they have in the past, which eats up some of the eight weeks that there is? What would have to happen if the program of instruction were shortened?

Mr. Strain. Sir, without sounding to be obstructionist, that really is a question for CSTC-A because all I do is simply provide the contract support and provide them the ability to execute whatever requirement they have come down with.
I am aware at a high level of the various discussions that have been ongoing, but I do not engage in the conversations or in the decision process for that. I simply just execute.

Commissioner Tiefer. We will go to them in a second.

Ambassador Johnson, I am going to ask a question about Blackwater because it is one of the five prime competitors on this contract. And I realize you are in INL and not diplomatic security, so your answer might just be you are asking the wrong person. But will State be passing over to DoD information about the past performance of Blackwater on the major contract it has performed for the State Department, which would be the personal security contract, under TWES I believe it is?

Ambassador Johnson. I am going to ask if I could take that because I want to give you a completely accurate answer rather than anything that I would speculate about.

INL does not have, and as far as I am aware has never had, a contractual relationship with Blackwater. So I do not have any personal experience to share. But the way that our acquisitions colleagues might communicate with their colleagues at DoD is something I think I should consult with them on rather than speculating about what that would be.

Commissioner Tiefer. I absolutely will regard that that is very appropriate. You are not the bureau that would
handle it.

I do note the significance of it, that Blackwater currently runs the Afghan Border Police training program, so it is not just drifting through the competition there. It is a significant prime competitor for that prime contract.

General Formica, you were fingered earlier as the person to ask on this. You have said that the goal is 160,000 in Afghan National Police. Suppose trying to reach that goal seriously affected the quality of the police. Say that one of the ways that would have to be attempted would be to shorten the program of instruction from eight weeks to a shorter time, at the same time as devoting time to weapons and paramilitary training. What would you think about the target of 160,000 in that bind?

General Formica. I appreciate the change from goal to target because again, sir, I just for the record would say that that was our proposal. That has not been accepted by the Department of Defense or approved by the Government of the United States and by Afghanistan. So it is not yet a goal.

That said, we look at and have reviewed the program of instruction for all of the training we do on a regular basis, and there is no doubt the current training for police was at eight weeks. We have looked at whether or not six weeks is something that was achievable. It was done with a
committee of actually civilian police professionals provided by the international community who were assigned to CSTC-A. They are looking at the program of instruction to see whether or not we could not reduce the amount of training, but compress into a six-week period the amount of training that was required to turn out police of the same quality.

One of that is slightly longer training days and a fuller training week, recognizing that we are in an insurgency and that we probably needed to get a full six-day week out of the training. So by adding training time to the training day and to the training week, there was some compression in the time required to train without degrading the quality of the training.

You also referred to the balance between the increased number of counterinsurgency or amount of counterinsurgency training, and my numbers will be about wrong. But in the eight-week POI [Plan or Program of Instruction], or in the training that we currently provide, my number is about 45 percent or so was the kind of training that would best prepare a policeman for a higher-end activity more suited to a counterinsurgency and about 35 percent or so that was used for what I would call police or law enforcement specific training, and the rest more in administration, the general training.

Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you, General Formica.

I am done.
Chairman Shays. Mr. Dickson.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, sir.

General Formica, I would like to talk. I realize that you left command on November 21st, and this question is probably framed in the context of the day you left. Did CSTC-A, from your perspective when you left, have the appropriate resources necessary to handle taking on the management of the Afghan National Police training through the use of contractors? Did you have what you needed available to do that job?

General Formica. Again, we had the responsibility for training Afghan National Security Forces, army and police, from the day that I took command, and we were never afforded the resources that were required to provide the police mentors when the decision was made even a few years prior to that. So was CSTC-A adequately resourced to train and develop the Afghan National Security Forces? The answer is no.

I would also say that is one of the reasons why, in his strategic review, General McChrystal transitioned the role of develop--the line of operation, develop the fielded force, was transferred from CSTC-A, and the embedded training teams and police mentor teams that go with it, to the ISAF IJC, and that responsibility given to the regional commanders who are operating in the battle space, so that he
was going to take full advantage of the capacity and capability that those brigade combat teams brought not only to the conduct of combat operations, but to their ability to develop, mentor, role-model and train the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. In that regard, on the 21st of November, things were getting better.

I would submit that the addition of 30,000 additional soldiers only improves that.

Mr. Dickson. So now comes, in addition to all of that, the management and oversight of a major contract to facilitate training in-country. From your view, had CSTC-A properly lined up the resources necessary to manage the contract piece of that?

General Formica. As I indicated in my statement, sir, we had not matured that capability. Over time, as contracts grew, that was something that we identified. It was clearly an observation by the DoD IG, and we appreciate their thoughtful recommendations and help in that regard, and it was something that was noted in the report by the SIGAR.

We reorganized in CSTC-A to create a contract management cell and changed our joint manning document to increase that capacity. We took soldiers out of hide. I say soldiers, some servicemen out of hide and realigned them against that task. But when I left, the full JMD obviously had not been filled because we had only recently changed the
manning document, and that obviously takes time.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, General.

Ambassador Johnson, we talked a little bit about the transition plan, and Mr. Strain identified that he was kind of the source of this 90-day transition period requirement for the effective hand-off from State to DoD.

Sometimes we get numb to numbers because we have talked about over, what, 15 or 16 billion dollars being spent on training Afghan National Security Forces from the beginning of hostilities there. But even in that 90-day window, if we were to go at the historic rate of 34 or 35 million dollars a month, that is a 100 million dollars worth of activity that needs to be coordinated between State and Defense. So how effectively that the Defense Department stands up and State Department stands down brings into question the potential of waste and overlapping as we transition with the hand-off, basically scaling down from State and building up at Defense.

Will the plans that you talked about, the transition plan, ensure that the resources are effectively managed and that we do not have that kind of waste?

Ambassador Johnson. The plan and the activities of the individuals executing the plan will be designed to accomplish exactly that.

Mr. Dickson. Right.
Ambassador Johnson. While the 90 days I think we agree is the right numeral, we have sought to make even that as effective as we possibly can by front-loading things that we can already start to do, the inventories issue, for example, in order to make this as smooth as we possibly can, and to have neither overlap nor under-lap because we very definitely do not want a gap between us.

Mr. Dickson. Right.

Ambassador Johnson. That is part of the 90-day requirement, so that we do not, in making the hand-off, in any way drop any batons.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, sir. Clearly, there is a potential if there is not that kind of vigilance to have duplication of effort, multiple payments, and basically there is an inefficiency aspect that could creep into the situation if you do not manage it the way that you are describing. So, thank you for that, sir.

Mr. Strain, I want to talk to you about the question of any obstacles or impairments other than the legal process that is currently underway. You stated a very ambitious goal in my view, of awarding a contract in a matter of just a few weeks really, absent this current legal process that is going on.

Take that out of the equation and get back to some point in time where you are able to proceed. Are you sure
that you have all of the obstacles and impediments out of
the way that would enable to effectively award a contract
task order and meet the timelines that you have identified?

Mr. Strain. Thank you, sir. I would never sit in any
forum and suggest that I have taken into account every
aspect of every obstacle. What I would suggest is that we
have multiple people who have been continuously reviewing,
continuously looking at, continuously engaged in trying to
identify where the risk points are and how we mitigate those
risks.

One of the initial risks in my previous discussions
with the Commission was the risk of the timeframe that we
were initially looking at with respect to trying to make
this thing occur. One of the risk mitigation factors was
increasing the timeframe of the current contracts, so that
we would have additional time in order to conduct a more
thorough, reasonable and accurate turnover, as well as
ensuring we had fully and completely understood all the
requirements from CSTC-A and were able to ensure that the
contractors who will be ultimately awarded that task have a
full and complete understanding and are able to in fact
accomplish the tasks that CSTC-A requires.

Mr. Dickson. One of the things that we have observed
in our visits to Afghanistan and our additional research is
just how tough it is to do things sometimes in Afghanistan.
You mentioned earlier having a presence of about 25 personnel that are going to be in-country to oversee the management of that contract, to ensure accountability and to basically ensure that the contractor delivers.

Yet, the question is will they have adequate facilities, a place to live, the communications, the ability to travel effectively, to do their jobs in the timeframes that you are contemplating?

Mr. Strain. Yes, sir. I made a comment earlier with respect to establishing a full-time permanent presence in Kabul. We have access to our vehicles or access to our air support. We have access to a wide variety of capabilities of getting out, and that was done purposefully because of all of the oversight I have with respect to the other task orders I have in Afghanistan, Pakistan and in that region. So we established a capability that allows us to move independently, successfully, from Point A to Point B and to do the oversight that is required.

We will have, in conjunction with CSTC-A and the types of support that they are going to provide, in terms of billeting for our personnel who will be at the camp sites on a full-time oversight basis, and the transportation involved, either theirs or ours, to ensure that we can move the personnel back and forth as needed—establishing a rotation period for our personnel, so that they do not
become too embedded in the camp or with a particular group of people, so that there are fresh eyes and an understanding of what needs to be done, plus an ability for lessons learned.

We have expended a lot of time and effort to ensure that we can operate in the environment that exists there.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you very much.

Sir, that is all I have.

Chairman Shays. Thank you.

There is a real irony in this hearing. We are on thin ice, not for significant reasons. The life and death issues that we really should be talking about are, in a sense, kind of ignored a little bit while we tread so carefully on the contracting issue and the fact there is a protest.

So, Mr. Strain, I am not going to ask you some questions, but I am going to tell you what my observation is. You have come to our office more than once, and you have made us feel that this transfer can happen, like that. [Indicating.] You have made me feel like it would be an easy process.

We go to Afghanistan, and we hear comments from both DoD and State and see the body language that we could not see if we were communicating by email, that says this has been an awkward transfer.

It does not give me a warm, fuzzy feeling to think that
you have only had really one contact with State, and yet you are in charge of the program. You have delegated it to someone else. You cannot tell me how often they have done it. But that does not make me feel very comfortable.

We know as a matter of public record that the existing contractor has done a good job and has done it for five years, whatever. That is not being alleged one way or the other.

We know that in transferring it to DoD, that in order to move quickly with a task order contract, five contractors can do it, but the existing one cannot, and that is the way it is.

What we can address as a commission on contracting is understanding during time of war, does this process make sense, and do we risk the lives of our troops because we have a process that does not work properly?

We may in a special report or a report done next year say: This is crazy. The protest system needs to be looked at differently.

It does not leave me comfortable, Mr. Strain, that you cannot tell me, word for word, your knowledge of the protest because it impacts what you ultimately do. If the protest takes longer, it is going to impact you. I would think you would want to know that.

My understanding is it is a 100-day process. My
understanding is it could be waived. Whether it is going to be waived or not is not my privilege to know, and I would not ask you that. I would like to think you would know the other parts to it. I would also like to think that you might have a recommendation that you would be making.

The ballgame is whether we can adequately train enough Afghans in their police and in their army, so that we can leave.

Then the irony is if we can leave and we are still training them, it goes back to State. I would love someone to tell me the logic of giving it to DoD when the program is being done well, and then having to give it back to State when we leave, unless people think we are never going to leave.

What is also troubling, General Formica, is that we know right now that by October, 2010, we will have 134,000 if we can train them on time, and what we do not know is what are we going to do with the police. We are transferring a contract over. We know that we are now at 94,000, and by the end of the year we will be 96,800. That is what we know.

I would like to think we would be able to know more, like that a request of 160 has been acted by now. I mean we are sending our troops in. We are going to expand that, and yet we do not know if we are going to train more Afghan
police and border patrol.

So all of this is a bit troubling.

When we were in Afghanistan, it was emphasized more times than we can say, how corrupt every part of the system is. The one part I would think we would want to make sure was not corrupt was that the soldiers and police get paid, and one of the things we learned is they are not getting paid. Some are; some are not.

That impacts our contractors. So we meet with DynCorp, and we had an incredible conversation with them, very candid, speaking to people who have been there five years, six years, three years. We are learning that some of the people they are training are not getting paid.

So I would like to think that we could have covered a little more territory with this panel, and I think it would have been helpful to the Commission to understand the protest process.

General, are you willing to give me any concept of what you think about the protest concept and whether it should be different in time of war than during time of peace and whether if we had the regulations to make it different, whether we should be utilizing them?

General Formica. What I would say, Mr. Chairman, and I would have a couple of comments if we have time based on what you said.
Chairman Shays. You have time.

General Formica. But to that specific point, from my perspective as the former commander of the organization that felt responsibility for training and developing the Afghan National Army and Police, we would want to be able to either continue existing contracts or transition from one contract to another, and the imperative obviously is to do that without an interruption in the continuity of training or the quality of that training, and how the contracting process supports that. It seems to me those are the two objectives from my perspective, I would like to see.

I do not know if that answers your question.

Chairman Shays. Right.

General Formica. Certainly, we would not want to see an interruption in the conduct of training nor degradation in the quality of training as we transition the contract.

So I would like to make a point as well. We spent a lot of time talking about the transition of the contract. From my perspective, when I was in command of CSTC-A, the observation that I made, this is really one facet of a three-part approach to improve the strategy to develop the Afghan National Police.

The first element was to create an Afghan National Police Training Command because ultimately the responsibility to train the Afghan National Police is
something that the Minister of Interior has some level of responsibility for. We are there to help him and to provide him the resources to do that.

So just like the Afghan National Army has an Afghan National Army Training Command, it is commanded by a two-star general. He has got command authority over the training sites. That has been established, and it is thoroughly effective.

We do not have anything like that with the Afghan National Police. Their training is done by a directorate in the Ministry of Interior. So the approach is to create the first part of the strategy, create an Afghan National Police Training Command that has that kind of command responsibility for the conduct of training, responsive to the Minister of Interior.

Chairman Shays. What is the second one?

General Formica. Sir, the second one is to establish a training advisory group for police inside CSTC-A, now NTM-A, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, to take advantage of the increased number of U.S. and Coalition trainers that will come as part of NTM-A, who are responsible for training and mentoring that Afghan National Police Training Command which includes the trainers down at the regional training sites.

Then the third was to transition the responsibility for
managing the contract to the organization that was responsible for developing the Afghan National Police, so that we would eliminate the layer of going to the Department of State associated with that contract--so that you have got one organization, CSTC-A, that is responsible for training the Afghan National Police, provides the training advisory group and is responsible for oversight of the contract, so that you have unity of command and unity of effort.

Chairman Shays. Thank you.

Ambassador, do you want to jump in on this, as it relates to the whole issue of being able to do a protest and how you work that out?

Ambassador Johnson. I am not familiar with the protest process that my colleagues at DoD have ongoing. So I am going to approach this a little bit from the point of view of a learned citizen, if you will.

I think we need to have, and exercise, the authorities in order to accelerate things when we need to during wartime, whether it has to do with personnel, contracts or anything else. But apropos of everything from the Truman Commission to today, we also need a process under rule of law, so that if there are things that need to be dealt with through a protest or some other mechanism, that there is a way to do that.

Chairman Shays. But expedited.
Ambassador Johnson. Quickly, yes.

Chairman Shays. Let me conclude, and then I am going to let each of you make a closing comment.

One of the things that was revealing to me, I had heard about it, but to hear contractors, and this is one reason why we are going to be interacting with the contractors in this third panel. And we are not going to tolerate for a second someone attempting to suggest that by doing that we are interfering with the process because we will not, but we will learn.

What we learned from the contractors was for the folks who are running it, wondering why they could not continue to run it. But having said that, every one of them said, we are like professionals, if we end up working for someone else.

The irony to this whole process is that 60 to 70 to 80 percent of the folks who end up doing the training in a different contract, under different people, under a different management, may be the same people. That is one of the ironies to this whole thing.

It was impressive to me to see the amount of dedication to a cause that even superseded a company, that there was this real sense that we are doing something important and would like to continue to do it, this important work, even if it meant that they might be under a different management.
I thought it spoke well, candidly, to the intentions of these folks.

I would invite any of you to respond to any question that we did not ask that we should have, or any comment that you want to make based on questions that were asked, and I will start with you, Mr. Strain.

Mr. Strain. Sir, I would just like to, one, first of all, thank you for allowing me to be here and to have this discussion with you.

And a comment that you made with respect to making it sound easy and as a snap, if that came across, I apologize because I am fully aware of the complexities, both the importance of and the many land mines that exist, going through this transition process. We put a lot of people and a lot of time and effort into this, and we will continue to do so.

You asked a previous question of me with respect to the challenge process or the protest process, and with respect to that, from a personal perspective in a wartime environment, having served in a wartime environment, I believe that, as Ambassador Johnson said, the ability to expedite, the ability to move quickly beyond the protest itself and to address the issues is absolutely critical to what we do on a day to day basis. The service of the warfighter is absolutely paramount to anything that we do.
here. We have a lot of contracting rules and regulations, but at the end of the day our focus is on serving the warfighter and the needs of the folks in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world where we have work to do.

To that end, we will continue to move forward with what we are doing here. We will plough through the process as it exists. Some of the issues that we will have to overcome is the length of time it takes in order to address the issues and that, and how that will impact on our ability to conduct the transition, what that might potentially mean in terms of extensions of contract or in terms of our ability to move quickly with the changeover.

Those are questions at this juncture we cannot answer until we continue to pursue down this road, but I will be happy at some point in time in the future, if necessary, to talk to you about that again.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here. We look forward to continuing this process, and we look forward to spending a lot of time in Afghanistan supporting this effort.

Chairman Shays. Thank you, Mr. Strain. We also would concur. Thank you.

Ambassador?

Ambassador Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too appreciate the opportunity to participate in this
discussion, in this exchange with you, and I hope I have been responsive to your questions.

With regard to what you said about your engagement with the individuals who are contractors, who are working on the ground, I too have that kind of respect that you outlined. I am so far engaged in a not yet successful effort to have those who have given the ultimate sacrifice in service to our Country that way to be part of the Peace Officers Memorial that is in front of the Pension Building here. I think they deserve that type of recognition.

With respect to the question you asked us, whether we should be employing contractors more or less, I think it behooves us who are working on these issues always to be asking ourselves what the right mix is, whether some of the things we are asking these individuals to do are inherently governmental or not.

But, at the same time, I think whether it is the Department of State or the Department of Justice or other elements of our government who are providing this type of assistance abroad because of the flexibility that they have and because of the reach we need into our law enforcement community, particularly at the State and local level, we are going to need to rely on these contractor mechanisms to provide the support for as far into the future as I can see.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shays. Thank you, Ambassador.

General?

General Formica. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you, and I will add to my colleagues my sincere thanks at the opportunity to be able to appear before this Commission, and to thank you for the work that you do and will continue to do in helping us to better align the role of contracting and contractors with this very important work.

I absolutely share your notion and have great passion that nothing is more important in what we are doing in Afghanistan than the training and development of the Afghan National Security Forces, so that they can provide ultimately for the security and stability of the Afghan people, which is something they desperately want to be able to do for themselves, and we want to do enable them to do so.

I would reiterate that it is in fact as we have heard today in testimony, and I think you appreciate from your visits, a complex environment. And it is something that the development of those Afghan National Security Forces, army and police, is going to require the concerted efforts of our military, U.S. and our Coalition partners, government civilians and contractors, probably in increasing numbers if the decisions are made to increase the size of the Afghan National Security Forces.
For me, the transition of the responsibilities for the contract was not about changing contractors. It was about unity of effort and unity of command. So, again, the same organization that had responsibility for developing the Afghan National Police and helping them create a training command, for providing the training advisory group, would be the same organization that would have responsibility for management of the contract.

I would add, if I may, just one point. You talked about pay. We are obviously very concerned about several challenges in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces and in their administration. Pay is one of them.

You may be aware, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, that one of the efforts we have taken over the past several months to increase the ability of soldiers and policemen to get paid directly is through electronic funds transfer, where they get their money directly to their bank account, and that is in increasing numbers. When I left, it was somewhere between 65 and 70 percent or so for the soldiers in the army and over 80 percent for the police, that were actually receiving their pay directly through electronic funds transfer. Now that does not eliminate corruption challenges with being able to take their pay, but it certainly reduces the opportunity for it.
Chairman Shays. Right. Well, we thank all three of you for your service. We do look forward to working with you, and we have worked with you in the past and look forward to it continuing. So, thank you very much.

We will get to our final panel: Don Ryder, Vice President, Civilian Police Programs, DynCorp International; Fred Roitz, Executive Vice President, Xe Company, formerly Blackwater; and Nick Nickerson, Program Manager, Afghan National Security Sector Development and Fielding Program of the MPRI division of L-3 Communications.

If you would stay standing, gentlemen, is there anyone else who may respond to questions? If so, you might have them stand up because we do not want to swear someone in once we begin. So, if we may need to ask a question and you have to turn to someone else to answer it, we would like them to stand.

Okay, raising your right hand, do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Mr. Ryder. I do.

Mr. Roitz. I do.

Mr. Nickerson. I do.

Chairman Shays. Thank you very much.

Before I start with you, Mr. Ryder, let me just ask for
your cooperation, and we are going to try to be as cooperative as possible. We do not want anyone to game the system. This is not an opportunity for you to say something that would then give you an opportunity to make some kind of protest, or someone else a protest. We realize there is a contract that has to be settled.

We had a debate in our Commission on whether we should invite you, the third panel. Frankly, in some ways, you are the most important panel in being able to answer questions like what are the challenges of deciding whether to even seek work with the government in contracting, what kind of people do you look for, telling us what are the difficulties in training Afghans versus Iraqis, if you can tell us that, the differences between those who are literate and not--fill us in on the generic kind of stuff that will help us understand what it is like to be in your shoes and what it is like for other contractors as well.

If we can proceed that way, I think we can learn a lot, and we will not have created a circumstance that either you or we regret.

So, Mr. Ryder, we will start with you, and then we will go to Mr. Nickerson and Mr. Roitz. Mr. Ryder, you have the floor.
TESTIMONY OF DONALD RYDER, VICE PRESIDENT, CIVILIAN POLICE PROGRAMS, DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Ryder. Thank you, sir. Chairman Shays, members of the Commission, on behalf of DynCorp International’s 2,300 employees supporting the Afghan Civilian Advisory Support program, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing.

Since 2003, DynCorp International has partnered with the United States Government to build the capacity and professionalism of the Afghan National Police. Working closely with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Afghan Minister of Interior and the Afghan National Police in 33 locations throughout Afghanistan, our police training programs have consistently received high marks for performance.

As the program manager for the past 18 months, I am proud of the bravery, determination and competency of our team. Even in the most challenging times, the team continued to make progress and continued to move forward and never quit when it was too hard. Unfortunately, the work is not just hard, but it is dangerous. To date, 37 courageous DynCorp employees, including 6 in Afghanistan, have paid the ultimate sacrifice in supporting this police training program.

The Afghan police training program faces many
challenges: low literacy rates, drug use among potential recruits, issues of corruption, 26 percent attrition rate, low pay and extremely high casualties. This is, no kidding, difficult work, but at the same time it is absolutely essential. You know as well as I the importance of building an Afghan security force in terms of meeting the Administration’s goals in Afghanistan.

The Taliban understands as well. They see the Afghan National Police as a serious threat to Taliban control of villages, reflected in the vicious and, sadly, successful attacks on the police. Four times the number of Afghan police have lost their lives as Afghan soldiers. On Monday alone, 16 Afghan police were killed in 2 separate insurgent attacks.

As I said in my prepared testimony, we have faced many hard lessons over the six years in supporting this program. We have learned from these lessons and incorporated them in our operations and our training curriculum.

Drawing on my experience as the ACAS program manager, I have included eight recommendations in my formal statement. I would like to highlight just five right now.

One, focus on quality of police training and not simply quantity. The numbers trained is an ineffective metric for determining the capacity and capability of the Afghan National Police.
Two, increase the capacity at the central and regional training centers, and expand the number of Afghan instructors and U.S. mentors and advisors. Afghanistan needs more police recruits, but it also needs to provide advanced law enforcement training to existing police officers.

Three, enlarge the train the trainer efforts. DynCorp has transitioned training at the regional training centers to the Afghan police instructors. We now need to develop a cadre of field training officers to replace U.S. police mentors out in the field. Transfer of the responsibility should be based on meeting certification metrics. We should train to a standard, not to time.

Four, increase the number of police mentor teams and lengthen the period that they mentor and oversee police. Longer-term mentorship increases individual and unit level law enforcement skills, while reducing the possibility of corrupt activities.

Five, as our CEO, Bill Ballhaus, has discussed with the Commission in previous testimony, the Defense Base Act should be strengthened to better support the wounded and the families of deceased. Contractors on the battlefield are a reality of modern warfare, and those injured and wounded on the job deserve better than they get currently.

DynCorp International recognized this void and
established an employee assistance program. The program assists wounded personnel and the family of those killed in action. I am pleased to have with me today, Mike Warren who heads up this effort. Mike was a police officer in Dallas-Ft. Worth, and he was an advisor in Iraq. We encourage the Commission to study the program and see if it might be an effective model for the government to use.

Finally, I would extend my appreciation and thanks to the courageous men and women who work in remote and hostile locations in support of the Afghan National Police training program. Increasingly, we only hear bad news when it comes to overseas contractors, but it is my belief you would be hard pressed to find a more dedicated, focused and qualified workforce than the one we have supporting the program today.

They serve every day for a safe tomorrow, side by side of the military, of both United States and Allied Forces and our diplomatic counterparts. They do it because they make a difference. They do it because it is meaningful. It is a meaningful contribution to the long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan. I, for one, think they do it very well.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to address any questions you may have of me. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ryder follows:]
Chairman Shays. Mr. Ryder, that was a very helpful statement, and very touching. Thank you.

Mr. Nickerson.
Mr. Nickerson. Chairman Shays and members of the Commission, I am Richard Nickerson, MPRI’s Program Manager for our Afghan National Security Sector Development and Fielding Program headquartered in Kabul, Afghanistan. It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss this contract and the role that MPRI plays in supporting Combined Security Transition Command, or CSTC-A, in building capacity within the Afghan National Security Forces.

I have been part of this contract for more than six years, and in the course of my time on the ground, I have seen growth in the capabilities within the Afghan National Security Sector, and have firsthand knowledge of MPRI brings to CSTC-A’s training and reform effort of the Afghan National Security Forces.

I would like to begin my testimony with two overall observations, first about the contract itself, and secondly about lessons learned from my six plus years on the ground supporting CSTC-A’s mission.

Consistent with our contract and statement of work, MPRI assists CSTC-A with two basic functions at the Ministries of Defense and Interior: systems development,
and mentoring of senior ministers and general officers.

Within the Ministry of Defense, MPRI assists CSTC-A with the development and implementation of 23 ministerial level systems. Within the Ministry of Interior, we assist CSTC-A with 16 ministerial systems.

With regard to mentoring at the national level, MPRI will either be the primary mentor or be a backup to an assigned military mentor.

In addition, MPRI provides mentoring and training teams for the Afghan National Army, fielded forces within the five regional corps and capital division. Along with these corps advisory teams, MPRI provides four deployed mentors and trainers, supporting implementation of functional systems such as the Inspector General, regional hospital mentors and property book officer trainers, to name but a few.

Finally, MPRI is also involved with the development of the training and doctrine within the Afghan National Army and other specialty training and mentoring programs such as with the development of the Afghan detainee prison guard force.

My second major point is that we have learned the value of continuity. Many of our team members have great longevity in this program, which minimizes the effects of rotating military units, and military mentors and trainers.

MPRI understands the value of being integrated with
CSTC-A because it allows MPRI to better understand the commands and commanders' intent, which in turn allows for us to anticipate new or emerging requirements, and ensure their implementation throughout our entire effort. In addition, this allows for effective military supervision and oversight.

Lastly, we have learned the importance of cultural awareness and sensitivity and of treating the Afghans with dignity and respect. Cultural awareness shapes our programs and instruction, training schedules and expectations. Respect for the Afghans shapes the tone and tenor of how we mentor.

In conclusion, MPRI is proud of our ongoing support in Afghanistan and our contributions to mentoring, training and system development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

I, along with all of MPRI, appreciate the invitation to participate in this hearing, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nickerson follows:]
Chairman Shays. Thank you, Mr. Nickerson.

Mr. Roitz.
Mr. Roitz. Chairman Shays and distinguished members of the Commission, my name is Fred Roitz, and I am the Executive Vice President and Chief Sales Officer for Xe Services, LLC. Prior to joining Xe, I was an Army acquisition officer, with my last assignment being Commander of the Northern Region Contracting Center for the Army Contracting Agency.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today on behalf of Xe's new leadership team, including the company's new President and Chief Executive Office, Joseph Yorio, who joined the company last March, as well as the dedicated men and women of the Xe workforce.

The new Xe leadership team is committed to ensuring that all of its work performed for the United States Government and other customers is performed with the highest standards of honesty, integrity and reliability at all levels of the organization. Xe has an unwavering commitment to conduct business operations in full compliance with all the applicable laws, regulations and rules of the country in which we do business. Integrity and transparency must, and do, underlie all our relationships including those with our customers, suppliers and the communities in which we do business.
Our company's involvement and experience in the training of Afghanistan National Security Forces make Xe qualified to assist the Commission. Xe currently has more than 2,000 professionals deployed worldwide.

In support of the United States mission in Afghanistan, Xe provides training and mentorship to the officers and members of the Afghan Border Police, which I will refer to as the ABP, and the Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit, which I will refer to as the NIU. These are Afghan organizations tasked with combating narcoterrorism in Afghanistan. Xe trains these units to effectively interdict narcotics in one of the most dangerous border of the world.

The ABP training course lasts six weeks and includes firearms, tactics, special weapons, maintenance and the rule of law. Xe also provides mentors to the ABP to support operational success and reinforce the training.

In comparison, the NIU basic course lasts six weeks and focuses on rifle skills, ground offense, apprehension and arrest of subjects.

Xe has learned and applied critical lessons to improve these training programs. First, the training must recognize and respect the Afghan culture. In addition, the relationship between the individual instructor and trainee is critical. This relationship and the resulting esprit de corps must be built on hard work, trust and a strong sense
of mutual goals for the security and stability of Afghanistan.

Building this relationship between the instructor and the trainee requires maintaining a consistent individual presence of instructors during the entire training period. In addition, consistent with respect to the Afghan culture, the training schedule must coincide with the Afghan work week and holidays, which do not match Western schedules.

Proper motivations and incentives are also necessary for a successful training program. For example, Xe repeatedly emphasizes to Afghan officers the importance of leading by example, including full participation in the training alongside their Afghan subordinates. Xe has also learned that, like many Americans, Afghans do not like to be outperformed by their colleagues. This has been an outstanding motivational tool.

Xe's instructors are experienced and mature and have typically spent three to five years in Afghanistan. The average age of our ABP instructors is just over 40 years, the equivalent to a senior enlisted or field grade officer in the military. Further, like the members of the military, they are volunteers. They have chosen to be in the country in order to make a difference.

Chairman Shays and members of the Commission, I would like to thank you again for providing Xe the opportunity to
discuss the company's successful efforts in training the ABP and NIU. We are proud that our company's expertise and experience in law enforcement training can assist our Nation's important mission in Afghanistan. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roitz follows:]
Chairman Shays. Thank you, Mr. Roitz.

Mr. Green, you have the floor.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Mr. Ryder, You mentioned in your opening statement, you touched on several lessons learned, ways to improve, the training process. If you had to prioritize the top three, what would they be?

Mr. Ryder. Thank you, sir. I think as I looked at my experience from looking at the program over the past 18 months, I think for a successful law enforcement program in Afghanistan, the first thing I would do to prioritize is embed more law enforcement experts at the grassroots, lowest level.

What I mean by that is we provide a basic training, and that is all we are providing--is a basic law enforcement training. But then when they go back down into the districts, the grassroots level, what they need are the field training officers that I discussed. They need someone that is there to continue to provide mentoring and training for them, to continue to improve on the perishable skills that they may forget, that is with them 24/7. I think that is important.

The other piece that I think is important when you do that is you then provide and start to get after this issue that we have heard a number of times today, of corruption,
because what you then have is a conscience. You have someone that is looking over an Afghan National Police officer, that maybe if they are going to go astray they have someone that is looking over them to help them, to keep them moving forward. So I think embedding folks at the lowest level.

I think for sure we need to continue to focus on quality. We talked a lot today about shortening programs, shortening programs of instructions. The quality that we have, that we provide, we should not walk away from.

I think the third piece that I would say to prioritize this is there needs to be a focus from the grassroots level, the district, that then goes all the way to the province, to the region and the back to the MOI [Afghan Ministry of Interior]. The complete chain of command and the leadership coaching, mentorship, in that complete chain of command I think is extremely important, sir.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Mr. Nickerson, you did not specifically mention lessons learned or ways to improve training, but I welcome your thoughts in this slightly different training environment. What are the top two or three things that you feel ANA trainers could do to improve the process?

Mr. Nickerson. Thank you for the question. We too look, and it was mentioned by my colleagues, on culture.
The reason why we list culture number one, it gets at the notion of how we adjust our training. In our model, we look at the performance training which is we first show how it is done, the task is done, then through repetition, so we see that the Afghans have that skill down, and then we observe as they then perform that task, and as instructors also. So we get them to buy into become instructors themselves.

The second that was touched on is our responsibility to bring the right type of person and right trainer in, and that goes to what we think is the heart of working with CSTC-A--is that we understand what the requirement is that they want us to do, what the task is. Then we find that person with that skill set. That is our responsibility, and we go after that very seriously, and also that gets into the standards.

Then the last is the respect for the culture, so that we, as was mentioned, we adapt. We have our personnel understand what the training is, also the culture, so that they factor that in when they are instructing. And they observe holidays, the national holidays that they have.

Thank you.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Mr. Roitz, border police, what two or three things would you do, either that you are doing today or would differently?
Mr. Roitz. I think the number one thing is the field mentor program following the basic training is critical. We have experienced that on multiple programs, in multiple countries, that if you do not have the follow-up mentorship in the field, the perishable skills that they learned in their basic training will disappear.

The second would be that a critical focus has to be on the leadership of the Afghan Border Police and the development of them as leaders, so that when we, the mentors, are not there, that they will basically pick up that role and lead by example in their approach.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Mr. Roitz, we will start with you on the second question, and this will be my last one. Just give me your thoughts on the benefits or the limitations of contractors performing in the current mission that you are involved in, and the same question for the other two.

Mr. Roitz. I think the biggest benefit is we bring law enforcement personnel to be the instructors. For the field mentors, we try to get a balance of people that have law enforcement backgrounds as well as military backgrounds because it is a much more rigorous environment. But I think that is compared to the military instructors, that is a critical component for that program.

Commissioner Green. No limitations?
Mr. Roitz. The limitations I think really come down to the laws dealing with the international traffic and arms regulations as we want to modify the curriculum at a fairly rapid pace, that the rules governing contractors are much more restrictive than they are for the military.

Commissioner Green. Mr. Nickerson?

Mr. Nickerson. It was talked about earlier, but the continuity factor. Many of our personnel have been on the ground for quite a bit of time. It does assist the military as they rotate units and personnel in and out of the theater. Therefore, we can smooth out that bump, if you will.

We also provide a shortage of skills if they happen to have any. We can fill basically the gaps, if you will. We leaven the force.

And then we can react, and we are very flexible. If they need to change out skill sets, we can work with our contracting technical representatives to do that.

Commissioner Green. So you are one that does not necessarily believe that the military can train military better than contractors? You do not have to answer that.

Chairman Shays. I would love to know his answer. He smiled.

Commissioner Green. Okay, answer it.

Mr. Nickerson. Whether or not the military can train
better than?

Commissioner Green. Whether the military, we are not talking about police now. Whether the military can train military forces, the ANA, better than contractors.

Mr. Nickerson. I think the military does a fantastic job. I do think that contractors do have something else, something to offer also because of our length of time in many cases, of experience, and what not.

Commissioner Green. That is a very diplomatic answer.

Mr. Ryder, police, basic police training?

Mr. Ryder. Yes, sir. My personal opinion is our Army, it is not a core competency to train police. It is not a core competency to train law enforcement officials. So, when you have a contractor that is a professional, dedicated law enforcement officer from our United States, that is in-country to provide that training, I think it is a plus. Our Army is just not trained, organized or equipped to do police training.

I think the benefits that we have also heard is continuity.

We also heard the word relationships at the lowest level. When you have our law enforcement experts that are down at the district level and the region level, dealing with police chiefs and police officials, and they establish those relationships, I think the benefits, we just cannot
weigh them. We just cannot weigh what that really means.

    So I think those are the two most important things.
    I am trying to think of a limitation right now, sir,
    but I cannot come up with one.

    Commissioner Green. I am sure you could not think of a
    limitation. Thank you very much.

    Chairman Shays. Mr. Tiefer, you have the floor.

    Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Ryder, your statement has the top comment. It is a
    generic comment. It is not about this specific situation.
    "When developing training and mentoring programs, contract
    vehicles excluding the industry experts will not provide
    best practice or best value."

    Now I took a look. I polled the top 10 contractors
    this year in Afghanistan and the ones with the largest
    contracts. This is my own data. This is not from an
    agency. It is not the Commission data.

    Your contract, your CIVPOL contract, the one by which
    you currently train the Afghan National Police is number
    six. But what particularly interested me is that the same
    type of vehicle that you are on, and the next contract is
    going to be on, is out of the 10, 5 are also using that
    vehicle—not that particular vehicle. I mean they are not
    full and open competition. They are on a competition, among
    a limited competition, IDIQ contracts.
Three, I have to put a question mark. The data that was given to me did not tell or I could not understand it. And two simply were apparently not competed at all or were sole-sourced.

So would you explain what you meant that contract vehicles excluding the industry experts will not provide best practice or best value? To some extent, that goes against what we have been hearing for a number of years about how going away from full and open competition, and going to limited competition, IDIQ for task orders, is the wave of the future.

Mr. Ryder. Sir, let me try to address it this way for this specific contract and situation we are currently in. Currently--

Chairman Shays. Let me ask you something. Why can you not just make it generic? Why does it have to be this specific one?

Mr. Ryder. I thought that was the question, sir, but the question was about the contract. My statement was about the contract we are currently in.

Chairman Shays. Okay. Let me just say I am going to be really uneasy if we start getting into this specific contract, and I am not going to allow us to have that discussion. We are just not going to have it. You can talk generically about the issue.
Mr. Ryder. Commissioner, my opinion, based on the performance of the employees that we have had on the ground, we have demonstrated our subject matter experts and the performance that we have had with training the Afghan National Police. But by not permitting those that have the work today and are performing the work today, to continue to that work, is why you see my statement that you have just read to me.

Commissioner Tiefer. If a different vehicle were used, the previous panel was asked, and another of the competitors on the civilian police, the State Department CIVPOL vehicle, which is CPI, would be able to compete. Would you agree that that would be beneficial too, if they wanted to?

Mr. Ryder. In generic terms.

Commissioner Tiefer. Generic terms.

Mr. Ryder. I think the taxpayer is better served when there is full and open competition for a value of a contract.

Commissioner Tiefer. Okay. Again, staying in generic terms, I am a government contracts professor, so I think I can keep it incomprehensible, if nothing else. When there is a protest, although it is possible for the military to say that there are urgent and compelling reasons not to stay, but to go ahead, in general, will it not be open to an incumbent contractor who is making the protest?
Is there not frequent moves? This is a chess game. There are only a limited number of moves in the game.

Is not a frequent move for the incumbent to say, you could just extend the time a couple of months, that we continue performing on the contract, and so that is why there is not an urgent and compelling situation, and that is why the warfighter will not be in danger?

Is that not a standard thing that the incumbent can say, assuming the incumbent has not been told, oh, you have shortcomings, that is why this is coming to an end, which is usually not the case?

Mr. Ryder. Commissioner, I am not sure if I understand the question you are asking me. I think--

Commissioner Tiefer. I can ask it a different way, but go ahead.

Mr. Ryder. I think the question you are asking me, can the incumbent make the case?

Commissioner Tiefer. Yes.

Mr. Ryder. My answer to that is I guess the incumbent could make that case.

Commissioner Tiefer. Okay. We have a two-month extension of your contract in this situation, yes? That is a fact question.

Mr. Ryder. Right now, the task order as it is currently written ends 31 January. I just submitted a
demobilization transition plan that takes us through 31 March, so that it counts for a two-month extension.

Commissioner Tiefer. Okay. I want to ask Mr. Roitz from Xe, formerly called Blackwater, a question.

Would you normally provide past performance information if you had it? And do you have--you would know if you have because Blackwater--it is in the nature of when past performance information is developed by a contracting officer, the contractor is given an opportunity to put in a response.

On the most important contract you had in Iraq, the personal security contract, I correct something I said earlier, the vehicle it is on is the WPPS vehicle. Do you have past performance information on that contract?

Mr. Roitz. Yes, we do. Our past performance is generally good on that contract. We have had some issues years ago. But the performance under the WPPS contract in Iraq as a whole, we have performed it I believe admirably and effectively.

Chairman Shays. A little louder, Mr. Roitz.

Mr. Roitz. We have performed it effectively and admirably, in accordance with the scope of work of the contract.

Commissioner Tiefer. Well, let me ask, when that information was developed presumably by the contracting
officer, with comments by you, did it cover the incident in Nisour Square, which so alienated the Iraqi government that they were unwilling to license you to stay? It took a while before they were in a position to do that, but when they were in a position to do that, they refused to license you to continue there.

Did the past performance information encompass the Nisour Square incident? That is the one where the 17 civilians were killed and 5 or 6 employees of Blackwater have been indicted.

Chairman Shays. Just to clarify, the past performance of what?

Commissioner Tiefer. Of that contract.

Chairman Shays. To what?

Commissioner Tiefer. I do not understand.

Chairman Shays. In other words, what are you asking him? Are you saying the past performance in what contract?

Commissioner Tiefer. Oh, the contract is the one that was on the WPPS vehicle, that was of the task order in Iraq.

Mr. Roitz. I believe that information between us and the government is a protected item, but, if it is not, we will provide it to the Commission.

I think the Kennedy report that was done after Nisour Square found that there was many lessons learned, and it was found that the company was not responsible as a company.
There were individuals' actions that were being looked at. But I think the Kennedy report is well looked at from the perspective of having personnel, Department of State personnel in a convoy.

Commissioner Tiefer. Let me follow that up. I did read the Kennedy report.

I am not asking what you submitted in the current contracting process. That is, of course, source selection.

I am asking about when you filled out, whenever you filled out the exchange with the contracting officer, concerning what they would give you for the future past performance information. In other places, not in State, it is put into a computer system. State does not put it into a computer system.

So I would appreciate if you would, but I am not asking you to provide what you have given to this bidding process. I am asking you what you received and dealt with in the past.

And the Kennedy report left for the future whether it was in the best interest of the United States to continue your contract. That was left as a question by the Kennedy report. So I do not know what the State Department's view is, and I sure do not know it from the Kennedy report.

Chairman Shays. So if you would provide that, I will take my time.
Gentlemen, I want some fairly short answers. I would like to know things. First off, I would like to know the difference of being a contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan. If you could just site some differences I would appreciate. What is the difference? Is there any difference?

Does the government treat you differently in Iraq versus Afghanistan, number one?

Number two, is the challenge of being in Afghanistan different than being in Iraq in a noticeable way, for providing the same service in either country?

Mr. Ryder, could you start us out?

Mr. Ryder. Yes, sir. There are differences, obviously. The security situation in Iraq I think for a while was different than the security situation in Afghanistan. We saw the security situation in Afghanistan start to ramp up. We are seeing some of that in Iraq, but I think that was a difference.

I think the trainees, the police trainees, I think the literacy rate obviously was different in Iraq than we see in Afghanistan.

We have a 12-week program in Iraq. We have an eight-week program in Afghanistan.

Chairman Shays. That is interesting. You had a 12-week program in Iraq.

Mr. Ryder. Yes, sir.
Chairman Shays. And those individuals tended to be literate versus illiterate. They tended to have a little bit more income. Excuse me, their income I am not sure about their pay, but the point was they were not in the steeped poverty that you saw in Afghanistan.

And you are saying it was 12 versus 8, interesting. Keep going.

Mr. Ryder. I think the other differences, they are really not differences. The same contracting officer oversees both for us, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The same COR oversees both. We have different ICORs in both locations, but we have a number of ICORs that oversee the contract.

But beyond that, I do not see.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Nickerson? I am sorry, I am trying to move quick here.

Mr. Nickerson. Sir, I can only speak to Afghanistan.

Chairman Shays. Okay.

Mr. Nickerson. I do not know about Iraq.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Roitz?

Mr. Roitz. We do not have training contracts in Iraq. We do both training and security in Afghanistan.

Chairman Shays. But you were in both theaters, correct?

Mr. Roitz. Yes.
Chairman Shays. Well, describe to me the difference of theaters.

Mr. Roitz. I think that for Iraq the developing government after the invasion took a while to take place, and so the processes and procedures that you would normally see in the government, of even just customs clearances and the like, were much more difficult in Iraq. In Afghanistan, they were much more structured, at least in our view, and that assists greatly in the process.

The other thing is the licensing process. In Afghanistan, there was an established structure. They have changed it over time and allowed for a more orderly process of licensing.

The last would be from our interaction with the government, from a company's perspective, we had a different role in Iraq, especially in the earlier days, as protecting our diplomatic security folks.

Chairman Shays. Let me ask this question, I would like to know your capability to impact policy, given that you have information that should be able to influence policy? And I would like to know if it is different in Iraq versus Afghanistan.

If I were a trainer, I would be saying to the Afghan policymakers, you know, you got corruption a lot of places, but the one place you cannot have corruption is with police
and military because your police and military are your first line of defense, your second line of defense.

And I would be saying to the policymakers, would it not be nice to have loyal police and army? Make sure they get paid.

So, Mr. Ryder, you have been in. What is your capability of influencing that in Afghanistan?

Who would you talk to? Can you talk to the Afghan government or is prohibited? Can you talk to the American government?

Because, to me, that is like a key issue, and it makes whatever else you do succeed or fail. You have failed if they do not get paid, even if you are terrific at training.

Mr. Ryder. Mr. Chairman, our points of contact or entry back into our customer is purely through the State Department. I cannot talk about how I can influence, or how we can influence, the policy.

I can say that we do provide information, whether we think, whether our trainers think the training is going well, if we need to make changes to the training, if we think, whatever we think is going on with the program. We can provide that information, and we do provide that information both to our customer, which is INL, and to the end user in both countries, which is Department of Defense.

But, sir, I cannot comment about what happens with that
Chairman Shays. Okay. Mr. Nickerson, can you respond, or Mr. Roitz, either one of you, to this question? Do you understand the question?

Mr. Nickerson. I believe so.

Chairman Shays. Fire away.

Mr. Nickerson. I can talk about Afghanistan again. Once again, because we are embedded with the CSTC-A military, we mentor and train at the ministry level. That is I believe the level you are talking about for influencing any policy. Ours is really working together with them, so it is not an individual basis where we would walk in and influence, but we would work with our partners in the military.

On influencing the pay procedures, we have personnel that work in those positions, also assisting.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Roitz?

Mr. Roitz. I think an example would be at the ABP in our interaction with the senior leaders of the ABP. We do not have a formal mentoring. That is not our role.

Chairman Shays. Right.

Mr. Roitz. But in discussions with them and giving them feedback on how we see their forces working, and them instituting policy down their chain of command, things like holding their personnel for greater accountability, their
push for better accountability and not having the occupation that they have today. But I think that involvement, our company's involvement with the senior leaders of the ABP.

Chairman Shays. What I am wrestling with is this: You, in effect, are taking the place of government employees who might have the capability to have access. If you were in the government and you were charged with doing something, you would go to your boss and say, I cannot get this done, job done, because we cannot retain the police because they do not get paid. Their morale is down. They are not listening.

And I am wondering if inherently you have an easier time if you are part of government.

If you do not have a capability, I am wondering as a Commissioner member if there should not be certain rights or opportunities or obligations that enable you to pass on information.

I am absolutely convinced if we could get rid of the corruption as it related to police and army, you would have a lot more loyal police and army, that would be much more willing to sign up, and I can keep going on. Some police did not even know they had a pay raise. They did not even know they had a pay raise, and they did. That spoke volumes to me.

Let me ask you about the appeals process in general.
Forget this issue, in general, because you have been on both sides. Sometimes you appeal; sometimes you got a contract, and someone has appealed against you. Do you conceptually believe that we can speed up the process?

First off, let me ask you this, have you been in any instances where the process was speeded up by the government? They just moved forward and said you know we have got to move forward with this contract.

Mr. Ryder, have you had any cases--Mr. Nickerson--where the process was speeded up, so that one, either you or another contractor could have the issue resolved sooner?

Mr. Nickerson. No, sir.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Roitz?

Mr. Roitz. In my former role as Commander of the Northern Region Contracting Center, we were responsible for a large procurement for guards at our military bases, and we had multiple protests, and we did multiple protest overrides. The protest override process is a very structured process. It is service-dependent, and it goes to a pretty high level and a pretty high threshold to override.

Chairman Shays. Does it speed up the process significantly?

Mr. Roitz. What it allows, and there are two types of protest. There is a pre-award and a post-award protest. In the pre-award protest, the government is statutorily not
allowed to finish the award without the override. In the post-award process, the statutory limitation is performance.

So what the override does, and it is a service. The DoD can do it themselves. This allows them to either award the contract or to perform the service.

Chairman Shays. Could any of you answer in just a short period? I want to know how you think about that process. Forget this issue. Do you think that the government needs that option?

Mr. Roitz?

Mr. Roitz. Absolutely, the government needs it.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Nickerson?

Mr. Nickerson. Yes.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Ryder?

Mr. Ryder. Yes, sir.

Chairman Shays. Thank you.

Mr. Dickson.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My questions are not company specific, but I would like to also ask each of you certain questions about essentially the role of contractors operating in a wartime environment.

First of all, I would like to extend my appreciation to all of you for the work that you do and recognize that when we get out into the field, forward operating bases or in the theater, when you meet a lot of the contractor personnel
that are doing the day to day work in support of our military and our national security objectives, we get an education. We learn about a lot of really good, well-motivated people doing a tough job under difficult circumstances.

That said, there is also this business of accountability for government contractors operating in a war zone, and that means having adequate audit oversight. It means having contracting officer’s representatives available to monitor your work. It means having the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Joint Contracting Command doing the things that they need to do.

What I would like to know from each of you is in your judgment the amount of oversight that is required for contractors to perform in the field, do we have it about right? Are there not enough personnel to basically interface with you and give you the guidance and support that you need, or what are the issues associated with the whole business of government oversight of your activities in theater?

I will just go down the line. Mr. Ryder?

Mr. Ryder. Yes, sir. We do and currently have--I am trying. Do not hold me to the numbers because I may not have it exactly right. It is four in-country contract officer’s representatives in Iraq, and right now I think it
is four or five, going to seven or eight, in Afghanistan.
So, from my viewpoint, we certainly have the oversight that
is in-country, that is actually there looking at what we are
doing every single day on the contract.
   Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
   Mr. Nickerson?
   Mr. Nickerson. We have one contracting technical
representative in-country. I mainly interface with that
individual.
   In the past six months, since this last summer, there
was I guess a system put into place by CSTC-A to observe and
report back through their staff and capture an evaluation of
our performance.
   Now on an everyday basis, because we are embedded with
the military, there is an informal oversight, if you will,
that goes on consistently, in place.
   Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
   Mr. Roitz?
   Mr. Roitz. I think that there are two aspects of
oversight. You have the formal contract oversight of the
contracting officer's representative and the like. I think
in our case, and I think Mr. Strain addressed it earlier,
they are putting more folks in place.
   The more informal or the less structured of CSTC-A's
oversight or the DEA for the IU program, I think that that
is adequate.

Mr. Dickson. Let me thank you.

Let me ask in terms of we have had some discussions in our Commission's work about contractors having a role to identify better practices, finding ways to streamline, improve, save costs, avoid duplication, that kind of thing. In your experiences, in each of your companies, do you have examples where you have offered up and contributed new and better ways of doing things, to save money and basically improve operations?

Mr. Ryder. Sir, I do not have with me. I do not have that information to provide, of examples.

I do know that we have, as I mentioned earlier, we have that capability when it comes to the day to day training, how we do things, how we can do things better, that we provide that information both to the customer, INL, and to the end user, DoD. But I do not have specific examples to give you today, sir.

Mr. Dickson. Will you provide some?

Mr. Ryder. Sir, I will take it for the record.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

Mr. Nickerson. Working with the COTR, if positions or a function becomes no longer needed, the ability exists in our contract that they can go back to the contracting official in Aberdeen and eliminate that position, or tell me
to no longer fill that position.

Conversely also, if that position is just listed as not being filled because at their request, if a new requirement comes up of the same skill level, they can then activate that very easily.

Mr. Dickson. But if you felt one was not needed, you would feel free as a company to indicate that to your customer?

Mr. Nickerson. We have discussions of that, sir, in fact. If in fact when we are right-sizing, if you will, when the COTR comes to me with a requirement, if in fact while we are discussing what exactly they are looking at, we have the ability to nick it down, if you will. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

Mr. Roitz?

Mr. Roitz. Yes, sir. Probably a good example is how we have dealt with some of the illiteracy problems as well as the linguist barrier, and that is to utilize what we call video modular training, so that the same kind of training, the same video presentation is available. And it also functions as a tool for remedial training as well as for when we transition to Afghan instructors.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

My next question has to do with scalability. The President has announced the plus-up of some 30,000
additional military personnel. There will be a corresponding increase, I am sure with regard to contract support.

From your view, what would you advise the Commission to look at in terms of the issues and challenges associated with building up a contractor workforce by some accounts, by the Congressional Research Service accounts, could run anywhere from an additional 30,000 to 56,000 additional contractors in the next year?

What are the kind of issues that we should be looking at in terms of ensuring that our resources are used well and that we are being fair with contractors?

Is it doable, a build-up of 30,000? How do you do that and what are the issues?

Mr. Ryder. Sir, I will address the police side of that because I am not sure if I have the fidelity or the clarity of what they are going to do with the build-up of 30,000 to get to training the Afghan National Police. But as I see that build-up, as I mentioned earlier, I think the important piece is being able to drive additional resources and assets to the very grassroots level. I think for what we are doing currently right now, we have that capability to be able to ramp up with the military, if they choose to take portions of that force to then get to the Afghan National Police.

So I think it is doable over time, yes, sir.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

Mr. Nickerson. Well, what we are finding on the ground right now, as forces flow into the theater, is a redundancy, to make sure there is no redundancy out in the fielded areas, in fielded forces. If that is seen, if that is something we look at with the COTR, with the command, then positions can be moved or eliminated again.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

Mr. Roitz. I think there are two large issues. One is the choke points of getting the personnel into theater, the CRC requirements as well as the receiving, staging and moving them to their various locations. But I think there is a sufficient number of personnel available to do this based on the folks that we see that apply.

The second point would be--

Mr. Dickson. Oh, go ahead. Sorry.

Mr. Roitz. The people that we see express their interest in going downrange, if you will.

Mr. Dickson. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Roitz. The second piece would be life support downrange and the capacity to maintain that larger group. That is a challenge because you have a short-term requirement, depending on how much investment you want to make with the longer-term requirement.

Mr. Dickson. I appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my time.

Chairman Shays. Thank you, Mr. Dickson.

Mr. Green.

Commissioner Green. I just have one for the record.

Mr. Ryder, could you provide us a breakout of what training is being provided in Iraq that is not being provided in Afghanistan, to basic police training?

Mr. Ryder. Sir, I will take that for the record.

Commissioner Green. Thank you.

Mr. Ryder. Yes, sir.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Tiefer has the floor.

I am going to be wanting to ask a question just to have you think about how you respond to those contractors who are wounded and those that have been killed, and what benefits they receive from your companies.

Mr. Tiefer, you have the floor.

Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you.

I want to pick up from the questions about under the existing statute which would be the Competition Contracting Act. Mr. Roitz, you described well your serious, significant experience when you were in the government, doing these things. Then there were nods immediately about the importance of that, from everybody on the panel.

I think what you were talking about and what they were nodding yes to, and I will ask each of you in turn, is under
the Competition Contracting Act the last 25 years, in a pre-award situation, if a sufficiently high-level U.S. official says there are urgent and compelling reasons to override the stay, the stay is overridden, and the contracting process goes forward.

I think you were asked whether you thought that was very important to have that. Is that what you thought you were being asked, and do you think that is what is very important to have?

Mr. Roitz. I think the government needs the right to override, to do a protest override to continue, especially in wartime to meet the requirements and the missions.

Commissioner Tiefer. And you are talking about the existing statute that has been there for 25 years, yes?

Mr. Roitz. I do not know how long the statute has been in place.

Commissioner Tiefer. CICA of 1984, okay, however long it has been there.

Is that, Mr. Nickerson and Mr. Ryder, what you too were nodding yes to, the existing statutory system?

Mr. Nickerson. Sir, I will admit I misspoke. This is above my responsibilities. I am not familiar with the Act.

Commissioner Tiefer. Okay.

Chairman Shays. But let's be clear. Whether it is existing or past, you believe the government should have the
right to short-circuit the system, and you are not telling us when. You are just thinking they should have the right, correct?

Mr. Nickerson. Yes, sir. There is no problem with that.

Chairman Shays. Okay.

Mr. Roitz. Sir, I am not familiar with the statute. I am not a contracts expert, but I stay with what I said earlier. I think the government, in emergencies, ought to have that capability.

Commissioner Tiefer. Are you asking for a change in the law is sort of what I am asking.

Mr. Roitz. No. What I am saying is I think they ought to have a right, which was the question I was asked, that they have the right to in fact override the capability.

Commissioner Tiefer. Yes, override the stay. Okay.

Mr. Ryder, we have had a lot of talk which has been fairly consistent about quality, the need for the Afghan National Police training program not simply to crank out people by reducing its quality, but to keep its quality high even if there are pressures to switch to a more rapid process.

Let me ask you, I think your statement has a couple of information in that regard. In terms of what the barriers are to just speeding the process up, we have talked about
literacy. You mentioned a number of other things besides literacy. How would lowering the quality of the program leave it unable to deal as well as currently with things like corruption, drug use and the 26 percent attrition rate?

Mr. Ryder. My comment for the record on quality is that right now the training we provide in the eight-week training program is, in my view, basic training that we should not and we cannot walk away from if we are going to leave the Afghanis with a law enforcement capability. So that is my comments to the quality is exactly that.

We should not move away from that. That is, in my view, the minimum law enforcement training that needs to be provided every single day. That is my point on quality.

The issues we have with issues of corruption and issues of literacy, we have worked very hard. We have worked very hard to take a program of instruction and take that program of instruction to make it to hands-on training, where in fact we are viewing that they have received the training, they understand the training, and it is hands-on. So that piece, the literacy piece, is not going to go away.

Commissioner Tiefer. Okay. Let me ask it from the other side. You have heard that the goal is of reaching 160,000, an Afghan National Police force of 160,000.

Chairman Shays. No, no, that has not been agreed to. That is a request.
Commissioner Tiefer. True. I stand corrected.

Chairman Shays. The Army’s recommendation.

Commissioner Tiefer. CSTC-A’s recommendation for a goal.

I have no doubt that whichever contractor, whoever it is, will say loyally that they will do their best and they feel they can do whatever they are called on to do. I am not asking for that answer. I am asking sort of in the difficulty.

I see that you have stated, as a lesson learned, "Simply increasing the number of recruits and reducing the training cycle will not produce a capability to serve the needs of the population in the long term."

What will happen if you simply increase the number of recruits, say up to what it takes to get to 160,000, and you reduce the training cycle, say from eight to six weeks as we heard had been discussed, just discussed, had been discussed? What would be the effect of doing that?

Mr. Ryder. Sir, my opinion, the issue of quality and quantity comes really just to two points. You either have to do one or two things if you are going to increase the quantity. You either have to increase your capacity, the regional training centers that you can train at, or you have to reduce the program of instruction that you give to get to a number. Those are the two variables that you have to deal
If in fact you reduce the program of instruction, which to my points gets to quality--now the panel before me talked: Well, we really did not reduce the program of instruction. We kind of shrunk the timelines, made them work longer each day.

Then I have no issue with that, but to get to the numbers, and I know they are only numbers that are being recommended. Currently, in the RTCs the capacities that they have, the number that they can get to training at full capacity for a full year and using 49 or 50 weeks, I think you can only get to about 16,000 or 17,000 trainees. So there is some way you have to be able to get to the capacity to train.

My point is if you shrink the eight-week course to something less, and you pull law enforcement skills out, then what you are going to end up with, in my view, is someone that is not trained well enough in law enforcement.

If the strategy is because the insurgency, that we need something that looks more like a paramilitary, then so be it, as long as we understand that at the end of the day, whatever the end of the day is, you may not have a trained police force. You will have a paramilitary force.

Commissioner Tiefer. Am I right that what your understanding of what the Afghan people want from your
program is not merely paramilitary, but is those policing skills that you now try to teach?

Mr. Ryder. Sir, I cannot talk for the Afghan people. I can tell at the end of the day, if you were to ask my opinion on what we want to leave the Afghan people with, it is a police force that the Afghan people can look at them and say, these are folks that are going to protect and serve. That is what I would leave you with, sir.

Commissioner Tiefer. Thank you for allowing me the time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Shays. Thank you. Thank you for your questions.

Mr. Dickson.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I really just have one more question, and it is a contract-related question, but it also deals with your experience in-theater. It has to do with a concept that is developing, that in some cases we may be competing with ourselves for Afghan national workers.

In other words, the recruiting for the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army has been a challenge in some cases. The question is: Is part of that because the U.S. Government is awarding contracts for logistic services, reconstruction services and other activities that in essence create a competitive job market, where in fact we could
potentially be paying more for Afghans to be providers of logistics or reconstruction services than to serve in the Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army?

From your experience, do you have any indication of that kind of phenomenon?

Mr. Nickerson. I do not mean to be real short, but no, I do not.

Mr. Dickson. Okay.

Mr. Ryder. Sir, I do not have metrics. I do not have numbers. I do know that there is a competition, especially if you have an Afghani that goes through the police training, and goes through that and is successful, graduates from that. Then there is the competition of other security companies, other opportunities that pay more than he is paid for as a police officer. Then some of those would depart.

And when you see the attrition rate, I think about 26 percent, that is case. But I do not have hard numbers for you, sir.

Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

Chairman Shays. Thank you, Mr. Dickson.

Gentlemen, if you would be able to respond to the question of the dead and wounded, when we were writing the statement, my staff, our staff could not give us specific numbers of the numbers of contractors wounded and killed in Afghanistan and Iraq. That is stunning. In many instances,
they are former military personnel. Somehow it does not seem as important to some, evidently. So I would like you to speak about that.

How can we get an accurate number, and how can we make sure they are respected like anyone else who has lost their life serving their Country?

Mr. Ryder. Mr. Chairman, that is absolutely not true for DynCorp International. In my oral, I mentioned we have lost 37.

Chairman Shays. I think every contractor knows, so I want to put that on record, what they have lost.

Mr. Ryder. Yes.

Chairman Shays. The question is are you aware of any place that it is collected?

Mr. Ryder. I apologize. I thought you just meant by the company. I do not know. I do not know.

I can tell you that as you have heard from Mr. Ballhaus and you heard from me again today, we do take that very seriously. People are our most important asset. We do have a civilian employee assistance program that we stood up internally with the company.

Chairman Shays. Okay, so describe. That was the question that I was leading to. What do you do specifically, if Grant Green is one of your employees, and he is wounded?
Mr. Ryder. The military has a casualty assistance program.

We have a family liaison officer program. We have a police officer, and I mentioned Mr. Mike Warren who is with me, a police officer that goes to help that family.

We make injury visits, extended—we explain the DBA process to them, which is very complicated. We sponsored memorials for these family members. We meet with them annually. They have a open dialogue back into our civilian employee assistance program office and to Mr. Warren, to handle the challenges especially when it is death, or challenges of when there are severe injuries, to help them work their way through it.

We do not have all the answers, but we have a program that we know no one else has to assist them.

Chairman Shays. What happens if Mr. Green's injury is something he carries with him the rest of his life?

Mr. Ryder. We will work with that through the DBA process and that insurance that is there, but the assistance that we give them is to help them understand that because it is complicated, and it is challenging.

Chairman Shays. Okay. Mr. Nickerson?

Mr. Nickerson. I would just add two things for us, very similar that was just said, but we have had a number of people that we have had to medevac, and we have access into
the medical medevac in through Germany and then back to the United States.

Chairman Shays. Is that true for all contractors? Basically, they go through the system through Germany?

Mr. Nickerson. For myself.

Chairman Shays. Yes.

Mr. Ryder. There are a number of ways when you have someone that is injured. Depending on severity of the injury, the decision will be made. They will normally go through the military system.

Chairman Shays. Is it your decision or someone else's?

Mr. Ryder. No, the medical decision. The medical decision will be made, the seriousness of it, and they will be medevaced from either Bagram or--

Chairman Shays. I am sorry. Mr. Nickerson, you had the floor.

Mr. Nickerson. The only final point was that with CSTC-A we have lost two individuals, and they have always included us in any memorials on the installation. So it has been a dual action, together.

Chairman Shays. Mr. Roitz?

Mr. Roitz. We have a very similar program as DoD, casualty assistance officers. They actually make initial notification to the families in the event of a death or serious injury, in person. That is first the family learns
of it.

We have an additional life insurance policy.

We have lost 35 folks over time. We have a memorial garden, which holds the stones with names on it for those 35, and that is part of the indoctrination process for people that come to deploy, to understand the significant sacrifices that others have made.

Chairman Shays. When we talk about deaths and injury, you have employees that may be American citizens, Europeans, third world, so-called third world, indigenous folks as well. Would you keep track of all of them or just Americans?

Mr. Roitz. I believe we keep track of what we consider ex-pats. That would be U.S. as well as the foreign nationals from Europe and the like. For the third country nationals, we do not have really an interaction with the families.

Chairman Shays. Do you have a requirement in your contracts that asks how you treat the killed and wounded?

Mr. Ryder. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Chairman Shays. That is not part of it?

Mr. Ryder. I do not think so, not to my knowledge. It is part of, sometimes, proposals because it is an important part of the process.

Chairman Shays. It probably is a factor in terms of
you are seeking to recruit. I would think they would want to know what benefits and how a family is treated. All are nodding heads, and I am assuming that is true. The recruitment has that fact.

Let me just end by saying that I found this hearing and this panel very helpful, and I appreciate the questions of all the commissioners. I do not think we are doing enough asking all of you in a public forum what you are dealing with, and I would like to see us do more of that.

I am struck by the 12 to 8 weeks in Iraq and Afghanistan. That puts my antenna up in a way that makes me want to understand how.

We are going to be successful if we deal with reality. If we do not deal with reality and just deal with what we want things to be, but do not face reality, we are not going to succeed in the long run.

I wrestle with the fact that we want the military to be the tip of the spear, so we then have contractors doing those things that are not tip of the spear.

I then wrestle with, though, are there times that the contractors cover up a flaw in our military or State or whatever, where that should be done by the military or State, but somehow it is not, and we are not as aware of it.

Those are the kinds of things that the Commission wrestles with as well.
I would invite first any closing comment from any commissioner.

Commissioner Green. Just to reemphasize this eight versus twelve. Not to beat a dead horse, but I think, Mr. Ryder, you hit on it. That is if the POI is going to change at all, which works in more counterinsurgency type instruction, it is even more important I think that we do not reduce the length of that course, if you want to retain any of that police capability.

Chairman Shays. I agree. Any comment?

Mr. Dickson. No, sir.

Chairman Shays. Gentlemen, anything that we should have asked that we did not? Any comment that you want to respond to that was asked of one or the other, or that we made, that you would like to comment on?

Mr. Roitz?

Mr. Roitz. No, I would just like to thank the Commission for being able to speak today.

Mr. Nickerson. Yes, same thing, thank you very much for this opportunity.

Chairman Shays. Thank you.

Mr. Ryder?

Mr. Ryder. Sir, if I could, thank you for the opportunity on behalf of all my employees for me to be here today.
I would like to address this one thing that I was not asked, and I am going to put in the form of I am not going to talk about a protest. But what I am going to say--

Chairman Shays. You are making me nervous.

Mr. Ryder. No, sir. But what I am going to say is that we are, and all the employees are, as you have learned yourself, very dedicated, and we will do absolutely nothing that will impede the mission of the commander on the ground, whether there is an ongoing protest or whatever is going on. Our folks are dedicated. We are going to continue to do that. I have talked to the Commission before about that.

Chairman Shays. I think that is true, and I believe it is true for all three companies. And I think it is nice to say that you put your Country first, and we appreciate that.

Mr. Ryder. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Shays. Thank you all very, very much.

This hearing is closed.

[Whereupon, at 1:49 p.m., the Commission was adjourned.]