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on

"Risks and Challenges Associated with
ANSF Training Contracts"

Chairman Thibault, Chairman Shays, and members of the Commission. Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

As your Commission requested, I will in these remarks describe the risks and challenges the DoDIG has so far identified in its audits, assessments and investigations associated with contracting and contract oversight in support of U.S. efforts to train and mentor the Afghan National Security Forces.

U.S., Afghan, and third country contractors have a key role in Afghanistan, as they have had in Iraq. They provide indispensable assistance to our military and civilian personnel, enabling them to accomplish their extremely complex, but truly vital mission of developing the capacity of the Afghan security forces capacity to take lead responsibility for their country's internal and external defense.

In this operating environment, effective contracting oversight is uniquely difficult, but also critical to mission accomplishment.

Background

In recognition of its importance, Inspector General Gordon Heddell has made oversight of U.S. contingency operations in Southwest Asia the primary OIG focus. Oversight efforts in Afghanistan have encompassed a range of issues in which contracting for physical infrastructure, materiel, and services has been a component, most notably concerning the:

- safety of DoD military and civilian personnel;
- accountability and control of weapons and other sensitive U.S.-supplied technology;
- controls over cash, common access cards, and U.S. contractor and military property;

- controls over planning for and the use of Afghanistan Security Forces Funds, and also the funds used to support the Commander's Emergency Response Program;
- contract administration of contingency contracts including for construction projects; and
- training, equipping, and sustaining of the Afghan National Security Forces.

In June 2007, the DoD OIG established its first in-country field office, at Bagram Air Force Base, which it initially staffed with three auditors. It has since expanded its presence to include two more field offices, in Kabul and Kandahar, with a total of 14 personnel deployed--8 auditors and 6 criminal investigators. By early 2010, the OIG anticipates having 16 auditors assigned permanently in-country and 7 investigators. They will be supplemented by personnel from our CONUS headquarters and domestic field offices, including teams from the Office of Special Plans and Operations, which produced the assessment report on the training and mentoring of the ANSF reviewed by the Commission that is a source for today's testimony.

OIG's Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) efforts are focused on contract and procurement fraud, technology protection, and public corruption, which includes bribery and kickbacks. DCIS also performs oversight that indirectly supports the Afghanistan mission by assisting, for example, on audits OIG performed on body armor and armored vehicle contracts to supply U.S. forces in which issues of potential contract malfeasance were indentified.

Effective and Efficient Interagency Oversight Coordination

The DoD OIG is the lead oversight agency for accountability in the Defense Department, and, as such, is committed to maintaining effective cooperation and coordination relationships with other U.S. Government oversight organizations in Afghanistan. The objective is to minimize duplication of oversight effort, providing comprehensive coverage, and reduce where possible and appropriate the oversight support burden on field commanders and their inspectors general. Interagency

cooperation is clearly fortifying the SWA oversight effort.

Indeed, effective interagency coordination, collaboration, and partnerships within the oversight community are proving essential to providing comprehensive reviews of contingency contracting and other key oversight concerns so as to identify whether critical gaps exist and recommend appropriate oversight actions. For Southwest Asia, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, these oversight objectives are primarily accomplished through: the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia, and several interagency investigative task forces, each of which performs an essential interagency oversight coordination, planning and reporting function.

Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group. In April 2007, the DoD OIG jointly established and still chairs the interagency Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group. Today, there are over 25 DoD and federal oversight agencies or functional components that are members and guests of the Joint Planning Group, which meets quarterly but interacts regularly to promote unity of effort in SWA. The participants include the Government Accountability Office, the Inspectors General of State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, the Military Inspectors General and Service Auditors General, Combatant Command Inspectors General and their supporting component Inspectors General, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the Defense Contract Management Agency. In May 2009, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, also joined the group.

The Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group produces and issues a quarterly Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia, in response to the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, as well as a quarterly summary report addressing oversight challenges impacting Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Subgroup. Because of the increasing U.S. government resources that are being expended in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the supplemental funding that several of the statutory inspectors general received specifically for the oversight of their department or agency program activity in these countries, it became apparent that the oversight community had to more closely synchronize its oversight initiatives. Accordingly, in May 2009, the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group established a new subgroup to coordinate audit and inspection work solely focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The subgroup, chaired by the Inspector General for the U.S. Agency for International Development, first met in June 2009, and has issued its first Afghanistan-Pakistan Comprehensive Oversight Plan, which is now a subset of the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia.

Contingency Contracting. On July 18, 2008, our OIG issued a report on contingency contracting, “Challenges Impacting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom Reported by Major Oversight Organizations Beginning FY 2003 through FY 2007.” This summary effort compiled 302 related reports and testimonies given by the Defense oversight community and Government Accountability Office. Based on its analysis, the report concluded that, over the course of conducting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, DoD had experienced significant and recurring challenges in providing adequate oversight related to contracting, logistics, and financial management. As noted in the report, some of DoD’s contingency contracting issues were long-standing.

The report also identified DoD oversight initiatives already undertaken to address some of the contract oversight challenges identified during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These included requesting modifications in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and in DoD policies regarding the oversight of deployed contractors; increasing oversight of contractors performing logistical support work; deploying Defense Finance and Accounting Service personnel to support financial operations;

and assessing which business operations could be removed from the more dangerous contingency operational environment and be performed elsewhere.

Investigative Task Forces. As previously noted, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the criminal investigative arm of the DoD Inspector General, has investigated waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption pertaining to the Southwest Asia theater of operations since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This responsibility remains its top priority. DCIS also works closely with partner agencies in the National Procurement Fraud Task Force (NPFTF) and in the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF). Under the auspices of the Department of Justice, the NPFTF was created in October 2006 to promote the prevention, early detection, and prosecution of procurement fraud nationwide and abroad. This multi-disciplinary and multi-agency coalition, comprised of federal Inspectors General, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, and federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, has been extremely effective in fostering improved coordination in U.S. government and DoD procurement contract fraud investigations concerning SWA and Afghanistan.

In addition to investigating allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse, in May 2005, DCIS launched a proactive interagency project to analyze more than \$14 billion in payment vouchers related to U.S. Army contract purchases in Iraq and Afghanistan. The project has been aided in its efforts to identify fraudulent activity related to the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan by applying data mining techniques. Working together, OIG auditors and investigators have identified and referred questionable contracting transactions for criminal investigation that have included contract-related fraud and corruption.

Capacity Building of Afghanistan Government Inspectors General. In addition to its oversight activities, the DoD OIG also has supported the establishment and mentored the operations of Inspector General organizations within the Afghanistan national government, specifically in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

In November 2008, for example, our IG met with Maj. Gen. Sardar Mohammad Abulfazil, the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Inspector General, and Brig. Gen. Abdul Rashid, Deputy Inspector General for the Afghan National Army, to review the applicability of the DoD OIG organization model to their oversight needs. The DoD OIG had already previously engaged the respective Inspectors General within the Ministries of Defense and Interior in Iraq in their capacity building efforts. In one specific initiative, for example, our officer helped developed an MOI IG oversight initiative to maintain accountability of U.S.-contracted and DoD-supplied weapons and other sensitive technology equipment provided the Iraqi National Police, thus institutionalizing the sustainable accountability and control of this equipment.

In addition to meeting with the senior Afghanistan Inspectors General, our OIG staff has participated in training courses sponsored by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan addressing accountability of goods and services for the Afghanistan Security Forces. We are now examining additional measures to support the development of the respective Inspectors General in Afghanistan so that they can maintain sustainable oversight of construction and materiel the international community has provided the Afghan National Army and Police, including that funded by the U.S. government.

Oversight Coordination in Afghanistan. In addition to the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group meetings at OIG headquarters, OIG field staff also participate in the tri-weekly U.S. Forces-Afghanistan sponsored oversight “Shura,” or council, chaired by its Chief of Staff. This forum provides an on-the-ground opportunity for each of the oversight community representatives in-country to update the U.S. military command on the status of their respective organization’s current and planned oversight projects. It also presents a forum in which the oversight community is encouraged to advise U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan regarding preliminary report recommendations so that corrective action can be taken immediately,

instead of waiting for final issuance. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan also uses the Shura as an opportunity to brief the oversight community on Command programs and oversight concerns. For example, at the August 28, 2009, Shura, it provided a briefing on its Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). This is a significant U.S. military contracting initiative in support of the war effort, and therefore a priority focus of DoD OIG, the Army Audit Agency, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, which are currently coordinating their CERP oversight initiatives.

Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest Asia. To ensure there is effective coordination and interaction within the Defense and Federal oversight community, the DoD OIG recently created a forward deployed office based in Kuwait led by a newly-designated Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest Asia. He reports directly to our IG and acts on his behalf to coordinate and de-conflict DoD oversight efforts within Southwest Asia. This initiative has been well-received by the U.S. Central Command and the Defense and Federal oversight community. The Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest Asia is working to further improve oversight cooperation and communications focused on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Role of Contracting and Contractors in the ANSF Train and Equip Mission

With respect to the use of U.S. contractor services resources in support of the training and mentoring of the Afghan Army and Police and in the capacity-building of the MOD and MOI, contractor personnel have been a valuable resource supporting the accomplishment of these key missions in Afghanistan, as in Iraq. Their role as trainers, mentors, and subject matter experts has grown proportionately with the success of our efforts to increase the size of the security forces in each country. Some contract personnel have been in Afghanistan far longer than their military counterparts, and their continued presence has provided a significant degree of continuity and stability to U.S. efforts to build the ANSF.

Specifically, with respect to the ANSF Train and Equip mission we have observed contracted mentors and trainers performing the following primary roles and functions:

- At the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, MPRI personnel, via a DoD contract, assist CSTC-A to develop the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior by updating and implementing their organizational policies and procedures. They also provide staff support augmentation at CSTC-A headquarters.
- Within MOD Headquarters, MPRI personnel support CSTC-A by planning for MOD's institutional development and by mentoring senior level ministerial leadership. Personnel from both MPRI (DoD-contracted) and DynCorp (State Department contracted) perform these functions within the MOI Headquarters.
- In the Afghan Army, MPRI contractors provide mentoring support and instructional services to develop sustainability at various intermediate and force enabling institutional levels, including with the Logistics, Training and Medical Commands; and in support of the Acquisition Agency, Installation Management, and Intelligence and Detainee Operations.
- At the Army Corps level, MPRI contractors support training for the Commandos and the Army Air Corps, and they worked as mentors at each of CSTC-A's five Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands that mentored ANA counterparts.
- DynCorp provides civilian police contractors as training instructors, curriculum developers, and subject matter experts at the Regional Police Training Centers, which primarily has been a State Department responsibility.
- DynCorp provides civilian police contractors as members of the U.S. military-led Police Mentoring Teams that train district and provincial police.

- MPRI provides Mobile Training Teams that deploy with the military to various sites as needed throughout the Army and Police to provide logistics training.

In addition to the training and mentoring missions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers through their Afghan Engineering District (AED) develops and monitors multiple construction contracts to build and sustain ANA and ANP infrastructure facilities throughout Afghanistan. Much of the work under these contracts is performed by third-country and Afghan contractors and contract personnel.

Afghan Contracting Issues and Challenges

Development of an effective and sustainable Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Nation Police (ANP) has required addressing many uniquely difficult problems. Outside of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Masar-e-Sharif, for example, there is little infrastructure base to support widely disbursed ANA and ANP operations. Buildings, if they exist at all, are often little more than mud-huts. The transportation system is marginal, at best, and contractor convoys have had to contend with increasing attacks on the main roads by insurgents using Improvised Explosive Devices. In addition to a deterioration in the security environment, tribalism, illiteracy in excess of 70 percent, extreme poverty and endemic corruption, especially within some of the police services, trainers and mentors must contend with the isolation caused by severe weather conditions a third of the year.

To complicate matters further, any piece of land suitable for construction of an ANSF facility has to be de-mined, which often leads to subsequent claims of ownership by numerous individuals and families claiming legitimate title to the land. Multiple grants of title to a particular piece of land have been traced, for example, to the former King of Afghanistan, the Soviets, the post-Soviet Communist Regime, and to the Taliban. Resolving these claims can sometimes delay projects for over a year. Roads usually have to be built to the site of prospective new facilities, and almost all construction material, to include cement, must be transported overland into the country. Not surprisingly, Taliban

extremist extortion, kidnappings, and murders of contractor personnel have discouraged their involvement.

Efforts via the “Afghan First” program to hire Afghan companies and Afghan personnel to construct needed roads and facilities to support the development and expansion of the ANA and ANP have been essential in the building effort, but also have proven problematic. There are few Afghan companies with the requisite experience to effectively undertake and complete projects at the required standards. In some instances, Afghan companies hired proved unable to meet contractual timing and quality requirements. While many Afghans gladly accept the offer of employment, most are not qualified to contribute more than manual labor. As a consequence, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Afghan Engineer District (AED) have often had to rely on U.S. or third-country contractors in order to complete the construction necessary to support development of the ANSF.

Against this problematic backdrop, it is not surprising that construction of facilities to support additional Afghan army and police units and personnel have faced formidable challenges. Necessary construction projects have been delayed, or stopped altogether in any area that has not been sufficiently secured by U.S. or other Coalition forces.

Our recent OIG assessment regarding progress in developing ANSF size and capability noted that, as of March of this year, 69 percent of AED construction projects were at least 10 percent delayed. As a result, some fielded ANA units had to live in tents during the past winter months while permanent base facilities were being completed. Furthermore, there have been instances where the facilities constructed for the Afghan Army were not tailored to their current needs and maintenance capabilities. For example, in one facility observed there were no floor-level basins built in latrine facilities, resulting in lavatories being torn off the wall as Afghan soldiers sat on them to wash their feet, a cultural necessity. Facilities already built for the ANSF may not been well-maintained

and may not therefore be sustainable because of the lack of training in the Army and Police, or due to insufficient contract construction labor among the general Afghan population.

Recognizing these challenges, and in response to the OIG ANSF report recommendations, CSTC-A has reported that, in coordination with AED and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE), it is planning and designing to a new Afghan Army base standard, one that is more austere but still operationally functional. These ANSF facilities will be constructed to a minimal military standard, similar to those utilized by NATO. This standard design will reportedly result in lower maintenance requirements. And, while meeting International Building Code and National Electric Codes, the designs are intended to significantly reduce design and procurement time, as well as construction costs.

In addition, since the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) cannot afford to pay for operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, the U.S. and/or the International Security Assistance Force/Coalition currently finance the maintenance upkeep of ANSF facilities, often hiring non-Afghan contractors because of the limited pool of qualified Afghan contractors. As stated in CSTC-A's January 2009 report to Congress, "Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan", "...the GIROA will cover less than 20 percent of its total recurrent expenditures, including core and external budgets, in FY 2009." Contracted O&M costs will continue to be a responsibility for the U.S. and ISAF/Coalition partners for the foreseeable future. The current value of contracts to provide O&M for existing ANSF facilities is approximately \$75 million a year, funded mainly by the United States. As the ANA grows to 134,000, projected O&M costs, just for the ANA, are expected to be \$60 million in FY 09 and \$75 million in FY 10.

On February 9th of this year, the Principal Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense, testified before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on

the broad issues concerning “Oversight of Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.” The Principal Deputy noted that the size and skill of the DoD acquisition workforce had not kept pace with the growth of its contract oversight responsibilities. This oversight vulnerability has been accentuated during periods of rapid force build-up in Iraq of both U.S. and Iraqi forces. Effective oversight of the diverse functions performed under high dollar value logistics and support contracts requires a sizeable cadre of highly-trained Government contracting personnel with specialized knowledge and significant acquisition expertise. Collective results of work conducted throughout Southwest Asia have led the DoD OIG to conclude that a relatively small number of inexperienced civilian or military contract administrators and support personnel were assigned far-reaching responsibilities for an unreasonably large number of contracts. In order to meet urgent warfighter needs in the SWA contingency operations, contracted procurements had been expedited, contributing to less than prudent contracting practices.

Our OIG report on U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces validated similar contracting concern in Afghanistan, in particular, finding that the lack of appropriate oversight support for Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) contracts had resulted in failure to ensure that contractors selected had the capability required to meet the performance standards required.

In another finding in the same report, the assessment team identified an issue concerning a contract awarded by CSTC-A to a third country firm for maintenance of NATO weapons that U.S. forces were supplying to the ANA, to include M4s, M16s, M203s, M240s, and M249s. After contract award it was discovered that the contractor did not have the knowledge or even the tools required to execute the contract, requiring another contractor (MPRI) to step in. Appropriate oversight of contract development and performance execution could have avoided this outcome.

Contracting issues have been exacerbated by the shortage of personnel to effectively, plan, execute, and provide oversight of contracts let in support of ANSF development. For example, AED has ANSF-related construction projects, with associated contracting, ongoing throughout Afghanistan, and it forecasts additional construction projects that will require more than the 634 personnel authorized in March 2009, of which only 411 had been assigned as of the end of May 2009.

AED oversight responsibilities are remarkably diverse; AED has staff embedded with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), at major ANA and ANP facilities, and with the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Phoenix. On-site responsibilities include reporting of construction progress to ensure contractor compliance with their Quality Control Plan, resolving routine problems, maintaining progress logs, conducting weekly construction coordination and tailgate safety meetings, updating weekly construction status reports, and maintaining control over project sites until the projects are accepted from the construction contractors.

ANA building projects include brigade garrisons, battalion billeting, and combat support facilities throughout the country. The AED responsibility also extends to ANP projects, which tend to be even more widely distributed geographically. These include facilities for the Uniformed Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, the Border Police, and Counternarcotics Police.

But, our team reported that as of last spring, AED did not have sufficient core personnel with the skill sets required to provide adequate execution and oversight of the expanding scope of its current mission. Furthermore, ANSF end-strength could increase substantially beyond currently approved levels. AED will need to plan for the personnel capacity to prepare for and manage this increased construction contracting challenge.

The Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers noted our concern and recommendation regarding inadequate AED strength and capability. Due to the expected surge in the ANSF construction workload projected in FYs 2010 through 2012, the Corps

has now established a second engineer district in Afghanistan (AED South), and assigned a member of the Senior Executive Service to lead the two Districts. The latest manning document establishes 854 positions for AED, an increase of about 200 since our March 2009 assessment. Additionally, AED's assigned strength increased from 411 in May 2009 to 491 in August 2009. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reports that an additional 104 personnel have been selected to fill vacant AED positions and that they are starting to see a larger pool of qualified candidates as requirements in Iraq begin to drawdown.

A survey of DoD contingency contracting challenges in Iraq, and even more so in Afghanistan, points to a paucity of quality assurance in the various phases of the contracting process. This appears to have been caused by a shortage of trained, in-country Contracting Officers (COs) and Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs), their rapid turnover, and the resultant lack of continuity. Indeed, an Audit Report issued by SIGAR in May 2009 found that on one particular contract, the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative had only limited prior contracting experience and training, and had been unable to make field visits to monitor contractor performance.¹ GAO reports on contracting in Afghanistan have likewise repeatedly cited the inadequate numbers of trained contract management and oversight staff.

In April 2008, the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) also reported that there were shortages of qualified and experienced contracting personnel in-theater and in-country. In addition, JCC-I/A expressed concern about the adequacy of the basic COR on-line training, noting that JCCI/A had offered training in addition to the basic online courses in an attempt to raise COR capability to an acceptable level.

In March 2009, CSTC-A reported to our OIG assessment team, as it also did in April 2008, that their mission's accomplishment was hindered by a continuing shortage

¹ SIGAR Audit 09-1, "Contract Oversight Capabilities of the Defense Department's Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Need Strengthening, May 19, 2009, p.ii.

of experienced Contracting Officers in Afghanistan, and a critical shortage of trained and experienced Contracting Officer Representatives. This deficiency was exacerbated, it said, by the constant turnover of these personnel, who only serve three to six month tours.

Specifically, our September 30, 2009, assessment report on the ANSF noted that the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) had, on average, only three personnel who directly supported CSTC-A contracting. Moreover, their high turnover rate and assignment “under-lapping” produced a harmful lack of continuity in supporting CSTC-A.

DCMA has since reported to the OIG in a follow-up to this report that it has significantly increased its presence throughout Southwest Asia, from an assigned strength of 175, against a requirement of 195 in January 2008, to 240 personnel now, against a requirement of 281 in May 2009. In May 2009, however, while they had 100 percent of the 155 authorized personnel in Iraq, they only had 59 percent of 98 personnel authorized in Afghanistan.

Noting the observation regarding its personnel shortages in Afghanistan expressed in our September 2009 report on the Assessment of the ANSF Train and Equip mission, DCMA reported that they since had realigned resources based on theater requirements, available resources, and overall Central Command priorities. DCMA noted that a recent review had caused some incoming personnel to be redirected from Iraq to Afghanistan. They had also established a new Colonel-level command team and increased staffing to support their expanded contract oversight mission. As of November 2009, DCMA reported that they had deployed 87 percent of the 125 personnel authorized in Afghanistan. Additionally, DCMA reported that three more personnel had been assigned to the pre-existing three-person team at CSTC-A to support its growing contract administration and oversight mission.

Transfer of Afghan Police Training From State to DoD

On April 2, 2009, Senators Inouye and Cochran of the Senate Appropriations Committee requested that OIG DoD conduct an audit of administration and expenditure of Afghanistan Security Forces Funds used to contract trainers for the Afghan National Police. These funds have been provided since 2005 by DoD to the State Department for the purpose of training the Afghan National Police. A joint DoD and State Department IG audit team was formed for this task and it is anticipated that the team's audit report will be issued early next year.

In August 2009, while the audit was ongoing, State Department agreed to transfer responsibility for the Afghan National Police (ANP) training program to DoD. This was based on a mutual recognition by the two Departments that the lack of a single, unified chain of command for police training had resulted in confusion and unnecessary delays in modifying and implementing the program, a problem identified as early as 2006 in a Joint DoD - DOS IG Assessment of the Afghan Police Training Program. Additionally, due to the increased insurgent threat, the ANP training program lacked sufficient emphasis on counterinsurgency and tactical skills, similar to those already being provided to the Afghan National Army through DoD training programs. State Department and DoD concluded that the U.S. military was more suited to manage training to support the ANP's expanded operational role.

It was agreed that when the current State Department contract with Dyncorp expires in January 2010, DoD would assume control and primary responsibility. Under the new arrangement, DoD would also assume responsibility for all police training facilities, including basic ANP training, and also mentoring within the Ministry of Interior, and would maintain responsibility for the police mentoring teams embedded in ANP units throughout the Afghan districts and provinces. DOS would maintain responsibility for specialized training including the ANP's Criminal Investigations Division, Women's Police Corps, and Family Response Units.

To ensure that effective communication between the two departments and their field representatives was achieved in support of facilitating transference of the functions of the police training program to be transferred from DOS to DoD, the State-DoD audit team recommended in an October 2009 management letter that a State-DoD working group be formed to manage areas such as Government property transfers, the training centers, logistics, contracting, information technology, the training curriculum, resource management, recruits' biometric data, and programs of instruction.

The Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Counter Narcotics-Terrorism Technology Program Office, and the Defense Contract Management Agency established this working group in August 2009 to oversee the turnover of the police training contract to DoD. Although the working group has been fully engaged in this process, it is reportedly not certain the projected DoD contract assumption date of January 31, 2010 can be met.

Once the contract is transferred, however, it will be incumbent upon DoD to ensure that a sufficiently trained cadre of CORs and COTRs are in place to provide appropriate oversight of its execution in support of further expansion of the Afghan police.

Closing

In coordination with the community of concerned inspectors general, DoDIG is committed to the goal of providing effective and comprehensive oversight that addresses current and future contracting challenges in Afghanistan.

This commitment includes being prepared and able to extend continuing oversight in support of the President's recent determination with respect to U.S. strategy towards Afghanistan, in which the critical importance of Afghan National Security Forces

development was underscored. We are very mindful of the key role contracting and its related oversight will play in the accomplishment of this particular mission.

I thank the Commission for the opportunity to share our experiences and views and would welcome any questions you may have.