[Senate Hearing 111-516]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-516
TRANSPORTATION CHALLENGES
AND CYBERSECURITY POST-9/11
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 2, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Acting Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on December 2, 2009................................. 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 19
Statement of Senator Isakson..................................... 21
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 23
Statement of Senator DeMint...................................... 24
Statement of Senator Warner...................................... 26
Statement of Senator Brownback................................... 27
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 29
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 36
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 38
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 47
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 57
Witnesses
Hon. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Appendix
Robert A. Voltmann on Behalf of the Transportation Intermediaries
Association Concerning the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT), prepared statement......................... 59
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Janet Napolitano
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 61
Hon. Byron L. Dorgan......................................... 68
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 68
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 78
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 82
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 86
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 88
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 89
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe........................................ 95
Hon. John Ensign............................................. 96
Hon. Jim DeMint.............................................. 97
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 100
Hon. Johnny Isakson.......................................... 102
Hon. David Vitter............................................ 103
TRANSPORTATION CHALLENGES
AND CYBERSECURITY POST-9/11
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, people are coming, I
promise. And it's just--every day is one of those days, right?
Secretary Napolitano. I hear you.
The Chairman. You know a little bit about that.
Secretary Napolitano. I do, indeed.
The Chairman. The--one of the things I wanted to make,
which is not in my statement, that Commerce Committee is--we're
really glad to have you here, and we do have jurisdiction over
a bunch of things, like Coast Guard, TSA, and then there are a
bunch of sub-other entities. And, in all, I think we have 49
percent of your full-time employees come under our, quote,
``jurisdiction,'' or ``oversight,'' whatever you--not
``jurisdiction,'' but ``oversight,'' and 35 percent of your
discretionary spending. So, it's a chunk, and I think it makes
it--it's important that you're here, because they're extremely
important subjects to discuss.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I welcome you, and I thank you again for
joining us today.
And since the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, 8 years ago, we have, in Congress, passed a lot of
important pieces of legislation, to try to make our Nation more
safe, more secure. As the former Chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, which really helps, actually, in this
job, and now, as Chairman of this Committee, I sit at an
intersection between economic and national security, in a very,
very interesting way, and I have a deep appreciation of the
many challenges that we face, that you face, and opportunities
either lurking or simply on the horizon.
I'm proud to say that the Commerce Committee and its
members were deeply instrumental in developing all or part of
every major piece of legislation that the Department Homeland
Security is responsible for implementing, and we're very
acutely aware of that.
During that time, our Nation has made a lot of progress in
transportation security, but obviously we have a lot of work
that remains.
A complex goal--global transportation network and supply
chain--creates enormous security challenges for our Nation. For
whatever reason, we seem to be slow to understand that, as a
people. And as a government, I don't think we've done our due
diligence in terms of supporting DHS, and giving you the money
that you need. The Coast Guard's an incredible example of that,
and then all of the harbor problems and everything that you--
you're struggling to--and doing well, but you've got money
problems everywhere.
We have porous borders, both land and sea; they create a
lot of inherent risk. Over the last year, I've had the
opportunity to discuss with--the state of maritime and port
security with Admiral Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard. I
have an enormous regard for that man; I think he has terrific
vision and perspective. And, you know, he's very worried--to,
sort of, reinforce my concept on a lot of things, but one of
them was just the concept of small vessels. There are so many
small vessels out there; What do we do about small vessels?
What does he do? What do you do? I'll be introducing
legislation early next year on this issue, and I look forward,
Madam Secretary, to working with you as we develop that.
I also want to highlight that I remain deeply concerned
about the state of aviation security, and especially general
aviation security and aircargo security. In particular, we
remain far too vulnerable in general aviation. I've always felt
that. And it's a battle where nobody ever seems to advance the
ball, particularly. But, I mean, whenever I've been out to
Dulles Airport, I can never remember passing through any metal
detector; I never remember having any check on anything. And
that should not be. And it's sort of easy; it has--since we all
experience that, we notice it, and other people would be
inclined to notice that, too, and they may not--they may have
ill intent.
The--I think your predecessors shared that view--or, your
predecessor--shared that view, and I look forward to hearing
your views on this specific problem of the state of aviation
security. Both Congress and the Administration must balance
important but competing needs, maintaining an efficient flow of
commerce while ensuring that no terrorists can enter our
country by land, air, or sea. And they can. And we all know
that. I understand this balance, and I'm committed that we in
Congress do all we can to make sure that it's achieved, and
work with you to help you to make sure that it's all achieved.
I understand the GAO, the Government Accountability Office,
is releasing a report for the Committee today about the 100-
percent-scanning mandate for maritime cargo. That's something
that the House is really up on. I have my questions about
whether that's doable, and I want to talk about that with you,
because it's very--a very important subject, and you can
increase your security, if we had all the machinery for it and
could afford it, but you might slow down commerce, which I
suppose could happen. But, when you're talking about all the
ports around the world, it becomes pretty complex.
The GAO highlights the enormous difficulty of meeting this
mandate due to the global nature of supply chain logistics and
simply a lack of technology, sufficient technology. That does
not mean that we should not continue to strengthen our security
protocols to prevent high-risk cargo from entering this
country, whether by land, sea, or air. That's a big problem. We
need to work harder to find ways to balance our security needs
with our need to move goods and people efficiently. That's
always the challenge. And they are not mutually exclusive. They
don't have to be mutually exclusive.
I--you know, I--the two DNIs, President Bush's and
President Obama's, both, in an Intelligence hearing in the last
Administration and this hearing that are sort of global
threats, both of them flat out came and said that cybersecurity
is the greatest threat to national security. They--everything
else was after that. We hear that. It goes right through our
head. We don't do that much about it. And--that various
agencies do, and there are, you know, 50 Federal agencies
claiming jurisdiction, and 20 Congressional committees
claiming--or subcommittees--claiming jurisdiction. So, it's a
mess, but it's a mess which stands as our major national
security threat.
To date, Congress has not spent as much time on
cybersecurity as transportation security. And that has to
change. That's our fault. I'm committed to making cybersecurity
a focus for this committee and for this Congress; want to work
with you on that. The interconnectedness between government and
private industry on this critical issue cannot be ignored in
the 21st Century. And again, it's the number-one threat. Two
different people, 2 years apart, said exactly the same thing--
two different Administrations, two points of view.
Along with Senator Snowe, I've been working on legislation
that aims to address the threats that we face from
cyberterrorists who intend to wreak havoc on our
infrastructure. Madam Secretary, as you and I have discussed,
I've called the White House to develop a national security
strategy, coordinate new roles, renew responsibilities across
all boundaries. And the Congress and the White House and every
government agency has to be a part of that solution. And that's
very easy to say and extremely tough to get people to acquire
the necessary discipline to focus. We call for somebody who
reports to the President. Well, that becomes controversial: Is
that a czar? And I, sort of, don't worry about that. If people
say it's the number-one national security threat, to me that's
about all you need to know.
Anyway, we have enormous respect for you. I respect you
very much. Over the last 8 years, your Department has
experienced a lot of growing pains. I know you're the right
person to move the agency forward. I'm totally confident of
that. I look forward to being your partner--I think we all do--
in solving top security challenges.
And I turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator
Hutchison, from the State of Texas.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you very much, Senator
Rockefeller, for calling this meeting.
Welcome, Madam Secretary.
I want to start by saying, securing our transportation
network and infrastructure is essential for our national
defense as well as our economic prosperity. Texas is home to 29
ports, including the Port of Houston, which is one of the
busiest ports in the world. It ranks first in the United States
in foreign water-borne tonnage, and is home to one of the
world's largest petrochemical complexes, as well as the U.S.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. A terrorist incident at a major
U.S. port could cause a devastating loss of life and deliver a
huge blow to our economy.
For years, I've worked with my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle to strengthen our Nation's port security and our
transportation network. And, while we have made great strides
since 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security faces ever-
evolving threats and still must meet numerous challenges.
I want to address the transportation security officers, the
screeners at airports and other places--in some places--and
talk about collective bargaining. While Federal law, of course,
prohibits screeners from striking, allowing screeners to
collectively bargain through a union could have serious
consequences on the Transportation Security Administration's
fundamental security mission. I hope that you will talk about
that issue and how you intend to address it, because I think it
is very important for us to know that our screeners will not
able to strike and will not have bargaining that causes work
slowdowns and shortages and all of the things that are just
short of a strike.
Second--and this is something with which you have much
familiarity, I know--is the movement of goods across our land
borders. This is an integral aspect of our economy, and must be
conducted in a secure, and also efficient, manner.
Unfortunately, the wait times at many of our border crossings
have increased, while the flow of goods has decreased.
During the floor debate on the SAFE Port Act, I secured an
amendment that increased the number of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers by 275. Now, this is an issue on our land
ports. It's also an issue on our water ports, where, in some
cases, we are having to share a screener or a transportation
Border Patrol person with a port and an airport in the same
area. And that's not a good situation.
I welcome your views on how we can meet our resource needs
along the Nation's land borders, water borders, and airports,
because I think these are the key issues that we must address.
I will ask questions. I will not go further in my
statement. But, I do also have questions about the screening of
cargo at both our airports and our water ports, as well as, of
course, the land ports and the technology for that.
So, you have a huge job, and we know that. That agency is
young, and it is an amalgamation of many of our security
agencies. But, your responsibility is also critical. So, I
welcome you and look forward to asking you questions and
hearing what you have to say.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Thank you, Senator Rockefeller, for holding this hearing on
transportation security. Securing our transportation network and
infrastructure is vital for our national defense and our economic
prosperity.
Texas is home to 29 ports, including the Port of Houston, which is
one of the busiest ports in the world. It ranks first in the United
States in foreign waterborne tonnage and is home to one of the world's
largest petrochemical complexes, as well as the U.S. Strategic
Petroleum Reserve.
A terrorist incident at a major U.S. port could cause a devastating
loss of life and deliver a huge blow to our economy.
For years, I have worked with my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle to strengthen our Nation's port security and transportation
network. While we have made great strides since 9/11 in improving
transportation security, the Department of Homeland Security faces
ever-evolving threats and still must meet numerous challenges.
First, is the issue of allowing transportation security officers
(TSOs), or screeners, to collectively bargain for compensation. While
Federal law does prohibit screeners from striking, allowing the
screeners to collectively bargain through a union could have dire
consequences on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)'s
fundamental security mission.
Since the inception of TSA, it has been critical that the agency
has a nimble and flexible workforce which can react to emerging threats
at a moment's notice. How you intend to address this issue, Madame
Secretary, will be of great interest to me and many others on this
Committee, as well as the traveling public at large.
Second, the movement of goods across our land borders is an
integral aspect of our economy and must be conducted in a secure and
efficient manner. Unfortunately, the wait times at many of our border
crossings have increased while the flow of goods has decreased.
During the floor debate on the SAFE Port Act, I secured an
amendment that increased the number of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) Officers by 275, and I remain committed to ensuring
that CBP has the resources available to carry out a mission that is
critical to our Nation's economic and national security.
I welcome Secretary Napolitano's views on how the Department and
the Administration intend to best meet the resource needs along our
Nation's borders. We simply must have a renewed commitment to tackling
the pressing issues along our southern border, challenges that I know
the Secretary understands very well.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing. I look
forward to hearing from Secretary Napolitano on these very important
issues.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary--I should say to my
colleagues, that--it may be both parties, but, I know, our
party--we're having a Healthcare Caucus--I think is our 1,733rd
Healthcare Caucus--at 11:30. And so, what I want to do is, with
apology to colleagues on both sides, is to head directly to
you, so you can make your statement, and then we'll ask you all
kinds of questions.
Secretary Napolitano. Great.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. We'd be--they're all entered as an--
automatically into the record, but the timing--this is--Senator
Lautenberg, this is not unusual; this is the way we usually do
it. When we're not pressed, we don't do it; but we do do it
usually.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Hutchison, Members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to testify on the many actions that the Department
is taking to secure our country and, at the same time, helping
to strengthen the foundation of our economic prosperity.
In the interest of time, I have submitted a longer written
statement, and ask that it be included in the record.
But, I would like to focus my opening remarks today on one
particular issue, and that is the security of containerized
maritime cargo.
For years, the Department of Homeland Security and other
Federal agencies have been working to mitigate the threat,
particularly, of a nuclear device being brought into the
country. That was the intent behind Congress's mandate that the
Department scan 100 percent of maritime cargo headed into the
United States by the year 2012.
Now, when the Department looks to mitigate any threat, we
look to two guiding principles: first, a multi-layered approach
to security, making us more safe than relying on any single
layer; and second, risk management as the best way to make sure
that our actions are prioritized and that our resources are
focused correctly.
Now, for various reasons, it is difficult to measure, in
absolute terms, the risk of a threat of a nuclear device being
brought into the United States. But, when we look at our
vulnerabilities to this threat, it's clear that we are
vulnerable across a number of pathways, and one of these
pathways is maritime shipping containers. But, there are
others. Private airplanes, as you mentioned, Senator, small
boats, as you also mentioned, overland smuggling, are just some
examples.
So, when we think about securing the borders of the United
States, one useful analogy is that of a home. A house has a
front door, but it also has a number of other possible
entryways--other doors, the windows, even the chimney. Now,
here security has definitely improved at the front door; in
this case, the maritime cargo pathway. But, other possible
entryways also merit our attention.
So, therefore, we have been building a layered approach to
maritime cargo security. We collect advance information on
cargo entering the United States--who has it, where it's going,
who may have had access to it--so that we can focus on higher-
risk cargo. We work with partners in the shipping industry to
improve their security. Once we ensure that a company has put
strong security measures in place, we focus on higher-risk
shipments.
DHS personnel right now are located at 58 ports in 44 other
countries working with foreign officials to help ensure the
security of U.S.-bound cargo. And on top of these measures,
there is the 100-percent-scanning requirement being advanced by
pilot projects at five foreign ports.
Now, DHS learned a great deal from these pilots, but it has
also encountered a number of steep challenges. Some of these
issues relate to the limits on current technology. Technology
doesn't exist, right now, to effectively and automatically
detect suspicious anomalies in cargo. This makes scanning
difficult and time-consuming.
Available technologies are also limited in their ability to
see accurately through very dense cargo. And density often can
be the measure of something being disguised.
Other challenges are logistical. Many ports do not have a
single point through which most of the cargo passes, which
means that 100-percent scanning would either severely slow
trade or require a redesign of the port. And, on that note, the
costs of 100-percent scanning are very steep, especially in a
down economy. DHS equipment costs, alone, would be about $8
million for every one of the 2,100 shipping lanes at the more
than 700 ports that ship to the United States. So, therefore,
DHS is compelled to seek the time extensions, authorized by
law, with respect to the scanning provision.
But, the scanning provision has served and is serving its
purpose, allowing DHS to focus on this important issue and to
gain expertise in it. And so, in the view of the Department,
while we need to continue the current efforts, we need to
address the security of maritime cargo through a wider lens,
how to mitigate the threat against all potential pathways,
including, metaphorically, the other doors, the windows, and
the chimney.
I look forward to working with you and the Congress on an
approach to secure all vulnerable pathways that could be used
to smuggle a nuclear device into our country.
Let me, if I might, just briefly mention other actions we
are taking to help secure some of the other pathways into our
country. These include significant strides in ensuring the
security of air cargo. These efforts include work by the Coast
Guard to collaborate with our partners at other ports, and with
the small-boat community, to identify potential dangers and
identify a small-boat strategy. Our efforts also include work
with the general aviation community to devise rules to help
secure the country from a dangerous weapon being smuggled here
via private aircraft.
So, as you can see, we are taking action, but much work
remains.
So, I look forward to working with this Committee and with
this Congress on addressing this and other threats.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to addressing some of the issues that you have raised
in your own statements and to answering, to the best of my
ability, the questions that you might have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Janet Napolitano, Secretary,
United States Department of Homeland Security
Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Hutchison, and members of the
Committee: Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the efforts of
the Department of Homeland Security to improve security for land, sea,
and air transportation, and for cargo, while facilitating travel and
trade.
Ensuring our security and facilitating economic activity are
mutually beneficial, not mutually exclusive. A safe and secure homeland
requires that we maintain effective control of our air, land, and sea
borders. Secure, well-managed borders must not only protect the United
States from threats from abroad--they must also permit the expeditious
and safe flow of lawful travel and commerce. We are pursuing both of
these objectives through a broad array of programs in areas of special
interest to this Committee. Today I would like to highlight some
particular actions we are taking to address our security challenges,
and how we working to develop multi-level, risk-based strategies that
strengthen our security to the greatest extent possible.
Security Challenges in the Global Supply Chain
The Department has focused on securing the United States from the
threat of a nuclear device being brought into this country. Because the
potential consequences of such an event would be so grave, we need the
best possible strategy to prevent it from occurring.
We know that al Qaeda has expressed interest in obtaining the
materials necessary to perpetrate this kind of attack. To combat this
threat regardless of who the malicious actor might be, the U.S.
Government has put in place a series of programs and initiatives. These
include: gathering intelligence on the intent and capability of
terrorists or other adversaries; controlling and securing nuclear
material at its source; interdicting illicit acquisition of nuclear
material; detecting and preventing smuggling into the United States;
and preparing to respond to attacks. The detection and smuggling
portions of these programs are the predicate for Congress' requirement
to scan 100 percent of cargo headed to U.S. ports, and are one part of
this overall strategic effort, addressing only one possible pathway
through which nuclear material or a device might be smuggled.
We believe that as we look at all the pathways in which nuclear
material or a nuclear device might be smuggled, our Nation's security
programs should be organized around two fundamental guiding principles:
First, that a ``defense in depth,'' or layered, approach is more
effective than a single point of security; and second, that efficient
and effective risk management is the optimum way to prioritize our
actions and allocate our resources.
Assessing the risk of a nuclear device being brought into this
country presents some difficulties. When considering ``risk,'' we
measure threat and the intent, capabilities, resources, and activities
of possible threat actors; we look at our vulnerability to the threat;
and we look at the consequences if that threat materializes. In the
case of a nuclear device, the potential consequences are great, but the
likelihood of an attack is difficult to determine. We know that
terrorist organizations aspire to attack us in this way, but because
there is little evidence our adversaries have made a significant
advancement toward that goal, and because the threat environment is
constantly changing, we are limited in our ability to assess the
likelihood of the threat based on available intelligence.
At the same time, it is clear that we could be vulnerable to this
threat across a number of potential pathways. One of these pathways is
through commercial shipping containers that arrive at our seaports. But
there are others: General aviation, small boats, and over-land
smuggling are examples of some of these vulnerabilities. When
protecting against the threat of a nuclear device being smuggled into
this country, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with complex
systems that have many points of vulnerability. The matter is not as
simple as guarding against a threat at a single entryway or other focal
point.
The Status of Securing Maritime Cargo
DHS and Congress--through both the SAFE Port Act of 2006 and the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (``9/11
Act'')--have made significant progress in securing maritime shipping
containers from being used to smuggle a nuclear device into the United
States. Congress imposed multiple requirements--including a mandate to
scan 100 percent of containerized maritime cargo \1\--because it saw a
vulnerability that needed to be addressed. Because of this mandate, the
Department has gained critical knowledge and experience in securing
this pathway and has made important progress through a number of
initiatives, which are all different layers in our security approach.
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\1\ There are important differences between scanning and screening
of maritime cargo, as defined by the SAFE Port Act. ``Scanning'' means
utilizing non-intrusive imaging equipment, radiation detection
equipment, or both, to capture data, including images of a container.
``Screening,'' on the other hand, means a visual or automated review of
information about goods, including manifest or entry documentation
accompanying a shipment being imported into the United States, to
determine the presence of misdeclared, restricted, or prohibited items
and assess the level of threat posed by such cargo. I am using these
definitions for these terms for the purposes of discussing maritime
cargo.
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First, DHS collects advance information on all containerized cargo
entering the United States in order to help assess the threat that each
shipment could pose. This process provides critical guidance on where
we need to dedicate our security resources. In January 2009, the
interim final rule in the marine environment for Importer Security
Filing--known as ``10+2''--went into effect. This provides DHS with
greater visibility into a container's movements and the parties that
may have had access to it. DHS then puts this information through
sophisticated, automated analytic systems that identify the shipments
that pose the highest relative threats. Progress on 10+2 has been very
positive--industry participation has been very strong, and we have
already received more than 2.8 million filings representing more than
90,000 importers. We anticipate moving forward with a final rule either
soon. Through the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT),
DHS works with the trade community to encourage them to adopt tighter
security measures throughout their supply chains. Once we can certify
that these measures are in place, DHS expedites the inspection of goods
from these partners. This allows safer cargo to move more quickly and
enables DHS to focus on higher-risk shipments. C-TPAT currently has
more than 9,300 industry partners.
Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), DHS works with 44
foreign customs administrations to jointly identify and inspect high-
risk cargo containers at 58 ports before they are shipped to the United
States. This provides DHS critical ``boots on the ground'' at these
ports. Importantly, these ports represent about 86 percent of all
shipping into the United States.
The 100% Scanning Issue
In advancing the goal of 100 percent scanning, the Secure Freight
Initiative (SFI) deploys networks of radiation detection and imaging
equipment at five overseas pilot ports.\2\ This advanced pilot has
encountered a number of serious challenges to implementing the 100
percent scanning mandate.
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\2\ These locations are Southampton, United Kingdom; Qasim,
Pakistan; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; Busan, South Korea; and Salalah,
Oman.
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Certain challenges are logistical. Many ports simply do not have
one area through which all the cargo passes; there are multiple points
of entry, and cargo is ``transshipped,'' meaning it is moved
immediately from vessel to vessel within the port. These ports are not
configured to put in place detection equipment or to provide space for
secondary inspections. At these ports, scanning 100 percent of cargo
with current systems is currently unworkable without seriously
hindering the flow of shipments or redesigning the ports themselves,
which would require huge capital investment.
Other challenges are the limitations that are inherent in available
technology. DHS currently uses both passive radiation detection and
active x-ray scanning to look for radioactive material in cargo. An
important obstacle is the absence of technology which can effectively
and automatically detect suspicious anomalies within cargo containers
that should trigger additional inspection. Currently, DHS personnel
visually inspect screens for possible anomalies, but the scale and the
variety of container cargo make this process challenging and time-
consuming. In addition, current x-ray systems have limited penetration
capability; this can limit their ability to find a device in very dense
cargo. While DHS is pursuing technological solutions to these problems,
expanding screening with available technology would slow the flow of
commerce and drive up costs to consumers without bringing significant
security benefits.
Finally, and on that note, the costs of 100 percent scanning pose a
great challenge, particularly in a struggling economy. Deploying SFI-
type scanning equipment would cost about $8 million per lane for the
more than 2,100 shipping lanes at more than 700 ports around the world
that ship to the United States. On top of these initial costs,
operating costs would be very high. These include only DHS expenses,
not the huge costs that would have to be borne by foreign governments
or industry. It is also important to keep in mind that about 86 percent
of the cargo shipped to the United States is sent from only 58 of those
more than 700 ports. Installing equipment and placing personnel at all
of these ports--even the tiny ones--would strain government resources
without a guarantee of results.
The Path Forward
Thus, in order to implement the 100 percent scanning requirement by
the 2012 deadline, DHS would need significant resources for greater
manpower and technology, technologies that do not currently exist, and
the redesign of many ports. These are all prohibitive challenges that
will require the Department to seek the time extensions authorized by
law.
At the same time, it is imperative that we approach the threat of a
nuclear device being smuggled into the United States by addressing all
possible pathways. The 100 percent scanning mandate has enabled DHS to
focus on this issue, adopt the important tool of cargo scanning, and
determine how we can best act to mitigate the threat of a nuclear
device being smuggled into the United States. In the view of the
Department, however, we need to address this issue through a wider
lens: how to mitigate this threat across all potential pathways. I look
forward to continuing to work with Congress to address this threat in
such a way.
Similarly, DHS has been taking action to address our other
vulnerabilities to the smuggling of a nuclear device. As I explain
later in this statement, we are making important progress in securing
air cargo. The Coast Guard and our partners at ports of entry are
working with the maritime community and with owners of small boats in
order to identify potential threats. The Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) program is helping to ensure personnel
security at our own ports. DHS is continuing to work with the general
aviation community to develop rules that address the risk of bringing a
nuclear device being brought into the United States by private
aircraft.
All of these efforts are a work in progress. Thus, it is essential
that we look at security in a comprehensive manner and allocate our
resources according to a strategy that makes the most sense. We cannot
define ``security'' as being able to flip a switch between two options,
safe and not safe. Instead, we must evaluate all points of risk and
vulnerability, comprehensively across a complex system. Everyone
understands the importance of getting it right when it comes to our
approach to cargo security. It has long-term and lasting implications
for our domestic security, our economy, and our trade relations. I look
forward to working with Congress to develop and implement a solution
that allocates our resources in a manner that better protects the
homeland.
Actions and Challenges in Aviation and Surface Transportation Security
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made great
strides this year in addressing key issues in transportation security,
a sector critical both to our country's safety and economic prosperity.
In the face of an ever-changing threat environment, TSA is dedicated to
adopting new procedures and technologies that will protect the public
while respecting individual privacy rights and facilitating travel and
commerce. Today I will highlight a few important areas in which TSA has
been particularly active.
Before I do that, however, I want to express my appreciation to the
Committee for supporting the nomination of President Obama's choice to
head TSA, Erroll Southers. When he is confirmed, Erroll will bring
outstanding leadership to TSA as the agency continues its critical
work.
Development of a Dedicated, Effective TSA Workforce
The effectiveness of TSA's security efforts depends first and
foremost upon its people. The TSA workforce is the agency's most
valuable asset in preventing, detecting, and deterring threats to our
transportation sector. Building the TSA workforce is a major priority,
and TSA has initiated innovative programs to attract and retain a
motivated and a well-trained work force, including a career progression
program for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) and creative pay
incentives for part-time TSOs, such as a split shift differential,
Sunday premium pay, and full-time health benefits.
TSA has also created programs to address employee concerns. The
National Advisory Council (NAC) is a committee of management and TSO
representatives from various airports that acts as the liaison for the
workforce in presenting to senior leadership new ideas as well concerns
relating to existing practices and policies. The Model Workplace
program brings staff and leadership together to create a cohesive work
environment through local employee councils and training in conflict
resolution.
These programs also include an award-winning workers' compensation
program that has resulted in significant cost savings, an estimated
$19.4 million from FY 2007 to FY 2010. This program includes an
innovative nurse case management element that ensures affected
employees are receiving proper treatment, medication, and related
therapy to facilitate their return to duty after injury, thus reducing
time off the job. It also includes a review of all cases on the long
term workers compensation roles, which has resulted in the resolution
of 67 percent of the cases in existence when the review began in 2007.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is working to create a
similar program, and we moving to implement this program Department-
wide.
Technology Development
The Department is also aggressively moving to improve our
technological capabilities in order to address evolving threats to our
Nation's security in the air environment. Utilizing the latest
technologies allows DHS to more effectively perform its law enforcement
and security duties while at the same time facilitating legal travel
and trade and expediting security procedures for the traveling public.
Aviation security will focus on new technology at airport checkpoints
to screen passengers for concealed weapons, explosives, and other
prohibited items that might not be detected by a metal detector-
providing the capabilities necessary to combat the evolving threats
that our intelligence activities have revealed. TSA has gone to great
lengths to balance privacy with security in its screening processes,
and continues to work on technology enhancements that will offer even
greater privacy protections in the future.
Pilot Results for a Biometric Exit Program
At the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and the requirement of
Congress, since the inception of the US-VISIT program, DHS has
prioritized the development of an automated capability to record when
visitors leave the United States. This is an important tool to
addressing visa overstays. By adding biometrics to the current
biographic-based system of recording departures, DHS will be able to
more accurately and efficiently determine whether foreign citizens have
departed the United States.
From May 28 to July 2, 2009, US-VISIT tested biometric air exit
procedures at two airports, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport
and Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport, in accordance
with a Congressional requirement that additional biometric collection
testing be done prior to publishing a final rule on the topic.\3\ In
Detroit, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers collected
passengers' biometrics at the boarding gate. In Atlanta, passengers'
biometrics were collected at a TSA checkpoint.
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\3\ Previously, DHS had proposed a rule in 2008 that commercial air
carriers and vessel carriers collect and transmit the biometric
information of international visitors to DHS within 24 hours of their
departure from the United States. Congress asked DHS to test additional
biometric collection before finalizing this rule to ensure that the
best available procedures are implemented.
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The Department has submitted an evaluation of these pilots to the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees and to the Government
Accountability Office. The results of the pilot evaluation, combined
with the review of a completed public comment period, will inform the
final rule that the Department will issue to cover both airports and
seaports.
Secure Flight
One of the 9/11 Commission's key recommendations was for the
Federal Government to check passengers traveling on commercial airline
flights against terrorist watch lists, a responsibility that was
previously held by the airlines. In January 2009, Secure Flight became
operational, prescreening passenger name, date of birth and gender
against government watch lists for domestic and international flights.
The program makes travel safer and easier by helping to keep known or
suspected terrorists from obtaining a boarding pass and preventing the
misidentification of passengers who have names similar to individuals
on government watch lists. To date, 18 air carriers have successfully
switched to Secure Flight, including one international carrier. Testing
is underway with an additional 27 air carriers. Implementation for all
covered air carriers is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2010. I
would like to thank this Committee for your strong support for the
Secure Flight program since its inception and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) for its constructive collaboration during
its audit of this important program.
Foreign Repair Stations Rule
TSA is also making progress strengthening aircraft security. On
November 18, 2009, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making in
the Federal Register on Aircraft Repair Station security. The proposed
rule would establish security requirements for maintenance and repair
work conducted on aircraft and aircraft components at domestic and
foreign repair stations that are certificated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). It also requires FAA-certificated foreign and
domestic repair stations to adopt and carry out a standard TSA security
program to safeguard the security of the repair station, the repair
work conducted, and all aircraft and aircraft components at the
station. The program will require stations to implement strict access
controls, provide security awareness training, and allow for DHS
inspections.
After 60 days of public comment, we look forward to responding to
comments, finalizing the rule and moving forward with the required
security audits that to date have been conducted with the voluntary
cooperation of many foreign partners.
Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP)
General Aviation (GA) remains a concern to the Department because
of its ability to circumvent some of our layers of security and its
potential to deliver dangerous people or weapons to the United States.
Addressing this concern while maintaining a robust GA sector is one of
the purposes of the Large Aircraft Security Program.
TSA has sought out input from GA stakeholders throughout its
rulemaking process for LASP, receiving 8,000 comments in response to
the initial NPRM, conducting five public meetings and holding
additional comment outreach sessions with impacted stakeholders to gain
further input and feedback. TSA plans to issue a Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking before the end of 2010 that incorporates this input
and addresses some of the concerns of GA stakeholders.
Air Cargo Screening \4\
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\4\ The definition of ``screening'' contained in the portions of
the 9/11 Act that cover air cargo differs from the definition in the
SAFE Port Act. In this context, screening means ``a physical
examination or non-intrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a
threat to transportation security. Methods of screening include x-ray
systems, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection,
explosives detection canine teams certified by the Transportation
Security Administration, or a physical search together with manifest
verification. . . .'' I am using this definition when discussing air
cargo.
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Excellent progress continues when it comes to screening air cargo:
More than 50 percent of air cargo is now undergoing screening. More
than 95 percent of passenger flights fly each day carrying fully
screened cargo on board. TSA is moving forward with its Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP), but the program will need greater
participation from the air cargo industry in order to meet the August
2010 deadline for 100 percent screening of all cargo that is borne on
passenger aircraft for flights originating in the United States. To
that end, an industry-wide conference will occur in mid-December to
encourage participants in the air cargo supply chain to join the CCSP.
Meeting the 100 percent screening requirement for cargo inbound to
the United States from foreign countries continues to present
challenges. TSA is taking a layered approach to securing this cargo:
TSA is increasing security requirements for cargo acceptance, handling,
and screening of cargo transported into the U.S. on passenger aircraft.
It is strengthening global security standards through collaboration
with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and through
agreements on information sharing and standardization of security with
foreign partners. TSA is also working with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) to examine the feasibility of adapting CBP's automated
targeting system (ATS) to provide risk screening on every shipment of
cargo.
Improvements in Threat Assessments
The Department is also making progress in preparing a proposed rule
to standardize background checks, standards for redress, and fees among
all transportation workers who have access to secure areas of the
Nation's transportation system in order to reduce redundant background
checks and establish consistent standards across the country. This
future rule (Universal Security Threat Assessment/Fee Rule) will cover
several existing background check programs, such as the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) as well as Hazmat drivers, air
cargo, airport and airline personnel, and new populations we are
required to vet under the 9/11 Act, such as frontline rail and transit
workers.
Federal Air Marshal Service
I want to recognize the accomplishments of TSA's Federal Air
Marshals Service. In the past 4 years, TSA's highly trained Federal Air
Marshals have flown millions of missions worldwide and participated in
over 4,000 Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response operations
(VIPRs)--45 percent in aviation, and 55 percent in surface
transportation.
Surface Transportation
DHS, and in particular TSA, continues to enhance surface
transportation security by working with other Federal departments and
transportation providers. This will be a major priority of mine during
my tenure as Secretary.
Nothing is more important to security across all modes of
transportation than well-trained employees. The familiarity of
employees with the facilities and operating environments of their
specific modes and transportation systems put them in an ideal position
to identify and prevent threats. Targeted security training for key
employees is one of the most effective measures that we can take to
enhance security. To pursue this goal, TSA is drafting an NPRM that
will institute employee security training program requirements across
all surface modes of transportation: freight railroad carriers; public
transportation agencies (including rail mass transit and bus systems);
passenger railroad carriers; over-the-road bus operators; and motor
carriers transporting highway security-sensitive materials. Training
elements for these programs will address security awareness, terrorist
behavior recognition, and threat and incident prevention and response.
Actions and Challenges in Maritime Security
In addition to aviation security, maritime security continues to be
a major priority for the Department in its overall mission to secure
the Nation.
Piracy
The United States is committed to combating piracy, and DHS plays
an essential role in this effort. Currently, U.S. Coast Guard personnel
augment Central Command's Combined Task Force 151 as part of a U.S. and
international force operating in areas prone to piracy.
Because vessel owners and operators have primary responsibility for
the security of their vessels and the best defense against piracy is
preparedness, DHS has worked with Federal partners to develop guidance
for the maritime industry. For example, the Maritime Security (MARSEC)
Directive on Vessel Security Measures for High Risk Waters (HRW), which
was issued under the authority of the Coast Guard in May 2009 and
requires U.S.-flagged vessels to evaluate risk and determine
appropriate self protection measures for the vessel when operating in
high-risk waters.
This directive requires U.S.-flagged vessels to use security teams
(armed or unarmed) in the high risk waters, and we will continue to
work with the commercial shipping industry to develop and implement
preventative measures to combat piracy. Pirates have proven versatile
in adapting their methods so we will continue to provide guidance based
on how this threat evolves.
Small Vessel Security
DHS has identified small vessels (those under 300 gross tons) as
tools that could be used by terrorists to smuggle either weapons or
people, as attack platforms, or as waterborne improvised explosive
devices. Last year's attacks in Mumbai and the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole in 2000 demonstrate how small vessels can be used in terrorist
operations. Accordingly, DHS has reenergized the Department Small
Vessel Security Strategy, and we are nearing completion on an
implementation plan. This implementation plan encompasses programs and
actions across Federal agencies, and forms a broad doctrine for
reducing this risk.
At the same time, we continue to move forward in other important
areas of small vessel security. Many of these programs focus on
involving the American boating public in helping to ensure our security
from potential attacks that can use small vessels.
For instance, the Coast Guard America's Waterway Watch program
provides a way for the recreational boating public to report suspicious
and unusual activity when observed on the Nation's waterways. The Coast
Guard is also exploring initiatives such as the Citizen's Action
Network to improve communications with the boating public.
Our Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has been working on a
radiological/nuclear detection pilot program in both the Puget Sound
and the San Diego area to strengthen security through existing
technology and partnerships with the local maritime community in order
to detect vessels which might pose a threat. These steps are greatly
expanding detection opportunities and clarifying response roles and
options.
The path forward on small vessel security is clear: we will
continue to establish and strengthen our partnerships with the small
vessel community, engage with our international partners, and develop
and implement technologies to reduce the potential threats from small
vessels. We anticipate these efforts will lead to enhanced counter-
narcotics operations, greater safety for both small and large vessels,
and reductions in maritime crimes.
Interagency Operations Centers/SeaHawk
The Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) Project--initiated in
response to the requirements of the Security and Accountability for
Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006--has tremendous potential to ensure that
our ports are both efficient and secure, and dovetails with one of my
major priorities as Secretary: facilitating productive partnerships
with state and local government.
DHS plans to deploy the first piece of the IOC project, information
integration and management software known as WatchKeeper, Segment 1, to
all locations by the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2011. This time-
frame that allows for the improvement of the project through more
operational testing and refinement.
As scheduled, on October 1, 2009, the Department of Justice pilot
``Project SeaHawk'' in Charleston, South Carolina was transferred to
DHS. The President's FY 2010 Budget provides funding to support the
continued operation of IOC Charleston.
SeaHawk provides a collaborative, unified command-based work
environment to coordinate vessel and intermodal transportation
screening targeting in the Port of Charleston. This successful program
has received important support from local jurisdictions as well as from
Congress. Using SeaHawk as an example, the construction of an IOC in
San Francisco is already underway, and plans are under development to
expand the model to New Orleans and Houston-Galveston in the future.
We are also bolstering efforts among DHS components in order to
facilitate this interagency model. In March 2009, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard entered into a formal agreement to
cooperate on the development and deployment of all aspects of the IOC
Project and the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). In addition, Coast
Guard Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach is being used as a test site to
collaborate with DHS Science and Technology to provide mature
technology to the IOC Project.
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program
The successful rollout of the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) at Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)-
regulated facilities and vessels across the country is a direct result
of tremendous coordination and preparation by the maritime community
with the Department, the Coast Guard, and TSA.
DHS components are working every day to implement the TWIC program
in a number of ways: To date, DHS has conducted checks for and issued
over 1.3 million TWICs nationwide. Today, all credentialed merchant
mariners and transportation workers who are seeking unescorted access
to secure areas of MTSA-regulated vessels and facilities are required
to undergo a security threat assessment and receive a TWIC. The Coast
Guard is conducting visual TWIC verification checks as part of annual
compliance exams and security spot checks and will soon deploy mobile
handheld readers to its inspection field personnel.
In addition to reader capabilities being tested by the Coast Guard,
a comprehensive TWIC Pilot program is currently underway at various
facilities and vessels operations around the country. Laboratory reader
tests are largely complete, and 19 readers are approved for use in the
pilot. We anticipate a ramp-up of reader installations and installation
at all pilot ports January through July 2010, and we are also seeking
to augment pilot data by including additional facilities outside those
facilities designated as official pilot participants. It is clear that
Congress intends for the TWIC Program to use electronic readers to
further leverage the security benefits of the program; our goal is to
maximize the information learned from the pilot and stakeholder
involvement in the rulemaking process.
The excellent cooperation among DHS components on TWIC has yielded
significant efficiencies. The Coast Guard and TSA established an
exchange process that validates whether workers hold a valid TWIC prior
to being issued a Merchant Mariner Credential, yielding an estimated $9
million in cost savings over 5 years, starting in FY 2010.
The U.S. Coast Guard
Over the past year, the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard have
continued their exemplary service ensuring our waterways are secure,
both in the interior and along the coasts of the United States and
throughout the world. In order to ensure our Coast Guard personnel are
able to continue this excellent service, we must procure safe,
reliable, and capable equipment and infrastructure for them.
Fleet Modernization
The Coast Guard's readiness is continually threatened by a reliance
on assets, systems, and shore infrastructure that are outdated and
rapidly becoming less reliable. The cost of operating major cutters is
increasing, while the availability of these cutters continues to
decline because of an aging fleet that continually needs repairs. This
phenomenon has a direct impact on the Coast Guard's ability to execute
its mission. Shortages of parts have caused aircraft availability to
dip below the Coast Guard's 71 percent target. During the past 12
months, major unexpected repairs for Coast Guard aircraft and cutters
have cost the Coast Guard more than $60 million and resulted in a total
loss of over three cutter-years of operational time. Long deferred
maintenance backlogs also continue to grow. The Coast Guard has gotten
the most out of its aging fleet, but is now being forced to make
difficult financial and resource-management decisions to buy down risk
in the most critical areas.
To overcome these challenges, the Coast Guard must continue efforts
to modernize assets and recapitalize its major cutter fleet. In
particular, the National Security Cutter, a replacement for the High
Endurance Cutter class, is pivotal to ensuring effective enforcement of
immigration and narcotics laws. The Response Boats-Medium (RB-M), the
replacement for the USCG's disparate collection of mid-size boats, is
already underway and the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is already
proving its operational value on the Gulf Coast.
Acquisition Reform
Improving acquisition across the Department is a major priority and
in the years ahead. These changes will ultimately improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Coast Guard and the Department.
The Coast Guard, specifically, has consolidated acquisition
activities and adopted a blueprint for acquisition reform that make the
USCG better equipped to manage costs, schedules, and performance.
Additionally, in the past year, Coast Guard established the Aviation
Logistics Center, Surface Forces Logistics Center and Asset Project
Office, all of which have improved critical support services to
operational assets Coast Guard-wide. Moreover, the Coast Guard has
endeavored to improve its recruitment, development, and retention of a
highly qualified acquisition workforce to ensure we are maximizing the
use of taxpayer dollars. Because the Department and Coast Guard have
focused on ensuring the appropriate training, skills, and career
progression for the USCG acquisition work force, we are seeing positive
results. For example, all Coast Guard acquisition projects over $1
billion are now led by DHS Level III-certified program managers (the
highest level), a major change from only a few years ago. The Coast
Guard's Human Capital Strategic Plan outlines further initiatives
through which the USCG will continue to strengthen its acquisition work
force.
DHS Efforts to Combat Cybercrime
DHS continues to work extensively with other nations, Federal
agencies, state and local law enforcement, the private sector, and our
Nation's research and development infrastructure to secure America's
cyber networks from a range of threats, including cybercrime. Let me be
clear: cybercrime is an evolving and growing threat to our Nation right
now, and the Department is working hard to protect the American public,
our businesses, and our financial infrastructure from this threat.
Law Enforcement Actions and Partnerships Against Cyber-Crime
Network intrusions can be devastating to both businesses and
individuals. Data theft and loss of customer information to any size
company can have serious effects to that business. More often than not,
those who suffer the most severe consequences are small or medium-sized
companies. These companies often lack the resources or expertise
necessary to properly protect their networks and data. Our efforts must
become more nimble, and law enforcement agencies must be able to adapt
to emerging technologies and criminal methods.
Cyber-criminals operate in a world without borders. They can
traverse multi-national and multi-jurisdictional boundaries, and the
nature of cybercrime cases is becoming more complex. Our response to
the growth in cybercrimes and the increasing level of sophistication of
this type of threat demands a fully collaborative approach.
The U.S. Secret Service has adopted a multi-faceted approach to
aggressively combat cyber and computer-related crimes. The Secret
Service provides necessary computer-based training to enhance the
investigative skills of special agents through the Electronic Crimes
Special Agent Program and leads 28 Electronic Crimes Task Forces that
collaborate with other law enforcement agencies, private industry, and
academia. These approaches exemplify the integrated model that is
necessary to combat this threat. The Secret Service works through its
Criminal Intelligence Section to identify and locate cyber-criminals
and provides state and local law enforcement partners with the
necessary computer-based training, tools, and equipment to enhance
their investigative skills through the National Computer Forensics
Institute. Through international field offices, the USSS maximizes
partnerships with international law enforcement, and it uses the US-
CERT Liaison Program at Carnegie Mellon University to maximize private-
sector support and public outreach.
Outreach to the Private Sector
The mission of securing the Nation's cyber networks requires active
dialogue, collaboration, and information sharing between the public and
private sectors. Because so much of our Nation's critical
infrastructure is in private hands--including our financial
infrastructure--it is critical that private entities and the American
public know what cybersecurity means for them.
DHS has a number of cybersecurity partnerships underway with the
private sector. The Department conducts many of its activities through
the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC)
structure. CIPAC is organized under the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP) framework to facilitate effective coordination
between government infrastructure protection programs and the
infrastructure protection activities of the owners and operators of
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). To secure critical
infrastructure, the NIPP relies on the sector partnership with the
Federal Government. This includes Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers, technology and service providers, Sector Coordination
Councils, specific working groups, and partners from across the 18 CIKR
sectors.
Recent distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks illustrated how
government and industry work together to share information. During the
attacks, the National Cyber Security Divisions (NCSD), United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the National
Communications System (NCS), and the National Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications (NCC) partnered very well across government and with
the private sector to collect information, to understand what was
happening, and to share that information with stakeholders--leading to
a swift and effective response. The Department is developing a National
Cyber Incident Response Plan. This is an interagency effort in
cooperation with state, local, and private sector partners to define
the cyber incident roles and responsibilities across all sectors. The
Department has also launched the National Cybersecurity &
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), a consolidated 24-hour watch
and warning center, to improve coordination between Federal and private
sector operations centers. The NCCIC brings together interdependent
missions of the NCS, NCSD, US-CERT, NCC, Office for Intelligence &
Analysis (I&A), National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) and the private
sector to prepare for, respond to and recover from threats to the
Nation's IT and communications infrastructure.
Indeed, while DHS works closely with the private sector to share
information and to respond to incidents, the private sector also plays
another important role. It possesses a great deal of technology and
expertise that can help the government in secure its own systems. A
vital private-sector partnership can further the development of
comprehensive, innovative solutions that improve and expand our
Nation's capabilities and keep us ahead of emerging cyber threats. DHS
is working with industry to find these solutions. Expanding these
partnerships is one of my major priorities as the Department works to
secure our Nation's networks from a range of cyber threats.
The Recovery Act and Strengthened DHS Efforts
Finally, I would like to describe to the Committee how the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act has provided critical funds to DHS
components that are strengthening our security efforts, facilitating
travel and trade and stimulating the American economy.
Congress appropriated $1 billion to TSA to procure and install
explosives detection systems and checkpoint explosives detection
equipment for checked baggage at airports. TSA will expend around $700
million of these funds to accelerate the modification of existing
checked-baggage inspection systems to ``in-line'' baggage handling
systems. TSA will also use around $300 million for its Passenger
Screening Program to install upgraded screening technologies at more
passenger checkpoints.
Furthermore, the Recovery Act provided $680 million to Customs and
Border Protection and the General Services Administration for greatly
needed improvements to aging infrastructure, and for the addition of
new technology at our Nation's borders.\5\ These funds support a wide
range of activities related to improving our antiquated port
infrastructure: the planning, management, design, alteration, and
construction of CBP-owned land ports of entry; procurement and
deployment of non-intrusive inspection systems; expedited development
and deployment of border security technology on the southwest border;
and the procurement and deployment of tactical communications
equipment.
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\5\ It is important to note that most of the CBP-owned ports of
entry are on the northern border, while the General Services
Administration controls the facilities of most of the ports on the
southwest border. CBP owns 39 northern border ports and four southwest
border ports.
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Finally, the Recovery Act provided $98 million to the Coast Guard
in order to support shore facilities and aids to navigation, as well as
to repair, renovate, assess and improve vessels. Of this funding, $88
million will be used for the construction, renovation, and repair of
vital Coast Guard shore facilities. The remaining $10 million will help
address the needs of the aging High Endurance Cutters.
Conclusion
As you can see, the Department of Homeland Security is moving
forward in strong, strategic directions to improve the security of our
Nation. Developing smart, strategic ways to secure our country will
make our efforts more effective. Improving the security of our
transportation sector--air, land, and sea--our supply chains, and our
cyber networks will help ensure they continue to be engines for our
Nation's economic prosperity.
Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Hutchison, and members of the
Committee: Thank you for this opportunity to testify today. I am happy
to take your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Let me start out with a relatively small thing, but which
is--seems to be very fixable, and we can be a part of that. The
drug trade is transporting enormous amounts of cash via vessels
on the high seas since our money laundering laws were
tightened, post-9/11. I understand, from the Department of
Justice--and they had a big conference on this fairly recently,
and there was a general agreement that we need to tighten up
laws so that we can prosecute. We cannot prosecute, at this
point. And so, what I'm asking is that--if you agree that
existing laws are insufficient in order to prosecute these
criminals, and have you evaluated the threat with the
Department of Justice? And do you need additional authority,
and can we help with additional authority, so that these
criminals can be prosecuted?
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, I think that, in that
connection, I would defer to the Department of Justice, who
would have the actual prosecutorial responsibility.
But, I would inform the Committee that we have seen an
uptick in cash going, by sea, that is being used in the drug
trade, proceeds of the drug trade; also, drugs coming in by
sea. That may be an indicator that many of the measures we're
taking at the land border, particularly the Southwest border,
are having an impact, because we are now inspecting so much
more of the southbound lanes than--way more than ever
previously. And we have dog teams, in fact, down at the
Southwest border, that are trained to sniff out bulk cash that
would be going south into Mexico as the proceeds of the drug
trade. So, if there's any good news there, it may be that we're
forcing these drug cartels into the ocean.
The Chairman. All right. Well, then----
Secretary Napolitano. The answer is yes.
The Chairman. --yes. That's what I wanted. Just one more,
and then we'll proceed. Protecting the Nation from security
risks posed by nearly 13 million small vessels. I just--I had
no idea that there were 13 million small vessels that exist--
is, you know, an absolutely monumental task. There are parallel
security threats in the general aviation sector, which I have
mentioned, which has been long unaddressed as a matter of
vulnerability in our aviation industry. So, I want you to
respond to that. I understand that you and Admiral Allen are
preparing a revised small-vessel security strategy. When will
that be finished? That's one question. It's my understanding
that DHS has a number of related, but not coordinated, programs
to address small-vessel security. How will you integrate these
multiple programs into one comprehensive, layered security
approach?
Secretary Napolitano. The answer to your question is, the
small-vessel strategy--the revised strategy--will be available
by the beginning of 2010, so we're well along. We've
incorporated comments from the small-vessel community.
We are integrating it into our strategy, in particular, for
how we secure the ports. And, Senator Hutchison, you mentioned
the ports in Texas and other ports. And again, we get to that
theory of the layered-risk approach, measuring risk layering of
various things. But, for example, having different checks and--
as vessels enter the ports, particularly some of our larger
points--ports, are some of the mechanisms that we're now using.
The Chairman. All right. And you have the American
Waterways Watch. You have the Citizens Action Network, Pleasure
Boat Reporting System. Is--and it's all voluntary, of course--
is that in any way helpful?
Secretary Napolitano. Those are helpful, yes.
The Chairman. But insufficient.
Secretary Napolitano. I think we need an overall strategy,
and we need to continue to work on the small-boat issue. I
would not sit here today and tell you we have solved that
problem.
The Chairman. I thank you.
And--Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let's start on the collective bargaining issue. What is
your view about the effort to have collective bargaining among
the Transportation Security Administration screeners and
personnel?
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator.
I think that we can accomplish collective bargaining, and
also do that in such a fashion that we never, at one moment,
sacrifice any whit of security, that that can be built into any
collective bargaining agreement.
By the way, I'd like to thank the Committee for supporting
the nomination of Erroll Southers to be the head of TSA.
Obviously, he would have a point position on that particular
issue.
Senator Hutchison. And what would be the safeguards?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, you can----
Senator Hutchison. I mean, I mentioned earlier and
addressed that the slowdowns, the sickouts, that sort of thing
could have terrible consequences on our security. So, what
would you do to protect the traveling public from this kind of
diminishment of capability if there were collective bargaining?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, now--I speak now as a former
Governor and a former State attorney general--there are
examples, around the country, of collective bargaining
agreements with law enforcement agencies that have similar
responsibilities, where you have carve-outs, in effect, in the
collective bargaining context, to make sure that those types of
things are not part of the collective bargaining agreement. We
would anticipate, in this context, with the TSOs, that we would
be able to reach such an understanding. I will say, by the way,
that I worked as a TSO screener last Wednesday, the busiest
travel day of the year, and got a little bit of insight into
what their life is like on the line. And I also saw a lot of
different kinds of shoes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hutchison. Well, let me say, Madam Secretary--I
appreciate that--and I think they're doing a great job,
because, of course, we all travel so much, and I--I think they
are doing a great job.
But, what about the need for flexibility? When there is a
threat, a crisis, where you have to do something very quickly,
is that on your agenda for protection, as well, if you're going
to go into collective bargaining, where someone can be called,
they can work more than the established number of hours? Do you
have that kind of flexibility? And are you going to use it?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, the answer is yes, but I would
give you an example. Even without a collective bargaining
agreement right now, our TSA employees have been very eager to,
whenever we've had an emergency and we need to, for example,
bring more people down to help staff an airport in a hurricane,
when the people who work there have to stay home and work with
their families because their house has been destroyed or
whatever, and we have never had a problem, in my experience,
with employees being willing to move to a place where a crisis
is occurring.
Senator Hutchison. Well, this is something that we will
want to watch very carefully, because I think it has some
pretty strong consequences if it's done, and if it's not done
right.
Let me ask one more question, and then I will be finished,
for this round.
Guantanamo Bay detainees being tried in New York, we all
know that the decision has been made to do that. I have two
questions.
Number one, were you consulted about the security issues
that would surround such a trial, before the Attorney General
made that decision?
And second, are you going to take extra measures, during
that trial, to protect the traveling public while that is going
on in New York?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, the Department of Homeland
Security is part of the review team that President Obama
established in connection with closing the prison part of
Gitmo--not all of Gitmo, but where the detainees are. And the
answer is, that we have been working on a host of security
issues, and I would anticipate we will be working, not just
with DOJ, but also with the City of New York as they prepare
for the trials.
Senator Hutchison. So, were you consulted in the beginning,
before the decision was made to bring them to New York for
trial?
Secretary Napolitano. I was not--not in the sense of being
consulted as to whether security concerns would preclude the
ability to try them in New York, but I'm very comfortable with
the decision to try them in New York.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano, we are very comforted by the fact
that you're in charge there. You come with a great record of
public service, and you've shown a firm hand since you're here.
So, with that, I ask--2 years ago, Congress acted to
require 100-percent scanning of all shipping containers. Now,
one of the things that we know is that the--our only threat is
nuclear, obviously. The worst attack we've had on American
shores was not nuclear, but it was devastating. So, we've got
lots of places to look. Threats don't only exist in containers,
as you have noted. Can--do we see any concrete improvements in
cargo scanning that had been made since January of this year?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, I would point to at
least two. One is, is that at the end of January of this year,
the so-called ``10-Plus-2'' interim rule went into effect. And
I look forward to this January, where we will see even more
compliance with that rule. This is a rule that really provides
shippers to provide more advance information about what is in a
container, who's had access to it, who's packed it, and the
like, that we can then use and evaluate against a number of
risk measures that CBP now has. And in addition, we have seen
our ability now, with--particularly with ARRA money and some
other of the monies that the Congress has supplied, an ability
to buildup even more on some of our port security. And that has
occurred since the beginning of the year.
Senator Lautenberg. Let me ask you this. Since the task of
securing 100-percent scanning is so monumental, is there a
linear approach that says, ``Let's look to those ports that
come under most concern,'' they're--I'm sure they're--that we
have identified those, would we not? And--but, also, one of the
things that I'm--I look at--I'm Chairman of the
Transportation--Surface Transportation Subcommittee, and when
we look at where we have to be concerned, we've got to look at
mass transit, passenger rail, frequent targets of terrorist
attacks. Last week, a terrorist bombing of a Russian train
resulted in the loss of 26 lives. But, those threats have not
influenced our transportation security efforts to the level
that, frankly, I think ought to be required, in terms of
balance. What steps are being taken now by the Administration
to protect those millions of Americans who daily travel by mass
transit or passenger rail service?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, I'd like the
opportunity to provide you with a more detailed answer in
writing, because a number of steps have been and are being
taken from the deployment of grant monies to localities that
operate mass transit--buses, you know, those sorts of things,
streetcars and light rail and the like. I think, in terms of
grants, in 2010 Congress appropriated $300 million for that
purpose, and then the Recovery Act added another $150 million
in FY-2010 and those grant monies are being deployed.
I think we are also deploying a number of portable
monitors, more transit officers, in particularly in large
transit hubs; in addition, we have deployed behavioral
detection officers under the so-called SPOT program--to give
you just an indication of a few of the things that are
happening in the land transportation environment where
passengers are involved.
[The information referred to follows:]
TSA has established a five-pronged strategic approach to surface
transportation:
Protect High Risk Assets and Systems;
Elevate the Security Baseline;
Build Security Force Multipliers;
Assure Information Flow; and
Expand Partnerships for Security Enhancement.
TSA is completing a comprehensive risk assessment for the rail
sector, as required by Section 1511 of the 9/11 Commission Act, is
being incorporated into TSA's Transportation System Security Risk
Assessment (TSSRA), which considers a wide range of terrorist attack
scenarios in each transportation mode and evaluates likelihood,
vulnerability, and potential consequences. When complete, the TSSRA
will provide the context for TSA to compare railroad risks with risks
in other modes of transportation. The national strategies, also
required by the 9/11 Commission Act, will be incorporated into the
corresponding annexes of the upcoming update of the Transportation
System Sector Security Plan (TSSSP). The TSSSP, a comprehensive
unifying plan, will supersede separate interim strategies and plans for
each mode of transportation. These two efforts are consistent with both
the 9/11 Act requirement at section 1511 and a recommendation of the
Government Accountability Office in its June 2009 report on mass
transit and passenger rail security.
TSA comprehensively assesses security in passenger rail through the
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program, under
which Surface Transportation Security Inspectors thoroughly reviews
security posture against 17 Security and Emergency Management Action
Items that are foundational to an effective security program. More than
120 BASE assessments have been conducted to date. Their results inform
development of risk mitigation priorities, security enhancement
programs, and resource allocations, notably transit security grants,
and enable production and dissemination of a compilation of Smart
Security Practices throughout the passenger rail community.
Senator Lautenberg. We're out of time, but obviously
there's a lot to talk about, and I will take the liberty of
inviting you in so that we can have a discussion of some of the
issues. And I appreciate your----
Secretary Napolitano. Right.
Senator Lautenberg.--good service. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. I look forward to that. Thank
you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Isakson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, first, two compliments. I want to thank
you for the tremendous effort you and the Department and FEMA
made in Georgia during the recent floods. I appreciate your
flying down to Georgia and seeing firsthand--I have to tell
you, the response of TSA has been--I mean, of FEMA's been
fantastic, and we're very grateful. Second, we had an issue
with approvals from your Department with regard to African
landings by Delta Air Lines in a number of new locations which
ran into a lot of difficulty, but, since that time, I want to
thank you for the effort you've paid on that. I understand that
things with regard to Angola and Liberia are moving along
nicely.
And there's another request that's coming--that's all the
compliments; the next----
Secretary Napolitano. OK.
Senator Isakson.--things are the questions.
Secretary Napolitano. OK, now I'm ready.
[Laughter.]
Senator Isakson. Delta has announced it wants to fly into
Malabo at Equatorial Guinea on the west coast of Africa, which
is a gateway location. Equatorial Guinea has already issued an
advance approval and is doing everything that's been asked of
them, but they need assistance, not in terms of money, but in
terms of the Safe Skies for Africa Program from FAA and TSA.
And in a recent meeting in Atlanta, a TSA official announced
that three African countries would get that assistance. I just
want to urge you to make sure Equatorial Guinea is one of the
three that gets the Safe Skies Africa assistance so that that
can, in fact, take place as soon as possible.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. And second, we talked a little bit, on the
plane going to Georgia, about AirTran and a preclearance
request they'd made in Aruba. As you know, in a number of
places it's important for preclearance by Customs and Border
Patrol so that people transferring back into the United States
are cleared when they leave so they can land at a regular
terminal gate and leave without going through Customs and
Border Patrol or at the point they leave. That request was
rejected, which I have been told--and I don't know this to be a
fact, so it's not an accusation, it's a rumor--but, that's the
first time preclearance has been rejected by TSA.
I would like to ask you--Aruba is a tremendous source of
travel back and forth, primarily vacation travel. Atlanta's
Hartsfield is a huge point they leave from. There are already
20 to 24 flights on each Saturday, which is the big travel day
for tourism, and it would require a little extra personnel, on
behalf of the Department, to make the preclearance possible.
But, you already have 20 to 24 flights leaving during a 5-hour
window on Saturday anyway, so I'd really like for that
application to be looked at again, and see if there's anything
we can do to facilitate that.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, we'll be happy to review
that application again.
Senator Isakson. And last, a question. With the US-VISIT
program, we require biometrics, primarily in the form of
fingerprints, which are validated when someone comes into the
United States by air. It's my understanding that it's the third
phase of the program that's getting ready to be announced,
which will also require, at airports--when leaving the
country--a revalidation of the fingerprint to ensure the person
leaving is the person, in fact, that is supposed to be leaving,
but that that's not going to be required at our seaports or at
our border crossings with Canada and Mexico, on the ground. And
80 percent of the people that come to the United States come
either by sea or by the Canadian border or the Mexican border,
as I am told. Why would we not check at those borders, as well,
when they leave, to validate that the person leaving is, in
fact, the person we think they are?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, I'll get back to you, but
let me just--my guess is--my educated guess is that, with
respect to the Mexico and Canadian travelers, that the volume,
in terms of number of passengers and number of lanes, is such
that the logistics of employing that for the exiting visitors
at those land ports would be prohibitive. And that's really the
bulk of what we're talking about. So.
Senator Isakson. Well, I appreciate the answer, and I
appreciate your following up on both Equatorial Guinea as well
as the Aruba AirTran flight.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr.----
Secretary Napolitano. You bet.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Senator Pryor.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today. It's
always good to see you and be with you.
Let me ask a few questions, one about trucking;
specifically, trucking with Mexico. There has been some news
reports recently that have been critical of the Border Patrol's
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program. And the
gist of these news reports is that some Mexican gun and drug
smugglers are actually using this program because it allows the
trucks to get through the border quicker and, I guess, with
less security. Are you aware of that? Have you--are you aware
of those news reports?
Secretary Napolitano. I'm not aware of those news reports.
I am familiar with the C-TPATs program, however.
Senator Pryor. Well, there has been some that basically are
saying now that the cartels down in Mexico have figured out
that that's a way to get things in and out of Mexico, so I just
wanted you to be aware of that and maybe talk to your folks
about, you know, how valid that is and if there's anything that
Homeland Security needs to do to make sure that we minimize
that type of activity.
Secretary Napolitano. Oh, absolutely, because those are the
kinds of programs--again, we're always looking, you know, to
improve security, but we also have the responsibility to help
trade and commerce----
Senator Pryor. Right.
Secretary Napolitano.--move. And that is a particularly
difficult balance to strike at our land ports. So, we will take
a look at those news reports, Senator.
Senator Pryor. Well, I agree--appreciate that. And I know
that we have had some, you know, terrible news out of Russia in
the last few days. And Senator Lautenberg asked about that. And
it may be a little too early to have lessons learned, based on
rail security and bombs on trains or on train tracks, but I
would be interested to know, as you follow up with Senator
Lautenberg, about, you know, what we can do better, and your
assessment of how secure our rail system is in this country.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
Senator Pryor. And another thing is, there has been some,
let's see, DHS IG report that has looked at FEMA's use of four
primary sourcing mechanisms: one is warehouse goods; two is
mission assignments; three, interagency agreements, and four,
contracts. And basically the DHS IG has said that FEMA does not
have a clear overarching strategy that can guide decisionmaking
on which of these sourcing mechanisms should be used to meet a
particular need. Are you familiar with that DHS IG assessment?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, I'm familiar, generally. I
have not read the IG report, but I can say with confidence that
the current administrator of FEMA is addressing any and all
concerns that have been raised by the IG, and he's doing it
very rapidly.
Senator Pryor. Yes, one of the concerns, I think, that's
raised is that, in a disaster, we need to make sure that we can
deliver the critical commodities needed in that locality. And I
think it raises a question about that.
And the other thing I had for you, generally, on that--in
that same vein, is--I know one of the things that we've talked
about in this committee previously, and in Homeland Security,
as well, is trying to make sure that DHS and FEMA are working
with local and State leaders, and doing a better job of
coordinating with various industry groups, even like the
trucking industry or the retailers, or whoever it may be, to
try to make sure that we can all interconnect, when we need to,
to get what we need done done at a critical moment. Are you
comfortable, are you satisfied that we have been making
progress there, and there's sufficient cooperation and
communication?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, I think, and believe very
strongly, that we have improved cooperation there quite
substantially, both from FEMA itself and through the Office of
Intergovernmental Programs. And it's everything from regular e-
mails, conference calls, and all the rest. And that kind of
cooperation, that linkage up with State and locals, is
absolutely key, not just on the crisis management kinds of
issues that FEMA is concerned with, but also with the national
and homeland security issues that we also need to be working
closely with State and locals on. So----
Senator Pryor. Right.
Secretary Napolitano.--the answer is yes. And that
continues to be a priority of ours.
Senator Pryor. And, of course, that ties in with the H1N1
and other, you know, pandemic threats out there, to make sure
we have that coordination, that preparation on the front end.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Senator DeMint.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary, for your briefing and your
service to our country.
I want to focus just a few minutes on TSA workers, and just
a few questions related to them that--I guess the group we're
most exposed to, as Congressmen and Senators who fly all over
the country; we're with them every week. But, do you believe
the current labor policies of your agency adequately protects
the rights and interests of TSA workers?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, we work hard with our
employee workforce to address their issues and their interests.
And so, we work hard with them on a whole host of things.
Senator DeMint. Well, do you think an outside agency or
group is needed at this point to help establish work
requirements or staffing--standardize the staffing functions or
actually help to prescribe how the workforce is managed?
Secretary Napolitano. By ``outside groups,'' Senator, do
you mean a union?
Senator DeMint. Yes.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, as I mentioned to Senator
Hutchison--and again, I go back to my experience as a Governor,
as a State attorney general, my familiarity with----
Senator DeMint. Right.
Secretary Napolitano.--these issues. The answer is that
oftentimes in the process of interaction with the union, there
are issues raised that management didn't have prior knowledge
of, but, in any event, all the security-type issues can and are
addressed. And security, for an agency like TSA, would always
come first.
Senator DeMint. Well, that's good to hear. And I've
certainly seen, the collective bargaining work at the local
level, when there's a close working relationship, but we're
talking around 50,000 people, here, all over the country. What
I've seen since we've implemented the Department of Homeland
Security--as you know, in the beginning it was very
controversial about unionization, collective bargaining. In
fact, we had to suspend all that because there was a belief
that, with all the collective bargaining agreements, we could
not pull all the agencies together and do all the changes that
were necessary.
One of the good aspects of TSA has been their flexibility,
their ability to change constantly and use a continuous quality
improvement model, step by step, making changes. When you see
the variety of airports and the different carriers and the
different routes all over the country, the need for flexibility
at almost every airport is key. That is completely inconsistent
with the collective bargaining idea, where you're going to
standardize various aspects of work requirements and the
functions. I mean, how can unionization and collective
bargaining enhance security at our airports?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, the answer is,
collective bargaining and security are not mutually exclusive
concepts, and they're done--these types of agreements are
negotiated all the time, all over the United States. And, as I
said before, security always is our number-one interest at----
Senator DeMint. Well--but, the----
Secretary Napolitano.--the Department.
Senator DeMint.--concern is--it's easier for us, as a
Congress, to start a new agency than to try to get another one
to change--a lot of times, because of collective bargaining
agreements. So, it's--there's really no example of--up here,
that--of the flexibility that would be needed. The types of
changes and flexibility that I see continuously going on with
TSA is certainly going to change, to a degree, if there is a
third party involved in the decisionmaking, which there will
be. There's no reason for collective bargaining if there's not
some standardization or requirement to appeal to that third
party when changes are made.
But, my question to you is not whether or not you've seen
it work at a State or local level, but the whole point of
Homeland Security, and particularly TSA, is the security of the
passengers. And if, in the beginning, in our debate--and every
previous administrator of TSA has said that collective
bargaining is not consistent with the flexibility and the need
to change--you are telling us that you're going to collectively
bargain, even though there's apparently no reason to protect
workers, that there's not any reason to standardize various
work requirements. Why do we need to bring collective
bargaining into this process, when we see TSA making the
improvements that it needs to, to make our passengers more
secure?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Senator for noting
the improvements of TSA and the employee workforce we have
there. But, again, I'd go back to the basic point, that I do
not think security and collective bargaining are mutually
exclusive, nor do I think that collective bargaining cannot be
accomplished by an agency such as TSA, should the workers
desire to be organized in such a fashion.
Senator DeMint. OK. Thank you for answering my question.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Senator DeMint. Yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And now Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing.
And it's great to see my former colleague, former
gubernatorial colleague, Secretary Napolitano, and
congratulations. And I'd echo some of my colleagues' earlier
comments about the good job you're doing.
I want to continue on another line of questioning with TSA.
Circumstances happened in my State and, I believe, a number of
other States, where airports, if they are going through
renovations--in my particular State, the Richmond Airport went
ahead, at the encouragement of TSA, when they were doing a
renovation, and did a next-generation series of improvement of
inline explosive detection equipment. And TSA said, ``Go for
it. Do it.'' They went for it, did it, 3 or 4 years ago. TSA
promised them a reimbursement of close to $4 billion--$4
million. They're still hanging out, waiting for this
reimbursement. And this is not the only airport that's fallen
into this circumstance. And I raised this with Mr. Southers,
when he came by before his--when he was going through--and is
still going through--the confirmation process. But, I just want
to raise it again at the secretarial level, that there are--and
that Richmond Airport is not alone in this circumstance, where
airports, at the instigation of TSA, are going through, putting
in next-generation detection equipment, and then if TSA doesn't
honor their commitment to do the reimbursement, airports, on a
going forward basis, are not going to take this kind of step
that I think is necessary. Richmond went beyond what was
required, kind of went to next-generation; they did it in a
much more extensive way. And I just would ask your office to
look into this circumstance. And the more we can get these
dollars out so that airports get these commitments honored,
would be very, very helpful. I don't know if you're familiar
with this or have heard from other airports who have raised
this concern, but----
Secretary Napolitano. No, Senator. No other airports have
raised that concern, but I certainly will----
Senator Warner. If you could----
Secretary Napolitano.--look into it.
Senator Warner.--look into it. It's--the Richmond
circumstance has been now hanging out for a number of years. We
found a series of other airports that--this was not a one-off
circumstance, but it would be something I'd love to get some
feedback on.
Secondarily, I'm--again, on a parochial basis, and--but an
airport that many of my colleagues fly in and out of, Dulles,
where we went through an entire new passenger screening system,
and put in that, but TSA staffing shortages still make it--we
put in the new system; staffing shortages are there, so that
folks are not being served in a timely manner. I don't know if
that's kind of raised to your radar screen, as well, but I'd
ask you to look into that circumstance, as well. When an
airport goes ahead and upgrades their system, they've got to
make sure they've got personnel to go along with that.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed. I'll be happy to look into
that.
Senator Warner. All right.
One that--a final point I wanted to raise, and this is one
that I know you would be--will be sensitive to, as a former
Governor--perhaps not completely applicable, in terms of
Arizona--but, one of the things, in terms of vessel escorts,
you know, the Coast Guard has been successfully partnering for
a number of years with State and local law enforcement to do
vessel escorts as we've come into ports. I know, in our major
port, in Port of Hampton Roads, the port down in Norfolk,
literally 60 percent of the vessel escorts have not been
provided by the Coast Guard, but have been provided by State
and local law enforcement as transports come in. State and
local governments are under enormous financial stress. And I'm
just hoping that if this kind of ratio is maintained, not only
at Norfolk, but at other ports around the country, that next
year's financial budgets at most State levels are going to be
even worse than the last couple of years, as you, I know, are
well aware. My hope would be that there could be some level of
financial support still given to the State and local areas that
are clearly doing part of what would normally fall within the
Coast Guard's responsibility, to make sure that this very
successful Federal/local--Federal/State/local partnership, in
terms of vessel escorting, is maintained.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, yes, I'll be happy to flag
that, as well. That activity may already be covered under some
of our existing grant programs, but I'll flag it as a concern.
Senator Warner. We've heard concerns from, again, our local
folks, that they may be concerned--that they're not sure, if
they get cutbacks in their local and State budgets, that
they're going to be able to maintain this kind of partnership.
And that would be to the detriment of all of us. So, I
appreciate your attention.
And again, thanks, to the Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warner.
And Senator Brownback.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, welcome. Good to see you here. Look forward to
continue working with you on the NBAF facility. Got through
this year, and we'll be focusing on next year and continuing
that program to build it and to get it up and running. It seems
like, to me, the type of hearing that we're doing now lends
itself to that much more credence for a program like that,
where you're trying to protect domestic industry and do the
research that's necessary to be able to protect against
bioterrorism, agroterrorism, and some other facilities and
things.
I want to direct your attention to general aviation, if I
could. It's one of the main legs of the Kansas economy. It's
really been decimated lately, with this economy. Hopefully,
it's starting to come back a little bit.
The industry is very concerned about how it is, then, you
regulate general aviation, and whether or not you're going to
do it in such a fashion that it can no longer really provide
the service that it needs to. GA flies all over--90 percent of
the airports don't receive commercial flights; they only are
reached by general aviation. And so, there's a real convenience
factor, and there's a need; and yet, if it's over-regulated at
a point that they can't provide that service in a small airport
somewhere simply because of cost--it's cost prohibitive--it
shuts it down and it makes it less viable.
I know you're aware of this. In October 2008, there was a
proposed rulemaking by TSA on the creation of a large aircraft
security program intended to strengthen GA security. There was
a strenuous reaction from general aviation on that. I think----
Secretary Napolitano. That would be an accurate
characterization.
Senator Brownback. Good, I'm glad you got the message,
because they were deeply concerned about it, at a time when,
already, their sales and problems were mounting, and they
constantly say to me, ``Just don't kill us. OK? I mean, yes, we
need to address security--and we will work with you on common-
sense things we can do.''
They've put forth, already, seven areas of suggested
improvements for that rulemaking: identification of appropriate
weight threshold is one that's key to them; possibility of a
``trusted pilot'' card, if you can look at that and review in
it; review of passenger watch lists matching procedures; and
prohibited items--that's another one. They've got several
others, but--the thing they need is to have balance.
Security is the key thing, and we've got to provide the
security, but if you do it in such a fashion that they just
can't cost comply with it, you're just going to shut down a
bunch of airport services, because they just don't have the
ability to match the cost of the security with providing the
service. There's only so much freight that it can carry. And I
really hope you can work with the general aviation industry on
this, because it's just--they view it as life and death to them
on the industry in the United States, whether or not they're
going to be able to continue to serve 90 percent of the markets
that don't have commercial aviation.
I don't know if you have any thought or response to that. I
would appreciate your thoughts on it.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, yes--and this was an area,
actually, the Chairman pointed out in his opening comments--it
has been, in a way--when we look at vulnerability, risk threat,
general aviation is a concern that an aircraft could be
weaponized or used to bring something into the country. In
terms of that, the comments that we have received from GA have
been very useful. We have been working very closely with that
community. We've also been doing some reexamination of the
modeling that was used, for example, on the weight threshold.
The concern there, quite frankly, is, What is the weight by
which, if an aircraft were to be flown again into a building,
weaponized, how much fuel would be necessary to cause a
building to implode, as we saw, tragically, on 9/11? So,
they've been looking at remodeling on that, and taking into
account some of the concerns or information brought forth by
the GA community.
Also, how do you regulate who gets to fly these aircraft
around the country? Because of the possibility of bringing in
material that would be of danger. So, I think that working with
the GA community, taking into account their legitimate concerns
about the industry and the airports and the transportation
needs of the country, but also taking into account the very
significant security issues, we're hoping to get to the right
place.
Senator Brownback. We need you to work with us, if you can,
because it's an industry that's very dependent upon sensible
regulations that can work, but still let the industry be able
to fly.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
Senator Brownback. Thanks.
Thanks, Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Brownback.
Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Secretary Napolitano. In fact, one of my staff
people witnessed your work at TSA firsthand, as a screener.
They said you did an excellent job.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you very much.
[Laughter.]
Senator Snowe. I would like to address the issue of air
cargo screening. I know that the deadline for reaching 100
percent of screening of air cargo is scheduled for August of
2010. And I'd like to have your reaction to the report issued
last week by the Department's Inspector General concerning air
cargo screening, because raises some significant issues,
particularly with respect to securing air cargo.
At this point, your Department has said that more than 50
percent of air cargo has been screened. Is that correct? Is
that the figure being screened?
Secretary Napolitano. That is correct.
Senator Snowe. Because it wasn't clear in the Inspector
General's report as to whether or not that had reached the 50-
percent level. They also talked about the fact that there are
insufficient, or lack of, background checks or training with
respect to the personnel handling or accessing that cargo. The
report also indicated--but didn't give the number of--drivers
were handling or transporting air cargo without the required
background checks; the IG also reviewed the drivers' records
and identified that 23 percent did not satisfy the required
training and testing requirements.
So, have you had a chance to review this report?
Secretary Napolitano. I have not personally read the entire
report. I've read the summary of the report. I've met with TSA
about the report, as well as other members of my staff. Many of
the recommendations, or many of the concerns, raised in it are
things that we are working on right now. And I'll be happy to
provide you with kind of a progress report as to where we
stand, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Department of Homeland Security--Office of Inspector General
Security of Air Cargo During Ground Transportation (Redacted)--November
2009
Appendix B--Management Comments to the Draft Report
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Transportation Security Administration,
Arlington, VA, October 5, 2009
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Skinner
Inspector General
Department of Homeland Security
FROM: Gale D. Rossides Acting Administrator
SUBJECT: Draft Report: ``Security of Air Cargo during Ground
Transportation,'' July 2009
Purpose
This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) formal agency response to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) draft report;
``Security of Air Cargo during Ground Transportation'' dated July 2009.
Background
The Office of the Inspector General conducted this investigation to
evaluate the effectiveness of TSA's efforts to secure cargo while it is
handled or transported on the ground, prior to being shipped on
passenger aircraft. OIG found that TSA's inspection process has focused
on quantity rather than outcomes and ensuring corrective actions.
Automated tools to assist inspectors in analyzing results and focusing
their oversight efforts on high-risk areas in air cargo security were
not adequate. OIG makes six recommendations to strengthen the security
of air cargo ground transportation.
Discussion
The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 requires TSA to establish a system for industry to screen 100
percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft in the United States
to provide a level of security that is commensurate with the level of
security for the screening of passenger baggage. The legislation also
set an interim milestone of 50 percent screening to be reached by
February 2009. By August 2010, cargo not screened in accordance with
TSA-approved processes and procedures cannot be uplifted to a passenger
aircraft in the United States.
This is an extensive requirement and, TSA understands there is
simply not sufficient capacity or space in airports to meet its demands
without carrier delays, cargo logjams, and increased transit times.
Therefore, TSA has established a multi-dimensional strategy to
reconcile the requirements of the mandate, the security needs of
passengers, and the needs of a U.S. economy reliant upon the air cargo
industry.
In addition to TSA's existing security regime, we have established
three programs to assist in meeting the 100 percent screening mandate
and have made excellent progress:
100 Percent Narrow-Body Screening--100 percent of cargo
uplifted on narrow-body passenger aircraft has been screened
since October 2008. This program accounts for 96 percent of
passenger flights originating in the U.S. and its territories,
and covers approximately 25 percent of the cargo uplifted in
the US.
The Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)--A voluntary
program designed to enable certain vetted, validated, and
certified facilities to screen cargo prior to delivering the
cargo to the air carrier. To date, the majority of air cargo
screening is done by air carriers through CCSP.
TSA has certified 477 cargo screening facilities
through the program.
An interim final rule to accelerate the deployment of
the program was published in the Federal Register on
September 16, 2009, and will take effect on November 16,
2009. During initial deployment of CCSP, the onsite
facility assessment has been performed by a TSA Field Team
staff. TSA expects that during full rollout, assessments
will be performed by a TSA-approved validation firm.
Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) Screening Technology Pilot--an
initiative established to test screening technology in a live
environment.
Participants in this program are working directly with
TSA to provide information and data on cargo, commodity-
types, and a certain cargo screening technology.
Information collected from this pilot will impact future
TSA decisions on acceptable screening technologies.
There are 91 participating locations receiving
approximately $40.6 million in technology assistance.
TSA Explosives Detection Canine Programs--TSA certified
explosives detection canine teams are available to screen cargo
throughout the network.
465 law enforcement partner canine teams devote a part
of their time to screening cargo; 6 additional teams will
graduate in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009.
84 TSA proprietary canine teams are fully dedicated to
screening cargo. 36 more teams are authorized and planned
for deployment in FY 2010, 19 of which have been hired and
are currently in training.
TSA agrees that access control is a vital part of air cargo
security. In addition to our operational oversight, we will continue to
work to address access control vulnerabilities through clear policy
requirements for securing air cargo while it is being stored, sorted,
screened, and transported. We are in agreement that the concerns that
have been identified with the agency's security threat assessment
process should be addressed, and we are providing more guidance and
tools to standardize training. TSA's Office of Security Operations
(OSO) FY 2010 Regulatory Activities Plan (RAP) incorporates a risk-
based approach to inspections. In FY 2009, OSO Air Cargo Compliance has
continued to perform Quality Control (QC) and review audits of
Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) entries submitted by
field elements. Last, TSA will provide cargo inspectors with automated
tools that will allow them to dedicate more time with regulated
entities.
Overall, we believe that the recommendations contained in the
report will provide additional benefit to TSA. TSA has already begun to
formulate plans to implement the recommendations contained in the
report. Our specific response to each recommendation follows.
Recommendation #1: Mitigate access control vulnerabilities by:
a. Requiring more tests for access vulnerabilities and provide
corrective actions to the regulated entities;
b. Placing more focus on entities that are not following the
access control requirements; and
c. Requiring inspectors to spend more time promoting awareness
of access control vulnerabilities and their impact on cargo
security.
TSA Concurs: TSA agrees that access control is a vital part of our
layered approach to air cargo security.
a. TSA's Office of Security Operations (OSO) intends to
incorporate additional access control testing protocols in the
FY 2010 Regulatory Activities Plan (RAP). The RAP is the basis
for a Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) annual work
plan. These additional tests will augment the current system in
place. OSO will continue to inspect drivers on their training
and knowledge of their security functions.
Inspectors verify compliance with TSA's access control
requirements during all comprehensive inspections. In addition,
TSA performed a special emphasis inspection (SEI) during FY
2009 Q2 specifically concentrated on access control. The
objective of this SEI was to determine, through realistic
testing, if foreign air carriers, aircraft operators, and
indirect air carriers (IACs) properly control access to cargo
as required under transportation security regulations in 49
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and appropriate cargo
security programs. Aircraft operators, foreign air carriers and
IACs must prevent unauthorized access to cargo in accordance
with 49 CFR Sections 1544.205*), 1544.228, 1546.205*),
1546.213, 1548.5, and 1548.15. Additionally, specific
requirements regarding access control for employees or
authorized representatives are outlined in the applicable cargo
security programs. The SEI protocol stipulated that all
instances of non-compliance receive a formal investigation.
Cases could be resolved with either administrative or civil
penalty action. Counseling alone could not be used as a means
to close any violations discovered. Finally, SEI results are
being used to identify trends in vulnerabilities, assist in
identifying corrective measures (e.g., policy or operational),
and formulate additional access control testing protocols.
b. TSA is working with our partners to identify new access
control mechanisms. Through partnership with outside vendors we
are exploring new conveyance security technology. For instance,
TSA has authorized a pilot at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County
Airport called M-lock. The M-lock is an electronically
serialized locking mechanism which TSA is testing as a tamper
evident seal. This device is equipped with programmable
specific serial numbers which are displayed on an LED screen
with GPS tracking capability, thereby providing enhanced
conveyance-level security to Certified Cargo Screening Facility
(CCSF)-screened cargo.Currently, TSA is conducting Cargo
Vulnerability Assessments at all Cat X and Cat I airports. TSA
is committed to mitigating these vulnerabilities. Vulnerability
assessment results are being used to improve policy and
operational procedures. In addition to our operational
oversight, TSA has worked to address access control
vulnerabilities through clear policy requirements for securing
air cargo while it is being stored, sorted, screened, and
transported. Entities participating in the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP), for instance, have strict facility
and conveyance access control procedures that include physical
security measures (e.g., fences, cameras), employee
identification media, chain of custody technology applied to
the screened cargo, and secured conveyances (e.g., locked,
sealed, or vehicles under escort).
c. As of the date of this report, TSIs have conducted over
2,060 outreach efforts directly related to air cargo security.
TSIs currently spend a significant portion of time providing
outreach to Indirect Air Carriers and CCSFs both prior to their
becoming certified and after. Prior to an IAC becoming
approved, they must submit to a TSI Outreach visit. During this
visit the TSI reviews all requirements of the applicable Code
of Federal Regulations and the Standard Security Program
itself. This includes ground movement and access control to air
cargo. TSIs review the facility and trucks to determine if in
their current state, they would adequately be able to meet
requirements. If not, the TSI will work with the entity to
achieve the appropriate level of ground movement and access
control security prior to approval.
In regard to CCSFs, TSA also has a lengthy application process
that requires constant interaction and outreach provided by
Principal Cargo Security Analysts (PCSAs). These TSA personnel
work with an entity to help them achieve the required security
level through outreach and education. A CCSF must be
``certified'' by a PCSA prior to entrance into the program
Recommendation #2: Improve the security threat assessment process
by:
a. Requiring regulated entities to maintain copies of documents
reviewed for authenticating the identity of an applicant;
b. Revising the application form to include language noting
that failure to provide a social security number may delay or
prevent completion of the security threat assessment process
and;
c. Requiring TSA's Office of Transportation Threat Assessment
and Credentialing to vet applicants.
TSA Concurs: TSA agrees that the concerns that have been identified
with the agency's security threat assessment process should be
addressed and partially concurs with the recommendations on social
security number (SSN)
a. TSA concurs. TSA has just published an Interim Final Rule on
Air Cargo Screening, 74 FR 47672, 47701 (September 16, 2009)
(Air Cargo Screening IFR) that requires that each aircraft
operator maintain copies of the applicant's documents used to
verify identity and work authorization.
b. Currently, language in the Privacy Act Notice found in 49
CFR 1540.203(b)(2)(viii) regarding security threat
assessments provides that: ``Failure to furnish your SSN may
result in delays in processing your application, but will not
prevent completion of your Security Threat Assessment.''
However, TSA's recently published Air Cargo Screening IFR
contains the language that the IG recommends: ``Failure to
furnish this information, including your Social Security Number
(SSN) will result in delays in processing your application and
may prevent completion of your security threat assessment.'' 74
FR at 47683.
c. TSA recognizes the importance of utilizing the best method
possible to capture and evaluate the history of those who will
have ready access to our Nation's air cargo transportation
system. TSA will evaluate the process to require for air cargo
populations, the costs of necessary system/data base changes
that would capture biometrics, and the number of new-hire
adjudicators to execute the evaluation process. Additionally,
we will review the required increase of fees to cover the
vetting process.
Recommendation #3: Enhance training and testing requirements by
providing more specific guidance to regulated entities regarding the
training and testing requirements. Additionally, TSA should revise the
Regulatory Activities Plan to allow more time for inspectors to review
these requirements.
TSA Concurs: TSA specifies training and testing requirements in the
aircraft operator, IAC, and CCSP security programs. The security
programs clearly stipulate the minimum training content, frequency of
training, training log requirements, testing frequency, and passing
scores for tests. In addition, TSA provides the IACs with TSA-approved
training materials and tests for their Security Coordinators, direct
employees, and authorized representatives. We are currently developing
comparable materials for the aircraft operators and CCSFs. In addition,
TSA is beginning the process of developing standardized training and
testing, which it plans to require for all regulated parties.
TSIs verify compliance with TSA training and testing requirements
during inspections. Noncompliant entities are counseled on how to
obtain the proper security training and testing. In addition, TSIs
routinely conduct outreach to the regulated air cargo community.
TSA will be revising the FY 2010 RAP. TSA concurs that training and
testing of air cargo security requirements are important and will
continue to ensure proper regulatory oversight as such. TSA cargo
inspectors verify compliance with training and testing requirements as
part of all comprehensive air carrier, IAC, and CCSF inspections.
Recommendation #4: Revise the Regulatory Activities Plan to allow
more time for inspectors to:
a. Incorporate a risk-based approach that emphasizes the use of
historical data and analysis.
b. Provide support and education to the regulated entities to
ensure that cargo security requirements are understood and
implemented.
TSA Concurs: TSA's FY 2010 RAP addresses these concerns.
a. TSA's FY 2010 RAP incorporates a risk-based approach to
inform inspections. We have developed a risk score for every
entity regulated under a TSA air cargo security program. Our
approach provides a risk score per regulated entity per
location, which means that Regulatory personnel will be able to
access risk scores specific to their airport. Risk scores are
updated quarterly. Inspections will be driven based on the
entities score: red, yellow, or green indicators. Inspections
will also be driven by local and national intelligence as well
as responses to significant national events or identification
of systematic vulnerabilities; and
b. TSA will continue to work closely with aviation industry
stakeholders to provide support and education.
Recommendation #5: Provide better guidance, training and awareness
to all users of the Performance and Results Information System,
especially the Transportation Security Inspectors for Cargo.
Specifically, develop an action plan for the TSA officials responsible
for the Performance and Results Information System to educate the
inspectors and ensure optimal use of the available data and analysis.
The action plan should also describe:
a. The quality and quantity of information that should be
collected and reported to promote data consistency among field
locations;
b. Types of information and reports available for inspectors to
generate from the system as an effective management tool; and
c. The available analysis in Share Point to improve risk-based
planning reporting capabilities.
TSA Concurs:
a. In FY 2009, TSA's OSO Air Cargo Compliance has continued to
perform Quality Control (QC) review audits of PARIS entries
submitted by field elements. Each quarter, OSO Cargo Compliance
selects PARIS inspection reports for airports and Cargo TSIs in
each area to review for QC. The inspection QC reviews focus on
compliance with the National Inspection Manual (NIM) and RAP
requirements. The goal is to review at least one report from
each Cargo TSI at each airport by the end of the Fiscal Year.
Headquarters (HQ) shares this information with Assistant
Federal Security Director's for Inspections upon request and
allows them to take appropriate actions when necessary to
ensure the PARIS entries submitted by their staff are in
compliance with the NIM and RAP requirements.
b. In addition, TSA's OSO Compliance Programs provide PARIS
training and guidance materials. This training involves tips on
how to more efficiently use PARIS and on generating reports on
data contained in PARIS. Training is also provided on the
conversion of data extracted from PARIS into Excel Spreadsheet
``Pivot Tables.'' This training provides TSIs with the ability
to generate more useful reports on inspection, investigation
outreach and incident data, and analyze and organize the
reports in a fashion tailored to their needs. This is primarily
facilitated through three efforts. First, newly hired TSIs
receive PARIS training during the ``Transportation Security
Inspector Basic Training Program,'' a comprehensive 4-week
training regime at TSA's Security Enforcement Training Academy.
This training is conducted via presentation and hands on
exercises. This training is continued during the new TSIs
official on the job training (OJT). Second, experienced TSIs
receive a refresher during recurrent training. Recurrent
training is held at least once a quarter at various airports
throughout the country with the goal of all experienced
inspectors attending at least one session a year. Third, the
PARIS program office has developed a comprehensive series of
user guides and on-line demos.
Furthermore, in the interest of facilitating swift and
effective communications between the PARIS User Community and
the PARIS Support staff at HQ, TSA OSO, Inspection Enforcement
and Analysis Branch established a PARIS application Help Desk
Phone Line in the TSA Phone Network. Field personnel can call
HQ personnel and speak to a PARIS support staff member. This
additional communication channel is intended to offer an
additional convenient means for PARIS users to talk to one of
the experts who supports the PARIS program. It does not replace
the agency's information technology (IT) single point of
contact (i.e., SPOC) and the contractor-based support system
that TSA uses for its enterprise IT applications. Rather, it is
an opportunity for us to bring increased support to the PARIS
user community as it relates to the PARIS application itself.
The SPOC remains the first contact for any functional
anomalies. Field Inspectors can also reach the help desk
support through the PARIS Blog.
c. The Office of Compliance publishes periodic reports into
Sharepoint, an internal electronic tracking system. This system
is available to all inspectors who perform oversight as well as
staff who analyze inspection reports.
Recommendation #6: Provide Cargo Inspectors with automated tools
that will allow them to dedicate more time with the regulated entities.
Specifically, establish an action plan, with performance milestones, to
address the issues preventing the agency from using the personal
digital assistant devices to provide more efficient inspection
activities.
TSA Concurs in Part: TSA believes that the personal digital
assistant devices (PDAs) are antiquated technology and are not
efficient. We are moving forward with a plan to provide more modern and
advanced tools to our regulatory workforce to improve productivity.
These include, but are not limited to:
Blackberries, with camera feature, for all inspectors.
Document hand scanners. This device allows TSIs to make
copies of records. We have secured one per airport.
Test phones for special emphasis inspections and small
package testing. One test phone per airport with assignment of
a new number every 6 months.
Laptops for all cargo inspectors.
Dedicated cargo vehicles. We improved the ratio of one
vehicle for every two inspectors at the airport.
One GPS unit per cargo vehicle.
Air cards for communal use among Regulatory personnel.
These tools have already been procured and will be dispersed to the
TSIs by the conclusion of FY 2009.
In addition to securing new productivity tools, TSA's OSO has been
working to streamline the record keeping requirements associated with
documenting inspections. For instance we revised the PARIS prompts for
the passenger and all cargo air carrier and IAC inspection types.
Specifically we reduced the number of prompts by 40-50 percent while
still capturing all the requirements. This reduces the amount of entry
time per PARIS inspection record, and allows the Inspector more
discretion on the level of detail to input.
Senator Snowe. Do you think it's possible to reach the 100-
percent deadline for air cargo screening, by August of 2010?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, we're at about 98 percent--
we're going to be at about 98 percent, so I think that we'll be
very close to it, yes.
Senator Snowe. Even though the Inspector General indicated
that there there's a shortage of TSA personnel, in regard to
the screening program?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, again, subject to something
that I'm unaware of, sitting here right now, but I believe we
will be able to accomplish that.
Senator Snowe. The Inspector General's report indicated to
me--and this has been a concern of ours, obviously, since
September 11 and the 9/11 Commission's recommendations on
securing air cargo, that we are still not meeting our goals on
an issue that has languished over the years. We've been
determined to close this loophole, so it really is important.
And I understand that there has been considerable progress made
toward this. And we appreciate it, but we want to make sure
that we stay on target. And so, given these identifiable
deficiencies in the Inspector General's report, it does raise
some concerns.
And the Inspector General indicated, as well, that the
process is focused on quantity rather than outcomes and
ensuring corrective actions. As a result, air cargo is
vulnerable to the introduction of explosives and other
destructive items before it's loaded onto planes, creating risk
for the traveling public.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, yes, that's what the report
says. We have made, I think, even before the report was issued,
significant progress on many of the things that are identified
in there, because, as you know, reports often lag behind when
the concerns were actually raised. And so, we will be happy to
provide you with a briefing on the status, but we are making
great progress there.
Senator Snowe. OK. No, I appreciate that.
And one further point on this, because I think it's so
essential, is that this report indicates that TSA is unable to
properly identify and address vulnerabilities which continue to
occur year after year without an effective inspection process
for ensuring compliance of air cargo, and went on to say that
TSA misses opportunities to strengthen aviation security
against the introduction of unauthorized explosive, incendiary,
and other destructive substances of items into aircraft cargo.
So, that's obviously quite serious.
Secretary Napolitano. No doubt. We have, again, some
responses on that, but, again, I think that the key point is,
Are we moving to where there is a 100-percent, or close to it,
assurance of air cargo screening in the air environment? And
the answer is, we are making significant progress there, that's
going to continue to be a priority. And again, I look forward
to the confirmation of the new TSA administrator. Obviously,
having an administrator in place would be very helpful.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Snowe.
Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary Napolitano, thank you for being here, and
thank you for your hard work and dedication. I think the
President chose well when he put you into this position, and
your background and history and experience, I'm sure, has come
into use every single day that you've been in this position.
I think I could ask you questions all day. I think that is
probably the result of a State that has something like 75
different ports, you know, 15 of them which are probably
working ports for the interests that you care about, a border
crossing at Blaine that is probably one of the busiest border
crossing between U.S. and Canada in the country, and obviously
many other related issues to that. So, I'm going to try to get
through these, and if you could----
Secretary Napolitano. I'll keep my answers short.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
The first one has to do with, obviously, the Border and
Custom agents, which--you know, we were involved here in
increasing the funding to the northern border. We were very--we
worked very hard, as a delegation and a group of people, to
work on that, for many years, and we were glad we got it. You
may remember the Ressam case in which a Port Angeles border
agent was able to stop Mr. Ressam, who was the Millennium
Bomber, who came through. So, that was before we had the
resources. And we're very well aware of dangers there. But,
we've also had these incidents--and this weekend's paper, I
think, said it best, ``Illegal Immigrant Gets $48,000 in
Lawsuit Against Border Agents.'' And so, that's what's going
on, that we have this--I appreciate that Alan Bersin visited
the State. And so, he's had a lot of meetings, and he's had a
lot of discussions with our stakeholders, and we really
appreciate that. But, we just have a lot of the Border Patrol
acting very far away from the border, in plain clothes,
catching people by surprise. In this case, the border agents,
you know, in a plain car, plain clothes, came up to these two
individuals who were at a bus stop. Now, it's probably within
that 150 miles from the border, but it definitely is not next
to the border. It was in Mount Vernon, Washington. So, a good--
you know, a good 45 minutes, probably, at least, from the
border. And so, what I'm asking is, What steps are we taking to
ensure that the border agents don't engage in racial profiling
and that all the Department of Homeland Security agencies are
targeting the most significant threats at the northern borders?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, obviously, racial profiling is
repugnant to the law, and we do not racially profile. And that
is part of our training, it's part of our supervision, and it's
part of the ethos.
Second, a good border policy requires several things. It
requires trained personnel on the ground who are properly
supervised. It requires technology. And, in some instances, it
requires infrastructure. And so, both at the northern and the
southern borders, what we are about is having strategies for
those borders, that meet--the fact that they're different types
of borders, different terrain, and all the rest--but,
nonetheless, that combine, in a strategic fashion, those three
elements.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think we need to continue to have
a dialogue in the Northwest of what's going on, because I think
when we--I think when we end up seeing lawsuits being settled
against border agents, I think we have issues here that we need
to address. And we appreciate your cooperation in working on
that.
A second issue, if I could, is obviously that that--that
U.S./Canadian border is very important for shipping. And we've
had my colleagues talk about security and safety of cargo and
container traffic. What are we doing to help ensure that all of
North America adopts a regime for border security so that we
don't have Asian traffic deciding to go to Canada because they
can skip the regime that the United States sets up for border
security, only to have that cargo travel all the way across the
country and maybe enter, you know, someplace else that doesn't
have that border security that you were establishing? So, how
do we get that North America regime established?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, if you're talking about,
Senator, having almost like a perimeter policy around the
continent, obviously that's somewhat difficult. But, I meet----
Senator Cantwell. I'm saying there are billions of dollars
of business of cargo container going in--we're probably--you
know, 20 percent of all traffic coming from China. Now, if,
just up the road in Vancouver, they decide they're not going to
need a security regime, and it's cheaper and faster to go
through Vancouver, all that traffic is going to go there, and
the U.S. is going to lose that transportation business. So,
what are we doing to help make sure that those ports adopt the
same kind of regimes?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, I am meeting regularly
with my colleague, my counterpart on the Canadian side, as to
what is necessary for security at those ports, because there
are certain things that are constants with respect to--be it
integrated port security, be it air security, be it land border
security, there are certain things that need to be done and
need to be accomplished. But, there are differences, and there
are very real differences, between the two countries, and I
think part of that gets beyond my lane and gets into other
departments, in terms of negotiations, as well.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
I see my time is expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here. I was just
thinking of how full your plate is with H1N1 and the many other
issues that you've had, the Fort Hood shooting investigation
and a lot of other ongoing changes with our security. So, I
thank you for your leadership, and also the leadership you
showed when we had the floods in the Red River Valley, which,
you remember, involved not just North Dakota, but Minnesota.
Secretary Napolitano. Minnesota.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good.
Secretary Napolitano. Right across the river.
Senator Klobuchar. Exactly.
I'm actually going to mostly focus on the secure watch
issue and some of the terrorist watch lists, and the
misidentifications on those lists. But, I wanted to start with
one quick question about the Canadian baggage rescreening. And
this is something that affects my State. We have a state-of-
the-art airport and the requirement that checked luggage at
appropriately cleared Canadian airport facilities be rescreened
before the transfer to a U.S.-based connecting flight, it has
frequently caused delayed connections for our passengers
arriving, since Canada--because their baggage has to be
physically transported from the arrival. And I know that TSA
has been working with Canadian authorities for well over a year
to reach an agreement that could put in place new technologies
for Canadian baggage screening that would meet our own United
States security standards. And I wondered if you have any sense
of when that agreement will be reached.
Secretary Napolitano. I know about the issue, I know about
the discussions, and I don't know when they will come to a
conclusion. But, Senator, if you're asking me to see if I can
prompt them to hurry up, I'll be happy to do so.
Senator Klobuchar. That's a great answer, thank you.
The watch list redress problems--one of my primary
concerns--and I get to know the TSA people very well at my
airport, and have had very good relations with them, since I
have a hip replacement; so I talk to them every time I'm
through the airport, and they do a good job--but, my question
was about the No-Fly List. And last year, in response to
reports that thousands of U.S. travelers experienced
misidentifications each year, I introduced legislation to
require the Department of Homeland Security to establish a
comprehensive cleared list for innocent travels. The
implementation of the Secure Flight Program has been underway
for nearly a year now, and TSA officials continue to stress
that, once the program is fully operational, these
misidentifications will be minimized. And you say, in your
testimony, that 18 air carriers have successfully switched to
Secure Flight, and that testing is underway with an additional
27 air carriers.
For the air carriers that have not fully switched to Secure
Flight, how are passengers being screened against the watch
lists? How do you think this is going? We are still, obviously,
having some problems.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, if they're not in
Secure Flight--and again, that is a successful program, and I
think it demonstrates how, as our Department matures, but also
as technology gets better, and also as we get a better sense of
what actually needs to be done and what's value added to
security, some of these things do get dealt with. But, Secure
Flight is going to cover the vast majority of passengers by the
time of its full implementation.
Right now, we're in that transitional status, and those
passengers that are not on a--in a carrier that has moved over
are still being measured the old-fashioned way. But, we've also
implemented some computer software, for example, that helps us
segregate out often misidentified names, misspellings of names,
and things of that nature. And we have also worked to speed up
the--and make easier--the appeal process so people can get de-
watch-listed.
Senator Klobuchar. Right. And--but, one issue that still
remains, the Department of Homeland Security inspector general
recently reported that passengers who encounter
misidentifications and seek to use the Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program--named TRIP--to clear these problems, they said,
generally do not benefit from their participation in TRIP.
Their cases often languish for extended periods of time. The IG
made 24 recommendations. And one of the main problems
highlighted was that the cleared list of travelers who have
gone through the TRIP process is used by airlines only
sparingly to rule out false positives on the watch lists. You
have to understand, in our State we have a kid that was going
to Disneyland who couldn't go. He was, like, 2 years old--
because of--his name was on the watch list. So, we've had a lot
of concerns. We--I think we have a lot of common names in
Minnesota. We have a lot of Johnsons and things like that. So,
we continue to be concerned.
So, do you know what's happening with the IG's
recommendations on the TRIP program?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, let me get back to you on
that. I know that we constantly are working to make those sorts
of things more consumer friendly, more passenger friendly. But,
I'll get back to you specifically on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, January 19, 2009
Memorandum For: Richard L. Skinner,
Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security,
From: David Heyman
Assistant Secretary for Policy
Subject: 90-Day Response to the Office of Inspector General's Final
Report Entitled: Effectiveness of the Department of
Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS
TRIP) (OIG-09-103)
This memorandum is in response to your request that the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Policy (PLCY), in coordination
with Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), provide your office with an update on the
actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations contained in
the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) report entitled ``Effectiveness
of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program
(DHS TRIP) (OIG-09-103).''
The OIG had 24 recommendations directed to the Screening
Coordination Office (SCO) in PLCY, TSA, and CBP.
OIG has previously closed recommendations #3, 8, and 14.
DHS requests closure for recommendation #2, 6, 7, 10, and
23.
DHS and OIG consider recommendations #1, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 24 to be resolved but open until
implementation is complete.
DHS requests that OIG classify Recommendations #4, 5, and 9
as resolved but open until implementation is complete due to
the considerable progress that Secure Flight has made toward
implementation.
Recommendations
Recommendation #1: Replace TRIP's current case management system
with a system that fully meets the program's functional requirements
for case management and workflow, document management,
interoperability, and reporting. (TSA)
Update: Implementation is currently underway. It is occurring in
two phases: design and acquisition/implementation. TSA is fully funding
these phases through a combination of Secure Flight resources and
appropriations from the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget.
On September 22, 2009, TSA and IBM Global Business Services began
work under a contract to perform the requirements analysis and deliver
the solution design for the design phase of the new system. TSA held
the kick-off on October 28, 2009 with the IBM team and component
stakeholders. IBM submitted the Project Plan deliverable on October 30,
2009 and the Vision Statement on December 4, 2009.
Future deliverables for the design phase are: (1) Current process
assessment (``As-Is''); (2) New end-to-end processes (``To Be''); (3)
``As Is-To Be'' gap analysis; (4) ``To Be'' system requirements and new
system design; and (5) Change Management Roadmap. This phase is
scheduled for completion by April 16, 2010.
The Phase 2 target completion date is March 31, 2011. Depending on
the results of Phase 1, DHS may be able to accelerate the completion
date of the overall project to December 31, 2010.
While DHS believes that a successor case management system will
create new efficiencies and improvement metrics reporting, the current
system remains operational and sufficient to meet mission requirements
for serving the public. The current system allows DHS to receive,
process, and respond to redress cases in a timely fashion. Its
continued operation mitigates mission-related risks from the duration
of this schedule, allowing DHS to follow best practices in designing
and implementing the successor system.
Due Date: March 31, 2011
Recommendation #2: Define and communicate strategic and operational
management roles for TRIP, and participant and program manager
responsibilities, roles, and authorities. (SCO)
Update: DHS has implemented this recommendation through the
issuance of the ``Charter for DHS Appeals and Redress Process''
(Redress Charter), DHS has attached a copy to this letter for your
reference (see attachment A).
A working group of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the PLCY/SCO.
DHS Privacy Office (PRIV), DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), TSA, CBP, Citizenship
and Immigration Service (USCIS), and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) met to develop the Redress Charter. The working group
also consulted with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and
incorporated TSC's feedback into the final product. The SME working
group completed the review draft on October 5, 2009, and PLCY/SCO sent
the review draft to the DHS TRIP Governance Board, which is comprised
of DHS and component leadership. The Governance Board members completed
their reviews of the draft charter on October 22, 2009. PLCY/SCO issued
the charter as a memo on December 10, 2009.
Due Date: DHS requests that this recommendation be closed.
Recommendation #3: Seek independent funding for TRIP through a line
item in the department's budget or that of one of its components. (SCO)
Update: Funding for DHS TRIP was included in the DHS Appropriations
Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83), signed into law on October 28, 2009. PLCY/SCO
confirmed with TSA that the funds have been allocated as planned.
Due Date: Closed
Recommendation #4: Revise aviation security directives to specify
how air carriers are to use the cleared list, and develop and apply
inspection protocols that monitor air carriers' use of the cleared
list. (TSA)
Update: TSA has developed and applied inspection protocols that
monitor air carriers' use of the Cleared List. TSA has updated its
Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) handbook and issued it to the
TSIs in the fall of 2009. Relevant excerpts from the TSI Inspection
Handbook on the sections dealing with No-Fly list inspections will be
provided to 01G. Please note that these excerpts contain Sensitive
Security Information (SST) and should not be released or disclosed
without prior approval from TSA.
TSA will address the first part of this recommendation through
implementation of Secure Flight, which will transfer the watchlist
matching function from the air carriers to TSA. Due to the impending
cutover to Secure Flight, TSA opted to develop and apply protocols that
monitor aircraft operators' use of the Cleared List in lieu of issuing
new security directives.
The Secure Flight Final Rule went into effect on December 29, 2008.
In May 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of DHS
certification conditions confirmed that TSA generally achieved 9 of 10
statutory conditions and conditionally achieved the 10th condition.\1\
In November 2009, after the release of the final GAO report, TSA
provided GAO with the additional documentation to demonstrate that
Secure Flight has generally achieved Condition #10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For generally achieved, TSA has completed all key activities
which should reduce the risk of the program experiencing cost,
schedule, or performance shortfalls. For conditionally achieved, TSA
has completed some key activities and has defined plans for completing
remaining activities, that if effectively implemented as planned.
should result in a reduced risk of the program experiencing cost,
schedule or performance shortfalls.
Table 1: List of 10 statutory conditions for implementation of Secure
Flight assessed by GAO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statutory Conditions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Condition 1: System of Due Process (Redress)
Condition 2: Extent of False-Positive Errors
Condition 3: Performance of Stress Testing and Efficacy & Accuracy
of Search Tools
Condition 4: Establishment of an Internal Oversight Board
Condition 5: Operational Safeguards to Reduce Abuse Opportunities
Condition 6: Substantial Security Measures to Prevent Hacking
Condition 7: Effective Oversight of System Use and Operation
Condition 8: No Specific Privacy Concerns with the System's
Technological Architecture
Condition 9: Accommodation of States with Unique Transportation
Needs
Condition 10: Appropriateness of Life-Cycle Cost Estimates and
Program Plans
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secure Flight program began operational cutover to certain
aircraft operators beginning on January 27, 2009. As of October 31,
2009, all airlines were required to request and collect Secure Flight
Passenger Data (SFPD) including full name, gender, date of birth, and
Redress Control Number (if available). Secure Flight is being phased-in
gradually with implementation for all covered aircraft operators
scheduled to be completed by the end of 2010. As of December 4, 2009,
twenty aircraft operators have successfully cutover to Secure Flight,
including one international carrier. Furthermore, eight additional
aircraft operators are in parallel operations with Secure Flight (i.e.,
aircraft operator is sending passenger to Secure Flight, but not
applying Secure Flight Boarding Pass Printing Results), and testing is
underway with twenty-nine aircraft operators.
TSA has implemented a public awareness campaign that communicates
the benefits of the program as well as the changes it will bring for
passengers, aircraft operators, and other members of the travel
industry.
DHS understands that, at the time of its field research in 2008,
there were considerable unknowns surrounding the schedule for
implementing Secure Flight. In the intervening year, Secure Flight has
made considerable progress and is on schedule to complete
implementation with domestic and foreign aircraft operators by the end
of calendar year 2010. Given these changed circumstances since the time
of DHS OIG's field research, DHS asks that DHS OIG re-categorize this
action as resolved but open until implementation is complete.
Due Date: December 31, 2010
Recommendation #5: Provide more of the cleared list to air
carriers, at minimum ensuring that they receive all cleared list
records that match the current No Fly and Selectee lists using all
required matching routines. (TSA)
Update: The full implementation of Secure Flight in 2010 will
transfer the watchlist matching function from the air carriers to TSA,
eliminating the need to distribute the lists to the carriers. Per the
Secure Flight Final Rule, during normal Secure Flight operations,
Secure Flight matches limited passenger information to government
terrorist watchlist maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).
Given the changed circumstances since the time of DHS OIG's field
research (as discussed in Recommendation #4), DHS asks that DHS OIG re-
categorize this action as resolved but open until implementation is
complete.
Due Date: December 31, 2010
Recommendation #6: Develop and implement a plan for the Office of
Transportation Security Redress to address Secure Flight requirements
that, at minimum, provide for notifying current redress applicants that
their redress control numbers may be useful in future air carrier
reservations, and establishes how TSA will incorporate redress control
numbers into the cleared list. (TSA)
Update: The DHS TRIP Program Office has sent letters to all
aviation-related redress requestors notifying (or reminding) them of
their Redress Control Number (RCN) and explaining how the traveler can
use the RCN to help avoid misidentifications when traveling by air. TSA
approved the letter in September 2009.
TSA mailed this letter to 56,000 individuals, including both
persons who received redress through DHS TRIP and who received redress
through other means prior to the establishment of DHS TRIP in February
2007. The DHS TRIP Program Office began mailing it out in weekly
increments starting in October 2009 and completed the mailings on
December 15, 2009.
The RCN is a mandatory field on the Cleared List that is provided
to the Secure Flight program. The Cleared List (along with the RCN
information) is used within the Secure Flight matching engine. If a
passenger is found to be a possible match to the watchlist, the
passenger's information, including their RCN (provided at time of
flight reservation) will be made available to the Secure Flight Analyst
(SFA) so the SFA can clear the passenger accordingly.
Due Date: DHS requests that this recommendation be closed.
Recommendation #7: Use all cleared list records to assist in ruling
out all possible passenger data matches to the watch lists identified
through Secure Flight, and evaluate options for applying matching
thresholds for cleared list matches to account for possible cleared-
list passenger data entry errors. (TSA)
Update: As noted above, Secure Flight currently utilizes all
Cleared List records to assist in ruling out all possible passenger
data matches that were identified through Secure Flight. These Cleared
List records were incorporated into Secure Flight on December 15, 2008.
Further, Secure Flight works with the Office of Transportation Security
Redress (OTSR) and DHS TRIP Program Office in evaluating all other
options to clear passengers.
The Secure Flight matching engine already uses `near match'
matching logic when matching against the Cleared List so that possible
data entry errors do not prevent the SFA from reviewing near Cleared
List matches during the review process.
Due Date: DHS requests that this recommendation be closed.
Recommendation #8: Establish a process to monitor the currency of
Primary Lookout Over-Ride record owner status, and institute periodic
inspections to determine whether record owner notifications about
changes made to an underlying subject record are acted on
appropriately. (CBP)
Update: A process is in place to send notifications to the
responsible officer for disconnected Primary Lookout Over-Rides (PLOR)
that require attention. CBP field offices monitor a daily report on
disconnected PLORs, and these daily reports are also actively reviewed
by CBP headquarters personnel. In addition, CBP conducts an annual
nationwide review of all PLORs. OIG has closed this recommendation.
Due Date: Closed
Recommendation #9: End the practice of singling out passengers with
terrorist watch list lookout-related Primary Lookout Over-Rides for
selectee security screening when they are identified as possible No Fly
list matches during Advance Passenger Information System vetting. (CBP)
Update: Secure Flight will assume all No Fly and Selectee watchlist
matching for international flights for all covered aircraft operators,
and travelers will be able to provide their Redress Control Number at
booking. TSA is scheduled to complete implementation of Secure Flight
by the end of calendar year 2010.
Given the changed circumstances since the time of DHS OIG's field
research (as discussed in Recommendation #4), DHS asks that DHS OIG re-
categorize this action as resolved but open until implementation is
complete.
Due Date: December 31, 2010
Recommendation #10: Ensure that final determinations on whether to
create a Primary Lookout Over-Ride in response to a redress complaint
reside with employees unaffiliated with field offices that made the
original screening or admissibility determination. (CBP)
Update: The redress unit reviews, in coordination with CBP PLOR
managers, redress cases in which the field office did not implement a
PLOR to determine whether it might be appropriate to overturn that
field determination. The relevant excerpts from the Executive
Communications Unit's desk guide detailing the procedure will be
provided to the OIG. Please note that these excerpts contain For
Official Use Only (FOUO) information and should not be released or
disclosed without prior approval from CBP.
Due Date: DHS requests that this recommendation be closed.
Recommendation #11: Develop and implement a process for the
independent review and adjudication of redress cases related to DHS
criminal investigations. (SCO)
Update: The Redress Charter includes a provision that Component
Redress Offices ensure the ``independent review of cases assigned by
the Executive Agent'' (i.e., DHS TRIP Program Office).
In December 2009, PLCY/SCO launched the Redress Review. Following
the model of previous PLCY/SCO reviews for credentialing and vetting
programs, the Redress Review is a cataloguing of programs that have or
may be candidates for redress throughout DHS, including but not limited
to programs tied to DHS TRIP. It will include the development of
recommendations for the enhancement and further coordination of redress
services.
Relevant to this recommendation, the Redress Review will provide a
process to validate that independent review and adjudication of redress
occurs and that standard operating procedures (SOP) document the
process.
Due Date: April 30, 2010
Recommendation #12: Use TECS Primary Lookout Over-Rides related to
terrorist watch list lookouts to help rule out possible No Fly and
Selectee list matches identified through the Secure Flight program's
automated passenger data vetting process. (TSA)
Update: TSA and CBP are in the process of exploring how to share
information about the results of screening encounters as reflected in
the Primary Lookout Over-rides (PLOR) and Cleared List. Discussions
have occurred among program and information technology subject matter
experts to identify and rectify barriers to sharing as appropriate.
PLORs and the Cleared List are tools designed to meet the screening
environment in which they are used. For this reason, Secure Flight
currently uses the DHS TRIP Cleared List to clear individuals with
names or identifying information similar to that of individuals on the
No Fly or Selectee List in advance of passenger travel. While PLOR and
the Cleared List are both used to clear individuals, they serve two
distinctly different purposes. The DHS TRIP Cleared List is focused on
clearing those individuals associated with threats to aviation rather.
CBP, on the other hand, is responsible for conducting a much broader
mission at the border; consequently PLOR records will be a result of a
much broader screening activities.
The subject matter experts are engaged in identifying a path
forward to enhance information sharing. Finding a solution has proven
more complex than the initial expectations that DHS expressed in its
Management Comments due to asymmetrical elements in each process
related to their respective screening objectives. CBP and TSA are
exploring the feasibility of developing the operational and technical
solutions needed to meet the intent of the recommendation.
Due Date: March 31, 2011
Recommendation #13: Use the TSA's cleared list data to assist in
ruling out possible No Fly and Selectee list matches identified in
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) vetting. (CBP)
Update: In the long term, Secure Flight will assume the watchlist
matching function of Advance Passenger Information System (APIS),
taking advantage of the already established integration of the Cleared
List into the Secure Flight process. As stated in the response to
Recommendation #12, in the meantime, CBP and TSA subject matter experts
are engaged in identifying a path forward to enhance information
sharing relating to PLORs and the Cleared List.
To mitigate any potential negative impact on effectiveness, CBP
will continue its current practice of communicating directly with TSA
Office of Intelligence to confirm the status of No Fly and Selectee
list passengers to resolve potential watchlist matches through APIS.
Due Date: December 31, 2010
Recommendation #14: Create a procedure for officers at ports of
entry to learn whether Transportation Security Administration Office of
Intelligence analysts have ruled out passengers as the target of a
watch list lookout. (CBP)
Update: OIG has stated that CBP's procedures fully address this
recommendation and has withdrawn the recommendation.
Due Date: Closed
Recommendation #15: Enhance internal controls on the electronic and
manual processes for adding records to the cleared list, ensure that
all records considered for addition to the cleared list are subject to
identity document verification checks before addition, and conduct
intelligence analyst reviews of all possible watch list matches before
related redress records are added to the cleared list. (TSA)
Update: DHS TRIP is addressing this recommendation in three ways:
1) a case-by-case quality assurance review of the watchlist; 2)
incorporating redundant manual quality assurance reviews of a case
prior to inclusion on the Cleared List; and 3) hiring a full-time
vetting analyst to focus on internal controls as cases are processed.
The DHS TRIP Program Office has completed a manual review of the
Cleared List to ensure its quality over two stages. First, in December
2008 prior to submitting the Cleared List for integration into Secure
Flight, DHS TRIP personnel reviewed every record on the Cleared List to
verify the presence of required identity documents and to reconfirm
that none of the records on it were possible matches to the watchlist.
Second, between March and June 2009, DHS TRIP personnel conducted a
comprehensive review of all redress records to ensure that all records
were accurate and that the appropriate DHS component or State
Department office had adjudicated the case.
The DHS TRIP Program Office has incorporated a regime of redundant
quality assurance checks into its standard practices. DHS TRIP
personnel review all Cleared List records are reviewed a minimum of
three times prior to final processing. Reviews occur at the initial
triage, quality assurance, and archive stages. Additionally, management
conducts spot checks of individual records to ensure that the triage
process is working properly.
For 2010, DHS requested and received funding for a Transportation
Security Specialist (Vetting Analyst) for the DHS TRIP Program Office.
This individual will be located in a TSA Operations Center with close
proximity to Intelligence Analysts and will have access to secure data
sources. This access to all available data will allow the analyst to
verify document submissions, view source data for potential watchlist
matches, and work with appropriate intelligence and law enforcement
personnel before recommending process adjudication. DHS TRIP has
developed a Job Analysis Tool (JAT), which is under review for TSA
Human Capital Approval prior to competitive recruitment via USA Jobs.
Due Date: March 31, 2010
Recommendation #16: Automatically compare the cleared list against
the No Fly and Selectee lists when changes are made to any list, and
institute a process whereby intelligence analysts immediately review
matching cleared list records for possible removal from the cleared
list or refer them to the Terrorist Screening Center. (TSA)
Update: DHS has taken 2 steps in addressing this recommendation.
First, TSA is hiring a DHS TRIP Transportation Security Specialist
(Vetting Analyst) to be located in a TSA Operations Center. This
individual will be located in a TSA Operations Center with close
proximity to Intelligence Analysts and will have access to secure data
sources, enabling DHS TRIP to access all available data when verifying
document submissions. viewing source data for potential watchlist
matches, and working with appropriate intelligence and law enforcement
personnel before recommending process adjudication.
DHS TRIP has developed a Job Analysis Tool (JAT), which is under
review for TSA Human Capital Approval prior to competitive recruitment
via USA Jobs.
Second, DHS TRIP is in the process of upgrading its Information
Technology capability (currently projected to be complete by 2Q
FY2011). One of the upgrades includes the ability to automatically run
a daily comparison of the watchlist and the Cleared List that would
result in a conflict report for review by the Transportation Security
Specialist (Vetting Analyst). The vetting analyst will be able to
quickly determine if a change in the status of any Cleared List
individual should be changed.
Due Date: Hire vetting analyst by March 31, 2010. IT upgrade by
March 31, 2011.
Recommendation #17: Develop and promptly publish the required
System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment for its redress
case management system. (CBP)
Update: CBP has drafted a System of Records Notice (SORN) and
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Complaints Management System
(CMS) to cover CBP redress functions and activities that exceed the
scope of traveler redress covered by DHS TRIP and its privacy
compliance. These activities include officer professionalism
complaints, various ``wait time'' and other service-related complaints,
submitted through the CBP Info Center web page. Final clearance of
these documents through CBP is pending completion of initial IT system
security requirements for the hosting environment for the CBP Info
Center web presence.
Due Date June 1, 2010
Recommendation #18: Prepare and revise TRIP-specific standard
operating procedures that describe all redress office requirements in
intake and triage; coordination and prioritization; review and
adjudication; and closeout, response and reporting. (SCO)
Update: PLCY/SCO conducted a data call for all component SOPs
relating to DHS TRIP. PLCY/SCO has also obtained a copy of TSC's SOP to
serve as a comparable model. PLCY/SCO created a standardized SOP format
to improve transparency and assist in comparability among the component
SOPs. The tool allows PLCY/SCO to highlight the gaps in SOP
documentation and develop a questionnaire to assist the components in
documenting their processes and decision-making criteria for redress.
As discussed previously, PLCY/SCO has launched its Redress Review
project. Relevant to this recommendation, the Redress Review will
provide a process to validate that SOPs fully document redress
processes.
Due Date: April 30, 2010
Recommendation #19: Devise and institute quality assurance checks
using the 2007 TRIP quality assurance plan as a resource. (SCO)
Update: OTSR instituted a process where all inquiries received are
subject to 100 percent quality assurance check prior to final
processing (Cleared List, incompletes, or component/TSC referral).
Further, automated and manual Quality Assurance checks will be
included in the requirements for the new DHS TRIP case management
system. PLCY/SCO has provided the 2007 TRIP Quality Assurance Plan to
inform the work of the design team for Phase I. See Recommendation #1
for additional details about the deliverables and schedule for
designing and implementing a successor case management system.
Due Date: March 31, 2011
Recommendation #20: Develop and apply TRIP response letter
templates that more fully acknowledge the basis for traveler
difficulties, note what actions the government took to review the case,
and address the underlying cause for the travel difficulty; but do so
without compromising law enforcement investigations or revealing
redress-seekers' status in the TSDB. (SCO)
Update: PLCY/SCO led a SME group from PLCY/SCO. TSA, CBI:). OGC,
DHS CRCL, and DHS PRIV to review the response letter and recommend
changes to improve transparency and customer service. The group also
consulted with the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) in the course of its work. In reviewing the current
letters, the working group has as its mandate to make the tone and
content more customer-friendly and transparent without compromising law
enforcement investigations or revealing redress-seekers' status in the
Terrorist Screening Data base (TSDB).
The SME group reached preliminary consensus on a new draft of the
core response letter. It also generated scenario-specific variants of
this letter to meet the most common types of situations encountered by
redress. The SME group engaged with TSC in November 2009 to confer on
the letter package and met with representatives from the TSC, FBI, and
DOJ to discuss the proposal in detail on December 16, 2009. The meeting
generated some additional clarifications which will be integrated into
the proposal. The package was sent to DHS leadership for approval on
December 19, 2009.
The package is scheduled to begin the formal DHS approval process
on January 15, 2010. Department of Justice will also be approving in
accordance with the interagency Memorandum of Understanding on
Terrorist Watchlist Redress Procedures. The group briefed the TSC on
its proposal. TSC agreed that the changes seemed useful and consistent
with past direction but indicated that their leadership and legal
counsel would need to review the final product before formal
concurrence could be reached.
Due Date: February 26, 2010
Recommendation #21: Develop TRIP case disposition reporting
categories that reflect the full range of government efforts to resolve
redress-seekers' travel difficulties, and report on this information on
a regular basis. (SCO)
Update: Developing disposition reporting categories are part of the
Phase I design of a successor case management system for DHS TRIP.
PLCY/SCO has provided TSA with its observations about lessons learned
from current operations and continues to work with TSA on this effort.
See Recommendation #1 for additional details about the deliverables and
schedule for designing and implementing a successor case management
system. This recommendation would be implemented as part of Phase II
scheduled to be completed no later than March 31, 2011.
Due Date: March 31, 2011
Recommendation #22: Collect individual TRIP redress case
information on the date completed redress petitions are received, and
use this information to calculate overall TRIP case processing times.
(TSA)
Update: The current case management system is insufficient for
implementing this recommendation for the purposes of calculating
overall DHS TRIP processing time. It does not have the necessary fields
to distinguish between the dates that a case is opened and when the
triage review demonstrates that sufficient information and
documentation has been provided to begin the redress review process.
The system currently sacrifices that capability in order to ensure
that all cases are tracked whether the file has been completed with the
applicant's documentation or not. If additional information is
necessary, the cases are tracked as ``Pending Paperwork'' or, if the
applicant has not responded to our request after a significant amount
of time, ``No Paperwork.'' If and when the necessary information is
received, its status is changed to ``In Process.''
The capability to implement Recommendation #22 will be included in
the requirements document scheduled to be completed February 19, 2010
as part of Phase I of the acquisition of an improved Case Management
System (See Recommendation #1). It would be implemented as part of
Phase II scheduled to be completed no later than March 31, 2011.
The risk related to the due date is mitigated by continuing to use
the current system for calculating processing time. While inexact due
to inclusion of the time spent by cases in ``No Paperwork'' and
``Pending Paperwork'' status, it still provides useful data for
managing the process.
Due Date: March 31, 2011
Recommendation #23: Develop timeliness targets for each redress
processing stage, and case review and processing activities for each
participating agency and DHS component; and report to participating
agencies regularly on the achievement of these targets. (SCO)
Update: DHS has issued interdepartmental policy guidance through
the DHS TRIP Governance Board to establish timeliness targets for DHS
TRIP and related offices, as well as threshold and goal metrics for
meeting those targets. The guidance memo was issued on December 10,
2009. The guidance memo is attached for your reference.
Due Date: DHS requests that this recommendation be closed.
Recommendation #24: Collect and report on redress-seeker
impressions of the TRIP website, different aspects of the redress
experience, and their overall satisfaction with the program, with the
aim of using this information to identify areas for improvement. (TSA)
Update: DHS uses the American Customer Satisfaction index to
capture statistically reliable data that can be used to improve the
effectiveness of DHS.gov, including web-based information about DHS
TRIP. The tool prompts individuals who use the DHS website to provide
feedback on their experience. It includes several open-ended questions
that allow respondents to comment when they are having issues finding
information. DHS's current response rate (through November 2009) is 15
percent on exit response, which is high compared to most websites.
In November 2009, this tool indicated that members of the public
were unable to find information describing the Redress Control Number.
People were searching for this information because the airlines were
mentioning it in their communication efforts related to Secure Flight
as new optional field for reservations. As a result of this feedback,
DHS updated the website to explain the facts about the Redress Control
Number and reassure people that most travelers do not have nor need
one.
DHS is in the process of launching a customer satisfaction index
specific to the DHS TRIP website. PLCY/SCO, in consultation with TSA
and the components, drafted two surveys. One is specific to the redress
application process and the other asks questions about the overall
redress process. The first survey includes four multiple choice
questions to gather statistical information on user satisfaction and
three open-ended questions to solicit qualitative information that can
help identify areas for improvement. The second survey has five
multiple choice and one open-ended questions.
Because the surveys are a ``collection of information'' from more
than 10 members of the public, it is subject to the requirements of the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The PRA process includes submitting an
analysis to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to obtain an OMB
Control Number, publishing a notice in the Federal Register with a 60
day comment period, adjudicating the comments, and publishing a 30-day
notice in the Federal Register before the surveys can go live. The PRA
clearance process began on December 15, 2009 and is expected to be
complete no later than May 31, 2010.
A copy of the proposed surveys are attached.
Due Date: June 30, 2010.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please have a
member of your staff contact Ted Sobel in DHS/PLCY/SCO at 202-282-9570.
cc: Marcia Hodges, Supervisory Auditor, DHS GIG
Attachments:
A. Charter for DHS Appeals and Redress Process (re: #2) (Source:
PLCY/SCO)
B. Redress Control Number letter (re: #6) (Source: TSA)
C. Timeliness Targets Guidance Memo (re: #23) (Source: PLCY/SCO)
D. Website/Redress Experience Survey (re: #24) (Source: PLCY/SCO,
TSA, CBP)
Senator Klobuchar. All right, thank you very much, again.
And thank you for your leadership.
Secretary Napolitano. You bet.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing.
Good to see you here, Secretary Napolitano. We both share
the Southwest as home, and I think you're doing an excellent
job with a very, very difficult department there to manage.
I'd like, in my time, to hit a couple of areas. One is REAL
ID, and then the TSA approach to whole-body imaging.
As you know, more than 30 States, including New Mexico, are
unlikely to meet the December 31st deadline to become
materially compliant with the REAL ID Act of 2005. While I
understand the Administration would prefer to enact PASS ID Act
in lieu of granting an additional extension, the uncertainty
surrounding what your Department may or may not do if the
legislation is not signed into law is creating confusion for
people in the State that are not in compliance.
This is--and I'm sure you've heard a lot about this, too--
this is causing a great deal of anxiety with constituents, who
are seeing news reports they'll need a passport in order to
travel on a commercial airline in the U.S. after the 1st of the
year. I believe Senator Bingaman and I sent you a letter on
this issue, on Monday.
Will you commit, now, to extending the deadline for
compliance with REAL ID if Congress has not addressed the issue
by December 31?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, thank you, and yes,
here is the problem. Congress passed REAL ID as a footnote in
an appropriations bill, that did not have the benefit of
hearings, nor consultation with the States, which caused vast
revolt among the States, of which Arizona was one. And so, we
went and worked with the Governors, on a bipartisan basis, to
fix REAL ID, and that gave birth to a piece of legislation
known as PASS ID. It has been through committee, it has been
marked up, it is ready for floor action. It deals with a lot of
the issues that--it solves the Governors' problems with REAL
ID.
I would--before I get to the question of extensions--you
know, one of the reasons we had REAL ID, and now PASS ID, is
because the 9/11 Commission had a recommendation that we
improve the security quality of drivers' licenses. And because
REAL ID has been rejected by the States, just by granting
extension after extension after extension, we're not getting to
the pathway to have more secure drivers' licenses. PASS ID
helps us meet the 9/11 Commission recommendations and, at the
same time, addresses issues that were legitimately raised by
the states.
And so, what I would prefer to urge the Senate to do, and
use this hearing as an opportunity to really urge it to do, is
to move to floor action and move PASS ID through so we can get
it over to the House. I think it could go very quickly over
there. And we could solve this issue, as opposed to extension
after extension, which not only doesn't deal with the 9/11
Commission recommendation, but it's just another year of
uncertainty.
Senator Udall. Yes. Well, as you are probably aware, the
situation that we're in now, we have healthcare on the floor,
where if we tried to move to anything else, I think it would
make it much more difficult, procedurally. So, I think if--I
don't see us getting to PASS ID on the Senate floor between now
and the end of the year, so I think it would be very helpful
for you to issue a statement--you might use this as an
opportunity to do it--to assure people that, after December 31,
they will be able to travel with something other than a
passport. I don't know if you want to do that, at this point,
but--if you decline, that's fine.
Secretary Napolitano. I think I will not accept that----
Senator Udall. OK.
Secretary Napolitano.--invitation----
Senator Udall. OK.
Secretary Napolitano.--at this point in time.
Senator Udall. Thank you. The--I probably don't have enough
time to get you to answer the question, but on whole-body
imaging, let me just lay it out a little bit here. You're--TSA
is greatly expanding its use of whole-body imaging for primary
passenger screening at airports. And Albuquerque is one of the
airports where it's doing that. And although TSA has
voluntarily taken certain measures to protect passenger
privacy, I believe several serious questions should be answered
before TSA deploys these whole-body imaging machines more
widely. And one of the issues, really, is, if you decline the
machine, you get a full-body patdown. And, as you can see, that
could--you either--one or the other--that could be very
intrusive.
So, I--I'm going to submit the questions to you, because my
time's up and I know the Chairman may want to get to other
Senators here. But, I hope that you'll give us a prompt
response on that.
Secretary Napolitano. Right. And, Senator, in the airports
I've been at, observing how that technology is used and that
technology is much different than as portrayed in the press
but, in any event, it hasn't been a patdown, but you go through
the standard magnetometer process. We'll be happy to answer the
questions that you have.
Senator Udall. We'll get you all that information.
Thank you very much. Thanks for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Madam Secretary, I'm going to ask you a question which you
can't answer, but you want to, desperately. But----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. But, you can't, because OMB won't let you.
OK? I just----
Secretary Napolitano. I'll----
The Chairman.--thought I'd catch your attention----
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
The Chairman.--by saying--OK?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, you have.
The Chairman. The--to me, one of the most enormous problems
of your extraordinarily important agency--I mean, the President
spoke last night, and he kept coming back to what--``The
economy I really want to build is my country's economy,'' and
he really had to do that. And I sort of wanted him to say,
``And, by the way, in protecting security, we really need to do
much more with the Department of Homeland Security, and give it
more resources.''
I think it's one of the great anomalies--and, frankly,
embarrassments to us, in the Congress, and to appropriators--
that they have underfunded you. I mean, everybody loves to pick
on FEMA or whatever is going on, but often the reason is--or
they give you--they say you've got to have 100-percent
container scanning, air cargo, maritime cargo, you know, and
the--10,000 more rules and regulations have to pour out of your
organization, and it's just--it's an awful way--and you are
responsible, in so many ways, for our national security. I
mean, the intelligence people aren't. You are. They're meant
to, you know, provide information; and you have your own
intelligence folks. But, you need money. And my question I want
to ask you for is, How much money do you need, and what do you
need it for, to be able to do what you are required to do and
what you want to do? You'll never get another question so
wonderful as that.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just address it in the following fashion, which is
to say, one of the things that I have set about to do as the
Secretary is to identify the major mission areas of the
Department, to align our budget requests with those major
mission areas, and to create a longer-term vision for the
Department through the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
process. Congress asked us to complete that QHSR by December
31. We are on track to do so.
But, I--here's--you know, the major mission areas of the 23
agencies--22 agencies that we're--combine--really involve
counterterrorism, securing the air, land, and sea borders,
immigration enforcement while we work for immigration reform,
and preparation for, and the ability to respond to, disasters
of any type--natural disasters. And what we have been about
doing is prioritizing, under each of those, and aligning our
budget requests accordingly. And I hope----
The Chairman. I know what you're doing, and I applaud you
for it, but it's not helpful. I mean, you're laying out your
priorities, and what I would say is that you're then applying
totally inadequate resources to your priorities, because you
don't have any choice. And you can't say much, because OMB vets
your testimony, as they do with any Cabinet Secretary--and way
on down, too--and most people don't know that, that you can't
speak your mind.
Well, I don't want to get you fired, but I really do want
to--Homeland Security to have the money it needs. And, at some
point, maybe we'll have--maybe you can leave a private letter
and stick it under my----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman.--my office door or----
Secretary Napolitano. Over the transom, right.
The Chairman.--something. But, it counts, to us. It counts,
so that we can put pressure on appropriators to be helpful to
you. I'll just leave it there.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Because you're in an impossible situation.
I wanted to--did not want to leave Senator Brownback's--you
know, if you do any regulation of general aviation--the
business will go out of--it'll collapse. I just can't let that
pass.
I think you mentioned, 90 percent of airports in Kansas, or
whatever it was, were small airports, and they're for the use
of general aviation, and its convenience. Yes, it certainly is
convenient. It's probably convenient to a lot of people who are
running drugs and running guns and all kinds of things. And--
but, we can't do anything to increase their screening. Again,
I've--out at Dulles, the idea of walking through something,
which--you know, a machine that that lady, I guess, walked
through, crashed the White House party the other night. No,
they don't even have them out there. They don't even have them.
So, they--there are two--at any given moment, two-thirds of the
airplanes in the air are general aviation. They get all of this
attention from air traffic control, just as much as any
commercial air passenger and--yes, Kansas, you know, makes a
lot of general aviation aircraft, but there's also the question
of national security of them. You pointed that out, that they
could have fuel on them, they could run into buildings. I'm
pointing out that they could be running drugs, they could be
running guns, and we don't know about it. We're just--and so,
we can't touch them; they're untouchable, because if they--you
touch them, they call up all the Senators, who--and
Congressmen--who ride on their general aviation things, and
say, ``Don't you dare do anything with it.'' And that's exactly
the way it works. I mean, I tried to put a 25-cent-per-trip tax
on them last year to help pay for our air traffic control
system. That got 4 inches down the football field. The
telephone calls just quashed it immediately. And at some point,
this becomes a--just a little bit more than annoying, when they
become somehow sacred because they're fragile. They're not
fragile; they're doing very well. And whether they're doing
well or not is secondary to the national security concerns that
you would have, and that I certainly do have, about them. And I
just wondered if you would comment on that.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, as I suggested to
Senator Brownback, the security issues involving GA--general
aviation--need to be addressed. There was a proposed rule. It
had a strong reaction from that community. We have worked with
that community. We are in the process of finalizing that rule.
But, I agree with you that, when I look at the overall kind of
vulnerabilities and threats involving threats to the homeland,
particularly with respect to the larger general aviation
aircraft, there are security interests that must be protected,
and we are moving to do just that.
The Chairman. How do you do that? They resist that.
Secretary Napolitano. We do it by--through the regulatory
process, and we do it----
The Chairman. Then how come I don't see it?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, because we haven't finished----
The Chairman. I see no sign of it.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, we haven't finished the rule
yet. But, we will be doing it through a variety of mechanisms.
The Chairman. I advise you to be bold.
My time has run out.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
I wanted to go back to the border wait times. This is
something that I know you are familiar with, as well, having
been the Governor of Arizona. And my question is, How can you
address the border wait times? Because there are trucks backed
up for miles, taking hours to get through, and it does make a
difference in commerce and people being willing to come across.
How are you going to address it, keeping security in mind as
well as efficiency of commerce, on our land borders?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, a couple of things. And first
of all, between Fiscal Year 2008 and Fiscal Year 2009, we
actually saw a reduction in wait times, according to the data I
have, a 12.3-percent reduction. And the wait times for
commercial trucks--and I think that's what you're focused on,
Senator--went from, in 2008, 10.6 minutes to 9.3 minutes on the
U.S. side of the border.
Where the wait times can add up is on the Mexican side of
the border. And so, working with Mexico, they are now
establishing their own customs capacity on that side of the
border, which I think will do a great deal to resist--because,
as you know, when you go through a land port, you're actually
going through two borders; you're going through the Mexican
side and the U.S. side. So, the U.S. side, the wait times have
gone down, and, I think, will continue to go down, with our
greater use of technology. The Mexicans----
Senator Hutchison. I really am referring to the Mexican
side, because that affects so many of our border retailers, and
it's--it's commercial, but it's also people who will shop in
the----
Secretary Napolitano. In those areas----
Senator Hutchison.--yes.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed. And so, Mexico is now
developing its own customs agency, and deploying them to the
border, which they really had not had before, as well as we
build out our ports on the northern side of the border, we are
working with them to build their infrastructure to match our
ports so that they're paired up appropriately.
Senator Hutchison. So, we do have an ongoing effort to
coordinate better the Mexican side with our side so that we can
get some of those wait times down for commerce?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. OK. It's a big deal on our border. It
must have been, in Arizona, as well. Because border retailers
on our side get a lot of business from that land traffic; and
if you have to wait an hour or two, or more sometimes, it's a
problem.
Is there something we need to do to increase coordination?
Because there has been a complaint, that's ongoing for a long
time, of coordination of working hours between DEA, Customs,
and Border Patrol, so that sometimes one group is off on a
coffee break while the other group is on, but you have to have
all of them. Is there an effort in your Department to address
that kind of coordination to better utilize our resources?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, that coordination should
already be occurring under the direction of whoever is the
manager of the port. If you have a specific instance or a
specific port where you are getting reports that that is not
happening, I hope you would let me know about it, and we will
follow up.
Senator Hutchison. OK. I will do that. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
And Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for allowing me to ask a second round of questions.
And, Secretary Napolitano, again, thank you for your
service and all your hard work.
I'd like to submit a question, if I could, to you about
semisubmersible vehicles that are being used in the drug trade.
And my understanding is they're growing in numbers. I don't
know if we've thought about that as it relates to security,
since these are one-way vessels and they can be used for drugs;
they could be used for other things. But, I'm going to submit
that for the record and maybe get an answer from you.
But, I'd like to bring up two specific cases that are--been
really receiving national attention, and see if I could get
your help on that.
The first is Ernesto Gamboa. He was an individual who
served as a confidential informant, and, for the past 14 years,
assisted law enforcement in the dismantling of large and
dangerous drug operations. He frequently put himself at risk.
He worked with the Washington State Patrol, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the DEA, and INS, and with the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs, ICE. So, his cooperation was critical
to the success of Federal prosecutors in seizing hundreds of
pounds of cocaine and methamphetamine, as well as large
seizures of money and weapons.
During all the time that he was cooperating with law
enforcement over that time period, he was promised that he
would get help with his immigration status; but, instead, in
July he was detained by ICE and placed on removal, despite all
of the good work that he had been doing previously for these
various agencies. And so, I'm expressing concern over this
case, because he's kind of in limbo; he can't work, because he
doesn't have paperwork, and he can't get--if he is returned to
El Salvador, I'm sure he will likely be killed. And so, if we
don't help the Gamboas, who have been the informants for us,
how are we going to recruit other people to helping us with
finding drug traffickers and criminals?
And so, I would, you know, ask for your help in this case,
in understanding what we should do with Mr. Gamboa.
Secretary Napolitano. Be happy to look into it. This goes
to the intersection between the Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security, where Department of Justice
DEA doesn't have authority to make immigration representations.
Sometimes that gets lost in the shuffle. DEA needs to bring ICE
in, or vice versa sometimes. So, I think that illustrates,
perhaps, what is happening with Mr. Gamboa. I'll be happy to
look into the situation.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
The second one is a case, Alonso Chehade, who--you know, we
talked about this border issue in my first round of
questioning, and Senator Murray and I have asked you to defer
the removal of Alonso Chehade until the end of the 111th
Congress. He is a case that would be--if the DREAM Act was law,
he would obviously have the relief of that legislation. But,
he's a 22-year-old Peruvian national who resides--who's resided
in the United States since childhood. And earlier this year, he
literally took a wrong turn on I-5 and was detained when he
accidentally crossed into Canada. And so, now he faces
deportation. He graduated from high school with honors,
attended Olympic Community College, earned his bachelors degree
from the University of Washington. And so, it has generated a
lot of media attention in our State. And so, I'm hoping that we
can defer action on his case until the 11th--111th Congress--to
see if we can get the DREAM Act passed. And so, maybe Mr.
Chehade, who has come to the United States as a child, not of
his own doing, but has now been through our whole education
system, will not, because he took a wrong turn on a freeway--
will be able to stay in the United States.
Secretary Napolitano. I think his removal will be, or has
been, deferred. I will double check on that, Senator.
Secretary Napolitano. But, the situation you describe
illustrates why President Obama is eager to have the Congress
take up the whole issue of immigration and immigration reform.
These situations happen in my Department every day, day in and
day out.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I appreciate that. And I appreciate
you looking into this further. I think he's gotten a temporary
deferral, but I think that'll run out in January.
Secretary Napolitano. That may be right. I'll take a look.
Senator Cantwell. If you could, thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator McCaskill may be on her way. In the meantime, I
have one more question to ask.
The--are you OK on time?
Secretary Napolitano. I'm fine.
The Chairman. OK. The--this is cybersecurity. And this
doesn't appear to be a very important question, but it is to
me. Again, I go back to George Bush's Director of National
Intelligence, Barack Obama's Director of National Intelligence,
saying the number-one threat to this country is not al Qaeda,
it's not dirty bombs, it is cybersecurity. Huge importance.
More or less ignored by the press, a somewhat disinterested
public in that, because they can't wrap around those two words.
And you have some responsibility for that.
Now, my question is very specific, and you may not want to
answer it, but it's--I think we--I don't--I'll tell you how I
feel about it. You all had a big conference, and you decided
that you'd get somebody who would report to be responsible for
cybersecurity but who would report to the National Security
Council and to the National Economic Council, to which I say,
``Goodbye focus on cybersecurity.'' I mean, I've been through
that trip before. I've seen what happens. It just--you know, by
the time the Pentagon takes their chunk and--you know, it's--it
just--it won't work.
Senator Snowe and I, working on--are working on
legislation. We'd like to work with you on it. We say that
there ought to be somebody who reports only to the President.
Now, there's that part of this world which, ``Oh, there's
another czar,'' to which I would say, ``Well, if that's another
czar, then that's the one you want to have, because that's the
number-one national security threat to our country, and will
remain so.'' People have no idea what they can do. They read
about it. It hasn't happened in their community, so they forget
about it and go on, concentrate on al Qaeda and Taliban, and,
you know, all kinds of things, but not on cybersecurity, which
is the main threat.
So, I want to say to you that I feel very strongly that
there ought to be somebody who reports directly to the
President, who has that responsibility, who doesn't try to mix
the military and the intelligence and the National Economic
Council, because that will--he'll wander off into nothing being
done or money not being spent. I think, when you have somebody
who reports to the President, it's like the Office of Science
and Technology. That's a--he's not a--that's not an--Dr. John
Holdren is not an agency, he's a free-floater; he can walk in
and out of the Oval Office anytime he wants. But, he's doing
science and technology, which you just--affects everything we
do in our country, including cybersecurity.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
The Chairman. And I think that--I think that we ought to
have somebody who reports to the President. I want to say that
loudly and clearly to you. You don't have to respond, if you
don't want, to that view. I think the idea of having it at a
lesser stature with a more diverse number of bosses is a very
bad idea, and that we won't make progress, because it's the one
area of national security where the public really isn't there
yet. The press isn't there; they're not interested. It's
yesterday's news story. Somebody hacks into something, and then
you get 2 or 3 days, and it's gone. And that's a terrible
threat--a terrible thing to do to this Nation. So, I just--I
want to make that statement. If you'd care to respond to it,
I'd be happy. But, that's what our legislation is going to say.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy
to work with you on that legislation. I think your assessment
of cybersecurity as a threat is an accurate one. I would be
happy to brief you and your staff on the extensive efforts we
have taken within DHS to deal with the civilian side of
government and the protection of that, the .gov side, as well
as our interaction with the private sector. You know, 85
percent of the critical infrastructure in the country is in the
hands of the private sector, and they're totally network-
dependent. You think of utilities, water companies--and I could
go on and on and on. I know you understand what I'm addressing.
And so, we have been involved in a series of critical
infrastructure meetings over the last 2 months, myself
included, with the private sector, with respect to their own
network security, and how we work together to improve that. So,
I couldn't agree with you more about the severity and nature of
the threat, and I think it is going to be part of our ongoing
threat environment.
The Chairman. I think the private sector will be helpful,
but I have to--and this is not really quite fair of me, but--
about 10 years ago, I was worried about that and about--
generally, about powerplants and chemical plants that had--
backed up to the Ohio River. And if you go between--from
Pittsburgh, in the Allegheny River, down to Cincinnati, that's
about 200 miles--or maybe it's 300 miles, I have no idea, but
it's a long way--and there are hundreds and hundreds of
powerplants and chemical plants. And three Coast Guard cutters
that have, you know, machine guns on the front, heavy machine
guns--three--now, they can't go 24 hours a day, so that means
there's an average of one every 8 hours--to do--patrol all of
the Ohio River. This is what I'm talking about when I say,
``Please ask me. Do you need more money for that?'' So--because
it's--obviously can't do the job.
Anyway, I got them together, and I said, ``You've got to
improve your security. You're backed up against the water.
That's exactly where the terrorists will come at you.'' You
have--if you're a powerplant, you have these big cooling
things, they can drop things into that--the way for chemical
companies to be blown up. I mean, we've had instances in West
Virginia that have nothing to do with terrorism; they're just
accidents, and they're just massively threatening. And so, they
agreed to do something, and then they--this is slightly
cynically put, but it's the way I look at it--they came back a
year later, and they said that they'd given everybody who
lets--admits people into the workspace--that is, where their
cars pass through--a sidearm. Well, of course, that's the
opposite side of the plant; the river is on the other side of
the plant. It has nothing to do with what I'm talking about. So
that what--to the extent that the private sector is willing to
be helpful on something like cybersecurity, or other forms of
security--always makes me just a little bit suspicious,
because, as Senator Brownback said, it costs, and everybody's
feeling very fragile, and everybody is very fragile, but this
is--you know, this is the big one, as far as the Director of
National Intelligence says. I don't know if you have any
comments.
Secretary Napolitano. Our interactions on the cyber side
with the private sector to date have been, I think, very
productive. And perhaps it's because the economic costs of a
major denial-of-service attack or virus is substantial enough
that there are incentives there for everyone to work together.
But, this is an evolving field, it's an ever changing threat
environment. And again, it's something that I think we will be
dealing with for months and years to come.
The Chairman. OK. Yes, OK. Well, let--it appears that
Senator McCaskill may not be coming, so I will----
Secretary Napolitano. Do you want to----
The Chairman.--use her time. So just bear----
Secretary Napolitano. OK.
The Chairman.--bear with me one more time.
Can you please walk me through the challenges that you face
as you attempt to implement the 100-percent-scanning
requirement? And I have these photographs. And, you know, I'm
talking now about maritime air--I mean, water cargo containers.
And some of them, you know, they want--everybody want--in the
House--wants them scanned 100 percent. You're doing it at about
5 percent, I think. And some of them--there has to be more than
that, but--for example, just to pick out a Home Depot--I mean,
maybe every--probably every Tuesday, at about seven different
ports around the country, massive cargo containers of lumber
come in. And that's predictable. It's totally predictable. So,
can somebody hide something inside--a dirty bomb inside that?
And does that require scanning? Then you have the--you--things
are wrapped in plastic, and then they're--then they have--
wrapped in metal, and they have locks. And people say, ``Well,
that's good,'' except you can blow up the locks. Well, to blow
up the locks, I think, would probably be a fairly noticeable
event. And so, help me understand your view of what you can
responsibly, and should responsibly, do, and what you should
not cost-effectively and potentially responsibly do.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I--well, I'd begin by saying that we should not believe
that 100-percent scanning equates to 100 percent security. And
that is because, as I mentioned before, the 100-percent-
scanning rule only focuses on one method of delivery and in one
place. And there are numerous methods of delivery in numerous
places. And so, that is why we really have to take a more--
``nuanced'' is probably not the right word, but a layered,
risk-based approach to these issues.
But, for example, the technology really isn't currently
available. To name just one problem, we have a high rate of
false positives. The logistical challenges and cost to deploy
it----
The Chairman. You mean because the technology is
insufficient, or because it reads and confuses?
Secretary Napolitano. It reads and confuses. You have a
high level of false positives. The speed of the through-port is
very slow. You have lack of adequate anomaly detection. Even if
you had a good technical system, recognize that you're dealing
with 700 different ports around the world; having an adequately
trained workforce and the maintenance of these systems is an
issue.
You've got a trade issue. Many countries around the world
are very--not just resistant to, but, in some respects, almost
offended by the notion that we would install--you know, require
this at their port, in their country. So, you have to negotiate
each of those agreements separately. So, there's always the
possibility of a retaliatory type of approach.
There's the additional cost to the shipping system. There
was a study done recently, in the EU, that this could add as
much as 10 percent to shipping costs, which, in an era of a
fragile global economy, is a significant add-on.
So, I hope that gives you some picture of the difficulty
that we have implementing a 100-percent-scanning rule.
The Chairman. No, it's very helpful. And I asked that
question, actually, because it was so important that Senator
McCaskill get here, and that, therefore, I had to tread water
as best as I could.
Secretary Napolitano. Oh.
The Chairman. So, she can now ask a couple of absolutely
brilliant questions.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I'm glad you asked it, because
I studied my answer really hard. I wanted----
[Laughter.]
Secretary Napolitano.--to be able to give it to you.
The Chairman. Senator McCaskill.
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
you holding the hearing open until I had a chance to get here.
I was over in Armed Services, as we were dealing with the
President's speech on Afghanistan last night, and it took a
while for me to get my questioning done there.
I wanted to briefly bring up with you, Secretary
Napolitano, something that I have been working on for a number
of years now, and that is foreign repair stations as it relates
to airline maintenance. I know this is not necessarily in your
lane, but, in the long run, it needs to be on your radar--
pardon the pun--because we have, increasingly in this country,
turned to foreign repair stations for, not just kicking the
tires, but significant maintenance and repair work for our
domestic airline industry. It--FAA is--from many different
hearings in this room, we have figured out we're not really
sure why we certify certain repair stations but we allow
noncertified repair stations to do the work. We're not really
sure why we don't have the same kind of standards at foreign
repair stations, in terms of background checks, in terms of
perimeter security. And I bring it up to you because I think
this is something that we could benefit from you--your people
taking a look at this.
We had foreign repair stations doing significant work on
some of our airlines in countries that were on the State
Department's terrorist watch list. So, meanwhile, I--with a
smile on my face, get wanded every time I get on an airplane,
because I have one artificial knee, and they go through my
mom's stuff, because she has two artificial knees. We have
repair work, significant repair work, being done in places
around the globe where I don't think the American people would
be comfortable with the level of security and oversight that
we're providing them.
And I wanted to bring that up to you, because it's
something that I had worked on--and I know we haven't had a
chance to visit about it before--but would like your reaction
to that and whether or not you think that some of your
obligation, as it relates to homeland security, could reach out
to at least do an assessment, in your view, whether or not this
is something we should be worried about.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Senator. And the
foreign repair issue really reveals something which I say
often, which is that homeland security does not begin at the
borders of the United States. You really have to think of it in
a global context and then bring it home, so to speak.
On November 18 of this year, so just a few weeks ago, we
issued an actual Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on foreign
repair stations, and it builds on the certification
requirements that the FAA uses. But, it would require such
things as making--requiring that they be open to audits by the
Department of Homeland Security on a random and surprise basis.
It requires certain types of recordkeeping. It requires certain
types of other types of checks in the stations themselves.
The comment period on the notice, I think, closes, I want
to say, the third week of January. So, it is something that has
occupied our attention, and we're moving forward in that
fashion.
Senator McCaskill. That is terrific. I know you've got to
go, and I appreciate you sticking around until I got here.
I also do want to bring up--I am hopeful that you all are
looking at the security clearinghouse contracting issue as it
relates to a recompete. Those costs have gone up, I'm sure
you're aware. A security check has risen from $3-a-head to $27-
a-head. For many of our airports, that are struggling right now
in this economy, it has gotten to be a very expensive
proposition. And I know you all have--TSA has not gone on
record yet affirming that it will open the contract to
competition, but I am--wanted to go on record as saying I'm
hopeful that you all will move toward a competitive contract as
quickly as possible. I think this has been a sole source for
way too long, and I think we're paying more than we need to
pay.
Secretary Napolitano. Duly noted.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
And you have an appointment and a flight to catch. I
totally thank you for being here. It's very important to us, as
a committee. We respect what you're doing, and we want to be
your partner.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for the opportunity to be here today.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Robert A. Voltmann on Behalf of the
Transportation Intermediaries Association Concerning the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
The Transportation Intermediaries Association (TIA) is the leading
education and policy organization for North American third party
logistics professionals (3PLs). TIA is the only organization
representing 3PLs doing business in both domestic and international
commerce. With over 1200 members, TIA is the voice of 3PLs to shippers,
carriers, government officials, and international organizations. As a
condition of membership, all TIA members are required to sign and
adhere to the TIA Code of Ethics. The members of TIA include property
brokers, domestic freight forwarders, international forwarders and
NVOCCs, airfreight forwarders, logistics management companies, and
intermodal marketing companies. TIA is the U.S. member of FIATA
(International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations)
representing more than 40,000 3PLs around the world.
TIA supports the government's effort to involve industry in the
security of the supply chain. We support opening the C-TPAT Program to
all companies with a significant involvement in the international
supply chain willing to submit to the rigors of the program. We believe
that the C-TPAT program must be run in a non-discriminatory, mode
neutral manner. TIA supports mutual recognition of similar supply chain
security initiatives by our major trading partners, and the steps being
taken in that direction by the Department of Homeland Security.
However, TIA is concerned that:
C-TPAT is currently not open to all companies with a
significant involvement in the international supply chain
willing to submit to the rigors of the program.
C-TPAT eligibility criteria discriminate against a
significant segment of the third party logistics industry
licensed by the Department of Transportation.
C-TPAT rules do not comport with Federal law under Section
212 of the SAFE Port Act.
C-TPAT is currently not open to all companies with a significant
involvement in the international supply chain willing to submit to the
rigors of the program--
C-TPAT excludes Department of Transportation licensed brokers and
forwarders involved in cross-border trucking. The Customs and Border
Protection agency (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has opened the C-TPAT program to the following types of third party
logistics companies: customs brokers licensed by CBP, indirect air
carriers authorized by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
of DHS, and non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs) and freight
forwarders licensed by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). CBP has
not however, opened the C-TPAT program to brokers and forwarders
licensed by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of
the Department of Transportation (DOT) involved in the selection and
management of cross-border truck and rail carriers. This exclusion has
created a hole in the security network and discriminates against a
significant market sector involved in the international supply chain.
3PLs assess and maintain qualification files on thousands of motor
carriers engaged in cross-border traffic. Access to this capacity
through C-TPAT would allow CBP another window into the small to medium
sized motor carrier industry. Yet, rather than utilize a Federal
license as a requirement and develop a generic set of rules for all
non-asset based 3PLs, CBP has instead staked out a confusing and
discriminatory position that causes harm, confusion, and ultimately, a
gap in our supply chain security network.
C-TPAT rules discriminate against a significant segment of the
third party logistics industry and do not comport with Federal law.
Criteria being followed by CBP for third party logistics companies do
not properly reflect the nature of the industry as third party
companies that select carriers, arrange for transportation and oversee
the end-to-end movement of cargo in a mode neutral manner. Instead, the
proposed rules would exclude third party logistics companies that do
not own equipment or take possession of freight involved in the
international supply chain. If ownership of transportation assets is to
be a key qualification, it is unclear why CBP has allowed into C-TPAT
customs brokers, indirect air carriers, NVOCCs, and FMC licensed
freight forwarders that do not meet these equipment ownership
requirements, but has singled out FMCSA licensed brokers and forwarders
for exclusion. In any event, the existing rules applicable to 3PLs do
not comport with Federal law. The SAFE Port Act of 2006 (Public Law
109-447) states at Sec. 212 ``Eligible Entities''
Importers, customs brokers, forwarders, air, sea, land
carriers, contract logistics providers, and other entities in
the international supply chain and intermodal transportation
system are eligible to apply to voluntarily enter into
partnerships with the Department under C-TPAT.
While the Secretary is vested with the responsibility to draft
rules, the existing rules are too narrow to comport with the law. DHS
inexplicably has refused to admit non-asset based truck brokers ``who
perform duties such as quoting, booking, rating and auditing,'' in
clear violation of the statutory mandate.
Mutual Recognition between the United States and Canada appears to
continue the discrimination against segments of the third party
logistics industry. It is our understanding from Canadian officials
that U.S. CBP has urged Canada to bar FMCSA licensed brokers and
forwarders from the Canadian Partners In Prevention (PIP) program.
There are scores of Canadian companies licensed by U.S. FMCSA to
operate as brokers and forwarders in the United States. These companies
and their American counterparts select trucking companies and arrange
for the transport of millions of trucks across the U.S.-Canadian border
each year. The effort by CBP to bar these licensed companies that want
to participate in C-TPAT from the C-TPAT program is discriminatory and
endangers the security framework of the United States.
Mutual Recognition Must Include Mexico. U.S. DOT licensed brokers
and forwarders select and manage millions of trucking movements across
the U.S.-Mexican border. These companies must be able to join the C-
TPAT program like all other 3PLs. As Mexico develops its own system,
there needs to be mutual recognition between the U.S. and Mexican
programs.
Mutual Recognition between the United States and the European Union
is a good first step, but more work is necessary. TIA endorses the
position and concerns expressed by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) with regard to C-TPAT and mutual recognition. TIA echoes
the ICC's concern that mutual recognition validation is welcome, but
that the need for duplicative registration processes on both sides of
the Atlantic need to be eliminated.
The Customs Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations (COAC) must
be opened up to 3PLs and made more representative and transparent.
COAC, as the industry liaison to CBP, played a central role in CBP's
consideration of eligibility criteria for third party logistics
providers. For reasons unknown, property brokers were excluded from the
C-TPAT process while virtually all other members of the global supply
chain were included. As noted, property brokers assess and maintain
qualification files on thousands of motor carriers engaged in cross-
border traffic. They are in an ideal position to check on the security
qualifications of those carriers as well, but COAC apparently
recommended against including them in the program.
Apart from these security concerns, exclusion from C-TPAT
eligibility has put property brokers, many of whom are small
businesses, at an unfair competitive disadvantage in bidding against
those already in the program for business from large shippers, such as
automobile manufacturers, box store retailers and others who require
their transportation and supply chain service providers to be C-TPAT
qualified.
TIA believes that CBP may have adopted the unreasonable
restrictions on 3PL participation in C-TPAT in part because it relied
on faulty advice from the COAC, which is unrepresentative of the
property brokerage community. Simply put, while COAC does not include
property brokers, it does include members who may have a competitive
interest in excluding property brokers.
TIA urges the Congress to mandate that membership in COAC must
include non-asset based 3PLs. We also believe that Congress should
explicitly require CBP to open the C-TPAT program to non-asset based
3PLs, as the SAFE Port Act originally intended. We would be pleased to
work with the Committee in drafting legislative language to achieve
those objectives.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is releasing
their report on the Secure Freight Initiative and Department's attempts
to implement 100 percent scanning today. The GAO asserts that you plan
to issue a blanket extension to all foreign ports. Is this correct?
Answer. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
(``9/11 Act'') of 2007 mandates that, by July 12, 2012, any container
loaded on a vessel in a foreign port cannot enter the United States
unless it has been scanned by non-intrusive inspection technology (NII)
and radiation detection equipment before being loaded onto the vessel
at the foreign port. The 9/11 Act provides the Secretary with
flexibility to extend the 2012 deadline in two-year increments provided
two of six pre-defined conditions exist. The extension criteria within
Section 232(b) permits the certification of extensions for individual
port facilities, groups of individual port facilities, or all global
port facilities from which U.S. bound-containers originate. The mandate
to scan all U.S. bound containers with non-intrusive equipment at the
overseas port of loading has now been extended by 2 years to July 2014.
Question 2. Can you please walk me through the challenges you face
as you attempt to implement the 100 percent scanning requirement?
Answer. In April 2008, CBP submitted a report to Congress titled
``Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilot (Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Section 231)'' and
subsequent semi-annual update reports, CBP identified several
technical, logistical, and diplomatic challenges associated with
scanning containerized cargo at foreign ports. These challenges include
but are not limited to:
Technical
--Enhancing current technologies to effectively scan transshipped
cargo;
--Sustaining equipment operations in extreme weather conditions and
certain port environments (politics, cultures);
--Addressing health and safety concerns of host governments and
respective trucking and labor unions, specifically with
respect to imaging systems that use a radioactive source;
--Protecting data privacy concerns.
Logistical
--Re-configuring port layouts to accommodate the equipment without
affecting port efficiency;
--Persuading the foreign customs service and terminal operator to
meet additional staffing requirements;
--Developing and implementing local response protocols for
responding to alarms.
Diplomatic
--Concluding agreements with partnering nations and terminal
operators;
--Addressing the potential requirement for reciprocal scanning of
U.S. exports;
--Addressing the sensitivities of scanning cargo within a sovereign
nation.
Question 3. What lessons have you learned in implementing the pilot
program since this law was enacted?
Answer. CBP reported valuable lessons learned from the 100 percent
scanning pilot program as well as the significant costs associated with
procuring and deploying scanning systems. These lessons learned
indicate that scanning 100 percent of all U.S.-bound containers is
possible on a limited scale in low volume ports processing primarily
gate traffic, but it would be difficult to achieve at ports that
receive transshipped containers delivered to the port facility from the
waterside. CBP's reports detailed that deploying current scanning
technologies at high volume and transshipment ports threaten to
negatively impact port operations which would significantly delay cargo
shipments, increase operating costs, and infringe on the sovereignty of
foreign nations. While CBP continues to identify enhancements to
current scanning technologies to strengthen cargo scanning and risk
assessment capabilities, meeting the challenges of scanning 100 percent
of all U.S. bound cargo by July 2012 would be difficult to achieve and
the use of the extensions provided in the 9/11 Act will be required.
The April 2008 U.S. Customs and Border Protection initial Report to
Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilot can be found at http://
commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/
SFIReport_PublicRelease_FINAL_Consolidated.pdf.
Question 4. So all of us here today can understand it, please
explain the Department's layered strategy for port and cargo security?
Answer. CBP implements a multi-layered, risk-based enforcement
strategy designed to maximize security without causing economic
disruption. This strategy encompasses the following security programs
in the maritime environment:
The ``24-Hour'' Manifest Rule: Advance manifest information
provided 24 hours prior to lading at the foreign port;
Container Security Initiative (CSI): Stationing CBP Officers
at overseas ports to identify/examine high risk shipments;
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT):
Industry partnership aimed at securing the supply chain;
Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Technology: Utilized
for examining containers with limited impact to the port
operations;
Automated Targeting System (ATS): CBP's automated system for
screening data and analyzing potential risks;
National Targeting Center for Cargo (NTC-C): Centralized
targeting center to support maritime cargo enforcement
activities;
Secure Freight Initiative's International Container Security
program (SFI/ICS): Deploys scanning technology (non-intrusive
imaging equipment from CBP and radiation detection equipment
from Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration) in support of 100 percent scanning requirement;
Importer Security Filing ``10+2'': Requiring additional
advanced data to enhance targeting efforts.
CBP's multi-layered, risk-based enforcement strategy relies on
collecting advanced information, which is screened using automated
systems and analyzed by trained personnel, to provide actionable
information to CBP Officers. The screening and analysis of this
information allows CBP to focus its resources on those shipments of
concern, while facilitating the movement of legitimate cargo. In
addition to receiving advanced information, CBP partners with industry
members to enhance their own security practices throughout the supply
chain. Foreign government partnerships also provide invaluable insight
into potentially harmful shipments and, in some locations, have allowed
CBP to deploy scanning systems to scan containers for radiation,
including both imaging systems provided by CBP and radiation detection
equipment provided by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration. Finally, CBP has positioned technology at all
ports of entry that serve as a force multiplier for officers in the
field. Taken in combination, these layers provide meaningful supply
chain security.
Question 5. Do you concur with the GAO's finding that the 100
percent scanning requirement could present challenges to the existing
container security programs such as the Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program and the Container Security
Initiative (CSI)?
Answer. The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), CBP's program to
comply with the 100 percent scanning requirements, represents one layer
of CBP's multi-layered, risk-based enforcement strategy and is not
intended to replace other CBP programs and initiatives, such as CSI and
C-TPAT, which represent additional layers of CBP's enforcement
strategy. In the April 2008, Report to Congress referenced in Question
#1, CBP included letters and correspondence from members of the local
and foreign trade community as well as Foreign Governments expressing
concerns regarding 100 percent scanning to include referencing the need
to continue partnering with CBP in programs such as CSI and C-TPAT.
Question 6. Some foreign governments have stated that they may
adopt a reciprocal requirement that all U.S.-origin containers be
scanned. Would the United States be able to comply with such a mandate?
Do you have any sense of what it would cost to do so?
Answer. Some Foreign Governments have suggested that they may
consider adopting a reciprocal requirement that all U.S. origin
containers be scanned, but no official request has been made to CBP.
Question 7. In April of this year, Acting Commissioner Jay Ahern
testified that much had been done to enhance the security of cargo
containers relative to other modes of transportation. He added that
maritime security should not be overemphasized to the detriment of
other modes of transportation. Also, he requested that the scanning
requirement be thoughtfully reconsidered by Congress. Do you believe
Congress has imposed a goal on the maritime sector that is draining
limited resources from other more high risk threats to our national and
economic security?
Answer. A significant amount of attention and resources has been
applied to the scanning of cargo containers in the maritime and land
border environment which was emphasized due to the high risk threat
potential of cargo containers and also to the availability of suitable
commercial equipment. CBP is rapidly approaching the point where this
scanning capability has been implemented for cargo containers that
satisfies the mandates of the Security and Accountability For Every
Port Act of 2006. However, challenges remain within the maritime
environment surrounding bulk, break bulk and roll on roll off (RORO)
shipments.
Technical challenges and resource limitations remain to find
effective, suitable solutions for many other high risk vectors (e.g.,
air cargo, general aviation, rail cargo inbound from Canada and Mexico,
and between the Ports of Entry). Currently many resources have been
directed toward improving the capabilities within the maritime sector
that, in the future, could perhaps be better directed toward developing
initial capabilities for these other high risk venues.
Question 8. I have several questions regarding DHS's chemical/
biological detection capabilities for the transportation sector. First,
what has the Department done to develop chemical and biological
detection technologies for cargo?
Answer. The Detect-to-Protect (D2P) Triggers and Confirmers Project
has been developing and testing biological detection sensor systems for
high confidence detection of prioritized threat agents that have been
released into the environment. These sensors are designed to be used in
a variety of operational situations, with one possible deployment
scenario in cargo screening environments to provide rapid warning of a
semi-concealed or leaking threat, or to be used when inspecting high
risk or suspicious cargo. DHS has been conducting on-going testing of
these new sensors in operational environments.
DHS also has tested prototype bio-detection sensors in cargo
screening environments and plans on conducting further tests as the
technology matures. Currently, the device's confirmer sensor is
undergoing further development and live agent testing is being
conducted by the U.S. Army. DHS is also running a test of the trigger
and confirmer sensors in the DC metro to see how they perform in that
operational environment. Additional tests are planned for other CBP
operational environments.
The goal of the Non-Intrusive Container Monitor project is to
develop a sensor (or suite of sensors) that can target suspicious cargo
for chemical, biological, explosives, or contraband threats, and then
identify the material without exposing the public or CBP officers to
the hazard. DHS released a call for proposals for a ``secondary
screening'' technology that can address a broad range of threats--
chemical, biological, explosive, and contraband--in one device, or one
suite of devices that are all inter-operable.
The Autonomous Rapid Facility Chemical Agent Monitor (ARFCAM)
project has been developing and testing chemical detection systems for
high confidence detection of prioritized threat agents that have been
released into the environment. These sensors are designed to be used in
a variety of operational situations, with one possible deployment
scenario in cargo screening environments to provide rapid warning of a
semi-concealed or leaking threat, or to be used when inspecting
suspicious cargo. These sensors have recently been evaluated in a mass
transit facility.
Question 9. Do you have a deployment/implementation plan for these
technologies?
Answer. CBP has devices for use in the field by scientists for
chemical, explosives and hazmat detection. However, at this time there
is no similar hand-held tool that can properly be used by CBP officers
in the field. For biological detection CBP currently uses detection
paper in the field for certain biological agents. DHS continues to work
on the development of technologies for use by CBP officers in the
field.
Question 10. Has the Department conducted a risk assessment of the
key pathways that pose the highest risk in order to focus technology
deployment once they have been determined to be operational effective?
Answer. CBP's Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination
currently is conducting this assessment and reporting the status of
this work to the DHS Office of the Inspector General on scheduled
intervals.
Question 11. Finally, does DHS have sufficient resources allocated
in its budget for these initiatives?
Answer. DHS will continue to conduct its consolidated research
program supporting chemical and biological detection systems. To date
the program has yet to yield field operational devices to enhance
operational detection capabilities.
Question 12. Members of Congress and the general public have
significant concerns about the transportation of hazardous cargo in the
maritime sector. Coast Guard protocols require vessel escorts for
certain `Especially Hazardous Cargo'. On the Ohio River Valley in West
Virginia, the Coast Guard has only three small boats to protect dozens
of chemical facilities and the hundreds of vessels that transport ton
chemicals to them every year.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Coast
Guard has significant resource limitations in many locations such as: a
shortage of boats, a lack of qualified personnel, and unmet armament
requirements, all which hinder the agency's ability to fulfill its
mission requirement. Have you conducted as assessment of the assets and
personnel that are needed to adequately address this core mission
function? If yes, what were your findings and how can we help you? If
not, could you please do so and report back to the Committee?
Answer. The Coast guard leverages intelligence, Maritime Domain
Awareness and operational planning guidance to allocate assets/
resources across its portfolio of 11 statutory missions to reduce
safety, security, and environmental stewardship risk in the maritime
domain.
On a daily basis, Coast Guard operational commanders assess all
mission requirements of their respective areas of operations, including
consideration of Especially Hazardous Cargo escorts, and allocate
available resources to the highest priority needs.
Continued support for the Coast Guard's recapitalization programs
(e.g., National Security Cutter, Fast Response Cutter, Response Boat-
Medium, and Maritime Patrol Aircraft), consistent with annual budget
requests, is essential to sustaining the Coast Guard's ability to
manage risk within the maritime domain.
Question 13. How do you guarantee that intelligence information
sharing and coordination processes work properly?
Answer. A series of processes and interconnected systems ensure the
intelligence components of the Department of Homeland Security share
and receive critical information. Our most effective tool is the
execution of a ``hot wash'' following an incident to document the flow
of information, identify the successes, the shortcomings, and make
recommendations for improvements.
Question 14. Let's take the example of port security. Can you walk
me through how the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, local
authorities, and other DHS and U.S. Government entities share
information to prevent attacks, or investigate suspicious activity?
Answer. Our processes continue to evolve and improve; in response
to several recent Homeland threats, I&A created a tiger team comprising
representatives from each of the Department's intelligence component,
including USCIS, TSA, USCG, CBP, ICE, and our IC colleagues, called the
DHS Terrorism Task Force (DTTF). The DTTF represents a significant
evolution of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise by substantially
increasing the thoroughness of DHS support to FBI investigations,
enhancing Departmental collaboration, providing more comprehensive
intelligence support to DHS leadership decisionmaking, and building
toward a departmental Intelligence Enterprise. The DTTF serves as a
select group of appropriate cleared individuals from across the
Department. As evidenced by its activities during the past several
months, the DTTF has demonstrated to our partners at the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) that it can properly handle sensitive information while
simultaneously exploiting DHS data bases to generate additional lead
information. Specifically, during the threat environment from August
through October 2009, the DTTF's value was demonstrated by better
support to:
--The DHS leadership by leveraging the full benefit of DHS
Intelligence Enterprise capabilities daily, and sometimes under
significant time constraints. This support made for more
informed DHS operational decisions in response to fast-breaking
threat information. The DTTF also provided the DHS leadership
for the first time a daily window into the full extent of DHS
support to investigations from the perspective of the field,
various Component agency headquarters, and from DHS employees
embedded at the FBI and agencies of the Intelligence Community.
--The Intelligence Community by making informed inputs regarding the
broad scope of DHS actions in response to threat information
reported in the DNI Homeland Threat Task Force updates. These
updates were used to brief the President and key cabinet
officials about the threats and actions taken by various
departments and agencies in response.
--The National Counterterrorism Center by illustrating the utility of
expanding the dissemination of Restricted Handling material
which allowed for a more Department-wide view of the threat and
provided a more informed and collaborative interaction with the
NCTC.
--The nation's broader Homeland Security defense network by ensuring
that DHS outreach to our state, local, tribal, and private
sector (SLTP) stakeholders was carried out in accordance with
White House guidance and in close coordination with the FBI.
--The State and Urban Area Fusion Centers by providing greater
context to the evolving threat and directing state and local
partners to the information necessary for their leadership to
make more informed decisions about the prevention and
identification of additional threats.
In the context of recent threat streams, DHS I&A has
issued a number of bulletins and Roll Call release products
to our state and local partners to sensitize them to the
threat and to terrorist tactics and procedures. Zazi's
activities, for example, prompted DHS to issue an advisory,
Terrorist Tactics Against Mass Transit and Passenger Rail,
to alert the transportation sector to possible plotting.
In addition to bulletins and Roll Call release products,
DHS I&A conducted teleconferences with State and Local
Fusion Center Directors and State Homeland Security
Advisors, and will conduct table-top exercises with private
sector partners.
Question 15. What if actionable intelligence on an imminent threat
were to come in through the wider Intelligence Community? How does that
information get disseminated to these various entities, some of which
have personnel who may need to act but who do not have security
clearances? Can you walk me through a scenario in which the pieces of
DHS along with other Federal and local authorities would share
information and work together to address an imminent threat?
Answer. Actionable intelligence on an imminent threat is
immediately distributed through a variety of information sharing
mechanisms; including dissemination by our various IT systems, working
directly with our state and local partners, our Departmental personnel
in the states and with our operational components. Many of our state
and local partners, as well as private sector partners have security
clearances, but the Department has developed procedures to declassify
critical information. For example,
In the context of recent threat streams, DHS I&A has issued
a number of bulletins and Roll Call release products to our
state and local partners to sensitize them to the threat and to
terrorist tactics and procedures. Zazi's activities, for
example, prompted DHS to issue an advisory, Terrorist Tactics
Against Mass Transit and Passenger Rail, to alert the
transportation sector to possible plotting.
In addition to bulletins and Roll Call release products, DHS
I&A can conduct teleconferences with State and Local Fusion
Center Directors and State Homeland Security Advisors, and can
conduct table-top exercises with private sector partners.
Question 16. What about Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and other agencies, including those within DHS that it works with
on a daily basis. Agencies like CBP and ICE to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to local authorities? Please tell me,
specifically, what you do on a daily basis to promote and ensure
information sharing and cross-agency coordination on addressing
threats.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is an
active participant in intelligence information sharing and
coordination. TSA's Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) interacts daily
with members of the Intelligence Community, DHS components,
governmental agencies with intelligence functions like the Federal
Aviation Administration and other agencies within the Department of
Transportation, Law Enforcement, and international partners.
TSA-OI is an all source intelligence office with a 24x7, 365 days-
a-week intelligence watch. The Watch provides real time warning and
notification for TSA/DHS Leadership, TSA Federal Security Directors,
their staff, and Coordination Centers, Federal Air Marshals, and the
Intelligence Community on all threats related to the transportation
sector. This sector is comprised of international and domestic
commercial civil, commercial cargo and aspects of general aviation. It
also includes mass transit systems, passenger and freight rail,
pipelines, the U.S. highway system including commercial buses and motor
coaches, and a joint responsibility with United States Coast Guard for
maritime issues involving ferries systems.
TSA-OI also has a professional cadre of all source intelligence
analysts who provide value added intelligence analysis of
transportation-related information to a broad range of TSA stakeholders
in the form of briefings and written products.
To support this analysis TSA-OI has analysts embedded at the CIA,
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the NSA, the FBI's
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), and FBI's Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC). TSA-OI analysts are also assigned to DHS
Intelligence and Analysis and located at CBP's National Targeting
Center (NTC).
TSA-OI's Field Intelligence Officer program provides intelligence
support to over 25 of the Nation's busiest airports. Field Intelligence
Officers (FIOs) support the Federal Security Directors and their
staffs, interact with the local FBI JTTF, and communicate with state
and local law enforcement and security officials responsible for
transport security. While physically located at a major airport, all
FIOs have regional responsibilities. FIOs are responsible for all modes
of transportation. FIOs interact with Federal, State, and local
aviation, modal authorities, law enforcement, fusion and intelligence
centers, JTTFs, etc.
At the local port level, leveraging the Interagency concept of
operations, the Coast Guard Sector works with law enforcement partners
to increase and improve the sharing of actionable law enforcement
information between the Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, TSA, FAA and other
Federal, state and local law enforcement partners, for more efficient
and effective coordinated operations and response to threats and
incidents.
Coast Guard Sectors also lead Area Maritime Security Committees
(AMSCs) and Harbor Safety Committees and sometimes additional locally-
unique Federal/state/local/international organizations.
At the national level, the USCG Headquarters Command Center in
Washington, D.C. and the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center
(ICC) in Suitland, MD conduct direct coordination regarding suspicious
activities with DHS and other Federal partners, appropriate to the
nature of the activity. Both units have 7x24 watchstanding operations.
The National Response Center (NRC), collocated with the USCG
Headquarters Command Center, is the interagency Federal nexus for
suspicious activities reported by critical industries in our ports and
waterways. Industry reports which meet Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) criteria are forwarded by the NRC directly into the FBI Guardian
system, where the reports are accessible by the Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) units nationwide and all JTTFs have a variety of DHS
members.
ICE Intel disseminates vital information to the Intelligence and
Law Enforcement Communities through the production of Homeland
Intelligence Reports (HIRs).
In FY 2009, ICE disseminated over 600 HIRs containing information
relating to national security, Southwest Border security, transnational
criminal activity, and threats to public safety. HIRs produce and
incorporate information from open sources, law enforcement data bases,
and classified information. They are disseminated to the appropriate
parties as based on content.
Question 17. Protecting the Nation from security risks posed by the
nearly 13 million small vessels that exist is a monumental task. There
are parallel security threats in the general aviation sector, which has
been a long unaddressed vulnerability in our aviation industry. I
understand that you and Admiral Allen are preparing a revised Small
Vessel Security Strategy. When will that be finalized? It is my
understanding that DHS has a number of related programs to address
small vessel security but they do not coordinate with each other. How
will you integrate these multiple programs into one comprehensive,
layered security approach?
Answer. The Small Vessel Security Strategy was published in April
of 2009. The DHS Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan is expected
to be released by the Department in 2010. The Plan is being developed
through an integrated DHS component small vessel security working
group. The small vessel security initiatives of component agencies are
being coordinated to eliminate redundancies and ensure coordinated
implementation actions among Federal partners.
Question 18. TSA has not conducted a national railroad risk
assessment as required by the 9/11 Act. As a result, TSA has been
unable to assess the potential consequences of certain proposals, such
as allowing guns on Amtrak trains, on the security of the passenger
rail network. What are you doing to guarantee that TSA completes the
risk assessment, as required?
Answer. As required by the 9/11 Act, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has conducted the Transportation System Sector
Risk Assessment (TSSRA), which encompasses railroads and other surface
transportation modes. Through TSSRA, TSA has evaluated threat,
vulnerability, and consequence in a wide range of terrorist attack
scenarios for each mode of transportation. For mass transit and
passenger rail, this assessment considered more than 200 scenarios,
rating threat capabilities and likelihood of execution; vulnerabilities
of rail and bus systems and infrastructure; and potential consequences
in casualties, property damage, and impacts on the transportation
network. The resulting risk ranking enables setting of informed
mitigation priorities, both across the sector and by individual mode,
for collaborative security strategies, program development and resource
allocations. The TSSRA is in the final stages of review at TSA.
Question 19. The Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
program works with local law enforcement to serve as a deterrent to
potential terrorist attacks. However, a recent GAO report found that
some VIPR teams do not have sufficient training or enough radios and
other communication equipment to coordinate effectively with local law
and surface transportation officials. What are you doing to ensure that
TSA provides sufficient training and resources so that VIPR teams can
help protect our transportation networks?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) routinely
works with local transportation and law enforcement stakeholder/
partners to train and familiarize TSA deployable assets that are used
on Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) operations. Much
of this training is completed at the local level and is specific to
particular modes of transportation. One such example is TSA's
continuing initiative to train Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) and
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to work in mass transit
environments alongside local transportation and law enforcement
stakeholder/partners. Both FAMs and TSOs receive training directly from
the partnering transportation authority on safety matters, the transit
agency's physical structure, and specific operating procedures. TSA
also sends its personnel to numerous anti-terrorism training courses
that have specific application in the transportation domain.
TSA plans to develop an agency-wide VIPR specific training
curriculum for all TSA deployable assets that participate in VIPR
operations. In addition, TSA's Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air
Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) has developed specific VIPR law enforcement
training that is instructed at its training academy and field office
level.
TSA's OLE/FAMS has provided the necessary interoperability
communication equipment for the 10 dedicated VIPR teams. Additionally,
in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, TSA received funding for an increase of 15
VIPR teams, dedicated to the surface domain. The FY 2010 funding
provides the necessary radio communication equipment and training.
Question 20. What else can be done to improve our protection of
critical infrastructure from cyber attacks and what can be done to
improve public-private partnerships between government agencies and
critical infrastructure providers?
Answer. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) engages in a wide variety of
initiatives designed to improve the protection of critical
infrastructure from cyber attacks. Many of NCSD's ongoing initiatives
illustrate areas where NCSD is pursuing improvements to current
processes and practices. Generally, however, improvements in the
protection of critical infrastructure from cyber attacks could be
gained from implementing appropriate security measures and effective
partnerships across the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
(CIKR) sectors. Initiatives such as the development of improved
national cyber incident response, multi-directional information
sharing, improved national capability and capacity to detect, prevent,
respond to, and mitigate disruptions of voice and cyber communications,
and increased security for CIKR industrial control systems are ready
examples of areas where additional efforts will improve CIKR
cybersecurity.
Question 21. What can be done to improve public-private
partnerships between government agencies and critical infrastructure
providers?
Answer. Public-private partnerships between government agencies and
critical infrastructure providers are key to improved cybersecurity for
the Nation's CIKR. NCSD works closely with private-sector
representatives from each of the CIKR sectors and is actively engaged
in strengthening and expanding those relationships. Partnerships are
based on trust, which is enhanced through continued mutual engagement
between and among public- and private-sector partners. Initiatives
currently being pursued to improve public-private partnerships include:
increasing collaboration with industry on key plans such as the
National Cyber Incident Response Plan; integrating private-sector
involvement in cyber operations centers, including the new National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center; expanding the
services of existing cyber operations centers such as the Industrial
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team; and continuing to
protect the Nation's CIKR networks through risk-mitigation efforts
conducted in full partnership with industry as outlined in the
Information Technology Sector Baseline Risk Assessment.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Byron L. Dorgan to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question. I understand that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is actively examining the current process for
facilitating background checks for aviation workers in an effort to
enhance competition. I fully support the principle of competition, so
long as the high standards set by the current system are maintained and
security is never compromised. I hope you will adequately assess the
key capabilities necessary to maintain a successful process, including
the ability to instantaneously determine the status of any individual
worker in the system and to quickly respond to evolving TSA
requirements and directives. Maintaining the highest bar for security
must be your goal.
As you contemplate changes in this area, I urge you to pursue a
careful and informed course that ensures:
Today's high security standards are not diminished and all vendors
qualified by TSA meet the same high standards required today of the
Transportation Security Clearinghouse (TSC).
Airports have the ability to select a qualified entity to provide
these services at their facility.
The current TSC services, developed at no cost to the Federal
Government, remain available to airports and other users without
disruption.
With that in mind, I would like your answer to the following
questions:
What safeguards do you have in place to ensure that the existing
process and high standards are not disrupted as you pursue competition
for background screening services? What safeguards will be in place to
ensure that existing security capabilities are not diminished as
changes in this area are implemented? Does TSA intend to require that
all service providers are capable of monitoring the status of all
workers it processes prior to their assumption of these services at
airports?
Answer. In examining the current aviation worker screening process,
a primary objective of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
is to maintain or improve upon existing security standards and
practices. TSA hopes that competition in this area will yield process
enhancements and security capabilities that operationally improve
aviation worker background checks. As part of this process, TSA is
establishing data submission standards and will include best practices
for data security. The provider(s) selected to provide aviation
screening services would be expected to adhere to these standards and
undergo periodic reviews.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. Madam Secretary, as you know, there is a one-hundred
percent screening requirement for all cargo placed on commercial
passenger flights that goes into effect next August. In some instances,
meeting this mandate without causing undo economic harm is going to be
challenging. Let me give you an example. In Washington State, the fresh
cherry season is very short and cherries need to be picked, packed and
shipped within twenty-four hours. During the season, fresh cherries are
flown from SeaTac to Asian markets on anywhere between eighty to one
hundred dedicated freight aircraft flights as well as in the cargo hold
of numerous commercial passenger flights. To help Washington State
cherry growers meet the current fifty percent inspection requirement,
this summer TSA provided K-9 units to help scan the cherries shipped on
these commercial passenger flights. I thank the Department for doing
that. But everyone recognizes this is not a viable long term solution
to meet my growers need to have fruits shipped on commercial passenger
flights and TSA's need to ensure the security of our skies.
I have been told that equipment is being tested that would allow
freight forwarders to scan full pallets and containers at airports
before they are loaded onto planes. The availability of this technology
would greatly improve the ability of Washington cherry growers to get
their highly perishable product to Asian markets quickly and
efficiently, and eliminate the need for dogs. What is the status of the
technology and what is the status of the testing? When do you believe
freight forwarders will be able to begin utilizing these scanners? To
meet the one-hundred percent scanning requirement will it be possible
to accelerate the rollout of these scanners? If the scanning technology
is not widely available by the beginning of next cherry season, will
the Department continue to provide K-9 units?
Answer. Electronic metal detector technology that may offer the
potential to screen individual boxes and skids (up to 40 inches by 48
inches in size), provided that no metal is used in packaging, is
currently being tested in the laboratory and in the field. Testing is
being conducted using as aggressive and expedited a schedule as is
possible consistent with good test practices and concern for security.
If testing shows that systems using this technology are effective and
suitable, freight forwarders will be able to purchase and use such
systems immediately upon notification of system qualification. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expects that notification
of system qualification will be provided not later than end of March
2010, before the start of the cherry season.
Explosive detection canine units will remain an integral portion of
air cargo security screening and TSA's program was expanded by an
additional 35 teams in 2009. Although TSA will continue to facilitate
these situations with canines as much as possible, TSA will not be able
to fully alleviate the need for screening this cargo each time due to
limited resources and the increased amount of cargo to be screened
across the Nation once the 100 percent mandate becomes effective.
Alternatively, businesses such as the cherry growers can participate in
TSA's Certified Cargo Screening Program, which would permit these
entities to physically search the cargo as they build it up and offer
it for transport as screened cargo given all required security measures
of the program are adhered to. This program is available for
participation now and is being used by shippers of various time
sensitive and high value goods, perishable goods or goods that require
very special handling.
Question 2. Madam Secretary, roughly seventy percent of container
ship traffic entering the Port of Seattle and the Port of Tacoma is
discretionary. That is, only thirty percent of the contents of these
containers ``remain'' in Pacific Northwest. The ``vast majority'' gets
transported to points east, primarily by rail.
Washington State Ports compete with Canadian ports in Vancouver and
at Prince Rupert for discretionary container traffic. Asian shippers
decide where to ship to, based on price and schedule. I understand that
the statutory mandate to scan all U.S. bound containers with non-
intrusive equipment at the overseas port of loading has now been
extended by 2 years to July 2014.
Madam Secretary, do you know if container ships bound for Western
Canadian ports will have similar security requirements for in-bound
containers? For example, if containers arriving in Western Canadian
ports from country ``A'' are placed on rail and are transported across
the U.S.-Canadian land border, will the U.S. security of these
containers be equivalent to containers arriving at a Washington State
port directly from country ``A''? If that is not the case, do you think
that this difference in requirements present an increased level of
security risk to the U.S.? Also would this place U.S. west coast ports
at a competitive disadvantage? More broadly, do you see a need to
harmonize policies and practices with respect to ensuring the security
of in-bound containers across North America?
Answer. CBP has developed a multi-layered process to target and
examine high-risk shipments while simultaneously facilitating
legitimate trade and cargo. We are accomplishing this through
legislative initiatives, use of advance information, risk-management
targeting systems, detection technologies, extended border strategies
and the human factor.
CBP screens the data and information for all cargo containers
arriving in the United States from foreign locations, regardless of the
country of origin or the mode of transportation (e.g., sea or rail);
and closely scrutinizes and examines all shipments identified as high
risk. CBP employs its layered enforcement process to thoroughly screen
and ultimately examine 100 percent of the shipments that pose a risk to
our country.
Question 3. Madam Secretary, the semi-submersibles vessels used by
Central and South American drug-runners are typically built in the
jungles of Columbia, only built for a one-way trip, and are designed to
be scuttled (sunk) once either the delivery is made or the vessel is
detected by law enforcement.
This is an extremely effective method for drug-runners, but is
there any evidence that groups or individuals have considered using
semi-submersible vessels for something other than the drug trade? Are
our drug enforcement officials, law enforcement officials, and
intelligence agencies actively communicating to make sure that if there
is interest among terrorist groups or others for using semi-submersible
vessels for things beyond drug transport, our Nation's homeland
security system will pick up on that?
Answer. Available reporting indicates Self Propelled Semi-
Submersibles (SPSS) are built for the express purpose of transporting
cocaine from South America to off-load sites on or near the coasts of
Central America, Colombia, and Mexico. No available reporting indicates
SPSS operations have occurred in U.S. territorial waters. Moreover,
little to no evidence indicates groups outside the drug trade have used
SPSS vessels in any capacity.
Question 4. I know that your department and the Coast Guard are
working on the problem of small vessel security, and developed a Small
Vessel Security Strategy in April of 2008. Semi-submersibles vessels
are not mentioned in that strategy, though. Should they be, or are
semi-submersibles a separate threat demanding a separate strategy?
Answer. The DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy characterizes small
vessels as any pleasure or commercial watercraft regardless of method
of propulsion that is less than 300 gross tons. Although there is no
exact correlation between a vessel's length and its gross tonnage, a
vessel of 300 GT is approximately 100ft in length. This definition was
used to ensure that all potential small vessel threats, including SPSS
vessels, were covered.
Question 5. Is the Department of Homeland Security currently
developing a semi-submersible vessel security strategy? If not, why
not?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is developing a
submersible vessel strategy, which describes the Department's strategic
approach for countering the increased usage of self-propelled semi-
submersible (SPSS) vessels, as well as the potential use of self-
propelled submersible (SPS) vessels (submarines) to smuggle illegal
drugs.
Question 6. Madame Secretary, as you know, the 2010 Winter Olympics
in Vancouver, Canada will occur this coming February. First, I want to
thank you for your leadership and support in developing the 2010
Olympics Coordination Center in Bellingham and your agency's strong
partnership over the last 5 years in the 2010 Olympics Security
Committee. The facility is providing a location for inter-agency
training, coordination, meetings, and exercises that has significantly
strengthened overall preparedness in the region. It has proven its
utility during the Police and Fire Games completed this summer and I
know will do so once again during the upcoming Olympics. I believe the
Coordination Center is capable of continued operations beyond the games
with local Emergency Management and homeland security activities in the
region continuing to operate out of the facility. I believe this
capability is valuable for increasing the region's overall preparedness
along our northern border. Madam Secretary, are you willing to work
with me to see how the Department can maintain the Coordination Center
as a legacy preparedness facility into the future?
Answer. The Olympic Coordination Center has proven invaluable for
various events, notably: local tabletop exercises; ``Gold,'' the
largest National Level Exercise ever undertaken by Canada and a real-
world event; and the World Police and Fire Games. We are looking
forward to achieving the same level of success for the 2010 Olympic and
Paralympic Games in early 2010. As with any facility that DHS operates,
continued management of the Coordination Center will be evaluated
strategically and weighed against operational and resource constraints.
Question 7. On page 42, of the April 2007 GAO report entitled
``First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability'' (GAO-07-301), the GAO recommended that DHS ``develop
and implement a program plan for SAFECOM and other OEC interoperability
programs that includes goals focused on improving interoperability
among all levels of government''.
Currently, are DHS entities in the field required to develop radio
communications plans for specific areas of operation? If so, are these
plans cross walked with the plans of all of the state, local, and
tribal governments the DHS entities in the field work with on a day-to-
day basis in order to identify gaps in multiple agency communications?
Answer. Currently, there is no Federal or Department-wide policy
that requires Department of Homeland Security (DHS) field components to
develop radio communications plans for specific areas of operation.
However, the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) does have a
strong day-to-day working relationship and feedback mechanisms with
State, local, and tribal governments concerning strategic planning
activities. In several instances, DHS entities have developed radio
communications plans for specific areas of operations. For example, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency Disaster Emergency Communications
Division has undertaken an extensive effort to develop 27 State, 14
Emergency Support Function, and four regional emergency communications
plans. These plans provide guidelines for pre-positioning and deploying
communications resources during catastrophic incidents to support
emergency communications needs in the event of a loss of local and
regional communications services.
DHS and its Federal, State, and local partners do work
collaboratively to build and implement the national policy framework,
governance structures, and operational capabilities to make the
development of operational plans easier, more effective, and better
integrated. These activities take into account the unique missions and
geographies of DHS components, Federal agencies, and State and local
agencies, as well as the varying requirements of those components for
radio communications and interoperability. They include the following:
National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP)--In July 2008, DHS
released the first National Emergency Communications Plan in accordance
with Congressional direction. In developing this plan, DHS and OEC
worked closely with stakeholders across all levels of government to
develop a measurable, actionable national strategy to better coordinate
and guide efforts to improve nationwide operability, interoperability,
and continuity of communications across levels of government and
public-safety disciplines. The NECP complements and supports
overarching homeland security and emergency communications legislation,
strategies, and initiatives, including the National Response Framework
(NRF), the National Incident Management System, the National
Preparedness Guidelines, and the Target Capabilities List. Taken
together, the implementation of the goals and objectives of the NRF,
NECP, and other DHS strategy documents will improve nationwide response
efforts and bolster situational awareness, information sharing, and on-
the-ground tactical communications.
State, local and tribal Integration--OEC has strong day-to-day
working relationships and feedback mechanisms with State, local, and
tribal governments concerning strategic planning activities. OEC works
with the 56 States and territories, and several tribal nations, to
implement existing strategic plans through statewide planning workshops
and technical assistance. OEC also encourages the States, through their
Statewide Interoperability Coordinators, to maintain representation by
all levels of government on their statewide interoperability governing
bodies and coordinate their strategic and tactical activities across
all relevant partners.
Question 8. My understanding is that the majority of the State,
Local, and Tribal Law enforcement agencies operating on the Olympic
Peninsula utilize the UHF band for communications. I am told most
Federal agencies (including DHS) operating on the Olympic Peninsula are
utilizing VHF band radios for their communications. DHS communications
are primarily conducted on the Department of Justice, Integrated
Wireless Network (IWN)--an encrypted VHF trunking system.
Operationally, CPB agents need to be able to scan the radios of State,
Local, and Tribal law enforcement, to know if they need to respond to a
call for mutual aid, and more generally, to maintain situational
awareness . These trunked VHF radio systems cannot scan the UHF band.
And here lies the problem. It is somewhat mitigated at Blaine because
the CPB and local law enforcement share a common dispatch center. On
the Olympic Peninsula, though, dispatchers for local law enforcement
agencies and CPB are geographically dispersed which make the
coordination all that more challenging. Is DHS aware of the challenges
of trunking radio systems and the barriers they present to multi-agency
day-to-day field communications, particularly in more rural
communities?
Answer. There are two dimensions of the technical communications
challenge represented in this question: (1) dealing with multiple radio
technologies (trunked/non-trunked, analog/digital, proprietary/
standards-based), and (2) dealing with multiple frequency bands.
The biggest technology challenge is interoperating with proprietary
systems rather than standards-based systems. The only methods currently
available to achieve interoperability between multiple proprietary
systems or from proprietary to standards-based systems are either
carrying multiple radios, or using a gateway device or audio switch
technology that bridges systems together by connecting a radio or each
system to the gateway.
If you are dealing with standards-based systems (i.e., Project 25
(P25)), the trunked/non-trunked and analog/digital issues become much
more manageable. All P25 digital radios are required to be backward
compatible with analog systems. In addition, all P25 trunked radios are
compatible with non-trunked P25 systems. Therefore, if an emergency
responder needs to connect to multiple networks, it is recommended that
they specify and purchase standards-based trunking capability in their
radios and ensure that they are programmed appropriately for each
network that it must operate on.
In regard to the challenge of dealing with multiple frequency
bands, there are gateway devices available that can enable a UHF
network to communicate with the Integrated Wireless Network (IWN),
which communicates on the VHF band. For example, in the greater Seattle
metropolitan area, it is possible to set up radio gateways with local
and state agencies via the Tri-County Radio Interoperability System
(TRIS), which includes King County, Pierce County, Snohomish County,
the Port of Seattle, and IWN. In areas not covered by the TRIS,
interoperability switches are available and can be used to establish
interoperability among disparate networks.
The IWN's trunking system equipment (e.g., portables, mobiles, and
consolettes) is capable of operating in both P25 trunking and
conventional narrowband and conventional wideband modes in the VHF
spectrum, 136-174 MHz. These radios only operate in the VHF band but
some local agencies in the State of Washington operate in the VHF band
as well, and if authorization is obtained, these frequencies can be
programmed into the VHF equipment listed above.
Another alternative for local agencies operating in the UHF 400 MHz
band or 700/800 MHz bands is a multi-band radio (MBR). The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate's
(S&T's) MBR project hosted a short-term demo in Whatcom County and
Blaine, WA, between 12 local, state, and Federal agencies in the summer
of 2009 that enabled communications between UHF (400, 700/800 MHz) and
VHF (138-174 MHz) bands. In preparation for and during the 2010 Winter
Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, DHS S&T will conduct a
more detailed MBR pilot in that region from January 30-March 1, 2010,
to assess cross-border, rural and multi-agency emergency communications
and interoperability.
Question 9. As you may know, Assistant Secretary Bersin and I,
working with State, Local, and Tribal officials on the Olympic
Peninsula, created the Multi Jurisdictional Task Force to improve
communications between CPB and local law enforcement stakeholders on
the ground regarding a range of issues that impact our northern border.
The group identified a number of areas where more work is needed and
made a number of recommendations. Are you aware of the Multi
Jurisdictional Task Force and its short-, mid-, and long-term
recommendations? How does the Department intend to follow up on these
recommendations?
Answer. CBP is fully aware of the task force and the concerns that
it has identified with regard to radio interoperability.
The overarching concerns are:
The majority of the Olympic Peninsula's state, tribal and
local (STL) law enforcement agencies/departments utilize Ultra
High Frequency (UHF) band communications.
Most Federal agencies operating on the Olympic Peninsula are
utilizing Very High Frequency (VHF) band, while incorporating
digital encryption or trunking.
Within DHS, communications are primarily conducted on the
Department of Justice, Integrated Wireless Network (IWN), an
encrypted VHF trunking system.
In response to these concerns, the Office of Border Patrol and the
Office of Information Technology are actively working with STL law
enforcement partners on the Olympic Peninsula and have developed a path
forward which addresses the short-term, mid-term, and long-term goals
of radio interoperability.
The short-term goal is to establish an effective radio
communications capability prior to the beginning of the 2010 Winter
Olympic and Paralympics Games. To date the following actions have been
taken:
Clallam County Sheriff's Department has loaned five mobile
radios, which were installed in Border Patrol vehicles to
assist in radio interoperability until a long-term solution is
implemented.
Blaine Border Patrol Sector has loaned 15 portable (hand
held) VHF radios to Clallam County SO and other local law
enforcement agencies (LEA) to improve interoperability on the
Olympic Peninsula.
An ACU-1000, which provides a single UHF/VHF radio channel
for emergency radio interoperability on the Olympic Peninsula
has been installed at the Port Angeles Border Patrol Station.
The ACU-1000 will be utilized during the 2010 Olympic
Games and beyond, until a long-term interoperability
solution can be implemented.
The Clallam County Sheriff's Department has a Mobile Command
Center (MCC), which has an ACU-1000 installed in it, and can
also be utilized in the event of a large scale emergency.
To address interoperability concerns after the 2010 Winter Olympic
and Paralympic Games, and until a long-term communications solution can
be developed and implemented, the following courses of actions are
being pursued:
Continue to utilize short-term options beyond the Olympic
timeframe, until a long-term solution can be implemented.
Continue reassessing communications interoperability based
upon the needs of the Olympic Peninsula law enforcement
community.
In looking forward, CBP is actively pursuing a long-term
communications solution for the Olympic Peninsula by taking the
following actions:
Implement the CBP communications modernization effort in the
Olympic Peninsula.
Procure dual band VHF/UHF portable radios so that
Border Patrol Agents can communicate directly with other
STL law enforcement officers at the lowest level.
This technology will not be available until as late as
09/2010.
Procure and install UHF capable vehicle mounted radios
in CBP law enforcement vehicles so that Federal law
enforcement can communicate ``car to car'' with STL
partners.
Procure and install dual-band VHF/UHF base station radios to
increase communications between departments, vehicles, and law
enforcement personnel.
Question 10. Madam Secretary, one issue this Committee examined in
2007 with respect to the preparedness and coordination of first
responders across multiple jurisdictions and multiple agencies is
interoperable communications. It is still a work in progress.
Washington State's long-term approach is to use Radio over Internet
Protocol (RoIP). The Olympic Public Safety Communications Alliance
Network (OPSCAN) consists of over 40 local, state, Federal, and
Canadian public safety agencies, including DHS. OPSCAN has a fairly
extensive footprint in my state's Region 1.
One key advantage with using RoIP is that first responders, when
responding to an incident, in principle, can use their existing radios.
And with budgets being stretched as they are, it is especially hard for
smaller communities, especially where first responders are volunteers,
to afford purchasing new radios. Another approach the Department is
looking at to achieve interoperability is to develop multiband radios.
First, the Department has been looking at the use of radio over IP
and VOIP for interoperable communications for several years. What do
you consider to be the barriers for technology's widespread adoption by
first responders?
Answer. Although based on Internet Protocol (IP) standards, Voice
Over IP (VoIP)/Radio Over IP (RoIP) technology is not always
interoperable because it can be implemented in a number of different
ways by manufacturers. As a result, there is no guarantee that one
manufacturer's equipment will successfully interface with another's,
even though they may both use the same standards. To address these
interoperability gaps, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is assisting in the
development of VoIP specifications.
The Olympic Public Safety Communications Alliance Network (OPSCAN)
network uses a product from a Seattle-based company that implements a
Bridging Systems Interface (BSI) to help provide connectivity between
the agencies involved in the program. The BSI is an interoperability
specification developed by DHS S&T in partnership with the Department
of Commerce's Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) program. DHS
S&T and PSCR worked with emergency responders as well as this company
and others during the development of this specification. This
specification is currently implemented by 12 companies in their
commercially available products and is a big step toward addressing the
technical barriers to implementing interoperable RoIP solutions.
Further, DHS is producing a BSI Best Practices Guide aimed at
administrators and technicians that will provide guidance on procuring
and establishing interoperable communications using the BSI.
The largest barriers remaining for widespread implementation of
RoIP as an interoperability connectivity technology are related to
demonstration and knowledge dissemination. Most RoIP demonstration
projects, including OPSCAN, use a single-vendor solution to provide the
RoIP connectivity. A specific effort toward demonstration projects that
use multi-vendor RoIP equipment would be very helpful toward
demonstrating the viability of the technology. Further, more effective
means of disseminating the successes and challenges of implementing
such a system would also be helpful.
Question 11. What more needs to be done to evolve OPSCAN and
OPSCAN-like networks from a pilot project into a system for everyday
use, and is that something the Department is willing to consider
pursuing in partnership with the State of Washington?
Answer. The largest remaining barriers for widespread
implementation of Radio Over Internet Protocol (RoIP) as an
interoperability connectivity technology are related to technology
demonstration and knowledge dissemination. Most RoIP demonstration
projects, including the Olympic Public Safety Communications Alliance
Network (OPSCAN), use a single-vendor solution to provide the RoIP
connectivity. A specific effort toward demonstration projects that use
multi-vendor RoIP equipment would be very helpful toward demonstrating
the viability of the technology. Further, more effective means of
disseminating the successes and challenges of implementing such a
system would help in the development of products such as best
practices, lessons learned, and user guides that provide emergency
responders and other stakeholders with a better understanding of the
benefits and challenges they are likely to encounter when implementing
a technology.
Question 12. Does the Department intend to conduct a pilot of the
Bridging Systems Interface program in Washington State's Region 1
during the time of the Winter Olympics to see whether it does improve
interoperability under real world conditions?
Answer. Because the Olympic Public Safety Communications Alliance
Network (OPSCAN) network uses the Bridging System Interface (BSI); the
BSI will be piloted by proxy in any activities that involve the OPSCAN
network for the Winter Olympics. DHS will work with its partners in
Washington State to obtain any after-action reports from these
activities to help validate the application and use of the BSI in real-
world scenarios.
Question 13. The Department is currently conducting a series of
Multiband Radio Project pilots. How will the Department know if the
pilots are successful and what would be the next steps?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) is initiating Phase III of a three-phase,
multi-band, portable radio (MBR) project. Phase I was the laboratory
testing phase, which included emergency response agencies conducting
limited in-house laboratory testing in their radio facilities and
laboratory testing conducted by the Department of Commerce Public
Safety Communications Research Program located at the National
Institute for Standards and Technologies in Boulder, Colorado Phase II
was the test-demonstration phase that included an evaluation of the
prototype radios by emergency response agencies during training
exercises and some use in the field. Phase III is the actual pilot
testing by multiple agencies across the Nation using pre-production
prototype radios. Upon completion of the pilots, participating
practitioners will be interviewed by an independent party to help
understand how well the pilot achieved its goals and how well the
product met the expectations of emergency responders. All three phases
of the project include the documentation of results, which will be
compiled into a detailed final report on the mission impact and the
improvement and enhancement of radio communications interoperability.
DHS S&T undertook the MBR project to equip emergency responders
with the unprecedented capability of operating across the entire range
of public safety radio bands. Another goal of this project was to
encourage additional manufacturers to develop portable radio equipment
of similar capabilities with a future goal of seeing those
manufacturers develop and produce a similar mobile, multi-band radio
for installations in vehicles and mobile command centers (higher power
version). These efforts have sparked industry's decision to invest in
similar technologies; thus far, DHS has identified a total of four
different companies that have developed or are currently developing a
version of a MBR.
Looking ahead, software-defined radio technology could provide an
alternative solution that is expected to advance to a cognitive radio
technology in the future. A cognitive radio solution would not be
restricted to specific radio bands allocated to emergency response
agencies and could therefore access any available unused/authorized
spectrum available within the region. Ongoing research and development
initiatives are underway but there are numerous regulatory issues as
well as technical issues that must be resolved before this type of
technology will be available.
Question 14. Our borders and homeland security systems are being
tested every day by illegal drug smugglers. The illegal drug trade uses
every tool at its disposal, transporting massive quantities of drugs by
land, air, and sea. For example, international drug smuggling between
Washington State and Canada is often done covertly using helicopters.
And in the eastern Pacific Ocean, drug smugglers are now using
increasingly sophisticated and hard-to-detect semi-submersible vessels.
If drug smugglers are able to transport tons of drugs into our
country each and every day, what does this say about our Nation's
ability to detect and stop the smuggling of people and weapons for
other purposes like terrorism? Do you believe that use of increasingly
sophisticated transport methods like helicopters and semi-submersibles
are a potential threat to homeland security? Wouldn't an increased
crackdown against international drug smuggling by agencies like the
Coast Guard also have a side-benefit of strengthening our Nation's
anti-terrorism presence?
Answer. Your question identifies critical issues. It is the primary
mission of the Department to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States and to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to
terrorism.
The illicit drug trade is a vast and lucrative enterprise. While it
is a practical impossibility to stop all illicit trafficking, DHS
commits nearly four billion dollars a year to support the national drug
control program, including approximately three billion dollars for drug
interdiction. DHS works in collaboration with its partners in the
Departments of Justice, Defense, and State, and with our partner
nations to most effectively target our intelligence, interdiction, and
investigations to mitigate the threat posed by illicit drug trafficking
to the homeland.
I share your concerns that terrorist organizations may employ the
means and methods of drug traffickers to move terrorists or weapons of
mass destruction into the United States. One example of the
Department's vigilance to reduce the vulnerability to these threats is
the response to self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels. As the
threat posed by SPSS vessels developed, the Department proactively
sought legislation to designate the operation of SPSS vessels without
nationality as illegal and a threat to the security of the United
States. The resulting Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act
established civil and criminal penalties for persons using, navigating,
or operating SPSS vessels without nationality.
In the last part of your question, you ask if ``an increased
crackdown against international drug smuggling by agencies like the
Coast Guard also have a side-benefit of strengthening our Nation's
anti-terrorism presence?'' While the reallocation of resources to
support one mission may result in a ``side-benefit'' to another
mission, it is important to understand possible detrimental
consequences--direct and indirectly--of any reallocation of resources
on efforts to battle terrorism. DHS is committed to identifying the
appropriate allocation of resources amongst its various missions to
maximize the ability of the Department to mitigate threats to the
homeland, and particularly those posed by terrorists and weapons of
mass destruction.
Question 15. Given ongoing concerns about cost, schedule, and
performance issues with major acquisitions such as Deepwater and
SBInet, what progress has DHS made and what more can be done to ensure
that DHS acquisitions stay within cost, on schedule, and perform as
intended?
Answer. DHS has developed a comprehensive approach that establishes
acquisition management standards and oversight. Directive 102-1,
Acquisition Management was issued November 2008 establishing
acquisition program processes and formal acquisition review boards
(ARBs) that oversee major departmental programs.
During an ARB, the program manager (PM) summarizes program status
relative to cost, schedule and performance. The ARB serves as a forum
to assess acquisition program progress and bring essential issues to
the Acquisition Decision Authority (ADA). The ARB also performs a
staffing function to recommend, along with the PM, decisions and
courses of action for the ADA who exercises final authority for the
ARB. Once each ARB is completed, DHS documents it in a formal
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) and actively monitors the
completion of assigned ADM action items. DHS also tracks program
manager certifications and ARB progress and approval. Since the
directive was issued, over fifty ARBs have been held, of which five
were with SBI and six with USCG programs. Additionally, ten USCG
Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) were approved by the Departmental
ADA.
To complement the ARB process, Component Portfolio Reviews were
implemented. This process, jointly executed by the Component and the
Department, supports management of the Component's acquisition
portfolio and strengthens Departmental governance and oversight. These
reviews also provide insight as to systemic acquisition risks across
the Department.
DHS has designated six Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs) who
are responsible for program execution at their respective Components.
The CAE can chair decision meetings for specific programs as delegated
by the Under Secretary for Management (USM) who is the Department's
Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO).
Seven Independent Expert Program Reviews (IEPRs) have also been
conducted on programs of senior leadership interest that have cross
cutting areas pertinent to acquisition. In particular, an IEPR for
SBInet was conducted in FY 2008 and the USCG National Security Cutter
(NSC) in FY 2009.
In the future, DHS will continue to expand the oversight and
governance efforts listed above, as well as taking actions to
strengthen the acquisition enterprise (such as analyzing the adequacy
of program staffing for its major program portfolio).
Question 16. Improving the acquisition workforce has been noted as
a key acquisition management priority at DHS for the past several
years. What steps has the department taken to build and sustain a
sufficient, capable, and properly trained workforce to support DHS's
acquisition portfolio? What additional actions does the department plan
to take to strengthen its acquisition workforce?
Answer. To improve DHS's ability to effectively manage its current
initiatives and plan strategically for our acquisition work force, the
Department has taken the following steps:
1. We established an interim working definition (positions
within the Department that devote a minimum of 50 percent of
time and responsibilities to performing acquisition duties) of
the acquisition workforce that more accurately reflects the
number of employees performing acquisition-related functions to
guide current efforts, while continuing to formally add career
fields to the definition. Currently, DHS has established two
acquisition workforce career fields and one acquisition
workforce assignment specific specialty: (1) Contract Officers
and specialists, (2) program managers, and (3) contracting
officer's technical representatives. Further, the Department
has initiated the expansion of the acquisition workforce to
include Test and Evaluation, Logistics, Systems Engineering,
and Program Cost Estimating.
2: We have leveraged the successful execution of the
Department-wide Acquisition Professional Career Program (APCP).
This program serves as one initiative to address the
Department's shortage of acquisition professionals by
recruiting highly motivated and intelligent individuals into
entry level acquisition career fields. In addition to growing
the Department's acquisition talent, the program also serves to
develop a pipeline of future acquisition leaders and to
facilitate the goal of establishing the culture of One DHS.
The APCP program began in 2008 and since that time has grown to
109 participants. By the end of FY 2010 program will grow to
200 positions and in FY 2011 the program expects to reach its
full end strength of 300 positions. Since 2008, the program has
focused on recruiting contract specialists, but, in September
2009, DHS hired its first ``technical cohort'' that consisted
of 13 participants to include acquisition program managers and
systems engineers. In Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011, the program
will expand to other acquisition career fields to include
Business Cost Estimators, Information Technology Specialists,
and Logisticians. This program is expected, once fully
implemented, to add up to one hundred fully trained and
certified new acquisition professionals to the DHS Acquisition
workforce every year to offset losses from retirements and
transfers to non DHS agencies.
3. We have developed a comprehensive implementation plan to
execute the existing DHS acquisition workforce initiatives,
including:
Developing and executing a Department-wide Acquisition
Workforce Human Capital and Succession Plan in accordance with
the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.
Continuing the successful use of the direct hire and
reemployed annuitant hiring flexibilities to expedite hiring
and to fill critical vacancies.
Implementing the centralized hiring concept through
assumption of the lead role in all Department-wide acquisition-
related vacancy announcement postings.
4. The Chief Procurement Officer has coordinated with the
Department's Chief Human Capital Office to establish a joint
process for coordinating future acquisition workforce planning
efforts with the components for the purposes of informing
Department-wide planning efforts.
5. Improving the collection and maintenance of data on the
acquisition workforce by the following:
Assessing what additional data on current acquisition
workforce members, such as attrition data, would help inform
workforce planning efforts and then developing a strategy to
collect that information.
Expanding the collection of acquisition workforce data from
the appropriate component point of contact to include all
positions that DHS determines to be acquisition-related.
Conducting an assessment of options for creating systems to
maintain comprehensive acquisition workforce data and selecting
the appropriate system.
6. The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Acquisition
Workforce Branch is responsible for providing career
development training for the entire DHS acquisition work force.
Future acquisition workforce growth and succession requirements
as well as competition for talent between other agencies and
the components has raised concerns that reliance on these
outside training sources will not satisfy DHS's long-term needs
to train and retain employees. To that end, DHS has established
a centralized DHS Acquisition Workforce Training and
Certifications Offices to meet the expanding requirements and
has increased throughput of students completing certification
training to fill operational positions within the DHS
headquarters and Components.
Since its establishment in 2007, the Acquisition Workforce Branch
(AWF) Training Team has relied on various sources for the development
and delivery of acquisition-related training as a means to satisfy its
certification training and continuous learning requirements. The goals
of these offices are to:
Develop and execute a centralized acquisition workforce
training program comprised of certification, targeted, and
continuous learning developmental training opportunities.
Further expand, in addition to Contracting, Program Manager,
and Contracting Officers Technical Representative certification
programs, the DHS definition of the Acquisition Workforce by
developing the Test and Evaluation career field by the end of
the 2009 calendar year and begin drafting the Logistics and
Systems Engineering career field certification programs.
Publish a DHS course catalog and acquisition training
curriculum.
Implement a DHS wide online central registration and
certification system.
The Acquisition Training Office was established near the end of the
2007 Fiscal Year. In its first full training year, approximately 1,200
seats were available to be allocated for training. The FY 2010 training
program is projected to offer over 8,000 training seats. This
represents almost a 1000 percent increase in training throughput
capacity in two short years.
Student training and certification figures;
FY08 Training Catalog and Calendar
14 = Total number of titles in FY08 catalog
47 = Total number of classes scheduled
1,200 = Approx. number of seats available for all of FY08
820 = Approx. number of students enrolled
FY09 Training Catalog and Calendar
42 = Total number of titles in FY09 catalog
293 = Total number of classes scheduled
7,900 = Approx. number of seats available for all of FY09
6,785 = Approx number of students enrollments processed to
date
FY10 Proposed Catalog and Calendar
52 = Total number of titles in proposed FY10 catalog
283 = Total number of classes proposed to be scheduled
8,500 = Approx. number seats available for all of FY10
FAC-C Certifications Issued (Levels I, II, and III)
FY2007: 163
FY2008: 450
FY2009: 478
DHS Program Management Certifications Issued (Levels I, II, and
III)
FY2007: 279
FY2008: 517
FY2009: 694
COTR Certifications Issued
FY2007: 2,199
FY2008: 2,281
FY2009: 2,116
Average Cost per Student
Through the use of consolidated training contracts and a
centralized reservation system, the Acquisition Workforce Training Team
decreased the average training cost from approximately $2,000 per
student to approximately $250 per training seat. Further consolidation
efficiencies will continue to drive cost lower while standardizing the
acquisition workforce training requirements to meet the departments'
needs.
Question 17. The Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2010 and 2011, of which I am the lead sponsor, includes numerous
provisions to strengthen the Coast Guard, including a significant
overhaul of the Coast Guard's acquisition programs. I strongly believe
that we need to end the misuse of lead systems integrator approaches to
acquisition and build a system of serious accountability. How important
is it for the Coast Guard Authorization bill to be enacted this
Congress? Can you please comment on the importance of the bill's Coast
Guard acquisition reforms to help protect taxpayers, end wasteful
spending, and provide the Coast Guard with the assets it needs to
protect our Nation?
Answer. Enactment of an Authorization Act for the Coast Guard is
essential. I believe that such legislation must include provisions--
such as section 301 (Vice commandant; vice admirals) of S. 1194--that
would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Coast Guard and,
by extension, the safety and security of the United States.
The Department and the Coast Guard remain committed to adopting and
implementing the acquisition reforms contained in S. 1194--the evidence
of which is the significant department-wide improvements already
implemented in acquisition policy, processes, and execution. I believe
that such reforms could strengthen and solidify these improvements;
thus, these reforms are important, not only to the Service, the
Department, and the Government, but ultimately to the American people.
Broadly speaking, I believe that acquisition reform, particularly
those for an individual component, must not have a deleterious effect
on either the Department's ability to manage and oversee component
acquisition activities or my authority to unify departmental policies
and practices. I stand ready to assist in whatever manner to ensure the
swift enactment of an Authorization Act for the Coast Guard, and I look
forward to working with you, this Committee, and Congress to ensure
that these acquisition reforms are included--specifically, in a manner
consistent with departmental policy and guidance.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. Two years ago, Congress acted to require one hundred
percent scanning of all shipping containers coming to the U.S. However,
right now we are only scanning less than 5 percent of all U.S.-bound
containers and the GAO found that one hundred percent screening has not
been achieved at even one port. Can you identify any concrete, specific
improvements in cargo scanning that have been made by this
Administration since January?
Answer. CBP's Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) is the Agency's
program to deploy scanning and imaging systems overseas to meet the 100
percent scanning mandate of the 9/11 Commission Recommendation Act. SFI
has produced positive results in identifying needed improvements to
current technologies to enable CBP to detect anomalies in containerized
shipments via imaging systems. CBP continues to work with the vendors
of imaging systems to integrate these upgrades into the next generation
scanning systems.
SFI has scanning systems deployed at the Ports of Qasim, Pakistan;
Southampton, United Kingdom; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; and Busan, Korea
and anticipates being fully operational at the Port of Salalah, Oman in
April 2010. SFI operations at these ports continue to provide CBP with
data to enhance risk targeting, the ability to test system and scanning
technology enhancements, and experience and lessons learned to evaluate
potential additional locations that would strategically enhance CBP's
targeting efforts.
Question 2. The 9/11 Commission highlighted the importance of
securing mass transit and passenger rail. The 9/11 Act we passed in
2007 set deadlines for securing our surface transportation networks,
but TSA has missed many of these deadlines. How much longer will it
take for TSA to meet these deadlines, including the comprehensive risk
assessment and national security strategy for the rail sector that is
due this month?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently working on a set of risk assessments in response to several
congressional mandates and Government Accountability Office
recommendations. These reports, including the freight rail risk
assessment and national security strategy required by section 1511 of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
are expected to be completed and submitted to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
in the near future. TSA is also working on a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) that would require employee security training program
requirements for surface modes of transportation. These include freight
railroad carriers, public transportation agencies (including rail mass
transit and bus systems), passenger railroad carriers, over-the-road
bus operators, and motor carriers transporting Highway Security-
Sensitive Materials.
Question 3. Worldwide, mass transit and passenger rail have been
frequent targets of terrorist attacks. Just last week a terrorist
bombing of a Russian train resulted in the loss of twenty six lives.
Yet our transportation security efforts have focused almost exclusively
on aviation. What immediate steps is this Administration taking to
protect the millions of Americans who travel by mass transit and
passenger rail?
Answer. The Administration is advancing a multi-faceted strategy to
protect passengers traveling in mass transit and passenger rail systems
through the following priority areas:
Rail Transportation Security Rule--The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) issued a final rule to enhance
the security of our Nation's rail transportation system, which
included requirements for intercity, commuter, and short-haul
passenger train service providers and rail transit systems. See
73 FR 72130, November 26, 2008.
The rule codifies the scope of TSA's existing
inspection program and requires regulated parties to allow
TSA and Department of Homeland Security officials to enter,
inspect, and test property, facilities, conveyances, and
records relevant to rail security.
The rule also requires that regulated parties
designate rail security coordinators and report significant
security concerns.
Security Training Programs for Surface Mode Employees--
Pursuant to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, TSA is developing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) that would require employee security training
program requirements for surface modes of transportation.
The NPRM would cover public transportation agencies
(including rail mass transit and bus systems) and passenger
railroad carriers, as well as freight railroad carriers,
over-the-road bus operators, and motor carriers
transporting Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM).
The NPRM will propose minimum elements for the
training programs addressing security awareness, terrorist
behavior recognition, and threat and incident prevention
and response for frontline employees.
Protect High Risk Assets and Systems--Targeting grant
investments through the Transit Security Grant Program for
Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 and the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, totaling nearly $525 million,
for expanded operational capabilities and enhanced protection
of critical infrastructure.
Of note, nearly $78 million of the $150 million
awarded under ARRA specifically focuses on expanding
capabilities for visible, unpredictable deterrence through
the funding of dedicated law enforcement anti-terrorism
teams, including explosives detection canine teams and
mobile explosives detection screening, and reducing risk in
transit systems.
TSA augments these growing capabilities with
deployment of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) teams. Through a joint planning process between TSA,
the transit or rail agency's law enforcement and security
team, and local law enforcement officials, the VIPR team's
composition and activities are tailored to the needs of the
participating system. VIPR teams provide a range of
capabilities to enhance detection and deterrence in mass
transit and passenger rail, including surveillance
detection, behavior observation, mobile explosive trace
detection for random bag inspections, explosives detection
canine teams, specialization to resolve suspected explosive
devices, and other visible, random, and unpredictable
security activities. During 2009, TSA conducted more than
1,050 VIPR operations with mass transit and passenger rail
systems across the Nation.
Amtrak and TSA have jointly planned and executed
large-scale, integrated rail security operations in the
Northeast Corridor, which encompasses the largest
concentration of passenger rail services and highest volume
of passengers in the Nation. The most recent operation
unified law enforcement officers from 149 departments in an
unannounced surge to 157 passenger rail stations from
Richmond, VA, to Portland, ME, during morning rush hours of
September 9, 2009. These operations have provided a
foundation for recurring, joint security activities between
Amtrak and law enforcement partners throughout the
Northeast Corridor. TSA coordinates with mass transit and
passenger rail systems in a risk-based approach in other
metropolitan areas to advance similar approaches.
Elevate the Security Baseline--Pursuing continuous
improvement through comprehensive security assessments under
the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE)
program, use of the results to inform security enhancement
priorities, follow-up to assist in security enhancement with
the assessed agencies, and broad sharing of the most effective
practices identified in the assessments.
TSA surface transportation security inspectors
conducted more than 40 BASE assessments during 2009.
In December, TSA distributed an updated compilation of
smart security practices drawn from the assessment results
to law enforcement chiefs and security officials in mass
transit and passenger rail agencies. This compilation
consists of 80 smart security practices, many of which
focus on regional partnerships, random security patrols,
sweeps, and surges, and intelligence and security
information sharing, and training and public awareness. Its
specific purpose is to foster communication among security
professionals in mass transit and passenger rail nationally
with the specific objective of expanding adoption of these
most effective practices, tailored as necessary to each
agency's operating environment.
Build Security Force Multipliers--Expanding informed,
capable ``eyes and ears'' for security through targeted grants
awards during FY 2009 for employee security training, anti-
terrorism exercises, and public awareness campaigns, and
specially trained and equipped anti-terrorism law enforcement
teams and technological systems to enhance detection and
deterrent capabilities. TSA augments these capabilities through
focused support programs, including the following conducted
during 2009:
Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-
STEP), designed specifically to enhance capabilities of
regional security partners to work collaboratively to
enhance capabilities to prevent acts of terrorism through
joint workshops conducted over a period of months and a
regional table top exercise.
Bomb Squad Response to Transportation Systems--Mass
Transit, which uses training and scenario-based exercises
to expand regional capabilities to respond to a threat or
incident involving a suspected explosive device in mass
transit and passenger rail systems by placing bomb
technicians from law enforcement forces in a transit or
rail system's operating area in situations requiring
coordinated planning and execution of operations to
identify, resolve, and, if appropriate, render harmless
improvised explosive devices.
Employee Vigilance Campaign, which, under the theme of
``NOT ON MY SHIFT,'' employs professionally-designed
posters to emphasize the essential role that mass transit
and passenger rail employees play in security and terrorism
prevention in their systems. Adaptable templates enable
each transit agency to tailor the product to its operations
by including the system's logo, photographs of their own
agency's employees at work, and quotes from the senior
leadership, law enforcement and security officials, or
frontline employees. The unified Federal/local message is
conveyed by the inclusion of the Department of Homeland
Security seal alongside the agency's logo.
Lead Information Assurance--Employing the full range of
capabilities to ensure timely delivery of intelligence and
security information, at classified and unclassified levels, to
mass transit and passenger rail security officials.
During 2009, a joint DHS Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, TSA Office of Intelligence, and Federal Bureau of
Investigation effort provided classified intelligence and
analysis presentations to mass transit and passenger rail
security directors and law enforcement chiefs in more than
20 metropolitan areas simultaneously through the Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) network's secure video
teleconferencing system. These briefings, held in July and
December 2009, advance two key strategic objectives--
providing intelligence and security information directly to
mass transit and passenger rail law enforcement chiefs and
security directors and enhancing regional collaboration by
bringing these officials together with their Federal
partners to discuss the implications for their areas and
coordinate to implement effective security solutions. The
briefings will continue on approximately a quarterly to
semi-annual basis, with additional sessions as threat
developments may warrant.
At the unclassified level, TSA periodically produces
and disseminates Mass Transit Security Awareness Messages
that address developments related to terrorist activity and
tactics against mass transit and passenger rail.
Expand Partnerships for Security Enhancement--Engaging
continuously with senior executives, law enforcement chiefs,
and security managers for mass transit and passenger rail
agencies; State and local government officials, law
enforcement, and emergency responders; and Federal partners to
foster regional security coordination and to integrate the
spectrum of available resources for enhanced deterrent and
response capabilities.
In the Department, the Office of Inter-Governmental
Programs oversees this outreach, ensuring close
coordination at all levels of government on security
enhancement activities and actions to address a threat or
incident. TSA has made outreach to, and cooperation with,
governmental and industry partners the central element of
its security enhancement activities.
In 2009, TSA, with its Federal partners, most notably
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the FBI, held
two joint meetings with the Mass Transit Sector
Coordinating Council (SCC), which represents corporate and
employee interests through representatives from the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA), the
Community Transportation Association of America (CTAA),
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), Amtrak, and individual
transit agencies representative of the community in system
size and geographic spread, as well as representation of
business organizations providing support services to the
public transportation industry. These sessions streamline
the coordination process between government and the transit
industry, helping to advance a partnership in developing
and implementing security programs.
TSA also consulted extensively with the Transit
Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG), which
consists of law enforcement chiefs and security directors
from 15 mass transit and passenger rail agencies of varying
size, types of services, and locations. The collective
expertise and diverse experiences of the Group provide
invaluable practical context to TSA's policy and program
development and implementation, assuring that developing
security enhancement programs and initiatives align with
operational realities in mass transit and passenger rail
systems. Ten teleconferences and one joint meeting were
held with the Group during 2009.
Finally, TSA and DOT's Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) jointly sponsored two Transit Security and Safety
Roundtables, which brought together law enforcement chiefs,
security directors, and safety directors from the Nation's
50 largest mass transit and passenger rail agencies and
Amtrak with Federal security partners. In a workshop
format, the participants discuss specific terrorism
prevention and response challenges and work collaboratively
in developing effective risk mitigation and security
enhancement solutions. The Roundtables also enabled the
transit agencies safety and security officials to share
effective practices and develop relationships to improve
coordination and collaboration.
Question 4. Maritime workers are required to go through background
checks and obtain biometric I-D cards to gain access to our ports. Now
that the deadline for workers to obtain these TWIC cards has been met,
TSA must focus on deploying technology that can be used to accurately
read the cards. How long will it be before our ports have the
technology in place to read TWIC cards?
Answer. As required by the Security and Accountability For Every
Port Act of 2006, DHS will implement final reader requirements through
the rulemaking process. DHS intends to issue regulations that require
owners and operators of MTSA regulated vessels and facilities to have
and use TWIC readers in access control systems. The law requires DHS to
conduct a card reader pilot program to test the business processes and
technology required to deploy transportation security card readers. The
pilot also will examine operational impacts for vessel and facility
owners and operators.
Currently there are a total of 24 participants in 9 different
geographic locations representing a broad sampling of MTSA-regulated
facility and vessel operations (EOA/ST&E start dates included):
Port Authority of Brownsville, TX (early April 2009).
Watermark Cruises, Annapolis, MD (early May 2009).
Magnolia Marine, Mississippi (mid-May 2009).
Staten Island Ferry (early June 2009).
Clipper Navigation, Seattle, WA (late August 2009).
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (planned February
2010).
Port Authority of Los Angeles (planned February 2010).
Port Authority of Long Beach (planned January 2010).
APM Terminal, Portsmouth, VA (planned January 2010).
Exxon/Mobil, Baton Rouge, LA(planned January 2010).
Shell Norco, Norco, LA (planned January 2010).
The statute further requires that any final TWIC card reader rule
be consistent with the findings of the pilot program. DHS intends to
issue a rule after the final TWIC card reader pilot program report is
made public, incorporating the data and conclusions into the rule and
its supporting analyses. This will ensure the public has ample time to
review both the rule and the report before DHS implements a final rule.
At this time there is no requirement for ports to use readers and
the TWIC reader pilot program has not been completed. Once a final rule
is published, DHS anticipates a phase-in period at the ports with the
reader technology.
Question 5. In its last budget submitted to Congress, the
Administration requested two-hundred and fifty million dollars for port
security grants, a one hundred fifty million dollar cut from the
program's authorized level. As the President formulates his budget for
next year, will you recommend that he request the full authorized
amount of funding for the Port Security grant program?
Answer. Section 112 of the Security and Accountability for Every
Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) amended 46USC 70107 and authorizes
$400,000,000 for the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) for Fiscal
Years (FY) 2007 through 2011.
Although there was a reduction in the President's budget between FY
2009 and FY 2010, the PSGP was appropriated at its full authorized
amount for FY 2009 and received an additional appropriation of
$150,000,000 through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, providing a total of $550,000,000 for the program.
Further, while the SAFE Port Act establishes a maximum amount for
PSGP, other factors including the ability of grantees to absorb
additional funding affect our ability to allocate funds responsibly and
effectively.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. I realize that your agency is not directly responsible
for inspection or overseeing foreign repair stations. But what is your
view on how we certify and inspect foreign repair stations? Does the
lack of regular inspections of foreign repair stations raise security
concerns for your department? Aren't proper inspections and review also
paramount for aviation security so that we have a better handle on the
process and people involved in maintaining airplanes?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) published
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on November 18, 2009, which
proposes to issue regulations to improve the security of Aircraft
Repair Stations as required by Public Law 108-176: The Vision 100--
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act of 2003. The NPRM proposes to
establish requirements for aircraft repair stations to adopt and
implement a standard security program, and to comply with security
directives issued by TSA. This rule also proposes to codify the scope
of TSA's existing inspection program and to require regulated parties
to allow TSA and Department of Homeland Security officials to enter,
inspect, and test property, facilities, and records relevant to repair
stations. The comment period for the NPRM was extended to February 19,
2010.
Question 2. I'm aware that putting in security measures for the
airline operations has been a significant challenge because of the
diversity of aircraft, airports and operations across the country. I'm
aware that there are increased background checks for pilot training.
What about for airline mechanics? What can be done to check the
backgrounds of mechanics at foreign repair stations? Is there any good
way to track this?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) proposed
security regulations will require repair stations certificated by the
FAA under 14 CFR part 145, to adopt a security program that will
include the measures by which the repair station verifies the
employment history of its employees and conducts background checks to
the extent permitted by the laws of the country in which the repair
station is located. TSA will use the inspection process to make sure
that the verification measures listed in the security program are
adequate.
Question 3. Regarding the sole-source agreement with the American
Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) to process security data for
airport workers, are you planning to compete this contract when it
expires in October 2010? If not, why not? It seems clear this sole-
source justification is, in the nicest terms, a stretch: We are
requiring a simple transactional service--about 4 secure e-mails to be
exact--and there are plenty of other players in the field. Isn't this a
no-brainer? In this economic climate, how can we not be doing
everything in our power to get the best value for our already
struggling airports?
Answer. In examining the current aviation worker vetting process, a
primary objective of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
is to maintain or improve upon existing security standards and
practices. In furtherance of this objective, TSA is currently
establishing data submission standards and data security requirements.
TSA expects that multiple companies will qualify to meet the submission
and security requirements. TSA is supportive of a model that promotes
competition and airport choice and is currently evaluating several
options that would achieve this. TSA anticipates that competition and
airport choice in this area will yield process enhancements and
security capabilities that operationally improve aviation worker
background checks. TSA plans to engage industry in the first quarter of
CY 2010 regarding its plans.
Question 4. You've had almost a year now to get a handle on the
contracting environment at DHS. Do you know about how many other sole-
source contracts like this exist? What's your plan to root out the ones
that are not mission-critical and promote full and open competition
across the Department?
Answer. While securing the Homeland through the acquisition of
products and services is essential to our mission, executing contracts
that represent good business is a priority as well. This includes
maximizing competition and small business opportunities. We believe
that the practices we have instituted in past years, coupled with new
initiatives being implemented in FY2010, provide a strong mitigation
strategy for reducing and/or eliminating the use of inappropriate sole
source contracts.
A summary of our recent achievements and our key initiatives in the
area of competition are discussed below.
I. Competition at the Department of Homeland Security
The strength of DHS's Competition Advocacy Program is reflected in
continuing improvement in the Department's level of competition. As
indicated in the table below, Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 marked a recovery
by DHS to pre-Katrina levels of competition. Further in FY 2008 and FY
2009 DHS achieved a level of competition equaling or exceeding 70
percent, well above the Government wide average of 64 percent.
Seven out of eight DHS Components met or exceeded their FY 2009
competition goals, and six out of eight DHS Components achieved a
competition rate (in terms of competitive obligations) of 70 percent or
greater.
DHS Summary Competition Data: Fiscal Years 2003-2009
Percentage of Contract
Fiscal Year Dollars Competed Competed Dollars
FY03 71% $2,771,342,335
FY04 72% $5,116,950,676
FY05 56% $5,945,514,066
FY06 48% $7,353,642,377
FY07 69% $8,144,115,845
FY08 75% $10,208,340,211
FY09 76% $10,130,114,603
Source: FPDS-NG, FY 2009 Data as of 11/30/2009.
II. Competition Program Monitoring and Oversight
The Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) and the DHS Competition
Advocate monitor competition data as reported to the Federal
Procurement Data System on a monthly basis. Mid-year reports are
provided to the Chief Procurement Officer and to Heads of the
Contracting Activities regarding year-to-date competitive
accomplishments versus established goals. Corrective action plans are
requested of Components with mid-year goal/achievement gaps greater
than 10 percentage points.
In addition to monitoring Component competitive accomplishments
versus competitive obligation goals, progress related to two new
metrics will be monitored as part of the Competition Advocate's
monthly, quarterly, and mid-year reports beginning in Fiscal Year 2010.
These new metrics, reducing by 10 percent the percentage of
noncompetitive and one bid contracts, are being added consistent with
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-09-25, Improving
Government Acquisition, dated July 29, 2009, and Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) memorandum Increasing Competition and
Structuring Contracts for the Best Results, dated October 27, 2009. As
part of this effort, the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer has
established individual goals for each component and is providing
monthly updates to each component on their progress to date.
DHS is also involved in several post-award internal reviews of
noncompetitive contract awards. The DHS oversight division of the
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer recently completed a review of
sole source awards made during the period of April 1, 2008 through
March 31, 2009. The purpose of this review was to determine whether DHS
components are awarding noncompetitive contracts in accordance with the
provisions at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 6.3, the
Homeland Security Acquisition Regulations (HSAR), the Homeland Security
Acquisition Manual (HSAM) and DHS acquisition policies and guidance.
Also considered was a focus on the components' use of good business
judgment and adequate supporting rationale. The final report for this
review, including identification of opportunities for improvement and
associated recommendations, will be issued in February, 2010.
Furthermore, in accordance with DHS appropriations requirements,
the DHS Office of Inspector General is directed to audit and report
annually on contracts awarded during the previous Fiscal Year through
other than full and open competition to determine compliance with
applicable laws and regulation. In October 2009, the DHS Office of
Inspector General began conducting simultaneous audits of DHS
competition for FYs 2008 and 2009. The reports for both FY2008 and 2009
are anticipated to be issued in February, 2010. In addition, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently opened an engagement
assessing the extent of noncompetitive contracting, including sole
source, in the Federal Government's procurement of goods and services
(GAO Code 120850) to include review of the Department of Homeland
Security Competition Program.
III. Policies and Processes
The DHS competition policy conforms with that of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual.
OCPO Regulatory Advisories and Acquisition Alerts provide DHS
Components with accurate and timely information regarding new
regulatory, data collection and reporting, and procedural requirements
affecting Federal, Department wide, and Component competition programs.
On October 1, 2009, the third edition of the HSAM was issued containing
comprehensive and updated policy guidance related to competition.
Included in the HSAM are a new comprehensive DHS Market Research Guide,
an expanded and revised Acquisition Planning Guide, and a Guide for
Justification and Approval for Other Than Full and Open Competition
(including the requirement to post noncompetitive J&As to
FedBizOpps.gov).
In accordance with FAR 6.5 and Homeland Security Acquisition Manual
(HSAM) 3006.5, annual Procuring Activity Competition Advocate
competition reports are submitted to the DHS Competition Advocate. The
reports describe Component accomplishments over the past Fiscal Year
and plans for the upcoming Fiscal Year including those for increasing
competition, the acquisition of commercial items, challenging barriers
to competition and commercial item acquisition, and initiatives that
ensure task and delivery orders over $1,000,000 issued under multiple
award contracts are properly planned and issued. Component competition
reports are reviewed and used to support compilation of the DHS
Competition Advocate Report to the Senior Procurement Executive and the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy. Instructions for preparing FY
2009 Procuring Activity Competition Advocate Reports integrates
requirements associated with OMB Memorandum M-09-25, Improving
Government Acquisition, DHS implementing instructions dated October 14,
2009, and OFPP memorandum Increasing Competition and Structuring
Contracts for the Best Results, dated October 27, 2009.
IV. Awards, Incentives, and Outreach
In July 2007, the DHS Competition Advocate established the DHS
Competition and Acquisition Excellence Awards Program as a means of
renewing and increasing acquisition workforce interest in competition
and related innovative procurement practices by recognizing and
rewarding individuals and teams for outstanding contributions to the
enhancement of competition and the use of innovative and best
procurement practices. Thirteen nominations were received from across
the DHS organization during the award program's inaugural year. Seven
teams and individuals were selected for recognition, their efforts
collectively resulting in estimated cost avoidance/cost savings of over
$5.2 million. In a July 18, 2008 memorandum, the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) cited the DHS FY 2007 Competition and
Acquisition Excellence Awards Program as an example for agencies
considering establishment of programs to recognize employee
contributions to improving competition. Six out of eight DHS Components
submitted nominations for the DHS FY 2008 Competition and Acquisition
Excellence Award. Two individuals, one contracting activity, and three
teams were recognized for outstanding results in competition and the
use of innovative and best practices. The DHS Competition and
Acquisition Excellence Awards Program call for nominations recognizing
FY 2009 accomplishments was issued on December 4, 2009.
In numerous cases, including but not limited to the DHS Competition
Program, issuance of revised acquisition policy or regulations is
accompanied by specialized training provided to Components. For
example, in anticipation of implementation of the interim FAR rule on
the public disclosure of Justification and Approval (J&A) documents for
noncompetitive contracts (FAR Case 2008-003), Justification and
Approval development, review, and posting training was provided to 75
ICE participants in two 90-minute sessions on February 12 and 17, 2009.
The DHS Chief Procurement Officer hosts an annual DHS Industry Day
in Washington, DC to provide a forum to better communicate DHS
requirements and increase competition and use of commercial items by
sharing information with Federal contractors and other business
representatives interested in DHS contracting and subcontracting
opportunities.
V. Summary
We believe that our established policies, continued monitoring of
component progress, upfront and post award reviews, and proven
management commitment provide a strong deterrent against and timely
identification of potentially inappropriate sole source contracts.
DHS's focus on its Competition Advocacy Program through closer
coordination with Components, expanded Department wide policy, tailored
training, recognition programs and enhanced oversight has resulted in a
robust program in which the Department takes pride. The FY 2009 level
of competition, at 76 percent, is a testament to the Competition
Advocacy Program's success. DHS is committed to building upon this
foundation by continuing to strongly implement our current initiatives
and seeking new initiatives to best promote full and open competition
across the department.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. As you can see, there is a great deal of confusion
about what the policies are and how they should be implemented. In
order to clarify the current WBI policy, please answer the following:
If a passenger walks up to a WBI machine, realizes what it is, and
tells a Transportation Security Officer that he does not want to go
through the WBI screening, what is the correct procedure for the TSO to
follow?
Answer. If a passenger gets in line for advanced imaging technology
(AIT), formerly referred to as whole body imaging, screening without
being directed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
do so and then realizes that he or she is in the wrong line, TSA will
allow that passenger to undergo walk-through metal detector screening.
If TSA directs a passenger to the AIT for screening and the passenger
then refuses, TSA will conduct a pat down of the passenger as an
alternative to the AIT.
Question 2. If a TSO directs a passenger to a WBI machine because
it is the shortest line, and the passenger states that she wants to go
through a metal detector, what is the correct policy for a TSO to
follow?
Answer. This will be treated as a passenger opting out of advanced
imaging technology screening, and the passenger will be required to
undergo a pat-down search.
Question 3. If there are both metal detectors and WBI machines
being used as primary screening devices at the same checkpoint, do
passengers who go through the metal detector without setting it off
receive any secondary screening, such as a pat-down?
Answer. A passenger undergoes screening via the primary screening
device as directed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
For instance, if a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) directs a
passenger to advanced imaging technology (AIT) screening, that
passenger will undergo the AIT screening standard operating procedures
(SOP). If a TSO directs a passenger to the walk-through metal detector
(WTMD), that passenger will undergo the WTMD screening SOP. A passenger
who does not alarm the WTMD may receive a pat down if random screening
protocols are being conducted at that time or if the passenger is
wearing bulky clothing that the TSO believes could conceal a non-metal
prohibited item.
Question 4. If a secondary pat-down is not mandatory for all
passengers going through a metal detector at check points with both WBI
and metal detectors, how does this prevent terrorists from simply
choosing to go through a metal detector?
Answer. Passengers who go through the walk-through metal detector
may receive a pat down, which is conducted to detect non-metallic
threat items. A pat down may be conducted on a random basis or if the
passenger is wearing bulky clothing that the Transportation Security
Officer believes could conceal a non-metallic prohibited item.
Question 5. TSA stated policy--Passengers who do not wish to
utilize this screening will use the walk-through metal detector and
undergo a pat-down procedure to ensure they receive an equal level of
screening. I do not believe these are acceptable options--either go
through a machine that allows a TSO to see under a highly invasive
image of the passenger or have a TSO give a passenger a full pat-down.
What steps is TSA taking to accommodate passengers who have legitimate
concerns that either option is an unreasonable privacy violation?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
evaluated the privacy implications of the advanced imaging technology
and screening process, and has incorporated features that effectively
protect the privacy of the individual. TSA has provided the greatest
level of choice consistent with the need to provide adequate security.
TSA has determined that threats to the aviation domain do not remain
static and are currently evolving to include non-metallic threat
objects and liquids (e.g., explosives) carried on persons. Given the
known risk, TSA cannot accommodate passengers who are unwilling to
undergo screening.
Question 6. In October 2008, TSA released a Privacy Impact
Assessment for Whole Body Imaging. That assessment outlined many of the
policies TSA would use with WBI machines to protect passenger's
privacy. Would you support a follow up report, either by GAO or the DHS
Inspector General, to assess whether those policies have been followed
and that they adequately protect passenger privacy? Would you support
stricter guidelines from Congress on how TSA should safeguard passenger
privacy at airport screenings?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) would
welcome a review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or the
Department of Homeland Security Inspector General to assess whether the
policies outlined within the Privacy Impact Assessment have been
followed. TSA has welcomed and considered input on ways to improve the
protection of passenger privacy consistent with its underlying security
mission, but believes existing privacy frameworks adequately safeguard
passenger privacy at airport screenings.
Question 7. Members of the general aviation community have
expressed concerns about TSA's Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP)
proposed rulemaking. My understanding is that TSA is already addressing
these concerns by issuing a supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM). Could you share your view on how DHS should engage and work
with stakeholders from the general aviation community when developing
and promulgating aviation security requirements?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the
process of developing a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(SNPRM) to address general aviation security. The SNPRM will take into
account our security partner input gathered during the public comment
period. Based on this input, TSA anticipates that the proposal in the
SNPRM will provide an effective and feasible security program for the
general aviation community to implement, while maintaining an
appropriate level of security.
In Spring 2009, TSA implemented a new stakeholder outreach
strategy. This strategy includes monthly stakeholder teleconferences,
the designation of TSA representatives for various regions of the
United States to increase outreach capabilities to non-trade
association stakeholders, and the future establishment of a sub-working
group under the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. This strategy
bolsters TSA's industry/stakeholder communications framework and forms
the foundation for current and future interactions with the stakeholder
community on the development of general aviation security policies and
programs.
Question 8. As you may know, Sandia and Los Alamos National
Laboratories operate the National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center (NISAC) for the Department of Homeland Security. This
Center has provided important consequence analysis of the impact on
critical infrastructure from threats ranging from terrorism to natural
disasters. The work of NISAC has been important in the national
prioritization of infrastructure and our response to issues such as
H1N1. Have you considered using NISAC to analyze and prioritize the
consequences of a cyber attack on the U.S. infrastructure? If not, will
your Department explore how NISAC can assist in this important area of
national security?
Answer. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) met with
representatives of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center (NISAC) to discuss potential areas of support for the
Information Technology (IT) sector but determined that NISAC's work
does not fit with planned IT sector activities. Currently, NCSD's needs
in this area are met through other means; however, NCSD will continue
to consider NISAC for future activities. For cross-sector cybersecurity
work, NCSD receives support from Idaho National Laboratory and will
receive new support from RTI International. Additionally, NCSD is under
contract with the Software Engineering Institute/Carnegie Mellon
University to conduct a study on cyber interdependencies across
critical infrastructure and key resources; and with Sandia National
Laboratories to assess the risks associated with control system
components that have long manufacturing lead times or are only
manufactured overseas. The first part of this study will look at the
energy and water sectors and is intended to determine if the Nation
needs a ``critical spares'' mitigation plan. NCSD plans to expand to
other sectors in 2010. This effort addresses a deliverable assigned to
the Department as part of Initiative 10 of the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative.
Question 9. In the hearing, you discussed the fact that good border
policy is complex, balancing trained personnel, technology, and
infrastructure, and must account for the differences in types of border
(terrain, etc.) along both the northern and southern borders. Over
fifteen years ago, Sandia National Laboratories conducted an archival
mile-by-mile border study for INS that resulted in technology and
infrastructure recommendations. Has that study been updated and does a
similar study for the northern border exist? If not, will you consider
working with Sandia National Laboratories to update the southern border
study and to conduct a study of the northern border?
Answer. Since the Sandia National Laboratories study was completed,
CBP has since developed an internal planning process which replaces the
need for studies involving resource deployment strategies for
infrastructure and technology enhancements. As part of the most recent
congressionally mandated fence effort, CBP was required to develop
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to determine if a fence was the most
viable solution with consideration to operational effectiveness and
cost. Subsequent to the fence effort, H.R. 2638 was passed directing
CBP to conduct an AoA for all tactical infrastructure construction
projects funded under Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and
Technology (BSFIT) appropriations. CBP has complied with this law and
uses AoAs as the basis for tactical infrastructure and non-SBInet
related technology deployment decisions along the northern and southern
borders. The AoA solutions are determined by Field Commanders with
engineering, environmental and real estate support provided by the CBP
Office of Administration.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. Tourism is one of our Nation's greatest renewable
resources, yet overseas tourists coming to the U.S. have declined since
9/11 and have not yet recovered. Secretary Napolitano, would you be
supportive of creating a Tourism Liaison within DHS to coordinate and
interact with the travel and tourism industries?
Answer. I have designated the Private Sector Office led by
Assistant Secretary Douglas Smith to work closely with the travel and
tourism industry. We would welcome your support for more resources to
enhance our capabilities to address tourism. We agree with you that
tourism is a vital part of our Nation's economy. On October 1, 2009, I
met with private sector leaders from the travel and tourism industry at
a meeting hosted by U.S. Representatives Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Sam Farr
(D-CA) where we discussed how the travel industry can work more
collaboratively with the new Administration to improve the industry's
future and strengthen the American economy. On October 22, 2009, I met
with CEOs from the travel and tourism industry where I emphasized the
shared responsibility between the private sector and DHS for protecting
our Nation. For all private sector related issues, Assistant Secretary
Douglas Smith and his office serve as the contact point. In the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Private Sector Office was designated
as advisor on the impact of the Department's policies, regulations,
processes and actions on the private sector and will continue this
work.
Question 2. While we can all acknowledge Transportation Security
Officers and other front-line DHS personnel primarily serve a security
function, their interaction with the traveling public has inescapable
customer service aspects. Just as it has been demonstrated that law
enforcement personnel are most effective when they treat citizens with
respect, the performance of DHS security employees might be improved
with a less-adversarial, more passenger-friendly approach. Do you
believe DHS should provide additional customer service training to
frontline security and transportation personnel to help increase their
people skills and provide for a more open and welcoming environment for
our international visitors and domestic travelers?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to
develop training for frontline security personnel that enables them to
assess risks posed by travelers and control the environment to better
secure transportation. Our training also directs our Transportation
Security Officers to treat the traveling public with respect during any
security procedure. For example, TSA is now developing its training to
strengthen technical skills as well as skills to promote passenger
understanding of the screening process.
Question 3. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Anchorage
International Airport (ANC) was one of several airports required by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to invest in Explosive
Detection Systems (EDS) with the understanding the TSA would reimburse
the airport for at least 75 percent of the allowable costs. After
installation of the EDS was complete the TSA determined there was
insufficient funding and withdrew its commitments to reimburse ANC, as
well as several other airports.
Congress tried to address this issue with passage of the
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
which clarified airports should be reimbursed by the TSA for eligible
past costs (Public Law 110-53, Section 160). ANC has still not been
reimbursed because installation of the EDS was completed before
implementation of this Act. Secretary Napolitano, what will you do to
address the commitment for reimbursement originally made by the TSA to
airports such as ANC?
Answer. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, Section 1604) required TSA to create a
prioritization schedule inclusive of airports that have commenced
projects and incurred eligible costs in anticipation of receiving
reimbursement. TSA uses a risk-based schedule that focuses first on
those airports with sub-optimal solutions to ensure the most effective
security solutions are in place for screening checked baggage.
Competing priorities such as recapitalization of equipment that is
reaching the end of its useful life and completion of optimal solutions
have also precluded TSA from acting on reimbursement requests.
Question 4. The United States' Arctic border used to be
impenetrable, locked in ice for most of the year. A warming climate is
changing this scenario, with expectations that the Arctic Ocean will be
substantially ice free during summer months in 20 years. Recent summers
have already seen an increase in cruise ship and marine cargo traffic
in these waters and this increase is expected to expand as the ice pack
withdraws.
Secretary Napolitano, what do you see as the security implications
of an ice-diminishing Arctic? What does Congress need to do to respond
to these concerns? Do you support investment in the needed
infrastructure such as aircraft facilities, vessel monitoring systems,
better communications, icebreakers, and other needs to maintain a full
time national presence in the Arctic?
Answer. NSPD-66/HSPD-25, Arctic Region Policy, January 2009,
affirms our Nation's broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic and
guides the Department of Homeland Security's current operational
activities in the region. As the Arctic becomes more critical to the
U.S. and global economies and our national and homeland security
posture, NSPD-66 notes that it is imperative that the U.S. maintain the
operational ability to:
Control U.S. borders and areas under our national
jurisdiction;
Protect against all kinds of attacks across and from the
Arctic;
Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness;
Protect the global mobility of U.S. vessels and aircraft and
freedom of navigation and overflight under the principles of
customary international law;
Ensure the operational security of the maritime
transportation system;
Address hazards in the Arctic, including response to
environmental disasters and search and rescue requirements; and
Carry out all required military activities in the region,
including strategic sealift.
NSPD-66/HSPD-25 requires the heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies with responsibilities relating to the Arctic region to work to
identify future budget, administrative, personnel, or legislative
proposal requirements to implement the elements of the U.S. Arctic
Policy. Working with the Congress and OMB, the Department will continue
to seek to integrate the operational requirements and goals of NSPD-66/
HSPD-25 with its other budget imperatives.
DHS and the Coast Guard will continue to further define the
requirements for infrastructure support in this region. Toward this
end, the Coast Guard has contracted for a ``high latitude study'' to
assist in determining mission and infrastructure requirements to
properly carry out its eleven statutory missions in the Arctic (and
Antarctic) now and in the future. Currently, DHS has all of the
statutory authorities it requires to implement the tasks outlined in
NSPD-66/HSPD-25 and any other legislation imposing mission requirements
applicable to the Arctic region. Finally, the Department and the Coast
Guard continues to support U.S. ratification of the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. In response to my question regarding border wait times,
you responded that wait times at CBP crossing facilities on the Texas-
Mexico border had actually decreased 12 percent. However, these figures
only account for time spent inside the CBP facility and not the long
lines waiting to get in. At nearly all border crossings in Texas,
bridge operators and owners and local officials consistently tell me
that wait times outside CBP facilities can be 30 to 90 minutes or
longer for freight and/or passenger vehicles. The reason they have
provided to me is that there are not enough CBP staff to operate all
available lanes or to expand hours of operation at congested crossings.
How do you plan to supplement your measurement methods to reflect wait
times outside facilities and to gauge the necessary staffing levels,
number of open lanes and operating hours to decrease total wait times
at CBP crossing facilities to shorter and more acceptable levels?
Answer. In addition to recording and tracking our transaction time
of processing vehicles and travelers through primary checkpoints, CBP
also reports on wait times at our land border ports of entry. These
wait time reports include the wait times outside CBP facilities. While
in FY 2009 in Texas CBP saw an improvement in peak wait time averages
of 14 percent compared to FY 2008, wait times outside CBP facilities
can often be 30 to 90 minutes or longer. Wait times are publicly
reported on the CBP web page http://apps.cbp.gov/bwt/.
Wait times are an important concern for travelers and those
involved with or affected by international travel and trade. A
proactive approach to increasing public awareness of our mission
responsibilities plays a vital role in helping raise public awareness
and understanding of factors influencing wait times. Before anticipated
high volume holiday traffic and high anticipated wait times our field
offices provide public advisories. Additionally, our CBP port managers
are directed to prepare in advance of peak travel periods and staff
accordingly. Many of our locations have wait times as a result of
traffic volume exceeding port infrastructure limitations. Impediments
include insufficient access roads, road infrastructure, buildings,
bridges, and tunnels which are beyond the control of CBP. Additional
focus is necessary to address these issues in many locations.
With regard to measurement methods, CBP is planning to coordinate a
test of land border wait time measurement technologies (loops, GPS,
RFID, Bluetooth, video imaging, etc) later this year, with the
objective of enhancing wait time measurements. Although the initial
tests will be on the northern border, the analysis and best practices
identified will improve our methodologies.
CBP prepares a Workload Staffing Model (WSM), which is used as a
decision-support tool to assist in strategically determining CBP
officer manpower requirements. The Port of Entry volume, number of
lanes, and workload factors at each POE are drivers in this model. The
WSM is consulted as OFO applies its Resource Allocation Model (RAM)
process, which integrates operational and budgetary decisions on where
available resources will go. Wait times are also used as a factor in
helping to prioritizing funding of infrastructure construction
projects.
Last year, in the commercial truck environment, CBP implemented
extended hours pilot programs in both El Paso/Ysleta and Laredo/World
Trade Bridge. These pilot programs were discontinued after about 6
months, as there was very little volume during the additional hours.
CBP continues to address staffing and infrastructure issues and
continuously work toward improving wait times.
Question 2. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential,
known as TWIC, has been in development for 7 years, and although the
card has been issued to over 1.4 million transportation workers,
without the installation of the necessary card reader systems at our
Nation's ports, the TWIC is currently an expensive ``flash pass''. When
does DHS anticipate that TWIC will be a viable and complete security
program?
Answer. DHS has issued over 1.4 million Transportation Worker
Identification Credentials (TWIC) leading up to and since the national
compliance date of April 15, 2009. All personnel requiring unescorted
access to secure areas of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (MTSA) regulated facilities and vessels, and all mariners holding
Coast Guard issued credentials are required to possess a TWIC. Prior to
receiving a TWIC, all personnel are vetted to verify they do not pose a
potential security threat to the maritime transportation system. The
TWIC is currently used as a proof of identification and furthers DHS's
multi-layered approach to the safeguarding of our Nation's ports and
critical maritime infrastructure by ensuring only vetted individuals
have unescorted access to secure areas.
DHS intends to issue regulations that will require owners and
operators of MTSA regulated vessels and facilities to have and use TWIC
readers in access control systems. MTSA requires DHS to conduct a card
reader pilot program to test the business processes and technology
required to deploy transportation security card readers. The pilot will
also examine operational impacts for vessel and facility owners and
operators. The pilot, currently underway at multiple facilities and
vessels around the country, is critical to informing future rulemaking
on the operational impacts to affected facility and vessel owners and
operators. MTSA also requires that any final TWIC card reader rule be
consistent with the findings of the pilot program.
DHS intends to issue a proposed rule in Spring 2011, after the
final TWIC card reader pilot program report is made public this winter.
Data, supporting analyses, and conclusions from the report will be
incorporated in the proposed rule. DHS has a legal obligation to permit
the public to comment on the methodology and data underlying any final
rule. This will ensure the public has ample time to comment on both the
proposed rule and the report before DHS publishes a final rule.
A final rule requiring ports to use readers could publish the
following year assuming there are no significant issues raised during
the comment period. An ample phase-in period is anticipated after
publication.
Question 3. TSA has told the Committee that it is considering
harmonizing its credentialing programs with the aim of greater
flexibility and fee fairness for transportation workers. Given the
disparity of the various credentialing programs across DHS, how and
when does the Department plan to achieve this interoperability, so that
a truck driver carrying hazardous materials into ports or across
borders would not have to apply for two or three separate DHS programs,
each with its own fee structure and background check?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) is leading
an Integrated Project Team (IPT) to harmonize security threat
assessments and fees across all modes of transportation. To the extent
possible, TSA is developing a universal framework to harmonize the
nature of the threat assessment processes and security fee schedule.
The universal framework is being developed in alignment with the
TTAC Infrastructure Modernization initiative, an initiative to enhance
TSA vetting and credentialing programs that affect the security of all
critical transportation sectors. TSA is modernizing its business
processes and systems to improve and maintain the effectiveness and
efficiency of transportation security threat assessments.
Regulated TSA populations will incrementally transition to the
universal modernized platform as quickly as possible consistent with
government operational requirements and Federal rulemaking procedures.
Therefore, the harmonization of background checks and associated user
fees will be possible after the necessary regulatory changes have
become final, the supporting infrastructure has been modernized, and
all populations have been transitioned from current acquisition
contracts to the new platform. While TSA is finalizing an integrated
schedule, it is expected that the universal framework will become
effective during the second or third quarter of 2012, and that TSA
programs will be incrementally added to the framework thereafter. Note
that this framework is for TSA regulated programs only, and will not
cover CBP, ICE, Secret Service and many other DHS programs.
It is DHS's goal, in partnership with the private sector and state/
local agencies, to reduce redundant activities and leverage investments
wherever possible. To this end, DHS led a government-wide effort, in
partnership with the private sector, to build an interoperable
framework for credentialing across the spectrum. This framework allows
for credentials to be reused--by establishing common rules for levels
of trust and uses associated with each type of credential,
interoperability across populations, common processes for physical and
logical access control systems. This effort is directly in line with
the policy established through the DHS Credentialing Framework
Initiative (CFI). The CFI established several guiding principles--
including ``enroll once, use many'' for information reuse for
individuals applying for multiple DHS privileges and associated
credentials and vetting, associated with like uses and like risks,
should be the same. The CFI provides a cohesive framework, with
consideration for privacy, security risks, mission requirements,
information sharing and other capabilities incorporated to ensure
common strategies and objectives across DHS programs.
TSA has worked hard to align programs' security threat assessments
by establishing the same eligibility requirements, offering a standard
waiver and appeal process, and leveraging the same fingerprint-based
criminal history records check to reduce redundancy and costs for
workers. For example, the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) program is able to offer TWIC applicants a reduced
cost, from $132.50 to $105.25, when the applicant already has received
a comparable security threat assessment, such as:
Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME).
Merchant Mariner Credential/Document administered by the
United States Coast Guard.
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) card administered by United
States Customs and Border Protection.
Another example is that the Air Cargo worker requirements for a
security threat assessment accepts as comparable a valid Commercial
Drivers License (CDL) with HME, TWIC, and FAST, as well background
checks associated with Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)
badges.
Question 4. There are approximately 150,000 miles of freight
railroad tracks in the United States, on which many commodities,
crucial to our Nation's economy, are carried. Maintaining the security
of our Nation's railroad system, by monitoring the transport of
security sensitive materials, or mitigating threats of terrorist
attacks, is an important area for DHS and TSA to address. The 9/11 Act
required DHS to develop a National Strategy for Railroad Transportation
Security and submit a report to Congress by August 2008, detailing
security assessments and the cost to implement the strategy. When will
this report be submitted and will you commit to focusing the
Department's efforts on our Nation's surface transportation security?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) report
entitled the ``Railroad Transportation Security Risk Assessment and
National Strategy'' in response to the requirements in section 1511 of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/
11 Act) is in the final stages of review at TSA. The Railroad Security
Risk Assessment (RSRA) will describe the strategic level risks to the
freight rail mode. TSA will provide context for rail risk in the
transportation sector in the Transportation System Security Risk
Assessment (TSSRA), which is a comprehensive national risk assessment
that is required by both the Fiscal Year 2009 and Fiscal Year 2010
Appropriations language. Both reports are nearing completion.
The RSRA will also include a National Strategy for Railroad
Security. This strategy has been synchronized with the upcoming update
of the Rail Annex to the Transportation System Sector Security Plan
(TSSSP), as part of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. In order to
streamline and coordinate strategic planning, it is intended that the
updated TSSSP Rail Annex will supersede the RSRA report's rail
strategy. Both strategic planning documents will reflect the currently
assessed risk in the rail system and the larger transportation system.
DHS also employs a variety of programs and policies that are
focused on ensuring the security of the Nation's railroad
transportation system. On November 26, 2008, TSA issued a final rule
(73 FR 72130) for rail transportation security. The rule requires
freight and passenger rail carriers, as well as shippers and certain
receivers of rail security-sensitive materials (RSSM), to appoint a
primary, and at least one alternate, rail security coordinator to serve
as TSA's main point of contact, available on a 24/7 basis, to receive
intelligence information and coordinate security-related activities.
These covered entities are also required to report significant security
concerns to TSA. Freight railroad carriers, as well as certain rail
hazardous materials shippers and receivers, are also subject to the
chain of custody provisions (49 C.F.R. 1580.107), which requires a
positive and secure transfer of custody of a rail car containing RSSM
at points of origin, delivery, and interchange, and includes certain
requirements for physical security inspections of RSSM rail cars.
Pursuant to the 9/11 Act, TSA is required to issue a regulation that
would require an employee security training program for surface modes
of transportation. Under the 9/11 Act, the rules cover freight railroad
carriers, as well as public transportation agencies (including rail
mass transit and bus systems), passenger railroad carriers, over-the-
road bus operators, and certain motor carriers).''] The rules would
establish propose minimum elements for the training programs addressing
security awareness, terrorist behavior recognition, and threat and
incident prevent and response for frontline employees. As also required
by the 9/11 Act, TSA is developing regulations for railroad carriers to
conduct vulnerability assessments and develop security plans.
TSA, in conjunction with the private sector, has also developed a
list of 24 Security Action Items (SAIs). Distributed in June 2006,
these security guidelines identified best practices, which freight
railroads and their employees should implement to reduce the risk
associated with the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH)
materials. TSA also conducts Rail Corridor Assessments (RCAs), which
focus on assessing the vulnerabilities of high-population areas where
TIH materials are moved by rail in significant quantities. The RCAs
provide site-specific mitigation strategies and lessons learned, and
supported the development of the SAIs. These vulnerability assessments
have also led to the implementation of a TIH Risk Reduction Project.
Implemented in 2007, the Project focuses on objectively measuring the
risk reduction associated with the rail transportation of TIH materials
through 46 High Threat Urban Areas. As of October 2009, the
objectively-measured risk has been reduced 80 percent as compared to
the base measurement year (2006). The agency will continue to measure
the ongoing risk associated with the movement of TIH shipments by rail,
with the goal of a 10 percent risk reduction over the previous year.
Comprehensive Reviews conducted by TSA also provide a thorough
evaluation of the security of a specific rail corridor and a
comparative analysis of risk across transportation modes and critical
infrastructure sectors in a specific geographic area. Additionally,
TSA's Corporate Security Review program, an ``instructive'' review of a
company's security plan and procedures, provides the government with a
general understanding of each company's ability to protect its critical
assets and its methods for protecting hazardous materials under its
control. The Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP)
is also being utilized by TSA to enhance the preparedness of the
Nation's surface transportation network. I-STEP has been used by the
TSA Freight Rail Security Division to facilitate discussions regarding
the information-sharing processes and coordination between the Federal
Government and the freight rail industry, particularly during
heightened states of alert.
The TSA Freight Rail Security Division has also developed a
critical infrastructure risk assessment tool for freight rail bridges.
This tool is designed to measure the criticality and vulnerability of
freight rail bridges in the United States, and will serve as the
factual and analytical baseline to develop and propose security
enhancements and mitigation strategies for critical railroad
infrastructure. In Washington, D.C., DHS has also funded the National
Capital Region Rail Security Pilot project to demonstrate the
effectiveness of a suite of intrusion detection technologies in a
freight railroad environment, specifically the D.C. Rail Security
Corridor (DCRSC). The DCRSC is a seven-mile long corridor extending
from the Anacostia River across the Potomac River. This pilot project
included numerous components, including a virtual security fence that
will detect moving objects, perimeter breaches, left objects, removed
objects, and loitering activity. Data from the fence and the gates will
be encrypted and transmitted simultaneously to multiple locations, such
as the U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Secret Service, other applicable
Federal or local agencies, and CSX Transportation. Additionally, TSA is
initiating a pilot project in FY 2010 to test security technologies on
critical railroad bridges and tunnels.
The DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate--Office of
Infrastructure Protection has also engaged the Rail Subsector in
activities, projects, and initiatives, including conducting 55 Enhanced
Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative visits, 10 Computer-Based
Assessment Tool visits, 39 Site Assistance Visits, 121 Buffer Zone
Plans, and provided $15,171,500 in Buffer Zone Protection Program grant
funding to local law enforcement to increase preparedness capabilities
in communities surrounding high priority Rail Subsector infrastructure.
The TSA Freight Rail Security Grant Program also makes funds available
for security training of frontline employees, the completion of
vulnerability assessments, the development of security plans within the
freight rail industry, and the installation of tracking systems for
railroad cars containing TIH.
Question 5. Earlier this year, the House passed a TSA
Reauthorization bill. This Committee will likely work on a TSA
Reauthorization proposal sometime in the coming year. Does DHS/TSA
intend to submit a formal reauthorization proposal for the Committee to
consider?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is reviewing a number
of legislative proposals that may be appropriate for consideration in a
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authorization bill and
looks forward to assisting the Committee in promoting a package of
proposals that advance security in all modes of transportation. Among
other things, the legislative proposals considered by the Committee in
2010 should consider the need for implementing new technologies in
aviation security and ensuring that individuals who present a threat to
our Nation's security are not permitted to board overseas flights to
the U.S. Additionally, I hope the Committee would act upon the
legislative proposal forwarded to the congressional leadership in May
2009 to authorize the Transportation Security Administration to
incrementally adjust the aviation passenger security fee to cover a
larger share of the cost of aviation security. I look forward to
working with the Committee on any authorization language they will be
introducing during the Second Session of the 111th Congress.
Question 6. It has come to my attention that only a small
percentage of the Port Security Grant funding from Fiscal Years 2007,
2008, and 2009 have made it to the facilities that have been awarded
grants. Can you explain where the delay has been in distributing these
funds, and what steps are in place to ensure timely distribution? What
percentage of the grant funding has actually made it to the recipients?
Answer. Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has awarded over $1.2 billion in Port Security Grant
Program (PSGP) funding. Of this amount, approximately $49 million has
been drawn down by recipients through FEMA's electronic Payment and
Reporting System (PARS). This equates to approximately 4.1 percent of
the total awarded funds drawn down by recipients. Although this is a
relatively low percentage, drawdown figures should not solely be used
to gauge program progress or lack thereof.
Each PSGP award has several special conditions that must be
formally accepted by the recipient, some of which place holds on funds
until met. The two special conditions that most significantly impact
releasing funds and drawdown rates are the requirements for budget
reviews and Environmental and Historic Preservation (EHP) reviews.
These reviews take time and can vary by grant based on dollar amount,
complexity of projects, grantee responsiveness, department priorities,
workload, and staffing.
In FY 2007 and FY 2009, the PSGP received additional
appropriations, essentially making two rounds of grants for these
years. In addition, beginning with the FY 2007 Supplemental round, the
highest risk port areas were required to assign a ``Fiduciary Agent''
(FA), who serves as FEMA's grantee and point of contact for all grant
matters. The FA works at the local level with the Captain of the Port
(USCG) to foster regional collaboration and prioritize projects for
submission to FEMA. A series of deliverables are required to be
submitted to FEMA and must be approved prior to submitting projects.
These include a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) document and a Port-Wide
Risk Management Plan (PWRMP). These deliverables can take 12-18 months
to complete and grant funds may be used in their development.
Once these deliverables are submitted and approved by FEMA, the FA
submits projects for review and approval. Even before FEMA receives the
projects, they are reviewed and prioritized at the field level by the
local Captain of the Port. Because each FA is on a different timetable,
FEMA continually receives projects for review and must convene review
panels of subject matter experts from across DHS. These panels take all
of our grants staff away from their regular duties for many hours to
review projects. If projects are not approved, they must be sent back
to the FA for resubmission, causing further delay. Once projects are
approved, they are submitted for budget and EHP clearance to release
funds.
Once FEMA releases funds (either partial by project or the entire
award), the recipient is notified and may drawdown against the grant
through PARS. Of the $1.2 billion in PSGP funding awarded from FY 2007
to present, $223.5 million or 18.1 percent of total funding has been
released to grantees. FEMA does not control or dictate when recipients
must drawdown funds. Each recipient follows their local protocols.
Funds may be drawn down anytime during the award period and up to 90
days following the end of the award period.
FEMA routinely engages with port stakeholders to listen to concerns
and suggestions for improving the program. This past fall, FEMA invited
all of the PSGP FAs to Washington, D.C. for a two-day workshop on how
to improve the efficiency of the program.
One significant change with the FY 2010 PSGP is that all FA
projects are due to FEMA 45 days after application close date. All
projects will be reviewed at one time by one panel of subject matter
experts. This will put all FAs on the same timetable and will eliminate
the current practice of reviewing projects on a rolling basis and
expedite the release of funds.
For existing awards (FY 2009 ARRA and prior), FEMA has made
significant strides in releasing PSGP funding. Thanks to dedicated
contract support personnel, the EHP backlog has been cleared.
Additionally, it has been a priority of PSGP staff to review projects
in a timely manner, release partial funds as projects are approved, and
provide feedback to FAs as to status, particularly if projects are sent
back requiring additional work. Finally, the majority of CONOPS and
PRWMPs have been submitted and approved by FEMA, which now allows FEMA
to concentrate on reviewing and approving projects.
FEMA continues to work to strengthen the PSGP, a complex program,
with a multi-stage review process, co-managed with the subject matter
expertise provided by the USCG.
Question 7. The Coast Guard uses a Marine Security Risk Analysis
Model (MSRAM) to assess threats to critical infrastructure. However,
the Department of Homeland Security still does not have one model of
risk analysis that could be used by all agencies. Is there a plan to do
so? Can we establish a quantifiable risk analysis tool for the
Department that is adaptable for all DHS agencies?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assesses homeland
security risk by evaluating the potential for an unwanted outcome as a
function of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with
all hazards to the homeland. No single assessment of homeland security
risks, such as the Marine Security Risk Analysis Model, will provide
all the answers to the multitude of challenges the Department faces. As
of now, there is no plan to develop one model or tool for risk analysis
across DHS and other agencies. The goal of risk analysis is to inform
decisionmaking, but since decisions at different agencies and within
different sectors are unique, with different requirements, subject to
different constraints, and based on various degrees of information, it
would be counter-productive to attempt to develop a single tool.
Homeland security risks are so complex and cross-cutting that our
ability to manage risk effectively depends on our ability to integrate
and manage a wide range of homeland security activities with Federal,
State, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners. A
unified effort focused on integrated risk management concepts within
the Department is essential to understanding and effectively managing
homeland security risks.
Building and institutionalizing integrated risk management concepts
and practices for homeland security takes time. DHS, however, has taken
several critical first steps. The Department established the Office of
Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) on April 1, 2007. RMA's mission is
to enable and advance the effective management of risk by the homeland
security enterprise. In April 2007, RMA created a departmental risk
governance process by establishing the DHS Risk Steering Committee
(RSC), which ensures collaboration, information sharing, and consensus
building across the Department as we identify and integrate best
practices for risk management and analysis. In September 2008, the RSC
published a DHS Risk Lexicon, which establishes a common language for
discussing risk-related concepts and techniques, and released an
Interim Integrated Risk Management Framework in January 2009 that sets
the foundation for a common approach to homeland security risk
management.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. Madam Secretary, as you know, the Department has
embarked upon an approximately 10M square feet headquarters
consolidation at the St. Elizabeth's campus. How has the Department
worked with the private sector to develop and implement an action plan?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Capital
Region (NCR) Housing Master Plan was developed to provide the strategic
vision for facilities that support a unified department, organizational
structure, operations and culture. The plan outlines priorities of
implementation and addresses the mission fragmentation caused by the
Headquarters (HQ) elements being scattered in over 46 locations
throughout the NCR. To meet the component office space requirements
through FY 2011 for headquarters facilities, the Department will
require about 8 million gross square feet (GSF) of office space in the
NCR with the potential to grow to 10 million GSF by FY2015.
While St. Elizabeths will accommodate the main Department and
Component HQ mission execution functions with 4.5 million GSF of office
space, it does not have the capacity to accommodate all of the DHS
mission support elements. Therefore, the DHS NCR Housing Master Plan
also proposes to consolidate the mission support elements that are
currently dispersed throughout the NCR to support functional
integration, improve effectiveness and efficient management of the real
estate portfolio.
The end state real estate portfolio will include St. Elizabeths as
the center of gravity for the Department Headquarters and federally
owned locations at the Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC), the U.S. Secret
Service HQ and the DHS space at the Ronald Reagan Building. DHS has two
long-term leases that will also be retained--the TSA location in
Arlington, VA and the ICE space in SW Washington, D.C. A Mission
Support Consolidation Prospectus for lease authority was submitted by
General Services Administration (GSA) to Congress on October 18, 2009
to acquire a 1.2 million Rentable Square Feet (RSF) lease to
consolidate the remaining locations.
The Department and GSA have coordinated with the private sector
throughout the past four and a half years. We've received many
capabilities briefs from private sector entities with an interest in
the headquarters consolidation initiative including both the St.
Elizabeths Campus and the Mission Support Consolidation initiatives.
GSA also engaged the market in development of the mission support
lease prospectus to verify DHS requirements could be achieved while
ensuring competition among the private sector offerors.
On October 26, 2009, GSA and DHS sponsored an Industry Day at the
Ronald Reagan Building to inform the business community on upcoming
opportunities that will be available with the St. Elizabeths
development. Approximately 1000 people attended the forum which
provided opportunities for networking, sessions on DHS and GSA Small
Business goals and practices. In addition, the GSA Federal Acquisition
Service held a pre-solicitation conference in Washington, D.C., on
December 14, 2009, for the St. Elizabeths Campus Technology Integration
Program (TIP). The GSA acquisition strategy for the TIP is to provide
an Information Technology (IT) contractor to supply materials and
installation services for an enterprise wide IT campus infrastructure.
Question 2. How does the Department intend to facilitate
interaction across all DHS sites in the region through this
consolidation?
Answer. The establishment of St. Elizabeths as the Consolidated DHS
HQ with all component leadership/mission execution functions
represented and collocation of Component Operations Centers with the
NOC, will form the foundation for building a department that is
culturally, operationally and administratively unified. The campus
structure optimizes our prevention and response capabilities though
enhanced communication, coordination and cooperation and promotes
interaction through shared use of common support and administrative
facilities. The Technology Integration Program (TIP) being developed
for St. Elizabeths is also being designed to consider the overall
headquarters consolidation initiative and provides an enterprise wide
IT infrastructure to promote and enhance communications across the
consolidation sites. In addition, lessons learned with the St.
Elizabeths development will be leveraged across the entire
consolidation effort.
Execution of the St. Elizabeths development without addressing the
rest of the mission support functions will continue to impact the
effective communications, coordination and cooperation among the
headquarters and components due to the increasingly scattered nature of
the portfolio.
Question 3. As you may know, Saint Elizabeths could become a
security technology corridor that advances the mission of Department of
Homeland Security while simultaneously driving innovation and private
sector commercialization. How does the DHS intend to advance the
Department's mission while driving innovation and private sector
commercialization at the Saint Elizabeths campus?
Answer. The Department and GSA are closely coordinating with the
District of Columbia, the National Capital Planning Commission, the
Council on Environmental Quality/Office of the Federal Environmental
Executive, the White House Office of Urban Affairs and organizations
such as the Chesapeake Crescent Initiative (CCI) to explore
opportunities to promote sustainability and innovation in conjunction
with the St. Elizabeths development (DHS and DC's efforts on the West
and East Campus). There are also opportunities to link to broader
community revitalization efforts with the Sustainable Communities and
Neighborhood Revitalization initiatives.
The CCI is a regional collaborative effort formed by the Federal
Government, the District of Columbia, and the state governments of
Virginia and Maryland. CCI's goal is to focus on four areas: Regional
Collaboration; Environment/Energy; Innovation/Economy; and Secure and
Sustainable Development. CCI established the St. Elizabeths/Security
Working Group to address three specific objectives: (1) Convening
stakeholders--Federal, State and City governments, the private sector,
non-profit organizations, universities across the region, DHS employees
and the community of citizens in Ward 8; (2) Communicating progress and
identifying challenges that require collaboration to achieve success--
through meetings, events and academic research support; and (3) Serving
as a catalyst for action--to set new environmental standards with
renewed historic resources, improve transportation, build new
commercial and residential communities, foster education and workforce
development and identify and deploy innovative solutions to advance our
Nation's security capability--all in support of a new home for DHS, a
revitalized community and a stronger regional economy with 21st Century
jobs. The Department supports this effort with participation by our
Headquarters Consolidation Program Office and the Chief
Commercialization officer. Along with GSA, we will continue to work
with CCI and our District partners as they transform their approved
high level East Campus Redevelopment Framework Plan into specific
development initiatives.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Ensign to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question. Following the release of the TSA screening document
entitled ``Screening Management Standard Operating Procedures'' dated
May 28, 2008, that was placed on a website and contained Sensitive
Security Information including the identification cards of Members of
Congress earlier this week, I submit the following questions:
How high up did the authorization have to go before the document
was placed on the website?
Did the authorization go as high as the political appointees or was
it just a career employee that placed the document online for all to
read?
I understand that people were put on Administrative Leave following
this release of TSA security sensitive information. Were the people who
authorized the release of this information also put on Administrative
Leave?
I understand that there are currently 2 simultaneous investigations
ongoing with regard to the release of this information, an Inspector
General review and an Office of Investigations review. How long will it
take to complete the review process? Can you provide a timeline as to
when people can be held accountable for this release? When policies may
be changed?
Answer. After conducting an Executive Leadership conference call on
the night of December 6, 2009, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Acting Administrator implemented a number of
actions to address the breach of Sensitive Security Information (SSI),
including a directive to the TSA Office of Investigations (OI) to
investigate the cause and circumstances of the breach of SSI. The OI
began to investigate the matter until TSA was notified that the
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
would be investigating the same matter at my direction. As required by
a DHS Management Directive, OI suspended its investigation and deferred
the matter to OIG. Because these questions are the subject of the OIG
investigation, I am not able to provide specific responses until the
OIG completes its investigation and issues a final report.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jim DeMint to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. When will you repeal the current prohibition on
collective bargaining at TSA (ADM Loy Memorandum of January 8, 2003
Subject: Determination Regarding Collective Bargaining TSA Security
Screeners)?
Secretary Napolitano I was disappointed to hear this morning that
you had decided to agree to a collective bargaining agreement with the
TSA Screeners, overturning a policy which has kept the traveling public
safe for close to 7 years. At the hearing you stated, there are
examples around the country of collective bargain agreements with law
enforcement agencies that have similar responsibilities where you have
carve-outs in effect, in the collective bargaining context to make sure
those types of things are not part of the collective bargaining
agreement. We would anticipate in this context with the TSOs that we
will be able to reach such an understanding. Please provide a detailed
plan outlining the carve-outs you will insist upon in a collective
bargaining agreement including a rationale for the carve outs. Are
there any workers who you believe should not be allowed to be included
in a collective bargaining agreement?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony, I am waiting for the
confirmation of a nominee to head the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). I expect any future nominee to make a thorough
review of the matter, including the alignment of any decision about
collective bargaining with our profound commitment to maintain and
continue to improve transportation security, before presenting
recommendations to me on collective bargaining at TSA.
With regard to which positions might be included in a bargaining
unit of Transportation Security Officers afforded collective bargaining
rights, although no decision has been made, I would expect that such a
unit determination would follow prevailing law covering Federal
employees which excludes those employees deemed to be supervisory or
confidential employees.
Question 2. At the hearing you stated, ``I will give you an
example, even without a collective bargaining agreement right now, our
TSA employees have been very eager to, whenever we've had an emergency
and we need to, for example bring more people down to help staff an
airport in a hurricane, when the people who have to work there have to
stay home and work with their families because their houses have been
destroyed or whatever. We have never had a problem, in my experience,
with employees being willing to move to a place where a crisis is
occurring.''
Will you insist that as a condition of repealing the collective
bargaining agreement prohibition that any collective bargaining
agreement empower the Administrator of the TSA to have the authority to
transfer and reassign personnel in response to security threats for the
duration of the threat without first getting the approval of their
union?
Answer. As stated, I am awaiting the confirmation of a nominee to
head the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). It is my
expectation that any future nominee will conduct a thorough review of
all matters concerning collective bargaining at TSA prior to making
recommendations to me. I will ensure that any decision that is made
takes full account of security concerns, and enables TSA to continue to
maintain and improve transportation security on a daily basis.
Question 3. Madam Secretary, for several years your department has
been trying to address ways to better coordinate or harmonize
credentialing and background check processes. Today, for example, we
know that truck drivers can undergo up to four separate costly
background checks* through agencies within your department
to perform their job duties. Are you aware of this issue? If so, please
tell us what DHS is doing to coordinate or consolidate these multiple
screening and credentialing processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ DHS Background checks: Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME),
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), Free and Secure
Trade (FAST) program and Air Cargo Security Threat Assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. It is DHS's goal, in partnership with the private sector
and state/local agencies, to reduce redundant activities and leverage
investments wherever possible. To this end, DHS led a government-wide
effort, in partnership with the private sector, to build an
interoperable framework for credentialing across the spectrum. This
framework allows for credentials to be reused--by establishing common
rules for levels of trust and uses associated with each type of
credential, interoperability across populations, common processes for
physical and logical access control systems. This effort is directly in
line with the policy established through the DHS Credentialing
Framework Initiative (CFI). The CFI established several guiding
principles--including ``enroll once, use many'' for information reuse
for individuals applying for multiple DHS privileges and associated
credentials and vetting, associated with like uses and like risks,
should be the same. The CFI provides a cohesive framework, with
consideration for privacy, security risks, mission requirements,
information sharing and other capabilities incorporated to ensure
common strategies and objectives across DHS programs.
DHS has begun efforts on a number of initiatives to implement this
streamlined process and reuse of vetting results:
Reusing Assessments Conducted. TSA is working hard to align
the programs' security threat assessments (STAs) by
establishing similar eligibility requirements; offering a
standard waiver and appeal process; and leveraging the same
fingerprint-based criminal history records check to reduce
redundancy and costs for workers. There are several examples of
where this is apparent today:
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) program is able to offer TWIC applicants a reduced
cost, from $132.50 to $105.25, when the applicant already
is receiving a comparable security threat assessment, such
as one for:
--Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME).
--Merchant Mariner Credential/Document administered by
the United States Coast Guard.
--Free and Secure Trade (FAST) card administered by
United States Customs and Border Protection.
Another example is that the Air Cargo worker
requirements for a security threat assessment accepts as
comparable a valid Commercial Drivers License (CDL) with
HME, TWIC, and FAST, as well background checks associated
with Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badges.
Establishing ability to electronically verify person's
license, status, or privilege. In order to issue fewer
documents and reuse existing cards, the various organizations
interacting with these populations must be able to
electronically authenticate the credential presented and that
the person is authorized access.
For example, in order for DHS to stop issuing separate
HME endorsements to the holder of a TWIC, law enforcement
must have the ability to electronically validate that TWIC,
an ability they do not currently have.
TSA TTAC Modernization. The TSA modernization effort, an
initiative to enhance TSA vetting and credentialing programs
that affect the security of all critical transportation
sectors, will play a critical role in achieving these goals.
TSA is modernizing its business processes and systems to
improve and maintain the effectiveness and efficiency of
transportation security threat assessments.
Question 4. As I'm sure you are aware, my amendment requiring the
completion of 700 miles of reinforced double-layer fencing along the
U.S. Southern border by the end of next year was stripped from the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill just a few weeks
ago. How do you propose we move forward and solve the border security
problems our Nation is currently facing without completing this fence
and giving the law we passed a chance to work?
Answer. First and foremost, all efforts aimed at addressing threats
to U.S. border security must occur within an institutionalized concept
of operations that consistently leverages the proper, integrated mix of
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other Federal, State, tribal and
local resources to gain effective control, or situational awareness,
where applicable, in prioritized areas of greatest threat,
vulnerability and risk. As a stakeholder, CBP Office of Border Patrol
continues to implement the following:
Focusing on the capability to rapidly deploy personnel/
resources to areas deemed highest risk through intelligence and
predictive analyses along the Southern and Northern borders.
For example, state-of-the-art enforcement technology,
such as Mobile Surveillance System vehicle(s).
Expanding partnerships with other Federal, state, tribal and
local agencies to develop, refine and institutionalize a
nationwide collaborative, cooperative enforcement approach such
as the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT).
Combines capabilities and resources of Federal, state,
tribal and local law enforcement agencies to deny, degrade,
disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations.
Leveraging participation in fusion centers to
institutionalize intelligence-driven operations.
Question 5. Related to border security, one of the greatest threats
currently facing our Nation and our Southern border in particular is
the presence of violence and illegal drug trafficking taking place
between the U.S. and Mexico. Back in March, you announced a
``Comprehensive Response'' border security policy that:
Invested $700 million this year under the Merida initiative to work
with Mexico on law enforcement and judicial capacity,
Increased DOJ, DHS, and Treasury personnel and efforts directed at
the Southwest border, and
Renewed the U.S.' commitment to stemming the demand for illegal
drugs here at home.
Now that we are approaching the end of the year, can you provide
for us a brief update on the implementation of this plan, and describe
what impact this money and these efforts have had on the present
situation along the southern border?
Answer. The Department of State (DOS) is the overall U.S.
Government (USG) lead for Merida Initiative activities including the
acquisition of all technology equipment and software, such as Non-
Intrusive Inspections Equipment (NIIE). DOS also coordinates and
obtains all licenses or permits associated with the acquisition,
transportation, delivery and or shipment of equipment and software to
be donated to the receiving governments. CBP has established an inter-
office Merida Committee to coordinate with DOS, DHS and others and to
steer CBP implementation actions.
CBP and DOS established an Inter-Agency Agreement (IAA) to
fund a CBP Advisor to the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of
the State Department at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico responsible
for providing technical assistance and expertise related to
purchases under the Merida Initiative in Mexico. The advisor is
now working in this capacity.
CBP developed an IAA with DOS to provide training and
technical support for Merida Initiative activities. This IAA
was awarded on September 30, 2009. Specifically, this IAA
provides for the training of 44 dogs for Mexico Customs,
scheduled to occur in 2010. The training consists of 3 classes,
each 11 weeks long. The program includes the curriculum for
train-the-trainer as well. The first class will begin January
18, 2010. The IAA also provides for the training of 50 SSP
Officers on five ZVB X-ray vans (vans already purchased by NAS)
which will occur via five, ten-student classes held in or
around Mexico City. CBP will continue to work with Mexico
Customs on their curriculum to assist in moving from a revenue-
based to a law enforcement-based agency. Additionally, CBP
conducted an assessment of Mexico Customs basic academy
training. The resulting gap analysis will be a road map to
guide Mexico Customs in changing their curriculum from revenue-
based to law-enforcement based.
CBP will continue discussions of the way forward on geographical
expansion of the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and
Security (OASISS) program. OASISS is a binational prosecutorial program
focused on combating human smuggling across the Southwest Border by
identifying and prosecuting Mexican nationals arrested for alien
smuggling in the U.S. A memorandum of understanding for information
sharing with Mexico is being reviewed by the Office of Border Patrol.
CBP, in coordination with DHS, has partnered with Department of
Defense (DoD) Joint Task Force North, and other border security
entities in the U.S. and Mexico to develop a plan to gain greater
control over the Arizona Border. The plan is called the Operational
Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), though originally
designated the Arizona Operational Plan (AOP). A key component of the
plan is to operate collaboratively with the Mexican SSP Federal Police
to obtain greater operational control of the Arizona/Sonora border. A
Declaration of Cooperation with the SSP has been drafted for the
purpose of illiciting a sustained commitment of resources from the
Government of Mexico to control the Arizona/Sonora border. The
Declaration institutionalizes lessons learned from the ACTT bilateral
cooperation efforts and expands these collaborative efforts along the
entire Southwest border, closing smuggling corridors that impact upon
both countries' national security.
Question 6. As part of any collective bargaining agreement, will
you require that the agreement allow any TSOs to withhold the portion
of their union dues that finances lobbying and political activity?
Answer. Unlike the private sector, employees in the Federal
Government are not required to pay union dues or agency fees, even when
there is a collective bargaining agreement in effect. Accordingly,
there would be no reason to include such a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement at the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. I understand the Department has unmanned aerial system
(UAS) assets through Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Opportunities
for use of these systems could expand in the future to other components
of DHS and assist the Department in carrying out its significant
mission. The Air Force has acknowledged the difficulty of coordinating
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding the operation
of DOD-related UAS assets in domestic airspace. It is important that we
ensure a strong partnership between your Department and the FAA on
similar efforts. Please explain the process between DHS and FAA to
utilize domestic airspace for the UAS activities.
Answer. Currently, CBP Office of Air and Marine submits, through an
online process, an application for a Certificate of Authorization
(COA). COAs are required due to current Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs) written only for manned aircraft and that no UAS standards have
been developed and codified through rulemaking.
The COA application is very in-depth and contains detailed
information concerning the UAS aircraft operating location and
altitudes; supporting equipment and systems. The application also
solicits information on personnel and pilot qualifications. Last, the
application requires aircraft airworthiness information; potential
impact to other airborne aircraft; people and property on the ground;
communication requirements; and emergency aircraft procedures. Risk
mitigation is a paramount factor.
If the COA application is approved allowing the CBP UAS to operate
in the National Airspace System (NAS), it is disseminated to CBP and to
the FAA facilities whose airspace the UAS will operate within. FAA
facility air traffic controllers are trained on the operational
capabilities and limitations of the UAS as well as the restrictions and
operational parameters within which the UAS must operate. Continuing
coordination and collaboration exists to amend, if necessary, a
provision contained within the COA. COAs are currently issued by the
FAA from a one-time authorization to standing authorizations, but not
to exceed one calendar year. Standing authorizations can be renewed
after undergoing the same scrutiny as an original application. Though
there are various sizes of UASs in use, CBP operates the second largest
UAS in service today--the MQ-9 Predator B. At 10,000 lbs and with a
wingspan of 66 feet, it is the size of a large general aviation
aircraft and is flown by CBP and USCG personnel, all with FAA pilot
licenses. The pilots of the UAS communicate with and receive air
traffic control instructions from FAA controllers exactly as any
aircraft would be controlled and operate within the NAS.
Question 2. Must DHS work with any other Federal entities to fully
utilize the Departments UAS assets?
Answer. Yes, first and foremost with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for permission to fly in the National Air Space
through the Certificate of Authorization process. Though CBP operates
the MQ-9 Predator B, it is a DHS and national asset. CBP is
continuously partnering within DHS and other government agencies in an
attempt to demonstrate the capabilities this asset provides for law
enforcement, incident management, search and rescue, DoD support, etc.
No manned aircraft in the U.S. Government inventory provides the
persistent and sustained surveillance that the Predator is capable of.
Question 3. How can the relationship between DHS and FAA regarding
the use of UAS in domestic airspace improve?
Answer. Language in Section 1036 of the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417)
called for a more cooperative relationship between DoD and the FAA in
obtaining access to the NAS with UASs and as such the establishment of
a joint Executive Committee (EXCOM) to resolve conflicts and disputes.
Recognizing that DHS has a major role and requirement in obtaining
access to the NAS, DHS was invited to participate in the EXCOM. DHS,
DoD, NASA, and FAA are currently cooperating and collaborating on a
process to safely, efficiently, and timely gain increased and routine
access to the NAS.
Question 4. Are you aware of any instances where the Department was
delayed in utilizing UAS assets as a result of interagency
coordination?
Answer. Ad-hoc, non-routine access to the NAS by CBP UASs have been
processed by the FAA in an expeditious manner and ultimately never
denied. CBP operates under one of four types of COAs; mission
(operational), training (pilots), emergency, and disaster (FEMA or
Federal or State support).
Through the EXCOM, shortfalls have already been identified within
the COA application process. Corrective actions have been recommended
by a COA interagency working group which address FAA resource issues,
reduced COA processing timelines, standardized application information,
etc. If implemented, perceived delays should be minimized and COA
processing burdens on the FAA and proponents will be greatly reduced.
Question 5. Congress recently passed the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010, which was subsequently signed into law by
the President on December 16, 2009. The law includes a mandate that
Amtrak consult with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on
developing and implementing guidance and procedures to provide for
checked firearms on Amtrak routes that permit checked baggage. The law
also requires for consultation with TSA in reporting to Congress on
these efforts within 180 days of enactment.
Amtrak's consultation with the TSA is not only mandated, but it is
vital to the successful implementation of this important program. What
steps will you pursue to ensure timely and effective consultation with
Amtrak on these directives?
Answer. In accordance with section 159 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. 111-117), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has initiated consultation with Amtrak to develop
and implement guidance and procedures to provide for checked firearms
on Amtrak routes that permit checked baggage. Consistent with the
statutory mandate, Amtrak and TSA will continue to consult thoroughly
on security matters implicated by the requirement to develop and
implement a program for transport of firearms and ammunition in checked
baggage. Amtrak and TSA have agreed to form a joint working group for
this purpose.
Question 6. The President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2010
included $856 million for Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), which is
a needed increase from the previous enacted level in Fiscal Year 2009
of $294 million. Even with the increase for EDS that was recently
passed by Congress, the need of airports across the country to
recapitalize checked baggage screening equipment and accelerate the
deployment of in-line systems remains of the upmost importance. Without
continued funding it will be impossible to provide the latest, cutting-
edge technology necessary to keep the aviation sector secure from the
threats of terrorism.
As you know, many of these checked baggage screening systems that
were deployed immediately after September 11, 2001 have reached the end
of their life cycles and the costs to keep these older technology
systems functioning with minimal down time is becoming prohibitive.
Will you support maintaining the Fiscal Year 2010 EDS procurement
and installation funding levels at our Nation's airports in Fiscal Year
2011 necessary to maintain the Electronic Baggage Screening Program
(EBSP)? With the threat of new explosives evolving rapidly how do you
see this factoring into the replacement of older equipment such as
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) with newer equipment that is equipped
to change with these continued new threats?
Answer. The funding level for Fiscal Year 2011 will be released in
the President's budget in February. The threat of new explosives and
new threats to aviation security continues to evolve. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed a Strategic
Plan for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program, which includes a
central goal of replacing Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) equipment
used for primary screening with Explosives Detection Systems (EDS)
machines at airports. There is currently an on-going effort to replace
primary-screening ETD machines with Reduced-Size Explosive Detection
System (RSEDS) at Category X-III airports. In Fiscal Year 2010, from
January to September, TSA plans to deploy on average 20-25 RSEDS units
per month to airports nationwide. RSEDS provides a less intensive
manpower approach, plus the increased screening capabilities of EDS
relative to ETD equipment for primary screening. Please note that ETD
equipment will continue to play a critical role in assisting
Transportation Security Officers in resolving suspect baggage that have
alarmed the EDS equipment (referred to as secondary screening).
Among the actions being taken to address evolving new threats, TSA
is taking steps to pursue a full and open competitive procurement for
reduced-size, medium-speed, and high-speed EDS technologies. This
procurement will segment the technologies into distinct system types,
provide for increased competition, enhance detection and operational
capabilities, and provide for a reduced total cost of ownership.
Question 7. Continued efforts by the Transportation Security
Administration to enhance security at our Nation's airports remain
vital to our Nation's security. The Administration's focus on the top
20 to 25 airports to enhance security for 95 percent of passengers in
the United States is not reflective of the true situation since a
significant majority of passengers begin their trips at medium and
small airports. According to figures from the Department of
Transportation's Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 54 percent of the
passengers begin their trips at the Nation's top 25 airports, while 46
percent of the passengers begin their air travel at the next 225
airports. Since checked baggage is screened at originating airports,
medium and small airports cannot be neglected if aviation security is
truly to be enhanced. In knowing that two of the highjackers on 9/11
began their flight at a small airport in Bangor, Maine, what steps are
you taking to ensure that the need for medium and small airports to
receive the latest explosives detection systems is as important as the
Category X airports?
Answer. The needs of small and medium airports are taken into
consideration by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
enhance security at our Nation's airports. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2009
budget included $87 million for medium- and small-sized airports for
the procurement and deployment of certified Explosive Detection
Systems. The FY 2010 budget includes an additional $218 million for the
needs of medium- and small-sized airports. In addition, up to $50
million of the Aviation Security Capital Fund is used to make
discretionary grants, including Other Transaction Agreements for
airport security improvement projects with priority given to small and
non-hub airports.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Johnny Isakson to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question. Will the Department of Homeland Security plan to launch
the US-VISIT Exit program, and if so, will DHS plan to check departures
on the Canadian and Mexican borders, as well as in seaports?
Answer. It should be noted that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) currently has biographic exit information; however, the
Department is currently weighing several options for adding biometrics
based on pilots conducted over the past 6 years. The infrastructure at
land borders does not easily lend itself to any consistent form of exit
based on current technology.
Air/Sea
DHS has performed significant planning and testing over the past 3
years to examine possible solutions for integrating US-VISIT biometric
exit requirements into the international air departure process. For
more than 2 years, US-VISIT ran biometric exit pilots at 12 airports
and two seaports. These pilots evaluated the use of both automated
kiosks and mobile devices in port terminals. When the pilots ended in
May 2007, an evaluation determined that the technology worked
effectively but traveler compliance was low. DHS determined that
biometric air exit needs to be integrated into the existing
international traveler departure process.
On April 24, 2008, DHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) proposing that commercial air carriers and vessel carriers
collect and transmit the biometric information of aliens to DHS within
24 hours of their departure from the United States. In the Consolidated
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of
2009 (Public Law 110-329), Congress required DHS to test additional
biometric collection before finalizing the Air-Sea Exit NPRM to ensure
that the best available procedures are implemented.
From May 28 to July 2, 2009, US-VISIT tested biometric air exit
procedures at two airports: Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport
and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. In Detroit, DHS
tested the collection of alien passengers' biometrics at the boarding
gate by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers. In Atlanta, DHS
tested the collection of alien passengers' biometrics at Transportation
Security Administration checkpoints. Consistent with Public Law 110-
329, the Department has submitted an evaluation report of these pilots
to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, as well as to the
Government Accountability Office. The results of the pilot evaluation,
combined with the review of public comments submitted in response to
the NPRM, will inform the decision on the option to be selected for
publication in the final rule.
Land
Biometrically recording the departures of aliens at U.S. land
border ports of entry poses significantly greater challenges. Each
year, our land border ports of entry see more than 300 million
crossings at 170 port locations, including seasonal and other ports
that are not open year round. Due to variations in infrastructure,
environment, and traffic volume from port to port, a one-size-fits-all
solution to acquiring biometrics from aliens crossing the border will
be difficult. The Department is examining options for the land border
environment that will not negatively impact the economy, the
environment, or traveler safety.
Canadian and Mexican Borders
Seeking to maximize biometric information-sharing efforts in
support of its exit program, US-VISIT took the lead in forming a
Technical Working Group on Biometric Identity Management with the
Canada Border Services Agency.
The working group has established joint biometric principles and is
working on a framework to share biometric information related to third-
country nationals entering Canada to establish exit from the United
States. This work will progress over the next few years as Canada
implements biometric capture capabilities for visa and port-of-entry
operations. Canada plans to complete implementation of its biometric
program by 2013.
Since Mexico is in the initial stages of developing its biometric
capabilities for border and immigration control, there has not yet been
an opportunity to share biometrics for exit purposes. US-VISIT
continues to provide technical assistance in support of Mexico's
efforts to incorporate biometrics into its immigration process under
the Merida Initiative.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. Please provide information on actions the Department is
taking to ensure that ports that handle primarily oil and gas, not
cargo, will remain secure.
Answer. The Coast Guard has a multi-tiered approach to ensuring the
safety and security of ports which handle oil and gas.
The Coast Guard's Operation Neptune Shield identifies the Maritime
Security and Response Operations (MSRO) activities which the Coast
Guard Sectors will conduct and establishes their performance standards.
The MSRO activities identified in this self-imposed operation are
intended to deter, detect, prevent, protect against, interdict, and/or
aid the recovery from attacks and include but are not limited to:
waterborne, aerial, and shoreside patrols; security boardings; moving
security zone enforcement (vessel escorts); and fixed security zone
enforcement.
As mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), all
oil and gas facilities and vessels calling upon them are required to
maintain and implement approved security plans to ensure appropriate
measure are taken to deter, prevent and respond to security threats and
incidents. The Coast Guard verifies the adequacy of these security
plans by conducting periodic plan review, compliance examinations and
unannounced spot checks. As part of the mandated Area Maritime Security
Committee (AMSC) process, strong partnerships have been formed with key
stakeholders from state and local agencies and the maritime industry.
These partnerships have facilitated information sharing and a risk
based approach to address maritime security.
The Coast Guard's International Port Security (IPS) Program, also
required by the MTSA, assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism
measures in foreign ports including those which primarily handle oil
and gas. The IPS Program conducts visits to those ports to verify the
adequacy of the security measures using the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code as the primary basis to determine if a country
has effective anti-terrorism measures. The Coast Guard has visited the
ports in approximately 150 countries which trade with the U.S. For
those ports with inadequate security, the Coast Guard imposes
``Conditions of Entry'' on vessels arriving to the U.S. from them.
These conditions of entry require these vessels to take additional
security measures overseas or upon arrival to the U.S. to reduce the
risk to U.S. ports.
The Coast Guard's Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) is
a terrorism risk analysis tool used to perform detailed risk analysis
of the maritime transportation system and port critical infrastructure,
including oil and gas facilities. MSRAM provides a means to use
security assessments, consequence models, and threat information to
numerically quantify risk across all ports and industry sectors. MSRAM
identifies and prioritizes infrastructure based on defined terrorist
attack scenarios, and informs the Coast Guard Captains of the Port
(COTPs) and their Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) on the
highest risk critical infrastructure within their ports. Based upon
this information, the COTPs and AMSCs have modified their Area Maritime
Security Plans and prioritized Coast Guard and other law enforcement
resources to protect the highest risk critical infrastructure in their
ports.
Question 2. Many from Louisiana's maritime industries have voiced
concerns about bureaucratic delays when their employees obtain TWIC
cards. What is DHS doing to alleviate unnecessary delays while
maintaining and improving security measures?
Answer. Since the national implementation of the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has enrolled over 1.4 million workers
associated with our Nation's maritime ports and vessels and issued
credentials to those individuals who have been found eligible to
receive a TWIC. With the rollout of any program of this size and
complexity, there are always challenges to meet and process
improvements to make. TSA is continually reviewing its enrollment,
adjudication and credentialing issuance processes and procedures to
improve efficiencies wherever possible and expedite the issuance of
these credentials. An example of these efforts is our continual
communications with stakeholders via the TWIC Stakeholder Communication
Committee used to provide program updates and receive stakeholder
input. Also, we have added new personnel and resources to facilitate
the redress process for those individuals who have been deemed
ineligible to hold a TWIC as a result of the security threat
assessment. If there are any specific Louisiana Maritime Industry
concerns, TSA would be more than happy to address them.
Question 3. While protecting vital American jobs, the Jones Act
also serves to enhance maritime security. Please provide a status
update regarding deliberations by CBP and DHS, underway since July,
about whether to modify or withdraw several letter rulings concerning
the transportation by foreign vessels of cargo to offshore energy
sites.
Answer. Based on several substantive comments CBP received, both
supporting and opposing the proposed action, and CBP's further research
on the issue, CBP determined that the proposed modification and
revocation of ruling letters relating to the Jones Act published in the
Customs Bulletin on July 17, 2009, should be reconsidered. To that end,
the proposal was withdrawn by a notice dated September 15, 2009, and
published in the Custom Bulletin of October 1, 2009. Deliberations are
still underway on this matter.
Question 4. My understanding is that CBP has been presented with at
least two complaints of Jones Act violations occurring offshore in
recent months. Please provide the Committee with an update on the
status of those investigations. Also, please provide a full report at
such time as any action is taken in those cases.
Answer. This case alleges that on two separate occasions certain
merchandise was transported between Louisiana ports and locations on
the Outer Continental Shelf by non-coastwise-qualified vessels.
In consideration of the potential penalty assessment in these
allegations (at least $2 million for each case), it has been our
recommendation that no penalty action be pursued until the specific
facts of these alleged violations can be verified.