

Hogan Marren, Ltd.

**“Clinical Integration in Health Care:
A Check-Up”
Wrap-Up Session
May 29, 2008**

John P. Marren

jpm@hmltd.com

Hogan Marren, Ltd.

Chicago, Illinois

(312) 946-1800

What do we know about CI?

If Clinical Integration is defined as...

“... an active and ongoing program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the network's physician participants and create a high degree of interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to control costs and ensure quality . . .”

... then we know at least three things:

What *do* we know?

First, CI is not “new.”

- Several thousand IPAs and PHO’s entered into capitated arrangements since the late seventies, and to survive they had to maintain:

“ . . . an active and ongoing program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the network's physician participants and create a high degree of interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to control costs and ensure quality . . . ”

What *do* we know?

Second, the FTC has said *a lot* about Clinical Integration.



DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care

Issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission

August 1996



DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition

A Report by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice

July 2004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS: Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman
Pamela Jones Harbour
Jon Leibowitz

051 0137

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS: Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman
Pamela Jones Harbour
Jon Leibowitz
William E. Kovacic
J. Thomas Rosch

In the Matter of
New Century Health Quality Alliance, Inc.,
a corporation, and
Prime Care of Northeast Kansas, L.L.C.,
a limited liability company,
and
Elizabeth Gallup, M.D., J.D.,
Steven Baie, M.D.,
Thomas Allen, M.D., and
G. Robert Powers, M.D.,
individuals,
and
Associates in Family Medicine, P.A.,
Briarcliff Medical Associates, P.C.,
College Park Family Care Center, P.A.,
Family Health Group, Chartered,
Family Medical Group, P.A.,
Hickman Mills Clinic, Inc.,
Kanza Multispecialty Group, P.A.,
Landmark Medical Center, Inc.,
Michael E. Monaco, M.D., d/b/a
Select Healthcare, P.A.,
Kenneth Norton, M.D., P.A.,
Overland Park Family Health Partners, P.A.,
Quivera Internal Medicine, L.L.C.,
Sagport Family Practice, P.C.,
Shawnee Family Care, P.A.,
Statland Clinic Ltd.,
Sunflower Medical Group, P.A.,
United Medical Group, L.L.C., and
Kimberly M. Wirths, M.D., P.A.

Docket No. C - 4169



DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care


Issued by the
U.S. Department of Justice
and the
Federal Trade Commission

August 1996

***“... an active and ongoing program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the network's physician participants and create a high degree of interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to control costs and ensure quality.*”**

This program may include: (1) establishing mechanisms to monitor and control utilization of health care services that are designed to control costs and assure quality of care; (2) selectively choosing network physicians who are likely to further these efficiency objectives; and (3) the significant investment of capital, both monetary and human, in the necessary infrastructure and capability to realize the claimed efficiencies.”


FTC Consent Decrees



“...an arrangement to provide physician services in which:

- 1. all physicians who participate in the arrangement participate in active and ongoing programs of the arrangement to evaluate and modify the practice patterns of, and create a high degree of interdependence and cooperation among, these physicians, in order to control costs and ensure the quality of services provided through the arrangement; and**
- 2. any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing entered into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to obtain significant efficiencies through the joint arrangement.”**

The FTC "due diligence" list



1. What do the physicians plan to do together from a clinical standpoint
2. How do the physicians expect actually to accomplish these goals?
3. What basis is there to think that the individual physicians will actually attempt to accomplish these goals?
4. What results can reasonably be expected from undertaking these goals?
5. How does joint contracting with payors contribute to accomplishing the program's clinical goals?
6. To accomplish the group's goals, is it necessary (or desirable) for physicians to affiliate exclusively with one IPA or can they effectively participate in multiple entities and continue to contract outside the group?
7. If rank-and-file docs were deposed, would they be able to describe the things your organization does to improve patient care

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/204694/chapter2.htm#4b3



BROWN & TOLAND
MEDICAL GROUP

Contact:

Richard Angeloni
Corporate Director, Communications
(415) 972-4307
rangeloni@btmg.com

Press Statement

Brown & Toland and Federal Trade Commission Reach Settlement about BTMG's PPO Business Model

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. (February 9, 2004) Brown & Toland Medical Group (BTMG) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reached a settlement regarding the FTC filed in July 2003 concerning BTMG's PPO (PPO) business model.

This settlement allows Brown & Toland to continue to offer a managed PPO product. As part of this settlement, Brown & Toland agreed to offer its contracted PPO plans the opportunity to terminate, however, termination of existing PPO contracts is not required.

"We are pleased to proceed forward with our PPO program," said Gloria Austin, Brown & Toland's Chief Executive Officer. "We are continuing to enhance our clinical integration programs for the PPO product to benefit our patients and physicians.

"We have focused on enhancing clinical integration of our PPO network by including the ability to audit and report on patient claims data," Austin continued. "Brown & Toland is using this data to improve patient care. We have already launched a case management program for PPO patients. As a result, it is clear that we are well on the way to addressing the issues raised by the complaint. We have put the litigation behind us in order to focus our resources on patient care."

The FTC settlement discussed in its announcement does not constitute an admission of liability.

With the settlement, Brown & Toland will continue to offer its managed PPO program for its network of more than 650 community physicians and their patients.



BROWN & TOLAND
MEDICAL GROUP

On February 9, 2004, the FTC and Brown & Toland reached a settlement **allowing Brown & Toland to continue to offer a managed PPO product.**

January 2007

Dear AHP Physician Partner,

We are pleased to announce that in a consent decree, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has granted permission to Advocate Health Partners (AHP) to continue its innovative, integrated program to improve health outcomes for patients and lower the costs of health care. The FTC had been extensively reviewing Advocate Health Partners' *Clinical Integration Program* – a program that brings together 2,900 physicians to foster greater coordination and collaboration in the delivery of health care.

Bringing the FTC's four-year investigation to a close, AHP has entered into a consent decree that specifically allows its Clinical Integration Program to proceed, and grants AHP the right to continue its collective contracting on behalf of its 2,900 physician members with employers and for-service health plans. It also upholds AHP's current Clinically Integrated contracts with UnitedHealthcare, Great-West, HFN, the Advocate employee benefit plan and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois. This is the first time that the FTC has granted such permission to a physician organization already engaged in joint contracting on the basis of clinical integration.

The FTC consent decree follows a recent favorable ruling by an arbitration panel that also upheld AHP's Clinical Integration program in the face of private litigation by insurer United HealthCare.

The favorable agreement reached between the FTC and AHP is a significant victory for Advocate Health Partners. It supports our commitment to partner with our physicians and hospitals to achieve high quality, cost-effective health care for individuals, families and communities. Over the next three years, AHP will continue providing the FTC with information on the improved outcomes realized through the Clinical Integration Program.

As required by the FTC, a copy of the consent decree will be provided to you at a later date. In the meantime, the attached Q&A should address any questions you may have regarding the outcome.

Sincerely,



Lee Sacks, M.D.
President, Advocate Health Partners

On Dec. 29, 2006, the FTC concluded the investigation with a settlement that **permits AHP to continue both its CI program and its collective contracting**



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Bureau of Competition
 Health Care Division

June 18, 2007

John I. Miles, Esquire
 Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver
 1401 H Street, N.W., Suite 500
 Washington, D.C. 20005-3324

Re: Follow-Up to 2002 MedSouth, Inc. Staff Advisory Opinion

Dear Mr. Miles:

By letter dated February 9, 2002, from then Bureau of Competition Assistant Director Jeffrey Brennan to you as counsel for MedSouth, Inc., Commission staff issued an advisory opinion regarding MedSouth's proposed establishment and operation of a "clinically integrated" physician network joint venture. MedSouth's proposed joint venture included contracting payers on behalf of all of MedSouth's physician members on terms agreed upon by the physicians, including the prices to be charged and paid for the physician services provided pursuant to the contracts.

The staff advisory opinion letter concluded that the proposed program "appears to involve integration among MedSouth physicians that has the potential to increase the quality and the cost of medical care that the physicians provide to patients." The letter also stated that staff had "concluded that the joint contracting appears to be sufficiently related to, and reasonably necessary for, the achievement of the potential benefits to be regarded as the operation of the venture." Consequently, the staff concluded that the proposed program, including its price agreements, appropriately was subject to rule-of-reason analysis rather than likely procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, rather than to *per se* analysis of a horizontal price-fixing arrangement among competing physicians.

Because staff could not predict with any degree of certainty how the program would be implemented in practice, its actual number and categories of participating physicians, and the potential competitive effects in the area within which it planned to operate, the opinion letter's analysis of MedSouth's proposed conduct under the rule of reason was limited. In fact, staff expressed some concern that the potential MedSouth joint venture members together might be capable of exercising market power, at least in certain medical specialties and in some parts of the Denver metropolitan area. Nevertheless, staff concluded that the proposed program's potential for creating procompetitive efficiencies through the integration of its physician participants, and the absence of a sufficient basis for concluding prospectively that the program would create anticompetitive effects or exercise market power, the staff advised at that time that the Commission challenge the proposed program. Noted, however, that staff would "monitor MedSouth's activities

"We see no reason at this time to rescind or modify the conclusions the staff reached in its February 19, 2002 advisory opinion letter concerning MedSouth's proposed operation at that time."





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Bureau of Competition
Health Care Division

September 17, 2007

Christi J. Braun, Esquire
John J. Miles, Esquire
Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver
1401 H Street, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005-3324

Re: Greater Rochester Independent Practice Association, Inc., Advisory Opinion

Dear Ms. Braun and Mr. Miles:


This letter responds to your request, on behalf of your client, the Greater Rochester Practice Association, Inc. ("GRIPA"), for an advisory opinion concerning a proposed program which GRIPA would negotiate contracts, including price terms, with payers on behalf of physician members in connection with the sale of a program of "integrated services

As is discussed in detail below, based on your representations and the information provided, it appears that GRIPA's proposed program would involve substantial integration among its physician participants that has the potential to produce significant efficiencies in the provision of medical services, including both improved quality and more efficient and appropriate provision of those services by GRIPA's physicians. The Commission is generally supportive of contracting with payers on behalf of GRIPA's physician members, and the program is likely to be related to GRIPA's plan to integrate the provision of medical services. The program is likely to be reasonably necessary to implement the proposed program and to realize the efficiency benefits. We therefore conclude that the price agreements and other terms of the proposed program should be evaluated under the antitrust rule of reason. Finally, we have not conducted an investigation or formally defined the product and geographic markets within which GRIPA's proposed program will operate, the information you have provided concerning GRIPA's size, composition, form of operation, and characteristics of the market in the greater Rochester, New York, area, where GRIPA operates. It is unlikely that GRIPA, or its physician members, will acquire or exercise market power, or that the proposed program will have any anticompetitive effects. Accordingly, we have no current intention to challenge GRIPA's proposed program if it proceeds to implement the program as described.



"...[W]e have no current intention to recommend that the Commission challenge GRIPA's proposed program if it proceeds to implement the program as described."

- The FTC staff ... considered the **"explicit admission"** by GRIPA that **one objective of the plan was to contract at higher fee levels for the services of physician-members.**
- Ordinarily, such an objective would raise concerns that higher prices would result from the exercise of market power, the FTC staff said.
- "Here, however, GRIPA's higher fee levels are anticipated as **part of a program that seeks, and through the participants' integration appears to have significant potential to achieve, greater overall efficiency and improved quality** in the provision of medical care to covered persons."
- Based on the information provided, the FTC staff letter said, it appeared that GRIPA's joint negotiation of contracts, "including price terms with payers on behalf of its physician members who will be providing medical services to payers' enrollees under those contracts is subordinate to, **reasonably related to, and may be reasonably necessary for, or to further, GRIPA's ability to achieve the potential efficiencies** that appear likely to result from its member physicians' integration through the proposed program."



What *else* do we know?

Third,

many lawful, well-constructed CI programs have and are being developed across the country . . .

So, you need to get going!

“Publicly known” examples



Advocate Physician Partners



BROWN & TOLAND
MEDICAL GROUP



MedSouth
HEALTHCARE, P.C.

Other examples without national exposure

Example A

Community physician network (~200 physicians)

AMBULATORY

- Data collection and Data Warehouse:
Apply Evidence Based medicine protocols
- Patient communication and outreach for chronic disease management
- Physician education: quarterly roundtables
- Referral tracking initiative
- Formulary compliance and e-prescribing initiative
- EMR initiative
- IPA appointment/reappointment standards

INPATIENT

- Reduce avoidable days per physician
- Improve inpatient quality of care AMI
- Improve inpatient quality of care PNE
- Improve inpatient quality of care HF
- Improve efficiency: Preoperative scheduling
- Physician Participation in IT initiative
- Hospital quality indicators: mortality, infection and readmission rates

OTHER


- IPA appointment/reappointment standards (Include significant inpatient cases in IPA peer review/appointment process)
- Physician participation in hospital programs: IT training for Care Manager, Physician Portal
- Physician participation in hospital programs: Physician Advisory Panel for IT

Example B


Community physician-hospital organization (1 hospital, ~120 physicians)


- *Ambulatory EMR initiative*
- *Use of EMR for hospital-based physicians*
- *Review of data, use of evidence-based medicine*
- *Chronic Disease Management: Diabetes, CHF, Asthma*
- *Preventive Health Management*
- *Immunizations (adult and child)*
- *Physician education*
- *Pharmacy initiative*
- *Inpatient Quality of Care Measures: AMI, HF, CAP, SIP*
- *Timely completion of Medical Records*
- *Hospital Quality Indicators*

Example C: 8 hospitals & 2100 physicians



Clinical Programs Committee





*Reporting
the 2007
Clinical
Integration
Results*

The 2008 Value Report

 *Advocate Physician Partners*

Benefits from Clinical Integration


www.advocatehealth.com

**Search for: 2008 Value
Report**

(http://www.advocatehealth.com/physpartners/about/employers/value_report.html)

Or call 1.800. 3ADVOCATE

Food for thought...



“Though creating clinically integrated organizations is difficult and expensive, physicians should recognize that clinical integration can help them both to gain some negotiating leverage with health plans and to improve the quality of care for their patients.”

Lawrence P. Casalino M.D., Ph.D., University of Chicago

“The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration, and the Organization of Physician Practice,” *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, 2006, Duke University Press, 31(3):569-585; DOI:10.1215/03616878-2005-007