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Executive Summary

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed an audit of the process for providing and accounting for information provided to researchers. The objective of this audit was to determine whether controls were in place for ensuring requested records were properly accounted for when requested and returned to storage locations. Specifically, this audit focused on NARA's process for making records requested available to researchers, accounting for the records once they leave the record storage areas, and the process for refiling the records once the researcher finishes using them.

NARA provides information about records and makes them available to the public for research unless they have access restrictions. The Office of Records Services – Washington, DC (NW) has custodial responsibility for most of the historically valuable archival Federal records in the Washington, DC area. These records include military and civilian records from past and current executive, judicial, and legislative branch agencies and departments.

During the course of the audit, management officials and staff were cooperative. The staff provided documentation when needed. They also addressed questions and issues identified during audit. At the exit conference, management was receptive to the findings identified.

Our audit revealed that opportunities exist to strengthen the effectiveness and controls over the process of providing and accounting for information provided to researchers. Specifically, we found the following:

- NW's Access Programs (NWC) did not have a formal ongoing monitoring
 program for the records retrieval and refile process to identify and address
 potential problems and ensure compliance with program requirements. As a
 result (a) records were not refiled, refiled incorrectly, or refiled in an untimely
 manner, (b) pull slips were incomplete, and (c) pull logs were not maintained
 consistently.
- A centralized, integrated database for storing researcher requests for records was not utilized.
- Access to record storage areas at Archives I and II was not restricted to authorized personnel whose job responsibilities require access.

As a result of these conditions, NARA cannot adequately ensure records are properly accounted for nor appropriately safeguard the records entrusted to them.

This report contains four recommendations for addressing our findings. The recommendations in this report, upon adoption, will strengthen internal control weaknesses defined in the report.

Background

NARA provides information about records and makes them available to the public for research unless they have access restrictions. The agency holds billions of records in multiple formats. In addition to traditional paper (textual) materials, NARA's holdings also include special media materials such as microfilm, still pictures, motion pictures, sound and video recordings, cartographic and architectural records, and electronic records.

The Office of Records Services – Washington, DC (NW) has custodial responsibility for most of the historically valuable archival records in the Washington, DC area. Various divisions of Access Programs (NWC) within NW are responsible for introducing researchers to the reference process, providing reference assistance, delivering records, and monitoring the use of records in the research rooms. A *Reference Service Slip* (NA Form 14001 – See Appendix A) or *Request for Military Records* (NA Form 14027 – See Appendix B), is prepared whenever records are removed from their proper place in the record storage areas for use in the research rooms.

NARA directive, Archives 1400, Chapter 7, *Reference Service*, documents the limitations and procedures for reference services on accessioned records for all persons requesting such services. Reference services include providing information about the records, making the records available for use in research rooms, furnishing reproductions of records, lending records to other Government agencies, and providing information from specially identified records upon request.

NARA directive, Archives 1400, Chapter 8, *Security Procedures*, documents safety and security procedures for records in the custody of NARA. The procedures provide protection against theft, unauthorized alteration, and damage or disturbance caused by inexpert or careless handling. Only NARA employees and officials whose job responsibilities require access to records storage areas are permitted access.

NARA directive 1572, *Security for NARA Holdings*, specifies security for NARA holdings. At a minimum, holdings not in use must be stored in stack or storage areas with accessibility limited to authorized personnel. Whenever holdings are removed from secure storage locations for any reason, staff must document the removal by completing NARA approved appropriate record of the removal that identifies the removed holdings, the staff member responsible for the removal, and the reason for and date of the removal.

On a quarterly basis NW reports on agency-wide milestone objectives and target metrics in their performance reports. NW provides performance data for the target metric reviewing the percent of items requested in NARA's research rooms that are furnished within one hour of request or scheduled pull time. In FY 2009, 404,548 items were furnished in the NWC research rooms. During FY 2009, ninety-one percent, or 367,231, of those items were furnished within one hour.

Records Retrieval and Refile Process

Records are made available to researchers in the research rooms operated by NWC at Archives I and Archives II. The records retrieval and refile process (hereafter referred to as "pull and refile process") is initiated when a researcher submits a reference service slip (hereafter referred to as "pull slip"). The pull slip is a multi-colored (white, pink, green, and yellow) carbon copy document used to track records removed from the stack areas at NARA. It identifies the researcher (name and researcher identification number) and the location (stack area, row, compartment, and shelf) of the records in the stack areas.

There are several established times throughout the day when records are pulled for researchers. NWC employees locate and remove the records based on the stack area, row, compartment, and shelf indicated on the pull slip. The number of records pulled and the employee that pulled the records are indicated on the pull slip. The yellow carbon copy of the pull slip is left on the shelf in place of the records removed. The green carbon copy stays with the records at all times and the records are delivered to the research room's Holding Area. The pink carbon copy is placed in the "hold" box in the research room. When a researcher obtains the records, they sign and complete the "Record of Chargeouts in Search Room" section on the back of the pink carbon copy (this section is also completed when the records are returned).

After a researcher is finished viewing the records, the records are returned to the stack areas they were removed from previously. The yellow carbon copy is removed and the records are returned to the shelf.

Objectives, Scope, Methodology

The objective of this audit was to determine whether controls were in place for ensuring requested records were properly accounted for when requested and returned to storage locations. The audit was conducted at Archives I in Washington, DC and Archives II in College Park, Maryland, with representatives from NW's Access Programs (NWC), Customer Services (NWCC), Special Media Archives Services (NWCS), and Textual Archives Services (NWCT) divisions. We also contacted the Security Management Branch (NASS) of the Space and Security Management Division (NAS).

We examined applicable laws, regulations, and NARA guidance including (a) Archives 1400, Chapter 7, Reference Service; (b) Archives 1400, Chapter 8, Security Procedures; (c) NARA 1572, Security for NARA Holdings; (d) NARA 279, Exit Clearance Procedures for Separating or Reassigning NARA Employees, Contractor Employees, Volunteers, Interns, and Foundation Employees; and (e) NARA 271, Key Control at NARA Facilities.

To accomplish our objective, we reviewed NARA's process for making records requested available for researchers, accounting for the records once they leave the record storage areas, and the process for refiling the records once the researcher was finished using them. In addition, we interviewed staff in charge of providing textual and media records to researchers in the research rooms. For each of the areas, we judgmentally selected a sample of pull slips to perform detailed audit testing to verify whether (1) records were appropriately accounted for when removed from the record storage areas and (2) records were returned to the record storage areas. We also obtained information from NASS to verify whether (1) background investigations were completed for staff involved in the process for providing records to researchers and (2) access to stack areas was granted to individuals whose job responsibilities require access to records storage areas.

A review of whether requested records were safeguarded when used by researchers in the research rooms was not included in the scope of this audit. However, the OIG's Office of Investigations performed a proactive holding security assessment in January of 2010. The results of the assessment were detailed in *Proactive Holdings Security Assessment* (Management Letter OI 10-02).

Our audit work was performed at Archives I in Washington, DC and Archives II in College Park, Maryland between August 2009 and February 2010. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on audit objectives.

Audit Results

1. Lack of controls over accounting for records during pull and refile process.

NARA lacks an adequate internal control structure to ensure records are accounted for when they are requested and returned to record storage areas. The OIG reviewed pull and refile operations for five areas within NWC ((1)Archives II Research Support Branch (NWCC2), (2) Archives I Forms Reference Section and Archives I Reference Section (NWCT1F/NWCT1R), (3) NWCS – Motion Pictures, (4) NWCS - Cartographic, and (5) NWCS - Still Pictures) and identified weaknesses in each area. These weaknesses include (a) records not refiled or refiled to the incorrect locations; (b) records refiled in an untimely manner; (c) pull slips not completed in their entirety; (d) pull slips not maintained in a centralized location; and (e) pull logs not maintained. The weaknesses exist because NWC did not implement ongoing monitoring efforts to ensure an effective internal control structure. NARA directive, Archives 1400, Chapter 7, Reference Service and NW internal procedures require records be refiled to the stack locations from which they were removed and refiled in a timely manner. Also, federal guidance requires agencies to implement sufficient monitoring, oversight, and control activities to ensure weaknesses are mitigated. As a result of the above issues, NARA cannot ensure records requested in the research rooms at Archives I and Archives II are properly accounted for when removed from shelves. Additionally, without a consistent process for monitoring the pull and refile process, NARA's ability to identify and address potential compliance issues with program requirements is limited.

Government Accountability Office (GAO) *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* state internal control systems should be monitored to assess their effectiveness and to modify procedures as appropriate based on results of the monitoring activities. Monitoring is accomplished through routine, ongoing activities, separate evaluations, or both, and should be built into the normal, recurring operating activities of an entity. Everyone within an organization has some responsibility for monitoring.

As a part of fieldwork, we reviewed a sample of 136 pull slips for records charged out to researchers from December 2009 through February 2010. This review revealed several instances where controls were inadequate.

The following chart is a summary of the weaknesses identified by area:

	Records were refiled on the wrong shelves	Records were not refiled	Records were not filed in a timely manner	Pull slips were incomplete	Pull logs were not maintained
NWCC2	X				
NWCS - Cartographic	X			X	
NWCS – Motion Pictures ¹		X	X	X	X
NWCS – Still Pictures				X	
NWCT1F/NWCT1R		X		X	

a) Records were not refiled or refiled on the wrong shelves – One of the tests we performed was to review pull slips (48 in total) left on the shelves for records provided to researchers.

Fifteen of the 48 pull slips did not have corresponding pull slips in the research rooms' hold boxes (NWCT1F/NWCT1R, NWCC2 and NWCS – Cartographic, Motion Pictures) which would indicate the records were in use by researchers or on hold. After inquiry with employees and searching shelves, five of the pull slips' records were refiled incorrectly and found on other shelves by NWCC2 and NWCS – Cartographic employees. Two of the five were misfiled by NWCS - Cartographic because (1) researchers were allowed to create pull slips for records that were not contiguous and from different compartments and (2) the employees that refiled the records did not review the pull slips in detail and recognize the different locations for the records.

Ten of the 48 pull slips on the shelves (NWCT1F/NWCT1R) were extremely outdated (from 2003 through 2009), which is an indication the records are not accounted for and may have been misfiled or not returned by the researcher. Although, there were only ten sample pull slips with such extreme dates, the auditor noted a numerous amount of dated pull slips on the shelves in NWCS – Motion Pictures record storage areas. One of the pull slips left on the shelf was from 2007, and NWCT1F/NWCT1R personnel located the records 17 days after the auditor identified the exception. The other nine pull slips' records were not located by NWCS – Motion Pictures. The Supervisory Archivist of Motion Pictures stated it was not a problem if records were not returned by researchers since they are copies of the originals on file.

b) Records were not refiled in a timely manner - NWCS – Motion Pictures did not refile records after they were returned or not used by researchers in a timely manner. In

¹ NWCS – Motion Pictures does not provide original records for public researcher use. Any film, audio, or video items served in the Motion Pictures research room are designated as "reference copies" according to established NARA standards.

February 2010, we observed unrefiled records returned from researchers in December 2009, and records on hold from January 2010 sitting in the holding room (see Figures 1 and 2). According to Archives 1400, Chapter 7, *Reference Service*, records returned by researchers are required to be immediately returned to the holding area (Archives 1400 focuses on records, while this issue pertains to the reference copies NWC – Motion Pictures provides to researchers). Management indicated when records are not used for three workdays or if the researcher finished using them, they are returned to the record storage areas.

Figure 1: NWCS - Motion Pictures Hold Room - Reference Copies Waiting to be Refiled



Figure 2: NWCS - Motion Pictures Hold Room - Reference Copies Waiting to be Refiled



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c) Pull slips were incomplete – We reviewed 54 pull slips from NWCS. None of the pull slips from the NWCS - Cartographic and Still Pictures contain detailed information regarding the location of the records including the row, compartment, and shelf. NW memorandum 2004-12, Controlling Archival Records Removed from Stack Areas at Archives I and Archives II, indicates pull slips must include the date, name of requestor, agency or address, record group number, stack area/row/compartment/shelf, and record identification. While employees of NWC are familiar with the location of records, it does not provide a complete recording of the location of the records pulled or a trail for audit or investigative purposes. NWCT1F/NWCT1R also allows researchers to list their addresses on pull slips instead of the researcher's identification number.

We also noted researchers requesting records from the NWCS - Motion Pictures were not required to sign pull slips when they received the records or complete the Record of Chargeouts on the back of the pull slips. Researchers should acknowledge receipt of records by signing NA Form 14001.

- d) NW divisions did not maintain pull slips in a centralized location —When Archives Specialists, Aids, Technicians, and Archivists from various NW divisions need to pull records for operational purposes (preservation, processing, etc.) from the record storage areas, they complete pull slips for the removal of the records. As a part of our audit, we reviewed several of these pull slips. Our review found one centralized location was not maintained for the pull slips. Employees individually maintained copies of the pull slips at their desks for the records they removed. However, Archives 1400, Chapter 7, Reference Service, indicates reference units maintain a separate chronological file of the white copies of completed pull slips for records charged out to other NARA units. Reference units are also required to periodically review this file to determine when records are returned and to investigate the circumstances concerning overdue records.
- e) <u>Pull logs were not maintained</u> NWCS Motion Pictures did not maintain complete daily pull logs of records pulled for researchers. Without these logs, the statistical data for the quarterly NW performance report is incomplete.

As a result of the above issues, NARA cannot ensure records requested in the Archives I and Archives II research rooms are properly accounted for when removed from shelves. Internal controls are a major part of efficiently and effectively managing a program and developing a process for monitoring the pull and refile process is critical. A formal ongoing monitoring program of internal control activities will help identify any existing control weaknesses.

Recommendation 1

The Assistant Archivist for Records Services – Washington, DC (NW) should establish formal written policies and procedures to improve NW's monitoring of the pull and refile process.

Management Response

Management concurred with recommendation.

2. NWC lacks a centralized database to process researcher requests.

NWC did not utilize a centralized, integrated database for storing researcher requests for records. Instead each division developed separate databases for the requests. This condition is a result of NWC operating a decentralized organizational structure. Government Accountability Office (GAO) *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* asserts management should design and implement internal controls to protect its assets. The lack of a uniform process (1) impacts NWC's ability to properly safeguard the records entrusted to them; (2) increases inconsistencies; and (3) prevents the opportunity for divisions of NWC to work together for improved results.

During our review of researcher requests for records in the research rooms, we found NWC does not utilize a centralized, integrated database for storing researcher requests for records. Each area (NWCC2, NWCS, and NWCT1F/NWCT1R) maintains its own database and records different information for the requests (See Appendix C for a summary of the elements recorded in each database). NWCC2's database:

- Recorded the researcher's ID number, pull date, pull time, record group, stack area, and control number assigned;
- Recorded each stage of the process including when (1) researcher's requests are received, (2) the pullers picked up the requests, (3) record pulls are completed, (4) records are released by the researcher, and (5) records are refiled; and
- Linked each researcher request to the researcher's information (including picture) maintained in NARA's researcher registration application.

However, the databases maintained by NWCS and NWCT1F/NWCT1R were not as refined and comprehensive as they maintained minimum information about the researcher's requests. NWCS database recorded the date, pull time, puller, and number of records pulled. NWCT1F/NWCT1R maintained two separate databases, textual and military. The textual records database included the control number, researcher number, record group, and date of pull slip. The military records database recorded the researcher's last name and number of records furnished.

The separate databases are maintained because of the silo based program structure NWC has in place for the divisions involved in processing researcher requests for records. The divisions are treated separately and controls are not reviewed concurrently. For instance, a Lean study of the pull and refile process was performed in FY 2009 for NWCC2, whereas a detailed review has not been performed for the other divisions in NWC. The

study resulted in a number of changes and recommendations for NWCC2. Also, a new study is planned for FY 2010 for this same branch, NWCC2, which will look at all aspects of textual reference to determine how well they are providing the researcher service and if they need to make changes in order to better serve the researchers. A review of the internal controls for the research process for all divisions is a prudent best management practice.

NARA's ability to effectively identify and/or investigate potential theft of archival documents may be hindered as critical information is not housed in a central location. In the event a researcher is suspected of theft, a centralized database could provide essential information such as (1) photo identification of the suspected researcher; (2) dates and times of the researcher's visits; (3) all NWC locations visited; and (4) all records requested. Additionally, if an individual has stolen from other institutions, a centralized database may help determine if that individual has accessed records at one or more NWC facilities.

Recommendation 2

The Assistant Archivist for Records Services – Washington, DC (NW) should implement a centralized database for all of the NW divisions involved in the processing of researchers requests for records and determine the necessary information that should be included in the database. At a minimum the database should include the elements recorded in the NWCC database.

Management Response

Management concurred with recommendation.

3. Lack of controls over access to record storage areas.

Access to record storage areas at Archives I and Archives II was not restricted to authorized personnel whose job responsibilities require access. These deficiencies occurred because the controls outlined in NARA regulations, Archives 1400, Chapter 8, Security Procedures and NARA 271, Key Control at NARA Facilities were not enforced. Specifically, according to NARA directive Archives 1400, Chapter 8, Security Procedures only NARA employees and officials whose job responsibilities require access to records storage areas be permitted to access stack areas. NARA 271, Key Control at NARA Facilities, requires the primary key custodian to conduct biennial inventories of all keys. Without proper control, NARA risks unauthorized access to record storage areas which could lead to theft, alteration, and damage or disturbance to records.

Physical and Holdings Security has consistently been defined as one of NARA's Top Ten Management Challenges in our semiannual reports to Congress. During this audit we reviewed the listings of individuals with access to the record storage areas at Archives I

and Archives II. Our review found NASS did not perform its responsibilities associated with managing and administering access to record storage areas as access was not restricted to authorized personnel whose job responsibilities required it.

Specifically, we found:

- a) At Archives I, a card key mechanism was not used to restrict access or capture and log ingress or egress into stack areas. We also found key control was inadequate at Archives I to limit access to the stacks. These deficiencies were previously identified by the OIG in *Security over Holdings in Stack Areas* (Management Letter 06-03). In addition:
 - Updated key control logs to show when keys were returned, were not maintained.
 - Periodic reviews of access to the record storage areas were not performed as required. NASS completed the last review in May 2006.
 - NARA Form 6029, *Key Authorization Control Record*, was not on file for twenty-five individuals. Also, when key cards were on file they were not always completed when employment or contractor services ended at NARA.
 - Five employees have multiple keys to the record storage areas.

Management indicated during the audit, \$3.2 million was allocated in the FY2010 Repair and Restoration budget for a key card mechanism. An engineering firm was hired perform a design for the project. The design was completed and issued for contractor pricing. Construction work is expected to start in late 2010 and end in late 2011.

- b) Several employees at Archives I and Archives II had access to the record storage areas even though their job responsibilities did not appear to require access.
 - We identified 36 employees at Archives I, including: 22 Information Security
 Oversight Office (ISOO) employees, six Facilities Management Branch (NAFM)
 employees, five Congressional Affairs (NCON) employees, one Information
 Technology Services Branch (NHT) employee, one Policy and Planning Staff
 (NPOL) employee, and one IT Operations Branch (NHTW) employee. The
 Archives I Security Chief indicated some individuals have access to the record
 storage areas because it provides them easier access to their offices.
 - At Archives II we identified 19 employees, including: 6 Office of Record Services (NW), 3 Office of Information Services (NH), 2 Public Affairs and Communications Staff (NPAC), 2 Chief of Staff (NCS), 2 Office of Inspector General (OIG) employees, 1 Systems Development Division (NHV), 1 Facilities and Personal Property Management Division (NAF), 1 Policy and Planning Staff (NPOL), and 1 Office of Regional Records Services (NR).
- c) There were no controls in place to ensure employee's, contractor's, volunteer's, intern's, and Foundation employee's access to NARA facilities was removed when the individual either no longer needed access, no longer worked or performed

contractor services at NARA, or had not used their proximity or Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards for a period of time. At Archives I, 50 individuals who no longer work or perform contractor services still had keys to the record storage areas. Forty-one of the fifty were prior employees of NARA, six were prior contractors, and three were former Foundation employees.

At Archives II, PIV cards were not returned or deactivated for 33 individuals who no longer work or conduct business at NARA including fourteen prior employees, fourteen former security employees, and five prior contractors. There were also eight employees who had not used their proximity cards in a long period of time (from three months to over two years). During the audit, NASS took immediate action and deactivated these eight cards.

According to NARA 279, Exit Clearance Procedures for Separating or Reassigned NARA Employees, Contractor Employees, Volunteers, Interns, and Foundation Employees, indicates NARA must ensure all individuals ending their work or volunteer relationship with NARA, or relocating to a different office or facility within NARA, account for any outstanding accountable items (identification badges, PIV cards, keys, and proximity cards) for which the individual is responsible. Although this policy exists, in January management at AI indicated there is no formal process for contractors, volunteers, and non-paid students when their work or volunteer relationship with NARA ends.

- d) LB&B employees at Archives I and Archives II have unnecessary access to the record storage areas, including an administrative assistant, warehouseman, landscape specialist, and plumbers. While NARA directive, Archives 1400, Chapter 8, *Security Procedures* indicates facilities staff may have routine access to non-security access areas, it does not specify which positions should be granted the access.
- e) NASS does not provide employee access reports to organizations that would allow them to monitor and determine if access is still appropriate. Periodic monitoring would ensure access is granted only to individuals authorized and deviations are analyzed and corrected.

The conditions noted were attributable to inadequate management oversight and reviews. When access to record storage areas is not adequately managed the risk of theft increases. Also, as a result of the above issues, NARA cannot meet its mission of safeguarding and preserving the records of the Government.

Recommendation 3

The Assistant Archivist of Administration should immediately perform an inventory of access (key and PIV cards) to Archives I and Archives II record storage areas.

Management Response

Management concurred with recommendation.

Recommendation 4

The Assistant Archivist of Administration should:

- a) Update policies to clearly reflect which positions need access to record storage areas.
- b) Establish and implement procedures for monitoring access to record storage areas.
- c) Establish procedures for providing organizations with the information necessary to properly monitor and review access to the record storage areas, including electronic copies of a quarterly report to the head of each custodial unit which will enable them to monitor and review the access to the record storage areas. The report should include (1) individuals with access in their custodial unit, (2) associated key/proximity card number, and (3) the expiration date of the access for the proximity card (Archives II only).

Management Response

Management concurred with recommendation.

Appendix A – NA Form 14001 "Reference Service Slip"

Reference Service Slip					Date	NO.		
Name of Requestor						Agency or Address		
Units of Service					Source of Request (Check)			
Information	on	Records				NA Admini	stration Use	
Service (Number of	of	Furnished (Number	Textual, Still	Motion	Sound	Agency of Origin		
Replies)	01	of items)	Pictures, ETC. (Number of	Pictures (Number of	Recordings (Number of feet)	Other Government		
_			pages)	feet)	(rumber of feet)	Nongovernment		
						Request Handled	BY	
RG NO.	Stack	Area	Row	Compartment	1	Shelf	Outcard NO.	
Received	l Bv				Date	Returned To	Date	
Received	1 Ву				Date	Returned To	Date	

Appendix B – NA Form 14027 "Request for Military Records"

·	*U.S. GPO: 200	05-313-549/90102		
			1. DATE	2. BRANCH SYMBOL
REQUEST FO	R MILITARY RECORD	os		
3. NAME OF REQUESTOR		4. AGENCY OR AD	DRESS	
5. RG NO. 6. STACK AREA	7. ROW 8. COMPARTMENT	9. SHELF	10. OUTCARD NO.	11. SEARCHER
	k one only)	(IS MILLER OF BOURE	t and absolute assess	ata itama 12 15 16 and
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check			1 – complete items 13, 1	
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check MILITARY PENSION 13. NAME OF SOLDIER		If Pension is checked	I – complete items 13, 1 ENDENT	
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check MILITARY PENSION 13. NAME OF SOLDIER	BOUNTY LAND	14. NAME OF DEP	I – complete items 13, 1 ENDENT	4, 15, 16, 17 and 18.)
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check MILITARY PENSION 13. NAME OF SOLDIER 15. UNIT (CO, BN, or REGT.)	BOUNTY LAND	14. NAME OF DEPI	I — complete items 13, 1 ENDENT ES OF SERVICE	
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check MILITARY PENSION 13. NAME OF SOLDIER 15. UNIT (CO, BN, or REGT.) a. INVALID	BOUNTY LAND	14. NAME OF DEPI	I — complete items 13, 1 ENDENT ES OF SERVICE	17. STATE SERVED
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check	BOUNTY LAND	14. NAME OF DEPI	I — complete items 13, 1 ENDENT ES OF SERVICE	17. STATE SERVED
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check MILITARY PENSION 13. NAME OF SOLDIER 15. UNIT (CO, BN, or REGT.) a. INVALID b. WIDOW c. MINOR d. FATHER	BOUNTY LAND	14. NAME OF DEPI	I — complete items 13, 1 ENDENT ES OF SERVICE	17. STATE SERVED
12. RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Check MILITARY PENSION 13. NAME OF SOLDIER 15. UNIT (CO, BN, or REGT.) a. INVALID b. WIDOW c. MINOR	BOUNTY LAND	14. NAME OF DEPI	I — complete items 13, 1 ENDENT ES OF SERVICE CERT	17. STATE SERVED

Appendix C – NWC's Researcher Requests Databases

The following chart lists the elements from researcher requests recorded in the NWCC2, NWCS, and NWCT1F/NWCT1R databases.

	Database Elements
NWCC2	Recorded the researcher's ID number, pull date, pull time, record group, stack area, and control number assigned;
	Recorded each stage of the process including when (1) researcher's requests are received, (2) requests are assigned to staff for pulling, (3) record pulls are completed, (4) records are released by the researcher, and (5) records are refiled; and
	Linked each researcher request to the researcher's information (including picture) maintained in NARA's researcher registration application.
NWCS	Recorded the date, pull time, puller, and number of records pulled
NWCT1F/NWCT1R	Textual records database recorded the control number assigned, researcher number, record group, and date of pull slip.
	Military records database recorded the researcher's last name and number of records furnished.

Appendix D – Acronyms and Abbreviations

GAO Government Accountability Office ISOO Information Security Oversight Office

NAF Facilities and Personal Property Management Division

NAFM Facilities Management Branch

NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NAS Space and Security Management Division

NASS Security Management Branch

NCON Congressional Affairs

NCS Chief of Staff

NH Office of Information Services

NHT Information Technology Services Branch

NHTW IT Operations Branch

NHV Systems Development Division

NPAC Public Affairs and Communications Staff

NPOL Policy and Planning Staff

NR Office of Regional Records Services

NW Offices of Records Services – Washington, DC

NWC Access Programs

NWCC Customer Services Division

NWCC2 Archives II Research Support Branch NWCT Textual Archives Services Division NWCT1F Archives I Forms Reference Section

NWCT1R Archives I Reference Section

NWCS Special Media Archives Services Division

OIG Office of Inspector General PIV Personal Identify Verification

Appendix E - Management's Response to the Report



National Archives and Records Administration

8601 Adelphi Road College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

Date:

July 23, 2010

To:

Paul Brachfeld, Inspector General

From:

Susan M. Ashtianie,

Director, Policy and Planning Staff (NPOL)

Subject:

OIG Draft Report No. 10-14,

Audit of the Process for Providing and Accounting for Information Provided to Researchers

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft audit report. We appreciate the efforts of your staff and all parties associated with the audit process, especially the willingness of the auditor to meet and discuss changes to some language in this draft report.

We concur with all four recommendations in the report and will begin work on an action plan to address both the recommendations and the underlying findings.

If you have any questions concerning these comments, please contact Mary Drak via email at mary.drak@nara.gov or by phone at 301-837-1668.

SUSAN M. ASHTIANIE

Director, Policy and Planning Staff

NARA's wah sito is http://www.archives and

Appendix F - Report Distribution List

Archivist of the United States
Deputy Archivist of the United States
Assistant Archivist, Office of Records Services – Washington, DC (NW)
Assistant Archivist, Office of Administration (NA)
Chief of Staff
Management Control Liaison, Policy and Planning (NPOL)