# Quirks Uncovered While Testing Forensic Tool

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United States Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology

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# Outline

- Overview of computer forensics at NIST
- Quirks uncovered
  - Write Blocking
  - Acquisition to an image file
  - Restoration from an image file
  - Other
- Questions and answers

## Where is CFTT?

- US government, executive branch
- Department of Commerce (DOC)
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
- Information Technology Lab (ITL)
- Software Diagnostics and Conformance Testing Division (SDCT)
- Computer Forensics: Tool Testing Project (CFTT)
- Also, the Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) at NIST provides project input March 28, 2008

# Goals of CF at NIST/ITL

- Establish methodology for testing computer forensic tools (CFTT)
- Provide international standard reference data that tool makers and investigators can use in investigations (NSRL, CFReDS)

# Project Sponsors (aka Steering Committee)

- National Institute of Justice (Major funding)
- FBI (Additional funding)
- Department of Defense, DCCI (Equipment and support)
- Homeland Security (Technical input)
- State & Local agencies (Technical input)
- Internal Revenue, IRS (Technical input)
- NIST/OLES (Program management)

# Other Related Projects at NIST

- NSRL -- Hash (MD5, SHA1) file signature data base, updated 4 times a year (Doug White, John Tebbutt, Ben Long)
- PDAs and Cell Phones, NIST (Rick Ayers)
- SAMATE -- Software Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation (Paul E. Black)
- CFReDS -- Computer Forensics Reference Data Sets (Jim Lyle)

### **Forensic Tool Features**

- ... are like a Swiss army knife
  - Blade knife for cutting
  - Punch for making holes
  - Scissors for cutting paper
  - Cork screw for opening Chianti
- Forensic tools can do one or more of ...
  - Image a disk (digital data acquisition)
  - Search for strings
  - Recover deleted files

## **Testing a Swiss Army Knife**

- How should tools with a variable set of features be tested? All together or by features?
- Test by feature has a set of tests for each feature: acquisition, searching, recovery
- Examples: EnCase acquisition, iLook string search, FTK file recovery

#### Good News

- Forensic tools tested work
- Problems found are minor
  - Usually something is omitted
  - Nothing incriminating is created
- Investigators should be aware of the quirks

# Write Blocking

- Goal: Prevent changes to a protected drive
- Host interacts with a drive by a command set through an interface
  - Read
  - Write
  - Control & info

#### Int 13 Extended Write

DOS Interrupt 13 has three write cmds

- Write (original write cmd)
- Write long
- Extended write (added later for large drives)

 Early write blocker versions only block write & write long

# **Blocking read commands**

#### • Hardware write block devices ...

- Capture cmds sent from a host on a bus
- Send cmds to a protected device
- Return data to a host
- Some devices may ...
  - Substitute a different cmd
  - Cache results and not issue cmd to device. If the protected device is reconfigured to report a different size, a cached size is reported incorrectly
  - Block some read cmds

#### Allow Reads vs Block Writes

- Block unsafe commands, allow everything else
   + Always can read, even if new command introduced
   Allows newly introduced write commands
- Allow safe commands, block everything else
   + Writes always blocked
  - Cannot use newly introduced read commands

# **Source Acquisition**

- Tool acquires either
  - entire drive (physical drive)
  - partition (logical drive)
- Evaluate the acquisition by either ...
  - Hash of data acquired
  - Compare source to a restore

#### Hard Drive Organization

- Basic unit is a 512 byte sector
- 63 sectors are grouped as a track
- A set of tracks are grouped as a cylinder
- Sectors are addressed as:
  - Cylinder/track/sector
  - Cylinders start at 0,
  - Tracks start at 0, but
  - Sectors start at 1

### **Odd Sectors**

- Use dd to acquire either a physical or logical drive with an odd sector count and the last sector is omitted.
- Occurs in the 2.4 kernel and earlier.
- The current 2.6 kernel does not have the problem.

# **BIOS** Lies

- DOS based acquisition via BIOS interface
- Some BIOSs group several physical cylinders together into a logical cylinder
- There may be a fractional logical cylinder left over.
- In addition, some BIOSs may underreport the number of logical cylinders by 1 cylinder

# More BIOS Lies

- Actual geometry: 3,309/16/63
  - 63x16 sectors/cylinder (1,008)
  - 3,335,472 total sectors 3,335,472x512 bytes
- **BIOS** wants cylinder count < 1024
- BIOS reports geometry as: 826/64/63
  - 63x16 sectors/cylinder (4,032)
  - 3,330,432 total sectors

### **Restoring an Image**

• Testing the accuracy of a restore ...

Compare the original source sector by sector to the restored image

# **Missing Sectors on Restore**

- Restore an image of an IBM-DTLA-307020 with 40188960 sectors to an identical drive the results are ...
- Sectors Compared 40188960
   Sectors Differ 10395
   Diffs range 40178565-40188959
- Also the partition table gives 255 heads/cylinder and 63 sectors/track.
- That gives 16,065 (63\*255) sectors/cylinder
- Note that 40,188,960 mod 16,065 is ... 10,395

# Next Quirk, Starting with Answer

#### Image an NTFS partition of 27,744,192 sectors

| BBBBB        | CCCCC   | DDDDD  | EEEEE  |
|--------------|---|--|--|
| 27,744,120 s | sectors   |  |  |
| 7 sectors    |   |  |  |
| 57 sectors   |   |  |  |
| 7 sectors    |   |  |  |
| 1 sector     |   |  |  |
| BBBBB        | CCCCC   | BBBBB  |  |
|              | 27,744,120 s<br>7 sectors<br>57 sectors<br>7 sectors<br>7 sectors | 27,744,120 sectors<br>7 sectors<br>57 sectors<br>7 sectors<br>1 sector | <ul> <li>27,744,120 sectors</li> <li>7 sectors</li> <li>57 sectors</li> <li>7 sectors</li> <li>1 sector</li> </ul> |

# **NTFS Partition Restore**

Setup NTFS partition – MD5: 92b27b30bee8b0ffba8c660fa1590d49 - 27,744,192 sectors - Each sector filled with sector LBA & disk ID Acquire partition – Total Sectors:27,744,191 - 494A6ED8A827AD9B5403E0CC89379956 Rehash (minus last sector) -- still no match

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# **More NTFS**

- Restore image to NTFS partition
  Compare to original

  Sectors differ:
  Restore was in Windows XP ...

  Restore again, unpower drive, no system shutdown. Compare to original
  - Sectors differ: 8
  - Diffs range: 27,744,184-27,744,191

# **NTFS Resolution**

#### • Examine the eight sectors

- Last sector not imaged
- Other seven are a second copy of seven sectors starting at offset 27,744,120 -- Know this because each sector is tagged with LBA
- Verification:

#### Acquisition hash: 494a6ed8a827ad9b5403e0cc89379956

xena:/Users/jimmy root# dd bs=512 if=/dev/disk2s11 of=~jimmy/nt.dd xena.local(1009)==> dd if=nt.dd bs=512 skip=27744120 count=7 of=end.dd xena.local(1012)==> dd if=nt.dd bs=512 count=27744184 of=chunk.dd xena.local(1013)==> cat chunk.dd end.dd | md5 494a6ed8a827ad9b5403e0cc89379956 xena.local(1022)==> md5 nt.dd MD5 (nt.dd) = 92b27b30bee8b0ffba8c660fa1590d49

#### **Faulty Sector Behaviors**

- Some sectors adjacent to faulty sector missed
  - ATA interface: 8 sector window
  - USB interface: variable size window < 64
  - FW interface: variable, but different from USB
- Missed sectors filled with unknown data
- Image file gets out of sync

# Imaging a Drive with Faulty Sectors

- Acquire all sectors that are not faulty,
- identify all faulty sectors, and
- in the image file replace the faulty sector content with benign fill.

# **Reliably Faulty Drives**

- A set of known consistently faulty sectors.
- Can be imaged repeatedly with the same set of sectors reporting failure.
- Set of three reliably faulty drives:
  - MAX1 (54 faulty sectors)
  - MAX2 (398 faulty sectors)
  - WD (22 faulty sectors)

### **Basic Imaging Tools**

- DCCIdd V 2.0
- DCFLdd V 1.3.4
- dd on Helix with Linux kernel 2.6.14
- dd on FreeBSD V 5.5
- IXimager V 2.0 February 1, 2006

# Methodology

- 1. Create a reference drive identical to the faulty drive, but with no faulty sectors.
- 2. Clone the faulty drive with an imaging tool.
- 3. Compare the clone to the reference drive.

#### **Results for Drive MAX1**

| ΤοοΙ       | Bus | readable sectors missed |
|------------|-----|-------------------------|
| IXimager   | FW  | 0                       |
| Helix dd   | FW  | 5034                    |
| DCFLdd     | FW  | 5034                    |
| DCCIdd     | ATA | 306                     |
| FreeBSD dd | FW  | 0                       |

The missed sectors were misidentified as faulty and filled with zeros.

# **DCCIdd ATA Interface**

- Look at first difference between the clone and reference drive.
- The first difference is a run of 8 sectors, all zeros, on the clone (10,069,088 10,069,095).
- First faulty sector at address 10,069,095.
- DCCIdd misidentifies seven sectors as faulty on messages to stderr.

# More Runs (ATA Interface)

| Next four runs |           |          |  |  |
|----------------|-----------|----------|--|--|
| Bad Sector     | Run Start | Run End  |  |  |
| 10069911       | 10069904  | 10069911 |  |  |
| 12023808       | 12023808  | 12023815 |  |  |
| 18652592       | 18652592  | 18652599 |  |  |
| 18656041       | 18656040  | 18656047 |  |  |

•All runs included at least on faulty sector.

•All runs were 8 sectors long.

#### DCFLdd, dd & Firewire

- Some sectors around a faulty sector misidentified as faulty and imaged as zeros.
- Unlike ATA, the length of the run of misidentified sectors including the faulty sector varied.
- First five run lengths: 168, 216, 72, 248, 112.
- Note: all are a multiple of 8.
- Faulty sector was always in last group of 8.

## **Results: Sectors Missed**

- For IXimager and FreeBSD dd all the run lengths are one (no readable sectors missed).
- For imaging directly to the ATA interface with dd based tools the run length for a single isolated faulty sector was eight sectors (with seven sectors misidentified as faulty).
- For imaging with dd over the Firewire interface, the run lengths associated with a single, isolated faulty sector were a multiple of eight sectors (also with readable sectors misidentified as faulty).

# **Results: Fill Content**

- IXimager filled the sectors with the string: ILookImager\_Bad\_Sector\_No\_Data
- All the tools running in the Linux environment filled the sectors with zeros (NULL bytes).
- The sectors created by dd running in FreeBSD contained data from an undetermined source.

# **Other Quirks**

#### Hash Quirks

- Screen hash differ from log file
- Multiple hashes: SHA ok, MD5 wrong; hardware dependent



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