### Software Distribution and Setup Validation Requirements

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# Overview

- Background
- Software Distribution Methodology Requirements
- Reference Information Requirements
- Setup Validation Methodology Requirements
- Discussion

# Background

- TGDC Resolution 15-05: Software Distribution
  - To determine whether the identified voting system software has been distributed without modification
- TGDC Resolution 16-05: Setup Validation
  - To ensure voting systems contain only authorized voting system software, have no unauthorized software installed, and are in the proper initial state

# Background

- Two original documents combined to form one section
- Detailed analysis of scope and approach removed to improve readability
- Refinement and addition of requirements
- Correspondence of requirements to VSS and IEEE not included to reduce complexity but considered during development

- Vendor documentation to enumerate all software including third party software required by the voting equipment (6.0.4.1.1)
  - Detailed information to be documented (6.0.4.1.1.1)
  - Software files that never change, change based on the election, or change during ballot casting are identified. (6.0.4.1.1.2)

- Testing authorities to the witness of the final build of the qualified voting system software (6.0.4.1.2)
  - Complete record of the final build (6.0.4.1.2.1)
  - Source code and executables placed on write once media with unique labeling (6.0.4.1.2.2)
  - Records kept by testing authority until de-qualification of voting system (6.0.4.1.2.3)

- Testing authorities distribution subset of the final build record (6.0.4.1.2.4)
  - Only build executables and installation programs placed on write once media with unique labeling (6.0.4.1.2.4 and 6.0.4.1.2.5)
  - Vendors, NSRL, and other repositories receive copies (6.0.4.1.2.6)
  - Subset of record kept by testing authority until dequalification of voting system (6.0.4.1.2.7)

 Vendor responsible for providing repositories with a copy of all required third party software (6.0.4.1.3)

- Distribution of voting system and installation software using write once media (6.0.4.1.4)
  - Software sources: vendors, testing authorities, and voting officials (6.0.4.1.4.1)
  - Vendors and testing authorities document to whom they provide software (6.0.4.1.4.5)

- Verification of voting system and installation software on write once media using reference information
  - Vendors document process to verify qualified software using reference information (6.0.4.1.4.2)
  - Election officials verify write once media containing qualified software (6.0.4.1.4.3)
  - Voting equipment verify qualified software before installation (6.0.4.1.4.4)

- Most requirements apply to repositories that generate reference information
- Reference information will be generated by repositories (6.0.4.2.1)
  - Voting system software received from testing authorities
  - Election specific software from jurisdictions

- Reference information can be either complete binary images, cryptographic hash values, or digital signatures (6.0.4.2.1.1)
  - Repositories create record of reference information generation (6.0.4.2.1.1.1)
  - Records kept by repository until de-qualification of voting system (6.0.4.2.1.1.2)
  - FIPS approved algorithms for hashing and signing (6.0.4.2.1.1.3)

- FIPS 140-2 level 1 or higher cryptographic module for generation of hash values, digital signatures, and cryptographic keys (6.0.4.2.1.1.4)
- Hash value or digital signature covering reference information sets of hash values or digital signatures (6.0.4.2.1.1.5)
- Additional public key technology requirements (6.0.4.2.1.1.6)
  - Key pairs to be 2048-bits in length (6.0.4.2.1.1.6.1)
  - Private keys used for no more than three years (6.0.4.2.1.1.6.1)

- Distribution of public keys via write once media or a non-propriety signed format (6.0.4.2.1.1.7)
- Labeling of copies write once media containing public keys (6.0.4.2.1.1.8)
- Repositories document to whom they provide public keys (6.0.4.2.1.1.9)
- When a private key becomes compromised, Repositories notify recipients of the associated public key (6.0.4.2.1.1.10)

- Repositories to distribute reference information on uniquely labeled write once media and its associated documentation (6.0.4.2.2)
- Reference information without a digital signature stored in secure container when not used (6.0.4.2.2.1)

- Setup validation methods verify no unauthorized software is on the voting equipment (6.0.4.3.1)
  - Vendors provide a process to determine no unauthorized or modified software is present on voting equipment (6.0.4.3.1.1)
    - Process cannot execute or modify installed software (6.0.4.3.1.1.1 and 6.0.4.3.1.1.3)
    - Vendor documents process to verify software has not been modified (6.0.4.3.1.1.2)
    - Vendor provides a means to list all installed software files (6.0.4.3.1.2)

- Use of software and hardware from sources other than the voting system vendor to perform the verification process (6.0.4.3.1.2.1)
- FIPS 140-2 level 1 or higher cryptographic module used during verification with hashes or digital signatures (6.0.4.3.1.2.2)
- Reference information either from a write once media or other media with a digital signature (6.0.4.3.1.2.3)

- A read-only external interface on the voting system equipment to access software for verification (6.0.4.3.1.2.4)
  - Tamper evident techniques to protect external interface
  - Physical indicator shows when interface enabled and disabled
  - Disabled during ballot casting
  - Should directly access software locations without use of installed software

- Setup validation methods verify registers and variable of voting equipment contain proper initial and static values (6.0.4.3.2)
  - Vendors provide a method to inspect the register and variable values (6.0.4.3.2.1)
  - Vendors document the initial values of dynamic registers and variable except for values set by jurisdictions (6.0.4.3.2.2)
    - Modify to include static registers and variables and election specific values
  - Suggest deleting 6.0.4.3.2.3 and 6.0.4.3.2.4 already covered in 6.0.4.3.3

- Election officials run verification process before each election (6.0.4.3.3)
  - Modify to clarify both software and register/variable verification processes to be conducted on all voting equipment
- Election officials document results of the verification process (6.0.4.3.3.1)
- Anomalies in the verification process analyzed and resolved before the election (6.0.4.3.3.2)

# Discussion