Studies in Intelligence

**Needed: State-level, Integrated
Intelligence Enterprises**

**What the World Economic Crisis
Should Teach Us**

In Gratitude to the Crews of Air America

Reviews:

***The Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a
Band of US Soldiers Who Rode to Victory in Af-
ghanistan***

***Memorias de un Soldado Cubano: Vida y Muerte
de la Revolucion* [Memories of a Cuban Soldier:
Life and Death of the Revolution]**

***Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitio-
ners, Managers and Users***

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Center *for the* Study *of* Intelligence

CSI's Mission	The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger's desire to create within CIA an organization that could "think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems." The center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past activities, to explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and to stimulate serious debate about current and future intelligence challenges.

To carry out this mission, CSI publishes *Studies in Intelligence*, as well as numerous books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency's Historical Intelligence Collection of published literature on intelligence. |
| **Contributions** | *Studies in Intelligence* welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

      Editor
      Studies in Intelligence
      Center for the Study of Intelligence
      Central Intelligence Agency
      Washington, DC 20505 |
| **Awards** | The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in *Studies*. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is available for other prizes, including the Walter L. Pforzheimer Award. The Pforzheimer Award is given to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies'* purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers' nominations for awards. |

C O N T E N T S

INTELLIGENCE IN PUBLIC LITERATURE

INTELLIGENCE IN PUBLIC LITERATURE

Contributors

Craig W. Duehring is Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. During the war in Southeast Asia he served in the US Air Force as a pilot flying forward air control missions.

Rebecca Fisher is a researcher and analyst in the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Juan is the pen name of a senior National Clandestine Service officer.

Carmen Medina is the Director of CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and chairs the *Studies in Intelligence* Editorial Board. She served as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence and was an Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence.

Peter C. Oleson has held senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the DIA. He has taught at CIA University. He is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland University College.

Hayden Peake is the Curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served in the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

J. R. Seeger is a retired National Clandestine Service officer with service in Central and South Asia.

James E. Steiner teaches at State University of New York at Albany. He retired from CIA after 36 years of service in national intelligence n 2005. He has since been an adviser to the Department of Homeland Security and New York State's Office of Homeland Security.

Needed: State-level, Integrated Intelligence Enterprises

Dr. James E. Steiner

> " *Needed is a single, integrated intelligence enterprise with well-defined lanes-in-the-road for each large, complicated state like New York.* "

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a revolution has been underway in the relationships of federal, state, and local homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations. At the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been created, the "wall" between law enforcement and intelligence has been nearly obliterated, some law enforcement organizations are being directed to become more like intelligence agencies, and the foreign intelligence community is being fundamentally reformed.

The impact of these changes has been even greater at the state level: state governments have been assigned the lead role in homeland security. Most states have responded by bringing together existing public security, law enforcement, and emergency response capabilities—linking them to similar local assets—and opening channels to other states.

But a piece has been missing. Before 9/11, none of the states had a robust intelligence capability. Most now have created multiple intelligence cells in existing structures, as well as fusion centers, which for the first time connect state and local homeland security and law enforcement—and especially the new intelligence organizations—with federal, community, and, in some cases, foreign intelligence services.

Needed is a single, integrated intelligence enterprise with well-defined lanes-in-the-road for each large, complicated state like New York. We will see that this challenge is as daunting at the state level as it has been in the national Intelligence Community (IC).

One thing is clear—replicating the federal IC structure in 50 states is NOT appropriate. Some of the concepts we use in analyzing national intelligence missions and structures are useful—for example, differentiating between national (or state-level) intelligence and departmental intelligence. But for the most part, the federal model is just not relevant: collection is less a state function than is analysis; single-function collection agencies such as NSA and NGA have no comparable state analogue; HUMINT

States need to tailor the structures they build to accommodate the robust capabilities that national organizations with intelligence capabilities maintain within their geographic boundaries.

(confidential informants) is the dominant collection discipline at the state level; and we clearly do not want any state-level entities developing covert action capabilities. Finally, most states simply do not have the resources to create and maintain the multilayered, redundant structures so prevalent at the federal level. On the other hand, states need to tailor the structures they build to accommodate the robust capabilities that national organizations with intelligence capabilities maintain within their geographic boundaries. In addition, state requirements vary significantly across the country, and a single model will not meet every state's needs.

State and local fusion centers are the designated focal points connecting the federal IC to state and local intelligence collectors and analysts on counterterrorism threats. In most cases, state police manage state fusion centers. The centers' primary mission is to move counterterrorism (CT) intelligence from the local level to the federal community and from the federal level back to local law enforcement. But as we shall see below, state-level intelligence missions go well beyond providing operational intelligence support to law enforcement CT programs. Some fusion centers have taken on broader missions, especially in the public safety arena, and have other customer sets, including state executives and the public. Others have remained narrowly focused on CT or intermediate all-crimes intelligence.

Much has been written about fusion centers from the perspective of their primary mission and their relationship with federal law enforcement and the IC. This article will not duplicate that discussion. Rather, I will emphasize state-level intelligence requirements *beyond* the support-to-law-enforcement mission and focus on the primary, non-law enforcement customer—the state governor and his executive-level homeland security team.

The article is informed by multiple state models, but it focuses on New York state. The Empire State has international land and maritime borders, coastal and riverine international ports, and a huge immigrant community from countries of special interest. It faces a broad array of threats emanating from terrorism, natural hazards (including floods, hurricanes, tornados), and pandemic diseases. But most importantly, the bulk of specific, credible terrorism threat intelligence collected since 9/11 specifies targets in New York City. (See table on facing page.)

Know your Customer –the Governor

The president has a director of national intelligence (DNI), but New York's governor has no such focal point for intelligence. Intelligence is not seen as a separate function, but something embedded into other disciplines. For example, the governor looks to the superintendent of the state police to manage most law enforcement issues and expects that department to conduct law enforcement intelligence. Similarly, the governor looks to his homeland security adviser to help him define the homeland security threat and to manage risk (strategic mission) and meet his immediate public security priorities (operational)—the most basic of which is crisis management and recovery. He assumes that his homeland security adviser has built the intelligence capability to do his job.

New York's homeland security strategy demonstrates the centrality of both strategic risk management and operational crisis management/recovery to the governor and his senior resource managers in Albany.

Strategic Threat Assessments

At the national level, the DNI is required to provide the president and Congress an annual worldwide threat assessment as a necessary context for discussion of national security budget

Major Plots, Arrests, and Threats in New York State during 2001–2008

The list below is representative of the terrorism-related cases and plots the state has faced over the past eight years. They vary in their severity and their plausibility.

September 11 (2001): The most deadly terrorist attack in history, when Al Qaeda operatives targeted the World Trade Center with commercial airliners, resulted in thousands of deaths in Lower Manhattan.

Anthrax Letters (2001): The mailing of letters containing weaponized Anthrax spores, mainly to media and political targets, resulted in five deaths as well as numerous injuries.

The Lackawanna Six (2002): A group of Yemeni-Americans from outside Buffalo were convicted of providing material support to terrorism after spending time in an Al Qaeda training camp.

Iyman Faris/Khalid Sheik Mohammed Brooklyn Bridge Plot (2003): Iyman Faris, a truck driver who had been in contact with numerous Al Qaeda leaders, was involved in a plot to damage or destroy the Brooklyn Bridge.

Subway Poison Gas Plot (2003): Reports suggest that a Bahrain-based Al Qaeda cell intended to target the New York City subway system with a device that would disperse cyanide gas.

Herald Sq. Subway Plot (2004): Two men from Queens and Staten Island were convicted of conspiring to bomb the subway station at Herald Square.

Albany Missile Sting (2004): Two Albany residents were convicted of supporting terrorism for an incident in which they agreed to help launder money to purchase a shoulder-fired missile for a militant group.

East Coast Buildings Plot (2005): Three British nationals were charged with conspiring to bomb buildings along the eastern seaboard of the United States, including the Citigroup Center and New York Stock Exchange.

PATH Tunnel Plot (2006): This plot, disrupted in early planning stages, centered on a Lebanese national and several other individuals planning to attack the Port Authority Trans Hudson Tunnel connecting New York and New Jersey.

JFK Airport Plot (2006): Four men, from the Caribbean and South America, were convicted of conspiring to bomb the fuel distribution pipeline at John F. Kennedy Airport in Queens.

Aafia Siddiqui (2008): An American-trained neuroscientist wanted for supporting terrorism, Siddiqui was captured in South Asia with detailed information about numerous targets including Times Square, the Statue of Liberty, the subway system, and the Plum Island biological facility.

requests. Similarly, in New York strategic intelligence in the form of an overall state threat assessment comes first. In fact, state law requires that the homeland security adviser present a threat-to-New York briefing to selected legislators by 31 January every year. Some threats, such as terrorism, are new to governors but familiar to intelligence officers, but most of the threats facing a governor—blackouts, floods, hurricanes—are familiar to New York state but new to intelligence officers. Governors prefer a single, integrated threat assessment and look to their homeland security advisers to develop it.

At the national level, threat analyses are used to justify programmatic requests. At the state level, threat assessments are also a key input to the risk management process. As defined by DHS and included in New York's State Strategy for Homeland Security, risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence. It is determined by the event's likelihood and any potential consequences. Unwanted outcomes include loss of life, compromised essential services, economic damage, public anxiety, and other societal problems resulting from an attack or natural disaster. Preparedness efforts are designed to minimize the risk to the state, its infrastructure, and its citizens. The level of risk facing a region is a function of three compo-

---

The driving force for the DHS Intelligence and Analysis state fusion center program is intelligence support to law enforcement.

---

nents: threat (or natural hazard), vulnerability, and consequence. Addressing each of these components individually enables New York state to develop a cohesive strategy and to limit the risks it faces.

There are simply not enough resources to eliminate all of the risks we face. Risk management is the process by which senior leaders identify risks and threats, prioritize them (by likelihood and potential impact), and then direct federal, state, and local resources to act to minimize the likelihood of their occurrence and mitigate their consequences. The risk management process enables state leaders to prioritize mitigation steps that can be taken based upon potential occurrence of a risk, the potential impacts of that risk, and the economic and political capital available to take such action. The federal government alone has provided more than $3 billion to New York since 9/11 to buy down risk.

Responses to risk take many forms and fall into four major categories—prevention, protection, response, and recovery. A few of the many risk-reduction strategies New York and its partners are pursuing include increasing the capabilities of first responders, constructing and installing physical security systems, purchasing insurance, conducting public outreach

campaigns, and sharing intelligence.

Operational Intelligence

Be it a terrorist attack, a pandemic, a flood, a hurricane, or a blackout, the governor is immediately in the public (often national) spotlight. The governor is

- CINC of the state forces responding to the incident,

- chief executive officer of the government,

- chief communicator to a worried public,

- chief liaison to the governors of neighboring states, and

- chief liaison to the federal government.

In fulfilling these roles, the governor must make decisions on declaring emergencies or disasters, using the National Guard, requesting mutual aid, calling for federal assistance, authorizing emergency spending, suspending state regulations, requesting waivers of federal regulations, and ensuring that state agencies are responding appropriately. No governor can begin to take on these roles effectively without advance preparation and excellent, intelligence-driven situational awareness.

The driving force for the DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) state fusion center program is intelligence support to law enforcement. But savvy governors look to these centers for their comprehensive situational awareness, although they do so through their preexisting organizations. In New York, the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) is responsible for the development and maintenance of state-level response plans and manages the multi-agency emergency operations center.

Eventually, as they mature, most fusion centers and emergency operations centers almost certainly will be combined or co-located as they become focal points for information- and intelligence-sharing among local, state, and federal agencies from a variety of disciplines, including law enforcement, fire, EMS, emergency management, and, increasingly, public health, transportation, energy, and even the private sector.

Where the Strategic and Operational Meet…

Advance preparation is crucial to crisis management. The governor and his state apparatus need to be prepared and practiced before a crisis. Effective crisis-management programs encompass five critical components:

- Assessment of the threats facing the state;

- Development of a plan to mitigate those threats;

- Development of a strategy to prepare for all hazards;

- Development of and regular testing of response plans;

- Planning for short- and long-term recovery.

State governors support law enforcement efforts to disrupt and dismantle terrorist groups and prevent violent acts, and they enthusiastically support the DHS I&A fusion center initiative. But counter-terrorism (as opposed to homeland security writ large) is primarily a federal mandate. With the possible exception of New York City, the FBI, through the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), has first right of refusal on all CT leads/cases, and governors will not be held directly responsible if terrorists strike.

Governors are personally responsible for recovery after a terrorist incident, so it is not surprising that their focus is on minimizing the impact of a terrorist incident (or a natural or nonterrorist manmade event). Governors focus on mitigating threats to critical infrastructure and on facilitating quick recovery by preparing for and responding effectively to all hazards. As noted above, the strategic mission of state-level homeland security is risk management.

Critical infrastructure analysis and policy actions are cen-

The strategic mission of state level homeland security is risk management. Critical infrastructure analysis and policy actions are central to this task.

---

tral to this task. Governors understand the federal government's role in infrastructure protection (especially funding) and develop plans and strategies in the context of that federal role. Governors focus on ensuring that vulnerability and risk assessments have been conducted and are adequate for the entire infrastructure in their state. Interdependencies among industrial sectors are identified and governors invest in public infrastructure and work with the private sector and other states to increase the resilience of infrastructure on a regional basis. A governor can take a number of steps to protect critical infrastructure. He can

- identify the state's critical infrastructure;

- conduct vulnerability and risk assessments;

- identify and understand interdependencies;

- invest in infrastructure improvements;

- develop regional strategies; and

- coordinate with the private sector.

New York State's Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources list (CI/KR) is as wide-ranging and important as

in any state in the country. The items listed in the CI/KR are assets, systems, and networks—physical and virtual—that are so vital to the state that their loss, destruction, or incapacitation would have major cascading effects on security, economic security, public health, or public safety.

These sectors are not, however, just subject to terrorist threats. Natural disasters, human error, and poor maintenance can compromise critical infrastructure. Another key vulnerability that crosses all critical infrastructure sectors is their increasing reliance on computers and information technology. The threat of cyberterrorism or other cyberattack is illustrative of the interdependencies of modern society. New York's CI/KR have come to rely upon networked computers, data security, and the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that control infrastructure of all kinds.

Threats to state-critical infrastructure are assessed in the context of natural, man-made, terrorist, and technological events, and risks are determined based on these threats, their likelihood of occurrence, and the impact they would have on the immediate infrastructure and on interdependent systems and facilities. (Governors

New York's state fusion center is the locus of its intelligence support to state and local law enforcement.

The 18 DHS Defined Critical Infrastructure Sectors:
Agriculture and Food
Banking and Finance
Chemical
Commercial Facilities
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
Critical Manufacturing
Dams
Defense Industrial Base
Drinking Water and Water Treatment -Facilities
Emergency Services
Energy
Government Facilities
Information Technology
National Monuments and Icons
Postal and Shipping
Public Health and Health care
Telecommunications
Transportation Systems

currently look to intelligence to provide the terrorism portion of these threat assessments.) This type of analysis is used to prioritize infrastructure for protection and to develop and implement a critical infrastructure protection plan that identifies measures to prevent, eliminate, or mitigate the threat.

National-level intelligence analysts once had significant expertise on critical infrastructures—albeit from a radically different perspective. During the Cold War, CIA and DIA analysts used input-output analysis and other econometric techniques such as linear programming to identify economic targets that, if destroyed or damaged, would maximize the disruptions to the Soviet economy. Remnants of this broad expertise still exist at CIA, and more recently the IC has built world-class expertise in the cyber area. The National Labs at Sandia and Los Alamos also have created an exceptionally capable group conducting such studies at the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center.

At the state level, similar expertise exists in nonintelligence government and academic centers, focused mainly on analyzing the economic impact of various natural disasters and (nonterrorist) manmade events. Many states also have similar cybersecurity efforts. Some targets are obvious, such as infrastructure in areas prone to flooding, but most are not. Analysts are thus forced to conduct sophisticated, data-intensive studies to identify critical nodes, single points of failure, and other high-value infrastructure that might warrant extra protection or redundancy to improve resiliency of the entire system. Intelligence must identify the most likely terrorist targets.

The Bottom Line on Customers, Roles, and Missions

State-level intelligence has three primary functions and customers—providing CT intelligence support to law enforcement; ensuring situational awareness for state-level executive and legislative decision makers; and providing critical infrastructure threat analyses to executive decision makers and policy implementation staff. State-level intelligence also provides unclassified information and assessments to the private sector and to the public when it is possible and appropriate to do so.

New York's state fusion center, NYSIC (New York State Intelligence Center), is the locus of its intelligence support to state and local law enforcement and is managed by the State Police. Its primary focus is CT support to law enforcement, but it has a broader "all crimes" mandate. The fusion center directs a network of over 1,500 field intelligence officers (FIOs) throughout New York state to collect intelligence on suspicious activities and persons. Virtually all of these FIOs are part-time intelligence offic-

ers and full-time law enforcement officers. They move intelligence directly to the NYSIC but are organized administratively through 16 counterterrorism zones (see map on facing page).

On the federal side, the NYSIC interacts with the IC through the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) and the DHS National Operations Center (NOC). The FBI has the domestic lead in CT intelligence and is connected to other law enforcement through the JTTF. The Bureau's Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) are the lead domestic terrorism intelligence analysis centers outside Washington (with the exception of New York City where the NYPD intelligence and CT components dominate all other entities).

Homeland security advisers work for the governor and are responsive first and foremost to the governor's priorities, including intelligence priorities. A governor's top need for intelligence is not support to law enforcement, but to understand the terrorist threat as part of the risk-management process. The governor also needs to receive situational awareness in the run-up to a crisis and during ensuing crisis management. Both current intelligence and longer term threat analyses—especially on threats to critical infrastructure—are required to enable the governor and his staff to plan for, mitigate, and recover

---

Current intelligence and threat analyses—especially on threats to critical infrastructure—are required to enable the governor and his staff to plan for, mitigate, and recover quickly from crises.

---

quickly from crises. Effective crisis management and recovery requires extensive intelligence support and executive action before the crisis.

Intelligence Capabilities in New York—Today's Realities

New York's state and local intelligence heavyweights include the NYPD, the State Police, and the National Guard, all of which have hundreds or at least dozens of full- or part-time intelligence officers. Within New York state's borders, several federal agencies have significant intelligence capabilities, and many other

US law enforcement organizations have substantial intelligence assets. All are focused primarily on terrorism prevention through law enforcement.

The NY State Police, through the NYSIC, have taken the lead in state-level intelligence support to law enforcement. NYSIC is a model fusion center that includes intelligence cells on major crime areas such as gangs and narcotics. But its central effort is on counterterrorism. NYSIC has open storage of SECRET-level material, connectivity to secure intelligence systems, and a significant and growing cadre of analysts and agents from federal agencies, including DHS

Counterterrorism Zones 2009

New York State Intelligence Center maintains strong ties to CT initiatives on the state's border with Canada.

I&A, FBI, ICE, and Coast Guard. (See table on right.)

Federal analysts have connectivity to secure systems at their desks (as do a limited number of State Police). NYSIC coordinates intelligence collection and dissemination through its network of counterterrorism zones and FIOs. It maintains strong ties to CT initiatives on the state's border with Canada. These efforts are models of "jointness," being composed of officers from state, local, tribal, provincial, and US and Canadian federal intelligence and law enforcement organizations. On the downside, NYSIC currently has only modest linkages to the NYPD.

Strategic intelligence support to the governor is provided by the intelligence component (referred to as State Intelligence) of the state's Office of Homeland Security (OHS). This small unit provides strategic threat assessments and broad situational awareness to the director of OHS, the governor, other executive branch leaders, and selected members of the legislature.

New York state's OHS oversees the allocation and distribution of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal and state homeland security funding each year. In addition to funding law enforcement and emergency response, significant resources are directed toward developing a resilient critical infrastructure. OHS has developed a modest (albeit underresourced) internal intelligence capability to identify, collect, evaluate, and assess terrorist threats to critical infrastructure. The effort is modeled on the DHS Homeland Security Infrastructure Threat Reduction and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) office. This program is called CI/SAR, which stands for Critical Infrastructure/Suspicious Activity Reports. It is a GIS-based system which correlates SARs and New York's critical infrastructure. It is designed to identify proxy measures of threat (using the SARs) and targets (using CI) and then apply pattern analysis techniques to predict potential danger zones. Since the inception of this project in New York state in early 2007, the national level IC (acting through the DNI) has supported a similar approach nationwide.

The State Intelligence Vision

The list of state intelligence missions below is a vision for statewide intelligence analysis. It minimizes redundancy by tailoring the effort to support a primary customer—the governor—within existing threat assumptions, institutional arrangements, and other guide-

---

New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) Current and Former On-Site Partners

Local

NYPD

City Police and County Sheriff representatives

New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority

State

New York National Guard Counterdrug Task Force

Department of Corrections

Department of Motor Vehicles

Division of Parole

Office of Homeland Security

Police

Federal

DEA

DHS I&A

FBI

US Attorney's Office

Department of Defense-Defense Criminal Investigative Service

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Coast Guard

Customs & Border Protection

Social Security Administration

lines. Specifically for New York state:

• New York City is the prime target for terrorists in the United States. NYPD Intelligence and Counterterrorism Divisions are and will remain the dominant intelligence organizations in New York City.

• State intelligence should not attempt to engage in all areas of intelligence. The state intelligence function is primarily analytic and has no role in the collection or analysis of tactical intelligence.

• Intelligence support to protect critical infrastructure through efforts such as CI/SAR is the "natural" intelligence domain for the state. In New York, OHS is the lead agency for the critical infrastructure account, OHS directs the homeland security funding process for infrastructure protection, and CI is central to the governor's roles in protecting the state through risk management and especially in recovering from an attack.

• The state's law enforcement and IC intelligence partners at the local, regional, national, and international levels produce massive amounts of intelligence on CT. State intelligence should focus some of its resources on identifying finished national intelligence and key producers or information nodes, gather rel-

New York and other major terrorist target states need federal resources and intelligence-sharing support to meet this vision.

evant reports, and assess the implications for New York. This same approach should be used to harvest and tailor for the state open-source and academic research.

The State Homeland Security Intelligence Mission

The mission areas for state intelligence listed below, when integrated into the matrix of existing organizations and capabilities, yield a single, integrated intelligence enterprise. The missions areas include:

• Developing and maintain a center of excellence in critical infrastructure threat intelligence using methods such as CI/SAR for the entire state.

• Developing and maintaining formal contacts with major local, regional, national, and international partners to ensure full situational awareness and access to intelligence/information products: specifically,

•Working with state, regional and local fusion centers, which have primary responsibility for support to law enforcement, crisis management information flow, and tactical intelligence support.

•Working with NYPD intelligence (staffed at roughly 500 officers) in its role as the pri-

mary developer of CT intelligence regarding New York City. Expand on NYC finished intelligence products to address implications for the entire state.

•Working with the federal Intelligence Community in its role as primary developer of foreign and domestic CT intelligence.

•Identifying high-value IC intelligence products and providing value-added by assessing threat implications for New York state.

•Working directly with Ontario and Quebec intelligence partners. Border states are uniquely positioned to develop intelligence liaison relationships at the sub-national level.

The Federal Support Needed by State Intelligence

New York and other major target states need federal resources and policy support for intelligence-sharing to meet this vision, and President Obama has promised to step up to the challenge. His campaign platform states:

Improve Information Sharing and Analysis: Improve our intelligence system by creating a senior position to coordinate domestic intelli-

States facing major threats should have a number of intelligence officers and elected officials cleared at the highest security level.

gence gathering, establishing a grant program to support thousands more state and local level intelligence analysts, and increasing our capacity to share intelligence across all levels of government. (from www.change.gov)

The following steps would help New York state achieve this vision of an integrated intelligence enterprise:

• *DHS should provide grant funding for most state-level intelligence analysts.*

• *DHS, as the primary conduit for moving intelligence to the states, must view the states as its primary customer.*

• *DHS must ensure that the substance of all CT intelligence (raw and finished)—on which the federal government spends roughly $50 billion per year—is made available to the states.*

• *DHS must take as a top priority strengthening of the fusion center system of states, regions, and localities.* These centers are now at the outer end of the spokes that move intelligence from the national level hub.

• *DHS should accelerate production and deployment of the* the Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN) system. HSDN is the primary pipeline for moving classified intelligence (at the SECRET level) from the federal hub to the states' fusion centers. In 2008, only about 50 HSDN terminals were deployed and operational outside Washington, DC. There are roughly 1,000 pending requests from states and major cities for HSDN terminals.

• *Virtually all HSDN's scores of homepages and sites should be made available to state officials.* Currently, only two are available to state-level intelligence officers and officials— NCTC's and DHS's. Even outside of the Washington, DC, area, federal officers have access to all sites.

• *The Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITAC-G) at the NCTC should include state-level intelligence officers, and ITAC-G representatives from NSA, NGA, and CIA should have the mandate and authority to generate tear-line, SECRET-level reports from compartmented intelligence.* ITAC-G is responsible for reviewing all national-level intelligence and ensuring that highly classified intelligence is downgraded to the SECRET level so that it can be disseminated to state fusion centers. Currently, ITAC-G is minimally staffed and all state and local representatives must be sworn law enforcement officers.

• *Finally, the security clearance process must be fixed. The federal government should be able to process SECRET-level clearances within a month and higher level clearances for compartmented intelligence within 3 months.* States facing major threats should have a number of intelligence officers and elected officials cleared at the highest security level.

❖ ❖ ❖

A Note on Sources

This paper draws heavily and often directly from two studies. "A Governor's Guide to Homeland Security," prepared by the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, and the "New York State Strategy for Homeland Security," prepared by the Office of Homeland Security and available at: www.security.state.ny.us/, especially the sections on risk, threat, and critical infrastructure prepared by Brian Nussbaum.

What the World Economic Crisis Should Teach Us

Carmen Medina and Rebecca Fisher

> " *There is much for intelligence professionals to learn from the follies of economists, and from this folly in particular.* "

This article is based on a presentation made to a conference on the future of intelligence in May 2009.

"Why did economists not do a better job anticipating the crisis?" was the question everyone seemed to be asking as the global economy began to unravel last fall. The consensus seems to be that most economists not only failed to see the crisis coming but also were downright hostile to the few who argued that The Great Moderation—the era of economic stability brought about by modern banking system controls—wasn't so great after all. *New York Times* columnist (and 2009 Nobel Prize winner in economics) Paul Krugman was ridiculed for much of this decade.[a] Another harbinger named Danny Schechter wrote a book that 30 publishers rejected because they believed he was exaggerating. His book, *Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity and the Subprime Scandal*, finally went to print in September 2008, just as the implosion was getting under way.

As economists wrote about not having done a better job anticipating the meltdown, it became apparent that there were parallel take-aways for analysis in the field of intelligence. There is, in fact, much for intelligence professionals to learn from the follies of economists, and from this folly in particular. Warren Buffet's 2002 Berkshire Hathaway annual report hinted at such an association when he used the term "financial weapons of mass destruction" to describe the derivative asset class. When one of the world's most respected businessmen borrows from the intelligence lexicon, turnabout is fair play.

Though we probably don't need much reminding, it may be helpful to recall how the economic crisis evolved and the extent to which it radiated out. Anyone who has looked at his brokerage accounts or her retirement portfolio lately already "gets it" at the macro level. But what exactly happened on the cellular level to get us to where we ended up? And what can we, as intelli-

---

[a] For Krugman's post mortem see "How did Economists Get It So Wrong," *New York Times Magazine*, 6 September 2009.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Six lessons from the economists' experience seem to have unique applicability to what we, as intelligence professionals, do.

gence professionals, learn from those events?

Twenty years ago, economists—quite important ones—did see a game-changing financial crisis looming, although without any specificity as to its timing. In a conference organized in 1989 by the National Bureau of Economic Research to consider the risk of economic crisis, Lawrence Summers—then a professor of economics at Harvard University—presented a paper that tracked, in impressively close formation, with the timeline of today's crisis. With uncanny prescience, Summers wrote:

> It is probably now easier to lever assets than ever before, and the combination of reduced transactions costs and new markets in derivative securities make it easier than it has been in the past for the illusion of universal liquidity to take hold. Asset price bubbles are now as likely as they have ever been. Bubbles eventually burst. The increased speed with which information diffuses and the increased use of quantitative-rule-based trading strategies make it likely that they will burst more quickly today than they have in the past.[b]

As far back as 20 years ago Summers was writing about the increased speed at which information can disseminate and contagion can occur. Yet, when CNN International's Richard

Quest interviewed world economic leaders in January 2008 at the Davos Summit, only half of those asked said they thought the then new, disturbing reports about the housing crisis and equity problems would extend beyond the banking industry.

The fact is that most economists and business experts did not anticipate this economic regression, or its particular timing, with any great degree of specificity, despite the astute analysis of Larry Summers and a few other highly regarded theorists. Economist James Galbraith estimated that, out of thousands of economists, perhaps only eight or 10 individuals really saw the crisis coming.[c] Harsh as it may seem, his estimate is more generally true than not. But in the wake of calamity, the profession has vigorously begun its own "after action review"—with all kinds of lessons emerging in its own ranks, in the press, and in classrooms across the country. The difficulty is choosing just a

---

[b] Larry H. Summers, "Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Crises," in *The Risk of Economic Crisis*, edited by Martin Feldstein (Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 135–82. Available online at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6231.

[c] Deborah Solomon, "The Populist: Questions for James K. Galbraith," the *New York Times Magazine*, 31 October 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/magazine/02wwIn-Q4-t.html.

few to single out as particularly relevant to the intelligence profession.

Leaving behind the issues of bias on the part of economists (which has already been discussed among intelligence officers, along many dimensions) and "group-think" because, again, we are deeply familiar with these pitfalls, six lessons from the economists' experience seem to have unique applicability to what we, as intelligence professionals, do.

Lesson 1: There are no easy, obvious, straightforward policy responses to the economic crisis.

Once a financial crisis begins, there are no simple or clear policy responses; in reality, every policy response will inevitably feed back onto the economic crisis, for better or worse (in the tradition of the adage "When Alan Greenspan sneezes, the world catches a cold."). For example, Summers described the range of possible policy responses to economic crises to include:

• The laissez-faire position, which holds there is no reason for public intervention in financial markets.

• The monetarist position: that the only appropriate government role is to insulate the money stock from developments, i.e., declines, in asset markets.

• The classical position, which argues that the government,

as lender of last resort, should only lend to solvent banks, at a penalty rate, for short periods of time.

- The pragmatic position, which says the government must always do whatever is necessary to preserve the integrity of the financial system.[d]

All of these, even the option of doing nothing, have impacts on the crisis itself: an expansive monetary policy can lead to a currency crisis, which could in turn lead foreigners to sell, putting further downward pressure on assets and placing more strain on the financial system, which is where we started in the first place.

Admittedly, the issue of policy response is not part of the answer to the question of why economists missed important warning signs. But it is an object lesson in why responding to crises is so perilous: decisions can be dangerous, even those made with the best intentions. In this respect, the issue of policy response suggests a certain truth that intelligence professionals are wise to ponder: We often assume decisions are the start of long term, committed relationships—but sometimes decision making is just a one night stand. In the endless courting that occurs between intelligence professionals and policymakers, we, the intelligence professionals, often

behave as if our version of the truth—our "decisions"—take on Talmudic proportions (only this, one might argue, could justify the time it often takes us to deliver our considered judgments). We treat the decision space as though it is preparation for a committed relationship, but quite often the decision—frequently a not-very-clear choice among several other equally reasonable options—will be amended rather quickly, or overtaken by events even sooner.

Furthermore, decisions are rarely made in the full possession of perfect information, another reason they lack staying power. Our understanding of causality and sequence leaves much to be desired, and every day that passes offers more opportunities for new decisions that will affect the context of any given problem.

Lesson 2: We are overly sanguine about how close our information and intelligence sources approximate reality.

The second lesson from the global financial crisis is that economists thought their limited data accurately reflected reality. Famously, many of the financial houses in New York quantified their risk positions using algorithms that "assumed away" the very conditions that led to the crisis. In addition, as blogger and CNBC commenta-

tor Barry Ritholtz has noted, many of the actions that precipitated the crisis were hidden even to the most careful observers; what was in essence a "run" on the world's largest financial institutions didn't occur in the physical world—it happened as people pulled the virtual plug on their investments in the privacy of their own homes.

We intelligence professionals can be horribly guilty of this same error, treating the information that arrives in our inboxes as the population (to borrow a term from the pollsters), when in fact the information (secret or open source) can only ever be a sample. This is, of course, as the American, British, Australian, and other commissions and reports pointed out, one of the major plot lines in the Iraq WMD misstep. As Ritholtz also pointed out, the tendency of economists to uncritically accept data from certain limited sources led to only a passing familiarity with reality. The same can be said at times of intelligence professionals.

Lesson 3: Traditional economic analysis has trouble dealing with human irrationality.

Our third learning from economics is that economists have a difficult time confronting the problem of irrationality. Perhaps the best example of this is

[d] Summers, "Macroeconomic Consequences."

We all tend to underestimate the importance of emotions when we attempt to understand the actions of world leaders or the sentiments of a population.

Alan Greenspan's testimony before Congress that it never occurred to him that bankers and other capitalists would make decisions counter to their own best and long-term interests (what he actually said was, "Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's equity [myself especially] are in a state of shocked disbelief."); after all, classical economics is built on principles such as the invisible hand and the rational decision maker.

For intelligence professionals, the lesson here is straightforward: we, too, have an irrational attachment to rationality. We all tend to underestimate the importance of emotions when we attempt to understand the actions of world leaders or the sentiments of a population.

Lesson 4: Timing is very different from analysis.

Barry Ritholtz made this insightful observation in his blog; we would do well to apply it to intelligence. Understanding timing is different from analysis and requires an additional, probably still-to-be-defined set of skills; it is impossible to improve our ability to provide specific warning of threats or opportunities just by "doing analysis better." Advances here will require that we explore much broader sources of information. Advances in this area will also require as yet undiscovered (or, if already available, underutilized) cutting-edge intellectual and cognitive techniques and tools.

The importance of timing becomes evident in economists' struggles to identify the precipitating events in the countdown to crisis. Two camps seem to form in the debate: those who attribute the crisis to failings by individuals (e.g., bankers who irrationally failed to protect their own interests, whiz kids who created flawed algorithms) and those who recognize much more dynamic and amorphous forces at work (e.g., the emergence of new financial instruments which were deployed before anyone fully understood all their possible consequences; the use of new technologies that would affect the volume and velocity of trades in unprecedented ways, the growing interdependencies among financial centers, which increased the potential for and ease of contagion, and so forth). As a segue to lesson 5, it does appear that those who argue for more regulation in response to the crisis land in the first camp—explicitly or implicitly, they believe that regulating the actions of individuals can impose order on chaos—that is, they assume that the "individ-

ual actor" model will carry the day.

Lesson 5: How we think about causality in the world has great bearing on the priorities we set as an intelligence service and as a nation.

What caused the economic crisis? Was it the result of trends and dynamics that no individual, brokerage house, central bank could see coming, much less control—an "act of God"? Or was it caused primarily by the actions of a few, like the whiz kids who devised the clever algorithms that left out as "unlikely" the disastrous chain of events that actually happened? Perhaps it was the brokerage house that figured out how to bundle mortgages into some kind of new investment instrument. Maybe it was someone else entirely—the product of a "Great Man"? That the policy response to the economic crisis has thus far been to regulate and reregulate implies the "Great Man" theory wins out—as it often appears to dominate intelligence analysis and collection.

The wiser course is to consider all possible causalities; we may not be able to say exactly how or why, but few can deny that the world we now inhabit is vastly different from the one in which great men and the discovery of their secrets was the stock-in-trade of intelligence work. This points to an even larger question: the great debate between the value of

What seems warranted now is active movement away from intelligence analysis as rule-based, universally and eternally true.

secrets (and *secrecy*, writ large) and open-source information. As we consider the way we as a profession have regarded either and both of these, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that far too little attention has been paid to the importance of open sources.

In fact, it may already be too late for us—in automatically assuming that secrets are more valuable than anything entire populations could possibly tell us, we may have missed valuable opportunities to integrate not only our thinking about but our ability to integrate open sources into work processes, technologies, and products. In many respects it seems the open-source world has passed us by.

Lesson 6: The complexity of the modern world is overwhelming our existing intellectual and informational models.

The modern economy with its complex financial instruments—derivatives, credit default swaps, and other exotic investments—became too unwieldy, too complex for anyone, even the "experts," to understand. No amount of number crunching by economists using current analytical and information techniques would have allowed them to anticipate fully what was happening. They did not fail to execute; they failed to understand.

We too are in danger of failing to understand. Our rule-based and single-method approaches are adequate for tackling orderly problems but fall short in terms of helping us to master the chaotic ones—yet if we continue to ignore that chaotic problems do exist and profoundly affect our world, it will be at our peril. Increasingly, we see that individual ("Great Man") beliefs and the beliefs of small groups ("experts") comprise a very small part of what we mean when we use the term "intelligence."

What seems warranted now is active movement away from intelligence analysis as rule-based, universally and eternally true. Physicist Mark Buchanan wrote:

> The peculiar and exceptionally unstable organization of the critical state does indeed seem to be ubiquitous in our world. Researchers in the past few years have found its mathematical fingerprints in the workings of all the upheavals mentioned so far (earthquakes, eco-disasters, market crashes), as well as in the spreading of epidemics, the flaring of traffic jams, the patterns by which instructions trickle down from managers to workers in the office, and in many other things.[e]

This requires acknowledging that systems often viewed in the past as stable entities that need significant shocks to disintegrate are just as often veined with many minute and therefore largely unseen fault lines that can be activated by very small disturbances. The fact that these small disturbances (physicists call them "critical states") exist and can powerfully impact world events has innumerable implications for intelligence work, but at the very least it requires that we have the patience to let intelli-

---

[e] Mark Buchanan, *Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002), 21.

Decisions are clear...because the world is:	Decisions are fluid...because the world is:
evident	obscure
rational	irrational
predictable	not predictable
human actuated	outside the control of men
straightforward enough to understand	too complex for rules
In this world we need intelligence	In this world we need sense-making

Complexity is clearly the key theme that runs through the economists' post-mortems…. Let us take heed.

gence officers pursue very small leads and gather data on seemingly unimportant, tiny fault lines.

Many individuals, thinking about how to adjust our intellectual approaches to this much more complex environment, are beginning to introduce a new term to describe the cognitive adjustment we need to make—sense-making. It would require another extensive article to do this topic justice, but at its core is a realization that sense-making can never be contained in a finished product created by a lone expert; sense-making can only occur at the confluence of many different points of view.

There is no easy, obvious response to difficult intelligence questions because the complexity of the modern world has outpaced the capabilities of our current intellectual and informational models. These do not always accurately approximate reality, they make little accounting for human irrationality, and they fail to help us distinguish between timing and analysis. Taken together, these shortcomings force us to reconsider how we think about causality. In terms of the global financial crisis, complexity is clearly the key theme that runs through the economists' post-mortems and it serves as an important analogue for the intelligence profession. Let us take heed.

❖ ❖ ❖

In Gratitude to the Crews of Air America: A Speech to an Air America Symposium

Craig W. Duehring

The following was a speech Mr. Duehring delivered to participants, including many veterans of Air America service, in a symposium held at the University of Texas at Dallas on 18 April 2009.

As a presidential appointee, I usually speak from a position of having access to the latest policy, or at least I have the implied aura of representing a subject that I deal with every day. In layman's terms, the audience assumes that I know what I'm talking about. This audience is very different. Here I am speaking to a group of peers—of people who have assembled here because of their common experience during a unique period of American history. This period burst on the scene because of countless factors, now visible only through a close examination of history, which provided an opportunity for each person in this room. Like the Robert Frost poem, we faced a fork in the road and, for whatever reason, we chose our destiny. The consequences of this choice still evolve and, indeed, bring us together tonight.

So, what I thought I would do was give you a glimpse into what a Raven saw when he looked at the people who made up Air America. For you were certainly a major, major player in what we accomplished in the 6–7 years that the Raven program and its predecessor, the Butterfly program, was in existence.[1] As I think back to my time at Long Tieng, every picture includes a vision of an Air America aircraft.

My first tour out of pilot training was in III Corps where I flew O-1 Bird Dogs for the 25th ARVN Division stationed in the farming village of Duc Hoa, about half way between Saigon and the Cambodian border. It was August of 1969 and, because of the ferocity of the fighting in that area during Tet of 1968, the area was rather peaceful with irregular actions, by the Viet Cong, mostly. We had some action but even being shot at was a cause for great discussion at the little army bar that was the venue of our nightly rendezvous. After several months, I learned of a program that involved flying somewhere outside of Vietnam and since I faced the double incentives of a boring war and a boss who I detested, I followed my ambition and applied for the "Steve Canyon" program, or "Project 404," which were the official titles of the Raven program. I waited for word to leave which, inexplicably, never came. In desperation, I flew to Bien Hoa to determine the cause of the delay.

---

[1] The Ravens were US Air Force forward air controllers flying covert missions over Laos from air bases in the kingdom.

I was told that they had tried three times to reach me but, communications being what they were, I never received the message, and so they sent the number-two guy on the list. My only recourse was to extend for a second tour because the next opening wasn't projected to come up for several months. Imagine my surprise a few short days later when I received an urgent call to pack my bags and head to Udorn in early April 1970.

After "sanitizing" in the men's room of base ops, I met the guys at Detachment 1, near your own compound as I recall, and a day later flew to Vientiane. My new boss welcomed me with the news that I was to be assigned to Long Tieng to fly for Vang Pao and the Hmong people. I was thrilled. Action, at last! His second message was to tell me that the pilot who had preceded me there, Dick Elzinga, had disappeared along with the pilot he was to replace, Hank Allen, on his very first mission. To this date, their bodies have not been found. This was only one of many "silver bullets" that I dodged during the next 11 months at Long Tieng.

My first encounter of a group of Air America pilots was in the Purple Porpoise, run by the British owner and probable intelligence provider, Monty Banks. As I stepped through the circular door I was greeted with his famous call, "Shut the bleeding door." We joined a group of your folks, one of whom was celebrating his first $100,000 with the company. I was extremely impressed but tried not to show it since he was buying.

Long Tieng under siege was a new experience for me. We flew hard. In fact, on my first day on the job, I directed airstrikes on a site northwest of Long Tieng that was being attacked by a large group of NVA soldiers. After putting in three sets of A-1s, the attack was broken off and, according to the Hmong forward air guide on the ground, an estimated 200 enemy soldiers were killed. In retrospect, I believe those figures are suspect but, after only 24 hours in country, it was enough to impress this young pilot, I assure you.

From that point on, our lives were totally intertwined with yours. We ate often at the Air America hostel where you could get the best fried rice ever made, party at the bar or, more importantly, brief up a hazardous resupply mission or even a search-and-rescue mission.

On one occasion, we had two F-4 aircrew members who had spent a very cold night on the PDJ [Plane of Jars]. We planned the next day's mission using two sets of Ravens. The first primary and backup took off in the dark to direct the search and rescue by the Jolly Greens from Udorn. Two more of us launched with Air America helicopters to provide an immediate rescue force for any aircraft that might get shot down that day. We did this because the Jolly Greens had a nasty habit of pulling off and regrouping whenever one of their aircraft was shot up. This way, if we were there, we could keep the big rescue team on task while we tidied up the loose ends. In addition, we wrapped up a rifle, ammunition, food, water, clothing, and radios in blankets and stuffed them in a Pilatus Porter. The idea was, in case we were unable to pick up the crew members by the end of the day, the Porter would fly at extremely low level out of the setting sun and kick the bundles out the door so that our guys could survive the night. It was a nasty battle but the Jolly Greens were successful.

Of course, anyone who flew in that area knew that the primary rescue source was not the Air Force but Air America, simply because they were usually close by. All of us had your frequency set in our radios. When a plane went down, there was a call to Cricket and a call to Air America. Time and time again, you guys dashed into the unknown and saved American lives. After one rescue, this time of a Raven, the flight mechanic offered my friend a cigarette, only to have it refused. "I'm trying to quit" was the answer. At this point the flight mech laughed and said, "That's the funniest thing I've ever heard—a Raven quitting cigarettes—for his health."

There was more humor. One day I took off from Long Tieng in a T-28 and followed a C-123K on its way to Vientiane. I couldn't resist the urge to sneak up behind him and park off his left wing tip until he noticed me there with a noticeable jerk of the yoke. I laughed and pulled out ahead of him, feeling quite pleased with myself. A few minutes later I heard or, rather, felt something out of order. When I finally looked to my right, there he was—two props churning and the doors open on both J-85 pods. A flash of the trusty "bird" on his part brought about laughter in both cockpits, I'm sure.

In a more serious incident, my buddy, Chuck Engle and I were playing "high-low" looking for targets along Route 4 just west of Xien Kouang ville. In this silly game, one aircraft flies low and as fast as he can down a road while the other "flies cover" right behind him. All was well until Chuck took a load of AK-47 fire in the cockpit that shot out his side window. He claimed he could see the bullet pass in front of his face. Another round hit him just above the left ankle, passed completely through his leg and fell onto the floor. He recovered the bullet and had it mounted on a gold chain that he wore around his neck. Chuck pulled off while I shot a rocket in the direction of the soldiers. Then we began the 30-minute flight back to Long Tieng. Of course, our first call was to an Air America helicopter that changed course to intercept us. In the meantime, I tried to keep Chuck conscious, as nausea and pain took over. The entire story is written in the book, *The Ravens*. Eventually, a Huey came into position and I dropped back. The helicopter stayed with Chuck through the landing at Long Tieng. I remember that Chuck, as he saw the aircraft drifting off the side of the runway, took his useless leg and jammed it onto the rudder pedal, causing the aircraft to cartwheel and come to a stop. The flight doc and others pulled him from the aircraft and rushed him onto a waiting Volpar that took him to the hospital at Udorn. In retrospect, the stupid part of that entire mission was "our" doing, while the common sense part was compliments of the Air America team.

I'll tell one last story and then wrap it up. But, in this case, I've saved the best for last. And in this case, the professionalism of the Air America pilots saved my life. You may recall that, during the rainy season, the weather could get nasty for days. Even you guys were forced to sit it out once in awhile. During those times, we would move from the breakfast table to the poker table for an all-day session of dealer's choice, nickel-dime poker. Even on a bad day, you wouldn't lose more than about $25. By 9 or 10 in the morning, the beer lamp was lit with one of us staying sober just in case the weather broke. As it happened, it was my day to drink Coke and, sure enough, sometime in the afternoon, an A-1 descended through a hole over the PDJ and said the area was full of active targets. Cricket

did his thing by launching the fleet and I headed to Vang Pao's house to pick up a backseater. We made it to the PDJ and learned that the weather had improved well enough to start popping bad guys. Does the term "sucker hole" conger up any nightmares? We normally planned to get back to Long Tieng with at least one hour of fuel left, in case we had to divert. Well, Cricket kept laying on the fighters, and I stayed out a bit too long. It wasn't until I tried to make it home that I realized the weather had closed in behind me. I picked my way through mountain gaps that still appeared below the huge cloud banks now resting on the ridge lines. When the most direct route didn't work, I flew west to the lateral valley that formed a "V" with Long Tieng and Sam Tong in between, and attempted to come in what we called the "back door." That, too, was blocked, so I took advantage of the last opening I could find and popped out in the east-west valley that lies between Long Tieng and Sam Tong, just north of Skyline Ridge. The only sign of civilization was the winding dirt road that connected the two bases. I seriously considered crash landing on that road but decided against it because I knew that the wings would likely shear off and, as they pinched the fuselage, the flaps would come into the back seat and decapitate my backseater. So, I reemerged back into the valley west of Long Tieng and flew in circles with the clouds coming down on top of me, the fog filling in the valley below and daylight running out fast. I had 45 minutes of fuel and a one-hour flight to Vientiane, if I didn't hit a mountain on the climb out.

All the time this was going on, I was talking to the other Ravens in the Raven hootch. They said the rain was coming down mercilessly and that it was getting very dark. One of them volunteered to contact the Air America helicopter pilots to see if they could think of something. Shortly, I heard some chatter on the tower radio channel as three UH-1s cranked up on the ramp. Within minutes, they lifted off and flew in trail, slowly, out the "back door" to where I was orbiting in a space that kept getting smaller and smaller by the minute. "Hey, Raven" the first pilot called out, "I see you. Turn left…more…roll out. You are pointed at the back door. The gap is right in front of you." "You're nuts," I replied, "I don't see a damn thing except clouds and mountain." "It's an optical illusion," he said, "the gap is filled with heavy rain." I drove my little airplane straight at the mountain wall with my heart in my throat and past the hovering helicopter as I entered the point of no return. At the last possible second I saw a shimmering "V" coming down out of the cloud bank, only a couple of hundred feet tall. "Turn right, roll out…you are on track." I hit the heavy rain with an audible splash. Hell, everything is audible in an O-1. It poured off the wind screen in a constant torrent, but I found that I could see the ground flashing by on both sides and below me. "I have him," said the second helicopter pilot, "turn left…roll out… slightly right…watch out for that karst." Karst was right! It rushed by me below my left tire, far too close to be comfortable. I passed the second helicopter. "I've lost him," he said. "I've got him," the third pilot said. I was getting vectors from three Air America helicopter pilots hovering in trail of each other, in the heavy rain and fog. "Turn right…roll out. There. You are on extended downwind. Good luck." They headed on their way back to Vientiane, by what route, I have no idea.

I saw the ridgeline falling away a bit to the right, and at that point, I crossed over the compound below. A couple of the other Ravens raced out as they heard my engine, but the rain was too heavy to see anything even though I was much lower

than normal. I searched for the runway in the darkness and, miraculously, I saw a silver-blue ribbon to my front left side. It was the runway, totally covered in water, reflecting the last wisps of light that had forced their way through the clouds. Minutes later, all would be dark. I knew that, somewhere in front of me, another hillside loomed, and I needed to turn final just before I got there. I held on as long as I could then pulled the power back and established my best guess at a descending left turn to the opposite direction. As soon as I banked, the perspective changed and I lost sight of the runway. One potato, two potato, three potato, and I rolled out on heading. Again the runway appeared although somewhat shorter than I remembered. This was because I had turned early and positioned myself to land long. Never mind, the operative word was "land," which I did, with the water spraying everywhere from my hydroplaning tires. Fortunately, the water was deep enough that it rapidly slowed me down so that I was able to turn off onto the Raven ramp.

I shut off the engine and sat there shaking. Finally, I climbed out of the airplane and just hung on to the strut while I contemplated how close to dying I had just been. My backseater bolted for VP's house, while I searched for my jeep. I also took time to say a prayer of thanks to all those who helped me in my hour of need, especially those wonderful Air America pilots who came through—again.

When I departed Laos, I realized that I had served the longest tour at Long Tieng of any Raven—a record never broken. And, as I think back through a memory that is now getting a bit fuzzy here and there, certain images remain crystal clear—my

Long Tieng on a clear day. (File photo.)

fellow Ravens, the Hmong, VP, the mountains, the fear, the joy, and the bitter pain of loss. Always in the picture and in virtually every good war story I have, there appears a blue and silver bird or, perhaps, simply a silver bird that, even 39 years later stands as a towering symbol of courage, sacrifice, caring, skill, and honor.

Why did we do it? Why did we forsake all that was comfortable and well known to us to travel to a faraway land to risk our lives for people who will never know our names? Was it for our country? Was it for the money? Was it the feeling of knowing that you are the best at your trade? Or, was it for the fleeting thrill of being young and invincible? Perhaps it was all these. Certainly no one outside of our fold will ever understand, so why try?

Many beautiful words have been written which capture the emotion of this time from Rudyard Kipling to Lt.Gen. Hal Moore of *We Were Soldiers* fame. But, my choice is the poem by Robert Frost that I mentioned at the beginning of this speech entitled "The Road Not Taken." Let me close by reading the final stanza.

I shall be telling this with a sigh

Somewhere ages and ages hence:

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—

I took the one less traveled by,

And that has made all the difference.

Thank you for allowing me to be a part of your program and, on behalf of my Raven friends, thank you for always being there—anytime, anywhere, professionally.

❖ ❖ ❖

For more information on the Air America Symposium, including a full transcript of the entire event, please visit http://www.intelink.ic.gov/wiki/2009_Symposium_on_Air_America. (U)

The declassified documents released in conjunction with the symposium are available at www.foia.gov/airamerica.asp, among the special collections listed in the FOIA reading room of CIA's public web site. (U)

The Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of US Soldiers Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan

By Doug Stanton. (New York: Scribner, 2009), 354 pages, with endnotes and index. Foreword by Elisabeth Burgos.

Reviewed by J.R. Seeger

As US forces enter their ninth year of involvement in Afghanistan, it is easy to forget how combat operations began in this landlocked country in Central Asia. *The Horse Soldiers* is by all means a very personal account of the opening days of this nine-year campaign; Doug Stanton is very clear in his author's note that this is not an effort to create a strategic history. His objective is to help readers understand what it felt like to be a Special Forces operator assigned to Task Force Dagger, conducting combat operations on the ground in northern Afghanistan many hundreds of miles behind Taliban lines. Within the bounds of this perspective, this reviewer believes Stanton has done excellent work.

Stanton first captures the reader's attention with a short and vivid description of the opening hours of the extended fight at the Qala-e-Jangi (literally "fortress of war") in Mazar-e-Sharif. This prologue focuses on the most well-known portion of TF Dagger operations in the fall of 2001; it was the only portion covered directly by journalists on the ground during this action. With this brief reminder of the headline events of late November 2001, he quickly shifts back to the days immediately following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. His story begins with a cadre of young operators from 5th Special Forces Group (5SFG) from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. In this phase, Stanton nicely describes the growing tension between the fighters in the midst of tactical preparations and the families they would soon leave behind. He follows the group through an isolation facility in an Uzbek airbase and on into Afghanistan on a night helicopter insertion provided by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment—the Nightstalkers.

Once the members of TF Dagger are on the ground, the pace quickens, focusing on the combat operations that took place from mid-October 2001 through December 2001. During this period, two Special Forces A teams and a battalion command element from the 5SFG conducted operations against the Taliban, guiding the combat activities of Afghan resistance fighters, and supporting this "traditional fighting" capability by calling in airstrikes from US Air Force aircraft, including strategic bombers, fighters, and AC-130 gunships. Movement on the ground was complicated by the difficult terrain and the lack of motor transportation. Early on the SF operators learned that they were going to have to

move on horseback if they wanted to keep up with their local allies. This made for the most ironic aspect of the story: modern fighters with satellite communication, night vision devices, and complex weaponry traveling on small Afghan ponies. The pace was controlled by their Afghan allies whose strategy was to defeat a committed enemy while maintaining a low casualty rate and influencing others to support the resistance.

The at times laconic pace of movement provided the SF operators with ample time to reflect on the historic nature of their effort. As reported to Stanton, they were well aware that their operation tied them to other figures in the history of irregular warfare from World War I (the most famous being T. E. Lawrence) and World War II (including figures from the OSS). As reflected in some of the more prosaic descriptions that sometimes slip into the book, Stanton was clearly impressed with the sense of awe the young operators felt as they realized the enormity of the strategic board on which they were playing.

By the end of the story, Stanton has provided an understanding of the intellectual complexity of living in a foreign culture while applying tactical combat power on an irregular warfare battlefield. The "horse soldiers" were often cut off from any significant ties to their command headquarters. At the same time, they had to make decisions they knew were likely to have grave strategic significance, yet they made them with care, often in the middle of battle, and most frequently after having spent most of the day traveling on horseback.

Readers looking for an assessment of the strategic purpose of the initial operations or a discussion of how we got from a small set of Special Forces to a large-scale commitment of men and material will be disappointed in *The Horse Soldiers.* This story also does not explore the collaboration between the CIA and TF Dagger and their Afghan allies. The SF operators interviewed by Stanton kept silent on this partnership (no doubt because of its classified nature) and described only the now well-known role of the CIA pathfinders who provided the SF teams with access to alliance leaders and the role of two CIA officers in the battle of Qala-e-Jangi. Readers interested in this collaboration should look to *First In* by Gary Schroen or *Jawbreaker* by Gary Bernsten, both of which describe the story from the perspective of the CIA officers operating with the Northern Alliance headquarters. Until the effort in the fall of 2001 is further declassified, this will simply have to do.

In sum, Stanton's book provides great insight and understanding of what it was like for the members of TF Dagger in the fall of 2001. His thorough research included hours of one-on-one interviews with the surviving members of TF Dagger. He gives the reader a "feeling" as well as an understanding of how these "horse soldiers" succeeded in their operations in Afghanistan in 2001. He also provides family, friends, and anyone interested in Special Forces a glimpse of the world of the SF operator living and fighting behind enemy lines.

❖ ❖ ❖

Memorias de un Soldado Cubano: Vida y Muerte de la Revolucion [Memories of a Cuban Soldier: Life and Death of the Revolution]

By Dariel Alarcon Ramirez aka "Benigno"; transcribed by Elisabeth Burgos. (Barcelona, Spain: Tusquets Editores, S.A., 2003), 354 pages, with endnotes and index. Foreword by Elisabeth Burgos. (Originally published in French (Librairie Arhteme Fayard, 1996).

Reviewed by Juan

Memorias de un Soldado Cubano is a grizzled veteran colonel's captivating recollection of Cuba's Ministry of Interior (MININT), one of the nation's intimidating and oft-feared security services. Dariel Alarcon Ramirez, best known by his nom de guerre "Benigno," is a historic figure, who fought alongside Che Guevara in Bolivia during the fateful escapade that led to Che's death at the hands of US-trained Bolivian soldiers. In this book, Benigno shares with us a rare first-hand account of a communist agent's journey from illiterate peasant to senior MININT officer in charge of safeguarding Fidel Castro's personal security. Benigno earned this prestigious position through a lifetime of achievement in attention-getting intelligence and security operations, exporting Cuban-inspired revolution throughout Latin America and Africa, and actively promoting Latin American communist activities. Benigno's narration is wrapped in Cold War adventurism and intrigue. Adding meaningfully to the value of this historically charged account is a deliberate transcription of the oral history that a barely literate Benigno recited to transcriber Elisabeth Burgos over the course of many sessions. Burgos deserves great credit for drawing out Benigno and capturing the raw essence of his story.

This book is not about politics or ideology. It is a personal account in which the seasoned security official off-handedly exposes, often for the first time, a myriad of Cuban operations—a quality that is sure to appeal irresistibly to fans of intelligence literature. Benigno confirms much of what the United States has suspected of Cuban activities, but at times he provides brand new revelations of the involvement or extent of involvement of Cuban intelligence in seminal events from the 1960s into the 1990s. Revelations include secret missions to Peru, covert planning and financing of terrorist plots in various Latin American countries, and the clandestine training of citizens of countries friendly or neutral to Cuba. One vignette is illustrative: Cuban support and training of members of a Puerto Rican leftist terrorist group—one that went on to pull off the largest armored car heist on US soil—enabled the group to remit millions of stolen US dollars to Cuba to finance urban terrorist operations in Chile and in other Southern Cone countries. At the time, as a member of a MININT training team, Benigno helped prepare Latin American communist saboteurs, assassins, insurgents, and stu-

dent activists. His outline of Cuban MININT training of leftist candidates from all over Latin America is full of details of Cuban involvement and support for instability in the region, activities about which US intelligence then only had suspicions or was generally ignorant.

One of Benigno's most damning assertions, and an acknowledged impetus for writing the book, is his unwavering belief that Fidel Castro deliberately sent Che to his death-mission in Bolivia. Benigno suggests that Fidel, in effect, condemned Che out of concern that Che's popularity represented a threat to Castro's own leadership in Cuba. While this accusation does not represent an entirely new theory, Benigno's insider access, closeness to Che, and long-time relationship to Castro add strength to the argument. The author first began having doubts about Castro's designs for Che in 1965, when Begnino was fighting alongside Che in the Congo. Following his daring 1967 escape from Bolivia, Benigno claims to have carried a marked, though hidden, anger over Fidel's betrayal and the loss of Cuban combatants. Benigno admits that his disaffection with the regime increased as corruption and the good life took deep root among Cuba's communist elite. He is struck by what he calls "the moral decay" of the regime and the influence that personal allegiance to the Castro brothers has over absolutely everything else. The examples of outrages and excesses that he cites, especially involving the Cuban elite and MININT leadership, are insights only available to someone who has witnessed events from the front row.

While *Memorias de un Soldado Cubano* stands out in several areas, Begnino's treatment of his childhood and his reflections on the meaning of his efforts make the book unique and humanize his account. As a near-illiterate of very humble rural origins, Benigno reminisces about his harsh childhood genuinely and evocatively. Even the simple vocabulary of these passages have an endearing quality. Benigno explained that he ran away from an abusive home when he was eight years old and took refuge in the remote mountains of Cuba where he remained essentially cloistered until he was driven into the guerrilla ranks by violence around him. As he tells it, during his ascent within the guerrilla ranks, ideology was largely alien to him. Benigno, who has lived in exile in France since fleeing the regime in the 1990s during an official visit, makes it clear that he disagrees with the current government and despises the Castro brothers. While the reader may detect a certain degree of contradiction in Benigno, there is no mistaking, however, that he is unremorseful and unapologetic for his past actions and that he is not "simpatico" to the United States or the Cuban exile community. This candor adds to his credibility.

In sum, the events Benigno chronicles fill gaps for those who have closely followed the 40 years of Cuban-assisted challenges to US security. The enthralling true-life tale of armed anti-Americanism, communist challenge, Cuban defiance, chicanery, espionage, and good vs. evil (told from the side of evil) is a must read for students of intelligence, the era, or the country. Unfortunately, Benigno's attention-getting historical account of the Cuban threat will remain out of reach to potentially interested readers of English only. The book is currently available only in French and Spanish.

(Note for nonnative Spanish readers: Students of Spanish capable of reading at the high school level should be able to appreciate the full impact of Benigno's writing.)

❖ ❖ ❖

Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers and Users

Don McDowell, (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Revised Edition, 2009), 286 pp

Reviewed by Peter C. Oleson

Don McDowell's *Strategic Intelligence, A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers and Users* is a useful book for those learning how to approach complex intelligence analyses and estimates. Much of what McDowell addresses will be old hat to experienced analysts in Intelligence Community agencies, but for those with limited experience in strategic analyses or those who have worked mostly in current intelligence, investigatory work, or operational support this book provides a pertinent guide. It should be most helpful to those involved in strategic analysis in the security, law enforcement, and compliance and regulatory communities at the federal, state, and local levels. Many of the considerations the author addresses would also be useful in private sector competitive intelligence analyses and academic research.

McDowell provides an interesting, non-American perspective on the doctrine of doing strategic analysis. A former director of the Strategic Crimes Studies Unit of the Australian Attorney-General's Department, McDowell has taught the principles of intelligence analysis and management to intelligence, law enforcement, and tax authorities in Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, and Latin America. The original version of this book was self-published in 1998.

The author discusses general concepts of strategic analysis, issues for clients and managers, and processes and techniques, adding his own critical observations gained from four decades of international intelligence experience. His definitions are clear and memorable. For example, McDowell writes: "From a conceptual point of view, intelligence as a practice exists to illuminate the obscure, to forecast what is yet to come, to explain the 'iceberg' of truth beneath the tip of what can be seen." He neatly differentiates between "clients" and "customers": A "client" is the person who commissions the analysis and is, therefore, a major stakeholder in the effort; a "customer" is someone who reads the resulting intelligence and may, or may not, be a stakeholder. McDowell defines "strategic intelligence analysis" as a "specific form of research that addresses any issue at a level of breadth and detail necessary to describe threats, risks, and opportunities in a way that helps determine programs and policies." Its main purpose is to help management develop policies, strategies, and programs. As such, strategic intelligence analysis is distinctly different from, but complementary to, tactical or operational intelligence analyses, which are focused on specific targets or individuals and support the day-to-day activities of operational line units.

McDowell argues that every nation should invest in a strategic intelligence research unit to examine trends and futures, and he outlines the concepts, organization, resource requirements, and staffing considerations of such a unit. He believes any strategic analysis unit should be a separate and distinct entity, not an add-on to an operational agency. He states: "One thing is certain: Inevitably, there are no benefits derived from mandating [strategic intelligence analysis] to an existing agency. All already have their own functions and responsibilities…and [points of view]. This also serves to insulate the strategic analysis unit from the immediate pressures on agency management and the crisis of the moment. This is an interesting postulation when the reader reflects on the US Intelligence Community's internal arguments over the removal of the National Intelligence Council from CIA when the Director of National Intelligence was established.

Most of the book focuses on the process of strategic intelligence analysis—from initial tasking by the client through planning the schedule and resources needed (often an afterthought in the US Intelligence Community), planning the needed collection of information, approaches to collating and evaluating data, planning the analysis phase, developing hypotheses, and presenting the final judgments of the analysts. In this, McDowell is quite thorough. Part IV of the book, "Processes and Techniques," is the most useful part for those needing a "how to" book. Starting with chapter 8 McDowell lays out the methodology for undertaking strategic analyses.

After initially studying the problem to gain a conceptual framework for the strategic analysis and breaking the problem into its components, the author, in chapter 9, "Defining the Task: Prescribing the Boundaries of the Project," emphasizes the criticality of the terms of reference and study project plan, and provides a sample outline. In subsequent chapters he addresses generating hypotheses, developing indicators, data collection plans, collating and evaluating collected data, deciding on analytical approaches, and writing reports. In discussing data collection plans, McDowell recommends an initial two-step process of first conducting a data audit to determine what is known and then listing gaps and deficiencies in knowledge that should drive collection requests. He emphasizes the importance of data quality, which he defines as accuracy, reliability, and completeness.

Addressing the age-old conflict between the collector and the analyst over how much the analyst should know about the source, McDowell comes down on the side of the analyst: Analysts must know "how collectors" gain their access, how they record their observations, and whether there is a particular focus or skew in their observation and data collection routines that is consistent—or inconsistent—with that required of the strategic analysis." He also warns against both the "official data only" syndrome and a vacuum cleaner approach. Strategic intelligence analysis is likely to draw from many sources, and especially open sources. Unless one is willing to be inundated with chaff, McDowell admonishes analysts to gather only the data that is relevant to the analysis. He further instructs analysts to insist on data in a form that is relevant to their needs, not as the source may prefer to provide it.

McDowell puts more emphasis on the collation of data than many. He stresses the importance of the registry function and selecting an appropriate collation approach and system. In his chapter on analytical approaches, the author identifies many, but not all, analytical methods that may be germane. Those interested in the details of analytical approaches will need to look elsewhere for more defini-

tive explanations. He addresses the issue of quantitative versus qualitative analysis and concludes that no one approach alone is appropriate to a complex strategic analysis. Selecting the right approach for the subset of the problem being studied is one of the analyst's most important decisions. McDowell acknowledges in several chapters the benefits of automated processing tools but largely does not address specific tools that might be applicable to analysts.

Clearly McDowell is an analyst at heart and believes that the analyst should reign supreme in the strategic intelligence process, stating, "The analyst must control the whole strategic intelligence process." This view reflects his international experience in countries where the intelligence functions are not as dominated by the collection agencies as in the United States. He also argues for a "tight relationship" between the analyst, the manager, and the client of the strategic intelligence analysis. "Bonding" is the term used. "This is pivotal to ensuring that those who need the service [the clients] can relate effectively to its practitioners and providers, so that a candid exchange and negotiation of information, views, and suggestions can be facilitated."

McDowell also argues that analysts should make recommendations to clients based on the results of strategic analysis. As it is a manager's tool, to be relevant strategic intelligence analysis must address what one does, how one does it, and the legal framework. Otherwise the analysis is incomplete. While perhaps ideal, McDowell's philosophy begs the problem of management/policy influence on the analysts' conclusions, and in the US context, may cross the policy-analysis divide. McDowell, of course, is not constrained by the politics in the United States, and his identification of the legal framework reflects his law enforcement experience. Nevertheless, McDowell's views are relevant in non-IC analytical environments and in private industry where such issues may not exist.

Throughout the book McDowell offers sage advice to analysts and managers of analysts alike. "Production of strategic intelligence is almost never a task that is simple or quick," McDowell observes, and the impatience of clients can be a problem for analysts. Speedy analysis leads to sloppiness and errors. Above all a disciplined approach must be taken to ensure correct analysis. Clients sometimes direct that a specific approach be taken. McDowell writes: "All too often, managers and clients tend to put a spin on the way in which a potential strategic study topic is articulated, a spin that embodies their expectations, most urgent priorities, resource problems, and frustrations." This is a bad practice.

Strategic Intelligence is a doctrinal book on how to approach strategic analysis and do it well, avoiding the many pitfalls that can derail analysis. This book is not a detailed military field manual but it contains a lot of common sense gained through broad experience.

❖ ❖ ❖

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Secret Intelligence: A Reader, Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark (eds.)

Terrorism 2005–2007: A Chronology, Edward F. Mickolus

General Intelligence

Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations, Richard C. S. Trahair and Robert C. Miller

Historical Dictionary of Air Intelligence, Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey

Historical

The Central Intelligence Agency: A Documentary History, Scott C. Monje

Churchill's Wizards: The British Genius for Deception 1914-1945, Nicholas Rankin

Hunting Eichmann: How a Band of Survivors and a Young Spy Agency Chased Down the World's Most Notorious Nazi, Neal Bascomb

James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, & the Craft of Counterintelligence, Michael Holzman

Operation Kronstadt: The Greatest True Tale of Espionage to Come Out of the Early Years of MI6, Harry Ferguson

SPYMASTER: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, Oleg Kalugin

The Spy Who Came in from the Co-op: Melita Norwood and the Ending of Cold War Espionage, David Burke

Intelligence Abroad

Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence Inside MI5 and MI6, Gordon Thomas

Fiction

North from Calcutta, Duane Evans

Current

Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark (eds.), *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 552 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

The preface to this valuable volume asserts that with the end of the Cold War "policymakers and intelligence aristocrats [undefined] bought into fashionable theories about 'democratic peace' and the 'end of history'… [becoming] convinced they were entering a new and tranquil era." Thus, they turned their attention to economic espionage, ignoring terrorism. Whoever these thinkers might be, they apparently haven't considered the writings of Michael Scheuer, whose *Through Our Enemies Eyes* suggests the opposite was the case.[1]

As the editors of this volume note, the reality of "recent events have prompted academics in departments of history, politics and international relations to contemplate teaching intelligence for the first time." Toward that end, they have brought together 30 contributors—20 academics, 10 intelligence officers—who connect some of the classic intelligence literature "with writings on new developments." (xvii)

The contributions are separated into four parts. The first deals with the intelligence cycle. It includes a discussion of CIA culture and the interaction of collection and analysis, the role of SIGINT, the importance of open sources, analysis, and a discussion of the producer-consumer relationship. The final article in this part, by Sir Stephen Lander, former director-general of MI5, discusses the role and value of liaison or international cooperation among intelligence services. It is a topic not often raised in a public forum and in this case broaches some important issues—a treaty among nations not usually part of such an arrangement—that would change the conventional approach to the subject. The second part deals with counterterrorism, security, and counterintelligence. Part three looks at ethics, accountability, control, plus torture and assassination. Part four, "Intelligence and the New Warfare," considers covert action, military intelligence and deception, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping and peacemaking intelligence. Not all the articles are new, but each is worthwhile.

University of Toronto history professor Wesley Wark contributes a concluding essay, "Learning to Live with Intelligence," that is thoughtful and attention-grabbing. He argues that "public intelligence will require a new public outlook on intelligence." And to reach this goal, he echoes the theme of the *Reader*: "The future of intelligence requires a discovery of the past." (522)

The value of the *Reader* is enhanced by the inclusion of "essay questions" at the end of many of the articles, some of which challenge positions taken by other contributors. Whether viewed as a text or a source for stimulating

[1] Michael Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006).

thought on modern intelligence issues, *Secret Intelligence* is an important compendium and should be consulted by all concerned with the profession.

Edward F. Mickolus, *Terrorism 2005–2007: A Chronology* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), bibliography, subject, name, country and date indices.

Since 1980, former CIA officer Edward Mickolus has periodically published a chronology of terrorist attacks that, with the present volume, cover the period 1960–2007. His criteria for selecting events to mark are acts that involve "the use or threat of use of violence by any individual or group for political purposes." (ix) Each volume begins with a chronological listing of incidents by country. These are followed by a section of updates, which in the current volume provide follow-up details "first reported prior to 1 January 2005." (x) These include, for example, material on the outcome of trials not completed when the previous volume went to press. The third section contains a bibliography, grouped by topic areas, of writings that provide further details on the entries in the incidents section. The events chronicled in the incidents section do not include the source of its data. For this information one can refer to the bibliography or Google. The three indices allow one to look for incidents by subject, name, country, and date. The result is a relatively comprehensive chronological catalogue of terrorist acts.

A digital version of the entire database is available for those who wish to search using criteria other than those in the three indices. For example suicide bomber incidents or specific organizations are available.[2] For a quick assessment of domestic and international terrorist acts during this period, from which students and analysts can ascertain patterns of events and perpetrators, the Mickolus chronology is the place to start.

General Intelligence

Richard C. S. Trahair and Robert C. Miller, *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations*, (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), 2nd edition updated, 572 pp., glossary, chronology, index.

Richard Trahair is a social research adviser and consulting psychologist at La Trobe University near Melbourne, Australia. His coauthor is the editor of Enigma Books. The first edition of his encyclopedia was reviewed in *Studies* in 2005 and given poor marks for the number of errors it contained, especially since it was "intended as a useful tool to support espionage studies."[3] This updated and revised edition repeats that intention and the authors write that "the facts have been checked as thoroughly as possible." (xxviii) But, while some corrections have indeed been made, inexplicably far too many remain,

---

[2] http://www.vinyardsoftware.net/home.html
[3] Hayden Peake, "Intelligence Officers' Bookshelf," *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 4. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/Bookshelf_11.htm

including that dreadful oxymoron, "defector-in-place." Other examples are the factual errors in the sections on Philby and Blunt (not Blount as in the text [264]) and Bentley (18), to name just two. Moreover, with the exception of Israel, most Middle Eastern countries are still excluded, as is China.

There are three positive features about this work. First, it has an interesting review of the intelligence literature. Second, the chronology has been updated. Third, and most important, the sources arer cited after each of the several hundred entries. But had the contents of the entries been closely checked against the sources, the errors would have been exposed.

Thus while the authors deserve credit for an improved edition, readers are cautioned to check the facts in any entry of interest against the sources provided rather than assume their accuracy.

Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, *Historical Dictionary of Air Intelligence* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press), 219 pp., bibliography, appendix, chronology, index.

Former RAF intelligence officer and jet fighter pilot, Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, has assembled a survey of air intelligence entries—broadly construed—that cover the origins of the discipline to the present. The approximately 500 entries include a selection of topics that embrace air operations in war, aircraft types, satellite and fixed-wing reconnaissance, security services, spy cases, performance studies, organizations, sabotage operations, various codenames linked to air intelligence operations, and some of the participants involved.

While some of the entries, for example, the U-2 and the C-30 Hercules aircraft, are well known, many will be unfamiliar. This raises a major deficiency common to the entire Historical Dictionary series: there are no sources for the entries. Had they been required, describing the codeword KEYHOLE as an Air Force rather than a CIA designation could have been avoided. Likewise, differences in the entry for the BYEMAN codeword with those provided in other sources might have been explained.[4] Thus the reader is cautioned to seek further confirmation before relying on any given entry.

There are a few factual errors in the introduction. For example, the claim that "the first dedicated air reconnaissance missions were undertaken in 1870 during the siege of Paris" using tethered balloons ignores that fact that balloons were used for that purpose during the American Civil War.[5] With regard to WW II, there was no "entirely bogus assembly of infantry, artillery, tanks and landing craft in Southeast England." (212) The deception in that case was confined to landing craft at the ports and specious order-of-battle data communicated via SIGINT.[6] And members of WW II infantry units might take is-

---

[4] See for example, Jeffrey Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community, 5th edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 39.

[5] George O'Toole, *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), 133–36.

sue with the claim that "WW II was fought very largely in the air." (xxv) Finally, the allied troops occupied Iraq in 2003, not 2002. (88)

Overall, this historical dictionary provides a conditionally useful introduction to a subject not previously treated in this format.

Historical

Neal Bascomb, *Hunting Eichmann: How a Band of Survivors and a Young Spy Agency Chased Down the World's Most Notorious Nazi* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), 390 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

During WW II, Nazi SS officer Adolf Eichmann arranged for the collection and shipment of thousands of Jews to concentration camps, where most died. At the end of the war Eichmann disappeared, but the Israelis never stopped looking for him. The story of the clandestine operation that found, captured, and exfiltrated Eichmann from Argentina to Israel in May of 1960 has been told before, three times by participants in the operation. The most famous account was *The House on Garibaldi Street* by the team leader and head of Mossad, Isser Harel. Peter Malkin, the man who physically grabbed Eichmann told his story in *Eichmann In My Hands*. The subtitle of Zvi Aharoni's book, *Operation Eichmann: The Truth About the Pursuit, Capture and Trial of Adolf Eichmann* hints at a controversy that arose among the three authors.[7] Malkin writes that it was he who convinced Eichmann to sign a statement indicating he was willingly going to Israel. Not so says Aharoni, who challenged Malkin's account on that and other points as inaccurate and self-serving. Harel sided with Malkin. Author Neil Bascomb reviewed all the documentation, interviewed participants, and takes a firm position in *Hunting Eichmann*.

But that is not all that is new in the book. With the help of the Argentines, Bascomb obtained the passport Eichmann used—under the name Roberto Klement—when he escaped Europe, and it is reproduced in the endpapers. From primary sources in various archives, Bascomb tells how Eichmann escaped after the end of the war, how he ended up in Argentina after being captured twice and imprisoned by the US Army, and who helped him.

Another noteworthy aspect of the book is Bascomb's attention to the operational details, both planning and execution. This was the first operation of its kind for the young service and the participants, and it is interesting to read how they adjusted to the mistakes made. The one error Eichmann made, never before explained, is why he allowed his children to use the Eichmann name in Argentina. Had he not done so, as the book makes clear, it is unlikely he would have been found.

---

[6] Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007), 540-41.

[7] Harel (New York: Viking Press, 1975); Malkin (Warner Books, 1990); Aharoni and Wilhelm Dietl (London: Orion, 1998).

Most of the officers involved in the capture of Eichmann went on to higher positions in the Israeli intelligence services and the book's epilogue gives brief accounts of each. Rafi Eitan, may be remembered for his role on the Jonathan Pollard case. *Hunting Eichmann* is a fine book, well worth attention.

David Burke, **The Spy Who Came in from the Co-op: Melita Norwood and the Ending of Cold War Espionage** (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2008), 209 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Cambridge University historian David Burke knew Melita Norwood in 1997 as a source for his research on the Russian émigré community in England. Two years later he knew her as a former Soviet spy when she was exposed by retired KGB officer Vasili Mitrokhin in the *Times* on 11 September 1999. The next day, the 87-year-old Norwood spoke to the press. She admitted the charges, said she did it for ideological reasons, and stated she would do it again under the circumstances. Norwood turned down numerous offers to tell her story for money, but she did tell it to Dr. Burke, whom she had come to trust, on condition that he not publish until after her death.

The Spy Who Came in from the Co-op chronicles the life of the longest serving Soviet agent in British history. Code named Tina, later Hola, Norwood, a communist since 1931, was recruited in 1934. (7) At the time, she was working at the British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association (BN-FMRA) as a secretary. When the war began, the BN-FMRA was involved in atomic research, and Norwood began passing secrets to her controller, Ursula Kuczynski (Sonja). Burke describes her recruitment in some detail, explaining how, as a daughter of communists who sold the *Daily Worker* on street corners, escaped exposure despite the fact that the Security Service "connected her with Soviet espionage as early as 1938." (13) This curious circumstance was repeated in 1965, when "MI5 launched an extended investigation of Mrs. Norwood,…concluding that while she had been a spy in the 1940s," there was no evidence to support prosecution. Burke concludes that this decision was reached to avoid "exposure of yet another atomic spy." (163) All this was unknown to Hola, so she continued working and, in 1967, recruited an agent for the Soviets. (164) In 1979 Norwood traveled to the Soviet Union and received the Order of the Red Banner. (164).

As a subplot, the book also provides considerable detail about the Russian émigré community that lived in a now well-known residence for radicals, the Lawn Road Flats. Many of these people were Soviet illegal agents, whose stories he tells. Here we learn about the espionage roles of the Kuczynski family, Arnold Deutsch—principal recruiter of the Cambridge Five—and Andrew Rothstein the man who recruited Norwood.

In 2001, the British again decided not to prosecute the 89-year-old granny, though the decision was not reached without considerable public controversy, as Burke explains. He concludes by suggesting that "millions of Russians probably owe their lives" to her espionage [perhaps a line to explain his explanation for that claim?]. Whether or not this is hyperbole, the story of Melita Norwood is at once peculiarly fascinating and well told.

Harry Ferguson, ***Operation Kronstadt: The Greatest True Tale of Espionage to Come Out of the Early Years of MI6*** (New York: Overlook Press, 2009), 368 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, maps, photos, index.

Sidney Reilly, "Ace of Spies," escaped to Europe after his failed plot to overthrow the Bolshevik government in August 1918. That same month, Captain Francis Cromie, Naval Intelligence Division (NID), was killed by the Cheka—the Bolshevik security service—in the Petrograd embassy, and his networks went to ground. This left the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6), as it came to be called, with no officers in Russia. But SIS responded quickly and dispatched a recently recruited concert pianist, Paul Dukes—designated ST-25—to Petrograd in mid-September. His mission: reestablish the disrupted Cromie networks and report Bolshevik civilian and military activity. While the rapid response may now appear as traditional British secret service efficiency, it was entirely coincidental. Moreover, Dukes was given no training, told to create his own cover, get into Russia using his own devices, contact Cromie's agents—whose names and location he didn't know—and send their reports to London using couriers he would have to recruit. Although this was his first intelligence assignment, there was some basis for expecting success. Dukes, had lived and trained in St Petersburg, knew the language and the city where he was to operate, and, equally important, he wanted the job. Still this was on-the-job training in the extreme. MI6 did foresee that Dukes would eventually need to get out of Russia and made plans to evacuate him on a Royal Navy ship commanded by Lt. Augustus Agar. After being sworn to secrecy, Agar was told to create a plan to pick up Dukes; he chose an area near the Baltic ocean fortress island of Kronstadt. Dukes accomplished his mission, Agar did not, though not for want of trying. Both men told something of their story in memoirs.[8]

In *Operation Kronstadt*, former MI6 officer Harry Ferguson ties the two stories together and adds new details, many of which do not reflect well on the vaunted image of SIS or its first chief, Captain Mansfield Cumming. SIS had struggled during WW I and risked being abolished at its end. Ferguson explains Cumming's successful efforts to avoid this fate, due largely to Dukes natural abilities and ingenuity. ST-25 had some help from embassy officials in Helsinki, but his support from London headquarters was inept, if not incompetent. Before succumbing to pressure from the Cheka, which eventually penetrated his many networks, Dukes infiltrated the local Communist Party, impersonated a Cheka officer, joined the Red Army and the Comintern, and helped two of his agents escape from Chekist prisons. In the end, Dukes was knighted, the first officer to be so recognized for his operational duties, but he did not remain in SIS. Agar received the Victoria Cross and the Distinguished Service Order from the King, and returned to the navy duty. Ferguson's lively

---

[8] Augustus Agar, *Baltic Episode: A Classic of Secret Service in Russian Waters* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963); Sir Paul Dukes, *The Story of ST-25*: *Adventure and Romance in the Secret Intelligence Service in Russia* (London: Cassell, 1938). At the same time, the US government was trying to learn what it could of developments in Russia. See: David A. Langbart, "Five Months in Petrograd 1918: Robert W. Imbrie and the US Search for Information in Russia" at http://www.internet2.cia/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-1/index.html

narrative reveals how Dukes eventually escaped Russia and how Agar avoided capture. The book is well documented and pleasure to read.

Michael Holzman, *James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, & the Craft of Counterintelligence* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 399 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Several authors have published books that purport to tell the story of James Angleton, the chief of the Counterintelligence Staff at CIA from December 1954 to late December 1974. Yale historian Robin Winks covered Angleton's time at Yale and his OSS years. The others focus on his controversial CI Staff tenure, with David Wise's *Molehunt* being the most complete. [9]

The latest contribution, by independent scholar Michael Holzman, is a somewhat esoteric personal and professional biography lashed together by a social science theory of history and education. In brief, Holzman sees Angleton's life as a search for historical truth, defined as: "child's history" or "what is taught in schools," and "true history" which is secret. (ix-x) His search, Holzman asserts, matured at Yale where it was greatly influenced by the "school of New Criticism," an objective approach to literature that invoked the concept of ambiguity and suggested that literary works can have multiple simultaneous meanings. (ix-x) Both of these ideas were indeed part of Angleton's approach to counterintelligence. But Holzman suggests his application of them was corrupted by the Cold War, when "at one point there are children learning a child's version of history from their teachers," and "at another point there are, as Senator Church put it, '25 years of manipulation by methods that were plainly copied from the KGB: coercion, false propaganda, bribery, abduction, attempted assassination.' The points are connected; one thing follows from the other." (6)

This is not light reading and if a connection there be, it is never made clear as Holzman describes Angleton's personal life and professional career. Concerning the former, there is much that is new, mostly having to do with Angleton's passion for poetry, the famous poets he knew, and his relationship with his family and his wife Cicely.

There is little new, however, when Holzman turns to Angleton's career in OSS, his years at the CIA, and his retirement. The overall story is accurate in terms of his assignments, the operations that consumed his attention, and the molehunt controversy that ultimately ended his career. But when Holzman deals with counterintelligence matters he encounters difficulties. Some are relatively minor, as when he gets the dates of Angleton's service wrong— twice. (xi, 5) Other details involve Kim Philby, whose defection Holzman argues had a major impact on Angleton's approach to counterintelligence. For reasons not clear, Holzman finds it necessary to recount the Cambridge Five

---

[9] Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); David Wise, *Molehunt: The Secret Search For Traitors That Shattered The CIA* (New York: Random House, 1992). CIA's chief historian is preparing a review of the literature for a forthcoming issue of *Studies*.

saga, and here he can't get the facts straight. For example, Graham Greene was not Philby's deputy, nor did he count himself as Burgess's "friend to the end"—there is no evidence they ever met. (101) Holzman also credits Burgess with accomplishments performed by others. For example, Burgess did not "bring Philby into the British secret intelligence service,"[10] nor did he influence Blunt's entry into MI5. (104–5) When discussing Philby and the VENONA project, Holzman mentions Meredith Gardner, "the FBI's cryptographic genius, who broke VENONA," but Gardner worked for the US Army. In a similar vein, Holzman credits Prime Minister Harold Macmillan with exonerating Philby in a 1955 statement to Parliament—Macmillan was foreign secretary at the time. (135) And it was not Roger Hollis of MI5 who sent Nicholas Elliott to Beirut to secure Philby's confession—MI6 handled that operation. Holzman writes that in 1965 Philby "received recognition for his services in the form of the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of Lenin."—only the former was awarded.[11]

But the errors are not confined to the British. Turning to Angleton's CIA service, Holzman writes that in addition to his other intelligence duties he was made "head of the Israeli section of the Directorate of Intelligence"—the Israeli account, as it was then called, was in the Directorate of Plans (now NCS) where Angleton was assigned. (153) And in a statement that is not sourced or elaborated upon, Holzman writes that in 1973, Bill Colby said the Agency was "to cease to worry about vetting its sources," a most unlikely circumstance which was certainly not obeyed. In a discussion of the FBI-CIA cooperation in the arrest of KGB Col. Rudolf Abel, Holzman hints that the CIA involvement is "perhaps an indicator of illegal domestic surveillance"—a novel but inaccurate thought.

Holzman spends considerable time regurgitating the Church Committee hearings and Angleton's role in the events the committee made and the molehunt at CIA he engendered. There is nothing new here either, other than Holzman's view that Angleton was a malevolent instigator of evil acts so abhorrent that a further public airing is needed. To this end he quotes Justice Louis Brandeis: "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding." Angleton, Holzman concludes, "and his colleagues, the 'like minded men of zeal' who created the Central Intelligence Agency, forgot this, and for a time liberty itself was the victim. It is a danger that recurs." (323)

In the end, *James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, & the Craft of Counterintelligence* is less a biography than a literary vehicle skewed by a preconceived conclusion supported by secondary sources. James Angleton is worthy of a good biography. This isn't it.

---

[10] See Gemrikh Borovik, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of the Master Spy-KGB Archives Revealed* (Boston: Little Brown, 1994).

[11] See Rufina Philby, *The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow Years* (London: St Ermin's Press, 2000), 423.

Oleg Kalugin, **SPYMASTER: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West** (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 466 pp., index.

When Oleg Kalugin's memoirs were first published in 1994, he was a retired KGB major general, a former member of parliament, and a Russian citizen.[12] Born in Leningrad under Stalin, his career ended in Moscow under Yeltsin. This revised edition of his book describes the path and events from one era to the other. A new epilogue adds details about his personal life, tells why he sought asylum and became a US citizen in 2003, and gives his assessment of the current Russian government after his trial in absentia for treason 2002.

The other changes in this edition add details to cases he discussed in relatively vague terms in 1994. One case involved a penetration of the National Security Agency he originally described as "a soldier." Here he identifies the man as Robert Lipka, who was arrested in 1996 and pleaded guilty in 1997. Press speculation at the time—in Moscow and America—linked the clues Kalugin provided to the arrest. In this edition he reveals that Vasili Mitrokhin actually identified Lipka two years before the original *Spymaster* was published. A second operation in which Kalugin played a direct role was the recruitment and handling of "a valuable American in Vienna," as he was described in the one paragraph summary in the first edition. Identified here as US Army Col. George Trofimoff, Kalugin adds specifics and tells how he ended up testifying at Trofimoff's trial. The most controversial case to which he adds details involved the late American journalist and putative KGB agent, I. F. Stone. Kalugin makes clear his views on the subject but they are not likely to satisfy Stone adherents.[13]

SPYMASTER is the unique story of a former KGB officer who did not defect. It is a valuable Cold War memoir.

Scott C. Monje, **The Central Intelligence Agency: A Documentary History** (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008), 413 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, appendices, index.

A more accurate subtitle to this volume would be *A Selected Documentary History.* As independent scholar Scott Monje acknowledges in his preface, "the documentary record is not complete." (vi) In fact, neither the Soviet Union nor the KGB is included. Of the 18 chapters 15 deal with CIA's domestic activities. The exceptions are concerned with the war on terror, Iraq, and Iran. The introduction describes CIA's origins and current structure. This is followed by a useful chronology limited by the constraints noted above. Each chapter has a short introduction, with a few paragraphs outlining the themes supported by the documents to follow. For example, chapter 1 looks at the Agency's charter, beginning with OSS-related documents. It includes pertinent presidential

---

[12] Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

[13] See D. D. Guttenplan, *American Radical: The Life and Times of I. F. Stone* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).

and national security directives. Chapter 5, "Counterintelligence," deals superficially with the Nosenko case, a security review of a suspect employee, and the Ames case. Nine of the remaining chapters are concerned with the Family Jewels report. Separate chapters look at the Korean War, Cuba, and 9/11. The concluding chapter is a summary of the topics previously covered with a section on "the corrupting influence of secrecy." (399)

While this book is anything but a CIA history, it does reproduce some informative documents that may be of interest to scholars.

Nicholas Rankin, ***Churchill's Wizards: The British Genius for Deception 1914-1945*** (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2008), 466 pp., chapter sources, photos, index.

Sir Winston Churchill is the British counterpart to Abraham Lincoln when it comes to the seemingly endless publication of books about his life. In *Churchill's Wizards*, BBC producer-turned-author Nicholas Rankin writes about military deception as influenced by Churchill in and out of government during two world wars. These, Rankin writes, are built on "four pillars: camouflage, propaganda, secret intelligence, and special forces." (xiii) In 1914, for example, Churchill ordered the creation of a dummy fleet of warships "to baffle and distract enemy aeroplanes and submarines." (xiii) During WW II the commandos, Special Ooperations Executive (SOE), the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), and SAS were formed under his leadership. But this man of ideas didn't do the heavy lifting of deception. This was left to some very gifted military and civilian subordinates who Rankin neatly weaves into his story.

Although deception is the common thread, Rankin also provides historical background for the major battles and events he uses to focus on deception. The first half of the book deals with WW I, when forms of deception employing radios, code breaking, and photography were introduced out of battlefield and political necessity. Examples of the latter include camouflage and propaganda, concepts that had yet to appear in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Civilian artists rallied to the call and developed camouflage painting for ships and techniques to fool the new method of intelligence collection, aerial photography. Soldiers created metal trees for vulnerable snipers. Famous writers—John Buchan, Arthur Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling, to name a few—were engaged to create propaganda—the mix of truth and fiction aimed at the home front and the enemy. The story of the German execution of British nurse Edith Cavell for espionage, when all she was doing was helping escaped allied prisoners, was a prime example. The British never admitted that Cavell was, in fact, an agent of British secret service.

In the book's second half, Rankin describes the application of WW I experiences to more modern warfare. He tells of Dudley Clarke's work in the North African desert campaigns, the codebreaking successes at Bletchley Park, Operation Mincemeat—the man who never was—the impersonation of General Montgomery prior to the invasion of Europe, and the most famous and effective of all deceptions, BODYGUARD, which convinced the Nazis that the allies would land at Calais, not Normandy. In each of these cases, Rankin

identifies those involved, for example, Juan Pujol—Garbo—whose deception messages were crucial to BODYGUARD and to convincing the Nazis that the V weapons or buzz-bombs were landing in areas beyond their targets.

Many of the stories in *Churchill's Wizards* have been told before, but Rankin has enhanced them with recently released papers and diaries. It is very good reading and provides an intimate look at the use of deception and those who made it work. This valuable book gives a new perspective to the history of the warfare and deception.

Intelligence Abroad

Gordon Thomas, **Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence Inside MI5 and MI6** (New York: St. Martins Press, 2009), 430 pp., bibliography, index.

"What is it about the intelligence world that prompts people to write with such certainty about what they know they do not know?"[14] Former MI6 officer Alan Judd raises this question in his review of *Secret Wars* wherein he demonstrates Gordon Thomas's appalling grasp of the subject. Judd cites a few of Gordon's many errors of omission and commission that deal mainly with British matters. For example, Thomas calls the current head of MI6 the director-general—his title is chief, or "C" (2)—and notes that Stella Rimington, the first woman to become director-general of MI5, "climbed the career ladder at Century House," the headquarters of MI6 where, of course, MI5 officers do not serve. Continuing, he notes that the 100-year time span is unevenly treated. Many important operations are not even mentioned: the Penkovsky case and the Venlo incident to name two.

What makes this book of particular interest to Americans—in a book nominally about British intelligence, as Judd notes in passing—are the many operations that involved the intelligence services of both countries, and Thomas makes a dazzling muddle of each case he mentions, some of which never happened. In that category, we learn of a wartime trip MI6 Chief Sir Stewart Menzies made to Bern to visit OSS station chief Allen Dulles at a time when the Swiss borders were sealed. (33) Their relationship continued at the Yalta Summit, writes Thomas, and though neither attended, Thomas quotes a conversation between the two. (99–100) Later, in the spring of 1951, according to Thomas, Dulles and DCI Walter Bedell Smith flew to London in connection with the hunt for the British mole Donald Maclean, requesting that Maclean be returned to America for questioning. (126) Both the trip and the request are pure fiction. And, despite the volume of documented material devoted to Dulles's CIA career, he is described in *Secret Wars* as being involved in CIA's operations before the 1948 Berlin Blockade—he joined the CIA in 1951. Thomas goes on to describe Dulles as a "committed Anglophobe" from the days he wrote a college paper supporting the Boers of South Africa in their war

---

[14] Alan Judd, "At Sixes and Fives," Spectator.co.uk, 13 May 2009.

against Britain. Dulles did write such a paper, 26 pages, when he was seven years old and by the time he published it five decades later, he was hardly an Anglophobe.

Thomas gives similar treatment to another icon of espionage about whom few facts have gone unpublished—Kim Philby. According to Thomas, Philby's father was knighted—sadly there was no "Sir" Harry Philby. It was Philby too, says Thomas, who contacted Anthony Blunt to warn Maclean he was about to be arrested (126–27)—but Burgess did that. Moreover, we learn that Philby had been a member of the Cambridge secret Apostles Society (127), that he defected to the KGB from Britain (125), and that he worked with "FBI agent" Bill Harvey on the Maclean case (130). Phily was never a member of the Apostle's Society, he defected from London, and Harvey was a CIA officer at the time.

When it comes to describing CIA and its personnel, Thomas doesn't let up in erring. For example, he states the stars commemorating fallen officers on the marble wall at Headquarters, are inlaid "silver" (218)—they are black; that the biblical quotation from St. John is on a "marble plaque" (219)—it is in the wall; and that the cafeteria is divided to protect officers from being "identified" by visitors (44)—it once was but no longer is. He is no more accurate in claiming that satellite imagery at the National Photographic Interpretation Center enabled technicians "to see the infuriated face of a Soviet general in East Germany when the Berlin airlift started" in 1948 (182)—the first satellites flew in 1961. More surprising, Thomas asserts that DCI Bill Casey "gave a series of interviews" after his retirement, including one to Thomas (200)—Casey fell critically ill in January 1987, while he was in office, and was hospitalized until his death in May. (Author Robert Woodward claimed to have seen him briefly in his hospital room, a claim Casey's family disputes.) Then there was "the CIA team" that booked a table "at the Au Pied de Cachon, one of the finest restaurants in Georgetown" for KGB defector Vitali Yurchenko. Actually, it was one security officer, and the restaurant never had that reputation. In addition, Thomas includes many imagined quotes.

On the basis of this sampling (fewer than 15 percent of the total factual errors in the book), three observations can be supported. First, no other book on intelligence has as many errors. Second, the facts that are correct are not new. Third, notwithstanding the author's claim that he was "commended for his sourcing" (401), no source notes are provided. Cambridge Professor Christopher Andrew has written the official history of MI5 to be published later this year. Irish historian Keith Jeffery is writing a parallel volume on MI6, due out next year. Wait for them.

Fiction

Duane Evans, ***North from Calcutta*** (Pecos Moon, LLC, 2009), 360 pp.

When British historian David Stafford was writing his book on the WW II Special Operations Executive (SOE)[15] he discovered that some of the officers

who volunteered for dangerous work were motivated by the fictional stories of espionage in the books *The 39 Steps* and *Greenmantle* by John Buchan. Former CIA officer William Hood, author of *Spy Wednesday,* writing about the value of "cloak and dagger fiction," suggests its value is determined by the answer to the question: "Might the story really have happened?"[16] *North to Calcutta*, while total fiction, takes place in a contemporary setting, names actual intelligence services, makes reference to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) attack on Mumbai, and is likely to motivate readers as Buchan did—while answering in the affirmative Hood's question.

The hero, Tarek Durrani, is a former military officer educated in the West and a major in the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. He discovers a terrorist plot to use a suitcase nuclear bomb to blow up a dam in India during a ceremony attended by Pakistani and Indian officials. Blaming India for the carnage, rogue Pakistani army elements would then invade the disputed Indian Kashmir and achieve their long-term goal of total control of the region. At the same time, the terrorists would depose the legitimate government of Pakistan.

How Tarek first gets hints of the plot and how he uses his agents to learn the details is one part of the story. How the Indian security service learns of Tarek's efforts and works to prevent the disaster is another. The tradecraft employed by both services is basic but realistic. Of course there is a love story woven in, and it has a surprise ending.

Duane Evans, a special forces officer before joining the CIA, draws on his extensive service in South Asia to make *North to Calcutta* realistic and fast-paced. Former chief of CIA's Counterterrorism Center Cofer Black calls the book "a great tale of today's espionage and terror." At once entertaining and informative, *North to Calcutta* is an elegant example of espionage fiction.

---

[15] David Stafford, *The Silent Game: The Real World of Imaginary Spies* (Toronto: Lester& Orpen Dennys Limited, 1998), iv.
[16] Quoted in, Myron J. Smith, Jr. and Terry White, *Cloak and Dagger Fiction: An Annotated Guide to Spy Thrillers* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 662.