How do nuclear changes look to NATO?

Guy Roberts,

the new Strategic Concept of NATO:

how will nuclear issues

be involved in that

and what impact will it

have on these issues?

There is

in the new Strategic Concept...

There will be a section on the nuclear

deterrent posture of the alliance.

Of course in the 1999

Strategic Concept and the 1991 one

it was very prominent.

The difference will be is that,

due to the current

security environment,

the nuclear deterrent part of our

overall deterrent is not as significant,

because the threats

to which they apply are very remote.

And, as a result, I anticipate

that there will be a much smaller

reference to, but that it

certainly will be and will remain in,

the new Strategic Concept

our nuclear deterrence posture.

What that will be,

to anticipate the question,

I think that the fundamental pillars

of our current deterrence posture

will remain, and that is a belief

in the continuing need for deterrence.

We as an alliance believe

deterrence is important,

that it is an integral part

of our security situation.

Secondly, that, as the Madeline

Albright Group of Experts report

just recently reaffirmed,

that there will remain

some American

nuclear presence in Europe,

because of the importance

of the transatlantic link,

that commitment to,

on the one hand,

the security of Europe

and European allies,

and, on the other,

a great desire for the third pillar,

which is

burden-sharing and consultation.

The nations believe it is important

to share the risk of that deterrent.

Some countries mention

that they would like to see

NATO nuclear weapons

taken off of their territory.

What’s NATO’s response?

Well, that idea has been proposed

by a number of not only nations,

but also think tanks as well, and

that has certainly been something

that we as an alliance should look at

and re-examine

our nuclear deterrence posture.

It is one in which we believe

it deters potential adversaries,

it prevents coercion,

it is designed so that

we will never have to go to war,

but it needs to be examined

in the new environment.

Of course, we have already looked

at the security environment

and reduced these numbers

down to a very low number.

We only have a few hundred nuclear

weapons, the B61 gravity bomb,

US nuclear weapons in Europe today.

These proposals have been made,

most prominently by Germany,

but what has been key to all of this

is that all of the nations,

including Germany,

have said, very emphatically,

that any decisions about removing

nuclear weapons from any country,

any decisions about changing

the configuration, the composition,

the location of these weapons

will be done as an alliance,

and will be done

on the basis of consensus.

The element of missile defence

has been discussed,

particularly in the context

of the new concept.

Who will it be defending against?

Well missile defence is a part

of our overall deterrence posture.

I describe that as holistic deterrence.

Once we put in place

a robust missile defence system,

that will certainly put doubt

in the minds of any adversary

that a missile attack

won't get through.

That then hopefully will

detour them from thinking

they can gain politically

by attacking us.

It's very relevant. It complements

our nuclear deterrence,

our conventional

and all other capabilities.

There are over 30 nations

that are developing ballistic missiles.

There are many nations that are

developing ballistic missile defences.

I like to say that Europe already

has a missile defence system

and its the... I believe,

80 interceptors around Moscow.

Our Russian colleagues

believe in missile defence.

We're hoping to collaborate with them

and help develop

a collaborative system.

Some people say,

including Secretary of State Clinton

that one of the dangers

is not actually other countries

gaining nuclear

materials or weapons,

it's actually non-state actors

getting hold of one of those two.

What's your reaction and how

does NATO prepare against that?

NATO is certainly looking

at how we can develop

the capabilities to respond,

first of all to, in fact,

to structure

our deterrence posture in a way

that would hopefully put

in the minds of a potential adversary

that this is not

a good course of action.

One of the ways we can do that

is by working with our allies,

with the nations within the alliance,

with other organisations,

like the IAEA,

to develop the capability

to attribute any nuclear explosion

or improvised nuclear device,

or any radiological device,

to a particular country or location.

So we can track these things back

and hold accountable

any nation that might provide

those materials to a terrorist group.

We have some very robust

non-proliferation activities

to try to ensure

that materials cannot be transferred,

cannot be smuggled or stolen

and provided to terrorist groups that,

where they can themselves

fashion radiological weapons

or some other kind

of improvised explosive device.

NATO assembles many countries

with differing nuclear postures.

We've mentioned Germany

and its recent statements

and the US has an evolving

position on nuclear issues.

How does NATO gather those together

and come up with a single policy?

I believe that the differences

are one of degree.

On the one hand

several countries within the alliance

are committed and believe that,

of the importance of disarmament,

arms control and non-proliferation.

All countries believe

in the importance of those,

but it’s a question of a degree.

Some put more emphasis on that.

Others put emphasis on maintaining

a credible nuclear deterrent.

All of our nations support the idea

of maintaining a credible deterrent.

In fact, I think President Obama

in his speech in Prague last year,

when he talked about

a world free of nuclear weapons,

also pointed out

that until that day arrives

we'll continue to maintain

our nuclear deterrent.

And so countries that have argued for,

or espoused the idea,

of removing

nuclear weapons from Europe,

have done so in the context

of an arms control process.

A process, for example, of working

with Russia to get an agreement

to remove all tactical

nuclear weapons out of Europe.

That should be done

as part of an arms control process

and in that way we can enhance our

security, but unilateral reductions,

most nations see

as putting our security at jeopardy.

And so, one of the criteria

for bringing everything together

is back to this issue of security.

That's what this is about.

Security, security, security.

And if you can make a proposal

or any nation makes a proposal

that can be demonstrated

that it in fact enhances our security,

then you're going

to get acceptability by all the nations.

So, that being the standard by

which we will judge these proposals,

I think that

there is large room for agreement,

and what we're going to do with

the Strategic Concept, is just that.

We're going to work through

all these questions and proposals.

Do you think 2010 will be

a key year for nuclear issues

with the START-agreement,

the Nuclear Security Summit

and also, quite apart from the events,

it seems to be a year

when a lot of the countries

who are looking at the nuclear issue

for the first time,

Brazil, South Africa etc.,

when they come to make a decision

about whether

they support the existing order

or try to make changes

in the haves and have-nots.

Do you think this year those issues

are all coming to a head?

I believe they are,

I mean, this year with the impetus

of the new US administration,

the commitment by President Obama

to re-energising

the agenda for seeking in a world

in which nuclear weapons

continue to be diminished

to the point

where we can create the conditions

where we can have a world

free of nuclear weapons.

That has excited a lot of countries,

and that's given many of us hope

that we can achieve that

through hard work,

but it’s going to be a long process,

in which we have to create

the conditions

in which we have high confidence

that when we say the world has no

nuclear weapons it doesn't have any,

and create the conditions

where those that try to acquire them

will pay a price for doing that.

However, one of the questions

that you have to ask yourself is,

and this is why

it’s going to take a long time,

how do we create the conditions

where we don't end up

having another great power war,

like we had in 1945?

What kind of world are we going

to create without nuclear weapons?

Is it a world of 1914?

Is it a world of 1939?

We don't want that kind of world.

Get rid of nuclear weapons

and then find ourselves

in a situation where millions

are losing their lives.

We have to do this

in a step-by-step approach.

Final question,

it’ll probably be a personal opinion,

but I’d like to ask you

about the path to global zero

which President Obama, when

he talked about a global nuclear zero,

did say that it may

not happen in his lifetime.

When do you feel it’ll be realisable?

Is it completely realisable?

And what are the main obstacles

to a global nuclear zero?

That is a personal question.

I think it's possible,

but it's going to take

an awful lot of hard work.

There's an article written back

in 1961 by Fred Iklé,

it was for Foreign Affairs, and I think

it was After non-compliance what?

This was before any of the arms

control regimes were in place.

There was no NPT, no chemical

or biological weapons convention,

none of these things in place.

And what he said was:

Number one,

was the question of verification.

What kind of verification mechanisms

can we put in place

to give us all high confidence

that people aren't cheating?

Because in a world without nuclear

weapons the first to acquire them,

will gain a very big advantage.

This is something that we have

to ensure doesn't happen.

And that relates to the second aspect,

or the second condition:

What are

the compliance mechanisms?

How do we ensure that anyone

that cheats is going to pay

such a high cost that it just

won't be worth it to them?

Unfortunately our record

on compliance is very poor.

And this gives us all a lot of concern.

The obvious case is North Korea.

They've withdrawn from the NPT,

they've conducted two tests,

they've gained the advantage

of being an NPT member

without any of the costs to be paid,

and now they are one

of our biggest non-proliferation,

or proliferation problems.

Secondly, there is Iran,

with numerous

Security Council resolutions

and yet no progress

in resolving and ensuring

that they're not on a path

to acquiring nuclear weapons.

So, we have to build confidence

that we can put in place

the mechanisms to stop countries

from acquiring nuclear weapons,

to be able to eliminate them

and ensure

that they will never come back

and be a problem

for our security again.

And I would like

to think that that could happen,

but again, it's probably not going

to happen in my lifetime.

Guy Roberts, thanks very much.

- Thank you very much. My pleasure.