The Federal Reserve Bank of New York expects its employees to perform their duties with honesty, integrity and impartiality, and without improper preferential treatment of any person. The New York Fed’s Code of Conduct outlines its principles and standards for employee conduct, including rules for avoiding actual and apparent conflicts of interest.

Conflicts of Interest Rules
New York Fed employees are subject to the same conflict of interest statute that applies to federal government employees (18 U.S.C. Section 208). Under Section 208 and the New York Fed’s code of conduct, a Bank employee is prohibited from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any particular matter in which, to the employee's knowledge, the employee has a financial interest if the particular matter will have a direct and predictable effect on that interest. Participation in a particular matter may include making a decision or recommendation, providing advice, or taking part in an investigation.

New York Fed employees are also not permitted to own or control investments in depository institutions or affiliates of depository institutions. Additionally, staff members in the Markets Group and those with regular and ongoing access to Class I Federal Open Market Committee information may not own or control investments in a primary dealer or an entity that directly or indirectly controls a primary dealer.

In order to avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest, New York Fed employees are generally not permitted to accept anything of value from a supervised institution or anyone that does business or seeks to do business with the New York Fed. This prohibition applies to gifts, meals, favors, and entertainment.

Post-Employment Rules
All New York Fed employees are subject to post-employment restrictions that are designed to prevent the appearance of undue influence on New York Fed actions. Specifically, former employees are not permitted to contact the New York Fed concerning particular matters on which the former employees participated while employed by the New York Fed. In addition, certain senior employees are prohibited from contacting the Bank on business for a period of up to one year after terminating their employment.

Heightened Rules for Examiners
New York Fed employees who examine financial institutions are subject to more stringent rules regarding conflicts of interest. Examiners are restricted from examining institutions based on borrowing relationships, past employment, pension interests, and relatives working in the banking industry. Examiners are also subject to special post-employment restrictions.

Class A directors are required to be representative of the member banks in the District and for the most part they have been officers or directors of member banks or their holding companies.  Class B and Class C directors are required to represent the public “with due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumers.”  Neither Class B nor Class C directors may be officers, directors, or employees of any private sector bank or bank holding company.  In addition, Class C directors may not own shares in any bank or bank holding company.  The purpose of these rules is to ensure that Reserve Bank directors will be drawn from diverse backgrounds and that various viewpoints will be brought to bear on decisions relating to the administration of the Reserve Banks, as well as upon decisions and advice with respect to monetary policy and other policies. 

The roles of Reserve Bank directors generally fall in three principal areas: overseeing the management of the Reserve Banks, participating in the formulation of national monetary and credit policies, and acting as a “link” between the government and the private sector.

In the exercise of its management oversight responsibilities, a Reserve Bank’s Board of Directors reviews and establishes with management the Bank’s annual goals and objectives, reviews and approves the budget, and conducts an independent appraisal of the performance of both the Bank (including its efficiency and productivity) and its president and first vice president. The Reserve Bank directors supervise, through a general auditor whom they appoint, and who reports directly to them, the maintenance of an effective system of internal auditing procedures.

Directors have a special role with respect to monetary policy and credit policy. In this function, directors, with their diverse backgrounds, bring to the Federal Reserve System the greatest benefits of regional autonomy: a diversity of viewpoints on economic and credit conditions. This input helps the Federal Reserve anticipate changing trends in the economy. The Federal Reserve Act gives each Reserve Bank the power to establish discount rates, subject to review and determination by the Board of Governors.

Another principal responsibility of each Reserve Bank board is to select a Bank president who, in its judgment, will be qualified to participate in the monetary policy deliberations and decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee.  Effective July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act allows only Class B and Class C directors to participate in the presidential appointment process.

In addition to the Federal Reserve Act, the role of the New York Fed’s board is also addressed in the Bank’s by-laws and in the charters for the three board committees—the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, the Audit and Operational Risk Committee, and the Management and Budget Committee.  These further define the Board’s role and responsibilities as well as the limitations on its role and responsibilities.  The Bank’s by-laws make clear that particular bank supervisory and regulatory matters do not fall within the purview of the Bank’s Board of Directors. Further, Class A directors may not participate in personnel or budget decisions related to the Bank’s Financial Institution Supervision Group.  These constraints are designed to minimize the risk of an actual or perceived conflict of interest at the Board level. 

The New York Fed releases President Dudley's daily schedules every quarter with a one-quarter lag. The Bank will review this practice on an ongoing basis. Unless otherwise indicated, any redactions concern appointments for private matters (e.g. medical, social appointments), and contact information.

	Date	Schedule
	2012
	April 2, 2012 - June 29, 2012	Daily schedules
	January 3, 2012 - March 30, 2012	Daily schedules
	2011
	October 3, 2011 - December 31, 2011	Daily schedules
	July 1, 2011 - September 30, 2011	Daily schedules
	April 1, 2011 - June 30, 2011	Daily schedules
	January 3, 2011 - March 31, 2011	Daily schedules
	2010
	October 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010	Daily schedules
	January 29, 2009 - September 30, 2010	Daily schedules