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The Economic Perspective of Bank Bankruptcy Law

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Overview

Bankruptcy law, why do we need it?

Are banks different?

Optimal bank bankruptcy law

Bank bankruptcy laws around the world

U.S., UK, German and EU framework for bank bankruptcy

Two cases: Lehman Brothers and Fortis



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Bankruptcy law: Coordination problems, ex-post & ex-ante efficiency

Many creditors → Excessive liquidation Be the first to collect debt

Ex-ante efficiency: creditor-friendly bankruptcy law

Why debt is optimal?

 Prevents excessive risk taking & strategic default

 Induces desired effort



Ex-post efficiency: debtor friendly bankruptcy law limits

- Postponing bankruptcy
- Gambling for resurrection
- Looting
- Exploits skills & info of the existing management

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Are banks special?

Liquidity providers

Demand deposits (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) Loan commitments (Ivashyna and Scharfstein, 2010) Difficult to impose an automatic stay

Externalities of bank failure

Contagion, public confidence is crucial Damage to the real sector (SMEs) Damage to payment system Costs of 15-20% of GDP (Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta, 2002)

Bank operations are special

Asset substitution problem is severe (Flannery, 1994) Bank assets are opaque (Morgan, 2002) Bank risk taking can be

Unnoticed Fast changing



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Banks may be special but we have prudential regulation

Not always effective (current crisis)

Deposit insurance & lender of last resort

Additional risk taking (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) Bank zombies (Japan, 90s, Berglöf and Roland, 1995) Gamble for resurrection

Capital regulation & regulatory intervention

Forbearance & regulatory capture

- Too-big-to-fail
- Reputational reasons from the regulators (Boot and Thakor, 1993)
- Political costs of closing a failed institution (Brown and Dinç, 2005)
- Fragmented regulatory framework

PROPOSAL 1: THERE IS A NEED FOR SPECIAL BANK BANKRUPTCY LAW

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Bank bankruptcy law: Timely intervention

Timely intervention mitigates

- ex-ante & ex-post risk taking
- bank runs & systemic concerns
- problems due to fragmented regulatory framework
- Political pressure against closure

Trigger should be based on Clear and verifiable (hard quantifiable data, not too complex) Discretion of the regulator

PROPOSAL 2: A PRE-INSOLVENCY PHASE SHOULD EXIST

Proposal 2a: In a pre-insolvency phase corporate governance control should start gradually shifting to bank creditors

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Ex-ante & ex-post optimality

Should bank bankruptcy law be creditor- or debtor-friendly?

Creditor-friendly due to Liquidity provision Acute info problems Systemic concerns

Debtor-friendly due to prudential regulation (if successful) superior information of bank management (if not responsible for collapse)

PROPOSAL 3: BANK BANKRUPTCY LAW SHOULD BE LESS DEBTOR-FRIENDLY THAN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW.

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The design of bank bankruptcy law

PROPOSAL 4: AN EXPLICIT OBJECTIVE OF BANK BANKRUPTCY LAW SHOULD BE TO PREVENT SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS

Minimize costs for taxpayers, maximize the value of a bankrupt bank, respect APR

PROPOSAL 5: AN AUTOMATIC STAY MAY BE OVERRIDDEN

PROPOSAL 6: THE REGULATOR SHOULD LEAD THE RESTRUCTURING AND NOT THE COURT

Higher power than the court in the corporate bankruptcy (SPEED & INFO vs. FAIRNESS) remove management and shareholders impose a "haircut" on bank creditors transfer contracts (forced takeover of a part or the whole bank)

Liquidation, recapitalization (forced/voluntary), good bank/bad bank



Bank bankruptcy & prudential regulation

Restructuring fund


Closeout netting with regulator scrutinity vs. closeout without netting

Harmonize bank bankruptcy laws & deposit insurance shemes



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Overview of bank bankruptcy frameworks I: Frequency of restructuring methods in 2003/2008



Intervention (or taking control) and open bank assistance (liquidity support)

□ Transfer of assets and liabilities (incl. purchase and assumption) or merger and acquisition

(WorldBank, 2008, averages; No = 0, Yes = 1)

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Overview of bank bankruptcy frameworks II: Characteristics of an average bank bankruptcy law

	2008	2003
Is there a separate bank insolvency law?	0.18	
Does the Banking Law establish levels of solvency deterioration that forces automatic intervention?	0.54	0.52
How many months did each of these resolution techniques take on average?	8.74	9.92
Is court approval required for supervisory actions?	0.04	0.14
Is a court order required to appoint a receiver/liquidator in the event of liquidation?	0.53	0.52
Can the bank shareholders appeal to the court against a decision of the bank supervisor?	0.87	0.86




(WorldBank, 2008, averages; No = 0, Yes = 1)

Overview of bank bankruptcy frameworks III: Restructuring powers of various regulatory bodies

(WorldBank, 2008, averages; No = 0, Yes = 1)

2008



	U.S. bank bankruptcy	U.S. Dodd-Frank Act	UK bank bankruptcy law	Germany bank bankruptcy law
Ū	to the FDIC at the systemic	risks posed by large	 the financial system 2. Protect public confidence 3. Protect depositors 4. Protect public funds 	 Protect the safety of the assets entrusted to institutions; Protect the orderly execution of banking transactions; Avoid developments that prejudice the economy at large Prevent liquidity shortages and improve the capital position of financial institutions
insolvency	Prompt corrective action by the regulator	mitigatory actions by	In the scope of standard regulatory supervision	The regulator makes a recommendation to the bank to correct the problems within a strict deadline, if the bank breaches prudential standards
stays	Less general, major exception is insured depositors		resolution regime (SRR)	The regulator can impose a full or partial suspension of payments and a legal stay against creditor action
of process	Limited ex-post	Limited ex-post judicial	Limited ex-post judicial	measures are excluded by law

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Lessons from Lehman Brothers and Fortis

Lehman brothers

Abrupt unwinding is costly for the economy at large Fragmentation of insolvency laws leads to break up of the FI Special treatment of derivatives is necessary

Fortis bank

Late intervention by governments

Fortis shareholders opposed Belgium-BNP Paribas aggreement

The need for cross-country restructuring fund



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Conclusions

Banks are special due to:

Systemic concerns

Liquidity provision


INFO problems

Regulatory inefficiencies

Optimal bank bankruptcy law Pre-insolvency phase Strong power of the regulator Debtor-strict Option to override automatic stay



The legislators are moving in this direction



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APPENDIX: Effectiveness of the main features of bank bankruptcy law

Creditor-friendly	Pre-insolvency	Strong powers	Deposit
bank bankruptcy law	phase	of the regulator	insurance
4	4	5	4
5	5	5	5
4	4	1	1
3	3	5	3
3	5	1	2
5	4	3	1
	bank bankruptcy law 4 5 4 3 3 3	bank bankruptcy lawphase4455443335	bank bankruptcy lawphaseof the regulator445555441335351

5 = most effective; 1 = least effective

	U.S. bank bankruptcy	U.S. Dodd-Frank Act	UK bank bankruptcy law	Germany bank bankruptcy law
treatment of claimants	repaid (or transferred to a healthy bank) Absolute priority rule	Amounts owed to the U.S. have priority over the claims of general creditors	transferred to a healthy bank). Other claimants should obtain at least the amount they	offered by the deposit insurer
bankruptcy	initiates bank bankruptcy, the FDIC is in charge of restructuring Management is ousted	Under the new orderly liquidation authority, the Treasury Secretary has the power to appoint the FDIC as receiver; the determination of the financial institutions covered is made by the Treasury Secretary, upon the recommendation of two- thirds of the Fed board and two- thirds of the FDIC board	The BoE leads it in consultation with the Treasury in the case of involvement of public funds	procedures and leads the provisional administration The BaFin makes the resolution decision in cooperation with the
	the regulatory standards (with the most critical one of being undercapitalized)	Failure of systemically important financial companies to comply with enhanced regulatory requirements (e.g., risk-based capital, leverage, liquidity, credit exposure reporting, resolution plans)	conditions (capital requirements, liquidity and leverage ratios, and perceived	regarding adequate capital and liquidity and a bank's failure in
bankruptcy		 Purchase & assumption Liquidation 	-	 Restructuring by the depositor insurance scheme or by the private liquidity supplier The provisional administration procedure The bank insolvency procedure The bad bank procedure

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Appendix: The EU framework for bank bankruptcy

Directive 24/2001 on the Reorganization and the Winding-Up of Credit Institutions Branches vs. Subsidiaries

Directive 213/2001 on Financial Conglomerates Delegated supervisor

Communication 561/2009 on EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector Early intervention, resolution, and insolvency

ESFS (EBA + ESMA + EIOPA)

Disagreement between national authorities



ESRB

Systemic risk