Smart Defence: the analyst's view

Smart Defence:

The analyst's view

How can Smart Defence

work in practice?

Well, I think there are at least two

key ways in which this could work.

The first one is to focus

on urgent operational requirements.

To basically focus on those things

that we see we lack in operations.

And, I think, the other way

of thinking about this,

would be to start with

what countries are willing to do

because there are

sovereignty concerns related

to specialisation, prioritisation,

because once you collaborate more,

you accept mutual dependencies,

you make yourself

dependent on each other

and that is a difficult trade-off

to find for NATO member states.

What real difference

could Smart Defence make?

I think the ambition behind Smart

Defence is rather large actually.

If Smart Defence succeeds,

it will change the way that NATO

member states develop, provide,

operate, maintain,

but also discard military capabilities.

That is very encompassing in itself

and it would create a new way

of doing defence policy

within the NATO context.

What funding changes

could Smart Defence bring?

Well, the interesting question is:

What can NATO do to give incentives

to member states to engage in this?

And we can already see

that NATO is starting discussions

on seed funding for projects,

on more common funding to help

member states make the case

that this is something

that is in their interest to do,

not just a priority

that comes out of headquarters,

but something that they can explain

as being beneficial and useful.

How do NATO partners fit in?

I think for partners

the key question is:

What is their role

in NATO operations?

That is what is driving

partnership for a lot of countries

who do not necessarily

aspire to NATO membership.

So, the question for both

NATO and partners becomes:

How do you structure

that relationship?

Which capability goals can be defined

where partners can plug in

a capability that does not already

exist in abundance within NATO,

but that fills a visible and

important gap in NATO's inventory?

Is Smart Defence

a bottom-up or top-down project?

Well, I think it needs to be a mix.

Clearly,

Smart Defence cannot succeed

without the buy-in from

member states and from capitals.

This is for them to decide.

At the same time,

NATO as an organisation,

needs to think about

how it can most efficiently structure

its role as a facilitator,

as an advisor, but perhaps,

and this is slightly provocative,

as an enforcer of these decisions.

And one way to do this would be

to design a defence planning process

that is slightly more intrusive.

And this can be done by two ways:

by making it on the one hand

more future oriented

and by increasing

the multinational goals that it covers

so that it becomes less of

a bilateral NATO to one member state

kind of arrangement

and a more encompassing tool.

Will Smart Defence work this time?

Well, I think the chances are

that today we have

a very different context.

We have a triangular

challenge of austerity,

of operational challenges, which we

can see when our forces do deploy,

and of the uncertainty

in the strategic environment.

So, therefore the pressure

to change the way we do business

is much greater. However,

one has to of course acknowledge

that member states, governments

will within that general context

pursue different priorities,

will have different preferences.

There is no unifying threat and

that needs to be taken into account

as NATO develops the Smart

Defence agenda at Chicago,

but also following up on Chicago

to make sure that it is actually

not a headline grabbing moment

that fizzles out after the Summit.