II MAF

EXERCISE SOLAR FLARE-87

FINAL EXERCISE REPORT

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA 28542-5401

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3000
G-3/008-88(A)
27 Jan 1988

From: Commanding General, II Marine Amphibious Force
To: Distribution List

Subj: SOLAR FLARE-87 FINAL EXERCISE REPORT

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2D

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) List of Significant Events
(3) II MAF Narrative Description of SOLAR FLARE-87
(4) CG, Command Element, 2D MAB After Action Report
(5) CG, Command Element, 4th MAB After Action Report
(6) CG 2D MAW After Action Report
(7) Distribution List

1. In accordance with the reference, the following report is submitted.

2. Enclosure (1) lists forces participating in Exercise SOLAR FLARE-87. Enclosure (2) provides a chronological list of significant events. Enclosure (3) provides a CG II MAF Narrative Description on the overall exercise planning and execution. Enclosures (4) and (5) provide CG 2D MAB and CG 4th MAB After Action Reports respectively. Enclosure (6) is CG 2D MAW After Action Report.

3. Exercise SOLAR FLARE-87 was a force-on-force (MAB vs MAB), free-maneuver exercise conducted in the Camp Lejeune/Cherry Point operating areas. The exercise was conducted during 2D MAB ATD (18 July - 1 Aug 87) and integrated reserve and active forces from the platoon/detachment level to the battalion/squadron level. As a first in an exercise of this type and scope, SOLAR FLARE-87 was a success. While the true benefits of the exercise are intangible and reflected in the improved confidence and warfighting ability of the individual participants, the enclosed report provides a perspective from all major participants. In this regard, the specific format contained in the reference has been modified to encompass the unique qualities of SOLAR FLARE-87.

4. Attention is invited to Enclosure (3) which provides the overview of the scope and planning for the exercise; an execution summary; TECG recapitulation; and lessons learned.

H. W. BAKER
Chief of Staff

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Task Organization

II MAF — MAJGEN COMFORT

- II MAF CE
  - DET, HQSVCBN FMFLANT/II MAF
  - 8TH COMM BN (-)
  - HQ 2D RADBN
  - 2D RPV CO
  - DET 2, HQBN, 4TH MARDIV (TECG)

II MAF ACE, (PURPLE AIR) — MAJGEN DAILEY

- DET, H&HS-28 (TACC)
- DET, MACS-28 (TAOC)
- DET, 3D LAAM BN
- DET, VMGR-234
- DET, VMGR-252
- DET, VMAQ-2
- VMA (AW) 533 (NIGHT MISSIONS)
- DET, VMO-1 (NIGHT MISSIONS)

2D MAB — BGEN OMROD

- 2D MAB CE
  - HQSVC CO, 2D MAB
    - DET 1,2,3, HQ, 2D MAB
  - HQ BN(-), 4TH MARDIV
    - 2D PLAT, TRK CO, HQ BN
    - PLAT, MP CO, HQ BN
    - DET, AVSS, HQ BN
    - DET, 2D SCAMP
    - DET, 32D, 33RD, 34TH, 35TH, ITT, HQ BN, 4TH MARDIV
    - DET, 10TH, 12TH, 14TH, CIT, HQ BN, 4TH MARDIV
  - 6TH COMM BN (-)
    - DET, HQ CO, 6TH COMM BN
    - COMM CO, 6TH COMM BN
      - DET, COMM SPT CO, 6TH COMM BN
      - DET, LONGLINES CO, 6TH COMM BN
      - DET, 4TH FORECON CO
      - DET, PAO, 23D MARINES
      - DET, PAO, MAG-42 (REIN)
      - DET, PAO, H&S BN, 4TH FSSG
      - DSU, 2D RAD BN
      - DET, 4TH FIIU, HQ BN, 4TH MAW

REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM - 23 — COL GARCIA

- 23D MARINES (-) (REIN)
  - HQ, 23D MARINES
  - HQ CO, 23D MAR
  - 1ST BN, 23D MAR
  - 2D BN, 8TH MAR
  - 1ST BN, 14TH MAR (-) (REIN)
    - HQ BTRY, 1ST BN, 14TH MAR
    - DET, TPC 10TH MARINES
    - BTRY A, 1ST BN, 14TH MAR

BTRY C, 1ST BN, 14TH MAR
BTRY I (-), 3RD BN, 10TH MAR
BTRY P (-) , 5TH BN, 10TH MAR (CONSTRUCTIVE)
CO D, 4TH RECON BN
8TH TANK BN (-)
CO D, 8TH TANK BN
AT (TOW) CO, 8TH TANK BN
CO B, 4TH AAV BN
CO B (-), 2D LAV BN
CO A, 4TH CBTENGR BN

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP - 20 COL ONDRICK
MWCS-48 (-)
H&HS-48
MASS-6
MACS-24
MATCS-48
DET, 4TH FAAD BTRY
MAG-VF/VA
H&MS-(VF/VA)
VMFA-251, 2D MAW
VMA-133(-)
MAG-VH
H&MS-(VH)
MABS-42
HMM-774(-)
HMH-454(-)
HMA-773(-)
HML-771
DET VMO-4
MSWG-47
H&HS-47
WTS-47
WES-47
MWSS-271

BRIGADE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP - 2 COL KNIGHT
HQSVC BN, 4TH FSSG (-)
SVC CO (-)
COMM CO (-)
2D MP CO (-)
DET, HQSVC BN, 2D FSSG
4TH LANSPT BN (-)
HQSVC CO (-)
CO A
DET, 2D LANSPT BN, 2D FSSG
6TH ENGRSPT BN (-)
HQSVC CO (-)
CO C
BRIDGE CO (-)
DET, 4TH BULKFUEL CO
DET, 8TH ENGRSPT BN, 2D FSSG
4TH MAINT BN

HQSVC CO (-)
MT MAINT CO (-)
PLAT, AUTOCONTMAINT CO
DET, ELECMAINTRPR CO
DET, ORDMAINTCONT CO
DET, ENGRMAINT CO
DET, GSMAINT CO
4TH SUP BN (-)
DET, HQSVC CO
DET, SMU
PLAT, AMMO CO
DET, MEDLOG CO
DET, RATION CO
DET, SUP CO
DET, 2D SUP BN, 2D FSSG
6TH MT BN (-)
HQSVC CO
DET, 8TH MT BN, 2D FSSG
4TH MED BN (-)
DET, HQSVC CO
CO A (-)
CO B (-)
CO C (-)
4TH DENT BN (-)
4TH DENT CO (-)

4TH MAB BGEN CAULFIELD
4TH MAB CE
HQSVC CO, 4TH MAB
DSU, 2D RAD BN
CO A (REIN), 8TH COMM BN
DET, 4TH FORECON CO
DET, 2D SCAMP
DET, FLTTACDECGRULANT
DET, ITT

REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM - 2 COL BYRON
2D MARINES (-) (REIN)
HQ, 2D MAR
HQ CO (-), 2D MARDIV
2D BN, 2D MAR
3D BN, 23D MAR
1ST BN (-), 10TH MAR
HQ BTRY, 1ST BN 10TH MAR (-)
DET, TPC, 10TH MAR
BTRY B(-),1ST BN 10TH MAR
BTRY C(-), 1ST BN 10TH MAR
BTRY N(-), 5TH BN 10TH MAR (CONSTRUCTIVE)
CO B (-), 2D TANK BN
CO C (REIN) (-), 2D AAV BN
CO C (-), 2D LAV BN
CO A (-), 2D RECON BN

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP - 14 — LTCOL CARR

- HQ, MAG-14 (-)
  - CO A (-), 2D CBTENGR BN
  - DET, MWCS-28
  - BTRY, 2D LAAD BN (STINGER)
  - HMM-365 (-)
  - HMH-362 (-)
  - HML/A-167
  - DET, VMO-1
  - DET, VMA (AW)-533 (-)
  - DET, H&MS-14
  - DET, H&MS-26
  - DET, H&MS-29
  - VMFA-321, 4TH MAW

BRIGADE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP - 4 — COL DOUGLAS

- HQ, BSSG-4
  - DET, HQSVC BN, 2D FSSG
  - DET, HQSVC BN, 4TH FSSG
  - DET, 8TH MT BN
  - DET, HQSVC CO, 6TH MT BN
  - DET, 8TH ENGRSPT BN
    - DET, CO C, 6TH ENGRSPT BN
    - DET, BLK FUEL CO, 6TH ENGRSPT BN
  - DET, 2D SUP BN
    - DET, AMMO CO, 4TH SUP BN, 4TH FSSG
  - DET, 2D MAINT BN
  - DET, 2D LANSPT BN
    - DET, CO A, 4TH LANSPT BN, 4TH FSSG
  - DET, 2D MED BN
  - DET, 2D DENTAL BN

MAJOR MILESTONES/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE	19-20 OCT 86
II MAF LOI	18 Dec 86
INTEL CONFERENCE	24 JAN 87
MID PLANNING CONFERENCE	25-26 JAN 87
COMM CONFERENCE	27 JAN 87
FREQ REQ TO CG II MAF	1 APR 87
2D MAB CPX	11-12 APR 87
FINAL PLANNING CONFERENCE	31 MAY - 1 JUN 87
TASK ORGANIZATION PUBLISHED	5 JUN 87
MESSAGE OP ORDER PUBLISHED	18 JUN 87
2D MAB ADV PARTY ARRIVED	12 JUL 87
2D MAB MAIN BODY ARRIVED	18 JUL 87
PHASE I (SMCR UNIT TRAINING)	18-22 JUL 87
PHASE II (COMMEX/CPX/FINAL EX PREP)	23-25 JUL 87
PHASE III (EXERCISE SOLAR FLARE)	26-29 JUL 87
PHASE IV (UNITS RTN TO GARRISON)	29 JUL - 2 AUG 87
2D MAB MAIN BODY DEPARTED	2 AUG 87
2D MAB REAR DET DEPARTED	12 AUG 87

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Command Element II MAF Narrative Description of SOLAR FLARE 87

1. Scope/Planning

a. SOLAR FLARE 87 was a FMFLant sponsored, II MAF conducted exercise conducted 26-29 July 1987. This was the first MAB-level, force-on-force, free maneuver exercise integrating Reserve and Active forces. While emphasizing all aspects of a free maneuver exercise, SOLAR FLARE 87 was designed with enough structure to accomplish designated training objectives. This exercise tested the Total Force Policy by integrating Reserve and Active forces from the Platoon/Detachment level to the Battalion/Squadron level.

b. The II MAF planning sequence began with the Initial Planning Conference (IPC) in October 1986 at Camp Lejeune. Dates for major milestones and significant events were determined and basic precepts for forces assigned, task organizations, Reserve and Active force integration, tactical exercise control, operations, intelligence and logistics were discussed. As a result of the IPC and continuing staff action, II MAF published the exercise LOI in December 1986. A scenario TACTRASIT was developed which supported the II MAF Caribbean Campaign Plan.

c. II MAF exercise objectives for SOLAR FLARE 87 were as follows:

(1) To identify issues, problems, and procedures for integrating SMCR units into II MAF exercises and operations.

(2) To exercise SMCR and II MAF units together under the Total Force Concept.

(3) To support II MAF Campaign Plan training.

(4) To develop and refine requirements, procedures, and control measures to plan and execute free maneuver, force-on-force, Combined Arms Exercises consisting of more than one MAB.

(5) To exercise and train with Mobilization plans leading to SMCR reinforcement of II MAF.

d. The SOLAR FLARE 87 exercise included the 2D MAB's ATD in addition to the actual exercise period. The training period, 18 July - 1 August 1987, was delineated in Four Phases:

(1) Phase I: 18-22 July 1987. The main body of 2D MAB and assigned SMCR units arrived at Camp Lejeune/Cherry Point. SMCR unit training commenced to conduct field firing, unit maneuver training, MOS skill training and staff training. Amphibious refresher training was also conducted in the Onslow operations area.

(2) Phase II: 23-25 July 1987. All units were chopped for operations at the beginning of this phase. A II MAF COMMEX was conducted on 23 July and a II MAF CPX on 24 July. Final unit relocations were accomplished on 25 July which was utilized as a final field exercise preparation day. Controllers reported to their units and limited reconnaissance was permitted during this period.

(3) Phase III: 26-29 July 1987. The SOLAR FLARE Exercise was conducted and provided a free-play, combined arms, MAB vs MAB training evolution. This phase was broken down into four tactical evolutions. Missions were assigned by CG II MAF to CG 2D MAB and CG 4th MAB. The tactical evolutions commenced at a pre-determined time and continued until completion of specified time; or completion of the assigned objectives; or upon order of CG II MAF. A debrief was conducted at the end of each evolution.

(a) Tactical Evolution 1: 0600-1300, 26 July 87. This evolution provided movement to contact and meeting engagements throughout the daylight hours.

(b) Tactical Evolution 2: 1700, 26 July-1300, 27 July 87. Night operations commenced with 2D MAB in the defense and 4th MAB in night attack. At daylight 2D MAB conducted an assault against 4th MAB conducting a withdrawal/river crossing.

(c) Tactical Evolution 3: 1700, 27 July-1300, 28 July 87. Between 1800 and 0600, 2D MAB conducted night reconnaissance and 4th MAB night defense. At first light, 2D MAB commenced river crossing operations with 4th MAB in the defense.

(d) Tactical Evolution 4: 1700, 28 July-1100, 29 July 87. Meeting engagements continued from 1800-2400 as 2D MAB entered a withdrawal phase with 4th MAB in night assault. From 0600 to 1100, 2D MAB performed link-up operations with 4th MAB conducting probing operations. In addition, units of 4th MAB conducted NBC training.

(4) Phase IV: 29 July - 2 Aug 87. II MAF, 2D MAB, and 4th MAB forces returned to garrison. SMCR units prepared equipment for return to host units and departed for Home Training Center.

e. Planning in all functional areas between CE II MAF and CE 2D MAB accelerated following publication of the II MAF LOI in preparation for the Main Planning Conference (MPC) held in January 87 at Camp Lejeune. As a result of the MPC, the CE 2D MAB CPX dates were identified and staff planning began for conduct of a TWSEAS CPX 11-12 Apr 87. The objective of the CPX was to game Tactical Evolutions 1 and 2 as outlined in the II MAF LOI. The CPX was conducted by CE 2D MAB and its MSEs with II MAF providing a higher Headquarters response cell at the TWSEAS site at OP 2.

f. Tactical Exercise Control TACTRASIT developed for exercise control during SOLAR FLARE was approved prior to the MPC. The rules contained in the TACTRASIT were to be utilized as specified unless changed by CG II MAF on a case-by-case basis. An electronic warfare/intelligence cell was added to the TECG structure. The intelligence cell was structured to process information for TECG INTSUM distribution while the electronic warfare cell primary responsibility resided in tightly controlling jamming. The basic precept for tactical exercise control, which later proved very successful, was that in order to obtain combat interaction assessment an umpire must be present on the scene. This was particularly important for small units when the TEC structure did not have a permanently assigned controller to that unit. If combat results were desired the parent unit was to coordinate with the senior

controllers to insure the dispatching of controllers to the affected small units. The TECG Headquarters would be collocated with II MAF for the duration of the exercise. TECG organization for SOLAR FLARE was as depicted in figure 1.

Figure 1



g. Control of aviation assets was conducted utilizing a purple air concept. The CG 2D MAW was designated Tactical Air Commander for CG II MAF. The purple air concept evolved as an attempt to maximize the restricted airspace over Camp Lejeune and provide an equitable utilization by 2D MAB and 4th MAB of limited assets such as OV-10's, KC-130's and HAWK. The limited number of these assets prevented assignment on a permanent basis to each ACE. The airspace control would be provided on an alternating 30 minute time block segment for each MAB. This air control system allowed for safe air operations, as well as complying with FAA regulations.

Encl (3)

h. The final planning conference was held 31 May - 1 June 1987 at Camp Lejeune. Final coordination and briefings were conducted in conjunction with 2D MAB and 4th MAB staffs to resolve remaining conflicts and issues. In addition detailed coordination was conducted by the II MAF staff in preparation for publishing the SOLAR FLARE operation order and appropriate annexes. The following lists the documents and dates published:

(1) Annex A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to II MAF Op Order 22-87 - 6 June 87

(2) II MAF Op Order 22-87 - 2 July 87

(3) Annex M (AIR OPERATIONS) to II MAF Op Order 22-87 - 2 July 87

(4) Annex B (INTELLIGENCE) to II MAF Op Order 22-87 - 8 July 87

i. The planning cycle for SOLAR FLARE was remarkably smooth. The planning conferences were well organized and productive. Objectives were defined and were realistic, limited, consistent, and attainable. Participating units were chopped early for planning and remained constant. Disciplined, focused, and effective planning was the key to an exercise of this level. The staff planning sequence conducted by the Command Elements of II MAF, 2D MAB and 4th MAB was beneficial to all and set the stage for future exercises between Active and Reserve MAGTFs.

j. The concept of daily critiques following a tactical evolution was developed during the initial planning conference. The purpose was to assess the maneuver of forces and to maximize the training which occured. In addition these periods allowed the 2D MAB and 4th MAB to reposition forces and prepare for the next evolution. Since the exercise was conducted during the summer heat, the critique periods were intentionally scheduled during afternoon hours.

2. Execution

a. Starting positions (Camp Lejeune Special 1:50,000)

(1) II MAF - TWSEAS (OP 2)

(2) 4th MAB - North of the 37 Grid Line (Camp Lejeune Special)

(3) 2D MAB - South of the 29 Grid Line (Camp Lejeune Special)

(4) Command Element 2D MAB - LZ Falcon

(5) TACC - LZ Penguin

(6) Command Element 4th MAB - Base at Camp Geiger - Mobile CP in field.

(7) HQ BSSG-2 - LZ Gander

(8) HQ MAG-20 - Bogue Field

(9) TAOC - Risely Pier.

b. Exercise SOLAR FLARE was initiated by a FRAG Order from II MAF to 2D MAB and 4th MAB. Tactical Evolution #1 began approximately 0630, 26 July. As the exercise continued, the movement to contact and meeting engagements between units of the 2D MAB and 4th MAB were initially centered around highway 172 corridor, vicinity of LZ Dove and towards Duck Creek. Heavy reconnaissance and intelligence efforts by both MABs were conducted in order to locate opposing forces. At approximately 1300, a message was sent to 2D MAB and 4th MAB for the critique phase to be effected. The critique periods were held at the TWSEAS briefing area with approximately 120 personnel from various staffs attending. These critiques were invaluable. Commanders and respresentatives from II MAF, 2D MAB, 4th MAB, and the TEC presented self-evaluations of their actions during the pervious tactical evolution. Tactical plans and the results of these plans were presented and self-critiqued. Following each critique, a FRAG Order for the next evolution was issued by II MAF. Unit commanders and their staffs returned to their positions and conducted preparations for the next evolution. This sequence was used throughout the remaining portion of the exercise. Tactical Evolution #2 did not occur on the level expected. This was caused by the intense activity in Tactical Evolution #1 and the anticipation and planning for the river crossing the next day. Tactical Evolution #3 featured a river crossing by both 2D MAB and 4th MAB. The river crossing involved intensive engineering efforts involving barrier preparation and barrier clearing. Ferry operations were conducted and LCM-8s' were also utilized. Tactical Evolution #4 completed the exercise with a link-up operation by 2D MAB units and NBC and probing operations by 4th MAB.

c. The air concept of operations allowed both MAB's ACE to exercise all six functions of Marine Aviation. Mission sorties flown for and in support of the exercise came from MCAS Cherry Point, MCAS Beaufort, MCAS New River, OLF Bogue, NAS Oceana, and Navy Andrews. The airspace in the Camp Lejeune area, although restrictive, was scheduled and with excellent coordination, utilized to the utmost. The airspace usage consisted of W-127, W-122, R-5306D,E, R-5306C, BT-11 and BT-9. These areas were used to facilitate the numbers of aircraft sorties and flight hours flown.

3. TECG Exercise Recap (0630 26 July - 1130 29 July 87)

a. Artillery and Naval Gunfire missions:

(1)	2D MAB	NGF	ARTY
	Tac Evol #1	5	10
	Tac Evol #2	0	8
	Tac Evol #3	3	9
	Tac Evol #4	0	7
	TOTAL	8	34

(2)	4th MAB	NGF	ARTY
	Tac Evol #1	8	10
	Tac Evol #2	1	10
	Tac Evol #3	6	25
	Tac Evol #4	1	6
	TOTAL	16	51

Encl (3)

b. Total meeting engagements between 2D MAB and 4th MAB Forces: 276.

c. Casualties/Assessed

2D MAB			4th MAB		
KIA	WIA	POW	KIA	WIA	POW
202	316	39	175	219	5

d. LAAD Engagements (FAAD)

2D MAB	4th MAB
28	36

e. Intelligence

(1) Role Players Inserted. 2D MAB (24) 4th MAB (1)

(2) Scripted Intel Messages

(a) From II MAF - 2D MAB (12)

(b) From II MAF - 4th MAB (10)

(c) From DSU/RADBn - 2D MAB (10)

(d) From DSU/RADBn - 4th MAB (23)

(e) RPV - Although RPV support and missions were planned technical problems prevented any flights being flown in support of the exercise.

f. River Crossing/Ferry Operations

(1) Ferry - 26 River Crossings
145 Duck Creek Crossings

(2) LCM-8 - 28 River Crossings

g. Aviation Recap

Mission type	Sorties flown Day/Night	Flight hours Day/Night
SIMCAS	126/20	282.5/36.1
Assault Support	144/9	310.8/22.0
Aerial Refueling	16/1	34.7/3.1
Electronic Warfare	12/0	24.9/0
TOTAL	298/30	652.9/61.2

Encl (3)

4. Lessons Learned. The following are the most significant lessons learned from the CE II MAF perspective as the OCE.

a. Free play exercise with some structure. Early in the planning cycle specific training objectives were identified to be accomplished during SOLAR FLARE 87. While complete free-play would have been most desirable, the use of some structure to meet training objectives was necessary. In force-on-force exercises emphasizing free play, maneuver warfare, where specific tactical results are required, the use of some control measures in orders issued must be utilized. The structured control exercised through command channels was a key to success.

b. Tactical Exercise Control Plan. While the control system functioned well, the need for more controllers who would be available to evaluate functions such as reconnaissance teams, snipers, engineers, medical, etc. became apparent. In addition, the battalion level control organization should be increased by adding 2 additional mobile controllers. A properly structured and manned control organization provides the key to success in a free-play exercise.

c. COMMEX/CPX. In an exercise such as SOLAR FLARE, where the forces are highly mobile and the tactical evolutions fast moving, the COMMEX for MAGTF Command Elements and the TECG should be much more intensive. The necessity for a CPX for this scale exercise must be evaluated in terms of value gained against the planning and manpower time to make it successful. Little was gained from the CPX as structured for this exercise.

d. Air Support. The utilization of the 30-minute time block assigned to each MAB did not allow momentum to be achieved by application of air to the point of main effort. Possible solutions may be to extend the block times or have the OCE or TECG declare one force or the other will have local air superiority during a particular evolution for a certain period of time.

e. Tactical Evolutions and Critiques. In planning an exercise such as SOLAR FLARE, the tactical training objectives should be closely compared to the time phasing planned to accomplish them. In the case of SOLAR FLARE 87, deleting Tactical Evolution #2, as an example, and allowing Tactical Evolution #1 to continue at a more natural momentum and conclusion would have provided better combat training. While the critique periods were invaluable to all, the conduct of these should not be based strictly on a time schedule but on the natural breaks in the action. During these periods, adjustments to future planned tactical evolutions can also be accomplished. Adequate time should be allowed following the critique periods for commanders to return to their units, adjust task organizations, and issue orders before restarting the exercise.

f. Casualties and Replacements. While planning was conducted to implement extensive casualty and replacement play in the exercise, it never materialized. There was nothing wrong with planned procedures, but they were not exercised because controllers were overwhelmed with all their assigned duties. In future exercises, there needs to be more extensive effort in this area. Establishing a Causalty/Replacement Cell in the TECG, inclusion of casualties and replacement play more thoroughly into the Exercise Control

Plan, and the assignment of additional controllers would solve this situation.

g. Task Organization. The integration of Reserve and Active Force units in the exercise was a resounding success in implementing the Total Force Policy. While differences in equipment, for example, may be a concern in integrating Active and Reserve Forces, the efforts of the GCE, ACE, and BSSGs at 2D and 4th MABs in coordination and liaison between units proved Reserve units can be absorbed into Active Forces to fight as units.

h. Visitors. The protocol section in SOLAR FLARE planned for the escort of 12 distinguished visitors. In reality 26 individuals to include distinguished visitors, their guests, and staffs were escorted for periods of one to six days. Although the actual number of visitors was more than double the planning figures, the protocol section performed admirably. In future exercises of this nature, flexible plans must be developed for unexpected arrival of guests for whom, logistics and transportation requirements have not been specifically requested. In addition, outside agencies must understand that a force-on-force exercise cannot be structured to provide specific events for observation.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2ND MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
4TH MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, USMCR
4400 DAUPHINE STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70146

IN REPLY REFER TO
13 Sept 1987

From: Commanding General, 2d Marine Amphibious Brigade
To: Commanding General, II Marine Amphibious Force

SUBJ: EXERCISE SOLAR FLARE POST EXERCISE REPORT

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2D
(b) CG II MAF msg 151821Z Dec86 (II MAF LOI for Exercise Solar Flare)

Encl: (1) Exercise Task Organization
(2) Exercise Summary
(3) TACTRACIT for Operation Solar Flare
(4) Reference Pamphlet for Operation Solar Flare
(5) Intelligence Comments
(6) Operational Comments
(7) Communications Comments
(8) Admin/Log Comments

1. In accordance with reference (a), pertinent post exercise comments are submitted. An exercise overview is provided by enclosures (1) through (4). Post exercise comments are organized by functional areas in enclosure (5) through (8).

2. Exercise Solar Flare was a II Marine Amphibious Force exercise designed to provide training in the planning and execution of a free maneuver, force-on-force operation, involving the 2d MAB and 4th MAB. The exercise was conducted within the current II MAF Campaign Plan, as summarized in enclosure (4).

3. The following objectives were established for Exercise Solar Flare by reference (b):

a. Identify issues, problems, and procedures for integrating Selected Marine Corps Reserve units into II MAF exercises and operations.

b. Exercise SMCR and II MAF units together under the "Total Force" concept.

c. Support II MAF Campaign Plan training.

d. Develop and refine required procedures, and control measures to plan and execute free maneuver, force-on-force combined arms exercises utilizing more than one MAB.

e. Exercise and train with mobilization plans leading to SMCR augmentation and reinforcement of II MAF.

f. Support subordinate commanders in meeting their training requirements.

4. Commander's Summary

a. From its inception by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Exercise Solar Flare provided a unique training evaluation opportunity to the Marine Corps. This exercise required comprehensive pre-exercise planning by Active and Reserve staffs. A professional working relationship was established between II MAF, 2d MAB, 4th MAB and 6th MAB. The planning period also allowed for the 2d MAB Staff to become familiar with the II MAF campaign planning process and headquarters operations, while providing the II MAF staff the opportunity to evaluate the 2d MAB capabilities and institutional expertise. The integration of Active and Reserve forces, both for training and operations, provided an invaluable cross training experience and established a new level of Active-Reserve rapport.

The above mentioned training objectives were achieved by planning and/or execution during the exercise with one exception. The proposed Reserve mobilization training objective was suspended during the initial planning phase for several reasons, primarily due to the long-range planning required to support a MAB sized mobilization. The 2d MAB discovered that the areas of tactical deception and medical support will require increased emphasis during future operations. All other objectives were met resulting in the refinement and improvement of the 2d MAB command, control, communications and intelligence structure.

Exercise Solar Flare proved that Reserve and Active units can integrate rapidly and effectively to train safely in a complex and difficult environment. The professionalism and dedication of all participants was apparent and reflects credit upon themselves and the United States Marine Corps.

G. R. OMROD

Encl (4)

EXERCISE SUMMARY

The 2d MAB was task organized from approximately 125 units and detachments within the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and the 4th Force Service Support Group for the purpose of participating in a MAB level force-on-force exercise, Solar Flare. The exercise was scheduled by the Commanding General, FMFLANT and conducted by the Commanding General, II Marine Amphibious Force. The command element consisted of Headquarters, 2d MAB; the Ground Combat Element was formed by the 23d Marines, the Air Combat Element by MAG-20, and the Combat Service Support Element by BSSG-2.

The planning phase for Exercise Solar Flare spanned a period of approximately 12 months. To facilitate coordination, key officers from all major elements attended three planning conferences at MCB Camp Lejeune. In addition, a CPX was conducted in April 1987 at the TWSEAS facility at MCB Camp Lejeune. A Tactical Training Situation (TACTRASIT) was developed in the early planning stages in order to provide a constructive scenario. In July, 1987 2d MAB was assigned to active duty for training (ATD) at MCB, Camp Lejeune, with the ACE conducting operations from MCAS Cherry Point and MCALF Bogue Field. The exercise consisted of four phases with the third phase containing four tactical evolutions. Phase 1, 18-22 July consisted of the arrival of approximately 125 Marine units and detachments and their subsequent training. Phase 2 included a II MAF Commex and CPX during the period of 23-25 July. Phase 3, 26 July to 1200 29 July, contained the actual exercise consisting of four tactical evolutions. The final phase, 1200 July 29 - August 2 consisted of the retrograde of equipment and personnel, equipment maintenance and turn-in, and departure to home training centers.

Unit training was conducted the week prior to the start of Exercise Solar Flare. The Ground Combat Element trained at the various ranges aboard Camp Lejeune, firing all weapons organic to the Marine Infantry Regiment. The logistical requirements imposed by the Ground Combat Element offered excellent training for the BSSG-2. In addition to working with the USS Raleigh (LPD 1), the ACE also supported the GCE and BSSG training. By the end of the first week, training had progressed from firing on the ranges to training in company and battalion level tactics. The Ground Combat Element was afforded the opportunity to train with the Light Armor Vehicle (LAV) during the pre-exercise training as well as Exercise Solar Flare. The USS Raleigh supported training during the first week with landing deck qualifications, well-deck operations and related training. During the exercise, the Raleigh was used to provide constructive Naval Gunfire support. In addition to working with the Raleigh, the Air Combat Element also conducted helicopter egress training with the Ground Combat Element.

During Exercise Solar Flare, a 3-1/2 day exercise, both MABs included active duty and reserve personnel and equipment pursuant to the total force concept. 2d MAW F/A-18's flew in support of the 2d MAB and 4th MAW F-4's flew in support of the 4th MAB. Similiar augmentation occurred between the Ground Combat Elements of the two MABs with cross attachment of reinforced infantry battalions; and, individual Marines from each BSSG were also cross attached. Liaison officers from 2d and 4th MAB were exchanged immediately prior to the beginninng of the exercise and were able to observe the organization and functioning of the opposing MAB.

Post-exercise analysis continues, with after-action reports being submitted to the Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, and the Commanding General, II MAF. As a result of the exercise, relationships were established between 2d MAB and II MAF that will continue into a recently established 2d MAB 3 year training cycle; this cycle is expected to culminate in another MAF-level force-on-force exercise during 1990.

ENCLOSURE (4)

2D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
IN
EXERCISE SOLAR FLARE

TACTRASIT

OCTOBER 1986

5

Encl (4)

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

OPERATION SOLAR FLARE

The 2d Marine Amphibious Brigade is task organized from selected elements of the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and the 4th Force Service Support Group (FSSG). Its command element consists of the Hq, 2d Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) and various detachments from the Marine Corps Reserve. In July 1987, all of these elements will be assigned to active duty for training at MCB, Camp Lejeune and CAS Cherry Point, NC where they will train with their regular counterparts. The culmination of this training will be OPERATION SOLAR FLARE, an exercise scheduled by CG, FMFLANT and conducted by the Commanding General, II Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). Also participating in SOLAR FLARE will be elements of the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade and the 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade.

Since the exercise will involve the above commands operating in conjunction with, and in some cases in opposition to the 2d MAB, the scenario has been constructed around a partial mobilization of reserve forces. This mobilization is ordered by the national command authorities when worldwide events demand a response from US forces which cannot be fully met by active component forces without seriously weakening the United States response. General war has not occurred, but could occur. To facilitate the planning requirements of the Reserve participants, the scenario is unclassified. The focus of the operational employment of II Marine Amphibious Force is two fictitious island nations within the U.S. Atlantic Command area of responsibility: Cornada, a major island, whose dictator and government have been hostile to the United States for twenty years and Onslow, an island nation where a recent coup d'etat had installed a leftist military strongman who is also opposed to the United States.

The scenario describes a sequence of events which requires the deployment of II Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), by echelonment of lesser MAGTFs into the objective area (Cornada). II MAF elements become engaged in hosilities against Cornadan forces. Events in Onslow become critical and require that II MAF forces be diverted to that country. USCINCLANT, with insufficient forces to operate in both areas, recommends that 2d MAB, mobilized in Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, be deployed to Onslow.

The situations developed in the TACTRASIT describe the world situation and then through a series of messages and graphic illustrations, the events leading from the deployment of 2d MAB to the objective area. The amphibious operation, which establishes 2d MAB ashore and the termination of that operation, is also described. The termination of amphibious operation is the time of STARTEX for SOLAR FLARE. The final situation of the TACTRASIT shows the position of 2d MAB forces at STARTEX as well as the latest intelligence for planning tactical movements to carry out any missions assigned by II MAF.

2d MAB Operation Order 1-87 has been issued for the amphibious operation and its basic provisions may remain in effect during the MABEX, as modified by fragmentary orders issued to meet the changing situation ashore. The basic operation order and certain annexes are contained in the TACTRASIT. Certain annexes and appendices, such as the Comm-Elect and the Air Operations are left to the detailed planning of the MAB and subordinate element staffs.

The relationship between 2d MAB and 4th MAB, both of which are ashore in Onslow, is ambivalent. The exercise is designed to allow free ground maneuver between opposing forces. For this phase, the ground combat element of 4th MAB will serve as the opposition force to the 23rd Marines. In other phases of the exercise, the 4th MAB will be an adjacent friendly force to 2d MAB permitting the shifting of forces and support.

PURPOSE OF THE TACTRASIT

The purpose of this TACTRASIT is to provide the staff of 2d MAB and task organized subordinate elements of the MAB with a document showing events leading up to STARTEX of SOLAR FLARE. The document can be used by all personnel involved to become familiar with the circumstances under which the exercise will be conducted and the forces involved. It can be used as a vehicle for planning exercises to increase staff proficiency in responding to situations which may be encountered during SOLAR FLARE.

HOW TO USE THE TACTRASIT

The TACTRASIT consists of three parts: the TACTRASIT booklet (this document), a Reference Pamphlet and an Instructor's Guide.

The TACTRASIT is a self-paced, instructional pamphlet designed so the individual can use it without additional instruction or previous preparation. The TACTRASIT presents the background, establishes the general situation requiring action and proceeds to guide the user through a series of situations which focus on the deployment of II MAF forces in response to a contingency. In the case of this TACTRASIT, the requirements depict the deployment of elements of 2d MAB. The situations lead the user to the start of the exercise. Through the various situations and the accompanying questions, the user becomes familiar with the planning involved and execution of each option. The Reference Pamphlet provides a compilation and consolidation of key references, including various SOPs and other sources. The use of the Reference Pamphlet while working the TACTRASIT provides you with the background and knowledge to respond to each situation. The Instructor's Guide contains suggested answers for the questions listed in the TACTRASIT.

To use the TACTRASIT, lay it flat on a table or desk. Open it so that the entire situation and each map, chart or display can be easily read. After reading the background and purpose, turn to the next page. Read the situation as described and, where necessary, refer to the figures as shown on the same or facing page. At the end of some situations, there are a series of questions. These questions are related to the situation described, but expand on the situation and draw upon the professional experience of the user to provide the answer. The Reference Pamphlet provides additional material related to the situation. Using your experience and the situation as described, write your solutions to the questions on a separate piece of paper. Please do <u>not</u> write in the TACTRASIT itself or the Reference Pamphlet.



FIGURE 1-1

FIGURE 1-3



FIGURE 1-2

SITUATION ONE - Questions

1. Which of the following unified commanders is not assigned a specific area of responsibility?

   • USCINCEUR • USCINCSOUTH
   • USCINCPAC • USCINCCENT
   • USCINCLANT • USCINCRED

2. CINCMAC is a specified commander under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In general, what are his responsibilities?

3. What is the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS)?

4. In the Joint Operation Planning System, what is C-day?

5. What countries are included in USCINCCENT's area of responsibility?

IRANIAN OFFENSIVE

The Iran-Iraq Gulf war was entering its seventh year, but Iran remained firmly locked in the conflict to bring about the downfall of Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein at-Takriti and to seize part or all of Iraq.

Although the "human wave" attacks by the Iranian forces in 1985 were halted by the Iraqis and the casualty toll was in the thousands, Ayatollah Khomeini again was ready to unleash a massive offensive. Iran had moved approximately 600,000 young "fresh" troops and the fanatical Revolutionary Guards to the front lines in the southern marshlands west of Khorramshahr. In addition, Iran had formed an SAS style airborne brigade, which had been under intensive training, to operate behind Iraqi lines.

In late August, 1986, the Iranians attacked Baghdad and Basra with SCUD B missiles. Several missiles hit the Al-Douera refinery south of Baghdad causing heavy damage and reducing the production of aviation fuel. In retaliation, the Iraqis, with F-1 Mirages and air-to-air refueling, attacked the Sirri Island oil terminal, the oil export lifeline of Iran, located near the southeast end of the Persian Gulf. The air strike resulted in heavy damage to the oil terminal and three tankers were sunk. Most of Iranian oil exports, about 1.5 million barrels a day, had gone through Sirri since the exporting terminal on Kharq Island had been damaged previously by Iraqi air raids.

These attacks quickly intensified the war, with both sides attacking each other's industrial and transportation systems by air strikes, long range artillery and surface-to-surface missiles.

On 22 September, the Iranians began a major ground offensive aimed at cutting the highway from Kuwait to Basra and Basra to Baghdad. This pincher maneuver would isolate Basra, the second largest city of Iraq, and also cut the principal highway from Iraq's allies, the Gulf oil states and Saudi Arabia, and from the capital of Iraq.

Jordan's King Hussein and Egypt's President Mubarak were alarmed by the new offensive and the intensity of the battle and began sounding out other Arab states to assist in Iraq's defense. The U.S. was also gravely concerned of Iraq's capability to blunt the Iranian drive. A victory for Iran would be disasterous for the U.S. because of Khomeini's anti-American policy "the western Satan" and his vision to control and liberate the entire Mideast from U.S. influence. Therefore, the U.S. was seriously considering providing so-called nonlethal military aid to Iraq.

By mid-October, the Iranian offensive had broken through the Iraqi defense south of Basra and the Iranian forces were moving towards the city of Basra.

IRAQI COUNTERATTACK

On 20 October, the Iraqis counterattacked the forward thrust of the Iranian forces north and south of Basra with tanks and air strikes, which targeted the "human waves" with cluster weapons. The casualties were heavy among the young Iranian troops that had been recruited for this major battle.

In addition, the Iraqi air force mounted multiple air strike sorties against the Iranian cities, bombing civilian targets in Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz and attacking the forward logistic supply lines of the Iranian forces and major oil installations. The Iranian offensive soon collapsed because of the lack of logistical support, air cover and the punishing Iraqi counterattacks. The campaign resulted in heavy losses on the Iranian side and any possibility of the Iranians regaining the initiative in the war was lost. By 28 October, the Iranian forces were militarily defeated and had been pushed back to Khorramshahr. See Figure 1-1.

POLITICAL TURMOIL IN IRAN

In the beginning of November, the Chief of the Pasdoran forces accused the Head of the Army with the total mismanagement of the war effort, which resulted in the devastating defeat of the Iranian forces. These accusations resulted in numerous clashes between the Pasdoran and Army forces in Tehran, Tabriz and Esfahan. Appeals by the Majlis and Mullahs for calm were shattered when Khomeini supported the Pasdoran forces. This support caused the situation to deteriorate even more and provided other previously silent political factions the opportunity to declare themselves independent of the central authority in Tehran.

In early January 1987, support for the Supreme Faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Islamic Republic of Iran began to decline among the population because of war and its toll on the economic conditions of the country.

On 10 January, the Tudeh party, which had remained underground since the Republic was established, seized power in Tabriz and declared it a Soviet Republic. Khomeini denounced this action vehemently, however the Iranian Army was in total disarray and splintered in individual power struggles; thus it was powerless to suppress the takeover of the Tudeh party. The Pasdoran forces, also were not available because of the growing number of independent political factions and the general disillusionment of the Islamic government by the majority of the populace. Therefore, they were needed to ensure that control was maintained in Tehran and Esfahan.

SOVIET MOVEMENT OF FORCES

On 15 January 1987, U.S. intelligence sources indicated that the Soviets supported the Tudeh party and if requested, would be willing to assist the Republic. Three days later, two Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) were moved to the border south of Nachicevan just north of Joffa, Iran and Soviet delegates met with the Tudeh party leaders in Tabriz.

USCINCENT REQUEST FOR US FORCES

On 26 January, USCINCENT sent an OPREP-3 message to the NMCC concerning the current crisis in Iran and recommended that immediate action be taken to deploy forces to the USCINCENT theater of operations to respond to the Soviet movement of forces to the Iranian border.

DOWNFALL OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

In early February, the Iranian Army and its military structure had disintegrated and many of the soldiers along the frontlines deserted. The Air Force, weakened by aircraft losses and the incapability of maintaining the aircraft, also collapsed. The Navy still maintained an organized structure and intelligence sources speculated that they would be supportive of an overthrow of the Islamic government. Iraq, although the victor in the last battle, could not take advantage of the deteriorating situation. Instead, it strengthened its position along the front and waited to see if Khomeini's Islamic Republic would be overthrown.

On 10 February, the Pasdoran forces in the cities of Tehran and Esfahan were having difficulty controlling the rioting mobs which were demanding an end to the war and an improvement in the economic conditions. Several weeks later, the Kurds proclaimed their independence after decimating a Pasdoran Brigade and the Tudeh party claimed the province of Azerbaijan-E Khavari as a Soviet district and requested assistance from the Soviet Union.

On 15 February, the Iranian CINC of the Navy directed the Pasdoran forces in the area of Bandar Abbas to disband. This was refused and fighting erupted between these forces. With remnants of the Army forces and many Pasdoran defectors, the Navy forces were able to defeat the Pasdoran and establish control of the Bandar Abbas region.

US DEPLOYING FORCES

On 16 February, JCS issued a Warning Order based on the USCINCENT's OPREP-3 of 26 January. The Warning Order identified the deploying forces for USCENTCOM as the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82d ABN Div, the 101st Airmobile Div, MPS-2 and 7th MAB and two CVBGs. C-day was estimated to be 25 March 1987. Shortly thereafter, USCINCENT, the supported unified commander, submitted his commander's estimate to JCS and updated his assessment of the situation in SWA. (See Figure 1-2.)

On 24 March, the U.S. set DEFCON 3 and the forces deploying to the USCENTCOM theater of operations began movement on 25 March 1987. Figure 1-3 shows the forces deploying.

THE CENTRAL FRONT



FIGURE 2-1

SITUATION TWO - Questions

1. What are dual-based forces?

2. What is the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in NATO?

3. Most WP forces are organized into Motorized Rifle Divisions and Tank Divisions. What is the Soviet main battle tank that supports each of these forces and what is its main gun caliber?

4. What is the main Soviet infantry fighting vehicle in use today?

5. What countries beside the US are members of NATO?

6. NATO military command structure is divided among three major NATO commanders. What are their titles and where are thei headquarters located?

7. If US Marine forces are assigned to NATO, in what general areas will they operate?

SOVIET PREPARATIONS

During the latter 1980s, relations between the Soviet Union, the U.S. and other NATO countries remained strained. Each side continued to modernize both their strategic and conventional war-making capabilites. Each major power also assisted in the modernization of their allies and client states.

In January of 1987, western intelligence analysts noted that Soviet armed forces were taking steps to increase their readiness. It was evident that the Soviets had activated several wartime headquarters and had reinforced forward deployed locations in Germany. As part of this, the Soviets upgraded over twenty of their and Warsaw Pact Army Motorized Rifle Divisions from Class IV to Class I readiness status. Intelligence and Warning (I&W) indicators showed concentrations of Soviet air transports in airbases near airborne forces and forward deployment of certain Soviet naval aviation units. Soviet missile and air defense forces were also placed on increased readiness status. All of the above measures could have been construed as exercises or preparation for the annual large exercise Okean, but intelligence sources showed that the increase in readiness far exceeded anything experienced in the past twenty years.

US AND NATO REACTION

The National Command Authorities (NCA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all Unified and Specified Commanders of the United States were well aware of the situation, as was the NATO political and military organization and command structure. On 31 January 1987, USCINCEUR sent an OPREP-3 message to JCS/NCA recommending the alert of dual-based forces and possible contingency deployment of the 1st Infantry Division (MECH). This was concurred in and based on the USCINCEUR recommendation, they were alerted by JCS to deploy to USEUCOM on order.

On 2 February 1987, the NATO Defense Planning Committee met in Brussels to decide NATO's response. Throughout the three days of discussions and intelligence briefings, which included representatives of all the NATO nations, there was a genuine feeling of alarm at the Soviet preparations. It was finally decided that NATO must act if it was to present a credible deterence to Soviet actions. With all states concurring, it took the step of establishing the condition of "Military Vigilance."

The difficulty in a Western response to this Soviet buildup lay in the politics of it. The Soviets had not created a political crisis with the West, nor was there a major confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviets, which would justify wartime preparations being made. Moreover, since the preparations were being made in secret behind the Iron Curtain, there was little news in the Western press to cause alarm. Most information obtained by the West was through sensitive intelligence sources.

SOVIET RESPONSE

The Soviets responded to the NATO meetings in a typical fashion, accusing the U.S. and NATO of aggression and planning a nuclear holocaust. As a result of the Soviet accusations, the United Nations Organization focused some attention on the subject. However, the suggestion by the UN that a conference be called to discuss the situation and that NATO and Warsaw Pact inspectors be allowed to inspect and count each others forces in Germany was rejected by the Soviets.

During April, the NCA and NATO continued to closely monitor the situation. Intelligence available to both commands continued to show increased activity in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In particular, it was noted that the Soviet forces in Germany were reinforced by three Motorized Rifle Divisions from the Leningrad District as shown in Figure 2-1. It was also distressing to note that the Soviet Baltic Fleet, including a large amphibious force, was positioned at the Polish port of Gdansk.

US AND NATO RESPONSE

In response to the Soviet buildup, the JCS alerted, in addition to the 1st Infantry Division (MECH), four USAF tactical fighter squadrons for deployment to USEUCOM. In defense of any apparent delay on the part of NATO to mobilize, it should be noted that most NATO nations, particularly those such as West Germany, Norway, Turkey, etc., had most of their active forces based close to the area where they would fight. U.S. Army forces in Europe and U.K. forces deployed with the Northern Army Group of the Central Region were all located in or near their defensive areas. It is also understood that any increase in readiness in NATO automatically triggers an increase in readiness for these countries, which involves mobilization of reserves and Home Guard forces with the attendant disruption to the economy.

On 1 June 1987, I&W sources now reported a surge of submarine deployments from the Kola. Movement of Soviet forces to reinforce East Germany continued. This latest tactic caused NATO, which was still at Military Vigilance, to reappraise the situation and consider increasing its condition to Simple Alert. In that this would have been an unprecedented step, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) postponed any decision. In the interim, the U.S. and the U.K. decided to take unilateral steps. The JCS ordered the 1st Infantry Division (MECH) on 5 June 87 to deploy to Germany and the U.K. reinforced the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) while alerting 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines for possible deployment to Norway.

NAVBASE CHARLIE REINFORCEMENT AND EVACUATION



FIGURE 3-1

SITUATION THREE - Questions

1. The Atlantic Fleet Organization divides the fleet into type commands and operational commands. Name the type commands. Name the operational commands.

2. Who issues an Initiating Directive for an amphibious operation?

3. There are six conditions required to deploy an MPF MAB into an operating area. What are they?

4. What are the four phases of an MPF operation? Describe each briefly.

5. What type aircraft are in the air wing of a typical Atlantic Fleet aircraft carrier?

SITUATION THREE
THE CARIBBEAN

BACKGROUND

Within the Caribbean, two island nations have been a source of concern to the U.S. in recent years. For the past twenty-five years, the island of Cornada has been hostile to the U.S. and during that time had become increasingly friendly with the Soviet Union. In return for Cornadan friendship, the USSR has built the Cornadan armed forces into the most powerful armed force in the Western Hemisphere outside of the U.S. The USSR has also backed Cornadan sponsored insurgency and terrorist activity throughout Central America, Latin America and in the Caribbean Islands, exploiting unrest to its own benefit and to the detriment of U.S. interests.

U.S. NAVBASE CHARLIE, located on the southeastern end of the island of Cornada has over the years, provided a focal point for Cornadan hostility. From time to time, Cornadan threats against the base have caused the U.S. to reinforce its defense or to deploy forces in strength to indicate to Cornada that any attack against the base would be met by U.S. force. This has deterred any overt action, though there have been numerous incidents between the base and Cornadan military forces.

In November 1985, a coup d'etat took place on the island of Onslow, an island in the Caribbean long an ally of the US. A Major Juan Diaz soon emerged as the head of the ruling military junta. Initially, Diaz continued the Western-oriented position of Onslow, but in recent months he has become more anti-U.S.

CORNADA

In the mid-1980s, it became apparent that Cornada had become a major drug producer and was smuggling drugs into the U.S. The U.S. strongly advised the Cornada government to immediately cease the illicit drug smuggling. This warning was ignored by the government of Cornada.

In December 1986 and the early part of January 1987, the U.S. Coast Guard assisted by Navy E-2Cs, intercepted and boarded four Cornada trawlers in U.S. territorial waters. Each trawler had millions of dollars worth of drugs onboard; their destinations were Louisiana and Florida. This evidence and the confessions of the crew members reconfirmed that Cornada was a major supplier of drugs and was smuggling them into the U.S. in large quantities.

On 25 January 1987, the U.S. government imposed severe trade restrictions on Cornada and internationally announced that Cornada was a major drug supplier in the western hemisphere. The U.S. warned Cornada that the continuation of drug smuggling would not be tolerated. The Cornada government denied the accusations and made threatening comments concerning NAVBASE CHARLIE.

The Cornada government, using the United Nations as an international platform, demanded that all U.S. forces be withdrawn from Cornada and that NAVBASE CHARLIE be returned to Cornada. Cornada also accused the U.S. of routinely overflying Cornada on spying missions with U-2s and SR-71s.

Meanwhile, in Onslow, Major Diaz upon return from a visit to Cornada, publicly stated his support for Cornada and their demands for U.S. withdrawal from NAVBASE CHARLIE.

On the 27th, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN countered by charging Cornada with belonging to a "confederation of terrorist states", fomenting terrorist activity throughout the Caribbean basin and Latin America. The U.S. representative clearly stated that there is evidence that Cornada in the past years has increased its support of terrorist activity and that terrorist and insurgency training camps have been established and the trainees were being instructed by Cornada personnel. Moreover, Cornada is the central base from which these terrorists operate and is the staging area for military arms and supplies shipped to the various insurgency groups operating against legitimate governments in the Caribbean basin. Lastly, the representative cautioned Onslow of its support of Cornada and diplomatically stated that there were many U.S. citizens in Onslow and the U.S. expected them to be protected.

U.S. REINFORCEMENTS TO NAVBASE CHARLIE

Cornadan ground forces consist of three Corps with a total of ten Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRD) and three Tank Divisions (TD). Two MRDs and one TD are located on the eastern end of the island and the balance of the forces are based west of Durango. On 1 February, intelligence sources indicated that two Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) had been moved from the capital to Categena. On 5 February, the MRDs moved within 15-20 miles of NAVBASE CHARLIE. The presence of these ground forces in the vicinity of the base was considered as provocative by Commander U.S. Forces Caribbean (COMUSFORCARIB/CJTF 140) and he sent an OPREP-3 (commander's assessment of the situation) to USCINCLANT. USCINCLANT in turn sent an OPREP-3 to JCS stating his assessment and concern of having Cornadan ground forces so close to NAVBASE CHARLIE and recommended that the base be immediately reinforced and dependents and non-essential personnel be evacuated. On 10 February, JCS approved the recommendations of USCINCLANT. JCS also indicated that should the present situation worsen, JCS would issue a warning order.

Based upon the JCS response, on 12 February, USCINCLANT directed the following: (See Figure 3-1)

- FMFLANT Air Alert Force reinforce NAVBASE CHARLIE.
- U.S. Naval ships in port NAVBASE CHARLIE commence immediate evacuation of military dependents.
- MAC airlift delivering the Air Alert Force will evacuate remaining dependents and non-essential personnel.
- Placed an Amphibious Task Force and II MAF on alert as an additional reinforcement force.

Continued


10 MARCH - JCS WARNING ORDER
MPS-1 (MPF) ON ALERT
6th MAB (MPF) ON ALERT
CVBG DEPLOYS (CTG 20.1)
MPS-1 VIA PUERTO RICO TO CORNADA
ATF DEPLOYS (CTF 22/23) (20 MARCH)
MAC/6th MAB (3 MAY)
CVBG/ATF OPERATING AREA
4th MAB AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT (29 APRIL)
ATLANTIC OCEAN
LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY
Washington DC
Langley AFB
Norfolk (USCINCLANT)
FT Bragg
Camp Lejeune
MCAS Cherry Point
Morehead City
Shaw AFB SC
FT McPherson GA
Charleston
Beaufort
MacDill AFB FL
Homestead AFB FL
NAS Key West (COMUSFORCARIB)
STRAITS OF FLORIDA
BAHAMAS
CUBA
CAYMEN ISLANDS
JAMAICA
WINDWARD PASSAGE
GREATER ANTILLES
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
PUERTO RICO
NS Roosevelt Roads (COMNAVFORCARIB)
CORNADA
NAVBASE CHARLIE
ANGUILLA
BARBUDA
ANTIGUA
GUADELOUPE
DOMINICA
MARTINIQUE
SAINT LUCIA
SAINT VINCENT
BARBADOS
GRENADA
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
LESSER ANTILLES
ARUBA
BONAIRE
CURACAO
ONSLOW
CARIBBEAN SEA
NICARAGUA
COSTA RICA
COLOMBIA
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FIGURE 3-2

- Placed a CVBG on alert to sail within 48 hours to Cornada.

The Air Alert Force reinforcement commenced on 15 February. The Cornadan reaction to this rapid reinforcement and evacuation was to back off slightly and cool their rhetoric. However, as U.S. forces became committed to Southwest Asia (SWA) and tensions rose in Central Europe, the Cornadans become bolder. In early March, intelligence sources showed that they were moving another MRD into position near Cartegena. Their aircraft also became more aggressive, flying over the base and also running intercepts on transport aircraft flying routine logistics missions in support of the base.

On 10 March, JCS issued a warning order which directed USCINCLANT to deploy the CVBG and the amphibious task force with a MAB embarked to the vicinity of NAVBASE CHARLIE and further to be prepared to execute Phase I of USCINCLANT OPLAN 2XXX for the defense of NAVBASE CHARLIE. USCINCLANT and, in turn, CINCLANTFLT directed COMSECONDFLT to deploy the forces. LANTFLT type commanders provided forces as follows:

- COMNAVAIRLANT - One carrier.
- COMNAVSURFLANT - Surface and Amphibious Ships.
- CG FMFLANT - 4th MAB.

In addition, a maritime prepositioning force (MPF), the ships of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One (MPS-1) and the 6th MAB, was placed on 72 hour alert and the II MAF Headquarters was alerted to be prepared to assume the command as Commander, NAVAL BASE CHARLIE Defense Force.

On 15 March, 4th MAB embarked on amphibious shipping of COMPHIBGRU TWO and on 20 March sailed for Cornada after conducting a rehearsal at Camp Lejeune, NC. On 18 March, COMSECONDFLT published an initiating directive for amphibious operations in the vicinity of NAVBASE CHARLIE. The directive designated:

- COMPHIBGRU TWO (CTF 22) as CATF.
- CG 4th MAB (CTF 23) as CLF.

These forces arrived off-shore on 29 March and it was hoped that this would deter any overt actions by Cornada.

For the next two weeks, the Cornada government denounced U.S. foreign actions and continued to threaten to retake the naval base and push the "imperialist Yankees" into the sea. They also accused the U.S. of violating their territorial seas and demanded immediate departure of the CVBG and ATF from the area. On 12 April, an artillery battalion was moved into position near NAVBASE CHARLIE.

CORNADA FORCES ATTACK, US RETALIATES

On 27 April 1987, Cornada military forces began shelling NAVBASE CHARLIE, causing heavy damage to the installations and closing the airfield. A flash JCS execute order was issued and with the CVBG in position, air strikes were launched against predesignated targets and the Cornadan ground forces positioned near the naval base. Although the U.S. air strikes ran into concentrated AAA and SAMs, the strikes resulted in heavy damage to the docks and shipyard in San Carlos and destroyed many aircraft on the airfields with fighter sweeps. U.S. forces established local air superiority and continued to launch air strikes against the Cornada ground positions and their major C^3 facilities, airfields, ports, etc. In the early morning of 29 April, an amphibious assault was conducted by 4th MAB west of the naval base to push the Cornadan forces out of range from the base.

The Cornadan government assailed the U.S. in its invasion of Cornada and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces and restitution for the damage caused by the air raids against their cities. In Onslow, Colonel Diaz vehemently denounced the invasion and demanded that the United Nations intervene. Meanwhile, intelligence indicated that the still powerful Cornadan forces were moving toward positions to attack NAVBASE CHARLIE despite bombing attacks.

As part of the JCS execute order, Phase I of the CINCLANT OPLAN had been directed. In addition to the MAB amphibious assault on Cornada, CINCLANTFLT also directed the four ships of MPS-1 to get underway and proceed to the vicinity of Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. At the same time, 6th MAB and Military Airlift Command (MAC) were alerted to commence the airlift of MAB forces as soon as the airfield had been repaired. 6th MAB forces began turn-in of all their Remain Behind Equipment (RBE) and began forming planeloads of personnel.

On 2 May, COMNAVBASE CHARLIE reported that the base was secure, the runway had been repaired and port facilities and the beach area were capable of handling the MPF operations.

On 3 May, the 6th MAB Fly-in Echelon (FIE) began followed by MPS-1 which arrived on 6 May and commenced offloading the maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies (MPE/S). During the MPS arrival and assembly phase, II MAF headquarters and major subordinate command elements arrived on 10 May. The next day CG, II MAF reported to USCINCLANT as Commander Charlie Defense Command, a uni-service force, and the MAF composited to form a single GCE, ACE and CSSE as shown below.



The offload of the MPF ships was completed on 12 May. On 14 May an operation to push the perimeter further to the west and to destroy Cornadan forces in that area began.

HOME STATIONS OF 2D MAB FORCES



FIGURE 4-1

NATIONAL EMERGENCY

The situation worldwide was now the most serious confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet in the past thirty-five years. Several allied nations encouraged a meeting between the U.S. and the Soviet but this was rejected by the Soviet. In the meantime, JCS was assessing the ability of the U.S. to respond to each crisis. It was essential that forces deployed to SWA and the Caribbean not use forces earmarked to the reinforcement of Europe. The commitment of forces to SWA and now the commitment of II MAF to Cornada placed the U.S. reinforcement of Europe in jeopardy. Mobilization would be required to provide the additional forces.

On 1 May 1987, the President made a national TV address in which he delineated the increasing threat to U.S. interests worldwide. He emphasized the need for the U.S. to respond with strength to any threat to U.S. vital interests, and also the fact that active U.S. forces were stretched to the limits responding to the threats in SWA, Europe and in the Caribbean. The President announced that mobilization was being considered to increase U.S. military strength to meet these crisis situations.

Following the Presidential address, the Secretary of Defense alerted the Service secretaries concerning mobilization of selected Reserve and National Guard forces. Under law, the President may direct a partial call-up of Reserves to augment active forces. This call-up is limited to 100,000 personnel for ninety days. The NCA and JCS both agreed that the present crises demanded more than just augmentation and there was a definite requirement for some forces beyond a ninety day period.

The second and more satisfactory option was to declare a National Emergency and have a partial mobilization under 10 USC 673(a). This permits the President by Executive Order to call-up to one million personnel for up to two years. (The spectrum of mobilization is discussed in the Reference Pamphlet.)

On 5 May 1987, the President proclaimed a National Emergency and directed the call-up of selected Reserve and National Guard forces with 10 May designated as M-Day. These call-up forces were:

Army:
- 39th Sep Inf Bde at Little Rock, Arkansas to be deployed to Panama.
- 35th Infantry Division (Mech) at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas to be deployed to USCENTCOM.

Air Force:
- Ten Tac Ftr Sqdns of ANG.
- All reserve and Guard transport Sqdns.
- All reserve and Guard aerial refueling sqdns.

Navy:
- NRF amphibious ships.
- NAVCHAPGRU augmentation.
- Air transport assets.
- Two VP squadrons.
- Three Mobile Construction Battalions.
- Naval Control of Shipping Organizations.

Marine Corps:
- 2d MAB at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, NC.

MOBILIZATION OF 2D MAB

Upon receipt of the Executive Order directing mobilization of 2d MAB, Headquarters Marine Corps directed the 4th MARDIV, 4th MAW and 4th FSSG to mobilize the units and detachments that comprise 2d MAB in accordance with their predetermined troop list. The Station of Initial Assignment (SIA) was designated as MCB Camp Lejeune and MCAS Cherry Point. Individuals comprising the units and detachments were directed to report to their home station, as shown in Figure 4-1, where action taken to comply with the mobilization order included:

- Verifying personnel records.
- Reviewing shot records and ID tags.
- Counseling dependents.
- Releasing disqualified members.
- Determining status of AWOL members.
- Preparing allotments, SGLI, etc.
- Conducting refresher training.
- Preparing to move.

MOVEMENT TO THE SIA

Movement to the SIA was simplified due to the fact that the reserves did not have to deploy with unit equipment. Therefore, only individual weapons, uniforms and personal equipment were taken and units/individuals were moved by chartered commercial bus.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

When the 2d MAB mobilized at Camp Lejeune it was assigned to the operational control of the CG FMFLANT and the MAB was organized into a GCE, ACE, and CSSE, as shown, for training and subsequent operations. When operational, FMFLANT will CHOP 2d MAB to II MAF for employment.



TRAINING AT MCB CAMP LEJEUNE

When units and detachments arrived at their SIA, they were directed to a joint personnel processing center and then directed to a billeting area where they reported to their respective command, e.g. RLT-23 in the 6th Marines area, BSSG-2 in the French Creek area, etc.

Mobilization assistance teams had been formed shortly after M-day and conducted an evaluation of each reporting unit based upon the UNITREP, interviews with the commander and observation of the unit. This preliminary evaluation was then used as a basis to correct deficiencies in personnel, equipment and training.

PERSONNEL

Certain personnel in units were not MOS-qualified and those few who had not completed initial entry level training had to be pulled from units and given special training. It was also necessary, after field [illegible] especially in communications and maintenance skills. assign personnel

EQUIPMENT

Equipment was not a problem as the 2d MAB was issued the equipment that was recently turned in by 6th MAB. This equipment was newer and in better shape than most of the 4th DIV equipment left at their home stations. As a result of HQMC actions to modernize the Reserves, the majority of weapons and equipment was the same for both regulars and reserves.

TRAINING

Shortage of adequate training areas to meet unit training requirements were anticipated and arrangements had been made to deploy the artillery units to Ft Bragg, NC and the tracked vehicles to Camp Picket, VA, where they were able to maneuver and shoot for two weeks of intensive training. At Camp Lejeune, the newly acquired 52,000 acres west of Highway 17 known as "Pocosin", as well as areas of the Croatan National Forest, were used for training. One major problem was lack of training ammunition which had been deployed with 4th MAB.

SITUATION FOUR - Questions

1. What are some options for mobilization available to the President without congressional approval?
2. Who provides the mobilization assistance teams?
3. What are the responsibilities of the mobilization assistance teams?
4. How would a "full" or "total" mobilization impact on 2d MAB?
5. Why did 6th MAB turn in their major equipment?
6. What organization is responsible for arranging transportation of 2d MAB units to Camp Lejeune on mobilization?
7. Why were the forces of 2d MAB selected for mobilization?



FIGURE 5-1



FIGURE 5-2

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CORNADA

The MAF offensive that began on 14 May made exceptional progress during the first five days and managed to push the perimeter out some thirty to forty miles to the west and northwest as shown in Figure 5-1. However, the advance then lost momentum as the supply lines lengthened, the troops tired and the perimeter became stretched too thin. In the early hours of 20 May, a fresh motorized rifle regiment conducted a passage of lines and at 0430 launched an assault against 3/6. This battalion was forced to withdraw with heavy casualties. The withdrawal was exploited by a tank regiment in reserve. Marine and carrier air commenced a maximum effort to slow and contain the breakthrough while the division formed a MCATF to counterattack and cut off the tank regiment. Once the MCATF was formed, it cut off and isolated the remnants of the tank regiment and destroyed the remaining tanks and equipment with Marine air using laser designators in the OV-10s and A-6s to illuminate targets for the F/A-18s and AV-8Bs. This enabled them to maintain a good standoff from Cornadan SA-8s and ZSU-23-4s and at the same time obtain deadly accuracy.

With the exception of 20 May, USMC casualties had been surprisingly light, whereas by 30 May one-and-a-half MRDs had been defeated as well as most of the tank division. The Cornadans had attempted to bring additional forces forward, but they had been immediately interdicted by carrier air. By the end of May, the Cornadan ground forces were unable to operate because Marine and Naval air had achieved air superiority. On the US side the commitment of US forces elsewhere did not permit the reinforcement of II MAF. Because of this USCINCLANT directed II MAF to conduct defensive operations in present positions and await reinforcements.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN ONSLOW

Meanwhile, in Onslow, Colonel Diaz was using the situation in Cornada to justify his actions in Onslow. Every week to ten days he would go on the air and berate the U.S. for killing innocent civilians throughout Cornada and state that Onslow must assist her neighbor and ally in any manner possible. First this technique was used as an excuse to impose martial law; then trade restriction on U.S. products; justify non-payment of debts; closing the nations airports to U.S. tourists; demonstrations at the American Embassy and placing embassy personnel under house arrest.

Despite diplomatic efforts on the part of other Caribbean nations, Diaz persisted in using the Cornada situation as a means to justify his actions against U.S. interests in Onslow. Although in dire economic straits due to loss of the tourist industry and exports of tobacco, etc., Diaz permitted the populace to expropriate the assets of U.S. owned and controlled corporations. USCINCLANT, as well as the NCA and JCS closely monitored the deteriorating situation in Onslow.

CORNADA STABILIZATION

Throughout early June the Marines manned a perimeter some forty miles from the NAVBASE and there was little activity except for sporadic disorganized artillery barrages on forward outposts. Although Cornada was still diplomatically demanding the return of NAVBASE CHARLIE, they were not willing to lose any more men and equipment in the attempt.

ONSLOW'S ALIGNMENT

On 14 June, Diaz again addressed his people and began with his usual thirty minute harangue about the devastating attack by the U.S. Marines and the carrier air on the defenseless Cornadan populace. He continued to say that all property of U.S. citizens and corporations in Onslow was now the property of the state. It was expected that this was his aim but he then went on to proclaim Onslow was now a Marxist state and aligned with Cornada and Orange. Furthermore, he would do whatever necessary to further the cause of Cornada and Orange in the Caribbean region and that he was planning a state visit to Orange in the near future.

U.S. ACTIONS

USCINCLANT immediately sent an OPREP-3 message to JCS pointing out that Orange would undoubtedly exploit this opportunity to establish another base of operations in the Caribbean and in view of the present worldwide situation, this can not be permitted. USCINCLANT recommended the U.S. take immediate action to preemptively seize the island to stabilize the situation.

JCS, in turn, issued a Warning Order directing USCINCLANT to develop recommended courses of action for Onslow, but to limit forces to current Navy and USMC force levels available in LANTCOM.

After examining several courses of action in detail, USCINCLANT's commander's estimate recommended that 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade be backloaded from NAVBASE CHARLIE on amphibious ships still in that area and conduct an amphibious landing on the northern coast of Onslow. 2d MAB would embark on residual LANTFLT amphibious shipping and conduct an amphibious landing on the southeast coast of Onslow in the vicinity of JAX as shown in Figure 5-2.

A chronology of the message traffic received by 2d MAB as the Onslow situation unfolded is contained in the following pages (Situations). It also depicts the six phases of the Crisis Action System (CAS).

SITUATION FIVE - Questions

1. What are the six phases in the JCS Crisis Action System?
2. Who are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
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SITUATION AT NAVBASE CHARLIE



FIGURE 5-1

TTS30

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION



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TTS30

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CRISIS IN ONSLOW



14

Encl (4)

After a series of crises in the early 1970s, the National Command Authorities (NCA) became concerned that the military organization for responding to crisis situations was ineffective, and that the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) was not providing adequate and timely information to support the decision-making process. A system for the time-sensitive military planning was developed and is described in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), Volume IV, Crisis Action System (CAS). Since each crisis is unique, a rigid set of rules would be unacceptable. Instead, CAS is a flexible system that can respond to the demands of a dynamic situation. Like any system, the CAS is the combination of people, procedures and hardware that enable the system to function. The objective of the CAS is the timely development of a military option to present to the NCA for consideration and use in response to a crisis.

The six phases of the CAS are shown in the reference pamphlet. The phases alternate between action taken at the military command level (USCINCLANT for example) and the action taken at the NCA level. Formal JCS orders are issued to disseminate major NCA decisions.

PHASE I - SITUATION DEVELOPMENT. An incident occurs of national significance and is reported to an appropriate government agency. All concerned continue to monitor the situation. USCINCLANT sends an OPREP-3 Pinnacle message to JCS summarizing the current situation. The OPREP-3 message to JCS would be readdressed down the chain to the MAB.

160200 JUN 87

FM DIA
TO AIG 2067

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 0200//

SUBJ ONSLOW INTSUM

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN ONSLOW. A
2. GENERAL ARTURO CARILLO WAS ELECTED AS THE FIRST PRESIDENT IN 1945 AND SERVED AS SUCH FOR THIRTY-FIVE YEARS. IN NOVEMBER 1985, A COUP D'ETAT BY THE ARMY TOPPLED THE CARILLO GOVERNMENT AND THE GENERAL AND MANY OF HIS STAUNCH SUPPORTERS FLED TO THE US.
3. A MAJOR JUAN DIAZ SOON EMERGED AS THE HEAD OF THE RULING MILITARY JUNTA AND IN EARLY TV APPEARANCES PREACHED THE NON-ALIGNED POSITION OF ONSLOW. HOWEVER, AS THE MONTHS PASSED, HE BECAME MORE AND MORE ANTI-U.S. IN JANUARY 1987 DIAZ VISITED CORNADA. UPON HIS RETURN, HE PUBLICLY STATED HIS SUPPORT FOR CORNADA AND THEIR DEMANDS FOR US WITHDRAWAL FROM NAVBASE CHARLIE. IN THE LATER PART OF APRIL, WHEN THE CORNADAN MILITARY FORCES BEGAN SHELLING NAVBASE CHARLIE, HE WAS QUICK TO PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE HIS SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIONS AND DEMANDED THAT THE US WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IMMEDIATELY AND RETURN THE BASE TO CORNADA. B
4. AFTER THE US AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND AIR STRIKES, SELF PROMOTED COLONEL DIAZ DENOUNCED THE INVASION OF HER ALLY AND THE AIR RAIDS AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN THE BOMBED CITIES OF CORNADA. HE ALSO STATED HE WAS FEARFUL FOR HIS PEACEFUL NATION BECAUSE IT MAY BE ATTACKED NEXT BY THE US AGGRESSORS.
5. COLONEL DIAZ HAS CONTINUED TO USE THE SITUATION IN CORNADA TO JUSTIFY HIS ACTIONS IN ONSLOW. IN HIS WEEKLY TV BROADCASTS AND THROUGH ALL OTHER AVAILABLE NEWS MEDIA MEANS, HE HAS BERATED THE US FOR KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND STATED THAT ONSLOW MUST ASSIST ITS ALLY IN NEED. HE BEGAN IMPOSING MARTIAL LAW, FOLLOWED BY TRADE RESTRICTIONS AGAINST US PRODUCTS AND THEN STOPPED PAYMENT ON THE NATIONAL DEBTS TO US BANKS. BY THE END OF MAY HE CLOSED THE ONSLOW NATIONAL AIRPORTS TO US TOURIST. HE INSTIGATED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND ON 10 JUNE SURROUNDED THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WITH MILITARY FORCES PLACING THE EMBASSY PERSONNEL UNDER TEMPORARY HOUSE ARREST. ON 11 JUNE, HE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT MOST OF THE AMERICANS IN THE EMBASSY WERE US CIA AGENTS SPYING ON THEIR MILITARY FORCES, COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR A US INVASION. C
6. OTHER CARIBBEAN NATIONS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INTERVENE BY DIPLOMATIC METHODS, BUT DIAZ PERSISTS IN HIS SUPPORT OF CORNADA AND BERATING OF THE US.
7. ON 12 JUNE, DIAZ, ALTHOUGH HIS ECONOMY IS IN DIRE STRAITS BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF THE TOURIST INDUSTRY, EXPROPRIATED ALL THE US OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WHICH WILL RESULT IN FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISASTER.
8. ON 14 JUNE, ON NATIONAL TV, HE PROCLAIMED THAT ONSLOW IS A MARXIST STATE AND ALIGNED WITH CORNADA AND USSR. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE PLANNED TO VISIT USSR IN EARLY JULY AND ASK FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

BT

160440Z JUN 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG II MAF
CG 2D MAB

160220Z JUN 87

FM CINCLANTFLT
TO COMSECONDFLT
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
NAVCAMSLANT NORFOLK

152233Z JUN 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

152230Z JUN 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC WASHINGTON DC
JDA MACDILL AFB FL

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ OPREP-3/SITUATION IN ONSLOW

1. YESTERDAY COLONEL DIAZ, THE HEAD OF THE MILITARY JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT ONSLOW IS NOW A MARXIST STATE ALIGNED WITH CORNADA AND USSR. IF, AS A MARXIST STATE, HE PERMITS SOVIET NAVAL AND AIR FORCES TO OPERATE FROM THE ISLAND, THIS WOULD PLACE EVERY SHIP IN THE CARIBBEAN, THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE GULF COAST PORTS AND CITIES WITHIN RANGE OF ATTACK. A B
2. THE USSR WILL UNDOUBTEDLY EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH ANOTHER BASE OF OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION, THIS CANNOT BE PERMITTED AND IMMEDIATE ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO SEIZE THE ISLAND PREEMPTORALLY. ALL AVAILABLE LANTCOM FORCES ARE BEING USED TO DEFEND NAVBASE CHARLIE AT THE PRESENT TIME. IT IS HOPED THAT THE SITUATION THERE WILL PERMIT DIVERSION OF FORCES TO ONSLOW IN THE NEAR FUTURE. C
3. ALTHOUGH THE COUNTER-COUP ATTEMPT FAILED LAST WEEK, IT SHOWED THAT THE EXILED GOVERNMENT STILL HAS THE SUPPORT OF A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE POPULATION. A PROPOSAL TO EXPLOIT THIS FACT IS BEING SUBMITTED BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.
4. IN THE INTERIM, WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION AND ADVISE.

DT

PHASE II - CRISIS ASSESSMENT

PHASE II - CRISIS ASSESSMENT. During this phase, surveillance and reporting are greatly increased to obtain all information possible. If the decision-makers declare a crisis, a JCS Warning Order is prepared and released. The JCS Warning Order will include:

- situation
- forces available
- command arrangements
- tasks
- area of operations
- assumptions
- political factors
- tentative courses of action
- coordinating instructions
- admin and logistics
- reporting instructions

If required by the prevailing circumstances, the warning order may include changes to the alert status of units and movement of selected forces to preposition for impending operations.





1616322 JUN 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG II MAF
CG 2D MAB

1612442 JUN 87

FM CINCLANTFLT
TO COMSECONDFLT
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
NAVCAMSLANT NORFOLK VA

1610402 JUN 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

1609472 JUN 87

FM AMEMB JAX
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJ SITUATION IN ONSLOW

1. SITUATION THROUGHOUT ONSLOW, AND PARTICULARLY IN JAX AREA, HAS BECOME UNTENABLE FOR THE 2,500 AMCITS WHO ARE RESIDENTS SINCE DIAZ ANNOUNCED THE NEW MARXIST GOVERNMENT WAS TAKING OVER ALL US OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.
2. I HAVE SOUGHT PERMISSION ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ONSLOW TO CONDUCT A PERMISSIVE EVACUATION OF AMCITS BUT THE ONLY RESPONSE I GET IS THAT ALL AIRFIELDS ARE CLOSED.
3. AT THE PRESENT TIME, ONSLOWAN FORCES SURROUND THE AMEMB AND ALL EMBASSY PERSONNEL ARE UNDER HOUSE ARREST. THE ONSLOWAN COMMANDER INSISTS HIS TROOPS ARE HERE TO PROTECT US.
4. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON SENDS.

BT

A

WARNING ORDER

1914072 JUN 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG II MAF
CG 2D MAB

1908092 JUN 87

FM CINCLANTFLT
TO COMSECONDFLT
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
NAVCAMSLANT NORFOLK VA

1820152 JUN 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

1814402 JUN 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
TO USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCMAC SCOTT AFB IL
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC WASHINGTON DC
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

CJCS SENDS
SUBJ WARNING ORDER - ONSLOW OPERATIONS

REF USCINCLANT 1522302 JUN 87 (OPREP 3)

1. SUMMARY. THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. THE GOVERNMENT OF ONSLOW HAS THREATENED US CITIZENS IN THAT COUNTRY AND HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PROVIDE AID AND ASSISTANCE TO FORCES ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES WITH UNITED STATES FORCES.
2. SITUATION. THE USSR WILL UNDOUBTEDLY EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH A BASE OF OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN WHICH WOULD PLACE EVERY SHIP, THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE SOUTH COAST OF CONUS IN RANGE OF ATTACK. AT PRESENT ALL AVAILABLE LANTCOM FORCES ARE ENGAGED IN DEFENSE OF NAVBASE CHARLIE.
3. DETAILED PLANNING GUIDANCE
A. TENTATIVE MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCLANT WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO SEIZE THE ISLAND OF ONSLOW TO RETURN THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT TO POWER.
B. AREA OF OPERATIONS. COUNTRY OF ONSLOW AND ADJACENT WATERS.
C. ASSUMPTIONS. ARMED FORCES OF CORNADA WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW. GOC MAY TAKE POLITICAL ACTION - I.E., PROTEST IN THE U.N.
D. FORCE ALLOCATION. IN VIEW OF CURRENT WORLD SITUATION AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF OTHER FORCES, USCINCLANT COURSES OF ACTION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO CURRENT NAVY AND USMC FORCE LEVELS.
E. ANTICIPATED TASKS/OPERATIONS. COMSECONDFLT TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO QUARANTINE ONSLOW, LAND U.S. FORCES, DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND RESTORE ORDER. BE PREPARED IF DIRECTED TO EVACUATE U.S. CITIZENS AND DESIGNATED FOREIGN NATIONALS.
F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
(1) ANTICIPATED DATE OF EXECUTION: TBD
(2) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS: SIXTY DAYS
(3) DEFCON/DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE: AS DETERMINED BY USCINCLANT
G. KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS - NONE.
4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS
A. TRANSPORT
(1) AIRLIFT PRIORITY: 1B(2)
(2) LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC LIFT - STRATEGIC AIRLIFT ASSETS WILL BE LIMITED.
(3) STRATEGIC LIFT CAPABILITIES TO BE PROVIDED AS ARRANGED BY CINCMAC (AIRLIFT), COMMSC (SEALIFT), AND CDRMTMC (INLAND/CONUS SURFACE TRANSPORTATION.)
(4) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY JCS. PARENT SERVICES MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS.
B. FAD II FOR DEPLOYING UNITS.
C. KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS. NONE
D. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: PUBLIC AND MEDIA QUERIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO OASD (PA). AUDIO-VISUAL DOCUMENTATION AND MEDIA PRESS POOL WILL BE COORDINATED BY OASD (PA). INSTRUCTIONS TO FOLLOW.
E. USCINCLANT IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCLANT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. OTHER ACTION ADDEES ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. DIRLAUTH BETWEEN SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDS, WITH INFO TO JCS. USCINCLANT TO COORDINATE WITH AMEMBASSY JAX FOR CIVIL MILITARY AFFAIRS.
B. COMM-ELECT. CONUS-TO-ONSLOW CONNECTIVITY TO BE HANDLED THROUGH NAVCAMSLANT.

B

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION



191207z JUN 87

FM CINCLANTFLT
TO USCINCLANT NORFOLK
COMSECONDFLT

190815z JUN 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK
INFO CMC WASHINGTON DC
CG II MAF
CG 2D MAB

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ STATUS OF 2D MAB

REF A. JCS 061012Z MAY 87 (NOTAL)
B. USCINCLANT 181222Z JUN 87 (NOTAL)

1. REF A DIRECTED MOBILIZATION OF 2D MAB AT MCB CAMP LEJEUNE AND MCAS CHERRY POINT NC. G
2. REF B REQUESTED OPERATIONAL STATUS OF 2D MAB.
3. UPON ARRIVAL AT SIA, 2D MAB ELEMENTS WERE ISSUED REMAIN BEHIND EQUIPMENT OF 6TH MAB AND COMMENCED AN EXTENSIVE TRAINING PERIOD.
4. TRAINING PERIOD OF 2D MAB WILL TERMINATE ON 25 JUN AT WHICH TIME 2D MAB WILL BE DECLARED OPERATIONALLY READY.

BT



18

Encl (4)

PHASE III - COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT. USCINCLANT now develops and evaluates various courses of action and submits them to JCS in his Commander's Estimate. It reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various courses of action that may be employed to accomplish the assigned mission. It also contains recommendations as to the best course of action. Supporting commanders may be requested to provide certain information that could assist the supported commander in the formulation and evaluation of the various courses of action.

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

201627Z JUN 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG II MAF
CG 2D MAB

201212Z JUN 87

FM CINCLANTFLT
TO COMSECONDFLT
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
NAVCAMSLANT NORFOLK VA

200810Z JUN 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

200805Z JUN 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC WASHINGTON DC
JDA MACDILL AFB FL

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ OPREP-1 ONSLOW (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE)

REF A. JCS 181440Z JUN 87 (WARNING ORDER)

1. IAW REF A, THE FOLLOWING COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED FOR NCA CONSIDERATION.
2. MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED, USCINCLANT FORCES CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW TO DESTROY ONSLOWAN MILITARY FORCES AND ASSIST IN RESTORING THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT.

3. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION. THE RULING MILITARY JUNTA, LED BY COLONEL DIAZ, DECLARED ONSLOW A MARXIST STATE AND NOW ALIGNED WITH CORNADA AND ORANGE.

A. OWN COURSE OF ACTION. REF A DIRECTED THAT C/A BE LIMITED TO CURRENT USN/USMC FORCE LEVELS WHICH LIMITS THE COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE. THE FOLLOWING C/A ARE PROPOSED:

(1). C/A 1. BACKLOAD 4TH MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FROM NAVBASE CHARLIE ON LANTCOM AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS CURRENTLY IN THAT AREA AND CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON THE NORTH COAST OF ONSLOW TO SEIZE A LODGEMENT TO INCLUDE THE KINSTON AIRPORT. AIRLIFT THE AIR ALERT BATTALION FROM NAVBASE CHARLIE TO KINSTON TO JOIN 4TH MAB. 4TH MAB CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW TO DESTROY MILITARY FORCES AND RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. ONE CVBG FROM CORNADA TO ONSLOW TO SUPPORT THE LANDING. C D

(A) ONE CVBG
1. TG20 - 1 CARRIER AND SIX SUPPORTING SHIPS
2. LD - 0 HOURS
3. ER - 30 HOURS FROM CURRENT LOCATION
4. CL - 0 HOURS

(B) LANDING FORCE
1. 4TH MAB
2. LD - 36 HOURS
3. ER - 55 HOURS
4. CL - 0 HOURS

(C) AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE
1. PHIB GROUP
2. LD - 36 HOURS
3. ER - 55 HOURS
4. CL - 0 HOURS

(D) AIR ALERT BATTALION
1. INF BN
2. LD - 8 HOURS
3. ER - 3 HOURS
4. CL - 8 HOURS

(2) C/A 2. BACKLOAD 4TH MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FROM NAVBASE CHARLIE ON AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS IN THAT AREA AND CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON THE NORTH COAST OF ONSLOW. LOAD 2D MAB AT CAMP LEJEUNE ON RESIDUAL LANTFLT AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AND CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON THE SOUTHEAST COAST OF ONSLOW IN THE VICINITY OF JAX. CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO DESTROY MILITARY FORCES AND RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. ONE CVBG IN SUPPORT. D E F

(A) ONE CVBG - SAME AS C/A 1.
(B) INITIAL LANDING FORCE - SAME AS C/A 1.
(C) AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE - SAME AS C/A 1.
(D) ADDITIONAL MAB.
1. 2D MAB
2. LD - 36 HOURS
3. ER - 100 HOURS
4. CL - 0 HOURS

(E) AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE
1. PHIBGRU
2. LD - 36 HOURS
3. ER - 100 HOURS
4. CL - 0 HOURS

(3) C/A 3. BACKLOAD 4TH MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FROM NAVBASE CHARLIE ON AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS IN THAT AREA AND CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON THE NORTH COAST OF ONSLOW. LOAD 2D MAB AT CAMP LEJEUNE ON RESIDUAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AND CONDUCT AN ADMINISTRATIVE LANDING TO REINFORCE THE 4TH MAB. CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO DESTROY MILITARY FORCES AND RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. ONE CVBG IN SUPPORT. C D E D

(A) ONE CVBG - SAME AS C/A 1.
(B) INITIAL LANDING FORCE - SAME AS C/A 1.
(C) AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE - SAME AS C/A 1.
(D) ADDITIONAL MAB
1. 2D MAB
2. LD - 24 HOURS
3. ER - 100 HOURS
4. CL - 0 HOURS
(E) RESIDUAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING
1. PHIBGRU
2. LD - 24 HOURS
3. ER - 100 HOURS
4. CL - 0 HOURS

B. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING C/A. ENEMY FORCES HAVE THE POTENTIAL CAPABILITY TO ESTABLISH A SIGNIFICANT THREAT IF PERMITTED TIME TO MASS THEIR FORCES. IF THE ENEMY ELECTS TO KEEP HIS FORCES IN THEIR PRESENT DISPOSITIONS, THEY CAN BE ENGAGED AND DEFEATED PIECEMEAL.

C. COMPARISON OF OWN C/A.

(1) C/A 1 PROVIDES GREATEST DRAWDOWN FROM NAVBASE CHARLIE, REQUIRES STRATEGIC AIRLIFT ASSETS AND PROVIDES ONLY THREE INF BNS VERSUS FOUR IN C/A 2 AND 3.

(2) C/A 2 ENTAILS TWO SEPARATE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE ISLAND, THEREBY PREVENTING THE ENEMY FROM MASSING HIS FORCES.

(3) C/A 3 CAN BE INITIATED SOONER IN THAT ADMINISTRATIVE LOAD AND OFFLOAD CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED FASTER AND NO REHEARSAL IS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY CAN MASS ALL HIS FORCES IN THE KINSTON AREA AND PROVIDE A FORMIDABLE DEFENSE.

D. DECISION. RECOMMEND C/A 2 WITH THE OPTION TO EXECUTE C/A 3 IF THE ENEMY SITUATION AT THE TIME SO DICTATES.

4. FORCES AVAILABLE:
COMSECONDFLT
TF20 TWO CVBGS OFFSHORE CORNADA
TF21 CORNADA
TF22 TG22.1 NAVBASE CHARLIE; TG22.2 NORVA
USMC II MAF, CORNADA
USMCR 2D MAB, CAMP LEJEUNE

BT

APPROVED COURSE OF ACTION



20 JUNE COUNTER COUP



PHASE III - COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT Continued

2119212 JUN 87

FM DIA
TO AIG 2067

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 0200//

SUBJ ONSLOW INTSUM

1. YESTERDAY MORNING THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT BY ONE BATTALION OF THE ONSLOW NATIONAL GUARD TO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT IN JAX. THOUGH FIERCE FIGHTING TOOK PLACE IN THE MORNING IT WAS APPARENT BY THE AFTERNOON THAT ONSLOW NG FORCES SUPPORTING DIAZ HAD REGAINED CONTROL OF THE CITY. FIRING LATER IN THE DAY WERE PROBABLY EXECUTIONS OF SUSPECTED REBELS. LATER ONSLOWAN NG AND POLICE UNITS SURROUNDED AMEMB. DIAZ HAS MADE A STATEMENT THAT THE US AMBASSADOR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REBELLION AND HAS STATED HE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. HE HAS ALSO ACCUSED THREE US CITIZENS OF SPYING.

J

PHASE IV - COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

PHASE IV - COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION. In this phase the JCS review and analyze the Commander's Estimate and present the courses of action in order of priority to the NCA for decision. The JCS then sends an Alert Order to all concerned which conveys the NCA decision to prepare for military operations which completes Phase IV.

ALERT ORDER

251557Z JUN 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG II MAF
CG 2D MAB
CG 4TH MAB

251430Z JUN 87

FM CINCLANTFLT
TO COMSECONDFLT
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
NAVCAMSLANT NORFOLK VA

251013Z JUN 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

251007Z JUN 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
TO USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCMAC SCOTT AFB IL
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC WASHINGTON DC
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC.
CMC WASHINGTON DC

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

CJCS SENDS
SUBJ ALERT ORDER - ONSLOW OPERATIONS

REF A. JCS 181440Z JUN 87 (WARNING ORDER)
B. USCINCLANT 140805Z JUN 87 (CMDR'S ESTIMATE)

1. SUMMARY. THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED EXECUTION PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW.
2. SITUATION. THE MILITARY JUNTA HAS DECLARED ONSLOW A MARXIST STATE AND HAS MOVED FORCES INTO POSITIONS THREATENING THE AMEMBASSY. USCINCLANT WILL CONDUCT OPERATION IN ONSLOW TO DESTROY MILITARY FORCES AND ESTABLISH INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNTIL ELECTIONS.
3. MISSION. APPROVED AS STATED IN REF B.
4. EXECUTION.
A. COURSE OF ACTION. C/A TWO AS STATED IN REF B IS APPROVED.
B. MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. REF B APPLIES.
C. ALERTED FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED TO COMMENCE STAGING/LOADING. ACTUAL MOVEMENT TO COMMENCE ON USCINCLANT ORDER.
D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
(1) C-DAY TENTATIVELY SET FOR 11 JUL 87.
(2) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS: SIXTY DAYS.
(3) COORDINATE WITH NAVBASE CHARLIE FOR BACKLOAD OF 4TH MAB.
(4) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE FROM MY WARNING ORDER.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.
USCINCLANT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. OTHER ACTION ADDEES ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. DIRLAUTH BETWEEN SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDS, WITH INFO TO JCS. USCINCLANT TO COORDINATE WITH AMEMBASSY JAX FOR CIVIL MILITARY AFFAIRS.
B. COMM-ELECT. AS PER REF A.

BT

PHASE V - EXECUTION PLANNING

PHASE V - EXECUTION PLANNING. This phase begins upon receipt of the Alert Order. Planning is conducted concurrently at several levels and the result is promulgated in an Operation Order. The OpOrder contains:

- A task organization.
- The situation.
- The mission.
- The concept of operations.
- Anticipated time of execution.
- Rules of engagement.
- Command relationships.
- Logistics information.
- Administrative guidance.

260400Z JUN 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG 2D MAB
INFO CMC WASHINGTON DC
USCINCLANT NORFOLK
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMSECONDFLT
COMPHIBGRU TWO
CG II MAF

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ ACTIVATION FOR ONSLOW OPERATIONS

REF A. JCS 181440Z JUN 87(WARNING ORDER) (PASEP)
B. USCINCLANT 200805Z JUN 87 (CDRS EST) (PASEP)
C. JCS 251007Z JUN 87 (ALERT ORDER) (PASEP)

1. SUMMARY. REF A DIRECTED USCINCLANT DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION FOR ONSLOW OPERATIONS. REF B RECOMMENDED 2D MAB CONDUCT AMPHIB OPN. REF C APPROVED REF B AND ESTABLISHED C-DAY AS 11 JUL.
2. 2D MAB REPORT TO COMSECONDFLT ASAP AS CTG 23.2.
3. ANTICIPATE COMSECONDFLT INITIATING DIRECTIVE TO FOLLOW.

BT



22

AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA



INITIATING DIRECTIVE

011507Z JUL 87

FM COMSECONDFLT
TO CTG 20.2
CTG 22.2
CTG 23.2

INFO USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
CG II MAF
CTF 20
CTF 22

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ INITIATING DIRECTIVE

REF A. USCINCLANT 152230 JUN 87
B. JCS 181440Z JUN 87 (WARNING ORDER)
C. DIA 211921Z JUN 87
D. JCS 251007Z JUN 87 (ALERT ORDER)
E. USCINCLANT 271433Z JUN 87 (NOTAL)

1. THIS IS AN INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR THE CONDUCT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ON THE SOUTHEASTERN COAST OF ONSLOW TO DESTROY MILITARY FORCES AND RETURN THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT TO POWER.
2. SITUATION: REFS A THRU C CONTAIN A RECAP OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ON ONSLOW. REFS D AND E DIRECT COMSECONDFLT TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW.
3. MISSION: ON OR ABOUT 23 JUL 1987, CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ON SOUTHEAST COAST OF ONSLOW TO:
   A. SEIZE A BEACHHEAD FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS;
   B. CONDUCT SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS TO DESTROY ONSLOWAN FORCES IN ZONE;
   C. EVACUATE US NATIONALS;
   D. SEIZE THE CITY OF JAX;
   E. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT FURTHER OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER TO ISLAND.
4. CTG 22.2, COMPHIBGRU TWO IS DESIGNATED AS CATF. CTG 23.2, CG 2D MAB IS DESIGNATED AS CLF.
5. AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA IS DESCRIBED BY STRAIGHT LINES CONNECTING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
   A. 07645W/3445N
   B. 07645W/3417N
   C. 07715W/3400N
   D. 07745W/3430N
   E. 07745W/3455N
   F. 07715W/3455N
   G. TO ORIGIN
6. CODENAME FOR THIS OPERATION IS SOLAR FLARE. EXECUTE ON OR ABOUT 23 JUL 87.
7. NO OFFENSIVE USE OF NUCLEAR OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTEMPLATED. USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AUTHORIZED. CONVENTIONAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AS SET FORTH IN CINCLANTFLT OPORD 2000 APPLY.
8. UPON SEIZURE OF THE FORCE BEACHHEAD AND WHEN THE LANDING FORCE IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE, THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS TERMINATED AND THE LANDING FORCE CHOPS TO CG, II MAF.
9. FOR CTG 20.2 PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION UNDER SITUATION BRAVO. ACT AS AAWC TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE IN THE AOA UNTIL AMPHIB OPS TERMINATED.

BT

AOA

28

021622Z JUL 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG 2D MAB
INFO CMC WASHINGTON DC
CG II MAF
CG 4TH MAB

021007Z JUL 87

FM COMNAVSURFLANT
TO COMPHIBGRU TWO
INFO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMSECONDFLT
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW

REF A. COMSECONDFLT 011507Z JUL 87

1. REF A IS THE SECONDFLT INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW.
2. FOLLOWING SHIPPING ASSIGNED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY:
   USS NASSAU (LHA-4)
   USS SHREVEPORT LPD-12)
   USS NASHVILLE (LPD-13)
   USS TRENTON (LPD-14)
   USS FT SNELLING (LSD-31)
   USS SPIEGEL GROVE (LSD-32)
   USS SAGINAW (LST 1188)
   USS SPARTANSBURG CTY (LST 1192)
   USS FAIRFAX CTY (LST 1193)
   USS LAMOURE CTY (LST 1194)
   USS HARLAN CTY (LST 1196)
   USS CHARLESTON (LKA 113)

BT

030233Z JUL 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG 2D MAB
CG MCB CAMP LEJEUNE NC

022230Z JUL 87

FM COMSECONDFLT
TO CTG 22.2
INFO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ SAILING ORDERS

REF A. COMNAVSURFLANT 021007Z JUL 87

1. REF A ASSIGNED SHIPPING FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW.
2. SORTIE NORFOLK/LITTLE CREEK NLT 081200Q JUL 87 TO ARRIVE MHC FOR LOADING TO COMMENCE 090800Q.
3. BE PREPARED TO DEPART MHC 110600Q JUL 87.

BT

NE

030300Z JUL 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG 2D MAB
CG MCB CAMP LEJEUNE NC
INFO CMC WASHINGTON DC
CG II MAF
CG 4TH MAB

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ EMBARKATION AT MHC

REF A. COMSECONDFLT 022230Z JUL 87

1. REF A DIRECTS CTG 22.2 TO SORTIE NORFOLK NLT 081200Q JUL 87.
2. BE PREPARED TO COMMENCE LOADING AT MHC UPON ARRIVAL OF SHIPS ABOUT 090800Q.

BT

NE


COMBAT TOWN
HAWK
CROW
FIRE TOWER
DOVE
GOOSE
CANARY
BLUEBIRD
ATF OBJ 2
FBHL
LF OBJ C
LF OBJ B
LF OBJ A
RED BEACH
ONSLOW SOUTH TOWER
RANGE
34°32′
77°16′
Kinston
New Bern
Oak Grove
MCAS Cherry Point
Atlantic Airfield
Highlands
Jax
Morehead City
ATF OBJ 1
Burgaw
Hampstead
AOA

29

Encl (4)

2D MAB OPERATION ORDER

UNCLASSIFIED

2D MAB/CTG-23.2
CAMP LEJEUNE, NC
10 JULY 1987

CLF/2D MAB OPERATION ORDER 1-87 (SOLAR FLARE)

REF (A) MAP: DMA, GNC, CHART 9.
JOG(AIR) 1:250,000 BEAUFORT, NC
SERIES 1501, SHEET NI 18-4.
CAMP LEJEUNE SPECIAL MAP, 1:50,000
(B) COMSECONDFLT 011507Z JUL 87 (INITIATING DIRECTIVE)
(C) CATF/COMPHIBGRU TWO OPORDER 2-87 (SOLAR FLARE)

TIME ZONE: QUEBEC (Z+4)
TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE ANNEX A.

1. SITUATION
   A. GENERAL. THIS IS THE CLF/2D MAB OPERATION ORDER FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW.
   B. ENEMY FORCES. ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE).
   C. FRIENDLY FORCES.
      (1) CTG-20.2 - BATTLE FORCE SECOND FLEET PROVIDES ONE CVBG FOR AIR SUPPORT AND ACTS AS AAWC TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE OF THE AOA.
      (2) CTG-22.2 - COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWO ACTS AS COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE.
      (3) CG, II MAF - ASSUMES OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF LANDING FORCE WHEN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS TERMINATED.
      (4) CG, 4TH MAB - CONTINUES ATTACK TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN ZONE.
   D. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. NONE
   E. ASSUMPTIONS. NONE.
2. MISSION
   A. WHEN DIRECTED, ABOUT 23 JUL 1987, 2D MAB CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ON THE SOUTHEASTERN COAST OF ONSLOW IN THE VICINITY OF JAX TO DESTROY ONSLOWAN FORCES AND EVACUATE US NATIONALS.
3. EXECUTION
   A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ANNEX C (OPERATIONS). WHEN DIRECTED, AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY ABOUT 23 JUL 1987, 2D MAB FORCES CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE JAX AREA OF ONSLOW TO:
      (1) SEIZE A BEACHHEAD FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS;
      (2) CONDUCT SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AS PART OF II MAF TO DESTROY ONSLOWAN MILITARY FORCES IN ZONE;
      (3) SEIZE THE CAPITAL IN THE CITY OF JAX AND RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT;
      (4) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT FURTHER OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER TO THE ISLAND.
   B. TASKS
      (1) 23D MARINES (-) (REIN)
         (A) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY, CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT TO SEIZE LF OBJECTIVE C. ON ORDER, CONTINUE ASSAULT TO SEIZE, OCCUPY AND DEFEND ATF OBJECTIVE 2.
         (B) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY CONDUCT SURFACE BORNE OPERATIONS TO SEIZE LF OBJECTIVE A AND B. ON ORDER CONDUCT OPERATIONS ACROSS INLAND WATERWAY TO SEIZE ATF OBJECTIVE 2.
         (C) AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY CONDUCT HELICOPTERBORNE OPERATIONS TO SEIZE ATF OBJECTIVE 1 (BOGUE FIELD).
      (2) MAG-20
         (A) WHEN ATF OBJ 1 HAS BEEN SECURED ESTABLISH ACE TO INCLUDE THE TAOC AT MCALF BOGUE.
         (B) PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE, OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT AND ASSAULT SUPPORT TO THE LANDING FORCE, AS DIRECTED.
      (3) BSSG-2
         (A) WHEN DIRECTED, LAND ACROSS RED BEACH 2 TO ESTABLISH A CSSA AT LZ FALCON.
      (4) HQ 2D MAB
         (A) ON ORDER LAND ACROSS RED BEACH 2 AND ESTABLISH THE CP IN VIC OF ATF OBJ 2.
   C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
      (1) THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA) WILL BE ACTIVATED BY CATF AND REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL DISESTABLISHED UPON TERMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. THE AOA IS DESCRIBED BY STRAIGHT LINES CONNECTING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
      (A) 07645W/3445N
      (B) 07645W/3417N
      (C) 07715W/3400N
      (D) 07745W/3430N
      (E) 07745W/3455N
      (F) 07715W/3455N
      (G) TO ORIGIN
      (2) AIRSPACE COORDINATION: APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX M (AIR OPERATIONS
      (3) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)
      (4) CODE NAME: SOLAR FLARE
      (5) H-HOUR: TBD BY CATF
      D-DAY: 23 JUL 1987
      (6) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS: 60 DAYS.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
   A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. ANNEX J (COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS)
   B. SIGNAL. ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS)
   C. COMMAND POSTS. ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

ANNEXES:
A. TASK ORGANIZATION
B. INTELLIGENCE (OMITTED)
C. OPERATIONS (OMITTED)
D. LOGISTICS (OMITTED)
E. PERSONNEL (OMITTED)
F. PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OMITTED)
G. CIVIL AFFAIRS (OMITTED)
H. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (OMITTED)
J. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (OMITTED)
K. COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS (OMITTED)
L. OPERATIONS SECURITY (OMITTED)
M. AIR OPERATIONS (OMITTED)
P. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (OMITTED)
R. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (OMITTED)
X. EXECUTION CHECKLIST (OMITTED)
Z. DISTRIBUTION (OMITTED)

SITUATION FIVE - Questions, Continued

1. What amphibious ships carry helicopters during an amphibious operation? What amphibious ships have well decks which can be flooded?
2. What type aircraft are available to II MAF in 1987?
3. What are the duties of a helicopter support team (HST)?
4. What is an annex to an operation order? Why are annexes used?
5. Name the three principal centers which comprise the Marine Air Command and Control System.
6. The Landing Force Shore Party works closely with its Navy counterpart during the ship-to-shore movement. What is the Navy unit called?

ANNEX A

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO CLF/2D MAB OPORDER 1-87

HQ, 2D MAB
H&S CO, 2D MAB
DET 1,2,3, HQ, 2D MAB
HQ BN(-), 4TH MARDIV
DET 2, HQBN
DET, TRK CO, HQ BN
PLT, MP CO, HQ BN
DET, FIIU, HQ BN
DET, AVSS, HQ BN
ITT, 32, 33, 34, 35, HQ BN
CIT, 10, 12, 14, HQ BN
6TH COMM BN (-)
DET, HQ CO, 6TH COMM BN
COMM CO, 6TH COMM BN
DET, COMM SPT CO, 6TH COMM BN
DET, LONGLINES CO, 6TH COMM BN
DET, 4TH FORECON CO
DET, PAO, 23D MARINES
DET, PAO, MAG-42
DET, PAO, H&S BN, 4TH FSSG

ANNEX A Continued

REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM - 23
- 23D MARINES (-) (REIN)
  - HQ CO, 23D MAR
  - 1ST BN, 23D MAR
  - 3D BN, 2D MAR
  - 1ST BN, 14TH MAR (-)
    - HQ BTRY, 1ST BN, 14TH MAR
    - BTRY A, 1ST BN, 14TH MAR
    - BTRY C, 1ST BN, 14TH MAR
  - CO D, 4TH RECON BN
  - 8TH TANK BN(-)
    - CO D, 8TH TANK BN
    - AT (TOW) CO, 8TH TANK BN
  - 4TH ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN BN (-)
    - H&S CO, 4TH AAV BN
    - CO B, 4TH AAV BN
  - CO A, 4TH CBTENGR BN

MARINE AIR GROUP - 20
- MWHS-4
- MWCG-48
  - H+HS-48
  - MWCS-48
  - TACC(-) (2D MAW)
  - MASS-6
  - MACS-24
  - MATCS-48
  - DET,4TH FAAD BTRY
  - BTRY, LAAM BN (2D MAW)
- MAG-VF/VA
  - H+MS-(VF/VA)
  - MABS-24
  - VMFA 251 — 6 F/A18
  - VMA-133(-) — 6 A-4F
- MAG-VH
  - H+MS-(VH)
  - MABS-42
  - HMM-774(-) — 8 CH-46E
  - HMM(-) (2D MAW)
  - HMH(-) (2D MAW)
  - HMA-773(-) — 4 AH-1J
  - VMO-4 (DET) — 2 OV-10A
- MWSG-47
  - H+HS-47
  - WTS-47
  - WES-47



ANNEX A Continued

BRIGADE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP - 4
- H&S BN, 4TH FSSG (-)
  - H&S CO (-), H&S BN
  - SVC CO (-), H&S BN
  - COMM CO (-), H&S BN
- 4TH LDGSPT BN (-)
  - H&S CO (-), 4TH LDGSPT BN
  - CO A, 4TH LDGSPT BN
- 6TH ENGRSPT BN (-)
  - CO C, 6TH ENGRSPT BN
  - BRIDGE CO (-), 6TH ENGRSPT BN
  - PLT, BULKFUEL CO, 6TH ENGRSPT, BN
- 4TH MAINT BN (-)
  - H&S CO (-), 4TH MAINT BN
  - PLT, AUTOCONT CO, 4TH MAINT BN
  - PLT, ELECMAINTRPR CO, 4TH MAINT BN
  - TM, ORDMAINTCONT CO, 4TH MAINT BN
  - DET, ENGRMAINT CO, 4TH MAINT BN
  - DET, GSMAINT CO, 4TH MAINT BN
  - DET, ELMA CO, 4TH MAINT BN
- 4TH SUPPLY BN (-)
  - DET, H&S CO, 4TH SUPPLY BN
  - SMU, 4TH SUPPLY BN
  - PLT, AMMO CO, 4TH SUPPLY BN
  - DET, MEDLOG CO, 4TH SUPPLY BN
  - DET, RATION CO, 4TH SUPPLY BN
  - DET, SUPPLY CO, 4TH SUPPLY BN
- 6TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BN (-)
  - H&S CO, 6TH MTBN
- 4TH MEDICAL BN (-)
  - DET, H&S CO, 4TH MED BN
- 4TH DENTAL BN (-)
  - 4TH DENT CO (-), 4TH DENT BN

SITUATION FIVE - Questions, Continued

1. A task organization for a Marine Amphibious Brigade can be broken into four major elements. What are they?
2. A Regimental Landing Team is task organized to conduct ground operations. What forces are included in this task organization?
3. What weapons systems are available to the MAB Commander for air defense of the MAB Area of Ops?
4. There are six functions of Marine Aviation. What squadrons in the 2d MAB task organization provide each of these functions?

PHASE VI - EXECUTION. When the President so directs, the Secretary of Defense orders the Chairman, JCS to issue the JCS Execute Order. It contains the most current information, provides the latest guidance and establishes an execution time. Extremely critical situations, such as the one depicted here, could compress the actions taken in Phases II through V. On the other hand, the decision may be made at anytime to hold in the present phase or to revert to an earlier phase in the CAS process. Again, the keynote of the Crisis Action System is flexibility.

EXECUTE ORDER

150422Z JUL 87

FM CG FMFLANT
TO CG II MAF
CG 2D MAB
CG 4TH MAB

150224Z JUL 87

FM CINCLANTFLT
TO COMSECONDFLT
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
NAVCAMSLANT NORFOLK VA

152257Z JUL 87

FM USCINCLANT
TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

152233Z JUL 87

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
TO USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCMAC SCOTT AFB IL
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC WASHINGTON DC
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

CJCS SENDS
SUBJ EXECUTE ORDER - ONSLOW OPERATIONS

REF A. USCINCLANT 152230Z JUN 87 (OPREP-3)
B. JCS 181440Z JUN 87 (WARNING ORDER)
C. USCINCLANT 200805Z JUN 87 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE)
D. JCS 251007Z JUN 87 (ALERT ORDER)

1. THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
2. SITUATION. THE SITUATION IN ONSLOW HAS DETERIORATED AND THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAX AND US CITIZENS ARE ENDANGERED.
3. MISSION. CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN ONSLOW TO DESTROY ONSLOWAN FORCES, EVACUATE US NATIONALS AND RESTORE ORDER TO ISLAND.
4. EXECUTION
   A. COURSE OF ACTION. 4TH MAB CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF ONSLOW ABOUT 19 JUL 87. 2D MAB CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON SOUTHERN COAST OF ONSLOW ABOUT 23 JUL 87. CONDUCT SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS TO DESTROY ONSLOWAN MILITARY FORCES, RESTORE LAW AND ORDER AND RETURN LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT TO POWER.
   B. MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. UTILIZE FORCES STATED IN REF C.
   C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
      (1) AS STATED IN REF B.
      (2) EXECUTE ON 19 JUL (4TH MAB) AND 23 JUL (2D MAB).
      (3) DURATION OF OPERATIONS. 60-90 DAYS.
      (4) ROE AS PROMULGATED BY USCINCLANT.
      (5) DIRLAUTH ALCON.
5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
   A. MOVEMENT PRIORITY 182 ASSIGNED.
   B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. AS SET FORTH IN REF B.
   C. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING PROCEDURES APPLY. SEE JCS PUB 6.
6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   A. USCINCLANT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. OTHER ACTION ADDEES ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.
   B. SECONDFLT AUTHORIZED DIRECT LIAISON WITH AMEMBASSY, JAX.
   C. COMM-ELECT. NAVCAMSLANT TO ESTABLISH CONUS-ONSLOW CONNECTIVITY FOR ENTRY INTO DCS.

BT

D-DAY



D+1 SITUATION

SITUATION SIX - Questions

1. Name the phases of an amphibious operation.

2. Define an amphibious operation and describe its most salient requirement.

3. What is the purpose of a rehearsal?

4. In planning for an amphibious operation, there are certain "basic decisions" which have to be made prior to the commencement of detailed planning. What are these decisions?

5. What is the advance force and what are its primary tasks?

6. Name the five categories of the ship-to-shore movement.

7. What is an amphibious objective area?

8. How does the plan for the employment of aviation fit in?

9. What agency is responsible for fire support coordination during the initial phase of the ship-to-shore movement?

10. An amphibious operation is normally terminated when certain conditions have been met. What are these conditions?

11. What is a tank-heavy MCATF?

12. What is the caliber of the main gun on the M60A1 tank?

13. Name five functional areas of combat service support.

14. What is the unrefueled range of the LVTP-7?

160700Z JUL 87

FM COMSECONDFLT
TO CTG 22.2
CTG 23.2

160300Z JUL 87

FM UNCINCLANT
TO COMSECONDFLT

INFO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

BT
UNCLAS//NO 3000//

SUBJ MEDIA COVERAGE OF ONSLOW OPERATIONS

1. THIS HQS AUTHORIZES MEDIA COVERAGE OF OPERATIONS ON ONSLOW. THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE:
A. THE DOD NEWS MEDIA POOL CONSISTS OF TWO MILITARY ESCORT OFFICERS, ONE FROM OASD (PA), THE OTHER FROM USCINCLANT (PA), A REPORTER AND PHOTOGRAPHER FROM BOTH UPI AND AP, A REPORTER FROM UNITED STATIONS RADIO, A THREE-PERSON TV CREW FROM NBC, A REPORTER AND A PHOTOGRAPHER FROM U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT MAGAZINE AND ONE REPORTER EACH FROM BOTH THE SCRIPPS HOWARD AND MILWAUKEE JOURNAL NEWSPAPERS.
B. THE DOD NEWS MEDIA POOL WILL FLY BY DOD AIRCRAFT FROM ANDREWS AFB TO ARRIVE ABOARD USS NASSAU PRIOR TO L-HOUR, D-DAY.
2. UPON ARRIVAL, REQUEST PRESS POOL BE BRIEFED ON OPERATIONAL SITUATION. PRESS POOL REPS ARE PERMITTED TO ACCOMPANY GROUND FORCES IN CONDUCT OF MISSION, AS POSSIBLE, ON A NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OPERATIONS BASIS.
3. PRESS POOL WILL ARRIVE WITH PERSONAL EQUIPMENT. REQ PROVIDE BODY ARMOR, ETC., IF DEEMED NECESSARY. ADDITIONALLY, REQ PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, AS FEASIBLE, IN FORWARDING RELEASES BACK TO STATES. EXPECT WIRE SERVICE TRANSMITTALS TO USE NAVY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM AS TIME PERMITS BETWEEN OPERATIONAL MESSAGE TRAFFIC. REQ TAPES, AUDIO TAPES AND EXPOSED PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM BE FLOWN, SPACE AVAILABLE, TO CONUS WHERE OTHER DESIGNATED POOL REPRESENTATIVES WILL FURTHER DISSEMINATE VIA THEIR OWN CHANNELS.

BT

240107Z JUL 87

FM CTG 23.2
TO CTG 22.2

INFO II MAF
CTG 20.2

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 001 FOR PERIOD 230800 TO 232400 JUL 87

1. ENEMY SITUATION.
A. THE ONSLOW NATIONAL GUARD FORCES ENCOUNTERED BY THE LANDING FORCE RESISTED THE INITIAL LANDING BUT THEN WITHDREW TO THE NORTHWEST. ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE AREA CONDUCTING GROUND ATTACKS AND TROOP TRANSPORT OPERATIONS.
B. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
(1) CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW UNTIL ALL FORCES ARE ACROSS NEW RIVER.
(2) COUNTERATTACK 23 MARINE FORCES NORTH OF RT 172.
C. 1/23 MET MINOR RESISTANCE AT LF OBJ C WHEREAS 3/2 MET HEAVIER RESISTANCE AT OBJ B. CO 3/2 ENCOUNTERED ONLY SCATTERED RESISTANCE AT ATF OBJ 1.
D. ENEMY LOSSES THIS PERIOD: CONFIRMED KIA 23, EST WIA 35, POW-16. 1 TANK DAMAGED, 2 AAWS DAMAGED, 1 LAV DAMAGED, 4 TRUCKS OUT OF ACTION.
2. OWN SITUATION.
A. 1/23 IN LF OBJ C. 3/2(-) IN LF OBJ B. CO 3/2 IN ATF OBJ 1 (BOGUE).
B. BTRY A/1/14 LANDED ACROSS RED BEACH ONE FOLLOWED BY LFSP.
C. HQ 23D MARINES, FSCC AND DASC ASHORE VIC LF OBJ B.
D. 1/23 LANDED BY HELIBORNE ASSAULT ON LF OBJ C AT 0800. BY 1400 OBJ C WAS SECURED. AT 0800 3/2(-) REIN CONDUCTED SURFACE ASSAULT OVER RED BEACH 1 AND 2 AND SEIZED LF OBJ A AND B. 3/2(-) SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED THE INLAND WATERWAY AND CONTINUES THE ATTACK TOWARD ATF OBJ 2. CO 3/2 SEIZED ATF OBJ 1 AGAINST SCATTERED RESISTANCE AT 1500. AT 1800 HQ 23D MARINES, FSCC AND DASC LANDED OVER RED BEACH 2.
E. NONEFFECTIVE UNITS. NONE.
3. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. LANDING FORCE SHORE PARTY LANDED ACROSS RED BEACH 2, SUPPLIES LANDING AS PLANNED.
4. GENERAL. NO COMMENT.
5. COMMANDERS EVALUATION. LANDING AND BUILDUP ASHORE HAS GONE ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE DUE TO LACK OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTION. THE ENEMY NOW KNOWS WE ARE HERE AND WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO REACT SOON.

BT

250120Z JUL 87

FM CTG 23.2
TO CTG 22.2

INFO II MAF
CTG 20.2

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ SIT REP 002 FOR PRD 240001 TO 242400 JUL 87

1. ENEMY SITUATION.
A. ONSLOW NATIONAL GUARD GROUND FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN OUT OF CONTACT WITH 23 MARINES. ONSLOWAN AIR FORCES CONTINUE SPORADIC ATTACKS ON 2D MAB INSTALLATION AND ARTILLERY FIRE IS STILL ABLE TO HIT TARGETS IN FORCE BEACHHEAD.
B. EN COURSES OF ACTION
(1) CONTINUE WITHDRAWAL TO NEW RIVER.
(2) REINFORCE DEFENDING FORCES AND CONDUCT ATTACKS AGAINST FBH.
C. DURING THE NIGHT, ENEMY WITHDREW TO VIC ATF OBJ 2 AND ESTABLISHED A HASTY DEFENSE.
D. 2D BN STRENGTH EST 80 PERCENT. 3D BN 100 PERCENT. LOSSES BY 2D BN THIS PRD: CONFIRMED KIA-16, EST WIA - 60, POW - 4. 1 TANK DAMAGED, 2 AAV DESTROYED, 1 DAMAGED; 3 TRUCKS DAMAGED.
E. EXPECT ENEMY TO ATTACK WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO FORCE MAB FROM BEACHHEAD.
2. OWN SITUATION.
A. 1/23 CONDUCTING COMPANY SIZE PATROLS VICINITY COURTHOUSE BAY AND LZ BLUEBIRD. 3/2 CONSOLIDATED IN VIC OF ATF OBJ 2..
B. 1/14 IN LZ ALBATROSS, HQ 23 MAR FSCC AND DASC IN LZ FALCON. CONTROL OF SUPPORTING ARMS PASSED ASHORE AT 1800. TAOC BEING ESTABLISHED AT MCALF BOGUE.
C. CSSA IN LZ FALCON. MWSG-47 ASHORE AT BOGUE.
D. 1/23 CONDUCTED COMPANY SIZED PATROLS FROM LF OBJ A TO COURTHOUSE BAY AND LZ BLUEBIRD ENCOUNTERING ONLY MINOR OPPOSITION. 3/2 FORMED A MCATF AND ATTACKED TOWARD ATF OBJ 2.
E. NONEFFECTIVE UNITS. NONE.
3. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. SUPPLY BUILDUP ASHORE CONTINUES. MWSG-47 ESTABLISHING FACILITIES AT MCALF BOGUE.
4. GENERAL. PLANS ARE UNDERWAY TO CONDUCT AN ATTACK ON ATF OBJ 2 AT FIRST LIGHT D+2. INTEND TO BRING IN MAB FIXED WING AIR ON D+2.
5. COMMANDERS EVALUATION. TOMORROW'S ATTACK AT ATF OBJ 2 COULD WELL BE MET BY A COUNTERATTACK.

BT

SITUATION SEVEN
SITUATION AT STARTEX



Encl (4)

35

251907Z JUL 87

FM CTG 23.2
TO CTG 22.2

INFO II MAF
CTG 20.2

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ INTSUM NUMBER TWO/FOR PERIOD ENDING 251800Z JUL 87

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. (PARAGRAPHS WITH NO INFORMATION TO REPORT HAVE BEEN OMITTED.)
A. ENEMY INFANTRY BATTALIONS THAT WERE DEFENDING ATF OBJ 2 HAVE WITHDRAWN 4 KM TO THE NORTHWEST AND ARE NOW LOCATED VIC 883353 AND 865356. BELIEVE 2D BN IS AT 865356, WITH 3D BN, AT 883353. ALSO LOCATED IS AN ENEMY TANK CO AT 877368 AND AN UNDERSTRENGTH ARTILLERY BATTALION (155MM HOW) AT 862372. SINCE THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS SUFFERED MODERATE CASUALTIES BEFORE THEY WITHDREW, ESTIMATE THEY ARE MANNED AT APPROX 80 PERCENT STRENGTH.
B. TRACE OF FORWARD ELEMENTS. SEE OVERLAY.
F. AIR ACTIVITY. ENEMY AIR HAS CONDUCTED A LIMITED NUMBER OF CAS MISSIONS DURING THE PERIOD USING AV-8 A/C. ESTIMATE TEN SORTIES IN THE 24-HR PERIOD.
2. ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES.
A. PERSONNEL: CONFIRMED KIA - 24, ESTIMATED KIA - 31, ESTIMATED WIA - 110, POW - 45.
B. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL. 2 TANKS DAMAGED, 6 AAVS DAMAGED/DESTROYED, 2 LAVS DAMAGED, 8 TRUCKS OUT OF ACTION.
3. NEW OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS. MINEFIELD IS BEING INSTALLED JUST SOUTH OF MARINE ROAD VIC LZ DOVE.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES. HUMINT INDICATES THE ENEMY BATTALIONS ARE RECEIVING REPLACEMENTS.
7. ESTIMATED NUMBER AND TYPES OF VEHICLES, SHIPS, AIRCRAFT. VEHICLES: 17 M60A1 TANKS; 10 LAV; 24 AAV; NUMEROUS TRUCKS (M939) AND HMMWVS. AIRCRAFT: 6 AV-8; 6 F-4, 2 UH-1N, 6 CH46, 4 AH1T.
8. WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS. NO CHANGE FROM INTELL ESTIMATE.
9. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. THE ENEMY CAN DEFEND IN PLACE, REINFORCE AND CONDUCT COUNTERATTACK AGAINST FBH. HIS LOCS CAN BE CUT WITH AIR STRIKES ON THE ROADS FROM JAX.
10. CONCLUSION. THE ENEMY WILL MOST LIKELY CONDUCT ATTACKS SUPPORTED BY TANKS, ARTY AND AIR IN AN ATTEMPT TO DRIVE 2D MAB FORCES BACK TO THE BEACH. THE ENEMY ALSO MAY ATTEMPT TO INFILTRATE SMALL RAIDING FORCES INTO THE LSA OR OTHER REAR INSTALLATIONS TO SABOTAGE AND DISRUPT REAR AREA ACTIVITIES.

BT

260113Z JUL 87

FM CTG 23.2
TO CTG 22.2

INFO II MAF
CTG 20.2

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 30000//

SUBJ SIT REP 003 FOR PRD 250001 TO 252400 JUL 87

1. ENEMY SITUATION.
A. ENEMY FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN TO THE VICINITY OF FRENCH CREEK. INFORMATION INDICATES THAT BOTH INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN THE VICINITY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY TANKS, AAV'S AND ARMORED CARS (LAV).
B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:
(1) CONDUCT COUNTERATTACK AGAINST 23 MAR POSITIONS IN FBH.
(2) DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS.
(3) WITHDRAW ACROSS NEW RIVER.
C. AFTER PUTTING UP STIFF RESISTANCE ALL MORNING AT ATF OBJ 2, ENEMY WITHDREW TO THE NORTH IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON.
D. POW INTERROGATION REVEALS ENEMY IS PROVIDING REPLACEMENT TO 2D BN IN ORDER TO BRING THEM UP TO STRENGTH.
E. IF ENEMY IS REINFORCING IT IS EXPECTED THAT HE WILL ATTACK SOON.
2. OWN SITUATION.
A. 3/2 ON ATF OBJ 2 AS OF 1400.
B. 2D MAB HQ NOW ESTABLISHED IN LZ GOOSE. TAOC NOW OPERATIONAL AT BOGUE.
C. SIX A-4S OPERATIONAL AT BOGUE AND HELICOPTERS DEPLOYED ASHORE FROM LPH .
D. AT FIRST LIGHT, 3/2 ASSAULTED ATF OBJ 2. AFTER PROVIDING STIFF RESISTANCE ENEMY WITHDREW AND OBJ WAS SECURED BY 1400. THE BNS WERE ORDERED TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS.
E. NONEFFECTIVE UNITS. NONE.
3. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. ALL CSS UNITS ARE ASHORE AND GENERAL UNLOADING OF SUPPLIES CONTINUES. CSSA ESTABLISHED AT LZ FALCON.
4. COMMANDERS EVALUATION. THE 2D MAB IS ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS COMMENCING 260600R JUL 1987. RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

260200Z JUL 87

FM CTG 22.2
TO CTG 23.2

251430Z JUL 87

FM CTG 22.2
TO COMSECONDFLT

INFO USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT NORFOLK VA
CG II MAF
CTF 20
CTF 22
CTG 20.2
CTG 23.2

BT
UNCLASSIFIED//NO 3000//

SUBJ TERMINATION OF AMPHIBIOUS PHASE, OPERATION SOLAR FLARE

REF A. COMSECONDFLT 011507Z JUL 87
B. NWP 22B/LFM 01, PAR 113

1. REF A IS THE INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ON THE SOUTHEASTERN COAST OF ONSLOW.
2. THE LANDING WAS CONDUCTED ON 23 JUL AND AS OF THE PRESENT TIME, THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS EXIST:
A. MISSION ASSIGNED REF A HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
B. FORCE BEACHHEAD HAS BEEN SECURED. ALL OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN SEIZED.
C. SUFFICIENT TACTICAL AND SUPPORTING FORCES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE TO ENSURE CONTINUOUS LANDING OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT.
D. ALL NECESSARY COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE.
E. LANDING FORCE IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND CLF STATES HE IS READY TO ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED.
3. ACCORDINGLY, IAW REF B, RECOMMEND THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION BE TERMINATED AS OF 260400Z JUL 87 AND 2D MAB FORCES CHOP TO II MAF AS OF THAT TIME. CTG 23.2 CONCURS IN THIS MSG.

BT

GLOSSARY

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
ABN	Airborne
ACE	Aviation Combat Element
AEGCO	Amphibious Embarkation Group Control Office
AFU	Assault Fire Unit
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BDE	Brigade
BSA	Beach Support Area
BSSG	Brigade Service Support Group
C/A	Course of Action
CAS	Crisis Action System
CATF	Commander Amphibious Task Force
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCSAC	Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CLF	Commander Landing Force
COMUSCENTAF	Commander U.S. Central Air Forces
COMUSFORCARIB	Commander, U.S. Forces, Caribbean
COMUSNAVCENT	Commander U.S. Naval Central
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSSE	Combat Service Support Element
CVBG	Carrier Battle Group
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
FAAD	Forward Area Air Defense
FBH	Force Beachhead
FBHL	Force Beachhead Line
FHE	Forward Headquarters Element
FIE	Fly-in Echelon
FMFLANT	Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FSSG	Force Service Support Group
GCE	Ground Combat Element
HST	Helicopter Support Team
I&W	Intelligence and Warning
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
JTF	Joint Task Force
LAAM	Light Antiaircraft Missile
LFSP	Landing Force Support Party
LZ	Landing Zone
LZSA	Landing Zone Support Area
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MABEX	Marine Amphibious Brigade Exercise
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MAVC	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAW	Marine Aircraft Wing
MCALF	Marine Corps Auxiliary Landing Field
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCB	Marine Corps Base
MECH	Mechanized
MHC	Morehead City
MIDEASFOR	Middle East Force
MPE/S	Maritime Prepositioning Equipment/Supplies
MPF	Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ships
MPSRON	Maritime Prepositioning Squadron
MRD	Motorized Rifle Division
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCHAPGRU	Naval Cargo Handling and Port Group
NCA	National Command Authorities
NGF	Naval Gunfire
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NRF	Naval Reserve Fleet
NSA	Naval Strike Aircraft
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
OPREP	Operational Report
RBE	Remain Behind Equipment
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SIA	Station of Initial Assignment
SGLI	Servicemans Group Life Insurance
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SSBN	Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSN	Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine
STARTEX	Start of Exercise
SWA	Southwest Asia
TACC	Tactical Air Command Center
TAOC	Tactical Air Operations Center
TD	Tank Division
UNITREP	Unit Reporting System
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USCINCCENT	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
USCINCEUR	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, European Command
USCINCLANT	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USLANTCOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
VP	Patrol Squadron

2D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE

IN

EXERCISE SOLAR FLARE

REFERENCE PAMPHLET

OCTOBER 1986

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SITUATION ONE
SOUTHWEST ASIA

CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM

A crisis usually develops with little or no warning, and the President and his advisers must make quick decisions about a suitable course of action for the nation to take in response to it. Naturally, there are many options that are likely to be presented for consideration. The President can choose to do nothing, or can elect to use diplomatic, economic, or military means to solve the problem.

From a military point of view, a crisis is defined as "an incident or situation involving a threat from a source external to the United States, its territories, and possessions that rapidly develops and creates a condition of such diplomatic, political, or military importance to the U.S. Government that commitment of U.S. military forces and/or resources is contemplated to achieve U.S. national objectives." Nearly 200 incidents fitting this description have occurred since World War II. Crises are fast breaking events. Each one is different. They may be small, like the seizure of the Mayaguez, or they may be massive, like the evacuation of South Vietnam. Sometimes an incident in one part of the world will lead to problems in other areas. Some crises are predictable; many spring up where no trouble was thought to exist.

After a series of crises in the early 1970s, the National Command Authorities (NCA) became concerned that the military organization for responding to crisis situations was ineffective, and that various parts of the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) were not providing adequate and timely information to support the decision-making process. A system for time-sensitive military planning was developed and is described in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), Volume IV, Crisis Action System (CAS).

The focal point for military crisis management is the

National Military Command Center (NMCC), operated by the JCS J-3 in Washington. From the NMCC, crisis action teams coordinate with the National Command Authorities, military commands and other government agencies while dealing with a crisis. Since each crisis is unique, a rigid set of rules to respond to crises would be unacceptable. Instead, CAS is a flexible system which responds to the demands of a dynamic situation. Like any system, CAS is the combination of people, procedures and hardware which enable the work to be done. The CAS objective is the timely development of a military option to present to the NCA for consideration and use in response to a national crisis.

CAS provides a framework for the rapid exchange of information. It arranges for recommending and evaluating feasible courses of action. It uses commonly accepted planning procedures and formats wherever possible, but recognizes the need for varying degrees of detail as a function of time available for planning.

The time-sensitive planning process takes the participants through a logical sequence of phases that leads from the initial recognition of the problem to the development and execution of an operation order (OPORD). The six phases of CAS are situation development, crisis assessment, course of action development, course of action selection, execution planning and execution. (See Figure 1-1). The phases alternate between action being taken at the military command level and action taken at the NCA level. Several points are identified in the sequence where decisions must be made either to continue planning or to revert to an earlier phase in the process. Formal JCS orders (Warning, Planning, Alert and Execute) are issued after major NCA decision milestones. Deployment order or deployment preparation order can also be issued at any time during the CAS. They can also be included as part of the JCS Warning, Planning or Alert orders. The CAS requires that large quantitites of information be exchanged among the numerous headquarters and agencies involved. Figure 1-2 shows the CAS process and graphically presents this information

flow. Extremely critical situations could compress the actions taken in crisis assessment through execution planning.

THE CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM (CAS)		
UNIFIED/SPECIFIED COMMAND ACTIONS	**NCA/JCS ACTIONS**	**RESULTING DIRECTIVE**
PHASE I **SITUATION DEVELOPMENT** Worldwide events are monitored to detect situations with possible national security implications. A significant incident is recognized and reported to an appropriate government agency. The CINC sends a commander's assessment of the situation to JCS/NCA.	**PHASE II** **CRISIS ASSESSMENT** NCA consider all available information to determine if a crisis exists. NCA identify possible options (diplomatic, economic, military, etc.). JCS consider military C/A and may direct higher military alert conditions or an increase in deployability posture.	**JCS WARNING ORDER** The Warning Order designates supported/supporting commanders and command relationships. Describes the mission and objectives, allocates forces and lift assets, and suggests C/A. It calls for the commander's estimate and JDA deployment estimates. The Warning Order initiates Phase III. A Planning Order may be substituted when JCS select a C/A and are directing execution planning (Phase V).
PHASE III **COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT** The supported commander develops and evaluates C/A, using inputs from components and supporting commanders and forwards the commander's estimate to JCS with recommended C/A and support requirements. JDA/TOAs prepare deployment estimates. JDC builds or updates deployment database.	**PHASE IV** **COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION** JCS review commander's estimate and deployment estimates, then presents C/A in order of priority, to NCA for decision. In rapidly developing situations, this phase may occur without formal development of C/A (Phase III).	**JCS PLANNING ORDER and/or** **JCS ALERT ORDER** The Alert Order reflects the NCA decision. It defines the mission, updates the current situation, issues strategic guidance, and sets the anticipated date of execution. If events prohibited issuing a Warning Order, the Alert Order contains necessary planning guidance. The Alert Order initiates Phase V. The Planning Order is like an Alert Order except it is issued when execution planning is directed while waiting for NCA approval of a C/A.
PHASE V **EXECUTION PLANNING** The supported commander completes and refines planning done in Phase III and develops publishes and distributes OPORD, including major force list in JDS, operations instructions, and logistic and administrative guidance. Supporting OPORDs are developed. Units given an alert notification or a specific deployability posture will commence UNITREP.	**PHASE VI** **EXECUTION** The OPORD and supporting OPORDs are executed upon receipt of JCS Execute Order. Deployment database and movement schedules are kept current. Movement and status of forces are monitored and reported. The phase continues until the crisis is resolved or until forces are withdrawn.	**JCS EXECUTE ORDER** The Execute Order reflects the NCA decision to use a military option to resolve the crisis. It contains the latest information available, gives the latest guidance, and establishes an execution time.

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FIGURE 1-1



FIGURE 1-2

Encl (4)

OPERATIONAL REPORTS

The Operational Report (OPREP) is the reporting system used to keep the JCS, commanders of unified and specified commands, the services and other appropriate agencies advised of any event or incident which may attract national level interest; of operational plans and current operations involving the employment or movement of military units; and of the results of associated air, sea and ground activities. The OPREP is usually a narrative report which is formatted at the direction of the originator. The OPREP consists of the following five reports:

- **OPREP-1, Operation Planning Report,** is used to describe planned operations for current situations.
- **OPREP-2, Operation Start Report,** is used to advise that an operation has started or can be used to execute a plan or fragment of a plan.
- **OPREP-3 Event/Incident Report,** is used to notify immediately the National Military Command Center (NMCC) of any event or incident which may attract national-level interest.
- **OPREP-4, Operation Stop Report,** is used to report the completion of an operation or a phase of an operation.
- **OPREP-5, Operation Summary Report,** is used to give a statistical summary.

Only the OPREP-3 is implemented worldwide continually and is transmitted directly to NMCC by any command level having knowledge of an incident and access to a communications network capable of relay into communications systems serving the NMCC. Thus, OPREP-3 reports are of primary concern to the Crisis Action System (CAS) and these reports are the most likely basis upon which a crisis is recognized and the CAS is activated.

UNIFIED COMMANDS

US combat-ready forces are assigned to the operational command of unified and specified commanders (CINCs). A unified command is a command with a broad continuing mission, under a single commander and composed of significant assigned component commands of two or more services. A specified command normally includes the forces of a single service. There are seven unified and two specified commands. The Unified and Specified Command Organization is shown in Figure 1-3.



FIGURE 1-3

The prime responsibility of a unified commander is to support the policies of the U.S. government as they relate to a military presence, military assistance to foreign governments and military operations in his geographical area. In critical situations, the CINCs may be directed to carry out some or all of these responsibilities in areas outside their normal area of responsibility. The CINCs are responsible for keeping the JCS advised of developments in their assigned area that could affect the security of the nation.

A unified commander is authorized to communicate directly with the Secretary of Defense; with the JCS on strategic and logistic plans, combat operations, and "other necessary functions

of command required to accomplish his mission;" and with subordinate department of Defense agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Communications Agency. He may also communicate directly with the Chiefs of Services on uni-Service matters.

The CINC of each unified command has a joint staff composed of personnel from each Service having component forces under his command. One of the most important functions of a unified command is planning for contingencies in its assigned area and refining those plans through joint training exercises.

The CINCs are given broad authority in the command and internal administration of forces assigned to them. Their operational command includes determining the composition of subordinate forces, assigning tasks to the component or other subordinate commanders, designating objectives and "the full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission." It does not include administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training of component forces, all of which are responsibilities of component commanders and their parent Services.

A unified commander may establish subordinate unified commands or joint task forces reporting directly to him. (The CINC of a specified command does not have that authority.) A sub-unified command is established when significant forces of two or more services have a broad continuing mission. For example, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), became a sub-unified command under U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Currently, USPACOM has within its vast geographical area of responsibility, two sub-unified commands, U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan.

A Joint Task Force (JTF) is not a permanent command arrangement and may be activated when significant forces of two or more services are utilized in a mission with a specific limited objective. Because the JTF is not a permanent headquarters, the commander exercises operational control over assigned forces and

does not have directive authority in the field of logistics.

In a major emergency, a unified commander may assume direct command of one of his component commands, subject to JCS approval. Under exceptional circumstances and with the approval of JCS, he may also establish a separate uni-service force reporting to him. In the event of a major emergency, he may assume temporary operational control of forces of another command that are in his geographical area. Normally, however, units of another command based in or transiting a unified command area will not come under the CINC's operational control. A SAC wing based in a unified command area, for instance, remains under the operational control of CINCSAC, although the unified commander may provide base security and other support.

Component commands in a unified command advise the unified commander on proper employment of their respective forces. They report directly to the unified commander in all operational matters and to the Chiefs of their Services on matters that pertain exclusively to their particular Service such as personnel, training in uni-service doctrine, logistics and development of equipment.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

Area of responsibility. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was established as the sixth unified command on 1 January 1983. The commander's area of responsibility (AOR) begins in the east with Pakistan and includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Jordan on the Asian continent, the entire Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya on the African continent. It also includes the waters of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Figure 1-4 depicts USCINCCENT's area of responsibility.

USCINCCENT's AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



FIGURE 1-4

USCENTCOM responsibilities in the area include military planning, operational command of U.S. forces in the theater, joint exercises involving U.S. and regional forces and administration of the security assistance program. A small Forward Headquarters Element (FHE) afloat was established in December 1983 with the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf. This element serves as liaison with U.S. embassies and the nations of the region. It also aids in planning and coordinating joint exercises and performs other duties that benefit the command.

U.S. Forces. The command has been assigned for planning purposes, a force list of about 300,000 personnel representing four services.

The Army component is U.S. Army Forces Central Command (COMUSARCENT), the Third Army, headquartered at Fort McPherson,

GA. It has three and one-third divisions assigned for planning (82nd Abn Div, 101st Abn Div (Air Assault), 24th Inf Div (Mechanized, and an air calvary brigade) and other combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units.

The USCENTCOM air forces are commanded by Ninth Air Force at Shaw AFB, SC. The USCENTCOM air component commander (COMUSCENTAF) has seven tactical fighter wings available for planning. Also included are special capability assets such as E-3As; inter-theater and intra-theater airlift; and Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 squadrons configured for conventional bombs.

The naval component commander is COMUSNAVCENT, with its headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. It has the MIDEASTFOR and also available for planning are three CVBGs and a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) comprised of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) which is part of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) (7th MAB and MPSRON-2). Figure 1-5 shows the command structure of USCINCCENT.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US CENTRAL COMMAND



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FIGURE 1-5

Encl (4)

SITUATION TWO

CENTRAL FRONT

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Area responsibility and command relationships. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM/USCINCEUR) is a unified command, reporting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, which exercises operational command of all U.S. forces in Europe. The command covers a geographical area of more than 13 million square miles from the North Cape of Norway through the Mediterranean, most of Africa and part of the Middle East. The headquarters is located at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Federal Republic of Germany. Figure 2-1 depicts USEUCOM's area of responsibility. USCINCEUR is also dual-hatted as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The organizational structure of both are shown in Figure 2-2.

USEUCOM's AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



FIGURE 2-1

Encl (4)



FIGURE 2-2

Encl (4)

Mission. The US European Command's (USEUCOM) primary mission is to provide combat-ready forces to support U.S. commitments to the NATO Alliance. This includes war planning for both conventional and nuclear operations. In addition to the primary mission, the command is responsible for performing the following sub-missions and functions.

- Readiness of U.S. forces.
- Crisis Management.
- Intelligence Activities.
- Security Assistance.
- Non-combatant Evacuation.
- Humanitarian Relief.

U.S. Forces. To help NATO deter the Soviet threats and to secure U.S. vital interests in Europe, the U.S. forces maintained in Europe under the command of the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, total more than 300,000, including approximately 220,000 personnel assigned to the U.S. Army, Europe; 61,200 personnel assigned to U.S. Air Forces, Europe; and approximately 14,000 U.S. Navy personnel ashore as well as 1,000 Marine Corps personnel ashore who are assigned to U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

This heavy commitment of U.S. troops in Europe is required to provide the U.S. share of the collective security of common interests and values, to provide critical reassurance to our allies, to act as a deterrent against any future Soviet expansion, and to demonstrate clearly to the Soviet Union our unswerving resolve and commitment to a free and democratic Europe.

Threat. The Soviet Union remains the major potential threat to alliance security and freedom of action. The military threat is greater now than ever before because in all but strategic nuclear forces, the Warsaw Pact enjoys quantitative advantages ranging from 2:1 to 3:1 in conventional ground and air weapons to as high as 9:1 in intermediate-range nuclear forces (warheads on launchers). In the quality of its military systems, the Warsaw Pact no longer forfeits an advantage to NATO. Although the West

retains a technological edge in some areas, the Soviet bloc more than compensates by incrementally applying new technology - obtained by various means - to existing systems in the field at a faster pace than can the West.

This menace poses two threats to the West. The Soviets may become convinced of and emboldened by their military superiority, which could lead to steps resulting in the failure of deterrence and overt aggression by the Warsaw Pact. But there is another dangerous, although more subtle and less tangible, threat; Soviet intimidation and coercion of Western Europe through the exploitation of its perceived military superiority. This could lead to the extortion of political, economic, and military concessions, as well as continued attempts to split the U.S. from its European partners.

SITUATION THREE
CARIBBEAN

U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Mission. The primary mission of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) is to deter military attack against the U.S. The U.S. military strategy is a forward strategy - highlighted by geopolitical considerations. This forward strategy uses the oceans as barriers for the defense of the U.S. and principal highways for the movement of U.S. economic and military supplies. U.S. forces, forward deployed, are a vital part of this strategy and represent a commitment which should reassure U.S. allies and act as a deterrent to any potential aggressor.

In the maritime arena, the U.S. depends upon two basic functions to carry out the national strategy - sea control and power projection. Sea control is a selective function used only when and where needed. It is a requirement for most naval operations, and it is a prerequisite for successfully conducting sustained operations in support of Army, Air Force, and Marine general purpose forces.

An essential element of power projection is the amphibious task force with Marines embarked - this nation's major means of inserting U.S. ground forces into a hostile environment.

The Atlantic maritime strategy generally includes the following four major objectives:

- Establish military superiority - primarily naval and air.
- Ensure the unimpeded flow of seaborne traffic through the Straits of Florida, the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal.
- Concentrate available forces to deter, deny or destroy Soviet naval offensive capabilities, render their defensive naval force ineffective and provide support to the land battle.
- Establish control of additional sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Caribbean and in the Atlantic to ensure the

continued flow of oil and vital raw materials to the U.S. and its European allies.

Organization. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command has the responsibility to the Secretary of Defense as the unified commander for planning and conducting all U.S. military operations throughout the Atlantic. This predominantly maritime area of responsibility includes: the North and South Atlantic Oceans; the major portion of the Artic Ocean; the Greenland, Norwegian and Barents Seas, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico; and that part of the Pacific Ocean which is adjacent to the Central and South American nations. This area also includes several key island bases which play a critical role in accomplishing USLANTCOM'S mission. Figure 3-1 depicts USLANTCOM's area of responsibility.

USLANTCOM's AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



FIGURE 3-1

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USCINCLANT has individual Air Force, Army and Navy component commanders that provide TACAIR ground and Marine forces in support for assigned missions. There are also subordinate unified commands that are of vital importance to the defense of the Atlantic. These commands are the Commander U.S. Forces Caribbean; Commander, Iceland Defense Forces; and Commander, US Forces Azores. These commands help support our forward posture through the use of bases and facilities outside the continental U.S., thus reducing reaction and transit time. Figure 3-2 shows the USCINCLANT organization.



FIGURE 3-2

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Forces. The Army has the capability of providing up to three combat-ready divisions with 15,000 troops each, and the Air Force can provide up to 1,400 tactical aircraft. The Navy can provide up to 279 plus ships from the Atlantic Fleet, including battleships and new CGO with the advanced Aegis weapon system.

The Marines have improved their tactical air capabilities with the AV-8B (Harrier) and the F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft. The Fleet Marine Forces are now an integrated part of the new maritime prepositioning force (MPF). This operation provides for afloat prepositioning of selected equipment and supplies. This enhances a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) to quickly deploy by strategic airlift and link up with its combat supplies and equipment.

Threat. One of the primary threats in the Atlantic is the presence of Soviet nuclear-powered attack (SSNs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The Soviet Union has sixty percent of its SSBN force stationed in the Northern Fleet. In addition to this threat, the Soviets have developed a cruise missile (SS-NX-21) with a significant range to attack U.S. land targets. This missile can be carried in their newer SSNs such as the Victor III. Presently, the Northern Fleet possesses nearly fifty percent of the total tactical submarines including Oscar class nuclear-powered, guided missile submarines. More than half of the major Soviet surface combatants are in the Northern and Black Sea Fleets, with more than sixty-five percent of their antiship cruise missile-equipped surface ships in the combined western fleets.

Three-fourths of the naval strike aircraft (NSA), including the supersonic Backfire bombers, operate from these western fleets. The Backfire and Badger aircraft from this region pose a serious threat to Atlantic Command forces and NATO units in the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean.

The secondary threat is Cuba. The Soviet Union continues to increase its arms shipments to Cuba. The routine deployment of Soviet BEAR Ds (Recon) and BEAR Fs (ASW), operating out of Cuban

airfields and conducting surveillance of U.S. naval forces off the east coast, provides a visible demonstration of the strategic importance of Cuba to the military posture in the Caribbean. Cuba has the largest military force in the Caribbean and has expanded its influence throughout the Central American region, particularly in Nicaragua.

US COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN CORNADA

The command relationships for oeprations in Cornada are depicted in the following diagrams:

Initial reinforcement of NAVBASE Charlie from 15 Feb to 28 April.



Deployment of Amphibious Forces 15 Mar to 28 April.



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Upon termination of amphibious operations, CG, 4th MAB becomes Commander Charlie Defense Forces as a uni-service force directly under USCINCLANT. 3 May to 10 May.



On 10 May, the II MAF Hq and subordinate Command HQ arrive and the MAF composites forces from 4th MAB and 6th MAB which is in the arrival and assembly phase. 11 May to 3 July.



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SITUATION FOUR

MOBILIZATION OF 2D MAB

SPECTRUM OF MOBILIZATION.

The spectrum or degrees of mobilization range from selective, presidential call-up, partial, full and total.

Selective. For a domestic emergency, the President (or Congress upon special action) may order expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of reserve units and/or individual reservists to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, Federal property and functions, or to prevent disruption of Federal activities. A selective mobilization normally would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security. There is no designated limit to the numbers of persons involved. The SECDEF announces the mobilization and units and individuals are provided written alert notification. Only reserve units or individual reservists are eligible for call-up.

Presidential Call-up. The President may augment the active forces by a call-up of units of the Selected Reserve up to 100,000 men for up to ninety days to meet the requirements of an operational mission.

Partial Mobilization. To meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security, the Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) and mobilization of up to one million men of the Ready Reserve (units or individuals) for up to twenty-four months. In addition to reserve units, retired officers and members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve may be recalled.

Full Mobilization. Full mobilization requires passage by the Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a

national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all reserve units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for this expanded force structure. In addition to the personnel authorized under partial mobilization, national conscription is authorized and individuals receive a notice from their local draft board.

Total Mobilization. Total mobilization involves expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop basis to respond to requirements in excess of the troop basis and the mobilization of all additional resources needed, to include production facilities, to round out and sustain such forces. The mobilization spectrum is shown below.

THE MOBILIZATION SPECTRUM

	GENERAL DESCRIPTION	NUMBERS INVOLVED	WHO CALLS UP	LEGAL BASIS	PERSONS OR UNITS ELIGIBLE	METHOD OF CALL-UP	CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF) 13
SELECTIVE	For a domestic emergency, the President (or Congress upon special action) may order expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of Reserve units and/or individual reservists to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, Federal property and functions, or to prevent disruption of Federal activities. A selective mobilization normally would not be associated with a requirement for contengency plans involving external threats to the national security.	As determined by units selected.	President/ Congress	10 USC 3500, 8500 & appropriate orders of higher authority; 10 USC 331, 332,333. (Presidential Authority Only.)	Reserve units and/ or individual reservists.	SECDEF announces F-Hour. (Alert notification in writing to individuals and units.)	STAGE I. CINCMAC has authority to activate.
PRESIDENTIAL CALL-UP	The President may augment the active forces by a call-up of units of the Selected Reserve up to 100,000 men for up to 90 days to meet the requirements of an operational mission.	Limited to 100,000 (all services) for up to 90 days.	Presidential Executive Order	10 USC 673b	Units and individuals of the Selected Reserve only.	As Above	STAGE II. SECDEF has authority.
PARTIAL	To meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security, the Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active armed Forces (short of full mobilization) and mobilization of up to one million men of the Ready Reserve (units or individuals) for up to 24 months.	Up to 1,000,000 (all services) for up to two years.	Presidential Proclamation of a national emergency and an executive order.	10 USC 673	Ready Reserve Units and IRR. Standby Reserve, Retired Regular Officers, Fleet Reserve, Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.	As Above	STAGE III. SECDEF has authority provided President or Congress declares a national emergency.
FULL	Full mobilization requires passage by the Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all Reserve units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for this expanded force structure.	Up to the strength of the approved force structure of the Armed Forces.	Public Law or Joint Resolution by Congress declaring war or national emergency.	10 USC 671a 10 USC 672	All of the above, plus National Conscription as determined by the Congress and President.	As Above. (Notice from Local Draft Board for those conscripted.)	As Above.
TOTAL	Total mobilization involves expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop basis to respond to requirements in excess of the troop basis and the mobilization of all additional resources needed, to include production facilities, to round out and sustain such forces.	Strength levels beyond full mobilization as determined by the President and approved by Congress.	As Above	10 USC 671(a) 10 USC 672	As Above	As Above	As Above

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MOBILIZATION ASSISTANCE TEAMS

Mobilization assistance teams have the following responsibilities:

- Report to MCB Camp Lejeune or MCAS Cherry Point, as assigned, in accordance with mobilization orders.
- Participate in deployment validation meetings.
- Meet with incoming units to determine current readiness status.
- Assist incoming units with training.
- Design and conduct unit evaluations.
- Provide unit assessment data on mobilizing units.

Members of the mobilization assistance teams are retired regular officers and persons from the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. These retired personnel, under the age of sixty, have been selected by HQMC, based upon their experience and background, and issued "hip pocket" mobilization orders to report for active duty to fill billets required by mobilization or left vacant by deployment of FMF personnel.

IMPACT OF FULL OR TOTAL MOBILIZATION

In this instance, 2d MAB was able to use artillery and tank ranges at Ft. Bragg, NC and Camp Pickett, VA. In a full or total mobilization, these bases would be utilized by Army Reserve and National Guard forces. Marine forces at MCB, Camp Lejeune would be severely restricted to the existing limited ranges and operating areas.

EMBARKATION AT MOREHEAD CITY

The air landed geoprepositioned MAB and the MPF MAB (6th MAB) deploy without organic equipment and transportation. To assist these units in the move to Cherry Point for airlift, II MAF, 2d FSSG and MCB Camp Lejeune utilized a deployment support system. With the MAF and FSSG already deployed, 2d MAB would be assisted by the MC Base, Camp Lejeune.

2D MAB COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The command relationships for 2d MAB are shown in the following diagrams.

Upon mobilization, 10 May to 25 June when the MAB is declared operationally ready.



When operational, 2d MAB would normally CHOP to II MAF, however, in this situation CG, FMFLANT directed on 26 June that 2d MAB report to COMSECONDFLT as CTG 23.2, Commander Landing Force for subsequent amphibious operations in Onslow.



SITUATION SIX
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

EMBARKATION PHASE

During the embarkation phase, the landing force commander has certain responsibilities. These are:

- Preparation of the landing force for embarkation.
- Submission of requirements for embarkation assistance from forces afloat to the amphibious task force commander or his designated representative.
- Movement of embarkation components to and within the embarkation areas, and assembly of cargo and personnel on shore in accordance with the embarkation schedule and loading plans.
- Security of the embarkation areas, or the coordination of security measures with external agencies as prescribed by higher authority.
- Supervision of troop activities during loading.
- Provision for an Amphibious Embarkation Group Control Office (AEGCO).
- Provision for communications ashore in the embarkation area, including adequate communications security measures. To preclude significant commitment of organic communications equipment of the landing force required to be embarked, additional equipment should be provided for use in the embarkation area.

AMPHIBIOUS REHEARSALS

If at all possible, a rehearsal should be conducted prior to an amphibious operation. The purposes of a rehearsal are:

- To test the adequacy and completeness of plans.
- To test the timing of detailed operations, especially the scheduled waves of the ship-to-shore movement.
- To test all aspects of communications.
- To test the combat readiness of participating forces.

BASIC DECISIONS

Basic decisions are those decisions which must be made at the highest level within the ATF before detailed planning can proceed. The basic decisions are:

- Determination of objectives. The mission assigned the amphibious task force in the initiating directive usually includes the designation of an area or areas to be captured within the amphibious objective area. The amphibious task force commander and the landing force commander together select a general course of action for the force as a whole designed to accomplish the amphibious task force mission. On the basis of this decision, these commanders together determine a mission for the landing force which is designed to attain the objectives of the amphibious task force. On the basis of this mission, the landing force commander formulates his concept of operations ashore, including the selection of terrain objectives, the capture of which will assist in the accomplishment of the mission of the amphibious task force.

In the event the mission assigned the amphibious task force in the initiating directive does not include a clear designation of the area or areas to be captured, the amphibious task force commander will select such areas whose capture will accomplish the assigned mission.

- Determination of beachheads and landing areas. The process of selecting beachheads and their corresponding landing areas beginning with the designations of potential landing sites, is covered in the following paragraphs. Although treated separately, these factors are highly interrelated with the concept of operations ashore and are concurrently considered by the amphibious task force commander and landing force commander in reaching these basic decisions.

- Designation of landing sites. A landing site is a continuous segment of coastline over which troops,

equipment and supplies can be landed by surface means. While of minimum length to contain at least one landing beach, a landing site is restricted in maximum length only by the extent of usable, uninterrupted coastline. The amphibious task force commander designates the potential landing sites within the objective area. He furnishes the landing force commander with pertinent information concerning these sites, the suitability of seaward approaches and information on tides. The determination or confirmation of the characteristics of landing sites are therefore an early intelligence requirement.

- Determination of beachheads. The landing force commander determines possible beachheads and notifies the amphibious task force commander of his selections in order that they may be incorporated in the designation of tentative landing areas. A beachhead is a designated area of a hostile shore which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides the maneuver room requisite for subsequent operations ashore. It normally includes all of the initial objectives.

- Selection of landing areas. The landing area is that part of the objective area within which are conducted the landing operations of an amphibious task force. It comprises the sea, air and land areas required for executing and supporting the landing and establishing the beachhead selected by the landing force commander. When the amphibious task force is composed of two or more attack groups with related landing groups, a landing area may be assigned to each attack group.

The landing area selected must satisfy both naval and landing force requirements. Accordingly several alternate areas may be taken under consideration in the planning phase.

The amphibious task force commander delineates the sea areas

and air space required for the establishment of each beachhead tentatively selected by the landing force commander. The amphibious task force commander designates the combinations of sea and beachhead areas and air space as possible landing areas, and indicates their relative desirability from a naval viewpoint.

Primary and Alternate Landing Areas. The landing force commander selects primary and alternate landing areas from among those designated by the amphibious task force commander. The landing force commander maintains continuous liaison with interested commands to ensure that there is complete understanding on any restrictive considerations. The landing force commander selects those landing areas which, consistent with the ability of the surface and air forces to provide support, will best facilitate the accomplishment of the landing force mission.

Decision. The landing force commander presents his final selections to the amphibious task force commander for his concurrence in the light of his ability to support operations in the selected areas with the forces assigned.

- Landing force concept of operations ashore. The landing force commander's concept of operations ashore is a written and graphic presentation, in broad outline, of his intent with regard to the operation. It includes the formation for landing, the maneuvers for capture of the beachhead(s) and the principal landing force objectives. The landing force commander formulates alternate concepts for operations ashore, including plans for any subsidiary operations and presents them to the amphibious task force commander. This presentation of the landing force concepts to the amphibious task force commander allows the latter to determine if they can be supported by the forces available.

Naval and air considerations affecting the formulation of the concept of operations ashore are those pertaining to the capabilities for transporting, protecting and landing the landing force and for supporting its operations during and after the landing.

- Selection of landing beaches. A landing beach is that portion of usable coastline usually required for the assault landing of a battalion landing team or similar unit. However, it may also be that portion of a shore line constituting a tactical locality, such as the shore of a bay, over which a force smaller than a battalion landing team may be landed.

The landing force commander selects specific landing beaches from available landing sites within the selected landing areas. The amphibious task force commander reviews these selections in the light of the naval considerations mentioned previously. When the amphibious task force is composed of two or more attack groups with related landing groups, a landing area may be selected for each attack group. In this case, each landing group commander selects his landing beaches from within the assigned area.

The principal factors in the selection of landing beaches, in addition to those previously described for the selection of landing areas are:

(1) The landing force concept of operations ashore.
(2) Capacity for landing supplies and equipment.
(3) Suitability for beaching landing ships, landing craft and amphibious vehicles.
(4) Beach trafficability.
(5) Suitability of offshore approaches.
(6) Number, location and suitability of beach support areas and beach exits.
(7) Location, type and density of beach obstacles, including underwater obstacles.
(8) Nature of the terrain immediately inland from the beaches.
(9) Suitability of communications facilities, including roads, railroads and waterways.
(10) Suitability of the beach from the standpoint of expected weather and tidal conditions.

- Selection of helicopter landing zones. A helicopter landing zone is a specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. The landing force commander selects the helicopter landing zones and advises the amphibious task force commander. In reviewing these selections, the amphibious task force commander considers the ability of his other forces to support the proposed assault landings therein. When the amphibious task force is composed of two or more attack groups with related landing groups, the task of conducting the helicopterborne assault operations is usually assigned to the commander(s) of one or more of the attack groups.

The principal factors in the selection of helicopter landing zones are:

(1) The landing force concept of operations ashore.

(2) Enemy capabilities and dispositions, particularly the location, type and density of enemy antiaircraft installations.

(3) Nature of the terrain over which the helicopter-landed forces contemplate operations after landing.

(4) Requirements for logistic support.

(5) Requirements for air, naval gunfire and artillery fire support.

(6) Available helicopter routes to and from the landing zone, and restrictive effects on the employment of air, naval gunfire and artillery fire support of other forces.

(7) Ease of identification from the air.

- Selection of the tentative date and hour of landing. The amphibious task force commander, after consultation with the landing force commander, selects the tentative date and hour of landing. During the planning, tentative dates and hours are promulgated as early as possible.

The factors in the selection of the tentative date and hour for landing are shown in Figure 6-1.

FACTORS IN THE SELECTION OF D-DAY AND H-HOUR

Date for Landing ...



- AVAILABILITY OF FORCES
- READINESS OF FORCES
- PRESENT AND PROJECTED ENEMY SITUATION
- SEASONAL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION
- LOCAL CONDITIONS OF TIDE, WEATHER, CURRENT AND PHASE OF MOON (Duration of Darkness and Daylight)
- DESIGNATION OF LIMITING DATES BY A HIGHER AUTHORITY
- COORDINATION WITH PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

Hour for Landing ...

- KNOWN ENEMY ROUTINE
- DURATION OF DAYLIGHT
- NEED FOR TACTICAL SURPRISE
- LANDING FORCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
- FAVORABLE CONDITIONS OF WIND, TIDE, AND PHASE OF MOON
- REQUIREMENTS FOR CONDUCTING CERTAIN OPERATIONS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS
- MOST EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

TTS30RP

FIGURE 6-1

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ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS

The advance force arrives in the AOA early to accomplish certain tasks. These are:

- Destruction of Defenses Ashore. The advance force destroys beach and landing zone defenses, gun emplacements, control and observation posts, and any other installations which could be used by the enemy in opposing the surface and helicopterborne assaults. Naval gunfire, air strikes and artillery, if emplaced, are utilized for the destruction of enemy facilities.
- Preparation of Sea Areas. The advance force prepares the sea areas in the objective area for amphibious operations by minesweeping, minelaying, hydrographic surveys, and net laying, as necessary.
- Preparation of Beaches and Beach Approaches. The advance force prepares the beaches for landing and the approaches to the beaches for passage of landing craft, landing ships, and amphibious vehicles. All natural or man-made obstacles, including mines, which make passage and landing hazardous are destroyed. Underwater demolition teams accomplish destruction, removal or marking of such obstacles in the sea approaches to and on selected beaches between the 3 1/2-fathom curve and the high-water line. The landing force maintains liaison with the underwater demolitions teams to obtain first-hand information on the landing beaches and beach approaches. In certain situations, at the request of the landing force commander, underwater demolition team personnel may assist in the removal of land mines and obstacles on the beaches above the high-water line.
- Beach Reconnaissance. Beach reconnaissance is conducted by the advance force to collect the latest possible detailed information on beach gradients, obstacles (natural and man-made), tide and surf, depths of water, contour of the sea bottom, routes of exit from the beaches, soil trafficability, beach defenses and suitability of the

selected beaches for landing. Beach reconnaissance is usually performed by underwater demolition teams. However, such reconnaissance may be accomplished in conjunction with landing force or aerial reconnaissance units.

- Isolation of the Objective, and Attainment and Maintenance of Local Air Superiority. Attacks by air strikes, naval gunfire and amphibious raids are made, when required, against airfields, aircraft, communications and supply centers, shipping, and other critical targets, to isolate the objective and attain and/or maintain local air superiority.
- Pre-D-Day Landings. Pre-D-day landings may be executed for reconnaissance, destruction, or harassment purposes; to capture off-shore islands or promontories for the emplacement of artillery, navigation aids, radar stations, or logistic bases; or for other reasons. Helicopterborne troop units or airborne units may be employed effectively to accomplish these pre-D-day missions, including the reconnaissance of helicopter landing zones and drop zones. Such landings are usually executed in the same manner as the main landings.
- Demonstrations. Demonstrations may be conducted to deceive and confuse the enemy.
- Electronics Countermeasures. The advance force obtains maximum information of the enemy's communications and electronic facilities in, and adjacent to, the objective area. During advance force operations, these facilities are neutralized or destroyed in order to prepare the objective area for assault. Before destruction is ordered, due consideration must be given to the following:
  - Intelligence which may be gained through interception of enemy communications; and
  - Possible use of enemy facilities in the objective area, which may be captured by the landing force.
- Meteorological Information. The advance force, when so designated, will observe and transmit to the amphibious

task force commander meteorological and oceanographic data in the assault area. Of particular concern are the beach surf conditions and the state of weather and sea in the proposed transport area.

COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING ARMS

Initially, the CATF has responsibility for the overall coordination of supporting fires. Coordination of landing force requests for supporting fires, however, remains a landing force function. As command and control agencies of the LF are established ashore, responsibility for discharge of appropriate fire support coordination functions is passed ashore. When the CLF is ashore, has established the necessary facilities and conditions permit, the responsibility for overall coordination is then transferred to him by the CATF.

TERMINATION OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the mission of the amphibious task force in accordance with the specific conditions contained in the governing instructions set forth in the initiating directive. The firm establishment of the landing force ashore is usually specified as one of these conditions.

The landing force is regarded as firmly established ashore when in the opinion of the landing force commander:

- The force beachhead has been secured.
- Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to ensure the continuous landing of troops and materiel requisite for subsequent operations.
- Command, communications and supporting arms coordination facilities have been established ashore.
- The landing force commander has stated that he is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations.

When the amphibious task force commander and the landing force commander are satisfied that these conditions have been

met, the amphibious task force commander will report these facts to higher authority designated in the initiating directive. This authority will then terminate the amphibious operation, dissolve the amphibious task force, and provide additional instructions as required, to include command arrangements and disposition of forces.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN ONSLOW

The 2d MAB and 4th MAB command relationships for operations in Onslow are depicted in the following diagrams:

For amphibious operations in Onslow, 23-25 July.



----in support

Upon termination of the amphibious operation on 25 July, 2d MAB chops to II MAF for subsequent operations. Again, II MAF operates as a uni-service force under USCINCLANT.



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2d MAB/CTG 23.2
Camp Lejeune, NC
10 Jul 1987

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER ONE

Ref: (a) MAP: DMA, GNC, Chart 9
JOG(AIR) 1:250,000, Beaufort, NC
Series 1501, Sheet NI 18-4.
(b) Camp Lejeune Special Map, 1:50,000

1. MISSION. See 2d MAB OPORD 1-87

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Military Geography

(a) Topography. The island country of Onslow is located approximately 400 nm southwest of Cornada and 600 nm southeast of the southern tip of Florida. The island is approximately 4,125 square miles in area with forests and mountainous terrain dominating the western half; the eastern half consists of lowlands, with coastal beaches and waterways. Cross-country movement in Onslow is limited to the hard surfaced roads.

(b) Hydrography. Due to the restricted availability of ocean ports, Onslow's rivers and coastal waterways are the primary means for transiting shipping vessels to reach major port facilities. New River serves as the only ocean access to the capital of Jax. This river can accommodate only shallow draft vessels and is dredged to a depth of eleven feet. Except for its southeast coast, the Onslow shoreline is extremely rough. To the east of Onslow the offshore, nearshore and foreshore areas are relatively free of obstacles. Onslow's southeastern coastline is long, straight and paralleled by a coastal waterway. Cross-country movement is severely hampered by the coastal waterway, located approximately 270-530 meters inland from the beach; this restricts vehicles to prepared crossing points. Geological

Encl (4)

reports prepared by Exxon Oil Company, indicate that nearshore composition consists of soft sand, shells and scattered small rocks. The beach is considered firm when wet and loose when dry.

(c) Climate and weather. Onslow has hot, humid weather during most of the summer months. Temperatures range from highs in the 90s, to lows in the 70s. Rainfall occurs mostly as afternoon thundershowers; however, August is also the beginning of the hurricane season in this part of the Caribbean. Tropical storms can turn into hurricanes on very short notice. Hurricanes normally have winds in excess of 75 mph and dump several inches of rain in a short period of time.

(2) Transportation

(a) Highways. The majority of Onslow's highway system consists of paved hard surfaced two to four lane roads. The road networks near the capital city of Jax and Onslow's other cities are in good condition. Some of the highways leading to and from the major cities are two lane roads, whereas the roads around or within the cities are four or more lanes.

(b) Railways. Although rail lines exist between New Bern and the major towns of Morehead City and Jax, they are rarely used and service is almost non-existent. Most of the railways in the country's interior were constructed in anticipation of an economic expansion that never occurred and have since fallen into disrepair. The existing rail line is of standard gauge. Significant portions of the line are subject to flooding, particularly in the areas between New Bern to Jax and in the vicinity of Maysville.

(c) Waterways. Countless small rivers and streams serve as the primary mode of transportation in the interior of Onslow. Due to the lack of suitable areas along the country's coast, most ports are located on rivers. The majority of the waterways are characterized by steep banks, usually backed immediately by heavy vegetation. Crossing points are limited to well-used fords (depending on the season), bridges and ferries. Some of the bridges spanning the inland waterways hinder passage of river traffic, during periods when the draw span is down.

(d) Airports. There are several civil airfields in Onslow, located near Jax, New Bern, Kinston and Wilmington. Military airfields are New River, Bogue Field and Cherry Point.

(3) Telecommunications

The telecommunications system provides basic services and is sufficient to meet all demands of the economy. The primary facility is open-wire with some multi-conductor cable, radio relay and radio communications station. Logistical support is limited by low capacity circuits. The telecommunications pattern is most dense in the north and along the eastern coast. An open-wire network reaches all major cities and extends inland from the main ports, except for the high forestry areas in the south. The multi-conductor cable provides one hundred circuits on main routes westward from Jax. High capacity branches extend north to Kinston and south to Hampstead. Special systems exist for air, marine and rail transportation, but are minimal and would provide little logistical support. The only significant special system is the police system.

(4) Government

Onslow was initially discovered by Spanish explorers but was settled by English in the sixteenth century. The country declared its independence from England in 1760 and subsequently has been a republic, a dictatorship and a monarchy. The monarchy lasted from 1890 until 1922 when a republic was again declared. This republic was ruled by various corrupt combinations until General Carillo was elected in 1945 for a five year term. In 1955, Carillo was proclaimed President for Life. The president had full responsibility for determining national policy and presidential bills had priority before the assembly.

In November 1985, a coup d'etat by the National Guard toppled the Carillo government and Carillo and many of his followers fled to exile in the U.S. A Major Juan Diaz soon emerged as the military strongman and head of the ruling military junta. Since the takeover, economic conditions have grown steadily worse and anti-US sentiment has increased markedly. On

14 June 1987, Diaz declared the country a Marxist state and proceeded to confiscate most private industry which for the most part was U.S. owned. In foreign relations, Diaz established, for the first time, diplomatic relations with Cornada and the Soviet Union.

(5) Foreign Relations

Until recently, Onslow, as a nonaligned nation, maintained friendly relations with the East and West, although it has, historically, been a strong member of the western hemisphere system and a supporter of U.S. policy. The U.S. has maintained official representation in Jax almost continuously since the arrival of the first American Consulate 1797. There are no U.S. military facilities in Onslow. The United States and Onslow have had a security agreement since the mid-fifties and the Onslow National Guard is completely equipped with the latest U.S. weapons. Most officers, including Major Diaz, have attended U.S. Service Schools in the U.S. during the past ten years. Until this year, the U.S. maintained a forty man military assistance group in Onslow, working with the Onslow National Guard.

Though most officers in the National Guard appeared to have supported Diaz in this initial coup, there appears to be some discontent with his present policies. The U.S. encourages Onslow's policy of social and economic development within a framework of political stability. U.S. suppliers have successfully established themselves as direct exporters to the Onslow market, in part through the use of Export-Import Bank facilities. With the advent of the military junta, this may change.

(6) Economics

The principal domestic crops are tobacco, sugar cane, fruits and vegetables. Production includes forestry, fishing, meat and dairy items. Agriculture provides more than one half of Onslow's employment and since it is the largest economic sector, poor harvests and low prices have a disproportionate effect on the economy. Onslow has been making progress towards industrialization despite a modest resource base, limited markets and a

shortage of investment capital. This progress is the result of extensive foreign aid, pragmatic planning and a diminishing resistance to the adoption of modern methods. In addition, Onslow has relied heavily on the tourist industry to bring in foreign dollars and bolster the economy.

(7) Sociology

Onslow's population consists of 160,000 people.

Official language: English

Monetary unit: Onslow dollar.

Ethnic composition: White - 59%
Black - 40%
Other - 1%

Educational Attainment: Onslow has an excellent school system developed by the U.S. between 1945 - 1965. The population, as a result, is 95% literate with over 75% achieving a high school education.

(8) Culture

The culture of Onslow reflects the background of its early English settlers who were mostly Scots-Irish adventurers. Slavery was introduced on the island in 1650 and was only abolished in 1875. The high percentage of blacks in the country are descendents of these freed slaves. Under Carillo, the blacks achieved a degree of civil rights but Diaz has emphasized the abolishment of racial discrimination as one of his goals.

The principal religion is Protestant, with fundamentalist and evangelical churches the most attended. Religious freedom is emphasized with no state supported churches.

(9) Science and Technology

Onslow is not engaged in any significant research activity and imports all its industrial/technical/military equipment.

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Personnel Strength

(a) The strength of the Onslowan National Guard is 6,000 personnel including ground, air and naval units. The Guard

is organized into three battalions of infantry, a company of tanks, a company of amphibian tractors, engineer and reconnaissance forces and a battalion of artillery. One reinforced battalion is stationed in the Kinston area and the remaining two in the vicinity of the capital, Jax. Aviation units consisting of F/W and helicopter aircraft are based at New River and Cherry Point. Naval units, mostly small patrol craft, are based at New River.

(b) The military is looked upon as an honorable career. Volunteers for the armed forces have always been plentiful and are higher quality in education and physical fitness. Second-term reenlistees who have received advanced training normally reenlist after that tour ends. The racial mix in the Guard reflects the country's racial mix.

(c) Officers are volunteers and must be graduates of the Onslow Military Academy. For advancement in the officer ranks, a specified school and a minimum time-in-grade must be met. Many of the officers have attended schools in the US, such as the Infantry School at Ft. Benning, GA and the Artillery School at Ft. Sill, OK.

(d) There is a reserve force which consists of officers and enlisted personnel who have left the armed forces. The force is small because of the long term professional regular force. All separated personnel are required to become members of the ready reserve for ten years, after which they are transferred to a standby reserve for an additional fifteen years. During their reserve service time, they are subject to callup for training or active service in times of national emergency.

(2) Composition. The Ground Element of the National Guard is composed of three battalions, plus supporting armor, artillery and engineer units. One of three infantry battalions is stationed in Kinston while the other two are in Jax. It has tanks and AAVs to provide a mechanized capability.

(3) Location and position (peacetime)

(a) Two battalions are located in and around Jax, with one battalion in Kinston.

(4) Movements and activities

(a) The three battalions of the Regiment generally stay and train in the vicinity of their permanent barracks. Once a year they conduct a regimental size field exercise east of Jax with tanks, artillery, AAVs, engineer, etc. supported by aviation.

(5) Training

(a) Conscript. The conscript is first sent to one of the Recruit Training Centers at Havelock or Holly Ridge for eight weeks of basic training. Upon completion of basic training, the recruit is assigned to a unit or unit-type training facility for training in specialized equipment or missions. After training in equipment type, the conscript is sent to a specific unit.

(b) Conscript Obligation. Each conscript is obligated for a 1-year tour of duty. Upon completion of this mandatory service, he becomes eligible for the NCO Academy or the Military Academy. There is limited information about the training and program of instruction of the Military Academy. This academy is the only officer candidate school in Onslow.

(6) Uniforms. The Onslow Armed Forces are trained and equipped by the U.S., and have adopted uniforms similar to U.S. issue.

(a) Ground Forces. Camouflaged utilities, combat boots, helmets (both new and old style), Alice packs, cartridge belts with suspender straps, first aid pouch, canteen(s). Rank and insignia devices are similar to USMC devices in most respects.

(b) Tank and AAV crews. Green coveralls, with CVC helmet. Pistols in shoulder holsters.

(c) Air Force. Khaki flight suit, hard hat, sun glasses, white scarf.

(d) Naval forces. Blue denim dungarees, white dixie cup hats, black shoes, key ring hanging from belt.

(7) Logistics

(a) Production. Onslow has only a limited capacity to produce military materiel. The country lacks natural resources,

an industrial base and skilled manpower, all basic to a modern arms industry. Onslow depends upon the United States and other Western nations to provide arms on a favorble long-term loan or grant basis. Indigenous production is limited to small arms ammunition.

(b) Domestic Production Facilities. Onslow has no capability to manufacture weapons or armored fighting vehicles.

(1) Ammunition. Onslow has the capability to reload and manufacture small arms ammunition at the New Bern Ammunition Plant. The plant probably is capable of producing 5.56-millimeter (NATO), 7.62-millimeter (NATO) and 9-millimeter rounds. There are no production figures available. The plant became operational in 1982.

(2) Chemical, Biological and Radiological Production. There is no CBR production capability in Onslow.

(c) Other. Other military-related production capabilities in Onslow include a petroleum products refinery in Jax and a vehicle assembly plant situated in Kinston. The refinery is capable of producing 3,300 barrels per day of diesel/-gasoline. The vehicle assembly plant assembles only vehicles. This includes Berliet, Fiat, Ford (United Kingdom), Saviem, and Renault trucks, utility vehicles, and buses.

(8) Communications. The Onslow National Guard possesses modern communications equipment including the capability to transmit by secure circuits. The Onslowans have recently purchased additional equipment under the U.S. military assistance program.

(9) Chemical, Biological and Radiological Capability (CBR). Onslow maintains a limited CBR capability. The Onslow Army has some atrophine injectors and protective masks in storage. The location and quantity are unknown. CBR defensive tactical doctrine is patterned after U.S. doctrine.

(10) Electronic Warfare. Onslow has a highly developed capability for intercepting, identifying and jamming radio signals.

(11) Onslow Air Force (about 350 personnel).

(a) The headquarters of the Onslow Air Force is located at the New River Air Base, southwest of Jax. Starting out with primary trainers and pilot training in the early sixties, the U.S. continued to provide assistance to the Onslow government in the latter years. In the early 1970s, the U.S. entered into further agreements with Onslow to increase assistance in matters of training, equipment and establishment of the Air Force's technical support system.

(b) The Air Force's primary missions are: aerial defense of national territory, close air support of the Army, assisting the police in internal security matters and assisting the Navy in air-sea rescue operations.

(c) The Onslow Air Force has both Hawk and Stinger SAMs to provide ground based air defense of installations and has modern F/A-18 A/C equipped with AIM 7 air-to-air missiles for AAW. It can perform small-scale air transport, liaison and reconnaissance missions. All Onslow pilots are U.S. trained, having gotten their wings through the Naval aviation training system.

Aircraft in the Onslow Air Force are as follows:

6 F-4S
6 AV-8B
8 CH-46E

(12) Onslow National Navy (about 300 personnel)

(a) Onslow's naval forces are essentially a coast guard force with little or no combat capability. This service uses seven patrol craft to perform its coast guard-type functions. The primary missions are to patrol its coastline, enforce customs regulations, protect territorial fishing rights, conduct search and rescue operations and maintain navigational aids. A limited ship inventory and a lack of an aviation arm to conduct maritime patrol prevents the Onslow Navy from being able to effectively conduct its mission.

(b) The Chief of Staff of the Onslow National Navy, Admiral Sam Jones, exercises command and control over the shore establishment and operating forces at Naval Headquarters located at Morehead City.

(c) The Onslow Navy does not have any submarines in its inventory and the capability to detect, identify, track and kill subsurface targets is nonexistent.

(d) Lacking the platforms to both lay and sweep mines and having no known mine stockpile, the Onslow Navy possesses no capability to conduct this form of warfare and is not expected to acquire one in the foreseeable future.

The naval force, located at Morehead City, is as follows:

2 Cape class coastal patrol craft

5 Broadsword class coastal patrol craft

(e) Shore Facilities. Onslow is continuing to expand its port facilities. Although they are concentrating on improving commercial and fishing operations, the new facilities will also be capable of providing berthing for naval vessels as well as additional and more efficient cargo handling bases for potential military resupply. The most significant changes in the near future will be at the ports of New Bern and Jax. The Onslow port facilities are currently adequate to meet the needs of the small Onslow navy. The port expansion projects, both underway and planned, will contribute more to the commercial sector than the military sector.

(13) Operational capability to launch missiles. Onslowan forces have a limited air defense capability, being equipped with one I-Hawk battery and STINGER teams, which are normally attached to forward units.

(14) Serviceability and operational rates of aircraft. The Onslow air force maintains its aircraft at about 70%. A high tempo of operations may result in the availability rate falling to approximately 60%.

(15) Technical characteristics of equipment. The Onslowan National Guard possesses mostly standard U.S. equipment - i.e., M16 rifles, M60 and M249 machineguns, M2HB and MK 19 heavy

machineguns, SMAW, 60 mm and 81 mm mortars, DRAGON, TOW, M60A1 tank, AAV, LAV and M198, M109, M110 artillery weapons. The weapons are maintained in good condition.

(16) Significant strengths and weaknesses. Since the Onslow National Guard recruits from the various local areas, its troops are very familiar with the terrain and climatic conditions. The recently noticed dissatisfaction of certain NG officers with Colonel Diaz's Marxist views could create a leadership crisis and countercoup.

(17) Recent and present significant activities. Since the coup occurred, an increase in patrols has been noted, especially on the outskirts of Jax. More sentries have been posted at the various army installations and barracks. Radio transmissions have also increased within the past few weeks.

c. Enemy Unconventional Warfare

A small number of Onslowan forces is known to have recently trained in Cornada in special warfare tactics. Therefore, it is assumed that there is a cadre of troops capable of waging guerrilla warfare and conducting terrorist and/or sabotage attacks against U.S. forces. Rear areas and aviation installations could be prime targets for such attacks.

d. Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities. Since the civilian populace is still fairly supportive of the Onslow army, they will provide a ready source of information on U.S. movements and activities. Extreme care should be exercised in granting civilians access to U.S. installations. The Onslow army's counterintelligence capability is not believed to be well developed.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Analysis of the enemy's feasible courses of action indicate that he can:

a. Defend in place.

b. Reinforce the beachhead and conduct a delaying action.

c. Withdraw to a central location near Richlands and conduct a last ditch stand.

d. Revert to guerrilla warfare and conduct isolated terrorist/sabotage attacks.

4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. If the enemy chooses to defend in place, it will piecemeal his forces and enable the U.S. to defeat him in detail.

b. If he reinforces in strength, it could jeopardize the amphibious operation. Therefore, positive measures must be taken to isolate the force beachhead area.

c. If he withdraws to a central location, it will enhance his capability to defend. However, he would be giving up key terrain and isolating himself from the main population centers.

d. If he reverts to guerrilla warfare, it will have a minimum impact on the landing force's mission. Although he could inflict casualties, he could not control any of the important areas of the country.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Probable enemy course of action (from most to least probable).

(1) Reinforce the beachhead.

(2) Withdraw to a central location.

(3) Defend in place.

(4) Revert to guerrilla warfare.

b. The enemy is vulnerable to superior U.S. firepower - especially from air attacks and naval gunfire. The U.S. should capitalize on this advantage by building up its combat power ashore as quickly as possible.

(Signature)

Distribution: Same as Annex Z, OPORD 1-87.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: Intelligence

ITEM 1: Collection, Processing and Timely Dissemination of Intelligence Data

DISCUSSION: The effectiveness of a commander on the battlefield depends greatly on the timely receipt of accurate intelligence data. In addition, intelligence assets are highly effective in the offensive battle plan when integrated with operational planning. 2d MAB task organization included a vast array of intelligence assets. A tremendous amount of intelligence information was processed up and down the chain of command. However, the over-compartmentalization of information and intelligence data deprived the MAB staff of the opportunity to integrate the intelligence assets into the operational planning. Decisions, if and when to utilize jamming, were made within the compartmentalized structure of the intelligence section and not integrated into the operational planning cycle. The denial of source and processing information deprived the operational planning staff of the opportunity to evaluate and act upon the information.

RECOMMENDATION: Intelligence planning and processing must be integrated into the total operation planning cycle. Restraint must be exercised in restricting access to intelligence data in a tactical situation. Utilization of intelligence assets must be staffed to ensure a cohesive utilization of all available combat assets by the MAB Commander.

ITEM 3: The desirability of having the 2d MAB intelligence collection agencies train together prior to a major exercise.

DISCUSSION: During Exercise Solar Flare some problems were experienced by the 2d MAB in the ability of its intelligence collection agencies to communicate effectively during the initial phases. This problem was the result of differences in reporting formats, operational and communication procedures, and a lack of confidence in information appropriateness and acceptability. As the operation developed and the confidence level of the information collectors increased, the quantity and quality of information grew dramatically. Had the units in question been able to train and work together prior to the commencement of the operation, their initial effectiveness could have been signifi- cantly increased.

RECOMMENDATION: That 2d MAB intelligence collection agencies participate in a series of joint training exercises, together with liaison representatives from the G-1, G-3, and G-4, beginning at least one calendar year prior to a major exercise.

Encl (4)

ITEM 2: The need for correct and accurate personnel rosters of individuals designated for access to secured areas.

DISCUSSION: Exercise Solar Flare was determined to be a secure operation during the initial planning stages. As operation planning progressed, the request was made by the MAB G-2 for key units to submit personnel rosters, designating those individuals who were to be allowed access to secure areas such as the Combat Operations Center (COC). Either due to a lack of communication or understanding, the personnel access rosters were submitted late, or not at all. When the time came for the operation to commence, considerable confusion and loss of time resulted when certain individuals were denied access to the COC and other secure areas.

RECOMMENDATION: That greater command attention be directed to the composition and submittal of personnel rosters, designating those individuals access to secure areas during a secure operation.

ITEM 1: Utilization of Naval Gunfire

DISCUSSION: During Exercise Solar Flare it was apparent that some infantry commanders were not familiar with the NGF organization or the proper employment of NGF assets. One commander split a spot team, with one part of the team having the HF radio and the other part having the VHF radio. This caused the team to be ineffective. Additionally, on at least one occasion, two spot teams were consolidated into one, which resulted in inefficient utilization.

RECOMMENDATION: Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams need to be identified by name early in the planning cycle. The NGLO's/Teams should then drill with the units they will support. The NGLO should take a move active role in the planning process. MAGTF exercise staffs must take steps to start liaison with the Navy earlier in the planning cycle to ensure proper Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams are assigned and training with the GCE.

Encl (4)

ITEM 2: Liaison visit/exchange of COC Watch Officers between 2d MAB and 4th MAB during Operation Solar Flare.

DISCUSSION: Prior to Exercise Solar Flare, 2d MAB and 4th MAB agreed to exchange representatives from their respective Combat Operations Center's (COC's) during the operation. The goal of the exchange was to afford each an opportunity to observe and compare the other MAB's COC organization and operation. The 2d MAB representative joined the 4th MAB COC the day prior to STARTEX, and remained with 4th MAB through all but the final tactical evolution. The 4th MAB representative observed 2d MAB's COC in operation for one day of Solar Flare.

RECOMMENDATION: The 2d MAB staff, particularly G-3 Operations, should take every opportunity to participate in and/or observe active duty MAB's in operation.

ITEM 3: Coordination between air defense elements

DISCUSSION: A concept of operations to coordinate the efforts of the TAOC, DASC, LAAM Bn, and the LAAD/FAAD Btry is required to effectively employ air defense assets against enemy air threats. From the 2d MAB perspective, it appeared that each of the above elements were operating independent of each other in the air defense AOA. Rarely did the TAOC or LAAM Battalions coordinate or communicate with the LAAD/FAAD elements. Management, coordination, and allocation of air defense weapons was not addressed by LAAM or FAAD units. The ACE and GCE did not know the LAAD/FAAD employment plan. TECG credit for LAAD/FAAD operations was limited.

RECOMMENDATION: MAGTF exercise staffs must address these traditional planning and coordination requirements. MSC's should be involved in the advance planning cycle and not rely solely upon SOP's and FMFM guidance.

As a point of reference, the 4th MAB employs an Air Defense Officer to develop and coordinate air defense plans. During these planning sequences, this officer is responsible for coordinating the planning efforts between the ACE and the GCE.

ITEM 4: Honoring the air threat

DISCUSSION: The TECG rules of engagement created to facilitate an opposing force air war did not maintain the required degree of realism. Mission analysis by the TECG addressing the effectiveness of close air support tactics in a medium/high threat environment without effective loss assessment to either ACE was unrealistic. The focus by the TECG to award points for air missions flown in lieu of mission effectiveness served only to create a false sense of air capability.

RECOMMENDATION: The TECG must establish rules of engagement and evaluation criteria that forces each air combat element to plan and fly each sortie in accordance with tactical doctrine honoring the air threat or be assessed as a combat loss.

ITEM 5: Air to air combat operations

DISCUSSION: Initial planning for Exercise Solar Flare included a concept of operations for maintaining air superiority within the AOA. Fighter assets from MAG-14 and MAG-20 were to team up and defend against adversary forces augmented from U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy assets. This air augmentation did not occur and no alternate concept was pursued.

RECOMMENDATION: The exercising of the 2d MAB air defense system requires additional planning efforts and alternate concepts in the event of air support deficiencies. A backup plan to support this operation with internal assets should be a minimum requirement.

Encl (4)

ITEM 6: Use of existing buildings to house the MAB Command Post

DISCUSSION: Construction of a "tent city" MAB CP is a time-comsuming, labor-intensive project. Erecting tents and building the Command Post from scratch takes a large advance party and consumes valuable man-days. The exposure the MAB has during this evolution is high, and the footprint a MAB CP creates is very easy to locate by the most rudimentary techniques. Use of existing built-up areas should be maximized, thereby eliminating the "tent city" exposure. Use of existing structures to house the MAB CP would greatly decrease the time required to erect the CP and might help deny the enemy knowledge of the CP location. The emphasis of the MAB should be on planning, command and control, and the use of existing structures would prevent the diversion of energy required by erecting a "tent city".

RECOMMENDATION: The MAB should maximize the use of existing buildings whenever possible for the establishment of the MAB Command Post.

ITEM 7: Co-location of MAB Command Post with Major Subordinate Commands (MSC)

DISCUSSION: The location of the MAB Command Post must be flexible and is dependent on enemy, terrain and the tactical situation. The location of the MAB CP during Solar Flare was geographically compressed due to the limitations of Camp Lejeune. Normally the MAB Headquarters would be located up to 50 kilometers behind the FEBA.

As the situation dictates, co-location of the MAB CP provides many advantages over a separate free-standing site. The primary factor influencing which MSC to co-locate with is the amount of influence the MAB can assert on the battlefield. Under most situations, co-location with the ACE would allow the greatest flexibility in shaping the battle with the type of combat power which can have the most devastating effect on the battlefield. However, if the enemy has air superiority in the AOA, the ACE's role would be more of a defensive nature, and the location of the MAB CP may be shifted to a different MSC. By co-locating with a MSC, the MAB Headquarters need for extensive rear area security personnel can be combined with the security requirements of the MSC. This would relieve or reduce the requirement of the GCE providing the MAB HQ with security personnel, allowing the GCE to retain more of its combat power. In the event the MAB co-located with the ACE, communications between the MAB and the ACE would be greatly simplified, while increasing the risk of difficulty communicating with the GCE because of the distance likely to be involved. The distance problem might be solved with the use of an airborne relay between the MAB CP and the GCE.

RECOMMENDATION: The MAB Command Post should be co-located with one of the major subordinate commands, preferably the ACE.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: Operations

ITEM 8: Integration of SMCR and II MAF units

DISCUSSION: One of the great achievements of Exercise Solar Flare was the successful cross attachment of SMCR and II MAF (Active) units. Of particular note was the cross attachment of 3d Bn 23d Marines to 4th MAB and 2d Bn 8th Marines to 2d MAB. Diffi- culties arising from differences in equipment were encountered but minimized by pre-exercise planning and training. Liaison between 2d Bn 8th Marines and the 23d Marines was delayed because of 2d Bn 8th Marines operational commitments prior to the exercise, however, it did not significantly effect the integration. All other integration was conducted smoothly and effectively.

RECOMMENDATION: That all major Marine Corps exercises continue to integrate SMCR units and Active Marine Corps units.

Encl (4)

ITEM 9: Procedures and control measures for force-on-force combined arms exercises utilizing more than one MAB

DISCUSSION: The general concept described in the TACTRACIT of employing two MABs in one exercise works but has limitations especially when conducted in a congested area such as Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune. Topography and environmental concerns required the exercise to evolve in phases in order to accomplish all training objectives in a safe and efficient manner. However, these restraints affected the realism of the exercise and the ability of the MAB staffs to function in an operational manner continuously throughout the exercise.

RECOMMENDATION: That force-on-force combined arms exercises involving two MABs continue to be scheduled in accordance with Marine Corps operational and training requirements but a training area larger than the present MCB, Camp Lejeune be utilized if possible or another training area be used in conjunction with Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune if available.

ITEM 10: Air Command and Control

DISCUSSION: The limited size of the Camp Lejeune operating area and the air opposing force scenario for Solar Flare resulted in 4th and the 2d MAB's respective Air Combat Element using a single Tactical Air Command Center, Tactical Air Operating Center and Direct Air Support Center. These three controlling agencies were under the overall command and control of II MAF. Additional administrative constraints were imposed limiting each ACE to separate 30 minute operating periods within the Camp Lejeune training complex. Additionally, each ACE shared the TAOC and LAAM Bn assets.

The following problems were encountered:

1. The ACE Commander in essence forfeited his command authority within the TACC to II MAF.

2. The 30 minute alternating window for each ACE to function within the Camp Lejeune operating area was too restrictive and therefore degraded those missions which required considerable coordination and time such as SEAD and immediate type CAS missions.

3. The time pressure for Tactical Air Control parties to execute missions resulted in most missions relying upon alternate communication procedures. The OV-10's were used extensively in the TACA and FACA role in lieu of using the ground FAC as the preferred final controller in CAS missions.

4. Maximum effective utilization of Fixed Wing Air was thereby not achieved as a result of these artifical limitations.

RECOMMENDATION: MAGTF exercise staffs need to include representatives from Command, Control, and Air Defense units to plan an air war that is tactically realistic. Only then will optimum training benefits be realized. The respective operations cell for each ACE must be under the direct control of the ACE commander through his operations center if the TACC is remotely located. This is a must if the ACE is to exercise flexibility and control of their respective air assets in direct support of the GCE. The rules of engagement must meet SAFETY criteria in addition to training objectives.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: Communications-Electronics

ITEM 1: Need to identify Comm Company OPCON to 2d MAB

DISCUSSION: There is a definite need to have a specific Comm Company assigned OPCON to 2d MAB. Although 2d MAB was supported by Comm personnel from the 6th Comm Battalion, they were not assigned OPCON to the 2d MAB early enough for planning and training purposes. For example, the only 2d MAB training with the 6th Comm Bn under the supervision and guidance of the 2d MAB CEO was at the April CPX in Camp Lejeune. (Note: This was a "WIRE EX" and did not involve the use of any radio nets.) This was not adequate to develop the necessary training and teamwork needed for large scale operations (i.e., MABEX). The CEO must have the proper command and control over his Comm personnel in order to insure that they are trained according to the guidelines set forth by the CEO.

RECOMMENDATION: A specific Comm Company (from 6th Comm Bn) should be assigned OPCON to 2d MAB (CEO) for FY88-FY90.

Encl (4)

ITEM 2: MAB Units (HF/VHF)

DISCUSSION: 2d MAB has a total of 25 HF/VHF radio nets on which to either communicate or monitor. This is too many.

RECOMMENDATION: The CEO and MAB Staff should review the necessity of each MAB radio net in order to eliminate or consolidate nets. The final result would reduce the quantity of MAB radio nets but would increase the quality of radio communications.

Encl (4)

ITEM 3: CEO Staff Training

DISCUSSION: There is a need for formal training for the MAB CEO Staff in order to maintain and enhance professional growth in the Communications and Electronics field.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The CEO should request Mobile Training Teams from LFTCPAC (Coronado) to provide formal communications training to the MAB CEO Staff. In addition, other formal schools or instruction for professional growth should be explored, such as contact teams from (or visits to) the 4th MARDIV CEO or II MAF CEO.

ITEM 4: CEO contact teams to MSCs

DISCUSSION: Better liasion needs to be established and maintained between the CEO and the MSC's during both the installation phase and the Exercise itself.

RECOMMENDATION: The MAB CEO should establish Contact Teams to be sent out as needed to various MSC's. These contact teams would consist of 1-2 communicators that belong to and are controlled by the CEO. Their primary goals would be to assist the MSC's CommO's and to advise the MAB CEO of current comm status.

ITEM 5: Coordination of MAB CEO Staff with 6th Comm Battalion and MSCs

DISCUSSION: For an exercise of this magnitude, the CEO must have more individual contact with both the 6thCommBn and the MSC CommOs in order to develop the teamwork needed to unite the MAB CommOs into a cohesive unit.

RECOMMENDATION: Once the MSCs have been identified, the CEO should hold regular meetings with selected CommOs from the MSCs as well as from the 6thCommBn. This can be done by extending invitations for these CommOs to attend the MAB QSMs, or by having these CommOs make liaison trips to the MAB CEO. Additionally, it is important that CPXs be included within the MAB training schedule to get the "hands on" implementation time necessary to develop teamwork.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: Admin/Log

ITEM 1: Estimating Equipment Density Lists (EDL), Consumables, and Budgetary needs.

Discussion: Due to the lack of historical data, initial planning and subsequent requests for EDL, consumables, and budget estimates are inaccurate in that they do not adequately reflect the anticipated, or actual needs relative to a specific exercise or area of operations.

RECOMMENDATION: Planning documents and subsequent requests for EDL items, consumables, and budgets must be prepared utilizing historical data to reflect anticipated/actual needs based on the exercise and area of operations.

Encl (4)

ITEM 2: Advance and Rear Parties

DISCUSSION: Units consistently underestimate the importance of the size and makeup of these parties and believe that the only "real" ATD period is that pertaining to the main body. As a result the critical transition periods are often understaffed, disorganized.

RECOMMENDATION: 2d MAB and other senior MAGTF commands should develop and disseminate guidance to assure advance and rear parties are adequately staffed.

ITEM 3: Exercise logistics

DISCUSSION: Exercise play relative to Logistics was minimal therefore depriving the G-4 Section of providing a significant impact and/or influence relative to the actual play of the exercise.

RECOMMENDATION: The G-4 Section should be actively involved with the TECG in the planning and preparation of logistic items for insertion into the Exercise play. This would insure adequate logistical play and enhance the training opportunities for the G-4 Section.

ITEM 4: Concept of CSSE Support

DISCUSSION: All CSSE units, including mobile CSSE must be provided adequate security relative to both defense against air and ground threats.

RECOMMENDATION: That the CSSE be actively involved in the planning phase with the supported elements to ensure familiarity with the concept of logistical support and to provide input relative to anticipated requirements for CSSE support, and subsequent support.

ITEM 5: Repair Parts - PEB

DISCUSSION: Some SMCR Units authorized PEB's did not bring a PEB to ATD. As a result, the 4th MARDIV G-4 ops developed a master PEB which was subsequently purchased by RSU, MCB, CLNC and utilized during the Exercise.

RECOMMENDATION: All SMCR Units authorized a PEB must bring them to the Exercise. The CSSE should be directed to prepare a PEB List to support 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance, and ensure that these items are procured by the SMU prior to the Exercise.

ITEM 6: Medical Play

DISCUSSION: Individual and mass casualty play, though planned, was not executed. Consequently, this reduced the training opportunities of the G-1, G-4, and Medical Personnel.

RECCOMENDATION: Medical play, casualty reporting and evacuation must not only be planned, but also implemented and executed. G-1, G-4, and Medical personnel should be actively involved with the TECG in the planning of Medical play to ensure realistic training objectives. Planned Medical play must be interjected into the Exercise play.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
FOURTH MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
FPO NEW YORK 09502-8404

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3000
G-3
15 SEP 1987

From: Commanding General, Fourth Marine Amphibious Brigade
To: Commanding General, II Marine Amphibious Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 28542

Subj: SOLAR FLARE 87 AFTER ACTION REPORT

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2D

Encl: (1) Command Element After Action Report
(2) Ground Combat Element After Action Report
(3) Air Combat Element After Action Report
(4) Combat Service Support Element After Action Report

1. In accordance with the reference, the subject report is submitted:

F. E. OGLINE
Chief of Staff

Encl (5)

EXERCISE SOLAR FLARE 87 COMMAND ELEMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT

Encl (5)

ADMINISTRATION

TOPIC: Morning Reports

DISCUSSION: Morning Reports according to the LOI, were to be submitted to the G-1 NLT 0700 daily. With the exception of MAG-14, which called in like "clock work" at 0615 daily, BSSG-4 and RLT-2 never submitted a report after the initial one on 25 July 87. Reports are only due if changes occur after the initial report, however, numerous changes were encountered. No KIA/WIA/MIA's were reported by any of the MSE's. However, the figures listed below were briefed at the "hot wash-up":

	KIA	WIA
D+1	33	18
D+2	68	36
D+3	74	83
D+4	66	70
	241	207

RECOMMENDATION: That the accountability of our Marines become a priority for all commanders.

TOPIC: Casualties and Replacements

DISCUSSION: The G-1/S-1, during a field exercise, normally gets involved in real-world situations and usually never exercises how a G-1/S-1 would work under real contigences to include; casualty estimates, replacements, medevac's, grave registration, etc. In an effort to exercise these areas during Solar Flare, a plan was established that included the TECG Umpires tagging casualty role players. They were to be Medevaced to the BSSG-4 Medical Company. The MAB G-1 was to simulate the MAGTF Consolidation Transient Center and return all casualties as replacements back to parent units. The G-1 sent a team to process the simulated casualties/replacements twice daily. No simulated casualties arrived for processing. Over 400 KIA/WIA's were tagged during the exercise. An invaluable experience for the G-1 personnel was lost.

RECOMMENDATION: That the MSE's be directed by the Commanding General to support this part of future exercises.

INTELLIGENCE

TOPIC: Intelligence Operations: Forward (Mobile) CP

DISCUSSION: The forward (mobile) CP concept used during SF-87 presented some unique control problems for the G-2 section. The G-3 section maintained "net control" at the forward CP, while G-2 operations conducted the primary intelligence analysis effort at the rear CP. The added echelon of control between the forward CP and rear CP induced extended reporting and requesting times complicating the intelligence management process.

RECOMMENDATION: To eliminate the splitting of command, control and intelligence, should the decision be made to employ a mobile CP in future exercises, additional radio nets (aerial observation net, MAF Intel net) will have to move forward as well as additional intelligence personnel to aid in the analytical process.

TOPIC: Intelligence Collections: Collection Management

DISCUSSION: The scenario and force list for SF-87 provided the MAB with few organic collection assets:

1. The OV-10's were passed to the RLT for exploitation once airborne and on station.

2. There were no Force Reconnaissance assets and both the terrain and the scenario did not lend itself to using this asset.

3. SCAMP was able to provide a total of thirteen sensor strings, however, the terrain and scenario diluted the usefulness of this asset.

4. No National level intelligence (notional, provided by II MAF) was disseminated after day 1.

5. No RPV's, RF-4's or EA-6B's were used for intelligence collection. Because the majority of information recieved came from lower echelon units, traffic flow and analysis was relatively easy. However, if we should ever exercise all of the collection assets listed above and employ a mobile CP as structured in SF-87, a considerable time lag, and decrease in the quality of information may occur unless additional radio nets (Aerial Observation and MAF Intel nets) are provided for the mobile CP.

RECOMMENDATION: Consideration must be given to the fact that if command and control is to be passed to the mobile CP, sufficient communications assets must be made available to control the flow of intelligence information and allow command and direction of collections assets.

OPERATIONS

TOPIC: Planning

DISCUSSION: There were four conferences held to plan Solar Flare-87; a Pre-Initial, Initial, Mid and Final Planning Conference. The Pre-Initial was conducted to provide reserve participants an organizational base and was unique to Solar Flare. The other three were well organized and productive. The planning sequence moved smoothly and consistantly from exercise conception to execution. Objectives were defined early and remained focused. They were realistic, limited, and consistant. Participating units were chopped early for planning and also remained consistant. The result was a remarkably smooth planning process.

RECOMMENDATION: Encourage future planning that is equally disciplined, focused and effective.

TOPIC: Integration of Regular and Reserve Components

DISCUSSION: The integration of regular and reserve components was successfully accomplished. Units cross-chopped on 22 July and were employed effectively in a series of challenging tactical situations less than four days later. Valuable lessons were learned immediately and the total force concept was revalidated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Continued emphasis on total force integration.

b. Formal affiliation between the 2nd MAB staff and various II MAF MAGTF Command Elements. By making 2nd MAB a principal source of staff augmentation for various II MAF MAGTF exercises and operations we consolidate the benefits of participation.

TOPIC: Deception Operations

DISCUSSION: MAB deception operations centered on a mock-up command post built around Fleet Tactical Deception Group Atlantic's CRX Van. The deception CP was designed to look heavier than our actual mobile CP. It consisted of the CRX Van, an LVTC and an LVTP, several tents, antennas, trucks, and four mock-up M60A1 tanks. This package was used in various roles to simulate MAB, RLT and BSSG CP's. Effectiveness was difficult to determine because OPFOR (2d MAB) was experiencing communications problems which precluded effective tracking of enemy intelligence at their CP.

Development of the deceptive CP was an off-shoot of the mobile CP concept. Consequently, future use will probably be tied to the mobile CP utilization concept described below (i.e. emergency or echelon). There is, however, significant benefit associated with use of the CRX at either the MAB, RLT or BSSG levels.

RECOMMENDATION: Continued development of deception plans and concepts in concert with FLTTACDECGRULANT.

TOPIC: Use of a Mobile Command Post at the MAB Level

DISCUSSION: 4th MAB has been refining a mobile command post concept for just over a year. Solar Flare provided an opportunity to further experiment with the credibility of the concept. The problem encountered involved a tradeoff between real mobility and size. At the MAB level, genuine command and control involves a large intel and logistic tail. Real mobility requires a lot of that tail be cut off and left at the main CP (toward or in a rear area). Additionally, assignment of an effective security element to the mobile CP tends to degrade the basic concept (of mobility). It is, however, essential to any sort of sustainability. The result is a dilemma. Our conclusion was that a MAB mobile CP is useful on a temporary basis; as an emergency alternative or as an echelon of the main CP during displacement.

RECOMMENDATION: The mobile CP package should continue to be refined and used in appropriate circumstances.

TOPIC: NBC Play

DISCUSSION: NBC play for Solar Flare was limited, by design, to an RLT-2 evolution just prior to endex. It facilitated regular unit withdrawal while the reserves were conducting their link-up. The play was a limited success. It was to close to endex to sustain real interest by the participants and was not really evaluated by the TECG. Any NBC training is worth the effort but this was not our best effort.

RECOMMENDATION: Avoid scheduling NBC play adjacent to endex in future exercises. It deserves more attention.

TOPIC: Facilities

DISCUSSION: For Solar Flare, 4th MAB utilized existing facilities at Camp Geiger that simulated operations in a built up area relatively displaced from the FEBA. Billeting, messing, and office spaces were efficient and facilitated concentration on the tactical problem rather than exercise support functions. Useful lessons were reaffirmed concerning communications, command and control from a remote but realistic MAB CP location.

RECOMMENDATION: That the MAB continue to test a variety of CP concepts to obtain maximum experience and training.

TOPIC: Liaison

DISCUSSION: 2nd MAB and 4th MAB staffs exchanged key liaison officers to the benefit of all concerned. Exchange of organizational experiences, policies and procedures contributed to the total force concept.

RECOMMENDATION: The effectiveness of liaison officer exchanges is directly proportional to the willingness of the command to sacrifice a knowledgable key officer for the exercise. This should be emphasized in future exercises.

LOGISTICS

TOPIC: Logistic Operation Center Exercise (LOCEX)

DISCUSSION: In conjunction with providing a Solar Flare logistic response cell, the AC/S G-4 conducted an internal LOGEX to focus on those employment logistic issues which are not normally studied during exercises. In past exercises the logistic effort centered around employment, deployment, fiscal, and Host Nation Support planning and execution and rarely emphasized force logistic sustainment. These sustainment issues are important, however, and Solar Flare provided an excellent forum with which to practice employment logistics. The AC/S G-4 established a Landing Force Logistic Operation Center (LFLOC) and in conjunction with the Solar Flare scenario, force list, and exercise area developed special logistic situations and logistic requirements for internal staff discussion and resolution. These requirements often ended in staff presentations and/or preparation of planning documents associated with sustainment of the force, relative to the prepared special scenario. The individual and collective experience gained as a result of this exercise was of great value with the overall LOCEX being both stimulating and productive for those who participated.

RECOMMENDATION: None. Provided for information only.

TOPIC: Casualty Play

DISCUSSION: The exercise goal established by II MAF and 4th MAB, to exercise the casualty evacuation system from the company level through the BAS to the Medical Company, was not accomplished. Ground commanders at all levels did not support the exercise objective and a capability to evacuate casualties from the unit level was never demonstrated. Of the 70-80 simulated casualties levied against 4th MAB each day, a total of 16 were evacuated. Efforts to obtain the support of GCE Commanders and Staff to conduct casualty evacuation failed. The casualty evacuation portion of the GCE initiated NBC drill was cancelled, without notifing BSSG-4 or the Medical Company (-).

Personnel and equipment, vehicles and communication assets as well as the Medical Company (-) were available and ready to support the exercise, but were very poorly utilized. The MCSSD's evacuation platoon was utilized once to evacuate casualties, otherwise these assets were not required.

Casualty evacuation during wartime is a significant problem facing the commander and his staff. Unless he is able to establish and utilize an effective evacuation system, casualties will be a war stopper and impede tactical maneuver. Unless commanders understand and use the system in peacetime exercises, they will lose lives and possibly be unable to accomplish their mission in war.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Stress casualty evacuation as a major objective in future exercises.

2. Grade units on their medical readiness as a factor in combat readiness.

TOPIC: Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG)

DISCUSSION: For Solar Flare no medical cell was planned for the TECG. Medical play was to be supported by the TECG Umpires tagging casualties and the units being responsible for evacuation and care. A medical umpire staff was provided to the TECG by each MAB and the TECG had agreed to provide support (vehicles, comm) to the medical umpires. The umpires were to be at each BAS and the Medical Company (-) to evaluate the evacuation and treatment process.

Since the medical umpires were external to the TECG, but supported by them, it was never clear who dictated casualty play. Each Marine umpire at the company/battalion was free to tag or not tag casualties as they desired. It was never determined whose responsibility it was to enforce casualty play at the unit level. When units or their commanders did not evacuate casualties the TECG umpires did not follow it up. At the TECG headquarters it was unclear as to how many casualties were tagged and should have been evacuated.

RECOMMENDATION

1. A medical cell be included in the TECG.

2. Medical umpires be brought in early to develop the casualty play procedures and tags, and how the evaluation will be conducted.

3. Unit umpires should be well briefed prior to the exercise.

TOPIC: Medical Support for Task Organized Units

DISCUSSION: During Solar Flare (and in other exercises) several Task Forces were created around the AAV, tank and LAV elements. These detachments do not have a Battalion Aid Station assigned or designated to support them. Each element joining the task force may bring corpsmen with a Unit 1 (first aid kit). The task force faces a problem in determining where they get medical support and how casualties are evacuated. The higher headquarters for the task force, usually the RLT must plan for, aquire and allocate medical support for each task force.

RECOMMENDATION: Medical support requirements for task force operations be included in planning the T/O and T/E for the RLT.

TOPIC: Marine Corps Environmental Shelter System (MCESS)

DISCUSSION: During Solar Flare, Charlie Company (-), BSSG-4, established a field hospital using the MCESS shelters. The MCESS was used to house the core of the hospital; triage, operating room, wards, X-ray, dental while the remainder was housed in GP (M) tents.

The MCESS offers a very good environment for patients in the field. Once set up, they offer a heated/cooled, clean facility that offers many of the advantages of a fixed building, while retaining the capability to relocate. The major draw back to using MCESS in the Brigade is its lack of flexibility and mobility.

A medical company would carry 20-30 MCESS units plus complexing (joining) kits and corridores. This material is carried on the LVS (container carriers) vehicle. Forklifts, fitted with extended forks and lifting straps are required to move the shelters. Site preparation to reduce the slope of the land to less than 9 degrees is required. The hospital facility requires about 20 acres and should not be dispersed, since this exposes the casualty to the outside environment. Set up time is about 72 hours.

MCESS is well suited to a static or low manuever situation or as a pre-hostilities facility. It also has application in a rear semi-fixed combat service support area. MCESS can not replace the tent in the mobile environment.

The major area for improvement for the MCESS is the heat pump (TAMCN B0011) used with the shelter. The heat pump has a long history of being unreliable in the field and is very ineffective at cooling or heating. The MCESS currently has no alternate heating/cooling method. Kero-Sun heaters have been used in the past with some success. No alternate cooling source is available.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. The MCESS be utilized only as a follow on echelon asset or prepositioned asset.

2. Medical Companies must remain flexible and highly mobile to support a variety of combat environments.

3. The B0011 heat pump be replaced with a lighter, more reliable and more maintainable unit.

4. That MCESS support requirements (vehicles, generators, forklifts, bull dozers, etc.) be determined, as well as embark requirements, and provided to BSSG-4 and 4th MAB, so an estimate of supportability can be made.

TOPIC: Care and Reporting of Actual Casualties

DISCUSSION: Of the forces in the field, 10 casualities were evacuated for injuries or illnesses that could not be cared for by MAB assets. Two casualties were admitted to the Naval Hospital and 8 returned to duty in the rear. Reporting of daily sick call and evacuation of casualties was spotty at best. The schedule and formats were not followed by reporting units. Units reported communication problems in contacting subordinate elements for information. Alternative communication methods did not appear to be utilized. Casualty reports required on personnel hospitalized, were never submitted by the unit S-1. It appeared that unit S-1 personnel were either not in the field or had not taken the 4th MAB LOI, or the Marine Corps Orders on casualty reporting with them.

At the Battalion level the Surgeon for 2/2 stated he never received information from the RLT-2 staff, concerning the availability of the Medical Company for care of actual casualties, the reporting requirements or evacuation support.

No helicopter MEDEVAC's were required during this exercise.

RECOMMENDATION: Frequent meetings between the medical staff planners, G/S-1, G/S-4 and others down to the Battalion/Squadron level must be held. Units must provide a turn-over file to allow newly reporting personnel to understand the exercise plan.

HEADQUARTERS FUNCTIONS

TOPIC: Transportation to Camp Geiger

DISCUSSION: The original request for transportation, to Camp Geiger, was for over 80 personnel. After this POV's were authorized and a new count was requested. The new count still totaled over 60 personnel. On the date of departure less than 30 personnel showed for transportation to Geiger on-board two 40 passenger busses.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) POV's should be restricted to essentials only.

(2) Accurate personnel counts must be submitted to the Hq Cmdt on a timely basis. These counts must reflect who will need transportation.

TOPIC: Motor Transport Support

DISCUSSION: New procedures were implemented and they worked very well. Operators from within the sections were assigned individual vehicles thus, improving the support to the sections and relieving some of the burden off the Motor-T section.

RECOMMENDATION: That we continue to use these procedures.

TOPIC: Forward CP Security

DISCUSSION: Elements of the RLT were attached to provide security, this concept worked very well.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue with this concept.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2d Marines, 2d Marine Division , FMF
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 28542

IN REPLY REFER TO

3500
S-3
6 Aug 87

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division, FMF
To: Commanding General, 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade

Subj: EXERCISE SOLAR FLARE AFTER ACTION REPORT

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2D
(b) CG, 4th MAB 061333Z Jul 87

1. As directed by the references, the subject report is submitted.

M. J. BYRON

Copy to:

CG, 2d MarDiv
CO, BSSG-4
CO, MAG-14
Files (2)

Encl (5)

PART I - SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

A. SCOPE

1. Exercise Solar Flare was designed to exercise the integration of active duty and selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units under conditions closely approximating those associated with a major conflict. The Solar Flare FTX, conducted during the period 26-29 July 1987, capped the annual two week active training duty (ATD) period for reserve forces deployed to Camp Lejeune, NC as part of 2d MAB.

2. The Solar Flare FTX was a semi-structured, force-on-force, free play exercise placing the 2d MAB against the 4th MAB in a post amphibious landing scenario. Both MAB's were composed of both regular and reserve forces with the GCE's of each MAB, RLT-2 and RLT-23, each configured with one regular and one reserve infantry battalion as their nuclei.

3. Free play during this exercise was limited only by regularly programmed critique pauses, exercise area restrictions and safety considerations.

4. Forces participating as part of RLT-2 were as follows:

Regimental Landing Team 2

HQ Co(-), 2d Marines
2d Bn, 2d Marines
3rd Bn, 23th Marines
1st Bn(-)(REIN), 10th Mar
  HQ Btry
  Btry B(-)
  Btry C(-)
  Btry N(-), 5th Bn, 10th Marines
  Det, TPC, 10th Marines
2d Cmbt Engr Bn(-)
Co B(-), 2d Tank Bn
Co C(-)(REIN), 2d AAV Bn
Co B(-), 2d LAV Bn
Co A(-), 2d Recon Bn

B. OBJECTIVES

1. Objectives designated by the CG, 4th MAB for Exercise Solar Flare were as follows:

a. To exercise integrated active/SMCR units under the "Total Force" concept.

b. To support the II MAF Campaign Plan.

c. To support the training requirements of subordinate commanders.

d. To exercise tactical deception techniques and procedures.

e. To refine and evaluate mobile CP tactics.

f. To conduct a battalion size NBC decontamination exercise.

g. To exercise casualty and personnel replacement procedures.

2. RLT-2 objectives, supporting those of the CG, 4th MAB, were:

a. To fully integrate the 3rd Bn, 23rd Marines and other select reserve detachments into all phases of RLT-2 combat operations.

b. To continue to exercise the C3I and fire support coordination using multiple maneuver elements within the precepts of maneuver warfare.

c. To emphasize combat engineer operations in every phase of the exercise, to include the Engineer Bn(-) employment as a separate maneuver element.

PART II - CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

DATE	EVENT
31 May - 1 Jun 87	II MAF Final Planning Conference (FPC)
15 Jun	Initial RLT-2 Staff Briefings/Commencement of Active Planning
19-21 June	RLT-2 liaison visit to HQ, 3rd Bn, 23rd Mar
6 Jul	4th MAB LOI Published
17 Jul	Final RLT-2 Planning meeting
21 Jul	RLT-2/MAG-14 Planning meeting, MCAS Cherry Point
22 Jul	RLT-2 Field CP Established (Pre-FTX)
23 Jul	Solar Flare COMMEX
24 Jul	Solar Flare CPX/4th MAB Orders Group
25 Jul	Final RLT-2 Orders Group
26-29	Solar Flare FTX
29 Jul	RLT-2/BSSG-4 NBC Exercise

PART III - TOPICAL DISCUSSION

1. OPERATIONS

A. **TOPIC:** Training Area Utilization

DISCUSSION: With Exercise Solar Flare, as with past force-on-force operations conducted in the Camp Lejeune training area complex, there were two significant concerns associated with area use.

a. First, use of all the available training area was again not maximized. The initial laydown of forces was such that following tactical moves to contact, we had effectively eliminated all area north of the G-10 impact area. Thus, a full 1/3 of the available training area at Lejeune was never used to support combat operations. At least one entire phase of the exercise could have been conducted north of G-10 had a sincere effort to promote use of that area been addressed during planning.

b. Once again there were alot of disparate forces located throughout the training area at key locations. Water production facilities, Radio Bn installations, etc, were placed either in the center or along key peripheral avenues of approach. The placement of these non-combat forces led to non-tactical related intelligence reporting, undue area congestion and most importantly, an increased safety hazard. The placement of non-essential support units was obviously determined with little or no regard of the respective concepts of operations of the opposing ground forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Plan future exercises to promote maximum use of available exercise maneuver area. Avoid the tendency to start all maneuver in the center of the training area complex.

b. For large exercises request and demand exclusive use of the training area for exercise forces. Coordinate placement of support headquarters and agencies to ensure unimpeded movement of combat forces throughout prime maneuver areas and corridors.

B. **TOPIC:** Helicopters in Direct Support of the GCE.

DISCUSSION: During the entire course of Solar Flare, MAG-14 designated two AH-1's and one UH-1 in direct support of RLT-2. Placement and subsequent employment of these assets were controlled exclusively by the RLT Commander through the AirO. As a result the RLT experienced extremely responsive CIFS and helo recce support. Continual face-to-face briefings of the helo crews at the RLT COC enabled pilots to keep abreast of the rapidly changing enemy situation thus assisting in their survivability during mission execution. Similarly, pilot debriefs greatly assisted the development of the RLT intelligence picture of the battlefield. There are however two factors which must be considered with this method of helicopter employment.

a. The helicopters must be able to return frequently to a home field or FAARP for refueling, rearming and crew changes.

b. The field location of these assets must be carefully selected to provide maximum security for both the helicopters as well as the RLT CP. Attendant communications must be carefully planned to ensure effectiveness and redundancy.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to provide Direct Support Helicopter to the GCE in future operations where conditions and METT-TS support this means of employment. Identify this option early to ensure adequate time for required employment planning.

C. **TOPIC:** Combat Reporting

DISCUSSION: Operational reporting, in general, was marginal during the entire exercise. Moreover, the problem was manifested at all levels of command from the battalion through the MAB level. The RLT failed to submit some regularly scheduled SITREP's, nor did it receive similar reporting from subordinate units. Periodic recaps of RLT activities were sent on eleven occasions to augment SITREP and SPOTREP reporting. In addition, frequent checks were made to ascertain if the MAB staff was, as is common practice, monitoring the RLT TAC net. Never-the-less the flow of information up the chain was sporadic and even more importantly, often devoid of the RLT commander's immediate future intentions.

Information from above was equally sparse. Only one INTSUM was received and that was prior to STARTEX. Two SPOTREP's, devoid of source, were received and neither could be confirmed by other intelligence (in that regard, raw information without the source is useless in most respects). Reports of activities with the MAB rear area were at best hours old. MSC cross-talk was minimal from the intelligence and operational standpoints.

RECOMMENDATION: In future exercises specify operational reporting proficiency as a specific exercise objective. Pre-exercise COMMEX's should exercise passing of pre-formatted reports and emphasize cross- MSC communications.

D. **TOPIC:** Tactical Exercise Control

DISCUSSION: Overall tactical exercise control, under direction of Col GARVEY and the TECG, was excellent. Obvious strides have been made and the lessons learned from CAO 86 were well heeded. The Solar Flare tactical exercise control plan, to include the provisions for transportation and communications support, was well conceived, meticulously coordinated and widely published. As a result the quality of exercise control contributed significantly to the conduct of the exercise. Movement control, engagement results and the effects of fire support coordination, were particularly well umpired. There is now a well documented base from which future enhancements can be made to further improve exercise control. Areas requiring further consideration/enhancement are:

- Providing controllers down to the platoon, small task force level to ensure better control of isolated/decentralized engagements.

- Enhancing the control/evaluation of engineer efforts, LAAD employment and CAS effectiveness.

- The provision of extra umpire teams to accomodate the control of units created as the result of imaginative task organization; e.g. creation of task forces, special operation groups, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to use the Solar Flare TEC concept as the basis for controlling/evaluating all future force-on-force exercises and, improve the current concept by incorporating above delineated enhancements.

E. **TOPIC:** Critique Periods vs. Operational Continuity

DISCUSSION: The concept of having predesignated exercise pauses for the purpose of phase critiques was excellent. General block times for initial and succeeding phases were necessarily established with the provision, however, that pauses would actually occur based upon the quality of combat being pursued and not just because given time has elasped. Phase I, movement to contact, was just starting to get interesting when the first pause occurred, as scheduled. In this one phase, action should have been allowed to continue, or at least the respective engaging commanders should have been consulted for recommendations. While it would have been difficult, perhaps even infeasible, a given phase should have been allowed to continue until a natural break in action/momentum occurred. Once the momentum of a given series of actions is stopped, it takes an inordinant amount of time to be recaptured. Breaks also interupt the natural flow of logistics support and result in surges which attempt to resupply everyone during the break so all units will be at 100% when action resumes. Once a pause is declared, it is equally important to designate a restart time that is realistically attainable by all participating forces. There must be time to react to critique points (lessons learned), change task organization as appropriate, reposition forces, issue orders down the chain, and reactivate the reconnaissance reporting chain. Reconnaissance, of course drives a force-on-force scenario.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For future planning consideration only.

F. **TOPIC:** River Crossing Assets

DISCUSSION: Deliberate river crossings such as those conducted during Solar Flare are rarely exercised at Camp Lejeune. One primary reason -- lack of supporting landing craft. Solar Flare pointed out the necessity for more frequent exercising of this tactically fundamental, yet complex, evolution. To exercise this concept adequately requires assault landing craft augmentation in the

form of LCM-8's or LCU's. These craft are only available from U.S. Army or Navy assets upon request, and then only for limited periods. What is required is a permanent ACU detachment at Camp Lejeune. A cadre of 2 to 4 landing craft, manned by either trained Marines or sailors, regular or reserve, would greatly assist in both amphibious and river operations training and would probably receive extensive use. This availability would certainly open up portions of the Lejeune training area to mechanized assets which are normally restricted to operations south and east of New River. Both Division and FSSG would benefit from the acquisition of this added training support.

RECOMMENDATION: Actively pursue the acquisition of permanently based LCM-8, or LCU's for local training.

G. **TOPIC:** Engagement by Fire Support means of Deep Targets

DISCUSSION: The use of fire support in engaging deep targets (i.e., CP's, Fire Support, logistics trains, or assembly areas) was not a factor in the overall evaluation during the exercise. The concept in using fire support was centered at the lower levels where "credit" could be determined and BDA established.

RECOMMENDATION: Future exercises should evaluate the capabilities of the RLT FSCC and artillery battalion headquarters FDC in planning fires on deep targets that normally influence the actions of the front line units.

H. **TOPIC:** BSSG-4 Fire Support

DISCUSSION: Due to the limited fire support assets available during the exercise, the ability of the GCE to actually provide timely and responsive fires to the BSSG was not realistic. During situations when the BSSG was under attack the RLT was also engaged. For the artillery battalion to engage a target to the rear, howitzers would actually have to be pulled out of their positions and layed towards the rear: a time consuming procedure. Additionally to reroute air to the BSSG effort degraded pre-scheduled sorties required for the RLT. The coordination between the BSSG and GCE was good and fire support was provided when requested.

RECOMMENDATION: A more realistic approach toward fire support for the BSSG is needed.

I. **TOPIC:** Artillery Ordnance Required Supply Rate (RSR)

DISCUSSION: A constructive mix of artillery ordnance was not predetermined for the exercise. Consequently the RLT's planned use of FASCAM was ruled out by the umpires. Predetermining RSR would improve logistics planning and fire support asset selection.

RECOMMENDATION: That a basic allowance and a varied ordnance mix be stated in the LOI in future exercises.

J. **TOPIC:** Target List

DISCUSSION: Deleting targets from the target list as they become obsolete makes the target list a more responsive tool. This target list purification is a continuous process. Only on two occasions during the exercise did a subordinate FSCC recommend deletion of targets that no longer supported the scheme of maneuver.

RECOMMENDATION: In future exercises the target list must be kept current. When time is available it should be purged and quickly submitted to higher headquarters for action.

K. **TOPIC:** Call for Fire Requests

DISCUSSION: Task forces and attached units requesting artillery fire support tied up the FSCC net with their requests.

RECOMMENDATION: All units should have the frequencies of the artillery Battalion/Battery COF and should contact them directly to request fire. The artillery battalion will call the RLT FSCC if a problem arises in providing support or cross boundary coordination is required. As a last resort the FSCC net can be used to transmit CFF to the artillery battlaion.

L. **TOPIC:** Artillery Liaison Officers Control of Forward Observer Assets

DISCUSSION: During the exercise a maneuver element had decided to use an FO team as a retrans site. The Artillery Liaison Officer had been directed previously to attach the spare FO team to a task force which was the POME. The responsibility to have positive comunications established between the artillery battery and the supported unit lies with the artillery unit. The mission of the FO team is to provide artillery, air, or naval gunfire support to the maneuver commander.

RECOMMENDATION: Forward Observer teams should be utilized in their designated capacity. When a communications problem exists between supported and supporting units, alternate nets should be used to reestablish comm or higher artillery headquarters should be called to assist in rectifying the problem.

2. **INTELLIGENCE**

A. **TOPIC:** Intelligence Collection: SCAMP

DISCUSSION: SCAMP provided negligible support to the RLT-2 collection effort. This was due in part to maintenance problems and in part to the fact that the problem "by-passed" the emplaced sensors after the first phase.

RECOMMENDATION: Retain a sensor "Reserve" for use as necessary, or recover (for reuse) implanted sensors which no longer serve a purpose.

B. TOPIC: Intelligence Collection: Recon

DISCUSSION: Division recon assets assigned to RLT-2 were inadequate in number.

RECONNAISSANCE: During exercise planning every effort must be made to ensure the necessary number of teams is provided.

C. TOPIC: Intelligence Collection: Recon Motorcycles

DISCUSSION: The recon motorcycles proved invaluable for use with the reserve recon team and provided speed and flexibility during their operations.

RECOMMENDATION: Division reconnaissance elements should continue to develop motorcycle use. Recon reserve team use of motorcycles has a higher payoff than exclusively using motorcycles as couriers.

D. TOPIC: Intelligence Collection: Aerial Imagery/Observation.

DISCUSSION: RLT-2 received negligible information from this source and had none in direct support.

RECOMMENDATION: From time-to-time higher headquarters should provide direct support intelligence dedicated overhead platforms to the regiment.

E. TOPIC: Intelligence Collection: Radio Bn (DSU)

DISCUSSION: There is an understandable reluctance to ID source of DSU collected information, but analysis would be significantly enhanced if this were done.

RECOMMENDATION: If source not ID'd clear language, perhaps a code word could be used.

F. TOPIC: Intelligence Analysis

DISCUSSION: Very little intelligence analysis was conducted during the exercise. This was due primarily to a lack of raw information acquired by the collection effort. To conduct analysis without information is guesswork.

RECOMMENDATION: A greatly enhanced collection effort is necessary.

3. ADMINISTATION AND LOGISTICS

A. TOPIC: CASUALTIES AND REPLACEMENTS

DISCUSSION: Casualty and replacement play are legitimate and beneficial. There are many complications in the realistic development of replacement criteria. The Admin/Personnel Officer, as well as the commander, must be acutely aware of the impact of personnel gains and losses, especially men with critical MOS's. Gains, losses, and possible redistributions were not exercised during Solar Flare.

RECOMMENDATION: That identification of casualties include MOS to facilitate needed replacement by critical specialty, and that personnel attrition during future exercises, be coordinated through the various levels (i.e. CSSD and the Medical Company) to allow redistribution of personnel assets by the respective commanders.

B. **TOPIC:** Task Forces LAV, AAV and Tanks were not equipped to provide internal CSS.

DISCUSSION: The above mentioned task forces are provided equipment through their own T/E enabling them to provide CSS with organic assets. These units participating in Solar Flare did not bring their assets thereby making it very difficult to support them.

RECOMMENDATION: That when mechanized attachments are task organized as a separate maneuver element they be required to bring sufficient assets to provide internal support. This would increase their mobility and, at the same time, reduce the burden on the mobile CSSD.

C. **TOPIC:** Reaction to requests for CSS.

DISCUSSION: On several occasions requests for CSS were submitted in conjunction with displacements and it was critical to know when the support could be provided. The BSSG was unable to accurately predict the estimated time of arrival of support from the mobile units.

RECOMMENDATION: That the CSSD provided feedback to the requesting units so to not impede movement on the battlefield.

4. **COMMUNICATIONS**

A. **TOPIC:** Naval Gunfire Communications

DISCUSSION: The Naval Gunfire Liaison officer was never able to establish radio communications with either of the two naval gunfire ships. The NGF LnO's radios were thoroughly checked several times and were always found to be operational. His radio operators swept through all of the assigned frequencies many times during the exercise but never communicated with the ships. There was an unsuccessful attempt on the third day of the exercise to fly the NGF

LnO out to one or both of the NGF ships to coordinate establishment of the NGF circuit. Post-exercise phonecon with the communications officer on one of the NGF ships revealed that: (1) the ship might not have received the message containing the frequencies and call signs, (2) the communications officer on the ship was unaware that he was supposed to be up on any NGF nets, and (3) that he believed that NGF was being simulated by another ship (a ship other than the two ships that we believed were providing NGF support). It seems likely that there were never any ships operating on our assigned NGF frequencies during the exercise.

RECOMMENDATION: That in the future, and whenever possible, the NGF LnO coordinate much more closely with appropriate representatives of the ships assigned to provide NGF support.

B. **TOPIC:** Automated Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (ACEOI)

DISCUSSION Three months prior to the start of the exercise, liaison was made with the various staff sections, as well as the 4th MAB in order to construct an ACEOI that would accurately reflect the desires of the commander and support the tactical play of the exercise. Provisions were made in the ACEOI for the use of one task force, and for the provision of several spare frequencies and call signs. Subsequently however, we had created a total of four task forces (AAV, LAV, RAID, CEB). The use of more task forces than planned required the assignment of spare frequencies and call signs that were not necessarily associated with the participating unit. Furthermore, during the play of the exercise additional task force organizations were formed (e.g. BINGO) which were not planned during initial communications planning. These additional task forces and the use of the spare frequencies and call signs tended to confuse and invalidate the ACEOI for the communicators, and more importantly for the commanders and operators.

RECOMMENDATION: Task organizations should be identified as early in the planning process as possible. In most cases it takes a minimum of one month lead time to produce an ACEOI. This planning figure is even bigger if the ACEOI is to be produced by a higher headquarters (i.e. 4th MAB). If it is impossible to foresee all possible task organizations then call signs and frequencies should follow as closely as possible the task forces owning unit (i.e. use a call sign for 1st Plt, LAV's instead of creating "BINGO" call signs). If neither is possible then we should be prepared to accept confusion.

C. **TOPIC:** Communications Equipment within Task Force Organizations

DISCUSSION: A chronic problem within the RLT is the lack of communications equipment within task force organizations. Any unit organized as a task force should have sufficient communications equipment to provide for the minimum necessary command, control, and fire support communications. In most cases this results in four single channel radio nets in several combinations of HF and VHF. When making up these task force organizations we must keep this requirement in mind. We must also remember that the parent unit of the task force must be prepared to provide the communications support needed for the task force. The regimental communication platoon does not own, nor do we have access to sufficient assets to provide radio communications to these task forces.

RECOMMENDATION: Again, forthought and planning are the key to avoiding communications problems with task force organizations. Units providing the task force must be required to provide radio equipment to allow the task force to be active on all required command, control and fire support communications.

D. **TOPIC:** Identification of communications requirements prior to STARTEX

DISCUSSION: On the day of the exercise several sections identified to the Communication Officer requirements for communications which were not identified during the planning for Solar Flare. Due to the prior temp loan of all unused equipment to support 3/23 it was not possible to provide all of the late requested communications.

RECOMMENDATION: Sections should be reminded that they must identify their communications requirements to the communciations officer prior to the beginning of the exercise. This will help ensure that our precious few radio assets will be utilized in an efficient manner.

E. **TOPIC:** Use of TACP Personnel

DISCUSSION: Adequate provisions for the employment of TACP personnel and equipment were not made prior to the beginning of exercise Solar Flare. This caused initial problems in the employment of air as well as communications assets early in the exercise. Since the amount of air play in any given exercises varies, it is necessary for the Air Liaison Officer to ensure that his communications needs are adequately planned. For example, exercise Solid Shield had very little air play and required little TACP play, contrasted with exercise Solar Flare which required greater TACP participation. It is not feasible from a personnel or equipment standpoint to dedicate TACP assets if the exercise is not anticipated to have sufficient air play.

RECOMMENDATION: Maintain close liaison between Air Officer and Communications Officer to ensure that air requirements are met, while maintaining efficient use of TACP assets.

F. **TOPIC:** TOW Communications

DISCUSSION: Prior to exercise STARTEX all TOW radio's were technically inspected by the communications platoon technicians. Additionally crypto variables and ACEOI's were made available to the TOW platoon commander; there were no limitations on the quantity of ACEOI's. During the exercise extra copies of the ACEOI were maintained at the RLT CP. Additionally radio technicians were stationed at the forward CP, the Alpha CP, and at Bldg 123.

RECOMMENDATION: That the TOW platoon commander avail himself of the communications platoon's services both prior to and during the exercise.

5. **MEDICAL**

A. **TOPIC:** Simulated Casualty Play

DISCUSSION: All acknowledged simulated casualties were handled properly, medically and administratively, at the BAS and RAS levels. This is not to say that casualties which may have been assessed at the company level were in fact made known to the BAS(s). Known casualties were reflected in each morning's mortality and morbidity reports. Medical evacuation was requested by the BAS and RAS for all casualties that required same to the CSSD. However, no ambulances from the CSSD arrived until the afternoon/evening of D+3, 28 Jul. This was despite repeated calls from the BAS for evacuations on both 26 and 27 July. The RAS had only two simulated WIA's declared at 1206, 28 July. Although evacuation was called for, no evacuation transportation ever arrived.

RECOMMENDATION: Conduct more contingency planning and publish more definitive details concerning medical evacuation to all levels of command.

B. **TOPIC:** Requirement for enhanced communications between the RAS and BAS's.

DISCUSSION: As the RAS is not in the evacuation chain from the BAS(s) to the CSSD a requirement for reliable and redundant communications between the RAS/BAS was not emphasized. When it became apparent that higher levels of the medical evacuation chain were malfunctioning, the RAS was tasked with ever increasing data gathering and message sending responsibilities. At no point prior to the exercise was the RAS physician informed of these potential responsibilities. The normal time delay for a response to a given message, if it could be sent at all, was from 2 to 4 hours. Most messages were passed over non-medical related nets and the RLT-2 medical regulating net was never up.

RECOMMENDATION: Place greater emphasis on pre-operation medical planning and instruction, especially with RAS/BAS surgeons, so that potential problems can be anticipated and solutions identified before deploying to the field.

C. **TOPIC:** Inadequate Emergency Room Response to an Actual Casualty

DISCUSSION: On 26 July at 1610, LCpl MCGOWAN was presented at the RAS with a 24 hour history of cramping lower abdominal pain and diarrhea, with three liquid stools every hour. While his abdomen was non-tender, he was dramatically orthostatically hypotensive (supine 118/88, 84; standing 100/90, 140, near syncopal: severely dehydrated). After the exam an I.V. was placed and the patient bolused with one liter of normal saline, a second liter was hung and the patient was transported to the ER at the Naval Hospital. The vehicle departed at 1630.

The RAS surgeon then went to the RLT-2 COC to inform the ER of the patient's impending arrival. The ER, in the name of LCdr RIOS, refused to accept the patient telling the RAS physician, Dr PIGMAN, the he could not accept a "lateral transfer". Dr PIGMAN ignored the order not to send the patient thus avoiding needless delay of continual treatment. The patient was eventually accepted at the ER.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Naval Medical Corps do away with any policy, if one exists, that refuses the transfer of a patient from a field tent (without invasive monitoring, without labratory or radiographic capabilities, with limited pharmacy assets, no toilet or running water) to an ER of a NAVAL HOSPITAL.

PART IV - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

1. Far too frequently, after action reports tend to focus on "What went wrong" during a particular exercise. From the RLT perspective, Exercise Solar Flare was a salient success. There were no "warstoppers" in evidence. The MAB and RLT both attained almost all major exercise objectives. The exercise of casualty evacuation and personnel replacement procedures never got off the ground. Initial RLT analysis indicates that there is nothing wrong with our present procedures. As in past exercises, this important evolution was not synchronized fully with the exercise control plan. Planning for medical and personnel exercise play cannot be done in isolation or as an afterthought nor can we allow the entire exercise to be "held hostage" to one or two particular disciplines. More work is required in this area. Medical personnel exercise planners must get involved early on in exercise design.

2. The performance of 3rd Bn, 23th Marines, RLT-2's SMCR unit, did much to enhance the credibility of the "Total Force" concept in the eyes of regular forces. These Marines were superb and, given closure times stipulated in the Marine Corps Mobilization plan, will have no difficulty in fielding a viable unit should the need arise. RLT-2 has had considerable experience in working with NATO units. Application of previous lessons learned in the OPCON chop of subordinate allied units paid off in the rapid assimilation of 3/23 into the RLT structure. RLT-2 made a heavy, out of hide investment in C3I liaison with 3/23. This paid off.

3. The overall exercise control structure established by Col Pat GARVEY, USMCR and his Marines deserves special mention. Solar Flare was the best controlled exercise that I have observed in the recent past. 4th MarDiv invested substantial time and money into the development of an exercise control plan by KAPOS, INC. There were minor flaws, i.e., medical/personnel play, umpires for task forces, etc., but these were relatively insignificant compared with the overall success of the control plan. The regular establishment should make every effort to build on this effort. Moreover, it would be to our advantage to seek the services of Col GARVEY and crew for future exercises.

4. The lessons learned by Col GARVEY when he observed the CAO in November 1986, apparently escaped those regular officers involved in positioning forces. Given the high degree of mobility inherent in II MAF forces, maneuver areas need to be maximized. This was not done. Moreover , large enclaves of non-maneuver forces were established in and along maneuver corridors. II MAF failed to reserve training areas for the exclusive use of exercise forces. The result - RLT-2 had innumerable contacts with SOI, 6th Marines, 22 MAU and various other units, to include the Mexican Marine Corps during the exercise. It is recommended that all non-maneuver units and command elements be moved outside CLNC, i.e., Oak Grove, Camp Davis, Gieger, Bogue Field. This is a realistic test of real world logistics and communications requirements and would free up maneuver space.

Encl (5)

5. From a tactical perspective, there is no substitute for the combat realism provided by a force-on-force, free play exercise. The fact that both MAB's did it without any accidents is in itself noteworthy. KUDOS should go to the small unit leaders who made it happen -- safely.

6. Combat reporting is essential in maneuver warfare. This is an area which was poor within the RLT and, from the RLT perspective, deficient throughout the MAGTF. Cross talk between MAGTF MSC's was non existent. Feedback must be provided by the MAB to MSC's regarding intent and contacts -- particularly in rear areas. We need to look more in this area -- Cold Winter 87 worked well because we worked at it! We did not take adequate advantage of the time available during the preexercise period to shake the dust off the system.

7. The greatest benefit from Solar Flare, and the most significant accomplishment of 4th MAB, was not mentioned in any exercise critiques nor was it identified in exercise objectives. Perhaps more by accident than design, in Solar Flare we came very close to replicating the deployment profile we would find in a short fuze, "come as you are", NATO scenario. All MSC's and the MAB command element were in the midst of summer turnover and faced with the additional challenges of high optempo, disparate forces and short time to form for operations. With minimal planning time, and virtually no pre-exercise work-up, 4th MAB and its MSC's again demonstrated the capability to fight and win.

Encl (5)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 14
2d MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION
CHERRY POINT, NORTH CAROLINA 28533-6010

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3000
CMDO
18 Aug 87

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14
To: Commanding General, 4th MAB

Subj: SOLAR FLARE AFTER ACTION REPORT

Ref: (a) CG 4th MAB 061333Z Jul 87
(b) MCO 3000.2D

Encl: (1) Problems/Discussions and Recommendations

1. As directed by the references, enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. This report contains information related to the conduct of Exercise Solar Flare 87 (SF-87). Although the problems discussed are peculiar to the ACE's participation in the exercise, their resolution will help to improve the overall integration of all elements of the MAGTF in similar exercises in the future.

W. D. CARR JR.

Encl (5)

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Purple Assets

Discussion: Throughout the exercise "purple" assets were divided evenly between both ACES. Publishing a "purple frag" did nothing to enhance utilization of "purple" assets but did add considerable time to the air tasking process. Each ACE utilized 2 KC-130's per day which was half of the KC-130 assets and used the EA-6B's during alternate phases which were published well in advance. Scheduling of these assets independently by both ACES would have been more efficient and much quicker.

Recommendation: During future exercises like Solar Flare, divide assets evenly between the ACES and do not publish a "purple frag".

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Block times for fixed wing air.

Discussion: The block times assigned for fixed wing A/C had the effect of providing "immediate air" for the GCE but, unfortunately did not encourage the use of pre-planned strikes. As a result, there was little fire support coordination (i.e. artillery used to suppress AA positions while air hit a hard target, etc.)

Recommendation: That in future operations more effort be expended to integrate and coordinate the use of all supporting arms.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Block times for fixed wing air.

Discussion: The 30 minute block times assigned to each ACE for F/W air did not allow momentum to be achieved or confirmed by the application of this force multiplier to the point of main effort.

Recommendation: 1. Extend block times. 2. Have OCE/TECG declare that one force or the other will have local air superiority during a particular evolution or for a particular time.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: The air war for exercise Solar Flare.

Discussion: The opportunity to exercise the full range of aviation capabilities and to use aviation assets to help shape the battlefield for the ground commander was extremely limited under the constraints of the exercise scenario. II MAF could easily have provided a framework within which air could conduct advance force operations prior to start ex. Additionally, deep targets could have been identified to simulate air interdicting enemy supply routes, preemptive strikes on airfields, etc. Also, exploitation operations using air could have been developed once the ground battle had achieved decisive results. Much of this was done on the initiative of MAG-14, but it could have been more effective if MAF had developed the scenario and used both ACES in a "purple" role to respond to these missions.

Recommendation: That the OCE develop a plan to support all phases of a combat/amphibious operation.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: TECG/OPERATIONS

Topic: BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment)

Discussion: BDA was not available (often for several hours) after CAS missions were flown, thus preventing air from influencing the battle directly and reducing the effectiveness of CAS to attrition only. Suppression and or nuetralization of enemy forces was not addressed.

Recommendation: That in future exercises, immediate BDA be made available.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Computer Generated Frag.

Discussion: Use of Z-150 computers to generate daily frag orders saved 4-6 hours during the air tasking process and were essential. The one day the network was inoperative, the frag was transmitted from the TACC after 0430 and was never recieved by some units. With the computer network, frags were routinely received by 2100.

Recommendation: That computer networks be adopted Marine Corps wide to publish daily frags.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Use of tactical communication circuits.

Discussion: From MAG-14's perspective, tactical communications were virtually non-existent. Although the nets had been established, only a handful of messages/traffic was passed over the tactical circuits. Virtually 98% of our comm was via hard wire commercial telephone. Obviously not a good test of our ability to communicate using tactical means.

Recommendation: Force more reliance on tactical comm assets and minimize the use of commercial telephones.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: FAC/DASC Communications

Discussion: Although comm between the DASC and aircraft was usually very good, often there was a breakdown of comm between the DASC and FAC's (ground). This could be a training problem or a problem related to radio's or equipment. At any rate, a number of sorties went unused because DASC was unable to talk with FAC's and effect the hand-off of air to them.

Recommendation:

1. Increase FAC training between FAC's and squadrons.
2. Work to ensure solid comm link between FAC's and DASC.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Terminal Control of Aircraft.

Discussion: Although communication links with senior controlling agencies for control of CAS aircraft were readily established the passage of control to FAC or FAC(A) was poor. On many occasions the FAC, FAC(A) was not ready to receive aircraft or was not in position conduct close air support. Most aircraft were cleared for armed RECCE both beyond and inside the FSCL just to funnel aircraft into the AOA vice attacking under DASC control.

Recommendation: That the communication/control interface between DASC and the maneuver elements be established and rehearsed prior to the start of the exercise or at least prior to the arrival of aircraft.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: VHF Communication problems.

Discussion: Because of decisions made late in the planning for Solar Flare, 4th MAB and MAG-14 were further apart than originally anticipated. Many nets were planned as VHF nets assuming the original planned locations of the 4th MAB and MAG-14. With last minute changes, it was too late to change these nets to HF. To make VHF work over the extended distance involved, it was necessary to use directional antennas. Although successful for point to point communications, it was not possible for the ACE to monitor the transmissions of other stations on these nets. Because of this, the ACE was not capable of anticipating requirements, gathering additional intelligence, and learning of problems relevant to the air war. An additional problem was the simultaneous usage of the same net by stations which could not hear each other's transmissions.

Recommendation: With the use of directional antennas, all stations must not assume that their transmissions are being monitored by other stations and secondly Net Control Stations must assist by passing informations to other stations.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Equipment Availability

Discussion: The scope or size of Solar Flare required more communications equipment than could be provided by MWCS-28. Without equipment augmentation from the Reserves, several nets would have had to be combined. In some instances low power radios had to be used as substitutes for high power models. An example of this was the MAG-14 Command Net. With all GRC-193's committed elsewhere, this requirement had to be handled by the less powerful PRC-104 at New River. As a result, New River could hear Cherry Point but not the reverse. This reinforced the need to use garrison telephone system.

Recommendation: Equipment limitations must be considered during the planning process. Stretching communications assets to support and expanding exercise can result in poor communications performance.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: INTELLIGENCE

Topic: Dissemination of Intelligence.

Discussion: Throughout the FTX there appeared to be a real difficulty in obtaining timely/accurate intel on both the friendly and enemy situation. The intel was not pushed down to us, but had to be pulled from higher headquarters. In order to be able to provide accurate intel to pilots and to place strikes outside the FSCL, the ACE needs to be included in the intel loop. On at least one occasion incomplete intelligence led to routing transport helos directly over a large enemy force with resultant heavy losses.

Recommendation: Ensure accurate, timely dissemination of intel (both enemy and friendly) to all MSC's.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT

Topic: All Weather Close Air Support.

Discussion: It is impossible to conduct All Weather Close Air Support without good offset data for a radar reference location or without using a RABFAC beacon. Since the Camp Lejeune AOA has few radar significant locations which FAC's are familiar with and can use efectively. the only logical alternative is to employ a RABFAC beacon for AWCAS for Solar Flare. RABFAC beacons were not used effectively

Recommendation: Ensure that the maneuver elements utilize the RABFAC beacon.

Encl (5)

FUNCTIONAL AREA: ORDNANCE

Topic: Simulated Ordnance.

Discussion: SIMCAS with unexpended ordnance is authorized virtually everywhere except at Camp Lejeune. Aircraft routinely perform SIMCAS with unexpended ordnance on numerous exercises without any added safety risk. Flight over uncontrolled airspace with ordnance is authorized and aircraft performing actual CAS at G-10 fly over populated areas. The restriction negates any possibility of accomplishing training for attack crews.

Recommendation: Change the Camp Lejeune range regulations to allow SIMCAS with unexpended practice ordnance

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BRIGADE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP-4
2d FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (REIN)
FLEET MARINE FORCE, ATLANTIC
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IN REPLY REFER TO:
3000
3
4 Sep 87

From: Commanding Officer, Brigade Service Support Group-4
To: Commanding General, 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFLant, Little Creek, Virginia 23521

Subj: SOLAR FLARE-87 POST EXERCISE REPORT

Ref: (a) CG 4th MAB 041533Z Aug 87

Encl: (1) Summary of Scope and Objectives
(2) Functional Area Comments
(3) Commander's Summary

1. In accordance with the reference, enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted in regards to our participation in exercise Solar Flare-87. The objectives of this report are to highlight significant events and lessons learned from a combat service support perspective.

B. L. GRICE
By direction

Copy to:
CG, 2dFSSG

Encl (5)

SUMMARY OF SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

1. The mission of Brigade Service Support Group-4 was to provide combat service support, less aviation peculiar items, to 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade units during Solar Flare 87. To support the concept of CSS, the BSSG nucleus staff planned and formed Combat Service Support Detachment 1/4, the CSS element of the BSSG. In addition to providing support from a CSSA, three mobile Combat Service Support Detachments (MCSSDs) were formed, with two in direct support of maneuver battalions during all phases of the exercise.

2. The objectives of BSSG-4 were diversified and varied depending upon the tactical scenario. These objectives and their outcome are summarized below.

a. The concept of integration of reserve (BSSG-2) and active (BSSG-4) units provided a unique opportunity for our Marines to gain insight on the capabilities resident in the reserves, and to professionally grow by working hand-in-hand with their counterparts. The integration was a success and should be actively pursued, on a larger scale during future exercises.

b. Providing responsive logistics support was successfully carried out through the MCSSDs remaining in close proximity to the maneuver battalions. In addition, a Logistical Liaison Officer was attached to the S-4 of the maneuver battalions to ensure supply classes I, III, V and IX were delivered in a timely manner.

c. Providing required support to a highly mechanized combined arms force presented the BSSG with an opportunity to use several means of delivery. Delivery means consisted of motor transport assets which were resident in each of the MCSSDs, HST and air delivery missions, bridging and ferrying and LCM-8's from the USS Charleston. These various means of delivery ensured CSS was flexible, continuous, and professional.

d. Using the reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU), BSSG-4 produced over 17,000 gallons of potable water for 4th MAB units.

e. To improve the survivability of the BSSG, without degrading the responsiveness of CSS, and to comply with the higher headquarters requirement to coordinate rear area security, a Rear Area Security Operations Center (RASOC) was established within the BSSG. Although requests for artillery and naval gunfire forward observers were denied, the RASOC was staffed with a Rear Area Security Operations Officer (BSSG-4 PlansO), an Air Officer (2d MAW), and an S-2 section (G-2, 2d FSSG). The rear area boundary was established daily by 4th MAB. Units within the rear area established point security. The RASOC coordinated fire support and Military Police patrols along the main supply routes and between the point defenses. These active measures were augmented by deception efforts, effective use of camouflage and dispersion, and frequent displacing of the command elements and MCSSDs.

f. The medical company attached to us during Solar Flare 87 operated out of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Shelter System (MCESS) with complete operating rooms, X-ray, laboratories, wards and dental facilities contained within these systems. The field hospital had a much safer and cleaner environment in which to work. The draw back is that the system takes time to set up and requires significant transportation assets to move. It is not mobile and is best employed in a static situation.

3. Supply Usage/Support Data:

a. Class I 45,276 MRE's
17,450 Gallons of water

b. Class III (Bulk POL)
19,619 Gallons Diesel
750 Gallons Mogas

Class III (Packaged POL)
2 Drums 30 wt oil
1 Drum 10 wt oil
8 Gallons Brake Fluid
1 Gallon Hydraulic Fluid
1 Drum Anti-freeze

c. Class IV
58 rolls barb wire
2500 engineer pickets 6 ft
745 rolls concertina
20 rolls engineer tape
5000 sand bags

d. Class V

DODIC	ISSUED	RETURNED
A080	26,220	2000
A111	12,800	22,000
G930	4	0
G940	32	0
G945	20	0
G950	21	1
L307	53	1
L312	49	3
L314	33	1
L598	231	0
L599	115	0

Supply Usage/Support Data: (Cont)

DODIC	ISSUED	RETURNED
UX94	500	0
L311	6	3
A075	3600	0
L306	6	0
G895	2	0

e. Class IX (Walk-thru transactions)

14 total
11 filled
3 NIS

Class IX (Batteries)

BA4386	707
BA1372	226
BA5590	882
BA211	31
BA3030	2945
BA200	36
MX306	40
RL159	14
DR8	36

f. Transportation (Motor Transport)

1800	Passengers hauled
980,000 lbs	Cargo hauled
26,117	Miles driven

Transportation (HST)

26 July	4 pallets MRE/2 pallets batteries
27 July	4 pallets MRE
28 July	M149 Water trailer

Transportation (Air Drop)

26 July 6 PAX, 50 water cans

Encl (5)

FUNCTIONAL AREA COMMENTS

Rear Area Security

Topic: Requirement for a Dedicated Communications Net for Rear Area Security (RAS)

Discussion: For the defense of the MAGTF rear area, the RAS Commander must have a dedicated means to coordinate the efforts of all friendly units in the rear area. During the exercise it was apparent that the RAS Coordinator was not always kept aware of friendly units in the rear area. This nearly resulted in two fire missions being called on friendly forces in the rear area by the roving military police patrols. In addition, a military police patrol was ambushed by friendly forces who were not aware of the MP patrol routes because they did not coordinate with the RAS Coordinator. Prior to the exercise, it was discussed and agreed that coordination of the rear area would be over the BSSG Command Net. Unfortunately, friendly forces did not always report in over this circuit.

Recommendation: That a dedicated communications net be established in the CEOI for RAS. The CSSE would be net control. All friendly forces entering the rear area would be required to enter that net. The net would link the scattered friendly forces, coordinate patrols between point defenses and identify missions of reaction forces. It would also provide an alternate means of requesting fire support, and fire support coordination, in the rear area.

Topic: Forward Air Controllers

Discussion: The Rear Area Security Operations Center (RASOC) coordinated air support in the rear area. Close air support(CAS) for defense and rear area security was extremely limited because no forward air controllers were assigned.

Recommendation: That in the future, a UHF radio be established in the RASOC along with a forward air controller and supporting team who could be dispatched as necessary to areas requiring CAS on an immediate basis. This would greatly enhance rear area security and the BSSG's defense by increasing air support responsiveness. This team could also be employed in support of the MCSSD if they were deployed outside the umbrella of the supporting battalion.

Topic: Close Air Support (CAS)

Discussion: Severely limited due to nonavailability of a FAC at the BSSG. Requests for CAS had to be accompanied by a request for a FAC. Thus many of our CAS missions were delayed or denied. In a combat environment this handicap would be totally unacceptable. CAS is vital to both the defense of the BSSG and rear area security. The results of CAS requests were 8 close air support missions requested, 4 completed after delay and 4 denied due to nonavailability of a FAC.

Recommendation: That aviators continue to be assigned to the BSSG's on a TAD basis to fill the billet of Air Officer for major operations. All future BSSG air officers should be school trained forward air controllers and be accompanied by a full FAC team with their complement of radios in order to properly coordinate and direct close air support.

Topic: Fire Support Coordination

Discussion: To coordinate fire support within the rear area a fire support coordination center (FSCC) was established within the BSSG-4 RASOC. Although not properly manned with artillery and naval gunfire liaison officers the FSCC, with a fire support coordinator (BSSG-4 PlansO) and an Air Officer (2D MAW), managed 27 fire missions and 5 CAS missions. Despite this success the requesting proced re was too lengthy for "immediate" missions as each request had to be relayed two or three times to reach the firing battery. It should be noted that most of the fire missions were called by the mobile military police patrols.

Fire support coordination for the MCSSD's was handled by the FSCC of the supported battalion. If a MCSSD returned within the rear area the FSCC within the RASOC coordinated their missions.

Recommendation: That if the CSSE is tasked to coordinate rear area security, then the rear should be treated as another zone of action. To ensure positive control over fires within this zone of action the CSSE commander must establish an FSCC. That the MAGTF command element must ensure that this FSCC is properly staffed with liaison officers from the various supporting arms.

Air Operations

Topic: Helicopter Support

Discussion: Resupply, not only for supported units but also to replace dump levels, needs to be accomplished rapidly over a long distance. Helicopter resupply allows isolated units to receive additional support rapidly. Both their speed and heavy lift capability readily lend themselves to the tactical situation. Direct coordination between air control agencies and BSSG/CSSD would speed up the timeliness of support.

Recommendation: That direct liaison with air control agencies be allowed, and that the BSSG air officer be kept abreast of aircraft availability to best utilize limited flight time.

Topic: OV-10 Support

Discussion: Needs some more work to be effective. Our first air recon mission (to photograph both friendly and enemy positions) was assigned to the reserve OV-10 detachment (Enemy) by the 4th MAB/VMO-1. The day prior to the mission, we learned that the 4th MAB/VMO-1 (Friendly) had decided to "share" OV-10 assets and missions with the reserves. No prior notice was given from higher headquarters. Upon discovering this OPSEC breach we initiated the proper procedures and dealt with it. The second problem area with OV-10's was photography support. On several occasions we requested poloroid instant photos of various locations to be taken and dropped to us in a specific LZ at a predetermined time. Not one photo was ever received by the BSSG.

Recommendation: That in the future, have a FAC assigned to talk with and direct OV-10's. This would greatly increase our chances of receiving requested photos.

Topic: Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV's)

Discussion: Only one RPV was allocated for use for Solar Flare-87. During the operation, it was only available to the 4th MAB as a whole for a total of one day. Consequently, difficulties with the RPV monitor location (with 2dMAW/ distant from BSSG), daily situations, mechanical trouble and demand from other users prevented us from utilizing this asset.

Recommendation: That more RPV's be provided to exercise forces for exercise play.

CSS Function

Topic: Delivery Modes(AAV/LAV's)

Discussion: Mobile logistics presents a challenge to CSS units. To resupply a highly mobile unit means that the CSS elements need to maintain several means of delivery. Use of air assets are limited by the anti-air situation and must be augmented by ground support means. Both LAV/AAV's have a heavy lift capability coupled with an amphibious capability. Understanding there is a limited amount of these vehicles available for CSS units, we must make maximum use of their versatility.

Recommendation: That during mechanized operations, the MCSSD's should be equipped with vehicles similar to the mechanized force supported. This will facilitate the concept of unit distribution support of these units.

Maintenance

Topic: Operator Level Maintenance

Discussion: Overall operator level maintenance was very poor throughout the MAGTF. On several occasions contact teams where dispatched to repair an item and the only problem was the lack of 1st echelon maintenance.

Recommendation: That operators inspect their equipment daily and that added emphasis is place on the operators to know their echelon of maintenance. OIC's and SNCOIC's should conduct more frequent inspections of their equipment to prevent damage.

Military Police

Topic: Military Police support needed for MAB rear area

Discussion: During Solar Flare-87, BSSG-4 was supported with an MP company (-). During this time the MP company was stretched to the limit of it's resources. If Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) play had been involved, the MP company would not have had sufficient manpower to support the BSSG effectively.

Recommendation: That a company of military police be employed to support a BSSG.

Topic: Military Police Company crew served weapons support

Discussion: During Solar Flare-87 the MP company was equipped with one M60 machine g n er vehicle and either one dragon or one LAAW per vehicle. The M60 has severe limitations against armored vehicles that are likely to be encountered in the rear area. It is unlikely that the MP company will be equipped with dragons during our next conflict. The SMAW has a range limitation against the rear area threat. The M-2 machinegun is not intended to be used on troops in the open and will not penetrate the frontal armor of a BMP. For the MP's to be effective in the rear area, they should be equipped with a suppressive fire weapon capable of defeating small enemy troop formations and light armored vehicles (BMP class).

Recommendation: That the MP's be equipped with the MK-19 MOD 3, 40mm machine gun. This weapon is unhampered by the limitations of the M60 and M-2 machine guns.

Topic: Military Police Company vehicle requirements

Discussion: During Solar Flare-87, the MP company was equipped with four M1037 soft covered HMMWV's and seven CUCV's as patrol vehicles. These vehicles had two primary limitations:

1. No supplemental armor protection for the crew

2. No armament carrier mounts for M60 or M-2 machineguns, or MK-19 grenade launcher.

Recommendation: That the M1043 HMMWV be procured as the primary MP vehicle. This "hardened" HMMWV, equipped with supplemental armor and an armament carrier, would be an acceptable combat military police vehicle for all of their assigned missions.

Topic: Military Police Mission

Discussion: The danger to the rear area increases the importance of the military police as a combat power in the rear area. In past exercises, military police have been used primarily as security in and around the C.P. area. In spite of the fact that Marine Corps doctrine discourages the use of MP's as C.P. security, commanders have been reluctant to relieve them of this function. With too few MP's to go around, duties in and around the C.P. have received priority and few if any MP's are left over to provide securit on the MSR's and throughout the rear area. As a result, the commander must depend upon a shallow perimeter defense supported by the limited effectiveness of foot patrols, LP's and OP's. During exercise Solar Flare, military police performed their combat missions of circulation control and rear area security exclusively. The use of MP's in these roles provided the BSSG commander with aggressive, mobile combat patrols that were able to assist in accomplishing the following:

1. Provided the commander with depth to his defense

2. Worked as the commander's eyes and ears, collecting information and intelligence about the enemy's location and disposition

3. On several occasions denied the enemy the advantage of surprise

4. Provided the commander with the ability to anticipate, respond, attack and counterattack

5. Ensured that friendly forces were not diverted from the main battle area

Recommendation: That Military Police be shifted away from CP/Operations center security and more into their circulation control and rear area security operations role. This mobile unit can be of far greater tactical advantage to the commander when used in the circulation control and rear area security missions.

Medical

Topic: Medical Controllers Group

Discussion: Little or no input was injected by the medical controllers. The ability of the controllers to assist and guide personnel could only enhance the learning experience. If the controllers as a group were given guidance prior to the exercises, the learning objectives could be discussed, addressed and practiced. This would in turn allow each area to "police" themselves and strive to meet the objectives.

Recommendation: That medical controllers be allowed to inject medical play daily in an organized manner as they determine to be appropriate. They should be afforded the opportunity to tailor each situation to meet the training objectives while keeping in mind the "flow" of the operation.

Topic: Evaluation of Simulated Casualties

Discussion: No more than ten simulated casualties reached the Medical Company from Battalion AID Stations. Apparently, aid station personnel did not realize their role in the simulated medical play which required them to evacuate casualties rearward. The number of persons available for casualty play is also in question, and it is not known how many simulated casualties actually reached the BAS's.

Recommendation: That all medical personnel in the operation know the medical training goals. Also, that line company officers be briefed about medical play and the rearward evacuation procedures of personnel when casualties are assessed during tactical play.

Topic: Exercise Command and Control of Ambulance Evacuation

Discussion: An ambulance and corpsman were assigned to each of the two BSSG MCSSD's. The CSSD ambulances were utilized to go forward and pick-up actual

and simulated casualties and deliver them to the Medical Company. MCSSD personnel initially thought that the ambulances and corpsman were assigned only to respond to actual medical problems originating within the BSSG and CSSD. This error was cleared after the first day of the operation, however, aid station personnel did not have a clear idea of the MCSSD evacuation role and hence, did not call upon the MCSSD's to evacuate casualties. The Medical Company was tasked with exercising procedures for requesting, dispatching, and controlling ground ambulances, but no requests for simulated casualty evacuation were received by the Medical Company.

Recommendation: That a MAB level medical meeting be held to inform all players involved in the medical play of their expected roles and responsibilities.

Topic: Medical Regulation

Discussion: Because one of the stations (4th MAB) did not have authentication and encryption materials, the medical regulating net operated in the clear. Medical administration reports, such as the Daily Morbidity Report, CLNC Hospital admission information and patient disposition data was sent uncovered. No "by definition", medical regulating was conducted over the net.

Recommendation: That the practice of medical regulating be built into the simulated casualty play scenerio. Otherwise, use of the medical regulating net becomes purely an administrative drill.

Topic: NBC

Discussion: A hasty equipment decontamination station (EDS) was set up during Solar Flare-87. The following vehicles were ran through the EDS:

3 - Amtracs
2 - 5 Ton, Cargo Trucks
5 - M998, HMMWV
1 - 5 Ton, Dump Truck

The RLT was tasked with conducting the EDS during Solar Flare-87 and the BSSG was to provide any equipment beyond their capability. Overall coordination did not begin until approximately 24 hours prior to the event. This caused some command and control problems resulting in a 2 hour delay in running the exercise. The 4th FSSG NBC platoon, who supplied the manpower to run the EDS, received excellent training in the operation of an EDS during their counterpart training cycle at FMFLANT NBC School.

Recommendation: That NBC coordination meetings be held prior to STARTEX to determine responsible players and equipment needs. In order to operate a proper EDS, two M12 Decon Units would be required, vice only one which was allocated. Equipment should be picked up earlier than when it was to allow for a complete LTI.

Encl (5)

COMMANDERS SUMMARY

1. Overall, Exercise Solar Flare-87 provided this Organization a tremendous training opportunity in a highly mobile arena while intergrated with Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units. This allowed us to practice and refine the utilization of all means of Combat Service Support (CSS) delivery available to us, exercise tactical deception, evaluate mobile CP tactics, coordinate rear area security, provide bridging and ferrying support, and employ mobile Combat Service Support Detachments (MCSSDs) to accomplish unit CSS distribution.

2. In general, our objectives were accomplished. However, there are a few areas, as indicated in enclosure (2), as well as other internal areas associated with forming and training of the CSSE which require refinement. Based on lessons learned during Solar Flare-87, we believe that these areas will be resolved.

Encl (5)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2d MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION
CHERRY POINT, NORTH CAROLINA 28533-6001

IN REPLY REFER TO
3000
SC 1
13 Nov 87

From: Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Commanding General, 2d Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: SOLAR FLARE AFTER ACTION REPORT

Ref: (a) CG, II MAF 062042Z AUG 87
(b) MCO 3000.2D

Encl: (1) Problem Areas and Recommendations

1. As directed by the references, enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. This report contains information related to the planning and execution of Solar Flare 87 from the II MAF Tactical Air Commander's perspective. Additional After Action reports dealing with specific aviation issues are being provided separately by each ACE through the respective MAB commander.

3. Conceptually, Exercise Solar Flare 87 provided a unique framework for the command and control of opposing force aviation assets. The II MAF Tactical Air Commander located at Camp Lejeune, NC exercised airspace control and deconfliction functions from the TACC through a single TAOC and joint DASC. The ACE commanders were sited at MCAS Cherry Point, 4th MAB, and MCALF Bogue Field, 2d MAB, and did not have direct access to the established command and control system for the prosecution of their respective air campaigns. This structure created a situation wherein the II MAF TAC had operational control with no tactical planning requirements and the doctrinal TAC's (MAB ACE's), planned and executed air plans without command and control assets. Given the airspace and range limitations, the single II MAF TACC functioned well in deconflicting opposing forces, managing airspace and ensuring the availability of SIMCAS and Assault Support sorties. However, in future exercises procedures enabling MAB ACE Commanders to function with a dedicated command and control system should be sought out and implemented.

4. From the Tactical Air Commander's vantage point the majority of the stated exercise training objectives were met. The limited scope of the individual ACE Force Lists and the extensive number of SIMCAS and assault support sorties prevented in depth aircrew training in the remaining Marine Air functions. Although identified and accepted as a shortfall by the TAC and ACE commanders as early as the mid planning conference, it is certainly a requirement which can be facilitated in follow on exercises by time expansion and/or force list expansion techniques.

5. Enclosure (1) provides specific topical areas identified as deficiencies or that are considered worthy of modification or enhancement in future exercises of this nature.

W. L. BARBA
By direction

Encl (6)

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Maximum Utilization of CAS Missions

Discussion: Several CAS missions during SOLAR FLARE were RTB'd because the DASC could not contact a FAC to control the missions. Several different factors contributed to this problem: (1) The FAC's were not located in a position that enabled them to communicate with the DASC (2) The FAC's experienced problems with their radio equipment; and (3) The FAC's were often buttoned up inside LAV's or AAV's when maneuvering to new positions and were not able to monitor their nets continuously. This last factor should have been better coordinated to allow for maximum utilization of all CAS missions. The FAC's daily scheme of maneuver was not closely coordinated with the preplanned CAS missions that were scheduled. The ACE agreed to support the GCE by committing a CAS mission to every 30 minute block time, but did not coordinate a FAC to control every mission. Because this plan was not entirely coordinated, several CAS Missions were never utilized.

Recommendation: That the GCE and ACE better coordinate their preplanned requests so that CAS missions are not lost due to lack of terminal controllers.

Encl (6)

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Purple Assets

Discussion: Throughout the exercise "purple" assets were divided evenly between both ACES. Publishing a "purple frag" did nothing to enhance utilization of "purple" assets but did considerable time to the air tasking process. Each ACE utilized 2 KC-130's per day which was half of the KC-130 assets and used the EA-6B's during alternate phases which were published well in advance. Scheduling of these assets independently by both ACES would have been more efficient and much quicker.

Recommendation: During future exercises like Solar Flare, divide assets evenly between the ACES and do not publish a "purple frag".

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Range Regulations for Camp Lejeune

Discussion: Camp Lejeune Range regulations permit one fixed-wing mission at a time to work within the R5306 D/E. The only exception to this allows an OV-10 in a FAC(A) role to control a separate fixed-wing aircraft in the range area, thus both missions are allowed in the airspace concurrently.

In addition, the range regulations do not allow a simulated Deep Air Support mission to be run without positive control by a FAC. The regulation states: "Any aircraft participating in live firing operations, bombing, close air support (live or simulated), paradrops or combined air-ground exercise requires positive control by FAC. FAC can be on ground or airborne [FAC(A)]." These restrictions virtually put a halt to a MAB on MAB FEX involving two ACE's.

Recommendation: Revisit range regulations and within the context of safe control allow two independent sections simultaneously. In addition, address current A/C targeting capabilities which permit safe and accurate DAS profiles without FAC control.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Block times for fixed wing air

Discussion: Block times assigned for fixed wing A/C had the effect of providing "immediate air" for the GCE but, unfortunately did not encourage the use of pre-planned strikes. As a result, there was little fire support coordination (i.e. artillery used to suppress AA positions while air hit a hard target, etc.)

Recommendation: That in future operations more effort be expended to integrate and coordinate the use of all supporting arms.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS/INTELLIGENCE

Topic: RPV and Air OPS Integration

Discussion: RPV airfield and flight requirements must be clearly defined to all participating air elements early in the planning cycle. The lack of communication, of details and requirements, created misunderstandings which required resolution during the FEX.

Recommendation: Enhance Intel/RPV-AIR subcommittee interface during the planning conference cycle.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: LAAD Fire Direction/Excessive Missile Engagements

Discussion: There were a total of 140 engagements recorded by LAAD teams and forwarded to the TACC during Exercise SOLAR FLARE. These results are misleading due to a number of factors such as the availability of Stinger weapons, actual response time to resupply LAAD teams via CSS channels, and most importantly, the lack of missile signature and excessive time on station by hostile aircraft. As a result, after one or two teams from the same section engaged a target, the aircraft would continue its mission and invariably come under fire from teams assigned to their sections. The use of pyrotechnics to signal engagements was not identified to 2dLAADBn or 4thFAADBtry representatives until hours prior to deployment. Once procured in short numbers the color of pyrotechnic changed, to no avail though, as fire hazard conditions precluded their use.

Recommendation: Restrictions on the number of weapons available, as well as missile resupply support, continues to improve with each operation. However, the following measures are recommended for future exercise:

a. That additional TECG umpires be made available to monitor and evaluate mission engagements.

b. That the use of pyrotechnics (i.e. Smokey Sams and pop-up flares by color) be identified in the OCE's Letter of Instruction in order to facilitate procurement in a timely manner, as well as coordination with all other units using the same pyrotechnics.

c. That the use of MILES (Air Defense Variant) be considered for employment.

Encl (6)

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: MEDEVAC

Discussion: No dedicated MEDEVAC package was utilized by either MAB ACE for SIMULATED MEDEVAC's. The option of diverting aircraft assigned to other missions to support this essential requirement proved only partially effective. On three occasions no aircraft were available and the ACE was compelled to constitute a package.

Recommendation: More appropriately provide for the requirement. Address deficiencies early in the planning cycle.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: Simulated Ordnance vs Range Regs

Discussion: SIMCAS with unexpended ordnance is authorized virtually everywhere except at Camp Lejeune. Aircraft routinely perform SIMCAS with unexpended ordnance on numerous exercises without any added safety risk. Flight over uncontrolled airspace with ordnance is authorized and aircraft performing actual CAS at G-10 fly over populated areas. The restriction negates any possibility of accomplishing training for attack crews.

Recommendation: Change the Camp Lejeune range regulations to allow SIMCAS with unexpended practice ordnance.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: OPERATIONS

Topic: All Weather Close Air Support

Discussion: It is impossible to conduct All Weather Close Air Support without good offset data for a radar reference location or without using a RABFAC beacon. Since the Camp Lejeune AOA has few radar significant locations which FAC's are familiar with and can use effectively, the only logical alternatvie is to employ a RABFAC beacon for AWCAS for Solar Flare. RABFAC beacons were not used effectively.

Recommendation: Ensure that the maneuver elements utilize the RABFAC beacon.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: TECG/OPERATIONS

Topic: BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment)

Discussion: BDA was not available (often for several hours) after CAS Missions were flown, thus preventing air from influencing the battle directly and reducing the effectiveness of CAS to attrition only. Suppression and or neutralization of enemy forces was not addressed.

Recommendation: That in future exercises, immediate BDA be made available.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Comm-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI)

Discussion: An automated CEOI was developed for each MAB and an additional training CEOI for pre-exercise use by 2nd MAB. With minor exceptions, these documents proved both extensive in coverage and accurate in detail. Widespread distribution on the CEOI greatly enhanced implementation of the comm plan because operators at all levels had access to the crucial information on frequencies, call signs and circuit guard responsibilities. We experienced no difficulty whatsoever in maintaining the daily changing call-sign and frequency progression. Additionally, because frequency assignment within the CEOI was thoughtfully accomplished, instances of mutual interference were rare.

Recommendation: The CEOI would be more versatile if the call signs listed were drawn from the National Security Agency (NSA) data bank. Presently call signs for II MAF CEOI are self-generated within the computer program used for publishing the CEOI. Use of NSA call signs would correlate the CEOI call sign/unit associations with widely used NSA call sign books available to all services.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Leased Line Requirements

Discussion: During the initial planning conference leased line requirements were defined for support of the TACC and other ACE agencies. At the final planning conference the original leased line needs were confirmed by the users and new requirements added. At some locations, particularly OP-2 and LZ Penguin, leased line requirements far exceeded the base cable pair available. As a result, cable pair had to be tactically extended over long distances from other base locations to support leased line requirements at OP-2 and Penguin. The quality of service provided on the telephone circuits extended over these lines was marginal because of voltage drop and increased noise inherent in such long cable runs (in excess of 8 miles). During leased line installation the week prior to he exercise, two of the leased lines were abrubtly considered unnecessary by the requesting unit resulting in significant waste of effort and resources by base telephone personnel.

Recommendation: That leased line requirements be kept to a minimum with only AUTOVON, data and safety circuits receiving priority of considerations for assignment of available pairs. If base cable must be extended to the main CP locations, only those circuits of lower priority should be assigned to the lines provided in this manner because of the degradation of service likely.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Use of Tactical Circuits

Discussion: Internal and external planning of the ACE was accomplished primarily through the use of the garrison telephone system. Because of the geographical location involved, this telephone system was well suited to support SOLAR FLARE. Planners were accustomed to using the system and the large number of extensions available at the Cherry Point site provided easy access.

Recommendation: To enhance the realistic training provided by such an exercise, tactical circuits must be utilized to a much greater extent. Planners who become accustomed to simply picking up a telephone will find their jobs considerably more difficult when deployed to an expeditionary field or in NATO Operations.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Communications Call Signs

Discussion: During the course of some tactical evolutions not all units used their tactical call signs identified by the ACEOI, but instead their squadron call sign's. In addition, II MAB and IV MAB ACEOI's were identical. This hindered the perception of 2 separate opposing forces at war.

Recommendation: Stress importance of remaining "tactical" as much as possible. Have separate ACEOI's for each force and ensure compliance.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Computer Generated Frag

Discussion: Use of Z-150 computers to generate daily frag orders saved 4-6 hours during the air tasking process and were essential. The one day the network was inoperative, the frag was transmitted from the TACC after 0430 and was never recieved by some units. With the computer network, frags were routinely received by 2100.

Recommendation: That computer networks be adopted Marine Corps wide to publish daily frags.

FUNCTIONAL AREA: COMMUNICATIONS

Topic: Air Frag Routing

Discussion: Air Frag transmission for Solar Flare was accomplished through a triply redundant system involving data link via Zenith computers, tactical teletype via multichannel radio and AUTODIN via Defense Communication System (DCS) Entry. This combination of paths proved highly reliable for both field and garrison based units, regardless of location. Despite these precautions, misunderstanding by comm center watch and duty officers resulted in late receipt of the frag on two occasions.

Recommendation: Concentration on the electrical path of the air frag is not enough. Duty officers of garrison based units and comm center watch officers from all participating comm centers should be briefed by the CEO on routing procedures.

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