

Warren Featherstone Reid
Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson, 1964-1981

Interview #2
Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson
(Thursday, July 9, 1981)
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

RITCHIE: In our last interview, we concluded with the 1962 election. From most of the things I've been looking at, the '62 election looked like a real turning point in Magnuson's career. So I thought this would be a good point to talk about the election and about Magnuson's political career before that election. Could you give me some background information on Magnuson as a Senator before 1962?

REID: As a Senator?

RITCHIE: Well, his political career.

REID: That may take too long. Let's start in '44 when he did run for an open seat in the Senate. A close friend, political colleague, co-worker, Homer Bone, who had been a senator from our state since 1933, had been offered and accepted a federal judgeship and did not seek reelection. So there was an "open" seat. Bone did not take the judicial position until after the election—he remained in the Senate in '44. So Magnuson ran and was easily nominated and easily elected. Then there was a resignation and an appointment by the then sitting governor, Arthur Langlie, that accelerated Magnuson's seniority within the Senate. He came here in December of '44. He went on the normal committees. He went on Judiciary, he went on Commerce, and several others. There were a lot of committees in those days. It was the '46 reorganization that slimmed the number.

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Then there was the turnover to the Republicans in the '46 election, and the only Republican senator from our state was elected at that time, the only one for several decades, Harry Cain. Magnuson was in the minority. Of course this accelerated his seniority within the Senate, so by '49, he was up a little bit, but he still was not a chairman. It was in the '49 to '53 period that he switched from Judiciary to Appropriations. Again, the Democrats regained control in the '48 election, but lost it in the '52 election. I think Magnuson, from what I have been told by Irv Hoff, who was his AA at that time, and Fred Lordan, who was very close to the office and later became the second administrative assistant to Magnuson, that Magnuson was a little uncertain if he really wanted to stay in politics. He enjoyed the work. He enjoyed the backroom work more than anything else. He enjoyed committee work, and he enjoyed working on little projects, be they parochial for the state, be they parochial for the Northwest.

We've always had a different approach towards the ownership of natural resources in the Northwest. The bulk of the hydroelectric power in the Northwest is publicly developed and publicly sold, although we do have two major private companies, Puget Sound Power and Light, and Washington Water Power. But in the state of Washington the bulk of the customers, the bulk of the power, is sold by public agencies. Magnuson believes in that type of development of the natural resources because in the Northwest, we've been able to develop the Columbia River to its highest potential because we not only invested public funds to produce power, but we took public funds to have flood control, to have wildlife enhancement, to have recreation. Nobody believed

them when they said

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they were going to have recreation, but today behind every major dam—every dam—on the Columbia River you've got huge marinas, any number of power boats, many sailboats (although sometimes the sailing isn't that good in eastern Washington as it is in western Washington). And you've had an entire new industry develop, where people have taken shoreline behind a lake, behind a dam, and developed tourist attractions. We have developed tourist attractions. We have developed public parks. Often this was done with some political controversy.

There's one major park in the eastern part of the state called Sun Lakes that was a major contention in the 1948 governorship race. I remember it, I was fairly young at the time, but Sun Lakes was close to our home town, and there was a great deal of controversy about spending this public money to build this park that included a golf course. I believe there was a candidate defeated for the statewide office because of it. But yet today, Sun Lakes is one of the major money-makers of the state park system. It is a beautiful park. It does have a golf course, and it has everything else including boating ramps and camping sites, daytime as well as overnight, and it's typical of the public investment that has been made by various governments, state, county, local, federal, in facilities like that. If you're driving around the country and you go through the state of Washington, you will find more overnight camping spots, more pullouts off the road where you can stop and picnic, than in any other state in the nation. Some people called it socialism; I would rather call it populism.

But it was a way of developing public resources, and Magnuson enjoyed his own participation in that. Of course, he was a forerunner

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in it. He had a little help from people like Bone, because Homer Bone was older than Magnuson, preceded Magnuson in the state legislative system, of course, got here sooner. Homer Bone had been one who had pushed for the legal basis for public utility districts, people-owned utility districts in the state of Washington. Magnuson had picked up that fight when he was in the state legislature, had advanced it when he was a county prosecutor. And then when he got to Congress in '37, joined Bone in various things like that.

It was in the late '40s, early '50s that there was a "CVA." We have the Tennessee Valley Authority, there was a push to have a Columbia Valley Authority. Of course, this got bound up with the private versus public ownership issue, and the fact that the Columbia River is the border between Oregon and Washington. Many of its tributaries come out of Montana and Idaho as well as Canada. The political fight really involved those states, and the Montana Power Company had a great deal of influence on the Montana congressional delegation. The Idaho delegation did not include people like [William] Borah. The Oregon delegation did not have Charles McNary and was very much for private power. So it was a big fight, and it was one that Magnuson lost. It never came about, but they did preserve the federal agency Bonneville.

Magnuson did go through, I believe, some personal question as to whether he really wanted to stay in this business, and this might have affected the '50 campaign, when he came close to being defeated, within fifty thousand votes. But he survived. And then in the mid-'50s, when accidents like the death of Burnet Maybank accelerated Magnuson not from a lowly member of Appropriations but chairman of a subcommittee, chairman

of

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what Magnuson felt was a choice subcommittee, Independent Offices, that included the Veterans' Administration, the National Science Foundation, which Magnuson had personally worked to get authorized, and all of the independent agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the F.C.C. [Federal Communications Commission], all of the alphabet soup down there, that also appeared before Magnuson's authorizing committee, Commerce. In '55 he became chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, as it was called then, and he became chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee on independent offices. He became a baron, with all the perks, the power, etc. And in those days they were, I think, more considerable than they are today.

I think starting in '55 he really found himself—enjoyed himself—within the Senate. He'd already been accepted as one of the boys, because he had been one of the boys under [Sam] Rayburn. The holy water that Rayburn could put on a member of Congress was considerable. Magnuson came from the House to the Senate with that imprimatur: Here's a guy that will go along; here's a guy that cooperates; here's a guy that keeps his mouth shut; here's a guy that you can work with; he's liberal but, you know, forgive him on that. So Magnuson immediately was accepted, but then when he got to the position of power, that acceptance was even more so. He was able to accommodate the regional interest of people.

In the '50s he did a number of things with the Commerce Committee. They got very active in the radio field in protecting both FM and UHF, the channels that were outside the normal television band. It was a Maggie law that required, in interstate shipment of TV sets or radios, that the FM be on the radio and that the UHF be on the TV.

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Coupled with that was an understanding, a very strong understanding with the FCC, that these channels would be reserved for more public use, and so that there would be public television, public radio. Subsequently there was even funding allowed, and it all went through the Commerce Committee. These were Maggie laws.

So after the '56 election and his assurance of staying, which was almost a landslide, he approached the '62 election with relative confidence. The polls that we had out there approaching '62 looked very good, with Magnuson's favorable ratings. There were signs that weren't good. The bad signs were the fact that of seven congressmen, the Democrats only had two. The Republicans who were in Congress, Walt Horan in the 5th District, Tom Pelly in the 1st, Thor Tollefson down in Tacoma, Catherine May in the eastern part of the state. They just seemed to roll up bigger votes all the time. I think we helped, the Democrats helped, because we didn't put up very good candidates against most of them most of the time. When Scoop got elected to the Senate and left the 2nd District, which had been solidly Democratic for many years, it went Republican and no Democrat could dislodge Jack Westland. And Jack's only claim to fame when he first got elected was that he won the PGA. He was a good golfer. He came back here and played at Congressional and he was still a good golfer and he kept winning.

And then Don Magnuson in '60, the denouement of Don Magnuson as a public official was right there in the election results because the poor devil only won by 139 votes. Ninety-five thousand on each side and he had

just 139 more than the other guy. Julia Butler Hansen had been elected to the House from the 3rd District. Julia was an old-time

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political figure in the state of Washington. She was a fantastic legislator, and had been in the state legislature for many years. When she got back here she got next to Mike Kirwin and others and was quickly accepted as a legislator, not just a female. She became quite a power in the House before she left. Her seat was good but the Don Magnuson seat was lousy. Approaching '62, if you looked at the congressional election figures, it didn't look good. But the polls were good as we approached '62.

RITCHIE: Would you say that the population of the state was becoming more conservative at that time? Was Magnuson perhaps more liberal than his constituents? Or less liberal?

REID: It's hard to say, because our state with its initiative and referendum, we had issues on the ballot that have always been issues where you might put a conservative-liberal question mark, and our people have been able to vote. By and large our people have taken what I think the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] or anybody else might measure a more liberal stance. Our state defeated right-to-work laws on three occasions. Our state adopted a very liberal and very costly public welfare program at one election. It almost broke the bank in the state coffers. There had been issues like public power that had been on the ballot and the public always went with the public side of the issue. So I think you could say that our state was liberal.

Magnuson always had a more liberal tint to him than most of the members who were elected, or most of the state officials. He was usually out on, not the fringe, but the forefront. He probably was a little more liberal than the average. Our people had a fairly good voting participa-

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tion. It was well over 50 percent in those days. It's been dropping more recently. Our population, whether it was stable or not, it was always increasing. The war brought a lot of people, the Depression, of course, started it, but the war brought people. Boeing expansion, shipyard expansion, the military bases that we've always had. Fort Lewis is a very old army base, along with Benning and a few other places; it was an assignment where rising stars always ended up somewhere along the line. Ike was there in '35 or '36 as a young major. Bremerton has always been a major facility for the building and repair of naval vessels. So the war did bring more people, and they stayed. If you can find a job in the state of Washington, most people don't leave.

There had been that increase in population. As we approached the '62 election there probably had been at least a doubling of the population from that time that Magnuson was first a congressman, representing the major portion of the metropolitan area of Seattle and Bremerton. In '37 I'm sure we were down—I know before World War II we were below the million-and-a-half mark, and that by '60, we were up to the three million mark, and now we're over four million. So you had that addition, and of course you had births and new voters. It wasn't as bad as this last time when over two-thirds of the population in the state of Washington was born after Magnuson first was elected to office!

RITCHIE: Magnuson had been particularly successful over those years in bringing federal money into the state.

REID: Oh, yes.

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RITCHIE: I was looking at some statistics that 15 percent of all the federal funds for public construction were spent in the state of Washington, which had 2 percent of the population of the country.

REID: Well, the Columbia River was the biggest single reason for that. The Columbia is one of the greatest natural resources in the world. It is a river that has quite a fall from its source to its ocean. It is falling water that can become hydroelectric power. Whatever happened back a zillion years ago that helped form the Columbia created a gorge, where we were able to put up dams. For the early dams, none of the great thought went into it, but they didn't make any boobos. They discovered by the time Magnuson was active and the Roosevelt administration was receptive, that you could build dams very close to each other and you could have that backup from one literally come to the doorstep of the next one. So that's what we were up to. We were able to do that without flooding great expanses of land.

I know in my own home town, we had an early dam that was built privately, in fact the only private dam on the Columbia was Rock Island. It was built by Puget Sound Power and Light back shortly after World War I. It was built low, just to get hydro, just to generate electricity, not to do a damn thing about holding back water and preventing floods or anything else. Well, that dam was condemned and purchased by our PUD, our Public Utility District. Later, our Public Utility District raised the dam, made it higher. When they did it, it took out some acres of orchards, but only a few. It was not like some rivers—you could never

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build the dams on the Mississippi that we've been able to build on the Columbia, because of the Mississippi Valley. You would end up flooding a zillion acres and people just wouldn't stand for it. It would take out too much good bottomland. The Columbia River really doesn't have good bottomland in the more accepted sense because of the way it was built. God was very kind to us.

So we were able to develop the Columbia, but that was costly. Even though we make the claim that Uncle just loaned us the money, we're repaying it with interest (and we have repaid, in fact the Grand Coulee is way ahead of schedule of being "repaid"), that took a lot of money up front. And the up-front money came from the federal coffers. Magnuson and everybody else out there that has represented the state, and even the Republicans, Walt Horan who was a very good Republican all the years that he was here, was a strong public power advocate and supporter of U.S. public investment in the development of the Columbia. So when it came to public works the state of Washington and the Northwest picked off an awful lot of that money. We got more than our fair share, perhaps, but yet it was a national investment and it is being repaid. If it hadn't been done, we'd be burning barrels of oil in the Northwest for electrical energy. We might not have had the cheap power that could have produced all the aluminum, reduced all that bauxite to aluminum, and that aluminum went into bombers, and P-38's that that helped win World War II.

RITCHIE: Yet here you have a senator who has obviously been very successful in drawing in . . .

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REID: The pork.

RITCHIE: The pork through the pork barrel, who's chairman of a major committee, who's responsible for the federal funding that is helping all these people move into the state, and all the rest, and in 1962, which was a Democratic year in the state of Washington.

REID: It was not much of a Democratic year in the state of Washington. Nixon carried the state of Washington in '60. Kennedy was popular but yet an unknown quantity. The '62 election, the things that hurt Warren Magnuson, I think he was hurt most by Don Magnuson. Don was still on that ballot. They tried to get him to read the tea leaves and get the hell off and not run for reelection. He did run for reelection. He had been reelected in '60 by 139 votes. He was defeated solidly in '62. In that '61-'62 period there was one time in the spring of '62 when Don Magnuson, and as I mentioned he had the twin failing of cards and liquor, he was found dead drunk in the skid row area of Seattle. He was arrested, he was booked, he was released. The radio stations that found out about it published the fact on the air, on their newscasts. There was one radio station in Seattle that didn't say Don Magnuson, they said "Senator Magnuson." Now that broadcast did not continue all day, but it was part of the morning, into the day, before somebody got it corrected, got it changed. Now, there was no way the Warren Magnuson camp could get everybody to publish the fact: "Look, it was Don, it wasn't Warren; it was the congressman, not the senator." We just had to live with the fact, but that went on. He had also publicly divorced and separated, and all of this was public knowledge, it was widely published, and Don Magnuson's opponent used it.

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Warren Magnuson's opponent was an unknown. There were several opponents in the primary, but the one that emerged from the primary was a fellow named Richard Christiansen. He was a reverend. He was ordained in the Lutheran Church. That's a big plus in the state of Washington. We have a lot of Scandinavians; we have a large Lutheran population, a very respected Lutheran population. Nobody knew this Reverend Christiansen and he was not the choice of the, what you might call the "Powers That Be" of the Republican party. I know he was not the choice of the Weyerhaeuser group, the Norton-Clapps, and others who historically had supported more conservative candidates, who had strongly supported Eisenhower and Langlie, and later supported Richard Nixon over Nelson Rockefeller. He was not their candidate; they had another candidate. But Christiansen emerged from the primary, and he emerged because he got in a car and went all over the state and he was able to motivate women. He was a handsome guy, charismatic. He was what I would call a Billy Graham type, because he was a revivalist. He would get these women to throw a tea party and he would go in and he'd work with these gals for an hour or so and then they would go out and work like hell for him. In fact, they came up with the slogan "Women on the Warpath," WOW, and it was very successful in numbers of volunteers. It was also modestly successful in raising some money, because these gals would have bake sales and cookie sales for Richard Christiansen.

Well, Richard Christiansen's people had made some other contacts. They made one with big oil, [H. L.] Hunt in Texas, and they'd made a connection with the American Medical Association in Chicago. Dwight David Eisenhower's brother Edgar got involved in Christiansen's campaign

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as the treasurer. It's documented that the American Medical Association put in \$197,000 for the defeat of Warren Magnuson, not really the election of Richard Christiansen, but the defeat of Warren Magnuson. They saw Warren Magnuson as a socialist, he favored the Ewing Health Plan, which Oscar Ewing and Harry Truman tried to put through in the '49-'50 period, and Magnuson was an avowed supporter of this thing called Medicare that was coming down the pike. And by gum they were going to get rid of him! Magnuson had always been against big oil as far as its depletion allowance. He voted up here, he and Russ Long might agree on a lot of things, but they never agreed on that. So Magnuson had always been a no vote in oil depletion allowance and he'd always been a yea vote on some kind of national health plan for the people.

So there was big money that had come into the Richard Christiansen campaign. It was smartly handled. As I said, he was a revivalist, he was an excellent TV performer. We have a great example today in the White House. Richard Christiansen was a fantastic performer on the tube in 1962. They were picking up half-hours and they were challenging Magnuson to a debate. They came up with a gimmick that was, as far as I was concerned, very devastating to us. He would start off by saying that he'd invited Senator Magnuson to debate, but the senator couldn't get there, or wouldn't get there, but we have his chair over there. And there would be a rocking chair, it was a Kennedy-type rocking chair, but they had the damn thing wired in some way so that it would move. So Christiansen would make some kind of comment on where he stood and then he'd give some kind of a lead into what Senator Magnuson's position was, and once in a while they would zero in on that chair. Sometimes the

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chair would move very slowly, and sometimes it would move very fast. It was a clever visual gimmick.

Of course, all Magnuson's advisors told him that he should not debate. The results of the '60 debates between Nixon and Kennedy, people read them all sorts of ways, but our people were reading them that an incumbent should never honor a challenger and give him visibility, blah, blah, blah. Magnuson himself probably wanted to. I know he did this last time, and he had previously, and I know from one of his appearances in the '56 campaign—there was an instance where the Seattle Rotary Club held a big lunch in Seattle, and both Governor Langlie and Senator Magnuson appeared. They did not debate, but they both appeared. Governor Langlie went first and opened the door by casting stones and political barbs, so when Magnuson got up, he did his part. According to most people, Magnuson just devastated Langlie in that encounter. I tend to agree with Magnuson that he could appear in a joint appearance and he'd come off the better. But I was perhaps one of the few that felt that way in 1980, and that was certainly true in '62.

I was involved in the campaign in King County, I was living there, practicing law, and was involved in the campaign there. There were no joint appearances, and it was a very close election. But, again, the congressional side: Don Magnuson lost badly, Julia was the only Democrat who retained her seat, and when you totaled up the Democratic vote for congressional candidates and the Republican vote, the difference was about 250,000 on the Republican side. The margin between Warren Magnuson's vote, about 492,000, and the Democrats for Congress, was over 150,000. And Magnuson's race was *the* race. It was the one time no governor, no

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president, the senatorial race was "the race." You didn't have any protection. There was no cover, with some

other race taking the spotlight. So Magnuson did run well ahead of the congressional candidates, well ahead of his party. Christiansen ran behind his congressional people, and he ran behind his party. I would say it was a personal triumph for Magnuson.

Any review of the 1962 election must factor in the physical arrangement of the ballot in Washington state. The Senate race was on top, followed by all of the U. S. congressional races—and the preferential placement for all of the Democrats or Republicans goes, by law, to that party which carried the previous presidential race. So not only was Senator Magnuson somewhat "exposed" in the only statewide race, but as a Democratic candidate, he suffered the handicap of Nixon having carried the state in 1960. Another factor, missed by many national types, is that voters in Washington do not have the option of voting a straight ticket by hitting just one lever at the top of the line or marking just one box on their paper ballots.

The money spent on the other side exceeded the money spent on his side. I think they spent their money much more wisely. We had an instance of sheer horror when our billboards first appeared in about June or July. When they first went up, something had happened at the printers, because Warren Magnuson's picture was on each billboard, and it was in beautiful color, and there was a background. The backgrounds differed, but the picture was the same. But the picture came out just horribly, and they had to replace it. Why—this was a question we asked Jerry Hoeck and others—why somebody hadn't looked at the damn thing

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before it went out? It was embarrassing, and it was something that was picked up by not only the television and radio but the newspapers, so it drew unfavorable attention to something that really was unfortunate. I felt there was a mistake in the billboard verbiage, because it was very egotistical. It was: "Magnuson Makes Washington Great." It was an egotistical statement. If they had just added the word "Helps" in there, I thought it would have been better. But, you know, in those kinds of decisions, everybody argues and everybody has a different opinion.

RITCHIE: That was the campaign where his face was on the billboard with a picture of the Grand Coulee dam, with the assumption that he helped to build it. Something of an allusion to one of John Kennedy's references.

REID: Right, Magnuson helped. In fact, when Magnuson was in the state legislature in '33 he led the attempt to get money from the state coffers to help build Grand Coulee, but he was not in the Congress. It was more former U.S. Senator C. C. Dill. Dill struck a bargain with Jim Farley before the Chicago convention. Dill had the votes, Dill was the favorite son from the state of Washington. Magnuson was in the delegation, but Dill was the leader of the delegation. And it was C. C. Dill that stuck a deal with Farley, you know, we'll give you the votes, but here's what we want. We want that Grand Coulee Dam built. Dill paid off and so did Farley and Roosevelt. It got started as a W.P.A. project and grew. Of course, Magnuson over the years did help add powerhouses, in fact they're still building powerhouses

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with some of the Maggie and Scoop money that we've gotten. There's a hole there where they can build another powerhouse someday, because that was one of the things that Magnuson worked on, because Grand Coulee is capable of even more generation that it's doing right now.

RITCHIE: So when the votes were all counted up in this election, Magnuson had won by about fifty thousand votes . . .

REID: About forty-five thousand or forty-six thousand, less than fifty thousand.

RITCHIE: It must have come as something of a breathtaking surprise that it was such a slim margin.

REID: It was, and it did bother Magnuson personally, a little, although he put that behind him quickly. There was another factor. We had the Cuban Missile Crisis hit during the campaign. We also had a session of Congress that ran later than normal. I believe they didn't get out of here until the middle of October, October 13th, something like that. Our primary was in September, the general of course in November. But during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy had some kind of a briefing down in San Francisco that a lot of the western senators went to. Magnuson went there and was there overnight. He came back to Seattle late in the evening from San Francisco, from this presidential briefing. Our P.R. people thought this was a natural. They wanted to seize the initiative and get people thinking about Cuba or something or other, so they took Magnuson directly from the airport to the television station. As they walked in the door they turned on the cameras. Now, I was not present, but I was on the other end of it, I

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was watching the tube. It was one of the lousiest appearances I have ever seen. Technically it was not coordinated, and Magnuson was not up to snuff. He was tired and he showed it. It was not a good appearance. Now, it did come late in the evening. As I remember it was either ten or ten thirty. So many of us, I know I certainly just sat there praying that nobody else was watching. We did get a little flack from it the next few days. But it was a booboo on our part. We made every mistake ("we" collectively) and Magnuson won in spite of it, and us.

RITCHIE: You said you were working in King County during that election. What were you doing during the election?

REID: Well I was physically on the payroll of the Washington state legislature, the Joint Committee on Governmental Cooperation. I lived there, I'd been living there since '57, and I also had a very modest, modest law practice. And I was involved in the Magnuson campaign, as a friend, as one of the older-timers but yet still young. Not on his payroll, but I did go out and represent the senator at some events. I'd been doing that for several years. In fact, I remember in 1960 I went out to represent John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and a state representative at that time by the name of Joel Pritchard joined me. We both went to a fraternity and he spoke for Richard Nixon and I spoke for John Kennedy. Joel and I had known each other since he first appeared in the state legislature in the House. Of course, now he's back here as one of our congressmen. So I had done things like that in past elections, I'd been a "speaker." I did quite a bit of that in the '62 election, because you have to have surrogates.

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Magnuson has never been a hit-and-run artist. It's always been very difficult, if not impossible, for him to fly back to the state on a Friday and appear Friday night, Saturday, and Sunday and get on the "red-eye" and get

back here Monday. He would much prefer to go out there and stay five or six days or a week. The job here has not allowed that very much. But that's the way he's operated. Whenever he could get away from here for five to ten days, that's what he would do. Scoop, on the other hand, has been making that weekend run ever since he was in the House, and still does. I think it's almost habit now with Scoop. But it's a different campaign style, and it's a style that Magnuson never was able to do, even though some of his newer people in the '60s and '70s thought that was the way to go and tried to get him to do it. He just refused and would not.

RITCHIE: I suppose when he started out his political career the type of transcontinental transportation wasn't as good.

REID: That's right. There were several stops on that airplane before it got here. He didn't take his first, non-stop transcontinental flight until 1960, when he flew from Baltimore to Los Angeles for the Democratic National convention! Of course, when he first started out as a congressman he was able to go home and spend three or four months and get around casually, and he did. He got to know people, people got to know him, but as the population expanded, that old style of spending more time with a group and for an entire evening, or at least for two or three hours, was diminishing returns. When you start getting a population of two and a half to three million, three and a half, four million,

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there's just no way. Even if you do it like Scoop does, there's still no way that you can really physically meet all those people, although Scoop meets more of them than Magnuson, and more of them actually see him. He has the ability to go into a room and make the circle and get out of a room in twenty-five to thirty minutes that Magnuson finds impossible. He just won't move that fast and won't pass people by that fast.

RITCHIE: Well, after that '62 election, Magnuson came back to Washington and began to make some changes in his staff, particularly in the Commerce Committee and I assume on his personal staff as well. Was this a direct result of the election, that he felt the time had come to make some dramatic changes or change the advice he was getting?

REID: It was a mix. There was a changing of the guard. One, Irv Hoff opted to leave. I know it was financial with Irv. The pay, the offers on the outside were much greater than the ability on the inside. So Irv had left as AA. A new AA had come aboard, Fred Lordan. Fred was an old friend of Magnuson's, a long-time associate, able lawyer and an expert at legislative craftsmanship. There was another person that most people can't even remember, Frank Pelligrini. Frank Pelligrini was a very good lawyer and had been the more or less top staff person on the Commerce Committee, very capably. Frank died of a heart attack, early. There was an opening that neither Magnuson nor Frank Pelligrini wanted!

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Jerry Grinstein, who was the son of an old friend of Magnuson's, and from the state, and a very bright lawyer, Harvard-type, was there on the staff at the time. So Jerry became the top counsel. Now there were some old-timers that were on the staff that Magnuson had inherited and that were experts. Then there was of course the fact that Dirksen [Senate Office Building] had been built and there was more room, and with more staff allowance, and the increasing demand by other members for some kind of direct assistance that the staff did grow. You want to remember that the Commerce Committee had the likes of Phil Hart, who was certainly just

as liberal, if not more so, than Magnuson, many of the same people. It had some very able people like John Pastore, Bob Bartlett, Clair Engle, Joe Tydings, Bill Spong, Dan Inouye, Adlai Stevenson, John Tunney—and on the Republican side the Thruston Morton's, Norris Cottons, and men like Bob Griffin, Ted Stevens and Mark Hatfield who were all equally interested and active. So there was an expansion of the staff, mainly on the younger scale, and we acquired some very able people that were able to work with the old timers like Nick Zapple. Nick was a real expert in communication law. Magnuson had really inherited him, but came to depend upon him, and trust him a great deal. Magnuson himself had a keen interest in communications, and a long interest because when Magnuson was an attorney back in the '29, '30, '31 period, Magnuson had represented a small radio station in Seattle that needed to get a permit in order to get more wattage, and so Magnuson had a personal knowledge of the FCC and its problems and complexities that he brought here. He didn't learn it here. He may have honed it here, but he didn't come here a virgin and discover there was an FCC. But Nick became an extremely

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valuable staff person to Magnuson as well as to John Pastore and others in the FCC area.

After the '62 election some of this became a little more evident. Which was first? You have to remember that the Kennedy administration started, or tried to start, a surge of domestic initiatives and the Johnson administration grabbed the ball and ran with it. One of the key decisions of the Johnson administration, civil rights, Magnuson was a participant in the White House decisions on that legislation. I think he was perhaps the author of the idea that the bill be split when it came to the Senate, and that Mr. Eastland and Judiciary be given the Civil Rights bill, but that the Commerce Committee, because of the interstate and commerce clause, be given the "public accommodations" section, which certainly impacts more on Commerce than it does the Judiciary. Well, everybody knew that the Civil Rights bill under Jim Eastland would not see the light of day. There was some hope that a public accommodations bill in the Commerce Committee might see the light of day, and it did. It didn't get out without some problems, some troubles, even a physical altercation between a Ralph Yarborough and a Strom Thurmond. But it did get out and Magnuson carried it on the floor. One of our future administrative assistants, Stan Barer, was the key staff person on that public accommodations section and was stuck on the floor with Magnuson for almost three months when that bill was filibustered. Of course, the plot was that when Commerce reported it, that the other portions would be added to it as amendments, and it would be the vehicle for getting the Civil Rights Act through the Senate. The plot worked, not without some consternation on the part of Richard Russell and the old-timers, but it did work. Cloture was voted, and it did pass, and it became law.

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But yet that was somewhat typical of some of the things that were happening: the Johnson administration, the Great Society efforts, many of the bits and pieces of that legislation did hit Commerce and go through Commerce and make it possible for the Mike Pertschuks to emerge as visible people. We got Mike from Maurine Neuberger's office. Of course, being from Oregon, being from Washington, we had some more than casual working relationships. We got to know Mike when Mike had been picked up by Maurine. Maurine was the one that really got him started on the Commerce Committee, but he's a bubbly guy, a bright guy, very capable. He quickly became part of the Magnuson cabal that permeated the Commerce Committee at the time, and became a successor to Grinstein. When Grinstein left the Commerce Committee, Pertschuk became the chief counsel. But a lot of things were done during the mid-60s that were a combination. I don't know who

deserves most of the credit, but I think it has to be shared between the Johnson administration and the Califanos, and whoever it was down there in the White House bowels trying to stir up things, Johnson trying to stir up things, Hubert Humphrey stirring up things, and Warren Magnuson stirring up things.

RITCHIE: In terms of creating the staff, Jerry Grinstein seems to get a lot of credit. I was wondering what kind of a person he was, if you could give a sketch of him, and what his influence was on Magnuson at that time.

REID: Well, Jerry's extremely bright, not just as a lawyer. And he's concerned. He carries some of the same concerns about injustice that many of us in the Magnuson camp carried. Of course,

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Jerry being Jewish, there might be a heritage there of discrimination, anti-discrimination that would filter into some of his thinking. But he certainly found a compatible group, starting with Magnuson and most of the people associated with Magnuson through the years on his staff. I would say most of them, myself and Magnuson included, it's the helping hand rather than the handout that we are trying to achieve, that there shouldn't be any artificial barriers. I know I personally had a great deal of trouble with Affirmative Action, because to me it's more a euphemism for quotas, and I've seen quotas used to discriminate. So I've had trouble with Affirmative Action myself.

But Jerry did have a great deal of influence. He came to Magnuson as somebody that Magnuson had known casually as a child, a little better perhaps as a teenager and college student, but then joined the staff and proved himself intellectually and personally very capable. He proved that he was capable to others as well as to Magnuson, so it didn't cause Magnuson any trouble with his colleagues when Jerry was given responsibility. Magnuson has always delegated a certain degree of hiring capability to his staff. Magnuson has not personally interviewed every applicant. Magnuson would like to see and chat with prospective finalists, and almost invariably sprinkled his blessing on any selection that any of us might make. He of course retained veto power and only rarely did Magnuson exercise that power for either clerical or professional type personnel. Of course, Jerry had an opportunity to garner more, but Magnuson also started a program in the early '60s, about '63.

He started a program together with the University of Washington Law School of accepting from the Law School a senior, a graduate, whom they

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selected—two law professors and another professor from political science, three of them would interview and select—and we would take. Magnuson's idea was that the individual would spend a year on his staff, on the Commerce staff, and then go back and not be afraid to represent home state clients before federal agencies. That was modestly successful, that portion of it, because a few of them did return after only a year. Most of them stayed here. A lot of them stayed here. That's how we got Stan Barer in the first place. That's how we got Lynn Sutcliffe. That's how we got Dan O'Neal, and a number of very good people. And they stayed with us. One that didn't was a young fellow named Norm Maleng, who admitted that he was a Republican and mentioned that to Magnuson, and Magnuson said "Well, we don't worry about politics here, you know, worry about politics later." Well, Norm Maleng did stay just a year and then went back home. Later he ran for prosecuting attorney of King County and in every bit of literature and everything else praised the fact that he'd been an intern with Warren

Magnuson, and it didn't hurt in his election as King County prosecutor, and he's prosecutor right now. But that farm club from the UW Law School proved very fertile, very fertile indeed. I don't think we had a bust in the lot. Magnuson was proud of it, liked it. It gave us some very good, active young people, and continual freshness.

RITCHIE: Well, this then brings us up to the time when you came to join Magnuson's staff. Was that in 1964?

REID: Yes, I had been yakking with them in '63, but I had commitments out home that kept me there through '63 and I came to the staff in '64.

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RITCHIE: What made you decide to join the staff now, some fourteen years after you first worked for Magnuson?

REID: Well, one was an accident of politics in the state of Washington. We had a Democratic governor, a Democratically controlled House and Senate, but a Democratic Speaker of the House who was at political odds with the Democratic governor. The governor of the state of Washington has the item veto, which the president doesn't, so the governor of the state of Washington was able to veto all funding of all legislative interim committees. That veto, which was exercised in '63, wiped out the funding for the interim committee that I was associated with, and that was still in existence. On July 1, we didn't have any money. I had the choice of either finding something else or—and the governor at the time, [Albert] Rosellini, there was an offer of "you know, we'll find something, don't worry, we want you around." But I had gone through a personal situation with a gal that I thought I wanted to get married with, almost since '49. She and I had a romance off and on, and I had gone through a situation with her where she was on but I was off. So I thought a personal change would be good. It was a combination. If the interim committee had stayed in existence with money, I think I probably would just have stayed, because I liked the work, I enjoyed it, I was able to help fabricate legislation, look into local problems, see them very closely and help work out changes, and see the changes work or not work. It was a very intimate association with government. That's one of the problems I felt back here, it's less intimate. But the combination of personal and political, and the offer—I grabbed it.

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RITCHIE: Did you come back to work on the Commerce Committee staff or on Magnuson's personal staff?

REID: Well, I knew I was going to be associated with the personal office, although I didn't worry about the paycheck. It had been explained that I would be housed probably in 127 [Magnuson's office, Russell Senate Office Building] but that I would be paid by Commerce, and don't worry about it. I didn't. So I came back and joined the Commerce Committee staff as a professional staffer. I was housed in 127. And calling cards were printed and it said "Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson." I used the same calling card for eighteen years, although I occupied different positions and was "on different payrolls," the disbursing clerk sent a check to Riggs [Bank] every month and it didn't matter where it showed up in the Secretary [of the Senate]'s book, to me.

RITCHIE: Before we get into just what you were doing, I was wondering what your impression was of

the Senate after being away for fourteen years. Were you impressed by the changes or the lack of changes in the institution?

REID: At first it didn't seem that different, because there were a few people on the floor, Dickey Darling was still here at that time, Joe Stewart was still here. Dickey I had known quite well in '49, '50, Joe I had known of. They were still in the cloakroom. The floor didn't look any different. I remembered the old cars, and now they had new cars. More people. And Dirksen [Senate Office Building],

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which I never cared for. At one time I did occupy an office in Dirksen, as well as an office in 127, and I never did like Dirksen. I think the differences that first hit me were physical. Then the larger city, the larger population of the Hill. There was still Ballard on the police force, but now he was a captain, when I got here in '64. He later became an inspector. There were a couple of others I remembered from the police days that were lieutenants. But it was bigger.

I've spent a lot of time on the Hill because I found an apartment—I set out to find a place to live right on the Hill, I didn't want to have to commute—over on 110 D Street, just behind the Cannon [House Office] Building, and moved in in January of '64, and I'm going to move out August 8th of '81. I've been in the same two rooms all this time. I've done the Mike Palm eatery and other eateries on Pennsylvania Avenue and have walked the grounds day and night, early and late. I love the Hill. I love the Capitol grounds. I still get a thrill when I fly back to town and see the Capitol, or when I drive up Pennsylvania Avenue on the way home, and see it sitting there. Or when I walk across the grounds in the early morning when the blue is sometimes prettiest.

I think the increase in the numbers of people was most striking. There used to be an intimate dining room up there on the second floor of Russell. That was gone and there was a new cafeteria in the basement. I still call it the Hayden Memorial Lunch Room, because I can remember walking through there and Carl Hayden being there. He refused to pay more than a nickel for a cup of coffee. When coffee went to a dime he'd get half a cup but he'd only give them a nickel. Those were the days when Carl Hayden did eat down there quite often. Today the only senator

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that I've ever seen there, and quite often I see him there, is John Stennis on Saturdays. I have seen Sparky Matsunaga bring in a group and have lunch there on Saturday also. But in the old days in that cafeteria on the second floor, you used to see a number of senators that came in, although they even then had their place in the Capitol, where only they could go. But the larger buildings, the larger accommodations, the big cafeterias in Dirksen were all a little dehumanizing.

RITCHIE: Had the type of senators changed very much in the interim?

REID: I think so, because you didn't have the Tom Connallys or Vandenberg, McKellar, or the likes of the Senior Harry Byrds and Robert Tafts. Of course, Richard Russell was still here when I came back, and to me he was perhaps the epitome of the more old-time senator: well-schooled, well-honed, coming up through the ranks, being a governor, being a state legislator, learning the ropes before they got here, and then spending a long time in the vineyards here before they emerged as some kind of public figure outside of their own

constituency. Of course, Warren Magnuson and Henry Jackson have much the same background. The only difference between Magnuson and Jackson is the fact that Magnuson did serve as a state legislator. Jackson was a prosecutor and House member before he became a senator. I would say more in the '60s, and now perhaps far too much, you have people immediately somehow entering the chamber, and being given a toga, that you didn't have in the past.

RITCHIE: Your official title was assistant to the Chairman of the Commerce Committee . . .

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REID: Well, on the calling card it said "Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson" because that's the only name that was on the ballot in the state.

RITCHIE: But what actually were your responsibilities?

REID: Well, during the earlier period, when I first came around, I immediately assumed a responsibility within the office for relations, mail and physical relations with education and health people within the state. That also brought with it some of the national associations that might get involved. One of the things that I did in the health field, just by accident the president of the Washington State Medical Society at that time was my sister's surgeon in Spokane. He was coming back here for a national meeting, and he happened to mention the fact to her. She said, "Well, look up my brother. He works for Warren Magnuson." Dr. Carl Schlicke, who was a conservative Republican but a concerned physician, felt that the antipathy that had been highly evidenced in elections between the Medical Society and Magnuson was not healthy for either. So he did contact me not just to see me but to see if it was possible for them to see Magnuson. I said, "Well, why not?" So I talked to Magnuson and he said, "Well, that's a surprise."

We got them together over in the Senator's dining room over in the Capitol. We took a table and we had, I think, seven or eight people there. Dr. Schlicke had three of his people with him, and Magnuson and myself and Carl Downing, who was our press man. We had lunch and then we went up to Magnuson's hideaway [office], S-239 on the East Front of the Capitol, and sat and talked for about an hour. There was another

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doctor with the Washington state group, he was from Tacoma, who was really an ultra-conservative type. At the time Medicare had just passed and the debate within medicine was whether or not they were going to play the game. This guy was against playing the game and wanted some kind of a strike, but he didn't prevail. He remained on the board for several years and came back several times, and as he said, "Well, you know, Magnuson doesn't have horns."

That started the relationship between "organized medicine" in the state of Washington, the Washington State Medical Society, and Warren Magnuson. There was another fellow involved in this, his name was Harlan Knudson. He had just gone to work for the State Medical Society in 1963 as some kind of a legislative representative. Well, Harlan Knudson and I had met in Seattle when I was there, and he had run for the state House in 1962 and had been defeated, at the same time a friend of mine was running, and I was supporting, and he got nominated on the Democratic ticket, but he did not win the general election. So Harlan and I knew each other, and I liked Harlan. Harlan became a very lowly staff person for the Washington State Medical Society.

Over the years he became their top non-physician, still, is their top man. I helped engineer this meeting and over the last twenty years, a good working relationship has developed between organized medicine within the state of Washington and Warren Magnuson personally, and Warren Magnuson's staff. I wasn't the only one involved with that, there were other staff people that got involved, but I helped engineer it.

I did the same type of thing with some of the educator groups, common schools, colleges, universities. Magnuson had already had a

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reputation and an entree with some of them. There has always been a good chemistry between Warren Magnuson and the Jesuits. We have two Jesuit colleges in our state, Seattle University and Gonzaga. There's always been a good chemistry between those people and Magnuson and with [President] Tim Healey out here at Georgetown. Magnuson's always enjoyed their company and there's always been an entree if they had a problem. They always felt free to come to him, and he always saw them. So I didn't have to help open that door, that door was already there, but perhaps I expanded it and opened a few others, got a few others into Magnuson. We had a very good working relationship over the years with those people, and with various disciplines within the community of higher education as well as elementary and secondary. That was a major responsibility that I had within the office.

I had some other responsibilities at that time with the Commerce Committee. I worked on a publication that was going to publish the election speeches of the presidential candidates in '64. The Commerce Committee had done it in '60, because of the equal access law. They did publish the Nixon-Kennedy appearances and debates, but we never did go to publication on the Goldwater-Johnson race in '64. But I sort of honchoed the compilation of it. I also worked on the problem we had with the St. Lawrence Seaway that Phil Hart wanted us to look into.

RITCHIE: What was that?

REID: It was some sort of an expansion. I don't really recall at the moment. It certainly wasn't a high priority with me, I was just doing something to help out and fill in a vacancy on the staff at the moment.

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RITCHIE: The staff of the Commerce Committee has been described as one that worked primarily for the chairman. Some of the members complained that the staff wasn't as well distributed as it could have been. Is that a fair assessment?

REID: It could be, because you could say that there was three divisions of the staff. There was a minority and Jerry Kenney was head of the minority staff most of the time I was there, and they did their thing. There was another small cadre of people that kept the ship running, that handled documents and set up hearing rooms. Then there was the Chief Counsel, Jerry Grinstein, and company. It might well be that some of those members were unhappy with the fact that the Chief Counsel's group were more responsive, or totally responsive to the chairman. Of course the time that Strom Thurmond was a Democrat on our committee he would certainly be critical of the chairman as well as the staff because we were doing things that he opposed, like the public accommodations. The staff was just as gung ho as any member, and some of the members were certainly gung

ho, but the staff was very gung ho. I can picture the person, I can't remember his name, but I know that Strom had a person on our staff that was responsible to him. Magnuson never stood in the way of members having a person, even before S. Res. 4 or anything else came along. If they personally voiced to him an interest, he acquiesced. He started it with John Bricker when the election of '54 threw John out as chairman and Magnuson in as chairman. John bitched and Magnuson acquiesced and minority staff were allowed. Magnuson tried to hold it down, but whenever they expressed a desire,

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they got it. But just having somebody, the fact that a Mr. Thurmond might have a person, didn't assure the person any power or persuasive skills. It was still the majority that were going to prevail, and the majority's desire, whether it was labeling on cigarettes, which Thruston Morton didn't want to see, or public accommodations, which Strom Thurmond didn't want to see, it was going to happen. The staff was there to make sure it happened and happened well. So some of them would have reason to complain, and there must be some justification.

RITCHIE: I was thinking about people like Pastore and Hart and others who were pretty strong-willed individuals and who had particular interests of their own. I wondered what kind of demands they made on the staff of the committee.

REID: I know that Mr. Pastore was very active and persuasive and forceful, and had his people. So did Fritz Hollings. You have to remember also that when I first got here we still didn't have "Sunshine," and executive sessions were relatively closed. They were relatively closed to the staff too, you did not have a lot of staff in there. There was no rule but there was an understanding, and it was also a small room. We held our executive sessions in those rooms right behind the hearing room. 5110 was our big hearing room up in Dirksen, and there was a room right behind there and that's where the chief clerk, Eddy Jarrett, was, and that's where the executive sessions were held. The press and the public and the lobbyists were outside in the hallway and stayed outside in the hallway. They saw the people that went in, but that was all. The people that came out said whatever they

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wanted to say and that was the result. There were no minutes, no verbatim minutes, of executive sessions. There were minutes, yes, recorded votes, but it was just the bare bones. It wasn't until much later that you got "Sunshine," and open execs with even verbatim transcripts.

RITCHIE: Do you think the system lost something by switching over to the Sunshine laws? Or did it gain more than it lost?

REID: I'll let somebody write extensively on that. My own personal view is that Sunshine created much more posturing. I can remember sessions, and cigarette labeling was one, that both Maggie and Thruston had counted the votes, and Thruston knew he didn't have them, so Thruston didn't spend a lot of time holding up final action. I honestly felt during the sessions, I was there at a number of them, that there was less posturing. They made their point quickly, sometime eloquently, but they made it quickly and most of them were pretty good head counters anyway. Some of them weren't, of course. The real movers were. So things did move a little

more quickly.

RITCHIE: I understand from all accounts that I've looked at that Magnuson really excelled in the executive session, backroom discussions. That he had a technique of dealing with people that won him tremendous support from his colleagues.

REID: He always tried to be accommodating, he tried to be understanding. He did spend time trying to really understand why these people might feel the way they did. He spent time with them in the cloakroom of the Chamber, in the back dining room, the

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private, private dining room that they have, because he invariably ate there. It was rare that we would schedule him for a luncheon with constituents. He would meet constituents in his office, get it over with, wander over and have lunch with his colleagues. Although Magnuson can remember baseball scores and talk football or anything else, I know that isn't what they talked about when they would be in that backroom. Magnuson never tried to steamroller. He'd get impatient towards the end, but he had subtle ways of showing that impatience. He didn't do it verbally.

One of the ways he showed impatience, that he displayed more when he became chairman of the Appropriations Committee than he ever did before, and this was caused by Sunshine and the fact that Sunshine had a crowded room and Sunshine required the use of a gavel. Magnuson never used a gavel as I remember in the early days on Commerce. It was only Sunshine that required the presence of a gavel. But Magnuson would take the head of the gavel in his hand, and he's start tapping the handle on the table. It was kind of a slow tap, but as it got faster and louder, it was a way he was sort of showing anyone around the table: "Look, fellows, let's get to it." It was never very loud but whether you were a new man like Jim Sasser, or an old-timer like Stennis or Proxmire, it didn't go unnoticed, and it had its effect. But Sunshine did force these people who had a constituency or had any reason for publicly showing their hand to make sometimes long speeches.

RITCHIE: Tell me, in a situation where a senator is also the chairman of a committee, what's the relation between his personal staff and his committee staff? Are they two different institutions, or do they intermingle?

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REID: Well, they basically have different responsibilities. Of course, every chairman has the power to manufacture any kind of system he wants. Some members keep their personal staffs almost entirely divorced from committee work, or other work. And a personal staff does have, I think, I know Magnuson believed it, and the people who really ran Magnuson's personal operation, that the first job they had was to be responsive to constituents. As time grew, constituent mail grew. The personal staff did not have time to spend on things outside the state of Washington mail. So they either chucked it or sent it off to the committee. There's always a tendency on the part of staff of committees to ignore anything outside of their immediate concern and immediate assignment. Mail is a burden. Many committees on the Hill do not answer mail. Some of them will answer constituent mail of chairmen or a ranking member, if they are forced to, and some of them probably do a fair job of answering some outside mail. But I think by and large most of the committees do not answer mail addressed to the committee or addressed to the chairman or members.

I think it's one of the contributing factors to the turn off of some people. Because I know I looked at this problem when we were in Appropriations, and we had a very modest operation. But the rules at the time did not allow committees to have some of the equipment with which you can answer mass mail. I encouraged the Rules Committee people to really take a closer look at the mail that a committee has dumped on it, one way or the other, either it comes in the front door or it comes in the backdoor from a member's office. And it does concern me. I'm leaving that concern behind right now, but it does bother me. I hate to

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see it, especially I hate to see the little postcards that's personally addressed and personally written (the printed postcards that's put out by some interest group, that doesn't bother me as much) but the really personal letter that some citizen out there puts their stamp on and sends to a senator that they don't even know, that complains, or that urges, or advocates. I think there should be a response. We tried to do that for Magnuson. But our first priority, of course, was the home state mail.

But the relationships, Magnuson had the power and the wallop, even before Dirksen was built, to acquire real estate in Russell. There was real estate in Russell that was dedicated to the Commerce Committee before Dirksen opened up, so there was a small enclave of Commerce Committee staff right across the hall from 127. And there was an interplay between those staffs, at the higher level, "professional level," and at the secretarial level. So there was, I think, a very good working relationship. Now there were always problems and jealousies because of pay or perks or something like that. And when we acquired chairmanship of Appropriations and lost Commerce, we also acquired real estate across the hall from 127, in 132, we acquired two rooms where we housed the key staff of Magnuson's involvement with Appropriations. Again, there was constant interplay between the two.

Before he became chairman of Appropriations and I was in the personal operations, first he was chairman of Independent Offices [Subcommittee], then he switched to HEW [Subcommittee]. While he was chairing Independent Offices, I had some responsibilities within that personal operation for independent agencies because of the National Science Foundation and

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because of the Veterans' Administration. Then when he switched to HEW, and health and education, of course, were in there, I had more responsibilities, and more interplay with the Appropriations staff of HEW. So I was always involved in interplay with other staffs, or other staff people who were on Appropriations as well as Commerce.

When I first got back in '64, the personal operation was not that large. In '49 I guess he had nine or ten people, when I got back in '64 we had about twenty here, then we went to about thirty which included two in Spokane and four in Seattle, so the 127 group didn't increase that much. I can remember in '49, you had one secretary handling "legislation." In '64, we had two or three people involved, but within four years we had about six people in the legislative office. They would also handle some constituent mail and constituent relations on the legislation that they were working on. So it was the legislative office that really grew. The case worker didn't grow that much. The [service] academy person was still *an* academy person, the numbers might go up and down but the staff that handled it remained a one-person operation, with other duties too.

RITCHIE: But as the staff grew, that enabled you to do some more specialization, say in the areas you mentioned of health and education?

REID: Yes. I was perhaps one of the first that became that much of a specialist. Later we had others, in the late '70s we had one that was "energy," even though Magnuson didn't personally need an energy person, because of his own knowledge and interest in

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hydro, the fact that solar and atomic and everything else was coming along, we had somebody, Ed Sheets, who spent a lot of time working on some of the complex questions and issues in energy. When HUD [Housing and Urban Development] was created and you had urban development, and we had cities like Seattle, Tacoma, even some of the smaller ones that had redevelopment problems and particular issues, we had somebody that was sort of honchoing that and watching it closely and working with the department, working with the committees, and the local officials. Your committee personnel spend most of their time authorizing. Often they are more interested in authorizing than they are in reviewing existing situations or working with constituents. Of course, on Appropriations you've got half an eye on the back of your head looking at authorizations but you're more worried about what's actually happening and what's being proposed. But in a personal office, you've got somebody who's either trying to unscrew a screw up, or that's trying to get something put together so they can be on the front lines. So that staff person in a personal office has to really be looking in a broader spectrum than the staff person that sits someplace else.

RITCHIE: I was just looking at Eric Redman's book, *The Dance of Legislation*, and he was saying that when the Vietnam war picked up, the personal staff members were swamped with constituent letters and protestors and delegations and all the rest, but the business of the committees continued, that no one came to the committee staffs to complain about Cambodia; instead they went to the senators' personal staffs. He drew a very strong distinction between those who are insulated from the pressure of constituents angry over a particular issue, as opposed to those on the firing line.

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REID: And of course, in numbers, constituents far outweigh lobbyists. Now the best lobbyist knows that he needs to cultivate that key person who's sitting somewhere down on the staff of an authorizing committee, as well as the member. But the constituents don't. When Nelly Gray and company march through the building with their red roses, they're going to members' offices and just packing the reception rooms. They could walk right by a committee, be it Health and Human Services, or Judiciary, or Appropriations. And the mass mail hits the personal office, not the committees. So Eric is very, very right, very true.

RITCHIE: Now, when you say that you had responsibility for Independent Agencies, and you were interested in health and education, what kind of functions were you performing? What duties did you have?

REID: Some of them I shared, some were ones that Magnuson had originated and just handed me. Early in the game, when he acquired Independent Offices and the Veterans' Administration, he discovered a Veterans' Administration hospital system that was doing almost nothing in the way of bio-medical research, basic research in what they were doing. He had arguments with medical directors as well as VA administrators,

because he perceived this 180-some hospitals, the largest number of beds under one control in the world, and he couldn't understand how these people could go about their business and not be doing some basic research on their business. How could we do it better? So that was something that he kept after and he wanted some independent

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keeping after, so that was one of the little things we were watching, and that got handed me.

He'd helped create the National Science Foundation, to fill what he perceives—today as well as back in 1945-49—and a few others perceive, as a real void in the production of personnel that were capable of doing basic research in the basic sciences. It stemmed out of our experiences in World War II, and it was finally authorized in '50, came into existence in '51, Magnuson took over their money in '55. So we were watching and finding out, and trying to discover how well NSF was doing, what they weren't doing. So that was sort of an assignment that stemmed from him, but I found very compatible, very interesting.

RITCHIE: It was sort of an oversight role?

REID: Yes. And one of the outcomes of it was: you know there's a National Science Board, and there's never been anybody from the state of Washington on it; why don't you do something about that Magnuson? Well, he did. And there became a "Magnuson seat" on the Board. The first occupant was Dr. Frederick Thieme, who was then vice president of the University of Washington, later became president of the University of Colorado. He was originally appointed by Magnuson and Johnson. We had to get after [Jack] Valenti on that one. He got reappointed by Nixon over the strong objections of John Ehrlichman, because Fred Thieme and Gordon Allott became friends. There was a personal antipathy between John Ehrlichman and Thieme, and the fact that Gordon Allott overrode Ehrlichman on that, to this day I believe that it was John Ehrlichman that prevented the plane from stopping in Denver when

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Nixon flew to California in '72, the day before the election, and that contributed to the defeat of Gordon Allott, and Gordon certainly didn't deserve it. I think it was one of those little things that happen. But Fred and Gordon had become good friends. Gordon was on Appropriations, was on Independent Offices. They developed a personal friendship and Gordon got him reappointed. So Fred served twelve years.

John Hogness is on right at the moment, and he was the successor to the "Magnuson seat." At the time John Hogness became a member of the National Science Board, he was president of the University of Washington. That will probably be the last occupant of the "Magnuson seat," because there probably won't be a "Magnuson seat" in the future.

The Science Board members are the ones who are legally responsible for direction and policy of the NSF. And Magnuson had some impact on some of the things that they did or didn't do, especially in science education in the junior high, senior high school levels, some of the programs that he urged various directors, as well as that showed up in the reports of Independent Offices Subcommittee. Sometimes it was something that the Board was hesitant to do, and so a little nudge from the Hill helped. Or it was something the OMB [Office of Management and Budget] didn't want to do, and the Board did, but the Board played the honest game with

OMB and let us know, so that we took them off the hook. Many times the same thing has happened with NIH, National Institutes of Health. The Appropriations report differed from what the OMB thought should be going on.

RITCHIE: Well, I'm learning a lot about the mechanics of the staff system. This has been very useful information for me. I

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think the interview has been going very well, but we've been at it for about two hours, so I'm going to give you a break.

REID: I'm glad you don't have a clock on the wall.

[End of Interview #2]

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