Williams	Woolsey	Wynn
Wise	Wyden	Yates
NAYS—202		
Abercrombie	Gillmor	Packard
Allard	Gilman	Pastor
Archer	Gingrich	Paxon
Armey Bachus (AL)	Goodlatte Goodling	Payne (VA) Petri
Baker (CA)	Goss	Pickett
Baker (LA)	Grams	Pombo
Ballenger	Greenwood	Porter
Barrett (NE)	Gunderson	Portman
Bartlett Barton	Hamilton Hancock	Pryce (OH)
Bateman	Hansen	Quillen Quinn
Bentley	Hastert	Ramstad
Bereuter	Hayes	Rangel
Bilirakis	Hefley	Ravenel
Bliley Blute	Hefner	Ridge Roberts
Boehlert	Herger Hobson	Roemer
Boehner	Hoekstra	Rogers
Bonilla	Hoke	Rohrabacher
Boucher	Horn	Ros-Lehtinen
Brewster	Houghton	Rose
Brooks Bunning	Huffington Hunter	Rostenkowski Roth
Burton	Hutto	Sangmeister
Buyer	Hyde	Santorum
Callahan	Inhofe	Saxton
Calvert Camp	Istook Jacobs	Schaefer Schiff
Canady	Johnson, Sam	Sensenbrenner
Castle	Kim	Shaw
Chapman	King	Shays
Clay	Kingston	Shuster
Clement Clinger	Klug Knollenberg	Sisisky Skeen
Coble	Kolbe	Smith (MI)
Collins (GA)	Kyl	Smith (NJ)
Combest	Lambert	Smith (OR)
Cooper	Laughlin	Smith (TX)
Cox Crane	Lazio Levy	Snowe Solomon
Crapo	Lewis (CA)	Spence
Cunningham	Lightfoot	Stearns
DeLay	Linder	Stenholm
Diaz-Balart Dickey	Livingston	Stump
Dingell	Lloyd Machtley	Sundquist Talent
Dooley	Manton	Tanner
Doolittle	Manzullo	Taylor (MS)
Dornan	McCandless	Taylor (NC)
Dreier Duncan	McCollum McCrery	Thomas (CA) Thomas (WY)
Dunn	McDade	Torkildsen
Edwards (TX)	McHugh	Towns
Ehlers	McInnis	Upton
Emerson Everett	McKeon McMillan	Volkmer Vucanovich
Ewing	Mica	Walker
Fawell	Michel	Walsh
Fields (TX)	Miller (FL)	Washington
Fish	Molinari	Weldon
Ford (MI) Fowler	Moorhead Morella	Wolf Young (AK)
Franks (CT)	Murphy	Young (FL)
Franks (NJ)	Myers	Zeliff
Gekas	Nussle	Zimmer
Geren Gilchrest	Orton	
Gilchrest Oxley		
NOT VOTING—10		
Ford (TN)	Lewis (FL)	Tucker
Gallegly	Natcher	Wilson

Ford (TN) Lewis (FL) Tucker Gallegly Natcher Wilson Gallo Pickle Grandy Tauzin

So the resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider the vote whereby said resolution was agreed to was, by unanimous consent, laid on the table.

\$130.5\$ Lobbying activities

Mr. BRYANT, pursuant to House Resolution 397, moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill of the Senate (S. 349) to provide for the disclosure of lobbying activities to influence the Federal Government, and for other purposes, as amended; insist on the House amendment thereto, and request a conference with the Senate thereon.

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. VISCLOSKEY, recognized Mr. BRY-ANT and Mr. GEKAS, each for 20 minutes.

After debate,

The question being put, viva voce,

Will the House suspend the rules and pass said bill, as amended, insist on the House amendment thereto, and request a conference with the Senate thereon?

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mrs. KENNELLY, announced that two-thirds of the Members present had voted in the affirmative.

Mr. BRYANT demanded that the vote be taken by the yeas and nays, which demand was supported by one-fifth of the Members present, so the yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic de-

It was decided in the affirmative Yeas 315 Nays 110

¶30.6 [Roll No. 90] YEAS—315

Ackerman Doolittle Johnson (CT) Andrews (ME) Dornan Johnson (GA) Andrews (NJ) Duncan Johnson (SD) Andrews (TX) Johnston Dunn Archer Durbin Kanjorski Bacchus (FL) Edwards (CA) Kaptur Bachus (AL) Ehlers Kasich Baesler Engel Kennedy English Baker (CA) Kennelly Barca Eshoo Kildee Barcia Evans Kim Everett Barlow Kingston Barrett (WI) Farr Kleczka Fawell Bartlett. Klein Becerra Fazio Klink Fields (LA) Klug Beilenson Filner Kolbe Bereuter Fingerhut Kreidler Berman Bevill Flake Kyl LaFalce Bilbray Foglietta Bilirakis Lambert Bishop Blackwell Fowler Lancaster Frank (MA) Lantos Blute Franks (CT) LaRocco Bonilla Franks (N.I) Lazio Bonior Leach Frost Borski Furse Lehman Boucher Geidenson Levin Browder Gekas Levy Lewis (GA) Brown (CA) Gephardt Brown (OH) Geren Lightfoot Gibbons Bryant Linder Buyer Glickman Lipinski Byrne Gonzalez Long Calvert Goodlatte Lowey Camp Canady Gordon Machilley Goss Malonev Cantwell Green Mann Carr Greenwood Manton Castle Gunderson Manzullo Chapman Gutierrez Margolies Mezvinsky Clayton Hall (OH) Clinger Hall (TX) Markey Coleman Hamburg Martinez Collins (GA) Hamilton Matsui Combest Harman Mazzoli McCloskey Convers Herger Coppersmith Hinchey McCrery Costello Hoagland McCurdy Cox Hochbrueckner McDade McDermott Covne Hoekstra Cramer Hoke McHale Crapo Holden McHugh Cunningham Horn McInnis Danner Hoyer McKeon McKinney McNulty Huffington Darden de la Garza Hughes Deal Hunter Meehan DeFazio DeLauro Hutchinson Menendez Hutto Meyers Dellums Miller (CA) Hyde Inglis Inhofe Derrick Miller (FL) Deutsch Mineta Diaz-Balart Inslee Minge Dickey Istook Mink Jacobs Moakley Dicks

Mollohan Rogers Rohrabacher Montgomery Morella Ros-Lehtinen Murphy Roth Roukema Myers Nädler Rowland Roybal-Allard Neal (MA) Neal (NC) Royce Nussle Saho Sanders Oberstar Sangmeister Obey Olver Santorum Ortiz Sarpalius Pallone Saxton Schenk Parker Pastor Schiff Payne (NJ) Schroeder Schumer Payne (VA) Peľosi Sensenbrenner Penny Serrano Peterson (FL) Sharp Peterson (MN) Shaw Petri Shavs Shepherd Pombo Skaggs Pomeroy Skelton Portman Poshard Slattery Price (NC) Slaughter Prvce (OH) Smith (IA) Quinn Smith (MI) Řahall Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Ramstad Reed Snowe Regula Spence Reynolds Spratt Richardson Stark Ridge Stearns Roemer Stenholm

Strickland Studds Stupak Swett Synar Talent Taylor (MS) Tejeda Thomas (CA) Thomas (WY) Thornton Thurman Torkildsen Torricelli Unsoeld Upton Valentine Velazquez Vento Visclosky Volkmer Vucanovich Walsh Waxman Weldon Wheat Williams Wise Wolf Woolsev Wyden Wynn Yates Young (AK) Young (FL) Zeliff Zimmei

NAYS-110

Ford (MI) Oxley Packard Abercrombie Allard Gilchrest Applegate Gillmor Paxon Armey Baker (LA) Gilman Pickett Gingrich Porter Ballenger Barrett (NE) Goodling Quillen Grams Rangel Hancock Barton Ravenel Bateman Hansen Roberts Bentley Hastert Rose Bliley Hastings Rostenkowski Boehlert Hayes Hefley Rush Schaefer Boehner Brewster Hefner Scott Brooks Hilliard Shuster Brown (FL) Hobson Sisisky Bunning Houghton Skeen Burton Johnson, E. B. Smith (OR) Callahan Johnson, Sam Stokes King Knollenberg Clay Stump Clement Clyburn Sundquist Swift Kopetski Coble Laughlin Tanner Collins (IL) Lewis (CA) Tauzin Collins (MI) Livingston Taylor (NC) Condit Lloyd Thompson McCandless Cooper Torres McCollum Crane Towns DeLay McMillan Traficant Dingell Meek Tucker Dooley Mfume Walker Dreier Mica Washington Edwards (TX) Michel Waters Emerson Moorhead Watt Ewing Fields (TX) Moran Whitten Murtha Wilson Fish Orton

NOT VOTING-9

Cardin Gallo Natcher Ford (TN) Grandy Pickle Gallegly Lewis (FL) Solomon

So, two-thirds of the Members present having voted in favor thereof, the rules were suspended and said bill, as amended, was passed, the House insisted on its amendment thereto, and requested a conference with the Senate thereon.

A motion to reconsider the vote whereby the rules were suspended and said bill, as amended, was passed, the House insisted on its amendment thereto and requested a conference

Molinar

Jefferson

with the Senate thereon, was, by unanimous consent, laid on the table.

Thereupon, the SPEAKER pro tempore, Mrs. KENNELLY, by unanimous consent, announced the appointment of Messrs. BRYANT, GLICKMAN, FRANK, FISH and GEKAS, as managers on the part of the House at said conference.

Ordered, That the Clerk notify the Senate thereof.

¶30.7 POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE

Mr. LEACH rose to a question of personal privilege.

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mrs. KENNELLY, pursuant to clause 1 of rule IX, recognized Mr. LEACH for one bour

Mr. LEACH made the following statement:

"Madam Speaker, I rise to a point of personal privilege of the House.

"In rising to this point of privilege, I wish to express concern about the breakdown of comity that has occurred on a personal and procedural level in the House Banking Committee.

"On a personal level, unfortunate adjectives have been used; on a procedural level, unprecedented tactics have

been employed.

"I don't wish to dwell on the personal, except to stress my high regard for the chairman of the Banking Committee and to suggest that, as the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once observed, the temper and integrity of the political debate is more important in our kind of democracy than the outcome of any issue.

"Motivational aspersions are no substitute for full disclosure; indignation no substitute for pursuit of truth.

"Members of the majority may be speaking the truth when they indicate they have no evidence of a link between the failure of an Arkansas S&L and Whitewater and that they know of no improprieties at issue. But it should be understood that not speaking an untruth is not the same as describing a truthful situation, particularly if there has been no serious effort to pursue the truth

"Constitutionally it is the duty of Congress to oversee breaches of law or public ethics in the executive branch. During the 12 years of the so-called divided Government of the Reagan/Bush era, the legislative branch took its constitutionally mandated oversight function seriously, as witnessed by the expansion in the size of its staff and the number of investigations undertaken.

"Now both the executive and the legislative branches of Government are controlled by the same political party. The oversight mandate thus falls disproportionately upon the ranking members of the respective committees for those areas of the executive branch over which they have jurisdiction. Not to assume leadership in performing the oversight function with regard to the way in which the financial institutions of this country are managed and regulated would be to violate my oath to 'support and defend the Constitution of the United States * * * and * * * well

and faithfully discharge the duties of the office.'

"If the majority party refuses to uphold its responsibilities because of political embarrassment to its party's top elected official, the minority party is left with the choice either of joining in a complicity of silence or pursuing investigations that run the danger of

being partisan.

'In this context. I would simply emphasize that I raised the Whitewater issue with great reluctance, realizing the import as well as the power of the Presidency. I fully understand the political and personal liabilities involved. Nonetheless, I feel it would be inconsistent, indeed, hypocritical, to my own values, if I refused to pursue a line of inquiry potentially embarrassing to the President of a country which from its inception was intended to be hallmarked by law and its applicability to all citizens. It is, after all, the establishment of a government of laws, not men, that defines the uniqueness of the American experiment with democracy.

Procedurally, it should be noted that the minority is currently engaged in one of the most profound checks and balances philosophical engagements with the executive branch in the modern history of the Congress. This engagement carries far greater implications than any judgment relating to a particular embarrassment of a particular public official at a particular time because at issue is precedent: whether in future circumstances the oversight capacities of Congress can be thwarted if the majority party of Congress is the same as that in control of the executive branch and chooses to refrain from its oversight obligations in order not to embarrass its party's standings.

It is possible that the constitutional precedent for our checks and balances system surrounding the refusal of the administration to cooperate with an oversight probe of the executive branch which the majority party does not sanction may have more long-term negative consequences than any episodic embarrassment that might relate to this or any President's past. What is at issue is the definition of Congress as it applies to the constitutionally granted oversight responsibilities of the legislature. In our checks and balances system, Congress was given oversight responsibilities, but this administration is suggesting in response to minority requests for documentation from executive agencies that only chairmen speak for Congress. The minority in Congress, by this logic, has no power to advance or fulfill its constitutional rights if the majority does not concur in request for information. If such precedent is allowed to stand. Congress's oversight capacities will for all practical purposes be hamstrung whenever the executive and legislative branches of Government are controlled by the same party. Would our Founding Fathers have had this in mind?

"In this connection, on December 9, 1993, as ranking member of the Banking Committee, I wrote Federal regulatory agencies to request certain documents of an oversight interest [example, Tab A]. In a followup letter I pointed out, as the courts have noted, 'The Congress rarely acts as a body. Its manifold duties in the legislative, investigative, and oversight fields are almost invariably carried out through committees, committee chairmen, individual members, and staff personnel.' *Murphy v. Department of Army*, 613 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1979). In addition, the court stated:

The Senate and the House are so organized that certain legislative and quasi-legislative activities may be accomplished only through committee action. In other respects, however, the legislature acts through its individual Members. All Members have a constitutionally recognized status entitling them to share in general congressional powers and responsibilities, many of them requiring access to executive information. It would be an inappropriate intrusion into the legislative sphere for the courts to decide without congressional direction that, for example, only the chairman of a committee shall be regarded as the official voice of the Congress for purposes of receiving such information, as distinguished from its ranking minority member, or other committee members, or other members of Congress. Each of them participates in the law-making process; each has a voice and a vote in that process; and each is entitled to request such information from the executive agencies as will enable him to carry out the responsibilities of a leg-

"Agency heads responded that a ranking member only has the authority of an individual Member of Congress and, therefore, may only obtain information that would be available to the public pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, the Office of Thrift Supervision asserted that it differs 'with the view that Rules X and XI of the House of Representatives grant to a ranking minority member or any individual member—the same authority to request information that a committee chairman possesses.' In short, the agencies contend that only chairmen, not ranking members, speak for Congress.

"Subsequently, on March 8, 1994, I wrote requesting information for the Banking Committee's upcoming RTC oversight hearing [Tab B]. Agency heads again responded by holding to the position that only the chairman of a committee would be permitted access

to agency documents.

'In this dispute about who is entitled to speak for Congress in the context of Congress' right and obligation under Article I of the Constitution to conduct oversight of the executive branch, the chairman of the Banking Committee, in what may have been an effort to bolster the executive's position, wrote agency heads on March 10, 1994, to suggest that they deny my document request and wrote separately on March 14, 1994, to state that they need not answer questions concerning Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan at the scheduled hearings [Tabs C and D]. The chairman's letter contained an implicit and unprecedented philosophical assertion that not only does a chairman