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Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Program

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Irving A. Spergel and Staff, National Evaluation

## Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Program

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Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Program

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## Chapter 1

### **Program and Evaluation Background**

#### Introduction

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, utilized a collaborative process to respond to America's gang problem. Its purpose was to implement a comprehensive approach for gang prevention, intervention, and suppression through local programs around the country. Five cities – Bloomington-Normal (McLean County), Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds for periods of four or five years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated efforts assessing the local nature and extent of the gang problem, planning and implementing a comprehensive community-wide program.

As part of the comprehensive initiative, an Evaluation of the development and impact of these programs, and Technical Assistance, were also funded. This report is the first of a series of Evaluations of each of the programs, beginning with the Bloomington-Normal (McLean County) demonstration.

Background. Youth gangs were in existence and troublesome for many decades in large cities, among them Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, San Antonio, Cleveland (Miller 2001). Youth gang violence, gang-related drug activities, and other forms of gang crime were increasingly prevalent in cities of varying sizes. Violence was



increasingly lethal in the late 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s. Drive-by shootings claimed the lives of rival gang members as well as those of innocent bystanders. Entrepreneurial gang members also became active in the distribution of illegal drugs (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994, p. 38).

A disturbing trend since the 1980s and 1990s has been the emergence or re-emergence of the gang problem in a range of large-, mid-, and small-sized cities, suburban areas, small towns, rural areas and Indian reservations in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. However, the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions has not been clearly defined. The best approach(es) for addressing the problem has not been identified.

In an early national survey of law enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest U.S. cities reported the presence of youth gang problems (Curry, 1992). It conservatively estimated that during 1991, there were 4,881 gangs with nearly 250,000 gang members. In a series of national surveys of police and sheriff's departments in 1995 through 1998, the scope of the problem was somewhat clarified. An estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 youth gangs in 1998. This was a decrease from the previous year's figures of 816,000 gang members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth Gang Center, November 2000). Curry, Maxson, and Howell estimated homicide trends from 1,216 cities, with populations greater than 25,000 in 1996, 1997, and 1998. A total of 237 cities reported both a gang problem and at least one gang homicide for each of these years. However, relatively few of the cities, outside of Los Angeles and Chicago, reported large numbers of homicides (Curry, Maxson, Howell 2001 #3).

The characteristics of the gang problem, including terms such as gang member, gang, and

gang incident have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, for program and policy development purposes, is usually differentiated from organized crime, prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist groups, or even delinquent groups. Nevertheless, these categories of gang, crime group, or delinquent group can be overlapping. What generally distinguishes the youth gang is its interrelated commitments to violence, group symbolism, turf, drug use and drug selling, variable degrees of group cohesion, and sustainability. Most youth gang members are between the ages of 12 and 20, sometimes younger or older.

While gangs comprise mainly males, females are increasingly identified as gang members, although they tend to be less violent, less delinquent, and less committed to the gang. Gang members have different statuses in and degrees of attachment to the gangs. They generally come from similar problem family, school, low income, minority-neighborhood gang backgrounds. Further, the definition of a gang incident or a gang offense varies from city to city, depending on whether the police have adopted gang membership criteria (i.e., the youth involved has been identified as a gang member) and/or gang-motivated incident criteria, i.e., the incident itself has certain distinctive gang characteristics, e.g., drive by shooting, intimidation, retaliation, use of symbols, signs, or graffiti (Klein 1995, Spergel 1995).

While some progress has been made in defining the gang problem, it has not been clear how successfully to deal with the problem. Law enforcement has been the dominant agency in recent decades attempting to resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and spread in somewhat unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program operators, and researchers have come to believe that an informed and coordinated effort is required by all key

community elements to define and develop a common interrelated approach to successfully address the problem.

Preliminary Efforts. OJJDP funded a preliminary research and development initiative, The Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, to investigate and describe conditions that perpetuate the youth gang problem and to develop a model of community effort to reduce it. Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, intervention and technical assistance models were produced. The report of that program (1987-1991) concluded that the gang problem varied somewhat from community to community but that in essence it was a result of a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the development of youth gang subcultures, community disorganization or fragmentation of response efforts to the problem (Spergel 1995).

A model or approach evolved based on the notion that local institutions had to be coordinated and efforts targeted to particular community contexts, social conditions and organizational arrangements, as well as to gang members and youth highly at gang risk (Spergel 1993). Shortly thereafter in 1994, OJJDP solicited applications and subsequently launched the 5-site demonstration of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. Closely associated were a comprehensive evaluation, training and technical assistance efforts, and the creation of a national advisory board (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

## Theory

The program model derives from social disorganization and, to some extent, from related theories such as Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control. The community-based program model builds on the causal ideas and research of Battin-Pearson et al (1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein (1971, 1995), Kobrin, (1951), Kornhauser (1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), Shaw and McKay (1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey (1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and Messner (1999), and Zatz (1987).

The program model assumes that those communities or community segments (e.g., a school) that contain mainly low income, ghettoized, changing and marginalized populations, with substantial proportions of adolescent males (and females) are prone to gang formation and gang problems. Gang-problem communities are substantially but not exclusively a response to external community forces that create local conditions of community disorganization, closely related to lack of social and economic opportunities.

Gang-problem communities tend to be of two somewhat overlapping types, chronic and emerging. The first is characterized by an established, marginalized population and a more serious gang problem, while the second is characterized by a recently-arrived, less marginalized population and a less serious gang problem. Levels and severity of crime, adult and juvenile, including gang crime, tend to be higher in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime community or community segments. Turf-based gang violence and drug crime markets are more

prevalent in chronic gang-problem communities; a range of minor offenses, less violence and relatively increasing drug crime activities may be prevalent in emerging gang-problem communities.

Organized crime and youth gang crime are partially integrated and better developed in chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Conventional institutions are relatively stronger in the emerging local gang-crime community segment, and also better integrated with conventional institutions of the larger community. Moral panic more often characterizes established populations and community leaders in emerging gang-crime communities than in chronic gang problem communities (Cohen 1980; Zatz 1987). Levels of victimization due to violence are low in emerging gang-crime communities, but high in chronic gang-problem communities.

Social control of youth in the chronic gang problem community is more widely shared among a variety of both criminal and conventional neighborhood and street-based groups (Venkatesh 1999). Social control of youth in the emerging gang-problem community is achieved through stronger local conventional organizations, particularly families, churches, and youth agencies. Access to illegitimate opportunities (such as criminal-gain behavior) and to gang status for youth is more systematically developed in the chronic gang-problem community, while access to legitimate opportunities (such as conventional employment) is largely cut off. Access to illegitimate opportunities and to gang status for youth is not as well-developed in the emerging gang-problem community, while access to legitimate opportunities is only partially cut off.

Social intervention and suppression strategies are spasmodic and poorly integrated with local norms in chronic gang-problem communities. The police pay major attention to serious

gang crime and take relatively less note of minor offenses. In chronic gang-problem communities, grassroots organizations are largely responsible for social support activities, and police for suppression activities, in separate domains. In emerging problem communities, social intervention and suppression strategies are reasonably well-integrated, but targeted usually to less serious gang offenses. Grassroots organizations and youth agencies tend to combine their efforts with justice agencies in such communities, often overreacting to the increasing presence of low-income minority youths.

We propose that community organization to counter social disorganization requires an increase in community mobilization, social intervention, and provision of social opportunities, as well as suppression in different ways, in the chronic and emerging gang-problem communities. In the chronic gang-problem community, greater responsibility is necessary at the city or county-wide level for mobilizing institutions to provide extensive resources, and for coordinating strategies and efforts directed to relatively more prevalent and more serious gang problems. In the emerging gang-problem community, there is relatively greater responsibility at the community level for mobilizing local institutions to acquire and provide resources, and for coordinating prevention and social intervention strategies directed mainly to less serious gang problems.

The general hypotheses proposed within general community organization framework directed to change in delinquent behavior of gang youth are that:

- a. In the chronic gang-problem community, when an appropriate balance of strategies, program elements, and implementation principles is established, such that emphasis is generally on social intervention and the provision of social opportunities within a closely-coordinated

pattern of services and suppression addressed primarily to gang-involved and hardcore youth, the individual level, and to some extent the aggregate level of gang crime will be reduced.

b. In the emerging gang-problem community, when an appropriate balance of strategies, program elements, and implementation principles is established, such that emphasis is primarily on social intervention and the provision of social opportunities within a loosely-coordinated pattern of services and suppression addressed primarily to at-risk and highly at-risk youth, the individual level, and to some extent the aggregate level of gang crime will be reduced.

### Gang Program Research

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or violence) prevention, intervention, or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry 1995; Klein 1995; Howell 2000; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen 2001; Sivilli, Yim and Nugent 1995; Spergel 1995). Reviews of evaluations of gang programs which include approaches to gang prevention, social intervention, crisis intervention, community organization, street work, interagency coordination, and community organization, indicate negative, indeterminate, or in a very few cases limited positive results (Howell 2000). Gang programs apparently fail for a range of reasons: poor conceptualization, vague or conflicting objectives, weak implementation, organizational goal displacement (particularly by police and youth agencies), interagency conflict, politicization, lack of sustained effort, insufficient resources, etc.

The evidence that a particular approach does or does not work may also be due to the failures of public policy, as well as to the limitations of evaluation research itself (Curry 1995). Gang program approaches assessed as successful may not be supported, and those assessed as

failures continue to flourish. Evaluation research, particularly outcome research, has generally had limited or no impact on policy or program development. It has not contributed to the creation of alternate or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be due in large measure to the complexity of community-based gang programs and to the difficulties of designing and implementing evaluations of such programs.

We discuss briefly those elements of gang research methodology which we believe are essential for gang program evaluation implemented within a comprehensive community organization or coordination framework. In this process we address some of the issues or obstacles relevant to the conduct of gang program evaluation. Program evaluation models ideally are driven by rigorous experimental design and procedures which cannot be applied to the real world of program operations. Evaluation research is expected to be not only objective and independent, but separate from and not closely identified with program goals, objectives, or personnel. However, the crisis (often politicized) nature of community-based gang programs requires a close, interdependent, and sustained relationship between program and evaluation personnel from program start to finish. The best of classic community-based gang programs, limited as they were by present-day methodological and statistical standards, depended on such an interpenetrating and interactive approach (Gold and Mattick 1974; Klein 1968, 1971; Miller 1962).

The following are methodological and conceptual issues which may not have been adequately resolved in past or current evaluations of comprehensive and/or community-based gang programs, and which we have had to contend with and attempt to resolve in our evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and



Suppression Program.

Cooperation with Program Operators. Program directors and operators are prone to distrust gang researchers who are not knowledgeable about program interests and constraints. Program operators are under great and conflicting pressures to accommodate the interests of funders, program operators, community residents, steering committees or advisory boards, other agencies (including elements of the criminal justice and social service system), as well as the media, government or political officials, and program youth themselves. Evaluators are generally regarded by program operators as a necessary evil, since they may affect the flow of funding for the program. Means are usually found to avoid the Evaluators' requests for data, or at best to partially comply with such requests.

Gang program operators tend to be over-stressed, frustrated, and often overcome by an impending sense of failure. The program operator may not know much about gangs or gang youth, or how or whether he can conduct a program that provides positive results which are clearly defined. The evaluator enters this complex, sometimes chaotic arena without sufficient understanding of the context and the diverse purposes of program-related actors. The problem for the evaluator is that these actors usually control various kinds of data essential to evaluation research objectives.

The evaluator must therefore be prepared to take the time and make the effort to understand program contextual factors and establish a substantially positive relationship with the program operators. Otherwise understanding of the program and access to data may be limited. The process of evaluation has to be negotiated, and sometimes politicized, for evaluation results

to be substantive, objective, and meaningful for the key evaluation constituents, funders, program operators, as well as the research community. Ideally, the evaluation has to regard program personnel as creators, providers, and partners in the development of the evaluation.

Research Design. Evaluation is designed to test the process, individual outcome, and impact of the program, based on an explicit, hopefully well-developed program model which ideally is theoretically derived. However, the evaluator's purpose is not to test theory; it is to test a program model. The implementation of the program contains elements of various theories. Programs cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or concepts. Most criminologists are more interested in testing theoretical propositions than the effects of a program model. Funders are interested in testing a particular policy which is never clear or formulated in detail. Program management is mainly concerned with general agency development, and economic and political survival. A consensus must be reached early in the funder-program operator-evaluator relationship as to what the actual goals and specific objectives of the program are. This process may drag on a long time. The objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent behavior need to be specified and agreed upon by the program operator and the evaluator in terms of the key services or contacts to be provided, in what way for which types of youth, for what purposes (i.e., what project activities are to produce what intended results), and how these intermediate results are to affect individual youth outcome.

Research variables, i.e., independent, mediating, outcome, and controlling characteristics (e.g., youth demographics, gang status and delinquency background) must be articulated and related to the program model, as well as to the reality of how the program is structured and

operating. Ultimately the main job of the evaluation is to know what the program components are supposed to be, what they are intended to do, and what in reality the components become. This process must occur through ongoing dialogue and mutual agreement between project operator and evaluator, and include what and how evaluation design procedures for data collection and analysis are to be related to the program. Obviously some flexibility has to be built into the implementation of both the program and evaluation-related models. The researcher and program operator have to negotiate continually to accommodate the implementation of both the program and the evaluation.

Community-based gang research is not medical or experimental research in which almost all elements are rigidly controlled. At best quasi-experimental conditions must be agreed upon and sustained, with room for limited maneuvering by the program operator and evaluator.

Technical Assistance. An intermediary may be required to assure that a set of informed and focused relationships about the purpose and needs of program implementation between the program operator and the evaluator is sustained. Technical assistance, with the aid of the mediating sponsor or funder, ideally initiates and sustains the relationship. While technical assistance is provided mainly to assist and supplement the efforts of the program provider, involvement of the evaluator is required to insure that the program operator, technical consultant, and funding agency are on board together with him as to what the program model is and how it is to be implemented.

The model has to be effectively articulated, sustained as much as possible, and changes made explicitly. Gaps and failures in the implementation process have to be addressed as early

and consensually as possible. The gaps, deficiencies and changes over time have to be recognized, accounted for, and anticipated in the analysis of results. Deficiencies by the technical assistance team, the evaluator, and the funder have to be identified, corrected, and accepted without politicization. The evaluator, in any case, has a special responsibility for controlling the integrity of the program model as best he can. This complexity of relationships, which can support or handicap common understanding and effective implementation of the program model, is avoided when the program operator and the evaluator are the same, when the evaluator is a partner with the program operator in development of the program model, and/or when the funder or sponsor of the program is strongly identified with the evaluator's conception of the program model and its implementation.

Evaluation Problems at the Start – Youth Demographics. A key problem of the community-based gang program arises when youth selected for the program are not who they are supposed to be. The problem is compounded because the program operator and the evaluator often do not know what the critical program-related characteristics of youth are until a sufficient number have actually entered the program. Procedures for who is admitted to the gang program are often weak because definitions of who is eligible for the program are not clear. Such youth may not easily be recruited to the program. Conflicting views may arise early as to who realistically should be eligible for the program.

A key problem is that sources of reliable information about target youth characteristics (e.g., gang membership) may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, schools, in-house agency workers may not know specifically the locations of gangs, the specific

character of their activities, and which youth are at what level of risk. The concept of risk may not be clearly defined or operationalized. Information about gang youth referred to the program must be obtained from many sources in addition to official and established agencies, and include neighbors, local community groups, and especially former and present gang members themselves.

Who program youth are in terms of age, race/ethnicity, gender, why and how they are referred to the program, by whom and from where, must be known to the evaluator as soon as possible. We know from previous research that gender, age, race/ethnicity of youth in the program are critical factors in constraining expected outcomes. Females are less likely to be serious or chronic delinquents. Younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 are more likely to show increasing levels of deviancy than older gang youth. Most gang-involved youth are likely to be selected from minority race/ethnic populations. The level of success of the program can almost be determined a priori depending on the demographic characteristics of youth entering the program.

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close examination of who youth are and how they got to the program. He may be less interested in the types of youth who should be in the program, based on the program model, than in specific characteristics of youth or gangs, useful to his own ongoing research or theory development. He may focus too much on hardcore rather than at-risk youth, females rather than males, the psychological or structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the selection of youth based on their individual characteristics consistent with the program model. The acquisition of simple, basic data on age, gender, race/ethnicity of youth who enter the program is essential for

program and evaluation purposes. These data become the basis for comparison-sample selection and necessary multivariate analysis in light of the program model, but still may not be sufficient to explain why the program has succeeded or failed.

Gang Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a very close relationship between gang membership and delinquent behavior, especially during the youth's active or self-declared membership phase. Obviously, the evaluator's tasks are to determine to what extent the youth is a gang member and a delinquent in relation to his selection for and participation in the program. Each of these factors must be considered a variable, yet they may not be clearly known to program staff, and not necessarily clearly revealed even by gang youth themselves, certainly not at the start or even later in the program. A key proposition not clearly recognized or accepted by many policy and program personnel, or even by researchers, is that not all gang youth are or will become delinquent and not all delinquents will become gang members. Some non-gang delinquent youth may respond worse to the program than some gang youth who may be less delinquent and less committed to the gang life. The program often must deal with a varied sample of gang and delinquent youth.

The question of whether the youth is a gang member has to be related to a specific context. The issue is usually determined based on the youth's responses to surveys or interviews, or on the views of police, other program personnel, neighbors, or other gang members. Furthermore, the views of program staff may not be consistent with those of program youth or even other staff. The significance of these differences has to be explained based on criminal justice practice, program and community norms and values, as well as on particular gang

structure and process. Characteristics of the youth's race/ethnicity, community prejudice, neighborhood social and economic status and police practices enter into these definitions. For example, the fact that a youth associates with other gang members is a variable; it may or may not necessarily indicate he is a gang member or that he is or will be a delinquent, and these factors must be considered within the framework of police practice, agency recruitment needs, peer group characteristics, neighborhood pressures, family structure, the youth's school attendance, etc.

Of special importance for evaluation purposes must be the use of various methods to determine the nature and level of gang-delinquent behavior of the youth. A variety of sources of data on gang and delinquent behavior must be used and discrepancies explained. Field observations, self-reports, police records, and program worker observations alone may be insufficient bases for eligibility of youth to the program, and to predict outcome. Consistency of findings about the nature and level of gang identification and delinquency provides validity as to who the youth is. Different types of delinquency and patterns of association must be specified and attended to over the program and life course of the youth. Gang youth as they age may also change their patterns of offending (increasingly from turf or interpersonal violence to relatively more criminal-gain behavior, including drug selling) or may become conventional adults.

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995, Spergel 1995, Fagan 1989). What gang or pre-gang universe and sample to select or use depends on the nature and purpose of the program and ideally on some assessment of the community's actual gang problem. Characteristics of the universe of gangs in a particular community may be based on police, other

criminal justice, school, youth agency, and media information, and occasionally on community surveys. The youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of some segment of gang youth known to the police from a particular neighborhood or set of gang neighborhoods in a city or across cities.

In earlier decades gang programs focused more on particular gangs and their membership. Specific gangs were the primary targets of service and the basis for selecting comparison gangs. More recently youth appear to be selected for gang programs based on a non-differentiated cross-section of gang members in a community, and on estimated individual youth characteristics, mainly through referrals from probation, schools, and youth agencies. This may reflect wider community concern about the problem of youth gangs, the prevalence and dispersion of gang youth, fragmentation of gang structures into smaller units (still as part of a larger gang conglomeration) or a lack of familiarity in established agencies with the gang problem in particular community contexts.

A primary task for the evaluator is to select as a comparison group a non-served set of youth similar to program youth. However, as suggested earlier, both the program operator and evaluator may not know a priori, up front, or well into the program period what the characteristics of program youth are or will be. A time lag in selecting and interviewing occurs, although not ultimately in assessing official criminal histories of program or comparison youth. Finding and interviewing comparison youth may not be easy. Police, probation, youth agencies may have insufficient information about characteristics of gang youth or where comparison gang youth are to be located and how contacted. The equivalence of program and comparison youth is not a simple matter to ascertain or produce. When a community establishes a gang program, it



usually addresses the most problematic gangs and individuals. The comparison gang or individuals may or may not be more or less delinquent or problematic than the program youth.

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining equivalent samples in the open community is to use several types of comparison groups, if funding permits. Co-arrestee gang members from the same gangs are often equivalent; youth from the same-named gangs in an equivalent gang area in the same city may be somewhat similar. Another possibility is the use of criminal justice records of comparable gang youth not in the program, although this restricts the research to gang youth who have been arrested, and it may not readily permit the acquisition of interview data. The same program youth may be used as their own control, matched for an earlier or equivalent age period when they were not served, i.e., using a growth curve model for analysis purposes. This option assumes that police practices were comparable during the pre-program and program periods, and that there are sufficient program youth available to conduct the matching process. A community-based program model also may require selection of a comparison group from a comparable community. This creates further complexity and difficulty.

No community-based gang program research has as yet been able satisfactorily to resolve the matching or control group problem. Appropriate measurement and multi-variate analytic techniques can, within limits, compensate for the lack of the availability of an adequately matched comparison sample.

### Sources of Data and Instruments

Multiple sources of data and instruments are essential in gang program research. A basic principle in design of data collection sources and instruments, or actually any gang research, is to

assume that a single data source or instrument is inadequate to obtain valid measurement of the particular behavior of interest, particularly if it is delinquency. Interviews, self-reports, police and probation records, program worker observations, separately, are insufficient to provide accurate indicators. While a single source of data such as interviews and/or self reports over time may be useful for theory testing, findings of different data collection instruments, self-reports and police data must be juxtaposed over time to determine program effectiveness. The gang problem is a function of the interaction of individual-youth maturational and environmental processes, and different measures of each in interaction with the other are required.

Gang-as-a-unit, and community-level gang incident or arrest data as well as ethnographic or field observations may also be important as a framework to interpret individual-level findings resulting from the program. However, researcher field participation, the data collection method which has been the basis for classic gang studies, may not be sufficient in program evaluation. Youth gang activities occur at different times of the day or night or in early morning hours. The field observer cannot be present 24 hours a day to observe changes in gang or delinquent behavior of youth. Estimates of changes in gang structure, e.g., cohesion, leadership, recruitment, violation of gang codes, inter-gang conflict, cannot be accurately or reliably measured by a single data gathering procedure. Interviews, field observations, police and agency worker records together are required to clarify and verify patterns, despite the historical use of field observations primarily as a basis for theorizing in past research (see Klein 1971, Short and Strodbeck 1965).

Program Process Data. Special worker service or program tracking or recording devices have to

be created to describe the key activities or contacts provided to or indeed received by youth. Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social agency) may be insufficient for purposes of testing the program model. The problem of collecting data from workers or agency records is compounded in community-based research when data derived from multiple records and workers across different agencies have to be collected and integrated. Care must be taken in comprehensive, community-based, team-worker-coordination gang research to develop items which are directed to interagency, intergroup, and interworker exchange patterns in regard to particular organizational policies, services or contacts of interest.

The variety of measures constructed to obtain meaningful data on program effects has to include types of services or contacts and their dosage. Commonly accepted definitions of program measures must be established, since services or contacts may have different definitions and purposes for different agencies and worker disciplines. The identity and function of the particular provider gives special meaning to the service or contact, and the identity of the particular type of worker therefore has to be duly noted and its significance understood. The nature of collaboration among workers and agencies in the provision of services have to be viewed as a important variables. Structure and purpose of the service must be captured in the development and analyses of community-based program process data.

Measurement. The need to integrate data derived from different instruments, the reduction of differences between program and comparison youth characteristics which may have different baselines, the integration of multiple variables (especially when sample sizes are relatively small), as well as missing data, create formidable measurement problems in community-based

gang program research. Meaningful connections across variables as well as reduction in number of variables have to be engineered. Use of factor-analytic procedures may not be sufficient. Critically important are key program model propositions as well as clarification or further specification of key concepts. Appropriate scales may be required to reduce ratio or interval data to ordinal or nominal-level scales, especially when program and comparison youth characteristics are highly disparate and sample size is small.

Special measures or indices have to be created to test the program model. For example, a gang-involvement scale may have to be conceptualized and specific items introduced to measure change over time, not only in terms of the youth's original status as a gang or non-gang member, but in terms of a cluster of items such as rank in the gang, level of gang participation, time spent with gang friends, gang victimization, gang status of parents or siblings, etc.

Analysis. Finally, data on key variables reflecting differences between program and comparison samples related to the effects of the program on specified outcomes have to be tested in appropriate statistical form. Whether the program or its parts are successful or unsuccessful in predicting differences with the non-served sample probably has to be determined through use of multivariate analysis, particularly use of general linear modeling or logistical regression, but such analyses may still be unconvincing unless additional data using other units of analysis (such as related gang, agency, community characteristics) is available to throw light on the reasons for the individual-level findings.

In other words, the analysis of program efforts based on individual-level findings is a basic means of determining individual youth change, but is still not sufficient to determine what

the program accomplished or failed to accomplish. The congruence of findings using different sources of data (e.g., self-reports and police data) and different units of analysis and their relationship to predicted program outcomes at individual, group, and community levels is the best basis for making judgements about the value of the program. Researcher and program-operator qualitative observation, as well as theory and prior research findings, are additional data sources and provide standards against which to measure the reliability and validity of the qualitative findings obtained using individual-level data. We have tried to take these considerations into our evaluation of the comprehensive gang program model.

### The Program Model

The Comprehensive, Community Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of interrelated components: key program elements, strategies, and implementation principles, adapted to particular demographic, socio-economic, organizational and local community factors, including the nature and scope of the gang problem (see Chart 1.1). Policy, program, and worker efforts have to take place interactively at individual-youth, organization, and community levels. Ideally, all components of the Model have to be present and developed for maximum positive effects to occur in the reduction of the gang problem.

### Program Elements

A series of program structures and processes was necessary to activate the Model in the various sites, which included a steering committee, an interagency street team including youth

outreach workers, grass-roots involvement, social services, criminal justice participation, school participation, employment and training, and lead-agency management.

The Steering Committee had to engage the leadership of the community, including the mayor's office, public and non-profit agencies, local schools, grassroots and county organizations in a comprehensive effort in gang-problem analysis, policy planning, strategy development, acquisition of resources, and program implementation and refinement. The direction of the comprehensive program required criminal justice system policy and administrative support, and the front-line collaborative involvement of law enforcement, probation, community-based youth agencies, schools and employment sources, as well as the involvement of local grassroots groups (particularly churches and neighborhood groups) and even of former gang members. The steering committee was to bring the knowledge and influence of key community leaders together in a cohesive structure to guide the development of the program and an approach that would both protect the community and target gang-involved and high-risk youth for integration into the legitimate life of the community.

The Interagency Street Team should be a formal outreach team of direct-service personnel – police, probation, outreach youth worker, school official and community organizer – who continually interact with each other in regard to differential planning, programming and contacting gang-involved and/or highly at-risk youth, as well as particular gangs, families, neighborhood contexts and organizational situations that influence the behavior of targeted youth. The outreach or street team is the key direct-service and contact component of the program in continuing communication and coordination, with each other as well as with local groups and neighborhood residents. It should operate during day-time as well as evening and late

night hours, on weekends and during crisis times.

The Outreach Youth Worker has an especially important role to play. Ideally he should be a former influential gang member from the neighborhood, now fully identified with the norms and values of legitimate society, yet sensitive to the needs and problems of the local youth-gang society or culture. He contributes to the assessment of the existing and changing nature of youth gang problem situations, and facilitates the outreach efforts of the rest of staff. The team and the agencies represented must develop mutual respect for each other, including the youth worker, and modify professional and traditional organizational policies and forms of operation, as necessary, to achieve the goals and objectives of the comprehensive approach, including the use of former gang members. Outreach youth workers, if qualified and trained, can provide ready access to youth gangs, help define the gang problem and serve as mediators between the gang and established local community and institutional sectors. While the use of outreach youth workers has inherent risks, the benefits to program outcome outweigh the risks.

Grassroots Involvement. The local community is complex, with many different individuals, groups, and organizations concerned about the gang problem and working with gang-involved and gang at-risk youth. Two key parts of the community that must be involved in the comprehensive gang approach are: 1) established agencies such as police, schools, key governmental organizations, and youth agencies; and 2) the grassroots community comprising neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen groups, churches, and other organizations whose members live and interact mainly in the area. Established agencies often set key policies that affect the lives of the residents primarily through the values and interests of the middle class community or the city at large. The grassroots organizations more often focus on

social support, crisis intervention and socialization issues more directly related to the expressed needs of the local, usually lower-class, minority population. Communication and interaction between these two levels of community in respect to the gang problem are often characterized by ambivalence or antagonism. Grassroots groups typically are closer to and more responsive to the needs of gang youths and their families than the established agencies. The lack of sufficient interdependence and cooperation among these two community components usually characterizes a gang-problem community. It is essential that collaborative efforts and structures be created to achieve a common community approach to the gang problem. Grassroots elements must participate in the determination of the direction of the project, as well as in the day-to-day operation of the project street team.

Social Services. A variety of social service programs need to be provided to program youth and their families, including younger siblings, who may be at risk of gang membership and delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis intervention and referral, and/or direct help with school, employment, and drug use problems, as well as with gang-related and personal development issues. Families of targeted youth should also be recipients of social services; they may be in need of assistance with housing, public aid, health care, family conflict resolution, employment, immigration, racism, and other problems which also directly affect delinquent youths and may be conducive to their behavior problems and attachment to the gang.

Outreach social services and referrals for services are made through the street team, especially by the outreach youth worker, but also by other members – police, probation, neighborhood organizer – and other staff in the lead agency who may have case management responsibilities. A generalist as well as an outreach approach to the provision of social services



and social controls must characterize the team approach, such that each member of the team shares some degree of responsibility for other worker service or control functions.

Criminal Justice Participation. Police, juvenile and adult probation, and juvenile and adult parole must be knowledgeable about the local gang-crime and community situation, and closely identified with the comprehensive gang program. They are essential elements in the program. Police and probation assigned to the outreach team are most directly concerned with the provision of social control of, and suppression contacts for, the target youth, particularly those who are delinquent and gang-involved. They must be careful not to label or pay primary attention to youth who are not gang members or who are not at high risk for gang involvement. Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice system elements must support the efforts of the street-level team directed to providing sanctions to the particular youth on a graduated basis, as well as protecting the community.

Of special importance is appropriate policy and administrative support from criminal justice leadership which permits law enforcement officials to collaborate with each other, as well as with outreach youth workers and other social service, educators and job-development personnel, in an integrated social-development and control approach that creatively meets the needs both of gang-involved youth for social development, and of the community for protection. Legislators, the police, and the media have a special responsibility to accurately appraise the gang problem, and to address its complex social-control and suppression aspects in as balanced and rational a way as possible, especially recognizing the close connection between the gang problem and race/ethnic issues.

School Participation. Principals, disciplinarians and teachers from regular public,

parochial, or alternative schools are key elements of the comprehensive approach. A reciprocal and interdependent relationship must be established among school personnel and the street team and other staff of the lead agency. The steering committee and lead agency administrator have to assist school personnel in modifying practices of avoidance and zero tolerance, and an almost exclusive emphasis on suspension and expulsion of gang members and highly at-risk youth. At the same time, the street team participates in the life of the school and assists both program youth and school staff in modifying school policy, practice, and concerns and student-related behavior, to facilitate the better use of educational opportunities in the schools.

Target youth need to be mainstreamed within the context of existing school arrangements to the extent possible, so that they receive an education which prepares them for legitimate career development, while the needs and interests of other students, school administrators and teachers for a safe school and positive learning environment are also achieved. Youth workers have a special responsibility not only in helping program youth to make the best use of available learning resources, but assisting school staff to better understand the special gang pressures on program youth that arise from situations and crises both inside and outside the school. The use of alternative schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational and behavioral problems of particular gang youth. If the youth is referred to an alternative school, a high quality educational program in a therapeutic context must be provided, with a firm commitment to return the youth to the mainstream school as soon as possible.

Employment and Training. Critical to the transition of the youth from the gang, and to the development of legitimate and personally satisfying adult roles, is obtaining a job. Holding a full-time job is a significant step for the youth in no longer needing the gang, and no longer

having the time to associate with gang members and participating in gang life. Job and work-skills training provide a legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang, and entry into responsible adult status.

The youth worker and the job developer, who should be closely related to the comprehensive gang program, are responsible for motivating youth to obtain jobs, and also for sustaining them on the job once they are employed. A major task of the job developer is contacting employers and training institutions to facilitate job and training opportunities for gang youth. Special arrangements may be required to open up jobs for youth who may at first be marginal workers. Special incentives to employers may be necessary to enable them to hire gang youth. Neighborhood residents, former gang members, and the youth's family are important sources of referrals for jobs, and need to be activated by the street team. Girlfriends and wives also play an important part in sustaining youth on the job.

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and coordinate the various elements of the comprehensive gang program. In Bloomington-Normal the lead agency was Project Oz, a major youth-serving organization with many years of experience serving the social needs of youth and families. Such an organization must have a background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth and a broad understanding of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize its own agency resources as well as those of other agencies, acquire grassroots support, and develop further resources to sustain the comprehensive approach. A police department, youth agency, public school, community mental health agency, probation department, or a special youth authority may be well positioned to undertake leadership and responsibility for program development. Much depends

on the agency's commitment to an outreach, well-balanced, social-service as well as community-control and community-participation approach, targeted to delinquent gang and highly at-risk youth.

A special requirement is that the lead agency have not only management, staff capacity, interest and experience in dealing with the gang problem, but also genuine commitment to the comprehensive community-wide gang approach. The normal bureaucratic impulse to acquire and use resources to meet traditional or particularized organizational interests, and for the routinized provision of services, must be restrained. The use of a consortium of agencies by the lead agency to simply "split the pie," so that each agency can do what it usually does only now with more resources, is inappropriate. The lead agency must be truly committed to a new, institutional and community-participatory approach that ensures that changes in policy and practices are occurring in interrelated cross-agency and cross-grassroots fashion.

### Steps in the Approach

The steps in the application of the Comprehensive Gang Model (Chart 1.2) are as follows:<sup>1</sup>

- The community leadership, including those in established agencies and grassroots groups, the mayor's office and political leaders, as well as business leaders and the media must acknowledge that a youth gang problem exists.
- The steering committee, including agencies together with grassroots groups, must conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth gang problem in the identified

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<sup>1</sup> Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000.

target community where gang crime (particularly violence) is most evident, who the particular gangs are, the youth at risk, and the organizations available to address the gang problem.

- Once the steering committee is established, with the assistance and involvement of the lead agency and community leaders at influential agency and grassroots levels, a set of goals and objectives to address the identified gang problem(s) and causal factors is determined, based on the results of the assessment. The objectives may be refined over time as a better understanding of the gang problem emerges.
- The key goals must be the reduction of youth gang crime, as well as the social-development interests and needs of gang youth or those at high risk for gang involvement. This is to be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community groups and agencies to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational change and development targeted to the particular gang problem.
- The steering committee, the lead agency and community leaders must interact with each other to produce and make available relevant programming, strategies, services, tactics and procedures consistent with the Comprehensive Model, particularly its five “core strategies” (see below).
- The steering committee and community leaders must then assess the operation of the program, its outcome and impact, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If the results are positive, i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced, then sufficient resources must be provided to sustain project activity and development.

- The process of intervention and attempting to cope with the youth gang problem also contributes to an understanding of the nature and changing scope of the problem, as well as to whether an appropriate application of the Model has been made. This is an ongoing process, during the course of the life of the project and beyond.

### Strategies

The Model is multi-faceted and multi-layered, involving individual youth, family members, peers, agencies, and the community. It is based on research and community experiences which assume that the gang problem is systemic, and is a response to rapid social change, local community disorganization, poverty, fragmentation of approaches across multiple organizations, and racism. The five core strategies and their associated cultural elements are as follows:

#### Community Mobilization

- Key established organizations, including police, probation, social agencies, schools, manpower agencies, and community organizations, and especially local community grassroots groups, churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents and even former gang members, are involved in or advise on various assessment, policy, and program measures to be undertaken. These efforts are coordinated by the steering committee and the lead agency and, to the extent possible, integrated into program development.
- A steering committee of key established agencies and community organizations

(including grassroots groups), as well as political and governmental leaders, is closely involved in the development of policy practices, within and across agencies and community groups, and in the creation of the multi-disciplinary street team. They begin to modify their existing agency policies and practices in the process. Special attention by the lead agency is directed to crossing agency mission boundaries, and getting the steering committee to take collective ownership of the comprehensive program initiative.

- The lead agency along with the steering committee initiates, develops, and maintains interagency communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. Of special importance is modifying established law enforcement, school, and governmental policy to encourage the participation of faith and grassroots groups, as well as former youth gang members, in the steering committee process. The interdisciplinary team must also participate in steering committee activities and assist in neighborhood gang-program-focused development efforts under the aegis of the lead agency. Awareness of the issues of population change, and sensitivity to the culture, interests, needs, and complaints of local residents and gang youth is an essential framework for the operation of the steering committee, the street team, and the lead agency.

### Social Intervention

- The street outreach team, especially the youth outreach worker component, must collaborate with social service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, faith-based and other organizations, to provide appropriate combinations of prevention, intervention, and socialized control services, depending on the needs of gang-involved

youth and youth at high risk of gang involvement. Not all youth should be provided with equal dosages of control and social services, or even coordinated services or contacts.

- Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens (including gang youth) from gang crime and enforcing the law, serving the interests and needs of target youth and their families, and assuring the linkage of youth to services and the case coordination of these social services.
- Group activities are carefully developed in such a way as not to cohere delinquent or gang youth. Primary attention is on individual youth interests, and the needs of gang-involved and high-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better attachment to mainstream institutions of school, training, employment and association with non-gang peers.
- Sensitivity to the influence of gang structure and processes, and street team skill in the use of group structure and processes, are important, particularly at times of crisis when violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be prevented and controlled.
- A clear, commonly understood and accepting relationship between the street team (including the youth outreach worker), the individual youth, and the gang must be established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the nature and scope of the team's operation, and especially the interdependent roles of team members.
- Social intervention and social control should not be limited simply to a 9 to 5 routine of making contact and assisting youth with social-development needs and problems. Social intervention focuses on outreach to youth in neighborhood hangouts during evenings, on weekends and in crisis times, and must assist youth to achieve conventional social goals



and obligations within the legitimate culture of the neighborhood, as well as of the larger society.

#### Provision of Social Opportunities

- Access to opportunities, especially for education, training, and jobs must be provided to gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access is structured through the policy and administrative efforts of the steering committee, the lead agency, and the implementation activities of the street-level team.
- The members of the steering committee should be in a position to provide special and/or additional access to opportunity systems through their own agencies and across organizations, to better mainstream program youth into legitimate society. Appropriate arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth in the course of providing opportunities to them, primarily or exclusively to protect regular client groups.
- The street team, especially the outreach youth workers and case managers, serves to mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that target youth have access to and are carefully prepared to make use of educational and training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel must be willing and prepared to modify their practices, and to assist these youth who have special needs and social limitations. Social control and social intervention tactics may have to be carefully integrated into this process.
- The street team collaborates with local residents and family, as well as grassroots groups, businesses, schools, and social agency personnel in the provision of access to, and

elaboration of opportunities for, gang-involved and highly at-risk youth.

- The opportunity needs of siblings, parents and peer group associates are also attended to, particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may facilitate the transition of program youth to non-delinquent and non-gang roles.
- Of special importance is encouragement of the contributions of business, industry, government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youths, in part through not excluding those youth who may already have criminal records. In this process, appropriate social control and social support measures may also be necessary.

#### Suppression (Social Control)

- The development of formal and informal procedures of social control by staff, and personal accountability by program youth, are integral to a comprehensive approach to gang youth. Highly targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth about to engage in or who have actually engaged in criminal acts are appropriate. However, labeling youth as gang members those youth who are not gang members, and targeting minority youth for a whole range of minor and questionable offenses, is inappropriate. Social control must be based on positive communication, respect for youth and discretion in use of suppression tactics.
- Controls are broadly conceived and range from arrest and warnings to behavior modeling, advice, counseling, crisis intervention and positive attention paid to youth interests and needs by the street team. Carefully structured situations may be required in which

activities such as recreation, athletic events, holiday and family celebrations, group meetings, or conflict mediation sessions involve police and probation. At the same time, information sharing among all team members about serious criminal events is essential so that the offender is accurately identified, arrested and prosecuted.

- Suppression involves the street team organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods, encouraging them to report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, as well as getting gang youth not to hang on street corners, and getting them to help clean up litter and remove graffiti.
- Social control also requires the defense of gang youth by the street team from false accusations and prosecution, illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, and defending or vouching for youth in court when they are brought in for violations of local laws which may be illegal and unconstitutional. The street team, administrators of the comprehensive gang program, steering committee members and community leaders must not only contribute to the suppression of unlawful, especially serious, criminal behavior, but to the modification of criminal justice system practices, organizational policies and institutions that unjustly criminalize and/or punish youth.
- Accurate definitions of the nature and scope of gang crime are developed, and appropriate data collected and managed. Such accurate and valid gang information should be routinely collected and shared in meaningful ways with members of the street team and the steering committee as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the problem and the development of effective policy and program.
- Special commitments from police administrators and special training sessions for gang

specialists or project team police may be required to assure that police and criminal justice personnel participate in the project in accordance with the Model. The purpose of the project is not simply to assist police or probation to acquire intelligence in order to make better arrests. The police must be careful to refer troublemakers and troubled gang youth to social and mental health agencies, rather than routinely processing them through the justice systems.

- Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities provision, and relevant organizational change should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent community-building, focused on a gang crime reduction process. The lead agency, the members of the street team and the steering committee share responsibility for carrying out the suppression or social-control functions critical for building a “good” community, one of benefit to gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger communities, while avoiding labeling of youth who are not at high risk of gang membership and delinquent behavior.

### Organizational Change and Development

- Organizational change and development underlie the strategies of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. Local practices and institutions must change, and procedures and arrangements must be developed to meet the needs and problems of gang youth in balanced ways that enhance community and individual youth capacity to reduce gang crime. Enhanced law enforcement alone, and enhanced preventive and treatment services separately may be

inappropriate, and exacerbate the gang problem.

- Change of individual youth gang member behavior occurs in interrelated, interdisciplinary and collaborative fashion, based on the differentially-assessed needs of particular youth. The activities of personnel in the street team, community groups, and across agencies have to be modified towards a generalist mission and complementary worker-role activities, e.g., police take some responsibility for social intervention, outreach workers assist with suppression of serious crime and violence, and community organizers encourage alienated neighborhood residents to communicate with the police about gang crime incidents and advise on better ways to address the problem.
- Organizational policies, worker responsibilities and practices have to become more community oriented, even communal, and take into consideration the particular interests, needs, and cultural backgrounds of local residents, including the targeted youth. An elitist, bureaucratic, defensive approach to gang youth is counter-productive.
- Administrative arrangements, special training, and close supervision must be established, particularly for youth outreach and law enforcement workers to carry out their collaborative roles in a mutually trustworthy fashion, and in a way that identifies with the long-term, social-development interests of gang-involved youth.
- Staff development and training for the intervention team is conducted both collaboratively, as well as on a professionally separate basis. This includes the development of appropriate mechanisms for data sharing, interactive social intervention and suppression planning, and carefully managed implementation activities.
- Case management and associated data systems are established so that contacts and

services by all members of the street intervention team can be monitored for effective targeting, assessment of youth, program planning and implementation, and measuring program quality and effects. These and other data then become the basis for evaluating outcomes at individual, gang, program, agency (and ultimately interagency) and community levels.

### Program Implementation Principles

A set of principles guides the various organizations, community groups, and staffs in the implementation of the model strategies. They are the basis for developing, carrying out, and testing the program model within the framework of the core strategies.

### Targeting

It is critically important that the comprehensive gang program select the right organizations, neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community, in appropriate ways. This includes identification of the most significant aspects and precipitating situations of the gang problem, based on a careful, ongoing assessment of the specific youth involved, location, and context of the problem. There are many myths about the gang problem. For example, police may claim that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city. In fact gang incidents, gang hangouts, and where gang youth live may be concentrated in certain parts of a community. Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang youth, when they are not. Schools committed to a “zero tolerance” policy may find that they have contributed to an increased level of crime in the community. Only certain organizations in gang-ridden and emerging gang

communities may be substantially and constructively involved with the problems of gangs and gang youth, i.e., particular schools, churches, youth agencies, police units, neighborhood organizations, aldermen and government units.

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street as well as agency level is necessary to determine which gangs and members of the gang are most involved in serious crime (including drug selling and violence), where and when the gang offenses are being committed, and what organizational situations and changed policies and practices are critical to understanding and addressing specifics of the problem. It is important to target the most serious aspects of the problem first. Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influential individuals of the gang, are the critical focus of initial attention, as much to develop access to other gang members as to address ongoing and crisis gang problems.

Collaboration among community leadership, grassroots involvement and street team contacts to develop an understanding of the problem, based on real life field situations, is essential before long range planning, priority setting, and program operations are clearly and firmly established. Unfocused prevention, generalized public health missions, non-targeted suppression, and community demonstrations (such as marches or meetings) only for symbolic cathartic purposes, may be of little value. Diffuse strategies by interagency coalitions may readily become devices to avoid targeting the gang problem. Especially to be avoided is the division of resources and response to the problem based strictly on political interests, narrow agency missions, professional turf considerations, ignorance of the details of the problem, and impulsive action or personal-interest rhetoric.

## Balance

Once the specific problem(s), target area(s), gang youth, institutions or agencies, policies and staff to be addressed or involved are identified, a set of balanced strategies must be operationalized. The separation, independence or dominance of particular strategies in regard to program development is inappropriate. Only targeting hardcore gang youth for suppression, only targeting younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention services, and only targeting selected youths for jobs may not be consistent with the Model. A balanced but differential mix and dosage of multiple strategies for specific categories of program youth is required at different times. One type of program service and/or control is not suitable for all. Gang youth come in all forms and with varying degrees of personal and troublesome problems.

The consequences of imbalanced strategies may result in a dominant suppression approach, which excessively imprisons youth who can be readily served in the community with a combination of treatment, opportunities and graduated sanctions, or they may serve to label at-risk youth as gang members and make them more likely to be arrested for minor offenses (or even non-offenses). An approach which focuses only on recreation and group activities for gang youth may increase gang cohesion and solidification of delinquent norms and behaviors may increase delinquent activity, and may not meet the longer-term socialization and community-integration needs of alienated gang youth.

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A basic goal of the approach – to improve community capacity to address youth gang crime – cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components are involved in the development of the program and participate in its activities. The Model is not



implemented if only established social or youth agencies or law enforcement organizations participate. On the other hand, if the program is based primarily on grassroots participation, adequate resources may not become available to implement, sustain, or institutionalize the approach, even if the program shows promise. Certain basic functions of community building and social integration across different community levels relevant to the gang problem have to be carried out.

### Intensity

Dosage is the frequency and duration of specific and appropriate worker contacts, services, strategies, and agency involvements that are carried out for different categories of youth. An appropriate dosage is necessary for a positive outcome. However, the balance of strategies, type of worker, nature of coordination of different worker contacts, specific services, strategies, and controls may be more important than the amounts provided. This may be the case when the majority of youth in the program are under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system and are required to participate based on court, probation or parole orders. The program may then be viewed as punitive and primarily an extension of law enforcement and the criminal justice system. The type and purpose of coordination among team workers in relation to particular types of youth may be more important than the specific range of services or strategies provided by each of them. The length and frequency of contact the youth has in the program may be inversely related to positive outcome. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be beneficial for him to disassociate himself from a particular program. The combination and intensity of relationships by particular workers with different types of youth is critically

important.

### Continuity

Whether the same worker or combination of workers provides continual services and contacts for a substantial period of time may be more influential than if different workers are in contact sporadically with the youth for short periods of time. Continuity of contact is important particularly for gang or delinquent youth who have special needs for social support and control, or for building trusting relationships with adults. Gang youth are often distrustful as well as exploitive of relationships with adults. Workers may be viewed as undependable, rejecting, hostile, or readily manipulable. It takes time to develop a positive working (controlling and helping) relationship with certain gang youth. Service interruption and lack of continuity of contact by the worker may be a source of further alienation and interfere with the youth's rehabilitation. A return to or intensification of gang behaviors may result from crises that the youth may not be able to manage on his own. An empathetic and helpful adult whom the youth trusts is important at such junctures.

### Commitment

Work with gang youth and gang problems is challenging, complex, difficult and frustrating. Gang youth are often undependable, elusive, and hostile in their relationships with adults and peers, and require a high level of sensitivity, firmness and concentrated effort by workers. The workers on the street have to develop multidimensional skills. Traditional agency, school, and other institutional staff may not be interested in or prepared to work with

troublesome gang youth. However, the street team, particularly the youth worker, must reach out physically, psychologically, socially, and morally to assist gang youth. Team efforts together are reinforcing, and combine to introduce a reality-integrated world of opportunity, social support, and constraint for the particular gang youth.

Also, project agency administrators and supervisors may not be fully aware of the difficulties and challenges faced by direct-service team workers, and of special staff needs for support and sometimes controls. The tasks, problems and frustrations, of outreach community workers in the context of the streets are not easily understood. Appropriate management and extra supervisory commitment and exceptional procedures may have to be developed. Steering committee members and program administrators also must periodically renew their commitment to the comprehensive approach to the gang problem. The Model program usually challenges existing agency policies and procedures, professional norms, and creates extra agency work and discomforts. Commitment to the promise and even the validity of the approach may not come easily.

Chart 1.1  
 Program Implementation Model  
 Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression  
 Goal 1: Improve Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime  
 Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime





Chart 1.2

**Gang Process Model**  
**Steps in the Application of the Approach**



**OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach  
to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program**

(chart designed by Candice Kane)

## Chapter 2

### **The Structure of the Evaluation Process**

The Bloomington-Normal Project Evaluation examined the nature of program implementation, services and contacts provided to individual youth, based on the specifics of the Model described above. It examined individual youth outcome in particular, and to some extent the impact of the program on community gang crime. The present Evaluation was based on a specification of the program implementation model (see Chart 1.1, Chapter 1), particularly at the individual-youth level (see Chart 2.1). We focused our multivariate analysis on the worker-team approach, the services and contacts provided to individual youth, changes in youth characteristics and the consequent outcomes for individual program youth, in comparison to youth who were not provided with services, i.e., youth in the comparison area (Chart 2.1, items IV, V, VI). The Evaluation was based on an extensive analysis of a great deal of qualitative and quantitative data. Data for the individual-youth analysis was derived from worker tracking reports, individual program and comparison youth surveys (including self-reports) and official police histories. Data for analysis of changes in gang-as-a-unit characteristics and community gang-crime levels was based on gang police, crime analyst and official crime statistics. A great deal of analysis of field observation and program-development reports provided the background and also the basis for the explanation of the findings of the individual-level analysis.

#### Beginning the Evaluation

The Evaluation of the program model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – was simultaneous and complex, requiring extensive

#### 2.1

collaboration among local Project personnel, Local Evaluators, Technical Assistance and the National Evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of the National Advisory Board. Major problems of research design, data collection, sample development, and analysis had to be addressed at all stages of the Evaluation. The National Evaluator, the University of Chicago, was responsible for overall research design, instrument development, data management, and analysis, but only partially responsible for implementation of the program and comparison-youth samples and data collection design. The Local Evaluator at each site was selected and funded by the local Project Director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator and OJJDP.

Early problems of a lack of understanding of the program model and how to implement it, as well as slow acceptance of data collection procedures and responsibilities at the local sites, had to be addressed. Not all components of the model were adequately implemented by the local site operators; not all procedures for local data collection were followed. The difficulties of program and comparison-youth sample selection and data collection were not fully anticipated at local or national levels. Both cross-site and distinctive, individual-site program and evaluation problems were continually addressed, but never fully overcome.

The problems of insufficient understanding and acceptance of the program model by the local sites were largely handled by OJJDP management and Technical Assistance staff, but they also involved the National Evaluator. Much of the early problem of program model implementation and evaluation development surfaced around the issue of program sample selection. The program directors at the sites generally presumed that the primary, long-term purpose of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e. targeting at-risk, usually

## 2.2

younger youth not yet gang members or known to the police. In Bloomington the further assumption was that the police department, also funded by the Project, would continue separately to suppress gang-involved youth, and that the lead agency would continue separately to service less gang-involved youth and prevent highly at-risk youth from gang involvement.

The problems of implementation of Project purpose and sample selection were further complicated when the local Projects were required to focus in some integrated way on both gang-involved youth who were gang delinquents, as well as on youth at high risk for gang involvement. None of the Project lead agencies had experience providing a program of combined social service and suppression activities. The lead agencies did not necessarily have direct knowledge of or access to gang delinquents, except possibly at San Antonio. It was not clear to program operators who the gang members were and how to access them for program purposes. Almost no grassroots organizations, neighborhood groups or former gang members with access to gangs or gang youth were involved in program planning or implementation. Identification of specific gangs, gang youth, and their hangouts, as well as the types and range of crime they committed, was not known. At the start of the program the nature of the gang problem had not been addressed in detail. Criteria for admission of youth to the program had not been clearly considered. Referrals of youth to the program came predominantly from probation sources, mainly juvenile probation, and to a limited extent from schools with youth who might be suspended or expelled and were at serious risk for gang involvement.

The lead-agency, Project Oz program operator and the Bloomington police stated that the gang problem was pervasive throughout the twin cities of Bloomington and Normal, and also spilled over to the entire county. In due course, police statistics from Bloomington and Normal



revealed that gang incidents were concentrated in the Bloomington public-housing-project areas. Most of the gang problem was identified as African-American, and most of the youth in the program were African-American. African-Americans were 7% of total population of Bloomington-Normal in 1990, and 9% of total population in 2000. Police and probation identified a few white and Latino youth as gang members, and their initial expectation was that the numbers of gang members in the program would be small.

Not only selection of the program sample, but selection of the comparison sample would be a special task for the evaluation. A serious problem of comparison gang site and comparison sample selection occurred in the Bloomington-Normal Project, since the characteristics of the program sample were not yet known. A comparable gang-problem community where the program was not established had to be selected. It was not clear which area and which kinds of youth would be selected for the comparison sample. At four of the five sites, another part of the same city was selected. This was not the case for the Bloomington-Normal Evaluation.

The National Evaluators were advised that a comparable, non-served community could not be found in the Bloomington-Normal area because gang youth lived and ranged across the whole area. Champaign-Urbana, about 50 miles away, was regarded as the most comparable site. It was a twin city that also included a major university complex and had a somewhat similar population mix and gang problem. The evaluation task of obtaining cooperation from police and other agencies in this comparison set of cities to participate in the research, without resources for program services or other compensation, was a challenge. Contacting and obtaining interviews from a group of youths comparable to the program group would be the most difficult challenge to the integrity of the Evaluation. The problem was common across all of the sites, and special (not

always successful) arrangements had to be made to find and access such comparison youth.

Although the Bloomington Local Evaluator was an accomplished gang ethnographer, the comparison sample ended up being less delinquent (although it contained more gang members) and disproportionately more female than the Bloomington program sample. The differences were so great that the question was raised early whether a satisfactory comparison group had been found. Evidence would appear later that the overall gang problem was more serious in the comparison site. The comparison youth sample selected was “light,” especially based on official delinquency data, and did not adequately reflect the gang problem there. This would be a problem for evaluation at all sites, but was especially serious for the Bloomington-Normal program.


Collection of data was a great burden for local program personnel, as well as for the National and Local Evaluators, at all the sites. A variety of continuing obstacles and resistance had to be overcome. The plan for data collection included: individual youth surveys to be gathered for the program and comparison youth (on average there were expected to be approximately 100 for each group); program service records of contacts by workers with each youth, to be gathered by the different program workers at each site at three-month intervals; police histories of all program and comparison youth. The effort to obtain official school histories had to be aborted because of the unavailability of misconduct records for youth. Gang-as-a-unit data for all gangs, and community gang-crime statistics had to be obtained from gang-crime police and crime analysts in the program and comparison areas. Special organization surveys were to be collected from 20-25 administrators of key agencies and organizations addressing the gang problem in each of the program and comparison areas. Sources of data for

the National Evaluation also included local on-site observations of program operations and interviews of program staff, minutes of steering committee meetings, focus groups, cluster (multi-site program staff) meetings, monthly telephone conferences with key program staff from each site, yearly funding applications, records and special communications from each site with OJJDP, and, lastly, program performance measures based on interviews with key local program informants, at the end of the 4 to 5-year program period and beyond.

The Evaluation goals were to obtain a comprehensive view of each program in its community context, and to identify the changes that were occurring relevant to Model implementation at different levels of functioning – individual youth, gang, steering committee, key organizations, the community, and program operations. The evaluations were complex undertakings at all five Project sites. The proximity of Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana to Chicago permitted the Evaluation staff to make more field visits than was the case for the other programs. The Bloomington-Normal Program Evaluator made frequent visits to Chicago. The National Evaluators probably obtained a more complete view of the program there than at the other sites.

Chart 2.1

Evaluation Model: Program and Comparison Areas, Gangs, Youth  
 (Comparison Area Components = I, II, V [partial], VI, VIII, IX)



## Chapter 3

### **Bloomington-Normal Context**

The twin cities of Bloomington and Normal, Illinois are centrally located in McLean County, midway between Chicago and St. Louis, in rich farm country. The two cities experienced sharp increases in population and “tremendous economic growth” between 1980 and 2000; 15.2% between 1980 and 1990, and 19.8% between 1990 and 2000. The population grew from 79,861 in 1980 to 110,194 in 2000. Bloomington-Normal was also home to several regional and national corporations. The cities contained two major universities, Illinois State University and Illinois Wesleyan University (Project Oz proposal 1994; U.S. Census 1990, 2000).

Bloomington-Normal experienced a relative but not absolute decrease in its non-Hispanic white population compared to the non-Hispanic African-American and Hispanic populations between 1990 and 2000. The percentage of whites in the population decreased from 90.89% to 84.52%, (although the percentage of non-Hispanic whites actually increased from 83,613 to 93,132). The small non-Hispanic African-American population increased from 5,356 to 9,818; the Hispanic population from 1,133 to 3,312; and the Asian population from 1,719 to 3,318.

The comparison cities, Champaign-Urbana, are located 50.5 miles south-east of Bloomington-Normal, also in a rich farm county (Champaign) in the central part of the state. The site was a world center for technology development, largely through its major public university, the University of Illinois. The comparison site also experienced a population increase, although not so great or rapid as Bloomington-Normal’s. The total population increased 6.1% between 1980 to 1990, and 4.1% between 1990 to 2000.

### 3.1

The comparison site had a slightly smaller but more rapidly declining non-Hispanic white population base. Non-Hispanic whites were 69.27% of total population in Champaign-Urbana in 2000, compared to 84.52% in Bloomington-Normal. The comparison site's non-Hispanic white population declined in absolute terms from 77,546 to 71,979, while the non-Hispanic African-American population (16,513), the Hispanic population (4,012) and especially the Asian population (10,548) were larger in absolute size and percentage than comparable groups in Bloomington-Normal. Indices of segregation appeared to be moderate to fairly low in both sets of cities, however.

We do not yet know what changes occurred in family and household income for families living in poverty, and female-headed households, in the program and comparison areas, based on comparisons of 1990 and 2000 census data. We do know that median family and household income declined slightly in Bloomington-Normal (from \$47,860 to \$47,071), but increased in the comparison site (from \$42,647 to \$49,058), during the 1980-1990 period. Also, while the percent of families living in poverty, and female-headed households, increased in both areas, it was higher and increased more in the comparison site. In Bloomington-Normal, the female-headed household rate was 15.0%, and the family poverty rate was 6.4%. In the comparison site the female-headed household rate was 17.4%, and the family poverty rate was 11.2%. Both areas experienced an increase in labor force employment, and declining unemployment between 1980 and 1990 (Table 3.1).

Although there was a sharp increase in economic growth in Bloomington-Normal in the 1980s and 1990s, the Bloomington-Normal first year funding proposal indicated that the gap had widened between upper and lower ends of the population's socio-economic scale, and that the

gap may have contributed to “social disorganization” (1995 OJJDP Funding Proposal, p. 2). Professional two-income families were still the norm, but there was a disparity between the majority non-Hispanic white population and the minority (especially non-Hispanic African-American) population residing in low-income neighborhoods. The white Bloomington-Normal population was generally well-educated and employed. African-American families were located throughout the twin cities, but most of the single African-American female-headed households were living in public housing in Bloomington, where rental applications showed the unemployment rate was 76%.

Easy access along transportation routes, proximity to and family relocation from major cities (especially Chicago) was making for some growth in poorly-educated, unskilled and socially-disadvantaged minority populations in Bloomington-Normal. Many jobs were available at the local University, in restaurants and motels, but they were not well-paid. The illegal drug market, involving whites and university students mainly as consumers, increased and provided a growing source of income and survival for the minority population, including African-American disadvantaged youth and young adults.

In many respects, the population, community and organizational context of the gang problem were similar in Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana, except that there had been less rapid population and economic change in Champaign-Urbana. Its population was more diverse, and its minority population better established. As we shall see later, the community organizational context of Champaign-Urbana may have been less cohesive, and somewhat less concerned with (and less prone to) a suppression reaction to the gang problem.

### 3.3

Table 3.1  
Selected Population Characteristics  
Program (Bloomington-Normal) and Comparison (Champaign-Urbana) Areas  
1990 and 2000 Census

Ethnic and Racial Composition										
Bloomington-Normal						Champaign-Urbana				
Year	Total Population	Non-Hispanic (white)	Non-Hispanic (African-American)	Hispanic	Asian	Total Population	Non-Hispanic (white)	Non-Hispanic (African-American)	Hispanic	Asian
1990	91,995	83,613 (90.89%)	5,356 (5.82%)	1,133 (1.23%)	1,719 (1.87%)	99,865	77,546 (77.65%)	13,148 (13.17%)	2,126 (2.13%)	6,788 (6.8%)
2000	110,194	93,132 (84.52%)	9,818 (8.91%)	3,312 (3.9%)	3,318 (3.0%)	103,913	71,979 (69.2%)	16,513 (15.89%)	4,012 (3.86%)	10,543 (10.15%)
difference	+19.8%	+6.3%	+3.09%	+3.01%	+1.14%	+4.1%	-8.38%	+2.72%	+1.73%	+3.35%
Socio-Economic Characteristics										
Bloomington-Normal					Champaign-Urbana					
Year	Median Family Income in 1993	Female-Headed Household	Families Below Poverty	Unemployment	Median Family Income	Female-Headed Household	Families Below Poverty	Unemployment	Families Below Poverty	Unemployment
1980	\$47,860	12.9%	5.17%	5.0%	\$42,647	14.9%	8.0%	4.4%	8.0%	4.4%
1990	\$47,071	15.0%	6.4%	4.4%	\$49,058	17.43%	11.2%	4.5%	11.2%	4.5%
difference	- 1.6%	+ 2.1%	-0.7%	-0.6%	+ 15.0%	+ 2.5%	+ 3.2%	0.1%	+3.2%	0.1%



## Chapter 4

### **The Bloomington-Normal Gang Problem**

(Frank Perez and Candice Kane)

A local youth-gang problem was apparently present in Bloomington-Normal in the early 1980s, but was largely ignored by the media and community. Gangs visibly emerged, and were recognized as a problem that required public attention, between 1989 and 1991. Gang violence and gang-related drug dealing escalated and brought concern that serious gang and drug-related problems might be moving beyond the Bloomington low-income, poverty neighborhoods. The problem was largely attributed to outsiders moving in.

The gangs were mainly identified as coming from Chicago. Local gangs expanded, presumably influenced by outsiders; the gangs were predominantly African-American, but also included whites and Latinos. Some of the gangs had only African-American members; others were racially mixed; some contained older ex-convicts. A white supremacist group was present in the early 1990s. A group of 10 to 15 white youth not clearly classified as a gang became active in mid-1998, committing break-ins, muggings and pistol whippings. Some of the students at Illinois State University were thought to be involved with gangs in the drug trade. Staff of Project Oz, the lead agency, reported that twenty-two Illinois State University students were arrested for selling “dope” and being “hooked up” with gang kids but “they were Caucasian college students trying to make some money” and should not be considered gang members (Minutes of February 12, 1998 Conference Call). The distinctions between delinquents, criminal groups and gangs were not clearly made in Bloomington-Normal (F. Perez Memorandum to I. Spergel and C. Kane, July 7-8, 1998 site visit).

Distinctions between white and African-American youth as to gang membership status were clearly made. Outreach youth workers reported that “although whites were the main consumers of the drug trade, little attention was given to this;” attention was directed to the distributors who happened to be people of color. White youth presumably did not fit the gang criteria of involvement in either violence or drug dealing activity (F. Perez Memorandum to I. Spergel, September 19, 1997). In general, there was relatively little serious violent activity among gang youth. Such activity flared up occasionally and was likely to be of an interpersonal nature, and to occur within as well as between gangs.

The elements of gang structure and drug selling were complexly inter-related. The Crime Analyst for the Bloomington Police Department noted that “members of the 12 gang factions in McLean County are currently trafficking drugs.” Generally, each gang deals “crack cocaine from the single ‘rock’ level up to multi-ounce amounts. Several gangs also deal in powder cocaine and various amounts of cannabis.” Within each gang there is a range of drug trafficking among members. “We have instances where a newly recruited gang member spends time learning his or her gang literature, attending gang meetings, and shows increasing levels of criminality, but are not trafficking drugs as part of their membership... We have also documented gang members who do not take part in the gang [ceremonial] activities listed above, but are large-scale drug traffickers using the gang’s hierarchy and size to facilitate their trafficking” (Project Oz Funding Reapplication, Appendix Letter, April 1996).

According to the Bloomington Police Department Crime Analyst, various combined police operations were launched in McLean County, mainly in Bloomington and Normal, first against the Vice Lords – “Operation Playground” – in late 1992, and then against the Chicago

Gangster Disciple organization – “Operation Gangbusters” – in 1993. This created a “vacuum” in the local narcotics supply network. Gangster Disciples from other parts of the state moved in to supply the demand for crack cocaine. Further suppression activities were required by the local and county police departments.

More gang violence and less gang-related drug activities were noted at the start of the Bloomington-Normal comprehensive gang program, based on police arrest/suspect data from June 1995 to July 1996. The Bloomington Police Department reported 66 violent incidents and only 12 drug-related incidents. The violence, however, was not regarded as of a serious or primary gang-problem nature. Thirty-six arrestees/suspects for violent incidents were African-American, 7 were Hispanic, and 15 white; 9 arrestee/suspects for drugs were African-American, none were Hispanic and 3 were white (Memo from Chief of Police, December 30, 1996; City of Bloomington Police Gang Crime Statistics). According to the police, African-American gang members subsequently began “leaving violence alone and getting more and more involved in drug trafficking” (Discussion with Bloomington Police Department Crime Analyst, 1996-1999).

The African-American gangs in Bloomington-Normal generally did not fight each other, or even systematically compete for drug turf. Traditional or territorial intergang fighting was not present among these gangs. The gangs moved freely between Bloomington and Normal. When gang members were involved in violent incidents, these occurred mainly in the public housing areas of Bloomington, over individual or family issues, or between youth from the same gang.

Local program leaders (including the Bloomington Crime Analyst) speaking for Bloomington and Normal, state that gang size remained at about 640 during the four-year course of the Project. The Crime Analyst claimed that frequent sentencing of gang offenders to prison

balanced a continuous gang recruitment process. Local police reports indicate that between 1990 and 1995 most local gangs had distinct hierarchies and operated with 80 to 100 members each. But with intense and persistent pressure from the police, there was a “complete disruption of the communal and organizational structure.” The gangs in the late 1990s operated on the basis of factions with 10 to 12 individuals in each.

The gang problem in 1996, based on law enforcement statistics, was described as follows: 92% adult, 85% male, 61% African-American, 33% Caucasian, and 5% Hispanic (Project Oz Second Year Application, 1996). Updated police statistical evidence suggested that about the same proportion (16%) of gang activity continued to be carried out by females (Bloomington Fifth Year Proposal, 2000). Gang member origins were: Bloomington, 61%; Normal, 9%; Chicago, 14%; and Peoria, 9%. The remainder were from the smaller surrounding communities in McLean County. Furthermore, the key problem of drug crime continued to be the selling of crack cocaine, marijuana, and some heroin. Of the 107 Bloomington Police Department vice unit arrests in 1998, 85% were gang drug dealers whose origins were either local or Chicago street gangs (Bloomington Fifth Year Proposal, 2000).

Juveniles were and continued to be only a small part of the overall gang problem. The racial and gender patterns of juveniles known to McLean County court services did not reflect the mainly adult gang-offender pattern in terms of race and gender. According to a 1996 Juvenile Court Services report (Dietz letter April 26, 1996), juvenile youth classified as hardcore gang members were: white = 48 (including 15 Hispanic); African-American = 32; male = 65 (33 white and 32 African-American); and females = 15 (mainly Latin King Hispanic). Juveniles classified as marginal gang members were more often white and female (white = 60; African-American =

33; male = 33; female = 60).

Court services staff noted that the 240 juveniles on probation in 1995, 10 to 15 percent were estimated to be gang members. Furthermore, juveniles who were gang members were also involved in sex and weapons offenses. Those gang members who were 14 years of age and over were sent to adult court. The majority of juvenile cases in Juvenile Detention were for 30-to-90-day dispositions. Many were detained for contempt of court or violation of probation. The McLean County prosecutors office reported that gang members on the caseload, mainly adults, were charged increasingly with offenses of domestic violence, forgery, theft and burglary, some of which were drug-motivated. Violent crime was decreasing, but the rate of sentencing of gang members to prison was rising (Spergel and Sosin Field Visit Interview, 1995).

In sum, the gang problem in Bloomington-Normal, early and late in the program period was regarded by the police as comprising mainly African-American young adult males involved in drug dealing, and as getting worse. The general perception of key program personnel was that violence by gang members was present but sporadic, sometimes involving shootings, but generally not killings. The violence problem was not escalating but leveling off. While there was a substantial number of white juveniles (including females) who were described as gang-connected, African-American juveniles who were gang and nongang members were regarded by the juvenile justice system as relatively more serious offenders than white or Latino juvenile offenders. The primary response to the gang problem, regardless of the nature or level of gang activity, appeared to be suppression, with some variation depending on race/ethnicity.

Staff of the McLean County Juvenile Detention Center observed that minorities were given “harsher penalties than white gang bangers... that have come to detention multiple times ...

white gang bangers are rarely sent to the Department of Corrections. The African-American and Hispanic kids that come to detention multiple times are sent (usually at their second trip) to the [Illinois] Department of Corrections especially if they are males. The majority of law enforcement and media activities appear to be aimed at Black and Hispanic kids...” One other comment was that the gang youth of all races and ethnic backgrounds who came through the Detention Center appeared to be delinquent for such relatively minor offenses as simple fighting, showing gang signs, sporting gang colors, truancy and drug use; few were overtly violent; drug selling was increasing (Scott, September 4, 1997).

Key leaders of the Bloomington-Normal community, in Kansas City (June 6-7, 1995) for an orientation and training session prior to program operations, stated (based on National Evaluator notes):

- Bloomington-Normal didn't have a gang problem in the sense of chronic or even emerging gang violence.
- The gang problem was mainly one of older youth and adult ex-cons returning to Bloomington and Normal from the Illinois Department of Corrections.
- Gang youth could not be clearly distinguished from high-risk non-gang youth.
- The community gang problem was attributed largely to a lack of alternative educational training opportunities for at-risk kids from low-income areas.

The chairperson of the steering committee stated that suppression was a remedy for discipline problems occurring in schools. Expulsions were “common.” Gang membership was “so suppressed that it was not visible in schools.” “Zero tolerance” was an absolute value. The slightest show of gang membership or activity would result in suppression or expulsion (Spergel

and Sosin Field Visit, November 17, 1995). At the same time, school and community leaders showed growing concern about the large numbers of youth (mainly African-Americans) expelled from school. This concern was to lead to planning for the creation of a special school.

The SAFE school became the alternative to suspension and expulsion for gang and other youth from regular public schools. Youth were no longer released to the streets. However, the Project Coordinator lamented later that the “SAFE School still dismissed problem kids more frequently than the good kids. The good kids are the ones who should be dismissed or transferred early” (Field Notes August 4, 1998). At about the same time, the Local Evaluator observed to National Evaluation staff that Bloomington Schools “don’t attempt any type of intervention with their kids. They continuously let them act up until it’s time to throw them out” (F. Perez, memorandum to I. Spergel, August 4-5, 1998 visit).

## Chapter 5

### **The Bloomington-Normal Project Response**

(Frank Perez and Candice Kane)

The data in this chapter are drawn mainly from funding applications, steering committee reports and communications or exchanges between the Program Director and OJJDP. We focus on the nature of the community leadership climate and the background of general policy, planning and administrative structure that was the context for the development of the Bloomington-Normal Project. The specifics of program operations are discussed in the next chapter.

The findings of a McLean County United Way community-wide needs assessment survey of 1994, quoted in the program's second year application for continued funding from OJJDP, provides an historical context for why the community and the Project addressed the gang problem in the manner they did.

“An important finding of the key informant survey was the awareness of the need for increased coordination ... agencies will have to start sharing facilities and resources... In the next five years interagency solutions to problems will need to be worked out... McLean County has been and currently is a nice place to live... this is going to change for the worse within the next few years. We have got to plan more for the future... people who live here don't want to believe that there are 'terrible' things such as AIDS or gangs present in our community...”

(Second Year Proposal 1996, pp. 6-7)



The McLean County United Way community-wide needs assessment was the first document that we are aware of that provided evidence of a “moral panic” (Cohen 1980; Zatz 1987) in Bloomington-Normal about the presence of gangs and the incursion and growth of a low-income, African-American population. Moral panic largely dominated the specific pattern of community efforts, especially suppression, to address the gang problem. It became the basis for the development and operation of the Bloomington-Normal program, with expected increased arrest consequences, i.e., enhanced suppression, for the mainly African-American youth selected for the program.

The Bloomington Mayor’s 1990 Task Force to Study Gangs became the Community Youth Liaison Council (CYLC) in 1992, and, in due course, the steering committee for the Project Oz Comprehensive Gang Program in McLean County. The CYLC became Youth Impact, Inc., in 1997 (“the primary purpose of this change was to incorporate to receive funding as a not-for-profit entity and to simplify the name for promotional purposes [Youth Impact Annual Report 1997-1998]). CYLC and/or Youth Impact, Inc. consistently stated its mission over the four-year course of the program as “to develop a strategy through community involvement to control existing gangs and future criminal activities; to establish an environment which preserves our community by enriching all youth” (1996 CYLC Annual Report).

CYLC was an inclusive set of agencies and organizations with representation from: *law enforcement* – the McLean County Sheriff’s Department, Bloomington Police Department, Normal Police Department, Illinois State Police, Division of Criminal Investigation, and the security units of the two local universities (Illinois State University and Illinois Wesleyan University); *prosecution* – McLean County State’s Attorney’s office; *judiciary* – Illinois Circuit

Court, 12<sup>th</sup> Judicial Circuit; *probation* – McLean County Court Services; *corrections* – McLean County Juvenile Detention Center, McLean County Jail, and Illinois Department of Corrections. A fuller relationship with CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., was to develop in the later years of the Project.

In addition, CYLC had representatives from city government (Bloomington and Normal), the local Chamber of Commerce, a business and social-service community group called the McLean County Community Compact, a very small local grassroots organization – RAGE – (which was highly suppression-oriented and existed for only a year during the program), the local chapter of the Boys and Girls Club, Big Brothers and Big Sisters (which came to CYLC at a later period in the Project), the Parks and Recreation Department, various units of the County School System, the Western Avenue Community Center, the local housing authority, and other organizations. Some organizations had very limited or token relationships to the program. These included the NAACP, public housing tenant councils, faith organizations, and various grassroots organizations, including groups or organizations representing the Latino, mainly Mexican-American, community.

The CYLC was organized into three committees: Prevention, Early Intervention, and Suppression. The chairperson of CYLC, an administrator in the public schools, was a key formulator and supporter of Project objectives. The Coordinator and other staff of the lead agency, Project Oz, were also regarded as representatives of CYLC, and were closely involved with its committees. The relationships between CYLC and Project Oz were close and interlocking.

Project Oz's first-year grant application listed a variety of planning objectives, including

assessment of the gang problem, identification of the “at-risk” population, various youth training and educational objectives, and the examination of “ways to legitimately include juveniles in society.” Intervention activities were to include involving parents and “creating and applying anti-gang policies.” In this request for funding from OJJDP for the Comprehensive Gang Initiative, Project Oz stated “we intend to consolidate our efforts to suppress youth gang activity and reduce gang membership at its source. We are compelled to seek funding for planning and/or the adaption of a comprehensive, community-wide gang strategy” (1994 Funding Application, pp. 8 and 17).

The local Bloomington newspaper regarded the CYLC and the funding application as “efforts to suppress street gangs [which] will grow in intensity... Officials are preparing to announce a major program to reduce gang violence and involvement in an effort that will be part of a federally funded study...” (Pantagraph, June 15, 1995).

Letters of support from various heads of organizations cited the “McLean County Gang Suppression Application,” or CYLC, as the association to address gang violence, illegal activities and at-risk factors associated with gang membership (Mayor of Normal, April 10, 1996). A letter from an official of the Bloomington School District indicated that he fully supported the reapplication by McLean County for the Gang Suppression Project “... to decrease gang violence and illegal activities and the risk factors that lead young people to join gangs” (Letter to OJJDP, April, 1996).

OJJDP expressed early concern that the Project Oz application interpreted the comprehensive-model approach as intended to “rid jurisdictions of the gangs themselves.” The OJJDP Program Manager for the Bloomington-Normal Project indicated this might be an indirect

result of Project activities, but it was not the primary focus of the Model. The Model was intended to reduce gang violence and other illegal activities (Burch E-mail, August 30, 1995).

In their first site visit, the National Evaluators and the Technical Assistance Advisors noted that Project Oz, even before it undertook a project-planning phase, quickly began to recruit clients, mainly African-American youths 12 to 20 years of age from Bloomington. The Project leaders wanted to focus on early intervention and prevention. At first, they saw the Project as a means of expanding existing agency prevention and early intervention activities. The special gang focus was expected to develop separately through the CYLC Suppression Committee.

Representatives of housing project tenant groups, churches and other grassroots organizations serving the African-American or Hispanic communities were not part of planning efforts. This lack of involvement or inclusion was to persist throughout the life of the Project. Police and outreach youth workers originally were expected to be components of the Project, but to operate “independently.” The Project Oz Coordinator, early on and through most of the program, served as an intermediary between the youth outreach workers and the police liaison, in particular the Bloomington Crime Analyst (I. Spergel Summary Notes of Visit by Spergel, Sosin, Kane to Project Oz, November 15-17, 1995).

In its second year proposal for continued funding, the applicant established reasonably clear operational definitions of gang, gang member, at-risk and high-risk youth. It prioritized types of youth for different service patterns. The level of service was to be tied both to the number/severity of risk factors presented by the youth, and by the number/severity of gang incidents perpetrated by the youth. A “preliminary risk level chart” was established: Level 1 (high risk) – “admitted gang members and/or associates of known gang members... focus is on

intervention”; Level 2 (medium risk) – “youth [who] have not yet made a full commitment to a gang lifestyle ... focus is on intervention”; and Level 3 (low risk) – “youth involved in more positive than negative activities ... focus is on intensive prevention.” The application also stated: “we will continue to pursue aggressive suppression strategies” (Second Year Proposal, 1996).

The early annual reports of CYLC also emphasized Project suppression achievements: “In the first year of the grant, local law enforcement was very active in its efforts to suppress gang crime” (CYLC 1996 Annual Report). “Our County-wide Pro-Active Unit was slightly increased in size...; ... through intensive investigative approaches in 1996-1997 by local police departments, we have been able to incarcerate numerous hard-core gang members for narcotics trafficking” (CYLC 1997 Annual Report).

In the 1997 CYLC annual report, prevention-activity accomplishments were also noted: “Although intervention and suppression encompass the majority of our programming we incorporate prevention programming every chance we get.” The CYLC report indicated the county was the recipient of another federal discretionary award – the Juvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP) Grant – which was an effort to mentor younger brothers and sisters of the targeted youth in the Project. POWER (Providing Opportunities through Work, Education, and Respect), the new name for the comprehensive gang program (distinct from the steering committee structures, CYLC or Youth Impact), emphasized intervention, mainly basketball games, trips, a monthly speaker to youth groups, tutoring, and jobs provision.

The Crime Analyst of the Bloomington Police Department – whose position during the Project years was paid for through the gang grant – reported that the major organizational change strategies and objectives of the program, in terms of the integration of efforts related to the

suppression agencies, were as follows:

“At the outset of this grant law enforcement agencies were tasked with overcoming differing departmental policies and procedures. To date the agencies have worked exceptionally well together in finding common ground in regard to ... street gang reporting practice, gang intelligence collection ... information exchanges and centralized data ... exploration of ways to disseminate information outside law enforcement... creation of a multi-jurisdictional gang suppression unit... stepped up gang educational awareness for the entire community ...”

(Assessment attachment to Dietz letter of support for Second Year Project reapplication, April, 1996).

OJJDP’s response to the second year application for funding recommended modified objectives: the Project Oz program should develop “a street level mechanism for integrating efforts of law enforcement, schools, youth agencies, and grassroots organizations to target gang members and those at highest risk” (there was special concern that law enforcement officers and outreach workers were operating in separate domains with different youth); that it was important to “increase pro-social opportunities for gang youth, especially school, training, and job related;” and that the Project “develop a functioning coordination responsibility and mechanisms at the street level to mobilize and integrate efforts of community youth workers and police agencies.” OJJDP was concerned that outreach youth workers were not on the streets after 5:00 or 6:00 PM. Churches, settlement house agencies, and housing project neighborhood groups were not being contacted or conceived of as components of the program (OJJDP Manager letter to Project Oz,

July, 1996).

The third year funding application by Project OZ stated, the “goal remains the same to decrease or reduce the rate of growth of gang-related violence.” Additional objectives for year three included: “to increase participation of the faith community (especially in relation to mentoring, counseling and prosocial activities);” “to create more cross-integration of services (e.g., police assisting with alternative school sites, resource officers in schools, business involvement with the POWER program);” and “closer association with the alternative school ‘SAFE’ ” (the school established for youth – often gang members – who before had been suspended or expelled from regular public schools) (Third Year Application, 1997, p. 8).

Project Oz began to question the value of its emphasis on group activities such as basketball tournaments – “we would like to provide more individual counseling for program youth. Many of our services are tailored for groups.” The third year application also stated that the “CYLC would like to work more with the [public] housing neighborhood – [because they were] separated from the rest of the community” (Third Year Application, 1997, pp. 17-21).

Questions also began to be raised about the Project’s inclusion of a disproportionate number of African-American youths as the program continued. In response to a letter from OJJDP, Project Oz provided reasons for “the focus on black gangs:” “lack of employment opportunities” for them; “gangs in Bloomington are historically black based;” “white gangs do not fit criteria of program... they are prison based ... none have been arrested in a gang incident ... Insane Deuces may be a white gang, they showed up in police stats in 1997 but not in 1996 or 1998;” “Latin Kings (a Mexican-American gang) have 47 identified members; of these 14 are age 21 or younger; 11 of the 14 are currently on the caseload.”

Bloomington-Normal's community factors, particularly its white middle-class composition, key leadership perspectives and moral concerns about the gang problem, and the cohesiveness of its established agencies, set the stage for the development of the Comprehensive Gang Program. We could almost have determined the nature of the program and its outcome based on these factors.



## Chapter 6

### **Project Implementation: Strategies**

(Frank Perez and Candice Kane)

In this chapter, we center attention on the extent to which, and how, the program model was implemented at the operational level in Bloomington-Normal, with special attention to goals, objectives, and the five key model strategies: *community mobilization, social intervention, social opportunities provision, suppression, and organizational change and development*. Data are drawn mainly from national evaluation field observations and interviews with Project program staff, program reports, and OJJDP staff communications.

The basic structure and general purpose of Project implementation was largely determined by CYLC, particularly its chairperson. She represented the interests of the public schools in the protection and enhancement of the educational mission in Bloomington. Also extremely influential were the chiefs of police in Bloomington and Normal, and the director of McLean County Court Services. The lead agency, Project Oz, was a significant influence in the development of the program, but at the same time was dependent on the interests, influences, and resources of CYLC and its component organizations.

Key day-to-day operational figures were the Project Director, the Project Coordinator, the Crime Analyst, and to some extent at Project beginning, the Local Evaluator. These central figures operated largely within the framework of perspectives, intentions, and interests of CYLC and its principal constituent organizations: the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, McLean County Court Services, and the School District.

The director of the lead agency, Project Oz, was the Project Director of the

### 6.1

Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Program, and administratively responsible for the Project's development. Based on Project budget, he allocated only 10% or 20% of his time to the Project, but probably actually spent considerably more time on Project matters, particularly in communication with OJJDP, the National Evaluator, and CYLC.

The second year proposal described the structure of the program and the key role of the Project Coordinator as follows:

“The applicant, Project OZ, is an integral part of the communication structure (of CYLC). The program's liaison, the coordinator is the central figure who unites all the parts. He is a member of the CYLC Prevention and Early Intervention Committees, and provides public relations and media contacts. (He quickly became the county's 'single point of contact' on gang issues (Second Year Proposal 1996, p. 3).

The Project Coordinator reported to the Project Director, “but also takes direction from the conclusions reached by the steering committee (CYLC or, later, Youth Impact, Inc.), as directed by the chairperson or by consensus [of the steering committee]. His duties regularly include supervision of outreach staff when feasible, coordination of all steering committee's activities, weekly or daily contact with the crime analyst and members of the outreach staff, direction of activities such as the focus groups, and overseeing the documentation in the data base. He is also in weekly contact with the Intensive Probation Office, school staff and other community individuals or agencies on an as-needed basis. Further, he is the direct supervisor of the Job Specialist” (Fifth Year Proposal, p. 19).

In many respects the Project Coordinator set the tone for program operations. He had the critical role of organizing and facilitating meetings and developing a wide range of both CYLC and Project activities. His initial philosophy was that there were “good” or peripheral gang kids that program social services should primarily attend to, and that law enforcement, the court, and the correctional system should primarily deal with the “bad” kids, especially those who did not respond to program services.

The Crime Analyst of the Bloomington Police Department worked closely with the Project Coordinator. The two shared a great deal of information about program youth. They worked together on a day-to-day basis defining the nature of the gang problem, what the program should do with youth, who should be involved in the delivery of services, how specifically the youth should be served, and what communication across the agencies should take place.

Other positions budgeted included a Job Development Specialist to enlist members of the business community to offer opportunities to program youth, and to place and sustain program youth in jobs. Youth Outreach Workers were to be employed in a “street-based approach” to “make contacts with gang and at-risk youth,” “build trust and rapport with gang youth, especially leadership youth,” act as “liaison between youth and program components,” “make appropriate referrals [of youth] for immediate/basic service needs,” “make regular contacts with schools about specific at-risk youth,” and “maintain demographic and economic information given by youth” (1994 Proposal, pp. 20-21).

A Juvenile Intensive Probation Service (JIPS) Officer position was created in 1995 to work closely with the Project. He was supported for a year through the OJJDP grant, and then by McLean County Court Services. He was assigned 12 to 15 probationers, providing them with

surveillance during curfew hours, assessing probation violations, and arranging transportation for employment searches, doctor's appointments, drug treatment assessment, counseling and school registration. Later in the program, a state juvenile parole officer was assigned to work with gang youth in the Bloomington area, and with the Project.

The implementation of the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in Bloomington progressed through various phases. In the initial phase, the expectation of Project leadership, as suggested above, was that OJJDP funds would enhance existing key agency approaches to the gang problem. The program would emphasize prevention and early intervention, and permit continuation of services to youth in Project OZ's existing agency programs, while adding new referrals from police, schools, and other agencies. The expectation initially was that Project OZ would separately target the at-risk youth for services, and the police would separately suppress the gang bangers.

The second and dominant phase of the Project, in response to pressures from the OJJDP Program Manager, Technical Assistance, and the National Evaluation team, was the integration of probation and police suppression, outreach youth work, and social intervention, along with the provision of opportunities through school and jobs for both gang-involved and highly at-risk youth. Police focused on surveillance, and outreach youth workers focused on group services, limited counseling, and mediating services. They were to be more closely involved as a team in addressing program youth. Distinctions as to different patterns of worker contact and services to gang and at-risk youth were not made, despite the second year program application. A possible third phase, which did not fully evolve until the end of the fourth year and termination of OJJDP funding, was a more individualized focus on highly at-risk youth with emphasis on school and

job-development services. With each Project phase there seemed to be an increase in pro-active control or suppression, involving school, probation, and police personnel. The Bloomington Project developed an increasingly suppression-oriented, well-coordinated but non-differentiated service/worker contact approach to both gang-involved and gang at-risk youth, with probably greater emphasis on justice system controls than on social intervention and provision of social opportunities (particularly through probation, but also youth workers).

### Community Mobilization

The CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., (CYLC) sought to recruit additional agencies and community groups to enhance services and opportunities, particularly for at-risk youth and to some extent for gang-involved youth. Gang prevention was added to an already existing CYLC Prevention Committee interest in prevention of suicide, and use of drugs and alcohol. Big Brothers and Big Sisters were brought to the community, and other agencies began to serve at-risk youth through mentoring programs (JUMP). CYLC and Bloomington High School “partnered” more closely with Bloomington and Normal police departments.

The problem of disruptive youth in the schools was now handled through a special school program, a SAFE school, where gang and at-risk youth could be sent. Special efforts were also made through “outreach youth efforts” to counsel youth and their families and to refer youth for services. An innovative job-preparation service through the purchase and operation of an ice cream parlor, Scoop Dreams, was established with financial support and approval from the Mayor’s office and community volunteers.

The Project Coordinator and Crime Analyst reported that they conducted 150 gang-

awareness seminars and presentations before a variety of community agencies, schools, and community groups. Violence-prevention marches (“Walk and Talk”) took place in various neighborhoods. The Project Coordinator joined various Bloomington city officials, including uniformed police, in a door-to-door survey of the neighborhoods and gang areas. There was increased contact by the lead agency and Bloomington Police Department leadership with other justice and community agency administrators, especially probation, parole, schools and selected social service providers.

The Crime Analyst and Project Coordinator, along with Bloomington Police Department’s Crime Prevention Officer, developed an educational gang brochure, and distributed 35,000 copies throughout the community (Youth Impact Accomplishments 1995-2000). A support group for parents, an intensive program for high-risk and gang-involved youth, and a citizen adopt-a-class program were planned. The Early Intervention Committee of CYLC was instrumental in developing a tattoo-removal program for gang-involved youth, which required contacts with probation officers, parents, local law enforcement, and 30 hours of community service by youth. It is not clear, however, to what extent these latter proposed activities were actually carried out (1996 CYLC Annual Report).

Toward the end of the Project period, the Project Director noted that school, probation, and social agencies were now “working better together. The youth are better off now than before the program. The bad guys have been put away, while the program has helped other kids to go straight” (I. Spergel notes on visit to Bloomington February 8-10, 1999). McLean County Court Services, the state’s attorney’s office and the schools were planning to develop a police diversion program for youth attending Bloomington High School. Outreach youth workers were expected

to assist the school in developing positive student relationships, resolve complaints, represent students' concerns to school officials, and identify issues and report youth who threatened the safety and welfare of the students, faculty, administration and the public (Youth Impact Accomplishments 1995-2000).

There remained, however, little interaction or contact by the Project with grassroots groups or with the public housing residents of the community, where much of the gang activity occurred. Citizen groups in the Latino community were increasingly concerned with their gang problem in the later years of the program, but little Project outreach, community mobilization or social intervention effort was directed at the heavily Latino population in the area, where a major drug bust had occurred in 1994. Youth outreach workers believed there was little interest in the area, in part because the area still contained a large white population, and the Project did not want to associate the idea of a gang problem with the area (Perez and Scott Memo to I. Spergel, July 8, 1998).

The local churches close to minority communities with gang problems were not involved in community mobilization efforts. Probation officers revealed they had deliberately not referred white clients with criminal backgrounds to the Project. They thought the Project was only for African-Americans and Latinos. The Project was never able to establish fully collaborative relationships with the Western Avenue Community Center, which had close and sustained relationships with gang youth and their families in the African-American and Hispanic communities in Bloomington.

A National Evaluation staff member reported his views of the accomplishments of Project leadership in regard to the community mobilization strategy, in particular the high focus on

mobilizing justice, but not local social service, agencies:

“The Project was very successful in their town. The Project made inroads in creating partnerships between various criminal justice agencies where none existed before: the State’s Attorney, the court, juvenile and adult probation, and the police now were working closely together to make a safer community. However, the steering committee members have not established the same type of intensive relationships with social service providers that they have with the justice agencies” (F. Perez Memo to I. Spergel, February 11, 1999).

The Project Coordinator reported at the end of the Project period that there were “four main components of their successful program community mobilization effort: the lead agency, the schools, law enforcement, and court services. Other areas are also important but most of our strategies focus on these four” (Bloomington Site Report at Cluster Meeting, Mesa, Arizona, April 12, 1999).

Coordination. The relationships between police and youth outreach workers during the program period, particularly in the early years, were mainly formal and hierarchical, at least until the late summer and fall of 1998. Initially, the Project Coordinator met with the Crime Analyst and other justice system supervisory personnel. Information-sharing about the gang situation, and direct communication between front-line police or pro-active patrol officers and outreach youth workers did not take place. The later meetings began to involve street-level police, probation, parole officers and outreach workers as well as supervisors. Problems of coordination and



collaboration in terms of the Program Model and the Evaluation still remained.

“We [National Evaluation and Technical Assistance staff] attended the bi-weekly meeting [of law enforcement, probation, parole and outreach workers] called by [the Project Coordinator] to go over the status of each program youth. Many of the persons present did not know each other. About half of the youth discussed (n = 31) were not known to the police... the police were taking notes about many of the youths. When National Evaluation and Technical Assistance staff brought up the issue that police who knew the program youths should be completing evaluation worker-tracking records, the police were reluctant to do so, but they said they did not reject the program. They seemed uncertain about their role on the Project.

[The Project Director and Coordinator] later insisted there was considerable contact across the units, but that the police were reluctant to fill out worker-tracking records and this did not reflect that contacts across workers were not occurring” (Spergel notes on meeting August 3-5, 1998).

The National Evaluator’s visit to a Project interagency staff meeting approximately six months later resulted in a similar set of observations about the non-reciprocal relationships of police and outreach youth workers, and the unclear purposes of these attempted cross-disciplinary team meetings.

## Social Intervention

Social intervention, according to the Model, was to be a key strategy in the implementation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. It signified not simply a set of activities and procedures to facilitate the youth's social adaptation and social development, but focused on reaching gang-involved and highly-at-risk-for-gang-involvement youth in their street environment. Such youth generally were not served (or served successfully) by a variety of established social service agencies and community organizations. Social intervention as an integral component of the Community-Wide Model had to contribute to community integration and development. The social intervention worker, especially the youth outreach worker, had to be someone closely related to the community, i.e., a member of the target community, a former gang member from the community, or someone who was knowledgeable about and identified with key communal structures and knew the gangs in the area. The community-based status of the outreach youth worker, i.e., his being closely identified with the local community, accepted by gang youth and his bridging function, would be more important than the specific services he provided. Such a person could best penetrate and constrain gang structures, and facilitate the integration of individual youth into legitimate local and larger-community patterns of behaviors, as well as assist local institutions and agencies to better accept and serve individual youth.

Many of the outreach functions in the Bloomington-Normal program were carried out by the outreach youth worker and probation officer. They made contact with gang and at-risk youth, contacted parents, liaised between youth and program components, made appropriate referrals for services, made contact with important "partner" agencies such as school, police, job training and

placement agencies, as well as other social service and youth agencies. While probation officers had an authoritative relationship, the youth worker's relationship focused more on recreation and brief "counseling" or crisis contacts. Outreach youth workers assisted in the development of a range of group recreational activities (such as basketball games), and discussion groups around drug use and gang participation. Youth outreach workers went to court hearings, school meetings, contacted parents at home in the evening, responded to crisis calls from both the youth and (especially) the school regarding the youth's behavior.

Youth outreach workers on the Project were students who were in, or had graduated from, Illinois State University. Most were recruited by the Local Evaluator, who was a professor of criminology. While almost all of the outreach workers were minority group members, mostly African-American males, none were from the local community. It was difficult for these youth outreach workers to develop a close connection with local gang culture, and to understand gang patterns and gang leadership structures. Youth were largely referred to the program through established agencies such as probation and school, and less frequently through youth already in the program, or youth-worker street contacts.

The role of the youth outreach worker required that he "hang out" in parks, recreation centers, malls, or on the streets, particularly at night and on weekends, when youth gang activities were most likely to occur. This role was not substantially accepted by the Project administration. Project Oz generally required outreach youth workers to establish contacts with program youth during the day, at school and court, through scheduled recreational activities or through home visits, occasionally made at night. Project leaders did not accept the advice of Technical Assistance and National Evaluation personnel that outreach youth workers schedule night or

weekend work. The Project Director and Coordinator indicated that “clients are not out at night or at least not on the streets.” However, the police claimed that program youth “hung out in the neighborhoods and were easy to find at night and at other times in front of their homes and in specific identifiable street locations.” This latter view was verified by the National Evaluation staff in the course of ride-alongs with the police.

It was apparent that youth outreach workers were not finding program youth on the streets because the youth workers did not ordinarily contact youth in their hangouts at night or on weekends. The National Evaluator asked the Project Director about the contradictions of information provided by Project Oz staff and the police. The Project Director said that they now had plans to change the work hours of outreach youth workers (I. Spergel notes on visits to Bloomington, August 3-5, and 11-12, 1998). Nevertheless, Project administration believed that youth outreach work would not be effective in a community where drug use and drug selling were key problems. Traditional youth outreach work would be more relevant in neighborhoods where a good deal of conflict between gangs was occurring. The Project Coordinator also added in the course of one of the frequent discussions about youth outreach work:

“I’ll tell you the biggest things about street work is ... I think it’s a great thing, but you have to find workers who are not only willing to do it but are good at it. And maybe we didn’t do a good job finding people who are good at it”  
(Transcription of Bloomington site, conversation with project leaders, October 8, 1999).

Project administrators believed that the OJJDP grant required them to focus on

intervention and suppression. Social intervention activities included major basketball tournaments, fashion shows, and field trips to other cities. The Project Coordinator insisted that one of the significant accomplishments of the Project was that youth from different gangs were participating in athletic events without conflicts occurring. These events often involved significant adult observers from city government and business. Youth Impact, Inc., – the steering committee – strongly believed that the focus of social intervention should be on gang prevention. The JUMP grant that Project Oz applied for and received enabled them to “add the prevention piece” and target youth who were at lower risk.

Project Oz was interested in a range of social development issues, particularly providing services that would enable youth to take fuller advantage of learning and employment opportunities through Scoop Dreams, and mediating conflicts, especially between youth and the school. Also of special concern was the high level of drug use by program youth. The outreach workers counseled youth on the dangers of using drugs and alcohol and reminded them of the agency services available to them (Letter to OJJDP, January 5, 1998).

The Project did not make significant use of other services for gang-involved youth that were already available in the community. The program did not develop the same kind of working relations with the Western Avenue Community Center that it had with police, probation, schools, and certain other social service agencies serving at-risk youth, such as Boys and Girls Clubs and Big Brothers and Big Sisters. A problem of interagency collaboration persisted with the Western Avenue Community Center. Many of the gang youth in the program, especially African-Americans, were already known to the Center, where they regularly played basketball.

Key staff members of the Community Center knew the gang members and their families.

One of the male staff members grew up in the area, and was fully identified with the concerns and interests of the gang youth and their families. He was also critical of the lead agency for not acknowledging the Community Center's involvement with, and the assistance they gave, to these youth and their families. Toward the end of the Project, the lead agency indicated that the Center was also the only available and accessible agency for the Latino community, and stated that if fifth-year funding were available, an additional outreach worker could be hired to provide services to Latino gang youth, who were then increasingly involved in gang-violent activity (Fifth Year Funding Application, May 6, 1999).

At the beginning of the Project, OJJDP, Technical Assistance and the National Evaluator were concerned that the Project was focusing too heavily on at-risk youth and insufficiently on more seriously at-risk and gang-involved youth. In response to such feedback, the Project encouraged an increase in communications between street-level police and outreach workers about program youth. At first, outreach workers made efforts to initiate contacts with police (particularly those who might know the youth), but obtained a limited response. In due course, the police became more interested in contacts with youth outreach workers, mainly to obtain information for suppression purposes; and youth workers subsequently became less inclined to make contact with and provide information to police about program youth.

In one of his final visits to Bloomington, one of the National Evaluation staff reported contacts and conversations with the Project Coordinator and two outreach workers as they rode in the same vehicle together:

“The first outreach worker said that the Coordinator was clearly in favor of putting kids in prison for the slightest infraction. The Coordinator expressed

displeasure with the work of the Juvenile Intensive Probation Service officer, whom he described as too lenient with kids who showed up late for probation appointments. The other outreach worker believed that the Project was not successful because it sent so many youths – all Black – to prison. The Coordinator thought ‘this was a sign of success’” (F. Perez notes after visit to Bloomington, October 7-8, 1999).

### Provision of Social Opportunities

Social opportunities are defined as basic education, training and jobs, which offer access to legitimate adult roles and potentially satisfying legitimate careers in society. Youth gang members and the larger culture subscribe to these values. Schools seemed generally to have more difficulty operationalizing cultural and social values in respect to integrating gang and at-risk youth into the larger society. Gang youth appeared to have more difficulty accepting the norms and values of the school experience than of the job experience. Gang youth were not well-prepared for either experience.

Education. Schools in Bloomington had a “zero tolerance” policy directed toward gang behavior, however minor or insignificant. At first, the schools suspended and “often expelled gang youths to the streets.” However, local educators and other community leaders believed that “this was a contributing factor to [the youth’s] entrenchment in the gang and other criminal behaviors” (Youth Impact, Inc., Accomplishments 1995-Present). An education alternative to school suspension and expulsion emerged in 1997. While Project Oz did not directly create the

new educational alternative school called SAFE, several steering committee members and the Project Director did serve on the SAFE school board. They believed that youth, particularly at the high school (and to some extent at the middle school) level could receive an appropriate education in a separate educational program, earn a GED or a high school degree, even graduate and return to regular classes at their school of origin. As indicated earlier, the Local Evaluator noted that actual practice did not necessarily conform to theory or good intentions. Most SAFE youth were never readmitted to regular school because their past maladaptive behavior persisted in the alternative school as well.

In the course of the Project, mutually useful relationships were established between SAFE school and Project staff. Outreach youth workers were regularly called to the school to assist in resolving crises involving program youth. SAFE school began to serve as a place for counseling and tutorial efforts conducted by outreach workers at the end of OJJDP funding. Other schools in Bloomington and Normal also apparently began to make extra efforts to assist hard-to-reach or at-risk youth to adjust effectively to the school setting. Special school space was being planned for outreach youth work staff in the school. Outreach workers were expected to become an integral part of operations in local schools. The plan was for the Project Coordinator to transfer to the regional Office of Education in Bloomington to take administrative responsibility for outreach youth workers in the schools.

Employment. The Project experienced initial difficulties in both obtaining jobs for youth, and assisting them to sustain jobs. Employers were hesitant to work with gang-involved youth. Project staff were at first frustrated by the work ethic and work history of several of the youth.



The steering committee and Project Oz embarked on a complex, potentially meaningful and productive, but risky employment training venture. A vocational training laboratory was established in 1998. The Project began to operate a business and take direct responsibility for training youth. An ice cream store located near Project offices became available for purchase. The site would be used for job readiness training (job interviewing, role playing, creating a work ethic, learning to interact with co-workers and bosses, and of course, highlighting the value of regular paychecks).

The building, including the ice cream shop, renamed Scoop Dreams, and a second floor space, was purchased with funds from the City of Bloomington. Office space was created upstairs for training by a job development specialist; computers were donated for tutorial work. A community-policing substation was to be established upstairs, as well. The ice cream parlor opened up for business and training services with 15 program youth as employees. However, with youth quitting and not showing up, the regular work force consisted of eight youths. Each youth worked approximately 20 hours per week at Scoop Dreams during the summer of 1998. When the parlor closed for the season in October 1998, six of the youth obtained “viable” employment, a seventh went to college and others apparently returned to school. The media followed the Scoop Dreams experience with positive press and editorials.

In year two of Scoop Dreams, the Project partnered with the Regional Alternative School and added a formal classroom upstairs that could be used for vocational training in the morning, followed by work in the ice cream parlor downstairs in the afternoon and evening. Nine of the 11 youth who began the program in the second year earned credits toward their high school diplomas. Scoop Dreams was close to a break-even point in the second year. Several businesses

in Bloomington and Normal were committed to employing “graduates” of the program. However, while there were ambitious plans to increase the number of youth participating in the training experience and vocational classes, there was also a continuing sense of frustration by Project staff. Several of the program youth didn’t want a job or seemed to be unemployable. Program youth didn’t show up for follow-up job placement interviews. The job specialist observed that the youth she placed – some from Scoop Dreams – worked for a brief time and then quit. The complaint was that they “worked to get a youth a damn good job at \$10 - \$12 per hour and the youth quit in two days.”

As of late 1999, the job specialist had created a job bank with 165 entries. Twenty-five program youth had become employed, but each youth seemed to have many handicaps to overcome. Transportation was a major obstacle. Few of the program youth had access to cars to travel to work, usually several miles from their homes. Even fewer of the youth had driver’s licenses. The job specialist observed:

“The youths have spent so much time in the Department of Corrections that they have little or no exposure to the work environment and no work references. I have recently been working with one such youth, 18 years old, bad reputation with police, no family, a baby on the way, and no work history. I generated many phone conversations [to find a job for him].

Finally, I found Mr. M from the Pantagraph [the local newspaper] who was willing to take a chance on the youth. The youth’s job interview went well, but we were all sweating the ‘drug screen.’ The youth passed and we rejoiced. He is now working for the first time in his life. If this experience works, the

Pantagraph is going to employ another of our youth” (Kohler, Report from the Job Specialist, February 10, 1999).

### Suppression

The suppression strategy of the Model did not consist primarily of detecting, finding and locking up offenders, or even of community policing, in which community residents and local organizations were expected to collaborate with the police in protecting the community, stimulating the provision of public services, and even contributing to the community’s economic development. Instead, the intent of the comprehensive gang suppression strategy, based on the notions of social control and protecting the community, was targeting gang youth in ways both to assist them to conform to the law and to societal norms of conduct, and to hold them accountable for crimes they committed. The police officer was to use discretion in making arrests (especially around minor infractions and status offenses), communicate respectfully with gang youth and their families, and demonstrate a tough but concerned positive approach to youthful gang offenders and youth at high risk of gang involvement. The suppression strategy was expected to be optimally effective in interaction with other Project strategies, such as social intervention, provision of social opportunities, and community mobilization. However, this Model suppression strategy, at the operational level, could only be carried out where police department policies and practices and local community values and interests accepted the Model.

A pro-active multi-jurisdiction gang unit was established in Bloomington and Normal and the rest of the county, which emphasized an aggressive, no-nonsense approach to the presence and activities of gangs. The unit was formed before the start of the Project to address “an

outbreak of gang violence, gang incidents and chronic drug dealing.” It comprised 11 officers from the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, the McLean County Sheriff’s Department, Illinois State University Police Department, and the Illinois State Police. The unit was headed by the Bloomington Police Department. The officers of the unit could travel throughout the entire county, although most of the problem was located in Bloomington (Youth Impact, Inc. Accomplishments 1995-Present, 1999).

At first, there was limited contact by police with either probation, parole or social service elements of the Project. Operationally, the police perceived that funds obtained through the Project would serve to support and enhance its pro-active anti-gang crime activities, including more effective crime analysis and data systems coordination. The Bloomington Police Department did not see itself as substantially involved in prevention or social intervention in regard to the gang problem. The police initially did their job separately from social-intervention efforts of the Project. Gang and patrol officers were generally not conversant with Project staff or even with the probation officers who might be addressing the gang problem. Originally, the exchange of information about program youth was only at the supervisory level, between the Project Coordinator and Crime Analyst.

Also, juvenile probation was not at first integrated into Project operations. Seven different juvenile probation officers had been assigned to youth from the Project who were on probation. In the second year, in collaboration with McLean County Court Services, the Project funded an intensive Juvenile Intensive Probation Services (JIPS) Officer, with a caseload of no more than 15 youth, many of them in the gang program. Typically, probation officers carried a caseload of 50 individuals. Hardcore gang members were ordered into the program by the

juvenile court judge. The primary purpose of JIPS was to give youth “one last chance of avoiding the Juvenile Detention Center, the Department of Corrections, or a (residential) treatment facility. The youth would receive extensive services, but also extensive monitoring for accountability such as curfew checks, school and job accountability and drug and alcohol screening.” The secondary purpose was to identify those youth who were not participating in the program, and who were chronic violators of court orders who should therefore be incarcerated (Youth Impact, Inc., 1995 - 2000).

The JIPS officer took a relatively benign and socially-oriented approach. He provided his probationers with “surveillance during curfew hours and adjudicated violators in a fair and timely way. This officer [also] provided clients with transportation for employment searches, doctor’s appointments, drug treatment assessments, counseling appointments and school registration...” (Youth Impact, Inc., Annual Report 1997-1998).

In the middle of the Project period, special arrangements were made with the Illinois Department of Corrections for parolees (presumably with gang ties, returning to Bloomington) to work and cooperate with the Project Oz Gang Intervention Program. According to CYLC reports, the outreach youth worker “rides with the parole officer often. This allows better interaction with the youth and family. The partnership is one of the strongest pieces of our intervention program” (Youth Impact Accomplishments 1995 - 2000). Probation and parole officers were now in close contact with the Project outreach youth staff. Probation and parole officers also cooperated with the National Evaluation in the completion of program tracking forms. But Bloomington or Normal Police Department officers were not as yet integrated into the Project.

As indicated above, the OJJDP Program Manager expressed concern at the start of the third year of the Project:

“about the level of police involvement at the street level. Although [crime analyst] and detectives from the Pro-active (tactical) unit attend Project meetings, at what point does an officer(s) assigned to street patrol or with street level functions make a contact with targeted youth for purposes of rapport building, criminal investigation, or supporting other team members? It does not appear ... any [police] officers are tasked with making routine and/or purposeful contacts with the targeted youth. In effect, as previously mentioned, a team ... is operating on the street without law enforcement fulfilling its critical role. Bloomington and Normal police officers also did not complete tracking forms on program gang youth they contacted during most of the first three years of the Project” (Memo from OJJDP to Project Oz administrator, September 7, 1997).

The Project Director and Project Coordinator became aware that more positive contacts between the police and the program youth had to be developed (Minutes from Bloomington Monthly Conference Call, December 11, 1997). In a letter to OJJDP, the Project Oz director noted that “program youth and police officers are relatively polarized. Some of the mistrust and suspicion on both sides have eased somewhat, but there is still an urgent need to address non-suppression interactions between law enforcement and program youth...” (Project Oz director’s letter to OJJDP program manger, January 5, 1998).

The Project Coordinator observed a few months later that they could see a “big change”

in the level of police involvement in the Project. The police had been calling Project outreach workers and notifying them about certain kids. Three of the four police assigned to “cooperate” with the Project were now responding to the National Evaluator’s worker-tracking interviews; an interview with a fourth police officer was also set up. The “cooperating” police “thus far interviewed knew at least 10 of the 62” program youth. Much of the information they provided was on arrests for drug cases. But there appeared to be no significant effort as yet by police to build combined control and support relationships with these youth. The police continued to maintain a generally negative approach to Project youth (Memo from National Evaluator to OJJDP, March 30, 1998).

In discussions toward the end of fourth year funding, the Project administrators reiterated their commitment to the dominant value of suppression in their comprehensive gang program. The following comments were extracted from the transcript of a discussion with the Project Director and Coordinator:

National Evaluation staff member: “... Have you noticed that suppression has picked up, or is it basically the same? Is it more on target because your outreach workers are talking with the police and probation?”

Project Coordinator: “... I think it can’t help but go up when you create an eleven-person pro-active gang unit. You know they’re out there every single night in droves. They’re concentrating on gang members. Then you got two vice units, Bloomington and Normal, going at the same time...”

Project Director: “Now on the other hand we are talking with them [the police] about setting up protocols for getting youth referred for station adjustments and

into the program. [We want the police] to really target these younger kids the first time they pick them up” (Transcript, Bloomington Site, October 8, 1999).

Not recorded in the above conversation but later in the same day, the Crime Analyst indicated that he was concerned that all of the youth they had been sending to jail would come back to Bloomington-Normal as more sophisticated criminals. “This was already beginning to happen.”

In a report submitted to a cross-site meeting of program operators, the Bloomington site administrators presented their written report under various topic headings which included:

“Gang Suppression and Incarceration. This may be our strongest component. We are very aggressive when it comes to the war on gangs. It appears that gangs are the number one threat to this community, and they are dealt with severely by police, prosecution, and the judicial branch. Our failure is that we have developed an us-against-them mentality, and there is extreme animosity between gangs, and the so-called establishment. This will take a long time to change, even though we are addressing it” (Cluster Meeting, April 12, 1999, Mesa, Arizona).

### Organizational Change and Development

*Organizational change and development* was the fifth of the key model strategies. It did not stand alone as a distinct strategy, but was inherent in the satisfactory development of the other strategies: *community mobilization*, *social intervention*, *provision of social opportunities*, and *suppression*. Each of the strategies existed in Bloomington-Normal in some form prior to



the Project. Community leaders, Project Oz and CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., were already addressing the gang problem. The Model sought to address the gang problem at interrelated policy, program, and individual-youth levels, with special focus on outcomes for highly at-risk and gang-involved youth. Changes were necessary to make the local approach accord with the comprehensive, community-wide gang Model.

In the following discussion we first report perceptions of Youth Impact, Inc., leaders and Project Oz administrators about key achievements, strengths, and limitations of the program. Next we examine more systematically changes in the perceptions of a broad range of community leaders and agency administrators as to the nature of the gang problem and their program approaches, based on surveys administered between the first and third years of the Project. In the next section, we assess local application of the comprehensive OJJDP model using a set of performance scales which were rated both by program leaders and the National Evaluation staff at the end of the fourth year of the Project.

### Accomplishments of the Project

#### Perceptions of Project Leadership

In response to a request from the National Evaluator as to achievements of the Bloomington-Normal program at the end of OJJDP funding, the Project Coordinator indicated the following<sup>1</sup>:

“Services offered [to program youth] were street outreach, recreation, family counseling,

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<sup>1</sup>The agencies and categories of service referred to are similar, but the numbers of youth involved in various program activities differ from those obtained from program worker-tracking records (see Chapter 10).

drug and alcohol counseling, employment, mentoring, probation and parole assistance, etc.” He provided statistics in the following categories:

1. Source of referral of youth to the program

probation = 14  
parole = 8  
police = 31  
schools = 10  
youth agencies = 10  
street workers = 25  
other/self = 5

2. Education:

Youth in regular school = 74  
Youth in some alternative education = 29  
Youth who received a high school diploma, GED or college degree = 81

3. Employment:

Youth placed in jobs = 95  
Youth placed in small business with a stipend arrangement = 35

4. Tattoo removal

Youth undergoing removal of tattoos = 6

5. Referrals:

Big Brothers/Big Sisters (JUMP) = 75  
Boys and Girls Club = 26

(Source: Fax from Program Coordinator, May 23, 2001)

At the end of OJJDP funding in December 1999, support and funds had been received from various local sources to continue, expand, and somewhat reshape the program. The county of McLean, the Normal town council, the Bloomington City Council, and several school districts, as well as Project Oz and a range of youth-serving and community organizations, were to be more substantially involved in various aspects of the program. The CYLC mission statement

remained: “to develop a strategy through community involvement to control existing gangs and future criminal activity; to establish an environment which preserves our community by enriching all youth.”

A high level of responsibility for coordination of the various program elements was vested in the Project Coordinator, who was now directly and fully accountable to the Youth Impact, Inc., Board. According to a Youth Impact, Inc., Summary Report, the now-expanded Project Coordinator position

“was created to be the liaison between the gangs, the social service aspect, local law enforcement, court services, schools, and the community. This position also allows for gang education and new program development throughout the community. This position answers to the Youth Impact Board. Although this person is a Youth Impact Coordinator, he is housed at [the lead agency] to also oversee the Street Outreach Program, the Gang Diversion Program, the Bloomington High School Outreach Program, the JUMP Mentoring Program, the Boys and Girls Club Target Outreach Program and Scoop Dreams. This person serves on many boards throughout the community including Big Brothers/Big Sisters, McLean Compact, Regional Alternative School, Minority Council”  
(Youth Impact Accomplishments, 1995-Present; October 2000, Youth Impact, Inc.).

Youth Impact, Inc., claimed that in the expanded and reconstructed set of programs, 275 at-risk or gang-involved youth would be served, with the aid of 13 staff positions. The Youth Impact, Inc., report also noted that there had been an increase in gang activity at the end of the

OJJDP-funded Project, more shootings (although still at a relatively low level), and an increase in arrests for drug activity instigated by Chicago gangs who continued to influence the drug activity of local gangs. The Project Fifth Year Proposal to OJJDP (not funded) reported that gang recruitment remained “fairly stable at approximately 640 gang members.” Arrests and incarcerations of gang members appeared to balance the recruitment of gang members (Project Fifth Year Funding Proposal to OJJDP, 1999, p. 2).

Youth Impact, Inc., and Project Oz indicated that their most significant accomplishment was an “organizational change strategy” – the integration or better interrelationship and strengthening of various suppression units:

“The multi-jurisdictional gang pro-active unit formed across all territorial boundaries in this county. Officers from all jurisdictions work together as a unit to fight gangs. We developed a [Juvenile Intensive Probation Officer position]. This individual has targeted a small group of gang member probationers. These individuals are placed in intensive probation with more structure and supervision, as an alternative to the Department of Corrections. This program has proved to be very successful. We have developed a team approach to information sharing, that meets every month. This team involves police, outreach youth workers, program coordinator, adult probation, juvenile probation, and juvenile parole ...”

(Bloomington Cluster Meeting Presentation, Mesa, Arizona, April 12, 1999).

The Project Director reported that other suppression-oriented personnel – including officers of the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, juvenile detention offices, bike

officers, prosecutors, and a school resource officer – were now in constant contact with all prevention and intervention programs. “Law enforcement has progressed toward the implementation of school intervention when possible. Police officers working gang details now have as part of their procedures, a system to formally refer at-risk youth to local school service programs. Probation officers and juvenile parole officers are involved in this system” (Fifth Year Funding Proposal to OJJDP, 1999, pp. 13-14).

The Fifth Year Proposal Application (not granted) highlights suppression as the primary strength of the Project.

“We have been, and still are, known as a suppression-oriented city. We have a track record of working large long-term gang conspiracy cases that have effectively involved sections of each gang’s hierarchy... we plan on continuing this course of action as resources and opportunities permit... our information sharing capacity has been greatly extended due to this project...since 1995, we have developed an instrument for exchanging information between all agencies (justice and social agency) concerned and involved in gang suppression, intervention, and prevention” (Fifth Year Proposal, 1999, p. 13).

Another Project strength cited was enhanced intervention and prevention as combined with various types of school control or suppression.

“Project Oz has developed an outstanding relationship with both school districts... [Our outreach youth workers placed in the schools] are often called in to mediate situations. We attend suspension and expulsion hearings. The schools let us visit

our clients at schools preferably before school, during study hall, during lunch or after school. If our youth are not attending school, we are notified. We are sent progress and report cards on our youth. The relationship has kept more youth attending school, prevented suspensions and expulsions and allowed us to seek alternatives when the regular school setting was not working” (Fifth Year Proposal, 1999, p. 6).

The Youth Impact, Inc., plan indicated that the outreach youth workers connected with the Alternative School would now be stationed at Scoop Dreams, and on call during regular school hours via cell phone and beeper. The outreach youth workers were expected to intervene in problem situations before they escalated into more serious situations at school; they were to work with parents, conduct drug/alcohol prevention and education/career planning activities as well (Youth Impact, Inc., Accomplishments, 1999, 1995 - 2000).

The Project Director expressed pride in other accomplishments: job training activities at Scoop Dreams, placing some youth in college, and the development of special gang prevention programs in association with the various social services. However, the Project also identified certain program weaknesses.

“Engaging the grassroots and faith communities is our weakest point. We can do a better job including [contacts with] the churches. We also need to better work with neighborhood associations [especially in the Latino community]. The steering committee is working on getting input from these and [other] sections through a series of focus groups” (Fifth Year Proposal, 1999, p. 7).

Still observed as program weaknesses by Project leadership were staff turnover and the inability of schools to deal with troublesome youth.

“They identified staff turnover and the attendant erosion of relationships with Project youth as the primary weakness of the Project... Also identified [by Project staff] as a weakness was the lack of in-school suspension for youth who got into trouble at school; new infractions [still] result in suspension, expulsion or placement in alternative school” (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, February 8, 1999).

#### Organization Survey Results (Rolando V. Sosa)

The National Evaluation conducted community-agency leadership surveys at each of the five Project sites, including Bloomington-Normal. Project Directors at the start of the program provided lists of organizations and relevant contact persons for the National Evaluators to interview. These lists consisted of organizations expected to be members of the steering committee, service providers to be connected to the Project intervention programs, and other community organizations in the program area concerned about the youth gang problem. The individuals interviewed were in key policy-making, administrative, or high-level program implementation positions, and familiar with the youth gang problem and the organization’s response to it. Sometimes more than one person from an organization completed sections of the same survey questionnaire.

Organization interviews and/or the completion of questionnaires were conducted at two time periods to ascertain whether changes had occurred at the sites between 1996 and 1998. During the first survey (Time I), 132 organizations from all five project sites were interviewed;

during the second survey (Time II), 104 organizations were interviewed. Before the second survey, respondent lists were updated, and the new organizations on the steering committee were also interviewed. The following tables and analysis include only organizations which completed both surveys, i.e., 104 (or 79%) of the original 132 organizations.

Relatively more organizations in Bloomington-Normal completed interviews, both at Time I and Time II ( $n = 25$ ) than the average for the five sites ( $n = 20.8$ ). Also, Bloomington-Normal had the highest proportion of the same organization respondents at both time periods (88%), compared to the overall average five-site percentage, 69.2% (with a low for one site = 43%).

The respondents in the Bloomington-Normal organization sample included representatives of the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, McLean County Sheriff's Department, McLean County State's Attorney's office, McLean County Circuit Court Services, Circuit Court of McLean County, McLean County Juvenile Detention Center, United Private Industry Council, Project Oz, Western Avenue Community Center, Mayor's Offices of Bloomington and Normal, Bloomington Housing Authority, Public Housing Tenant Councils, Chiddix Junior High School, Parkside Junior High School, Bloomington Junior High School, Normal Community High School, Bloomington High School, Regional Alternative Education Program, McLean County School Unit District 5, Holton Homes Tenant Council, Woodhill Family Site, Bloomington Housing Authority, Sunnyside Resident Tenant Council, Olde Town Neighborhood Association, and Mt. Pisgah Baptist Church.

Respondents across the sites generally were males, in their late 40s, with masters degrees, who lived in the city although not necessarily in the program area. The Bloomington-Normal



respondents were similar to respondents at the other sites with some exceptions. All respondents lived in the program area. Slightly more of the respondents in Bloomington-Normal at the second survey (but not at the first) were African-American – 24.0% compared to the average 15.2% for all sites; but somewhat fewer of the respondents in Bloomington-Normal had advanced education (Masters and Ph.D./Law) degrees – 44% versus 59.8%.

Bloomington-Normal organization representatives rated gang crime in the program area generally at the same modest levels on a five-point (1 - 5) scale at Time I (3.07) and Time II (3.11), compared to higher levels across the five sites (Time I = 3.74 and Time II = 3.36).<sup>2</sup> The ratings were significantly lower at two of the other program sites. All site respondents, including Bloomington-Normal, reported that levels of serious violence and less serious violence declined at Time II. Respondents in Bloomington-Normal, perceived property crime as slightly rising. (However, see below; police statistics show an opposite effect.) Drug crime was also seen as substantially (but not significantly) rising in Bloomington-Normal, but slightly falling at the other sites. Respondents at all of the sites rated drug crime as the most serious of the different crimes. The perceived rise in drug crime was greatest in Bloomington-Normal. (Bloomington Police statistics agreed that a sharp rise in gang drug offenses occurred over the Project period.) Non-gang crime was at lower levels than gang crime at all sites, including Bloomington-Normal. There was also less variation in types of non-gang crime than was the case for gang crime within

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<sup>2</sup>We were able to collect Time I but not Time II organization-level data for the comparison sites. The organizations that responded from Champaign-Urbana, although smaller in number (n = 16), were representative of the same kinds of organizations as in Bloomington-Normal. The comparison area rated the level of gang crime at 3.84, significantly higher (.05) than Bloomington-Normal. Serious violence, other violence and property crime (but not drug crime) were viewed as significantly more serious in Champaign-Urbana than in Bloomington-Normal. Drug crime was also rated as more serious but not significantly so at Time I. Although non-gang crime was rated higher in Champaign-Urbana, the difference was not statistically significant.

and across sites, including Bloomington-Normal, between Time I and Time II (Table 6.1).

When organizational representatives were asked the question: “would you say the gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed the same, or become better?” (“over the last three years” at Time I and “over the last year” at Time II), all sites reported an increase in the gang problem, as did Bloomington-Normal (Table 6.2). Only Bloomington-Normal reported slight increases when organization representatives rated area changes in gang and non-gang crisis (Table 6.1), and when each organization representative was asked to rate changes in its organization’s experience with the gang problem (Table 6.2).

Bloomington-Normal organizations regarded their community’s gang-problem strategies as particularly good, and better than did organizations from other sites, especially at Time II. The organizations in Bloomington-Normal were in very high agreement that their approach to the gang problem was very good, i.e., there was high consensus on what a gang is, and on sharing information about criminal actions of specific gang youth. Bloomington-Normal organizations also agreed among themselves that their suppression strategies were very good (Table 6.3).

We observe that although Bloomington-Normal organizations had the highest and most consensual ratings of the quality of their strategies regarding the gang problem, in fact they were the only site whose organizations consistently rated the area and organization-experienced gang problem as getting worse. Their reported effectiveness of strategies did not accord with an improvement, i.e., a decline in the gang problem.

Bloomington-Normal’s organization ratings of the indicators of the strategies of *provision of social opportunities*, i.e., access to employment and to educational programs for gang members, were not as high as they could have been; nevertheless, they were still higher than at

other sites, particularly at Time II. Scores on *social intervention* were even higher than for the provision of social opportunities, but not as high as the ratings for coordination/agreement on *suppression* strategies. Similarly, Bloomington-Normal organizations perceived the strategy of *community mobilization*, especially community planning in regard to gangs, as very good, higher than the view held at all of the other sites, especially at Time II.

Organization respondents in Bloomington-Normal believed that their community had a moderately small problem in respect to property crime, but a serious drug crime problem (although not as serious as perceived at most of the other program sites). Bloomington-Normal organization respondents believed with a great deal of consensus that their strategies for addressing the gang problem were very good. The views of organizations in Bloomington-Normal were highly consistent regarding the scope of the gang problem and what to do about it, with great emphasis on the value of their coordinated community efforts and suppression.<sup>3</sup>

These perceptions from a range of organizations in Bloomington-Normal, systematically collected over the first three years of the program, are also highly consistent with views gathered independently through field observations by local program staff, and those expressed by community leaders (as well as by National Evaluators) over a four-year program and a one-year post-program period of time. The views of representatives of established organizations clearly indicated that a highly cohesive segment of the community felt threatened by a growing drug problem and the “incursion” of gangs. These organization respondents, community leaders, and

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<sup>3</sup>Champaign-Urbana organizations at Time I rated their community strategies for addressing the gang problem as generally low (3.42), but still in the average category. Organizations in Champaign-Urbana rated their community strategies at a significantly lower level than Bloomington-Normal organizations at Time I, for the following categories: social intervention (.01); suppression (.05); and community mobilization (.001).

the Project staff believed the gang problem had to be addressed through a series of well-coordinated strategies and efforts that emphasized suppression; there was also some interest in social opportunity and social-intervention strategies. The administrators of the Bloomington-Normal Project also clearly and explicitly recognized the distinction between the OJJDP Model and their own local model, which emphasized suppression in contrast to a more balanced and interrelated approach, as recommended by OJJDP.

#### Model Performance Indicators (Lorita Purnell)

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key program agency administrators, steering committee members and Local Evaluators to systematically assess the manner in which their local projects were implemented, based on a series of questionnaire scales. The seven persons who completed the ratings in Bloomington-Normal included the Project Director, the Project Coordinator, the Crime Analyst, the Court Services Administrator, the juvenile intensive probation service officer, an alternative school administrator, the head of a drug treatment and counseling program and the Local Evaluator. The performance-rating scales were also completed by three members of the National Evaluation team. The rating scales represented the specific model categories: *program implementation principles* – targeting, balance, intensity, continuity, commitment; the *program elements* – team approach, steering committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal justice and school participation, employment/training, lead-agency management; and the *program strategies* – community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression/social control, organizational change and development. There were multiple items for each of the subcategories

of *implementation principles, program elements, and strategies*. The scale for each item was 0 = no good, 1 = poor, 2 = fair, 3 = good, 4 = very good. All of the ratings were completed by respondents independently of each other.

The item scores per category were first summed, and then the categories were summed. The grand summary average (mean) score for all items and categories (if we also scored the missing responses) was 2.31 for the local program site respondents, and 2.10 for the National Evaluation staff. These grand summary scores were remarkably similar around the “fair” rating. No item achieved a score of 3 = good, or 4 = very good. The combined, unweighted score of all ten respondents, for all items, was 2.21 (Table 6.4). (See also Table 6.5 for Item Score Distribution). The largest number of responses was for three items: lead agency management, suppression/social control and criminal justice.

The categories which received the higher ratings by local program-related personnel were: targeting, balance, intensity, criminal justice, and youth outreach. The categories which received the higher ratings by the National Evaluation staff were: continuity, opportunities provision, employment/training and school participation – a completely different set of categories.

There was better overlap in relation to items which received the lowest scores, albeit they were rated at a slightly higher level by program personnel than by National Evaluation personnel. The categories with the lowest ratings, in rank order by the program-related respondents, were: grassroots involvement, continuity, suppression, community mobilization, and school participation. The categories with the lowest ratings by the National Evaluators were: grassroots involvement, community mobilization, criminal justice, suppression, and organizational change

and development.

If we combine the unweighted scores, the highest-ranked scores were: targeting, opportunities provision, intensity of effort, employment and training, and steering committee. The lowest combined scores were: grassroots involvement, community mobilization, suppression, organizational change and development, and criminal justice. These combined scores would appear to be more consistent with field observations findings than with the organization survey responses reported above. In light of the descriptive findings thus far, we believe the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Model was not adequately implemented in the Bloomington-Normal Project. It was distinguished by a highly cohesive community and an integrated, strategic and worker-contact approach to the gang problem, which emphasized suppression that would readily lead to an increase in arrests for program youth, as our findings below demonstrate.

**Table 6.1**  
**Ratings<sup>1</sup> of Gang and Non-Gang Crime Categories in Program Area**  
**By Site and By Time Period**

Type of Crime <sup>2</sup>	San Antonio (n=12)		Tucson (n=18)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=24)		Riverside (n=15)		Total (N=86)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Gang</b>	<b>4.27</b>	<b>3.61*</b>	<b>4.27</b>	<b>3.97</b>	<b>3.66</b>	<b>3.09*</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>3.11</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.74</b>	<b>3.36***</b>
Serious Violence	4.32	3.45	4.40	3.92	3.55	3.08*	3.25	3.10	3.66	3.39	3.76	3.35***
Other Violence	4.27	3.50*	4.21	4.07	3.62	2.85*	3.07	2.93	3.88	3.46	3.72	3.30***
Drugs	4.33	4.04	4.50	4.38	3.94	3.62	3.85	4.04	4.13	4.15	4.11	4.04
Property	4.27	3.76*	4.00	3.64	3.47	3.06	2.41	2.53	3.70	3.35	3.41	3.16*
<b>Non-gang</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>2.39</b>	<b>2.40</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>2.45</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>2.64</b>
Serious Violence	2.89	2.60	2.63	3.09*	2.54	2.11	2.31	2.15	2.68	2.35	2.55	2.41
Other Violence	2.55	2.80	3.14	3.43	2.82	2.03*	2.18	2.11	2.88	2.35*	2.67	2.47
Drugs	3.09	3.36	3.72	3.91	3.47	2.88	3.21	3.31	3.67	3.53	3.43	3.39
Property	3.11	3.41	3.21	3.19	3.16	2.43*	2.29	2.33	3.10	2.70	2.89	2.71

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; and \*\*\* p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys  
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
 School of Social Service Administration  
 The University of Chicago  
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

<sup>1</sup> Respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of gang and non-gang crime according to the following scale: 1=No Problem, 2=Small Problem, 3=Moderate Problem, 4=Serious Problem, and 5=Very Serious Problem.

<sup>2</sup> The question asks, "For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in (specific program area for each site) in the last 6 months." Specific crimes were categorized into four types: 1) serious violence comprises robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, and drive-by shootings; 2) other violence consists of threats/intimidation, possession of a knife, and possession of a gun; 3) drugs comprises both selling drugs and using drugs; and 4) property consists of vandalism/graffiti, breaking and entering, and car theft.

**Table 6.2**  
**Gang Problem Experienced by Organization by Site and by Time Period**

	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=15)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=23)		Riverside (n=15)		Total <sup>3</sup> (n=83)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Gang Problem Experienced by Your Organization...</b> <sup>4</sup>	1.92	2.23	1.33	2.13**	1.59	2.12**	1.74	2.35**	1.87	2.67	1.69	2.30***

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; and \*\*\* p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys  
 Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program”  
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<sup>3</sup>This is the sum of all the organizations, in all the sites, which completed a Time I and Time II Organization Survey. For each site, the number of organizations completing a Time I and Time II Organization Survey is given.

<sup>4</sup>Respondents were asked to rate the gang problem experienced by their organization according to the following scale: 1=Become Worse, 2=Stayed About the Same, and 3=Became Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question asks: “**Over the last 3 years**, would you say the youth gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?” In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in reference to the time period, “**Over the last year**, would you say the gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?” The question was changed at Time II in order to avoid referring to the time period specified at the Time I Survey.



**Table 6.3**  
**Organizations' Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem**  
**By Site and by Time Period**

Items <sup>1</sup>	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total <sup>2</sup> (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Coordination: Defining the Problem</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>3.62</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.78</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.56</b>	<b>3.70</b>	<b>4.07</b>	<b>3.20</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.55</b>	<b>3.74</b>
1. Organizations' Agreement On What a Gang Is.	4.23	3.95	3.84	3.95	3.76	3.76	3.80	4.28	3.53	3.92	3.82	3.99
2. Organizations' Agreement On Which Individuals Are Gang Members.	3.77	3.69	3.68	4.00	3.59	3.71	3.64	4.00*	3.00	3.44	3.53	3.78
3. Organizations' Agreement On What A Gang Incident Is.	3.46	3.69	3.63	3.89	3.76	3.47	3.88	4.12	3.16	3.58	3.61	3.79
4. Organizations Agreement On What Should Be Done About The Youth Gang Problem.	3.77	3.23	2.90	3.35	3.00	3.29	3.48	3.88	3.16	3.18	3.25	3.41
<b>Coordination: Information Sharing</b>	<b>3.38</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>3.44</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.33</b>	<b>4.27*</b>	<b>2.69</b>	<b>3.36</b>	<b>3.11</b>	<b>3.64***</b>
5. Organizations' Sharing Of Information About Criminal Actions Of Specific Gang Youth.	3.77	3.38	3.30	3.60	3.24	3.65	3.38	4.38*	2.81	2.42	3.27	3.73
6. Organizations' Sharing Of Information About Service Needs Of Specific Gang Youth.	3.08	3.17	2.89	3.42	2.88	3.41	3.20	4.16*	2.66	3.26	2.95	3.55
<b>Social Opportunities</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>2.38</b>	<b>2.39</b>	<b>2.47</b>	<b>2.47</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.35</b>	<b>2.85</b>	<b>2.32</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>2.37</b>	<b>2.69*</b>
7. Employment Opportunities For Gang Members.	2.23	2.08	1.95	2.15	2.06	2.35	1.83	2.46	1.62	2.38	1.93	2.28*
8. Access To Education Programs For Gang Members	2.38	2.69	2.80	2.85	2.88	3.24	2.88	3.25	3.14	3.22	2.84	3.07
<b>Social Intervention</b>	<b>2.62</b>	<b>2.85</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.60</b>	<b>3.64</b>	<b>2.42</b>	<b>3.84</b>	<b>2.99</b>	<b>3.28*</b>
9. Local Service Agency Programming To Deal With The Gang Problem.	2.62	2.85	3.00	3.15	3.06	3.29	3.60	3.64	2.42	3.84	2.99	3.28*

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; and \*\*\* p<.001.

<sup>1</sup> Respondents were asked to rate these items in the program area using the following scale: 1=Poor, 2=Fair, 3=Average, 4=Good, and 5=Excellent. The question was: "How would you rate your program area on the following statements?"

<sup>2</sup> The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response.

**Table 6.3 (continued)**  
**Organizations' Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning The Gang Problem**  
**By Site and by Time Period**

Items	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
<b>Suppression</b> 10. Law Enforcement Efforts In Regards To Gangs.	<b>3.83</b>	<b>3.58</b>	<b>3.95</b>	<b>3.95</b>	<b>3.82</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>4.40</b>	<b>4.48</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>3.84</b>	<b>3.92</b>	<b>4.01</b>
	3.83	3.58	3.95	3.95	3.82	4.00	4.40	4.48	3.37	3.84	3.92	4.01
<b>Community Mobilization</b> 11. Citizen Action In Regard To Gangs. 12. Community Planning In Regard To Gangs.	<b>2.88</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.84</b>	<b>3.03</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.68</b>	<b>3.72</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.61</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>2.98</b>
	3.23	2.23	2.67	2.81	3.00	2.82	3.52	3.32	2.45	2.42	2.99	2.78
	2.54	2.38	2.90	2.86	3.06	3.18	3.84	4.12	3.00	2.79	3.16	3.15

For differences between time periods: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; and \*\*\* p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys  
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
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 The University of Chicago  
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

Table 6.4  
Model Performance Indicators Assessment Summary  
Mean Scores<sup>1</sup> – Bloomington-Normal

Performance Indicator Category	Project Oz/Youth Impact, Inc.	National Evaluation	Combined
Targeting	2.99	2.49	2.74
Balance	2.75	2.33	2.54
Intensity	2.67	2.54	2.61
Continuity	2.17	2.83	2.50
Commitment	2.37	2.29	2.33
Team Approach	2.06	2.63	2.35
Steering Committee	2.56	2.64	2.60
Grassroots	1.94	.58	1.26
Youth Outreach	2.61	2.21	2.41
Criminal Justice	2.62	1.72	2.17
School Participation	2.31	2.71	2.51
Employment/Training	2.40	2.80	2.60
Lead Management	2.58	2.19	2.39
Community Mobilization	2.29	1.52	1.91
Social Intervention	2.52	1.94	2.23
Opportunities Provision	2.57	2.83	2.70
Suppression/Social Control	2.22	1.89	2.06
Organizational Change and Development	2.35	1.89	2.12
Totals	2.31	2.10	2.21

Instrument: Performance Indicators Survey  
Evaluation of “The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to  
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<sup>1</sup>The number and rating of responses for each item relevant to a particular major category of program elements, strategies and implementation principles, using a five-point Likert scale, are: no good = 0, poor = 1, fair = 2, good = 3, very good = 4. The Project scores are the mean scores for all responses received from Bloomington-Normal. The National Evaluation scores are the mean scores for all responses provided by the National Evaluation Team. The combined scores are the unweighted means for the Project and the National Evaluation Team.

Table 6.5  
Item Score Distribution: Model Performance Indicator Assessment  
Bloomington-Normal<sup>1</sup>

Performance Indicator Category	# of Responses Assigning a Likert Score of ... to a Given Category					Did not assign a Likert Score	Total Responses
	LS = 0	LS = 1	LS = 2	LS = 3	LS = 4		
Targeting	0	1 (2.7%)	8 (22.2%)	11 (30.5%)	13 (36.1%)	3 (8.3%)	36
Balance	0	0	6 (33.3%)	5 (27.7%)	5 (27.7%)	2 (11.1%)	18
Intensity	1 (2.7%)	4 (11.1%)	3 (8.3%)	9 (25%)	14 (38.8%)	5 (13.8%)	36
Continuity	0	0	4 (11.1%)	18 (50%)	6 (16.6%)	8 (22.2%)	36
Commitment	0	2 (5.5%)	9 (25%)	13 (36.1%)	6 (16.6%)	6 (16.6%)	36
Team Approach	0	4 (4.0%)	25 (25.3%)	35 (35.4%)	14 (14.1%)	21 (21.2%)	99
Steering Committee	0	2 (2.0%)	13 (13.1%)	24 (24.2%)	39 (39.3%)	21 (21.2%)	99
Grassroots	14 (17.3%)	27 (33.3%)	13 (16.0%)	4 (4.9%)	14 (17.3%)	9 (11.1%)	81
Youth Outreach	7 (5.1%)	10 (7.4%)	21 (15.6%)	45 (33.3%)	35 (25.9%)	17 (12.5%)	135
Criminal Justice	12 (7.0%)	12 (7.0%)	24 (14.0%)	52 (30.4%)	43 (25.1%)	28 (16.4%)	171
Schools Participation	3 (1.9%)	9 (5.5%)	20 (12.3%)	33 (20.4%)	59 (36.4%)	38 (23.4%)	162
Employment/Training	0	3 (6.6%)	8 (17.8%)	13 (28.9%)	14 (31.1%)	7 (15.6%)	45
Lead Management	1 (0.46%)	25 (11.6%)	50 (23.1%)	47 (21.8%)	65 (30.0%)	28 (12.9%)	216
Community Mobilization	7 (5.9%)	22 (18.8%)	22 (18.8%)	16 (13.7%)	31 (26.4%)	19 (16.2%)	117

<sup>1</sup>Number and rating of responses for each item relevant to a particular major category of program elements, strategies and implementation principles, using a five-point Likert scale, are: no good = 0, poor = 1, fair = 2, good = 3, very good = 4.

**Table 6.5, continued**  
**Item Score Distribution-Model Performance Indicator Assessment**  
**Bloomington-Normal**

Performance Indicator Category	# of Responses Assigning a Likert Score of ... to a Given Category					Did not assign a Likert Score	Total Responses
	LS = 0	LS = 1	LS = 2	LS = 3	LS = 4		
Social Intervention	2 (1.8%)	11 (10.1%)	21 (19.4%)	30 (27.7%)	27 (25.0%)	17 (15.7%)	108
Opportunities Provision	0	8 (9.0%)	11 (12.2%)	28 (31.1%)	31 (34.4%)	12 (13.3%)	90
Suppression/Social Control	3 (1.6%)	26 (14.4%)	34 (18.9%)	53 (29.4%)	31 (17.2%)	33 (18.3%)	180
Organizational Change and Development	0	8 (9.9%)	21 (25.9%)	17 (21.0%)	20 (24.7%)	15 (18.5%)	81

Instrument: Performance Indicators Survey  
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to  
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The University of Chicago  
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## Chapter 7

### **Research Method: Data Collection**

The Evaluation addressed several interrelated and sequential questions: 1) what was the nature and extent to which the comprehensive gang approach model was implemented?; 2) to what extent, if any, did the Bloomington-Normal program contribute to a relative reduction in youth gang crime, particularly at the individual-youth level; and 3) to what extent was the program associated with a change in gang crime at the community level? We have addressed the first question in the previous chapters of this report, at the level of program structure and development in its response to the gang problem, within the context of the community's concerns, fears and existing organizational arrangements, as well as of the extent to which the response was consistent with the OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Model.

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker effects, and outcomes for individual youth, particularly in respect to delinquent behaviors. Later we examine the possible associated effects of the program, with changes in gang crime at the gang-as-a unit and community levels. Our general hypothesis was that program services and contacts directly contributed to a change in key life-course or life-space characteristics of program youth, and also resulted in a change (reduction) in their gang involvement and delinquency patterns. First, we describe our research design, instruments employed to gather data, and the problems we encountered in data collection. In the following chapter we begin to describe the procedures we used to match our samples. We pay special attention to the measurement and analysis procedures we used to overcome serious sampling and data-collection problems.

### 7.1

We planned for and anticipated a sample of at least 100 program and 100 comparison youth who would be identified as gang members (or youth at high risk of gang involvement) at each site, and whom we would be able to interview in at least two waves. The youth were expected to be between the ages of 12 and 20 years, predominantly male (but with a substantial number of females), predominantly African-American and Latino, and (to a lesser extent) white non-Hispanic/Latino, Asian, and Native American. We expected the samples to reflect the nature of the gang problem in the most serious gang-problem program and comparison areas, as selected by local Project-site program and evaluation personnel. Some of these expectations were met, some were not. A variety of data sources and data collection procedures were used. Many of the serious burdens of data collection and subsequent obstacles to measurement and analysis were not anticipated.

Our main individual-level, data-collection instruments were the individual gang-member survey for program and comparison youth, the worker tracking form for program youth, and official police arrest histories for both program and comparison youth. Somewhat simpler and shorter forms were used to collect data on exposure to the program, and the dates and times the youth spent in detention or corrections, i.e., when he was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in the community. The variables constructed within and across the data sets were to tell us how the services and contacts were organized in relation to program-model requirements over particular time periods, what kinds of youth were in the program or comparison groups, and what key services and worker contacts were provided to and received by program youth.

The key life-course or life-space changes of youth that could be affected by the program would be changes in school achievement, jobs, income received, gang involvement, friendship

patterns, personal and family problems, aspiration and expectation levels, and perceptions of changes in gang and community characteristics. Outcome variables were changes in self-reported offenses as well as official arrests, controlled for prior arrests, demographic and gang-membership variables, and time-at-risk in the community. These factors were to be interrelated appropriately to provide us with answers to questions about the nature and effects of the implementation of the program model in Bloomington-Normal. Analyses had to be conducted using police and self-reported outcome data separately, due to the lack of congruence of time periods, as well as to sampling and data collection limitations (to be described later, in Chapter 8).

The gang member survey was conducted with individual youth by local site interviewers. The survey requested various types of information relative to the youth's gang activity, school, employment, leisure time and friends; to crime and fear in the neighborhood, the youth's neighborhood relationships, gang status, the gang structure and process, family life, demographics of the youth, self-reported delinquency, self-reported arrests, criminal-justice experience; and to the nature of his response to program activities and worker contacts. Information on self-esteem and alienation was also gathered. The survey interviews were to be administered at yearly intervals, approximately one year apart.

A worker program-youth tracking form was to be completed by each worker having contact with the youth at the local sites. Basic demographic information about the youth was requested, as well as: the worker's perception of the youth's role in the gang; dates of the youth's beginning and ending contact with the worker; number of contacts with the youth; sources of referral and reasons for youth being in the program; types of services provided; types of referrals



made; the worker's perceived helpfulness of his services to or contacts with the youth; and the worker's collaboration with other workers. A worker tracking form was to be completed for each individual youth on a quarterly basis (every three months) by the service or contact workers, mainly outreach youth workers and probation officers, but also by police, teachers, manpower specialists, and family treatment workers.

The third major form to be completed by the Local Evaluator and/or Crime Analyst for each youth was the police history of all arrests, warrants or suspect cases recorded in the police files, including: date and location of the offense; home address of the youth; gang involvement characteristics (gang motivated/gang-related); the offense charges and codes; nature of weapons involved; brief description of the incident; disposition of the incident/arrest contact; and whether the youth was placed in custody. The history was to reflect all of the youth's pre-program contacts with the police, updated through the end of the program period.

Not all of the data collected has been used for the analyses in this report, but will be in future analyses. We have concentrated first on those variables and data most critical to the questions of who the youth were, and what services or worker contacts were provided, with what results.

### Problems and Constraints

A variety of somewhat similar problems and constraints confronted the Evaluators at all five program sites during the implementation of the Evaluation design, particularly in regard to the creation of appropriate program and comparison samples, and to the integration of data from different instruments collected at different time periods. These problems constrained the

development of the subsequent analyses. Special youth-matching, measurement, and analysis procedures had to be created, which necessitated a great deal of extra research effort. First, we describe the data-collection problems. How they were resolved are described under the following headings: *collaboration*, *data infrastructure development*, *accessing and transferring data*, and *sample comparability*. The analysis problems and the procedures developed to manage them are described below.

Collaboration. The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the Evaluation. As indicated above, those directly involved in the Evaluation included a National Evaluation team at the University of Chicago, Local Evaluators at the five sites, Program and Evaluation Management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, and an Advisory Board. The Technical Assistance team was closely linked and integrated into this complex structure. The National Evaluation was directed by the Principal Investigator at the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. He and his team were responsible for the design of the Evaluation, including sampling frames, data collection instruments and management of the process for carrying out the Evaluation at the local level. Community crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program performance indicators, organizational survey and qualitative on-site observational and other data were collected directly by the National Evaluation team. Gang-member interviews, individual police arrest histories, and program worker tracking forms were mainly completed by Local Evaluators and local program personnel. All individual-level as well as aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, and analyzed by the National Evaluation staff.

The OJJDP Special Emphasis and the Research and Development Division program managers and other OJJDP staff played strong roles in the development and implementation of the program and research. They worked to assure the proper implementation of the Model. Most importantly, they assisted and pressured the Local Evaluators and Project Directors to complete their Evaluation-related assignments in conformity with the research design. The OJJDP staff mediated conflicts that arose between National Evaluators, Local Evaluators and/or local program staff. The National Evaluators also participated in resolving differences between local program staff and local site Evaluators, who were not always in close communication and collaboration with each other, particularly in respect to the collection of individual gang-member surveys, worker tracking forms, and individual police histories.

To a large extent, collaboration between program development and evaluation staffs was structured into the funding of the different program and evaluation functions. Local evaluation funding came out of the local-site Project budgets. The Technical Assistance and National Evaluation staffs were also integrated; their functions were carried out by some of the same staff, but from different budgets. Since the Model and ways to implement it were developed by the University of Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for the National Evaluation, and the Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation, who was also involved in development of the Model, took primary responsibility for Technical Assistance. Both worked in close collaboration with each other.

The national Advisory Board comprised three national experts in the areas of gang research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with the National Evaluation and Technical Assistance teams and their staffs to advise on research design, review

Evaluation materials, participate in selected cluster program-leadership meetings, assess Evaluation progress, and recommend further Evaluation strategies.

Data Infrastructure Development. Information and data processing systems had to be developed at the local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful individual-youth survey, program, and police data. There was a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident data from police sources. The definition and procedures for collection of gang-incident data were undeveloped at four of the five local sites. A definition of a gang incident had hardly been established at the beginning of the Project, referring mainly to a situation in which a youth was involved in a drive-by shooting or a gang graffiti incident. The police departments at the different sites had to specify the offenses which would now identify a gang or non-gang-related incident, and whether the gang incident was based on gang function or interest, or whether it was based simply on the youth's identification as a gang member. Also, definitions of a gang or a gang member were just being formulated. Juvenile or youth gangs had to be distinguished from motorcycle, prison, or adult criminal gangs.

Some consistency of definitions, for example, *gang-involved*, *youth-at-risk*, and *youth at-serious-risk*, had to be established across the local sites and with the National Evaluation team. Special forms and procedures were developed with the local police to identify and record *gang* as distinguished from *non-gang* offenses. The National Evaluation forms and procedures were delivered as new local site computers and software were being developed and installed. Existing police data systems had to be reconfigured, two and three times, to accommodate new operational definitions, and new data-collection and data-organizing procedures for both local

and National Evaluation purposes.

A further problem, particularly in Bloomington-Normal, was clarification of police data for youth classified as suspects, offenders, or those arrested on a warrant. A suspect was not necessarily arrested, but such suspect data collected was regarded as equivalent to an arrest. A warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred. The problems of interpreting police data, and the potential for over-counting arrests/offenses, were present in a site such as Bloomington and its twin city, Normal: two different cities, where a youth who was recorded as arrested for an offense in one city could later be recorded as arrested on a warrant for violation of a court order relating to the same offense in the other city. The development of criminal histories for youth known to one or more police jurisdictions required not only the clarification of terms, but also the integration of police-history data from a sheriff's office in the same or overlapping jurisdiction. Only unduplicated, official arrest data was to be used in the analysis. The collection of aggregate or community-level police data was even more complex and burdensome for the local Crime Analyst and National Evaluator. It required the realignment of police district and program and comparison-area boundaries for criminal incident-accounting purposes.

Accessing and Transferring Data. Closely related to the problem of developing new data systems, or modifying existing systems at the local sites, which would be useful both to the Local and National Evaluators (and the local programs), was gaining access to data sources.

Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement presented a series of problems. Local interviewers were mainly students, often females from middle-class

backgrounds, who had little familiarity with gang youth or gang problem neighborhoods. Many of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth in the gang neighborhoods, particularly in the evenings or on weekends. Interview locations that assured privacy, safety, and some comfort for youth were difficult to arrange. It was usually inappropriate to interview youth at local Project offices, where police or probation staff might also be present. Skill and sensitivity were required to explain the research and obtain consents from the youth, and from the parent if the youth was a juvenile. The parent or guardian might not be readily available. Considerable effort was also required to reestablish contact with a youth for second or third interviews. This was especially true for comparison youth. Whereas the reinterview rate at the second interview ranged from 70% to 80% for program youth, it was 50% or 60% for comparison youth.

Criminal-justice data was particularly difficult to access and use for the purpose of completing criminal-history data forms. Offense codes differed at each site. The data was often located in different sections or bureaus of the police department, e.g., juvenile, adult, and drug-crime sections might have to be separately accessed. Arrest dispositions might not be located in police department records, but at a corrections or detention center. Criminal case-record data was sometimes available through the computer, sometimes only in hard copy or partially on the computer. The police and sheriff dealing with the same youth might also not customarily share data. Police crime analysts or court clerks were generally reluctant to provide outsiders access to case records. Special arrangements had to be made through local police chiefs, chief probation officers, and sometimes presiding county criminal court judges to permit modifications of local procedures to accommodate Local and National Evaluation data needs.

Computerized data was sometimes provided in local police formats and submitted on

diskette, which could produce further problems of data transfer from local police to Local Evaluator to National Evaluator. Software systems might be different or incompatible between the local and national sites. Furthermore, data transferred via the computer was not always clean, accurate or complete.

Obtaining program-process data, i.e., the completion of standardized worker-service or contact-activity records across the different types of workers within and across sites, proved to be another formidable problem. Key problems were existing agency routine and limited Project interest, and/or insufficient particular worker motivation to complete forms. Each agency had its own system of recordkeeping, and Project-related workers did not welcome an additional “bureaucratic” burden. It was difficult for police or probation to understand why the recordkeeping they did for their own agencies was not sufficient for Project purposes. Some of the workers did not believe the Evaluation worker tracking form was sufficient to document what they were doing in the Project. At one site, the probation department insisted that all the necessary data for evaluation of the comprehensive community-wide gang program was already available, either in their hard-copy or computer records. A detailed comparison of data necessary for the National Evaluation and data available in the local-program data system revealed very little match.

Youth agencies did not have a tradition of systematic recordkeeping, although outreach youth workers were somewhat less resistant to completion of worker tracking forms than workers from other agencies. Police were especially reluctant to complete worker tracking forms. Special pressures from OJJDP had to be brought to bear to assure police cooperation. Since a substantial amount of Project funding was allocated to the police, the police were belatedly

persuaded to cooperate. The police across sites were substantially less cooperative than probation or youth workers in the completion of worker tracking forms.

Local site Evaluators and their data collectors had to be trained in how to use existing data sources, whether police, court, or school records, and how to interview gang youth. Inherent in the process of obtaining good data was not only training of local data collectors, but also the cooperation of local site management in the evaluation and development of effective monitoring procedures used by local program administrators and Local Evaluators. Training and demonstration sessions were conducted by National Evaluation staff with the different types and levels of data collectors at each of the local sites. Refresher training sessions took place for new data collectors.

Pressures from OJJDP had to be brought to bear when local-site data was not collected or provided in timely fashion. In one case, serious deficiencies in local data collection meant that a National Evaluator had to make special arrangements through OJJDP for a non-local Evaluator to collect program-youth interview data. In another case, access to aggregate-level, local police data was denied. Such data was too much trouble for the particular police department to reconstruct. This situation, in part, became the basis for termination of funding for that local Project at the end of the fourth program year.

Sample Comparability. The most serious data-selection and collection problem – a limitation of the research design and certainly of the analysis – was establishing comparability of gang-involved and highly gang-at-risk youth at the program and comparison sites. Similar comparison youth had to be found in a comparable, gang-problem community not “contaminated” by the



program. A research assumption was that comparable, gang-related youth should and could be found in a comparable community, and that Local Evaluators had sufficient know-how to obtain interviews from such youth. However, the task of finding comparable youth depended on knowing, beforehand, characteristics of program youth such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, delinquency background, and the nature of gang status. But this information was not clearly known until youth actually entered the Project for program services or contacts. Ideally, the nature and scope of the youth gang problem, and specific information about the youth gang population, should have been known in the Project area, and a representative sample of such youth should have been available to be recruited into the program. This was not the case. The details of youth gang membership, gang structure, gang process, and the delinquency problems they created were just in the process of being known at the beginning of the Project by the program personnel and the Local Evaluator. Knowledge of the gang problem and the gang population in the comparison community were even less well-known in detail. Also, first getting to know characteristics of gang problems and gangs in the Project area made the selection and timing of the youth interviewing process in the comparison area almost impossible. We could not select matching comparison-youth samples and interview them within a time frame similar to that for the program youth.

Furthermore, the task of selecting comparable youth to interview in the comparison area was compounded because there was no ready access to them. While it was not clear how representative program youth were of the youth-gang population in the program area, at least gang youth in the program area ordinarily would become known over time, and would likely become more readily accessible than comparison youth in a non-program area. The

characteristics of non-served comparable gang youth had to be learned, the youth had to be located in the open community, and then had to be persuaded to participate in the research interview.

Police, probation and community-agency personnel in the comparison areas were less likely than in the program area to be interested in the Evaluation, to have information adequate for gang youth contact, and to assist the Local Evaluators in the interviewing process. Information about and contact with the comparison youth had to be obtained with special assistance from police, local agency personnel, neighborhood informants, or gang leaders, but the process of contacting and “using” these intermediaries by Local Evaluators took time, and was not always effective. One enterprising and risk-taking Local Evaluator had her data collectors simply knock on doors in the comparison area to find gang-member prospects and interviewees. She developed a gang-member network approach, and was successful up to a point. Finding and matching comparison with program youth was still a difficult, somewhat unpredictable and not completely manageable process for all the Local Evaluators. At the end of the period when a substantial number of Time I program and comparison youth interviews were available and analyzed, the National Evaluators found that the comparison youth were disproportionately female, older, and less delinquent than program youth, with variation across sites. The National Evaluators tried to make adjustments through selection of only certain comparison youth for Time II interviews (those who would be more comparable to program youth) but were only partially successful.

In Bloomington-Normal, the process of knowing, locating, and obtaining a youth gang-member sample in the comparison area which was similar to the program sample was more

complicated than at the other sites. Despite ecological, economic, demographic, and even gang-name similarities, the nature and scope of the gang problem were quite different in the two sets of twin cities. Belatedly, we discovered that the sample of gang youth from the comparison area did not adequately represent its gang population, at least based on aggregate-level police data. The community gang-crime problem was more prevalent and serious in the comparison site than in Bloomington-Normal. While the program sample appeared to be reasonably similar to the citywide gang-crime population, this was not the case in the comparison area. The gang sample in the comparison area was far less delinquent than the Bloomington-Normal sample.

Furthermore, separate arrangements also had to be made with police and court officials in the comparison cities and counties to gain access to data, with little special inducement for them to cooperate. As it turned out, agencies in the comparison area were highly cooperative with the Local and National Evaluators in the provision of access to data. These comparison-sample problems at the area level were not present at the other sites, since the program and comparison areas were located in the same city.

The interest in the Evaluation, and the ability of the Local Evaluators to contact and interview gang youth and obtain data from criminal justice data sources varied at each site. The Local Evaluator for the Bloomington-Normal area, a recognized gang scholar and ethnographer, volunteered to establish street contacts with gang youth in the comparison area to obtain comparison-sample data. The sample he obtained, however, was a poor match for the Bloomington-Normal program sample, as mentioned above. Substantial numbers of youth in the comparison sample at Time I were either too old or did not even live in the comparison area. Special matching and measurement procedures had to be created to approximately equate the two

samples. The value of the comparison sample was diminished.

## Chapter 8

### **Research Method: Analysis**

The purpose of the Evaluation at the individual-youth level was to determine the nature and scope of the effects of program services and worker contacts (independent variables) on different categories of program youth, including change in key characteristics such as gang involvement, school achievement, employment and income (mediating variables), as well as change in delinquency patterns (outcome variable).

We planned to perform a comprehensive evaluation and gathered data from different sources within and across the sites over a period of four or five years, depending on the particular site. We obtained a good deal of data and created many variables, but our youth samples at each site were not large.

Interviews of program and comparison youth were sometimes collected at irregular time periods. The worker tracking forms supplied information about types and dosages of services and worker contacts, but not all workers had submitted forms over given time periods. The time of each youth's exposure to the program also had to be matched with a similar pre-program period. The data obtained from the different but related sources had to be checked and integrated before analysis could take place. Integration of the data sets across time periods created problems, and special measurements and analysis issues arose.

We had to overcome problems of: 1) mismatched samples; 2) erratic timing of interviews; 3) missing worker-tracking data from the early program period; 4) different police arrest patterns across cities; and 5) different time periods in which the types of data were collected. The analysis obstacles were present at each of the sites, but they were particularly

serious for the Bloomington-Normal Project.

Mismatched Samples. While all of the youth in the program sample were 12 to 20 years of age, the comparison sample contained a number of youth who were younger than 12 years and older than 20 years, who hung out in the comparison area but resided in a city other than the comparison site. Although we included these youth in several of the area analyses, we had to eliminate them from our comparison-area, individual-level analysis; we also did not have access to police data from other cities for these youth.

While only 19% of the program sample were females, approximately 50% of the comparison sample were females. More comparison youth, whether they were male or female, said they were gang members, compared to the program youth. Furthermore, based on official police arrest histories and self-reports, the program youth were two or three times more delinquent, on average, than the comparison youth, i.e., they had a greater frequency of arrests or self-admitted offenses. The program female group, in particular, was much more delinquent than comparison-group females. The predominant racial/ethnic group was African-American in both samples, but African-American youth were not necessarily as delinquent as white or Latino youth in the program sample, who were referred to the program more often from the courts or schools than were African-American youth.

In our matched sampling process, we had to exclude comparison youth who resided outside of the comparison area, and those who were younger than 12 and older than 20 years. Youth in both samples were predominantly African-American, and there was no significant difference in the distribution of this characteristic between the two samples. We excluded

race/ethnicity from the multivariate analyses. We adjusted age differences by placing youth in three age categories – 12 to 14 years, 15 and 16 years, and 17 to 20 years – to achieve a somewhat similar age distribution for the program and comparison samples. We could not do much with the difference in gender distribution between the two samples.

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Youth who entered the Bloomington-Normal program were not generally administered a Time I interview at baseline, that is, as they came into the program. Time I interviews occurred in a few cases before the program officially began, but mainly took place any time within the first year after the youth's entry into the program. Only about half of the interviews of program youth occurred within the first six months of youth-entry into the program. The interval between the Time I and Time II interviews of program youth was generally a year to a year and a half, but a handful of youth were administered Time II interviews two years after the first interview.

The pattern of comparison youth interviews was somewhat less erratic, but comparison youth were interviewed at a later time period than were the program youth. Age of comparison youth would not only have to be adjusted to match the age of program youth at Time I interviews, but to match the age when the program youth entered the program. This would also have to be done in such a way that criminal history periods of program and comparison youth matched the program and comparison periods.

Missing Worker Tracking Forms. Our problem was not simply that certain workers were reluctant to complete worker tracking forms, which described the kinds of services they provided

and/or the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. Worker tracking did not commence in Bloomington-Normal until 1½ years after the program had been underway. About 2½ years of relatively complete worker-tracking data for the four-year program period was available to the Evaluators. This gap did not occur at the other sites.

About 40% of the Bloomington-Normal youth entered the program before worker tracking records began. For the period prior to worker-tracking data collection we had no detailed evidence of services or worker contacts provided for these youth. However, for all program youth we did have relatively accurate and complete program-exposure dates, criminal histories, youth confinement records, the youth's own record of services received, and worker contacts from the individual youth gang-member survey. Issues of the reliability and validity of the services or contacts the workers said they provided had to be resolved; what workers meant when they checked off certain service or worker contact items also had to be clarified.

Different Police Arrest Patterns Across Cities. We learned belatedly that the arrest patterns of police in the Bloomington-Normal program and comparison areas were sharply different. The Bloomington-Normal police were more pro-active than in Champaign-Urbana in identifying gang youth, or at least in arresting them for a range of offenses or crimes, minor and major. This could explain why program and comparison youth differed in frequency of arrests, although not in nature of arrests. The youth samples from the two areas were otherwise similar in a considerable range of characteristics, e.g., school performance, employment, family structure, household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs.

A further distinction was that the level of community crime, gang and non-gang, was



more serious in the comparison area than in the program area (based on aggregate gang-incident and total arrest statistics, and on police perceptions of the criminal patterns of gangs). The gang problem seemed to be more serious in the comparison area, but this was not reflected in the comparison-youth sample arrest data.

In other words, while the program sample could be construed as somewhat representative of the gang youth arrestee population in Bloomington-Normal, it would be more difficult to come to this conclusion for the sample in the comparison community. We also could not completely explain why the comparison sample of youth who said they were gang members were not particularly delinquent, nor why the program sample had so many non-gang youth who were delinquent.

The best we could do to justify a comparison between the two youth samples was to use different sources of data in the separate multivariate analyses, and hope that somewhat similar or explainable change patterns would emerge. We could also examine trends and compare similarities and differences at the individual level with those at the gang-as-a-unit and general community gang-offense levels.

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally all of the data sets at the individual-youth level (individual interview, worker tracking, police, full program exposure, and confinement data) should have been integrated into one comprehensive data set. But this assumed that the time frames for the data collected would match, i.e., that interview, services provided, and worker contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. They did not.

Official police data covered the longest periods, 4 years before and 4 years during the program period for individual youth. The police criminal-history period could be adjusted to match the program-exposure period for individual youth. The program worker-tracking period was 2½ years; the interval between the Time I and Time II interviews was 1 to 1½ years. We could not readily make projections of data obtained based on matching shorter time periods to longer time periods, although we could do the reverse. Short time periods might not be adequate for measuring program effects.

### Analysis Strategy

We wanted to maximize the length of time during which the program could reasonably have some effect, utilize detailed program service, self-report and police information, and provide a comprehensive view of possible youth changes that occurred in interaction with the program, over time, which would best predict success or failure of the Project goal – the prevention, intervention, and suppression of delinquency and the gang problem, particularly at the individual-youth level.

We were not sure we could integrate all the key data sets satisfactorily to achieve this grand strategy. We decided to conduct parallel analyses, moving from larger, inclusive samples to smaller, richer samples of program and comparison youth, using individual youth characteristics, service/worker contact variables, outcome variables, and mediating variables. The major steps in our approach were:

1. Compare the effects of the program using official police data, and the full but non-detailed effects of services or worker contacts provided to the youth during the full program

period. We determined what the effects were on youth in the program compared to youth not in the program. While the advantage of this approach was the utilization of the longest period of possible program effect for all youth (using systematically collected police arrest data), we did not include any detailed data from worker tracking, or most of the interview data on characteristics of program youth. All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, whether the youth said he had been a gang member prior to program entry, and for prior arrests. We determined the multivariate (or bivariate) effects of the program using the police outcome variables of *total arrests*, *violent arrests*, *property arrests*, *drug arrests*, and *other arrests* (usually for minor offenses).

2. Next, compare the effects of the program on youth using the official police arrest and also different worker-tracking services and worker-contact data available over a shorter time period (about the 2½ year period during which detailed service and worker contact data were collected). These program service/contact variables were indicators of the five model strategies. A significant limitation was that we did not have a genuine baseline for when program effects could have started for many of the youth. In other words, we did not observe or measure the program effects on those youth who had been in the program before completion of worker tracking forms had begun. We used the same control variables as we did in the analysis described above, and compared arrest changes of youth in the 2½ year program period and in an appropriately matched 2½ year pre-program period.

3. As in (1) above, compare the effects of the program using self-report instead of police arrest data, and the full but non-detailed effects of the program during the 1 to 1½ year period between the Time I and Time II interviews. We would again determine what the effects were on

youth in the program, compared to youth not in the program. The advantage of this approach was using the youth's self-reports of the types and amount of offense (including gang-related) behaviors he or she committed over the six-month-prior-to-interview periods, 1 to 1½ years apart. Again, we did not include detailed worker-tracking or interview characteristics. We controlled for age, gender, race/ethnicity, for whether the youth said he was ever a gang member, and for prior offenses. We determined program effects on mediating youth characteristics as well as on dependent variables based on changes in self-reported total offenses, violence offenses, property offenses and drug selling.

4. Compare the effects of the program on the same youth who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II. We used detailed program effects, i.e., services and contacts provided by the workers in the interval between the Time I and Time II interviews. This analysis determined the effects of specific program activities on the mediating youth characteristics (such as school participation, employment, and gang involvement), that resulted in reduced delinquency. The key outcome variables were differences in self-reported offenses between Time I and Time II. Similar control and outcome variables (indicated above) using self-report data were available. Again, a genuine baseline against which to measure program effect was not obtained.

All of the above analysis strategies, in considerable measure, depended on establishing the equivalence of the youth samples. We used the same program and comparison youth samples or similar subsamples, regardless of whether or not outcome variables were based on police arrest records or interview self-report data. We had to establish that the larger youth samples used in the first set of analyses were reasonably well matched on key youth demographics, especially age and gender, program entry date and the amount of time each program youth was in

the program. Then we had to establish that the subsamples based on the Time I-Time II interviews were similar to the original samples.

### Procedures for Estimating Program Exposure Time for the Comparison Sample

(Kwai Ming Wa)

First Step: Assessing Program Characteristic Distributions. We examined program exposure time, i.e., the difference between program entry and program exit for each program youth. These dates were determined using official Project records (we corrected these dates in cases where we discovered services were supplied earlier than official program entry for 25 program youth). Program exposure time generally varied by age (Table 8.1). The program exposure period for younger youth was longer than for older youth. Program exposure also varied by gender, with males receiving slightly longer periods of service than females (Table 8.2). This indicated that matching risk periods varied by age and gender for the comparison youth. The race/ethnicity of program youth was not entirely applicable for matching purposes.

Second Step: Establishing a “True” Program Sample. For present analysis purposes, the size of the program sample of youth who were potentially provided with services (based on final Project records and the existence of a Time I interview) was 101 youth, not including 24 youth for whom there was no Time I interview, but who nevertheless received at least one month or more – two years in a few cases – of Project service. We did not know whether these youth were gang members or had certain other characteristics that could be elicited only through the interviews.

We computed the ages of the youngest and oldest program youth at the time the youth entered the program, either early or late. The ages of program youth at program entry were arranged according to gender in nine yearly groupings, from 12 to 20 years.

Third Step: Establishing a “True” Comparison Sample. We determined the various residence locations of all comparison youth (n = 134) at the Time I interview. We removed all youth from outside the comparison area (n = 19), since they were not residents of that community and could have committed crimes and been subjected to special influences outside of the comparison area, even if they hung out with gang members in the comparison area. We did not have full access to police data for these youth. (For various sampling purposes we do present data on these youth, later.) Since none of the individual program youth were under 12 years or over 20 years old at program entry, we also removed additional comparison youth who were younger than the youngest program youth (under 12 years, n = 4) and older than the oldest program youth (over 20 years, n = 32). (Again, we present data on these youth later.) All comparison youth were now those residing in the comparison area with ages ranging from 12 to 20. The “true” comparison group now contained 79 youth.

Fourth Step: Create a Matched Comparison Sample by Age, Gender and Program Youth Exposure Time. We computed the ages of each comparison youth based on the median program entry dates of the program youth, and estimated the best age and gender categories to represent his or her median age at program entry. We established the appropriate *matched* age for each comparison youth by determining the difference between his or her age in reference to the

particular age group of the program sample. This was within one year of the median age group of program youth, i.e., age at program entry (Table 8.3).

We also assigned the median age groupings of the matched comparison youth to the median age groupings of program youth by gender at program entry. Each comparison youth in the particular age and gender grouping now had the same median entry date, equivalent to the closest program-youth age grouping. Program and comparison youth were now matched by age and gender at the time of program-youth entry into the program.

Fifth Step: Program Exposure/Risk Period. For each program youth we computed the length of time the youth was in the program, based on the youth's date of program entry and exit. This was the program exposure time for each youth. We determined the mean exposure time of youth in each of the nine program-youth entry groupings. This mean exposure time was then assigned to the equivalent-age-computed comparison-youth grouping.

We now had equivalent exposure times for each of the nine matched program and comparison-youth groupings. Each of these nine sets of program exposure times were also matched for an equivalent pre-program period. The program and comparison groups of youth of different ages and gender now had the same (or very similar) program and pre-program risk periods.

Table 8.1  
 Median Program Entry Dates and Median Age for Program Sample  
 (by Age Group and Gender)

Gender*	Age Group	Number of Observations	Median Entry Date	Median Age
Male	12	3	11/19/95	12.31
	13	10	04/05/96	13.65
	14	14	11/24/95	14.68
	15	17	05/08/97	15.52
	16	12	12/23/97	16.79
	17	15	07/15/97	17.54
	18	8	01/18/98	18.27
	19	2	03/09/98	19.34
	20	1	07/30/98	20.09
Female	12	2	07/21/96	12.22
	13 †	0	08/27/96	—
	14	5	08/27/96	14.51
	15	3	09/24/96	15.94
	16	5	02/02/97	16.57
	17	2	11/29/96	17.28
	18 †	0	06/01/96	—
	19	1	06/01/96	19.05
20	1	03/01/97	20.30	

\* Number of males = 82; number of females = 19

† Indicates median age is not available



Table 8.2  
Mean and Median Program Exposure Times for Program Sample  
(by Age Group and Gender)

Gender*	Age Group	Number of Observations	Mean Exposure Time (yrs)	Median Exposure Time (yrs)
Male	12	3	2.66	3.61
	13	10	2.41	2.73
	14	14	2.88	3.28
	15	17	2.35	2.33
	16	12	1.75	1.51
	17	15	1.82	1.96
	18	8	1.70	1.96
	19	2	1.72	1.72
	20	1	1.21	1.21
	Female	12	2	2.94
13 †		0	—	—
14		5	2.54	2.84
15		3	1.90	2.69
16		5	1.61	1.24
17		2	1.58	1.58
18 †		0	—	—
19		1	0.67	0.67
20		1	2.33	2.33

\* Number of males = 82; number of females = 19

† Indicates mean and median exposure times are unavailable

Table 8.3  
An Example of Age Assignment for 9 Comparison Youth Based on Program Youth's Median Entry Dates

ID <sup>†</sup> for Youth	Gender <sup>‡</sup>	Date of Birth	Year Difference Between Birthdate and Program Entry Date*										Age Difference**		Age Assigned
			12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	≤1	>1		
1	M	04/05/1976	7.6	7.0	5.6	6.1	5.7	4.3	3.8	2.9	2.3	0	9	20	
2	M	08/16/1976	7.3	6.6	5.3	5.7	5.4	3.9	3.4	2.6	2.0	0	9	20	
3	M	07/01/1977	6.4	5.8	4.4	4.9	4.5	3.0	2.6	1.7	1.1	0	9	20	
4	M	08/05/1977	6.3	5.7	4.3	4.8	4.4	2.9	2.5	1.6	1.0	1	8	20	
5	M	07/28/1979	4.3	3.7	2.3	2.8	2.4	1.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	2	5	18	
6	F	03/04/1981	3.4	2.5	1.5	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	3	15	
7	F	03/23/1981	3.3	2.4	1.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	3	15	
8	F	11/26/1981	2.7	1.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	2	14	
9	M	03/20/1984	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	12	

† Nine different youth are identified in this example.

‡ M = male; F = female.

\* Indicates median entry date of program youth with respect to individual age group by gender (see Table 8.1).

\*\* Indicates number of time differences, ≤ 1 and > 1 year, in age groups 12 to 20.

For example, in the case of the youth with ID 6, whose gender is female and birthdate is 3/4/1981, the comparison youth age category to which she was assigned is 15 years because

- a) the program youth median age categories of 12, 13, and 14 years are too young for her;
- b) the program youth median age categories of 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 years are too old for her; and
- c) the closest program youth matched-gender, median age category and program youth entry date was 10/1981, i.e., 7 months or 0.6 years younger than she as a comparison youth would have been, if she had entered the program at that time.

## Chapter 9

### **Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth at Program Youth Entry**

(Kwai Ming Wa)

In this chapter we describe demographic, gang, and delinquency characteristics of the matched program and comparison youth samples and subsamples, based on data adjusted for time of program entry, program exposure period and police prior history, using procedures described in the next chapter.

In the first section, we identify not only the characteristics of the program sample but of the three comparison samples: the *true comparison sample*, the *underage and overage comparison sample*, and the *comparison Rantoul sample*.<sup>1</sup> In the second section we describe characteristics of the program subsample and the true comparison subsample only.

#### Characteristics of the Samples

In this section we focus our discussion on the program sample and true comparison samples, but we present demographic and gang membership data also on the two other comparison samples to demonstrate that the true comparison sample is an adequate representation of all the comparison youth interviewed. However, we describe pre-program period official delinquency, and gang and non-gang delinquency characteristics, only for the program and true comparison sample youth, since complete data on delinquency is not available

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<sup>1</sup> Several youth, now resident in Rantoul – a city 15 miles north of Champaign-Urbana, the comparison area where they were formerly residents – still hung out in Champaign-Urbana, and were originally interviewed as part of the comparison sample. They were later eliminated from the individual-level analysis, since complete police histories could not be obtained for them.

for the Rantoul comparison group, and we can't match the underage and over age comparison groups with the program sample since they are not of equivalent age.

Our main purpose in this section was to discuss the extent to which program youth and true comparison youth were still different, after our efforts at matching. We discovered that in some respects they were similar, but in other important respects, e.g., prior delinquency and gang membership patterns, they were strikingly different. The differences were critical for Evaluation purposes, and affected the degree to which we indeed had adequate samples and could come to conclusions about the effects of the program. We describe characteristics of gender, race/ethnicity, age, gang member status and prior arrests, and their interrelationships. A more detailed presentation and discussion of the interrelationship of these characteristics and program effect changes over time can be found in the multivariate analysis chapters, later in this report.

### Gender

There were substantially fewer females in the program sample (18.8%, N = 101) than in the true comparison sample (49.4%, N = 79). The small number of females in the program sample, when categorized by race/ethnicity, age, and gang member status, limited the analysis of the effects of the program on females (Table 9.1). However, there were substantial numbers of males in both the program and true comparison samples.

### Race/Ethnicity

There were very few non-African-Americans in our samples. The largest group of non-African-Americans was Hispanics or Latinos – mainly of Mexican origin; they comprised 15

youth (14.9%) in the program sample, and 1 youth (1.3%) in the true comparison sample. Five (5.0%) of the program youth were non-Hispanic white, and 2 (2.6%) true comparison youth were non-Hispanic white. There was a higher percentage of African-American youth (96.2%) in the true comparison sample than in the program sample (80.2%). There were proportionately more African-American males (82.9%) than African-American females (68.4%) in the program than in the true comparison sample, which had an equal distribution of African-American males (95%) and females (97%) (Table 9.2). Generally, we did not include race/ethnicity in our later multivariate analyses because African-American youth were predominant in both program and comparison samples and subsamples.

#### Age at Program Entry

The ages of youth were grouped into 12 to 14, 15 to 16, and 17 to 20-year-old categories, i.e., two juvenile groups and one young adult group. The proportion of youth in the different age categories was fairly similar within and across the two samples. There was a slightly higher proportion of the youngest age group, 12 to 14, in the true comparison sample (40.5%) than in the program sample (33.7%). However, there was a higher percent of 15 to 16-year-olds in the program sample (36.6%) than in the true comparison sample (30.4%). There was a smaller proportion of youth in the 17 to 20 age group – relative to other age groups – in both the program sample (29.7%) and in the true comparison sample (29.1%) (Table 9.3).

In general, males were older than females in the two samples, but both male and female Latino and white youth tended to be slightly younger than African-American youth.

## Gang Member Status

The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program (and its Evaluation) as adapted in Bloomington-Normal, apparently addressed the youth gang problem in its several stages of development – at-risk, seriously-at-risk, and gang-involved. Gang involvement of youth was expected to be related to delinquency. The Bloomington-Normal program, as other site programs, was supposed to provide differential service and worker contact patterns to the various categories of gang youth. Theory and research established that gang membership and delinquency were closely related, but this may or may not have been true in a community-based program serving a range of gang delinquent and/or non-gang delinquent youth over varying periods of time. Nevertheless, gang involvement was critical to the analysis of the types of youth in the program, the services and contacts they received and the resulting outcomes.

At the Time I interview, the youth was asked whether he or she was presently a gang member, had been a gang member in the prior six months, or ever. The definition of *gang member status* used in this part of the analysis was based on the youth's Time I self-definition of whether he or she had ever been a gang member. This more-inclusive definition permitted us to estimate the youth's status as a gang or non-gang member at the time of the youth's entry into the program, and probably even before the Time I interview. The classification of the youth as a gang member – by himself or by various program workers – may not have agreed. This problem is referred to in the next chapter, which deals with the analysis of services and contacts provided to youth. Further, a more complex concept and definition of *gang involvement* as a mediating variable is used later, in the analysis of Time I and Time II interview data.

At the Time I interview, a substantial majority of youth in each of the samples said they were or had been gang members. A somewhat smaller proportion of youth in the program sample than in the true comparison samples said they were now or had been gang members: program – 68.3%; true comparison – 79.8% (Table 9.4). Fewer of the African-American youth in the program sample said they were gang members (70.3%) than did African-American youth in the true comparison sample (75.9%). Relatively fewer African-American males (65.1%) and more African-American females (78.9%) in the program sample said they were gang members. The pattern was reversed in the true comparison sample: African-American males (82.5%) and females (76.9%) said they were gang members. Fewer white and Hispanic program youth, male and female together, said they were gang members than did African-Americans; Hispanic males more often said they were non-gang members ( $n = 7$ ) than those who said they were gang members ( $n = 4$ ); all Hispanic females ( $n = 4$ ) said they were gang members; and of the white males, three said they were gang members and one said he was not (the two white females said they were gang members).

Youth 12 to 14 years, in both the program and true comparison samples, said less often than older youth that they were gang members: program sample – 64.7%; true comparison sample – 62.5%. While many of the 15 to 16-year-olds in the program sample said they were gang members (70.3%), almost all of the 15 to 16-year-olds in the true comparison sample said they were gang members (95.8%). The pattern was similar for the 17 to 20-year-old group who said they were gang members (program sample = 70.0%; true comparison sample = 87.0%).

### Delinquency (Based on Arrest Data)

The greatest difference between the program and true comparison samples was in respect to delinquency background, i.e., prior arrests of youth matched for age and gender in the pre-program period. We did not include the under-age or over-age or Rantoul comparison youth in the delinquency analysis. More than three times as many program as true comparison youth had prior arrest histories. Of the 101 youth in the program sample, 64 (63.7%) had prior arrests; of the 79 youth in the true comparison sample, only 15 (19.0%) had prior arrests. More than twice as many males as females had prior arrest records in each of the samples. The numbers of prior arrests of youth were categorized as: none = 0; low = 1; medium = 2 or 3; high = 4 or more. A higher percentage of true comparison youth than program youth had no prior arrest records. This was so for males and females respectively, across the samples. Relatively more program males (34.7%) than true comparison males (12.5%) were located in the combined medium and high-delinquency categories. Relatively more program females (45.8%) than true comparison females (5.1%) were also in the combined medium and high-delinquency categories. Interestingly, females in the program sample had been arrested more often than males in the true comparison sample during the matched pre-program period.

### Gang Member Status and Delinquency

Not only were the program and true comparison samples mismatched in regard to their delinquency and gang-membership patterns, separately, but they were further mismatched when these two variables were interrelated, albeit in unexpected ways. It should be noted that the following subsample comparisons, across gender, race/ethnicity and age, may involve very small



cell sizes.

We presumed that youth who said they were gang members generally would be delinquent, and that those who said they were not gang members generally would not be delinquent, or would be less delinquent. This was so for the true comparison sample, but not completely true for the program sample. A slightly higher percent of non-gang-member youth (65.6%) than gang member youth (62.3%) in the program sample had prior arrest records. However, consistent with theory and prior research, more of the gang youth (40.6%) had medium or high levels of prior arrests, compared to non-gang members (28.2%) in the program sample. The pattern was very different for the true comparison sample: 22.2% of the gang members, but only 6.2% of the non-gang members, had prior arrests. Furthermore, while 11.2% of the gang members in the true comparison sample had been arrested multiple times (medium and high), only 1 non-gang youth (6.3%) had multiple arrests.

Gender. Patterns of gang membership and delinquency were somewhat different for males and females in each of the samples. In the program sample, more male gang members (64.8%) than female gang members (53.3%) were delinquent, and the delinquent males tended to have multiple arrest backgrounds. It is difficult to compare the degree of involvement of non-gang males to non-gang females in the program sample. The female non gang sub-sample was small ( $n = 4$ ). Seven of the non-gang males were in the high category compared to only 2 in the medium category. While similar percentages of true comparison youth-gang males (21.2%) and females (23.3%) had prior arrests, the true comparison gang males were more often multiple arrestees than the females. There was a relatively smaller group of non-gang members in the true

comparison sample (n = 16); only one, a male, was arrested. Consistent with theory and prior research, non-gang youth in the true comparison sample tended to be non-delinquent or less-delinquent. This was not the case with the program sample.

Race/Ethnicity. Although 80.2% of the youth in the program sample were African-American, and 80% of them said they were gang members, over 64.9% of the gang members had arrest records. This contrasted somewhat with the fact that slightly more African-American non-gang member youth (70.8%) had arrest records. However, more of the African-American gang youth were multiple arrestees (40.4%) than were African-American non-gang youth (25.0%). There were only four white youth who said they were gang members, and only two of them had arrest records. Only 1 white youth in the program sample was a non-gang member, and he had no arrest record. By contrast, 8 of the Hispanic youth said they were gang members, and 7 said they were not. Nevertheless, their patterns of prior arrests were similar. About half of the Hispanic gang or non-gang youth had arrest records, and a little less than half had multiple arrest records.

In regard to true comparison youth, 96.2% were African-American, and the large majority of them, 78.9%, were gang members (a similar percentage to African-American youth in the program sample). However, a much smaller percentage (23.3%) of true comparison African-American gang-member youth had prior arrest records. There were almost three times as many arrested program African-American gang-member youth as true comparison African-American gang-member youth. Likewise, the great majority (93.8%) of African-American non-gang youth in the true comparison sample tended to have no arrest records.

In other words, African-American youth in the program sample, whether gang or non-

gang members, had far more arrests than African-American youth in the true comparison sample. This was despite the fact that there were relatively more African-American gang youth in the true comparison sample. Further, two of the three non-African-American youth in the true comparison sample were white gang members without arrest records; the third was Hispanic and a gang member, but had no record of prior arrests.

Age at Program Entry. The proportion of gang youth in the three age groups – 12 to 14, 15 to 16, and 17 to 20 years – did not vary significantly across the program and true comparison samples. About one-third of the program and true comparison samples' gang youth were in each of the age groups. The largest proportion of gang members with arrest records was in the 15 to 16-year-old category of the program sample (69.2%), followed by program-sample gang youth 12 to 14 (63.6%) and those 17 to 20 (52.4%). Relatively fewer gang youth in each of the true comparison-sample age categories had arrest records. The largest proportion of gang-member arrestees in the true comparison sample was the 15 to 16-year-old group (26.1%), followed by the 17 to 20-year-old group (22.2%), and then by the 12 to 14-year-old group (15.0%).

Gang youth with multiple arrests were concentrated in the program sample, with relatively more in the 15 to 16-year-old group (57.7%), followed by gang youth 12 to 14 years, (45.5%) and by the 17 to 20-year-old group (14.3%). There were only three gang youth with multiple prior arrests in the true comparison sample; 2 in the 12 to 14 group, 1 in the 15 to 16-year-old group, and none in the 17 to 20-year-old group. Again, the proportion of youth with multiple arrests was considerably lower for program sample, non-gang youth, both in the 12 to 14-year old group (33.3%) and in the 15 to 16-year-old group (27.3%), but only slightly higher

than the similar-age-group program-sample gang youth – 4.3% (n = 3), based on a very small sample of non-gang youth in the 17 to 20-year-old group – 22.2% (n = 2). We could not explain why fewer 17 to 20-year-old youth were in the no-arrestee group. Perhaps such youth were more likely to be incarcerated and not available for the program.

There were far fewer youth with multiple arrests in the true comparison sample, non-gang youth age groups, particularly in the younger age groups: 12 to 14 years = 10.0%; 15 to 16 years = 4.3%. The exception was the 17 to 20-year-old true comparison gang youth group: 20.0% (n = 4) were multiple arrestees, compared to 14.3% (n = 3) in the oldest age group.

### Summary

In general, we concluded that the program sample contained relatively more arrested and multiple-arrestee youth than did the true comparison sample, across characteristics of gender, race/ethnicity and age, especially African-American youths, who were the large majority of youth in both samples. The distinctive characteristics of program and true comparison samples in regard to gang member status and arrest history were that the program sample contained a large group of non-gang members who were arrested; the true comparison sample did not have such a non-gang-member arrested group. Furthermore, a large majority of gang youth in the true comparison sample were non-delinquent. This was not the case for the program sample.

There is enough consistency with prior research on gangs and delinquency to suggest that the program gang-member subsample contained a larger number of multiple arrestees than was the case for the program non-gang youth subsample. Also, the true comparison sample was particularly unrepresentative of arrested gang youth in Champaign-Urbana, based on aggregate or

community-level gang-as-a-unit, arrest, and gang-incident data, which we describe later. A somewhat greater gang-crime problem existed in Champaign-Urbana than in Bloomington-Normal. Further, as we describe in greater detail in Appendix A, the nature of offenses for which youth were arrested in both the program and true comparison samples were similar. In general, arrests for both samples were mainly for property crime, less-serious violent crime, disorderly conduct and status offenses.

Finally, it is possible to interpret the data as indicating the samples of program and true comparison youth were largely at varying risk of chronic delinquency (at least based on official police arrest data) regardless of whether the youth said he was a gang member or not. Risk classification of youth in the samples is as follows:

No or Little Risk. In the program sample, 36.6% of youth, comprising gang members (25.7%) and non-gang members (10.9%), had no prior arrests. In the true comparison sample, 81.0% of youth, comprising gang members (62.0%) and non-gang members (19.0%), had no prior arrests.

Low or Moderate Risk. In the program sample, 26.8% of youth, comprising gang members (14.9%) and non gang members (11.9%), had only one prior arrest. In the true comparison sample, 8.9% of youth, comprising gang members (8.9%) and non-gang members (0%), had only one prior arrest.

High Risk. In the program sample, 36.7% of youth, comprising gang members (27.7%) and non-gang members (8.9%), had two or more prior arrests. In the true comparison sample, 10.1% of

youth, comprising gang members (8.8%) and non-gang members (1.3%), had two or more prior arrests.

Nevertheless, we shall observe later in the findings of our multivariate equations, that those youth with little or no prior arrest record tended to increase their arrest rates in the program period, while those with high prior arrest records tended to decrease their arrest rates.

### Characteristics of the Subsamples

In this section we describe demographic, gang and delinquency characteristics of subsamples of the matched program youth (N = 101) and true comparison youth (N = 79).<sup>2</sup> Not all of the youth who completed Time I interviews completed Time II interviews. Our subsample sizes are therefore reduced: program (n = 81) and comparison (n = 53). We describe the characteristics of these subsamples, and briefly compare their characteristics to those of the larger original samples at Time I.

The Time II reinterview rate for program youth was 80.2%, but for comparison youth it was only 67.1%. While our program subsample appears to be representative of the Time I program sample, the comparison subsample is not quite as well representative of the Time I comparison sample. Differences in the results of the analysis in this section, compared to our findings in the two earlier sections, may be largely due to the differences in the characteristics of the comparison sample and subsample.

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<sup>2</sup> We do not refer to any comparison sample other than the true comparison sample, and its subsamples, in this discussion. All references to comparison sample or subsample is to the true comparison sample and subsample.

## Gender

There was a slightly higher percentage of females in the program subsample (n = 17, 21.0%) compared to the original program sample (n = 19, 18.8%). There was also a greater increase in the relative number of females in the comparison subsample (n = 32, 60.4%) compared to the original comparison sample (n = 39, 49.4%). While the proportion of females increased by 2.2% in the program sample, it increased by 11.0% in the comparison sample (Table 9.5).

## Race/Ethnicity

Race/ethnic composition was more representative of the original samples respectively for the program and comparison subsamples. The percent of African-Americans in the subsample (n = 64, 79.0%) was close to that of the original program sample (n = 81, 80.2%); and the percent of African-Americans in the comparison subsample (n = 52, 98.1%) was close to that of the original comparison sample (n = 76, 96.2%). The representation of Hispanics or Latinos (n = 13, 16.1%) and whites (n = 4, 4.9%) in the program subsample was also very similar to that of the original program sample. There was only 1 Native American in the comparison subsample (1.9%) compared to 2 whites (2.53%) and 1 Hispanic (1.27%) in the original comparison sample (Table 9.6).

## Age

Youth were somewhat older in the program subsample and in the comparison subsample than in the respective original samples. The ages of the subsamples at the Time I interview were:

program – mean = 16.4 years, median = 16.6 years; comparison – mean = 16.8 years, median 16.7 years. However, the distribution of age in the comparison subsample remained somewhat skewed to relatively older and younger youth than was the case for the program subsample. Thus, there was a similar distribution pattern of ages in the subsamples and in the original larger samples. The standard deviations remained the same for the subsamples: program, 1.7 years; a little greater for the comparison group, 2.1 years; but respectively almost identical to the original sample standard deviations.

On a categorical basis, however, we found a larger proportion of comparison subsample youth in the 12 to 14-year-old group (18.87%) compared to the program subsample (13.58%); while the reverse was true for the 15 to 16-year-old group, as more 15 and 16-year-olds were now in the program group (44.4%) than in the comparison group (35.9%). Fewer program youth (42.0%) than comparison youth (45.3%) were now in the older, 17 to 20-year-old subsample (Table 9.7).

### Gang Member Status

Fewer of the program youth in the subsample were gang members at the Time I interview (66.7%) compared to comparison subsample youth (81.3%). Slightly more of the program youth (68.3%), and relatively fewer of the comparison youth (79.8%) were gang members in the original samples. The disparity in gang member status between the two subsamples was thus slightly increased (Table 9.8).



### Delinquency (Based on Arrest Data)

The proportion of program youth in the subsample who had prior arrests was somewhat similar to the proportion in the original sample. There was almost no difference between the original program sample (63.4%) and the program subsample (63.0%). However, there was a difference in the proportion of youth with prior arrest records between the original comparison sample (19.0%) and the subsample (24.5%). While more than three times as many program as comparison youth in the original samples had prior arrest histories, only 2.6 times as many program as comparison youth in the subsamples had prior arrest histories.

There were relatively fewer multiple offenders (based on prior arrests) in the subsamples than in the original samples, but the proportions on a gender basis across subsamples were similar. Relatively more subsample program males (26.6%) than subsample comparison males (19.0%) were in the combined median and high prior-arrest categories. Relatively more subsample program females (11.8%) than comparison subsample females (3.1%) remained in the combined medium and high prior-arrest categories. The multiple arrest patterns of the subsamples were somewhat better matched, particularly for the males across the subsamples, than they were in the original samples.

While the proportion of youth arrested, and the frequency of their arrests, varied sharply for the program and comparison subsamples, the nature and pattern of arrests were very similar, and in some cases identical, in the pre-program period. Most youth in both the program and comparison samples and subsamples were arrested mainly for misdemeanors – relatively minor crimes and status offenses typical of the patterns of deviancy and arrests of many adolescents in low-income, minority communities. The primary or most serious police charges for each youth

in the two subsamples, with 3% of total charges as the cutoff for the inclusion of similar categories of offenses, produced the following results (see Table 9.9). Only in the case of the comparison sample did the felony offense of aggravated assault reach or go beyond the cutoff percent, 4.1%.

In other words, while more youth in the program subsample than in the comparison subsample had prior arrests, the types of arrests generally were similar. The differences in characteristics between the original program and comparison samples may have been a result of the Local Evaluator's sampling process of delinquent youth in Champaign-Urbana, or it may have been due to different police practices in responding to deviant youth in the program and comparison areas, or both.

#### Gang Member Status and Delinquency

The subsample patterns were somewhat similar to the original samples. In the program subsample, slightly more of the gang members (64.8%) than non-gang members (59.3%) had prior arrest records. The proportion of multiple arrests was again higher for the program gang-member subsample (42.5%) compared to the program non-gang-member subsample (18.5%). The pattern for the comparison subsample also varied slightly. More of the comparison subsample gang members had arrest records (30.2%) and were multiple-arrest offenders (14.0%) than in the original sample. None of the non-gang members in the comparison subsample had prior arrest records. The gang-member program and comparison subsamples were thus somewhat better matched than in the original samples. We had relatively more gang youth with prior arrest records in the comparison subsample than in the comparison original sample.

Gender. The patterns of gang member status and arrests of the program subsample were similar to those of the program sample, but somewhat different for the comparison subsample. In the program subsample, again, more male gang members (67.5%) than female gang members (57.1%) had arrests, and the male gang members more often had multiple arrest backgrounds. Relatively more female gang members in the program subsample had arrests than either male or female gang members of the comparison subsample. However, within the comparison subsample, more male gang members (37.5%) relative to female gang members (25.9%) had arrests. Both the male and female gang members in the comparison subsample had more prior arrests than was the case in the original comparison sample. Also, substantially more of the comparison subsample male gang members (25%) had multiple prior arrests than was the case for male gang members in the original comparison sample (15.2%). Only 14 non-gang-program subsample males had arrest records, and of these, 4 had multiple records.

Only two non-gang program subsample females had a prior arrest record. None of the male or female non-gang members in the comparison subsample had prior arrest records. Based on the variables of gang member status and gender, the program and comparison subsamples were relatively more equivalent, particularly for males, than in the original sample.

Race/Ethnicity. As indicated above, the percentage of African-American youth in the program subsample (79%) was similar to the original program sample (80.2%). Of the African-Americans in the subsample, 71.4% were gang members (similar to the proportion in the original program sample). A similar proportion of African-American gang members in the program subsample (61.5%) had prior arrest records as those in the original program sample (64.9%).

About the same proportion of African-American non-gang members (63.2%) in the program sample had prior arrests. More of the African-American gang members in the program subsample (46.7%) were multiple arrestees than was the case in the original program sample (42.6%), and generally more gang members (58.3%) than non-gang members (23.1%) had prior records of multiple arrests.

The same 4 white youth who were in the original program sample were in the program subsample; 3 were gang members, but only 1 had a prior arrest record. Thirteen youth in the program subsample were Hispanic, and slightly less than half ( $n = 6$ ) said they were gang members; 2 of the 6 had prior arrest records. Four of the seven non-gang members had a prior arrest record.

In the comparison subsample ( $n = 53$ ), all youth were African-American except for one white female, who said she was a gang member, but she had no prior arrests. Of the 52 African-American youth, 80.8% were gang members, or about the same percentage as in the program sample. However, as in the two original samples, fewer of the subsample comparison gang youth had prior arrests, compared to program gang youth. Relatively more African-American subsample gang youth had arrest and multiple-arrest backgrounds than in the original sample. The subsamples were slightly less disparate than the original samples as to prior gang arrest background. Thirty-one percent (31%) of the African-American subsample gang youth, compared to 23.3% of the original African-American sample gang youth, had prior arrest records.

Age. Program and comparison subsample youths were slightly older at the Time I interview than

they were when matched for age at program entry in the police-based sample descriptions in Chapter 8. There were about an equal proportion of gang members in the three program-subsample age groups: 12 to 14 (64.3%), 15 to 16 (63.6%), and 17 to 20 (65.0%). The proportions of gang members in the subsample comparison groups were different. The largest percent of gang members was in the 15 to 16-year-old comparison subgroup (100%), followed by the 17 to 20-year-old group (81.8%) and the 12 to 14-year-old group (69.6%). There were relatively more gang members in the comparison than in the program subsample age groups.

While there were more gang youth in each of the three comparison-youth age categories, the gang youth were still officially far less delinquent than in the program subsample groups. In the 12 to 14-year-old age category, 61.1% of the program subsample gang youth had prior arrests, while only 18.8% of the comparison subsample gang youth had prior arrests; in the 15 to 16-year-old program subsample group, all youth ( $n = 21$ ) had prior arrests, while only 33% of comparison youth had prior arrests. The pattern was reversed for the 17 to 20-year-old group, but the number of youth, especially in the comparison subsample, was small: 65% of the program subsample gang youth ( $n = 13$ ) and 80% of the comparison subsample gang youth ( $n = 4$ ) had prior arrest records. In all age categories, except the oldest, program subsample youth gang members more often had prior arrest records.

In general, the subsamples fairly closely matched original samples across the various demographic, gang, and prior arrest characteristics. The differences that occurred served generally better to match program and comparison youth subsamples in various demographic, gang, and delinquency characteristics. The differences between the program and comparison subsamples were further muted when we focused on self-reported offenses rather than arrests.

Table 9.1  
Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Samples: Gender

The Samples	Male	Female	Total
	Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Frequency Percent
Program	82	19	101
	34.89%	8.09%	42.98%
	81.19%	18.81%	
	50.31%	26.39%	
True Comparison	40	39	79
	17.02%	16.60%	33.62%
	50.63%	49.37%	
	24.54%	54.17%	
Comparison: Age: less than 12 and more than 20	29	7	36
	12.34%	2.98%	15.32%
	80.56%	19.44%	
	17.79%	9.72%	
Comparison: Rantoul	12	7	19
	5.11%	2.98%	8.09%
	63.16%	36.84%	
	7.36%	9.72%	
Total	163	72	235
	69.36%	30.64%	100.0%

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8.

Table 9.2  
Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Samples: Race/Ethnicity

The Samples	White Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	African-American Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Hispanic Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Total Frequency Percent
Program	5	81	15	101
	2.13%	34.47%	6.38%	42.98%
	4.95%	80.20%	14.85%	
	55.56%	39.13%	78.95%	
True Comparison	2	76	1	79
	0.85%	32.34%	0.43%	33.62%
	2.53%	96.20%	1.27%	
	22.22%	36.71%	5.26%	
Comparison: Age: less than 12 and more than 20	1	34	1	36
	0.43%	14.47%	0.43%	15.32%
	2.78%	94.44%	2.78%	
	11.11%	7.73%	10.53%	
Comparison: Rantoul	1	16	2	19
	0.43%	6.81%	0.85%	8.09%
	5.26%	84.21%	10.53%	
	11.11%	7.73%	10.53%	
Total	9	207	19	235
	3.83%	88.09%	8.09%	100.0%

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8.

Table 9.3  
Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Samples: Age Categories

The Samples	Age: 12 to 14 Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	15 to 16 Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	17 to 20 Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Total Frequency Percent
Program	34	37	30	101
	14.47%	15.74%	12.77%	42.98%
	33.66%	36.63%	29.70%	
	40/96%	58.73%	33.71%	
True Comparison	32	24	23	79
	13.62%	10.21%	9.79%	33.62%
	40.51%	30.38%	29.11%	
	38.55%	38.10%	25.84%	
Comparison: Age: Less than 12 and more than 20	(6)	0	(30)	36
	2.55%	0.00	12.77%	15.32%
	16.67%	0.00	83.33%	
	7.23%	0.00	33.71%	
Comparison: Rantoul	11	2	6	19
	4.68%	0.85%	2.55%	8.09%
	57.89%	10.53%	31.58%	
	13.25%	3.17%	6.74%	
Total	83	63	89	235
	35.32%	26.81%	37.87%	100.0%

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8.



Table 9.4  
Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Samples: Gang Member Status<sup>2</sup>

The Samples	Gang	Non-gang	Total
	Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Frequency Percent
Program	69	32	101
	29.36%	13.62%	42.98%
	68.32%	31.68%	
	39.43%	53.33%	
True Comparison	63	16	79
	26.81%	6.81%	33.62%
	79.75	20.25	
	36.00	26.67	
Comparison: Age: less than 12 and more than 20	28	8	36
	11.91%	3.40%	15.32%
	77.78%	22.22%	
	16.00	13.33	
Comparison: Rantoul	15	4	19
	6.38%	1.70%	8.09%
	78.95%	21.05%	
	8.57%	6.67%	
Total	175	60	235
	74.47%	25.53%	100.0%

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8.

<sup>2</sup>Gang member status refers to self-reported status at any time prior to the program entry date for program youth, and the equivalent date for comparison youth.

Table 9.5  
 Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Subsamples<sup>2</sup>: Gender

The Samples	Male	Female	Total
	Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Frequency Percent
Program	21 15.67% 39.62% 24.71%	32 23.88% 60.38% 65.31%	53 39.55%
True Comparison	64 47.76% 79.01% 75.29%	17 12.69% 20.99% 34.69%	81 60.45%
Total	85 63.43%	49 36.57%	134 100.00%

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.1.

<sup>2</sup>The subsamples are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II.

Table 9.6  
Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Subsamples<sup>2</sup>: Race/Ethnicity

The Sample	White Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	African-American Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Native American Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Hispanic Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Total Frequency Percent
Program	4 2.99% 4.94% 100.00%	64 47.76% 79.01% 55.17%	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%	13 9.70 16.05% 100.00%	81 60.45%
True Comparison	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%	52 38.81% 98.11% 44.83%	1 <sup>3</sup> 0.75% 1.89% 100.00%	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%	53 39.55%
Total	4 2.99%	116 86.57%	1 0.75%	13 9.70%	134 100.00%

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.2.

<sup>2</sup>The subsamples are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II.

<sup>3</sup>This youth self-reported that he was white at the Time I interview, but Native American at the Time II interview.

Table 9.7  
Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Subsamples<sup>2</sup>: Age Categories

The Sample	Age: 12 to 14 Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	15 to 16 Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	17 to 20 Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Total Frequency Percent
Program	11 8.21% 13.58% 52.38%	36 26.87% 44.44% 65.45%	34 25.37% 41.98% 58.62%	81 60.45%
True Comparison	10 7.46% 18.87% 47.62%	19 14.18% 35.85% 34.55%	24 17.91% 45.28% 41.38%	53 39.55%
Total	58 15.67%	55 41.04%	21 43.28%	134 100.00

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.3.

<sup>2</sup>The subsamples are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II.

Table 9.8  
Program Entry<sup>1</sup> Subsamples<sup>2</sup>: Gang Member Status<sup>3</sup>

The Sample	Gang Member Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Not a Gang Member Frequency Percent Row Percent Column Percent	Total Frequency Percent
Program	54 40.30% 66.67% 55.67%	27 20.15% 33.33% 72.97%	81 60.45%
True Comparison	43 32.09% 81.13% 44.33%	10 7.46% 18.87% 27.03%	53 39.55%
Total	97 72.39%	37 27.61%	134 100.00%

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<sup>1</sup>Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.4.

<sup>2</sup>The subsamples are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II.

<sup>3</sup>Gang member status refers to self-reported status at any time prior to the program entry date for program youth, and the equivalent date for comparison youth.

Table 9.9  
Most Frequent Pre-Program-Period Police Charges (3% Cutoff)  
Program and Comparison Subsamples

Type of Charge (most serious per arrest) <sup>1</sup>	Subsample Pre-Program Charges	
	Program (n = 942)	True Comparison (n = 395)
• Shoplifting	7.1%	4.6%
• Theft	9.1%	9.8%
• Burglary	<u>3.6%</u>	<u>3.2%</u>
Total	19.8%	11.6%
• Domestic assault/battery	7.2%	3.2%
• Battery (simple)	8.0%	11.2%
• Resisting and obstructing a peace officer	<u>4.6%</u>	<u>3.2%</u>
Total	19.8%	17.6%
• Criminal damage to property	3.2%	3.7%
• Criminal damage to vehicle	3.3%	0
• Motor vehicle act	3.6%	13.4%
• Disorderly conduct	<u>4.1%</u>	<u>2.9%</u>
Total	14.2%	20.0%
• Curfew violation	4.1%	4.1%
• Status offense	<u>7.0%</u>	<u>7.0%</u>
Total	11.1%	11.1%
Grand Total (proportion of total police charges)	64.9%	66.3%

Source: Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana Police Departments

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<sup>1</sup>There were one or two charges for each arrest per youth. Only the most serious charge is selected. Thus, the charges equal arrests.

## Chapter 10

### **Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies**

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa)

#### Introduction

The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual, but the community and its organizations and programs participate in both the creation and the reduction of the youth gang problem. The Model assumed that key organizations in the community were not adequately integrated with each other in program or approach, and that sufficient resources might not have been available for them to target gang-involved or highly at-gang-risk youth. The community, including established agencies and grassroots groups, should have been addressing the gang problem by developing and/or rearranging their programs to better control and support targeted youth, and to integrate them into the mainstream community, particularly through school, jobs, and conventional age-appropriate socialization activities.

A truly comprehensive approach was required, one which included different types of agencies and local groups concerned with and/or closely related to gang youth, to their families, and to those at highest risk of gang delinquency. The Projects at the five sites, as they developed, were not only expected to mobilize both agency and grassroots elements, but to establish outreach contacts with targeted youth who were partially or poorly served, and not socially controlled. From a structural and process perspective, the Model required not only a steering committee of community leaders, but also an outreach team consisting of representative workers from the key organizations and community groups concerned with the youth-gang problem. The

community direct-service or contact team had to include police officers, probation officers, youth outreach workers, and related personnel including teachers, manpower workers and specialized treatment workers. They had to identify with the mission and interests of their agencies and the community, yet they also had to establish effective relationships with the targeted youth based on their agency's and the community's needs for youth social development and for community protection.

Sensitivity by workers to local, as well as to larger community norms and values, was a critical component of the relationships to be established with youth and their families. In particular, probation and police officers had to be sufficiently interested in social support as well as suppression measures, in meaningful local terms, to control targeted youth. Outreach youth workers ideally should come from the gang neighborhood, should be of similar background as the targeted youth, and should be able to serve as mediating role models.

These elements of the Model were not well-developed in the Bloomington-Normal program. Police officers participated, but resisted the implementation of the social-development aspects of the Model. Probation officers were the key source of contacts for the majority of youth recruited into the Project, and probably provided the dominant authoritative character of the program. Outreach youth workers, although generally of the same race/ethnicity as program youth, were not local to the community, and were not permitted to perform fully as outreach workers.

A Project street team was not established in the Bloomington-Normal Project, but communication and coordination among Project workers did occur. Youth in the program were provided with an interrelated pattern of services and contacts by the different agency workers.



Little attention was paid to an appropriate mix of strategies for different youth, to the modification of the roles of the different types of workers, and to how different agency workers were to function together to create an improved inter-organizational, street-level worker structure and process to meet the interests and needs of gang youth, and the needs of the community, within the framework of the Model. A major goal of the Evaluation was to discover to what extent the various parts of the Model were implemented, in what way, and with what effect. From an early point in the development of the Bloomington-Normal program, OJJDP, the National and Local Evaluators, the Technical Assistance team, and the Project operations personnel were aware of, and attempted to address, gaps and distortions in the way the Project adapted the Model.

The discussion in this section describes the worker tracking form, the problems associated with its completion, the source of youth referrals to the program, the types of specific services provided, and the nature and scope of worker contacts, including the differential patterns of worker coordination. Program strategies and services were inherent in the roles of workers who were in contact with youth. Model strategies were the bases for classifying services and worker contacts. Social intervention included individual counseling, family counseling, and advice or crisis intervention, provided mainly by outreach youth workers and treatment personnel, but also by probation officers, teachers, manpower personnel, and even police. Provision of social opportunities included educational services (i.e., school transfers/returns, placement, GED program) and vocational training (i.e., job referral and placement) mainly provided by school staff, outreach youth workers, manpower personnel, and less often by other types of workers. Suppression activities included arrest, surveillance, monitoring, detention, and

warnings, supplied mainly by police and probation officers, and to a lesser extent by teachers, outreach youth workers, and others (See Appendix B for a Glossary of Service and Worker Contact Activities). The significance of the types of services provided, per se, were not independent of who supplied the services or contacts.

The Model generally required that worker services and contacts be provided through an interrelated group or team of agency and community-oriented workers who implemented the five Model strategies in accordance with the principles of the Model. The workers were to target selected youth from selected gangs and gang segments. They were to implement strategies, particularly social services, provision of social opportunities, and suppression, in an interrelated and balanced manner. The targeted youth were expected to be chronic or core gang-delinquents, and to be at high risk for gang delinquency. Worker efforts might have to extend over a period of months or years, with frequent contacts (as much as 4 or 5 times per week) with hardcore youth, in order to contribute to their social development. Because of the inherent complexity and difficulty of these objectives and tasks, workers were expected to be highly skilled, motivated, and committed to implementing the Model.

### The Worker Tracking Form

The worker tracking form, the major means of obtaining data on services and contacts provided to youth by different types of workers, was a 12-page instrument containing closed-ended check-off items and open-ended questions. Each Project-related worker was expected to summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth over a three-month calendar quarter period. Local Project administrators were at first concerned about any extra

time and effort that completion of the form would impose. However, the National Evaluator estimated that it would take the worker approximately 10 or 15 minutes to fill out a form for each program youth. Such limited effort could still provide sufficient information for Evaluation purposes.

The form included the following types of information: identification of the worker and his organization; identification of the youth; the youth's demographics and gang affiliation (and estimated rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact with the youth (first program contact, initial contact in the reporting period, date of last contact in the period); the number of contacts with the youth; types of contacts/services provided; referrals made on behalf of the youth; a rating of the youth's progress by the worker; identification of services or referrals most helpful to the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the youth's degree of involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the reporting period. Also important was a description of the worker's contacts with other workers, within the Project or in other agencies, in regard to the youth.

The eight major check-off service or activity categories were: group-oriented services, individual counseling, case planning, suppression activities, job-related services, school-related services, family counseling, and material support. These categories were particularized into fifty-five subcategories. The types of workers expected to supply services/contacts to youth were: primarily outreach youth workers, probation/parole officers, police officers, school personnel; and secondarily, various other workers within these key agencies, and specialists from outside agencies (including treatment, manpower, and youth workers).

Strategies were implicit or explicit in the categories of services and contacts provided by

particular workers, for example: *social intervention* – individual and family counseling (including crisis intervention); *social opportunities provision* – vocational or job-related and education-related services; *suppression* – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, monitoring surveillance, etc. Also, the strategy of community mobilization was specified at the direct-service or worker-contact level as *coordination*, i.e., the number and types of services or control-related contacts by any worker with other workers in relation to youth. Special attention was paid to the type of coordination of services and contacts provided by a worker along with other workers, e.g., youth outreach-worker contacts about a particular youth with police and/or probation/parole, i.e., coordinated suppression. Also, the strategy of organizational change and development at the individual-youth level was indicated by the nature and scope of change in the patterns of services and contacts provided by the different types of workers to individual youth over the course of the program.

### Problems of Worker Tracking

The data derived from worker tracking was expected to be a substantial and representative sample of services and worker contacts provided to program youth. However, the data collected may not completely reflect the full scope of services or contacts supplied by the workers to youth in the Bloomington-Normal program. Some types of worker – for example, police – were initially reluctant to complete worker tracking forms. They began to complete forms at a later period in the program than did other types of workers. School personnel were also somewhat reluctant to complete forms. Youth workers and probation officers were the most frequent and regular suppliers of completed tracking forms. Staff turnover sometimes hindered

the timely completion of forms, and was a problem, especially for outreach youth workers, who tended to stay on the job in the program for shorter periods of time than did other types of workers, although replacements were found fairly quickly.

We are somewhat concerned about the reliability and validity of the services and contacts checked off by workers. Local Evaluators and program operators at one of the sites raised questions about whether workers honestly provided all the services they claimed they did. There was also some question as to whether certain categories of services were clearly understood by program workers. The aggregation of specific service/activity elements into summary categories somewhat mitigated the possible misinterpretation of specific service subcategory items. For analysis purposes, we regard the typology of workers as particularly valid, and more useful than service categories. It was quite clear that an outreach worker was not a policeman or probation officer, and that a policeman was not a teacher or a drug treatment counselor, although certain functions or activities might be common among the different workers.

The number of tracking forms completed by the worker might not record the precise number of contacts the worker had with each youth in the reporting period. The services data generally provided a gross estimate of categories or numbers of services provided. A worker tracking form was not necessarily completed each time the worker had contact with the youth, although this occurred at some of the Evaluation sites. A worker who completed a form for a particular youth might note one or two contacts with the youth; another worker who completed a form for the same youth might note ten contacts with the same youth over the same period. Both reports could be accurate. Also, some types of workers (such as probation officers) usually had detailed records of contacts with program youth for their own agency purposes. These then were

used to provide the relevant information for their Project working tracking forms.

A serious problem in the Bloomington-Normal site was the gap between the start of program services and the time when the worker began to complete the tracking forms. The Bloomington-Normal Project began operations (i.e., began providing services and contacts to youth) August 20, 1995, but the earliest period for which a worker completed tracking forms was January 1997 - March 1997. This time gap did not exist at the other program sites. Worker-tracking data for this earlier program period is lacking for 41 of the 99 youth in the analysis. Nevertheless, we are able to determine the full program exposure time for youth, based on complete entry and exit dates for youth who had any contact with the program.

Eight hundred and twenty-nine worker (829) tracking forms were completed in Bloomington-Normal for the 99 program youth who were interviewed at Time I, and who were still in the program between January 1, 1997 through June 30, 1999 (a 2 ½ year period) – an average of 6.8 forms per youth. Two additional program youth had Time I interviews, but no worker-tracking data for them existed. They were not included in the analysis based on detailed worker-tracking services and contacts, but they were included in the analysis based on whether youth were in the program and had at least a Time I interview.

The number of worker tracking forms completed by the different workers was: Project Oz outreach youth workers = 379; other workers from Project Oz = 16; probation/parole = 239; school personnel = 78; police = 65; job personnel = 22; youth workers from other agencies = 20; and special treatment (mainly drug counseling) personnel = 10. While Project Oz outreach youth workers produced a constant flow of worker tracking forms during the program period, probation officers completed increasing numbers and proportions of forms, and provided more services

than outreach youth workers. Police officers began to complete forms later in the program, and school personnel produced a slightly decreasing number over each of the reporting periods in the 2½ years of the program. These patterns reflected an increasing use of probation officers in the program, and also increasing involvement of outreach youth workers, even though they were periodically replaced by other outreach youth workers.

### Sources of Referral of Youth to the Program

The core group of youth referred to the program for whom we have relatively complete worker-tracking data consisted of 82 males (82.8%) and 17 females (17.2%). The largest overall sources of referrals of youth to the program were: court services – mainly juvenile probation, but also adult probation and juvenile parole (55.6%); Project Oz outreach youth workers (29.3%); schools (9.1%). The largest referral sources of males to the program were: court services (54.9%); Project Oz outreach youth workers (32.9%); schools (6.1%). The largest sources of referrals of females to the program were: court services (58.8%); schools (23.5%); Project Oz outreach youth workers (11.8%). The largest sources of referrals of African-Americans to the program were: court services (50.4%); Project Oz outreach youth workers (34.6%); schools (8.6%). Referral sources for Latinos (n = 14) almost exclusively came from court services (85.7%). For the small number white program youth (n = 4), a large proportion of referrals to the program came from court services (50%). The largest sources of referrals based on the age categories of youth were: 12 to 14 years (n = 15) – court services (73.3%) and another program youth (13.3%); 15 to 16 years (n = 54) – court services (64.8%), outreach youth workers (16.7%), and schools (11.7%); 17 to 20 years (n = 30) – outreach youth workers (63.3%) and schools

(6.7%) (Table 10.1).

Patterns of referral to the program varied somewhat in the period for which we did not have worker tracking, and for the period after January 1, 1997. We know that in the 1½ year pre-tracking period youth referrals (n = 41) came mainly from court services (63.4%), outreach youth workers (12.27%) and schools (12.2%). In the period for which we have worker tracking, the youth referrals (n = 58) came mainly from court services (50%), outreach youth workers (41.4%) and schools (7.6%). In other words, the dominant source of referrals was court services, particularly early but also later in the program. Referrals by outreach youth workers increased substantially in the first 2½ years of the program, but declined during the last year of the program (Table 10.2).

An important consideration in appraising the nature and impact of the program was that the majority of youth referred through court services, mainly through juvenile probation, were possibly less serious offenders. Youth in the program may or may not represent the full range of the population of youth gang members in Bloomington-Normal. The fact that most of the youth were probationers, and that many had no prior arrest records, may have influenced the pattern of services and worker contacts provided. Alternate and more substantial community-agency, grassroots, or youth-worker referrals to the program, whether the youth were more or less delinquent or more or less gang-involved, might have contributed to the development of a more differentiated pattern of services and worker contacts than was actually developed.

#### Dosages of Worker Services/Contacts

The sheer scope and intensity as well as the nature of services and contacts provided by



workers are important in the determination of program impact and its value for youth. First we describe the amount of services/contacts with youth by the different types of workers at the aggregate program level, including length and average frequency of contact. In the course of the 2½ year program period during which worker-tracking data were collected, workers indicated they had a total of 10,032 contacts with the 99 program youth. This was an average of 101.3 contacts by all workers over the entire 2½ year period, or less than one contact per youth per week. Some youth were provided more, and more frequent, contacts than other youth over longer periods of time. The pattern of contacts by workers with individual youth reveals little intensity of contact. All workers together contacted a youth on average about three times a month (mean = 4.4; median = 2.3 contacts per month). Coordinated contacts, where one worker was in touch with another Project worker about a youth, occurred about once every six weeks or less (mean = .58, median = .33 contacts per month). The largest number of contacts with youth in the aggregate were by probation workers (41.9%), outreach youth workers (25.9%), and school personnel (18.2%).

If we include all 99 youth in the program who were interviewed at Time I and who had worker tracking records, and the median stay in the program was 26.7 months (see below for individual-youth-level details). The contacts per program youth made on a monthly basis by the following types of workers were: probation/parole (mean = 1.59); outreach youth workers (mean= 0.99); school personnel (mean = 0.69). This low level of contacts indicates little or limited impact on youth by the program.

The Bloomington-Normal program lacked balance as well as intensity of contact with program youth. Probation/parole workers had almost twice as many contacts (on average) with

program youth as did either outreach youth workers or school personnel. This was hardly a balanced provision of contacts by different types of workers. There was too little contact by outreach youth workers or school personnel. The Model principles of program implementation, in particular frequency or intensity and balance, clearly were not achieved.

Relatively more contacts per youth occurred during the second, third, and fourth of the 5 six-month program periods during the 2½ years for which we have worker-tracking data. Most contacts with youth were provided in the last 1½ years of the program (74.3%), compared to the first year (25.7%). The relative distribution of contacts provided by the three major types of workers changed dramatically over the course of the program. In the early part of the program, relatively more contacts with youth were provided by school personnel (34.3%) and outreach youth workers (32.9%) than by probation officers (20.7%). In the later part of the program, relatively more contacts were provided by probation officers (49.3%) than by outreach youth workers (23.4%) and school personnel (12.6%). In other words, the Project appeared to shift to a more active criminal-justice-contact approach. Police officers, because of their small number of reported contacts with program youth, were not a significant part of this direct youth-services or contacts shift.

Although youth might not have been seen frequently, most youth were seen over a relatively long period of time. They had some exposure to the program and received varied services, according to worker-tracking records. We calculated the length of time workers were in contact with youth using two methods: time between the first contact and the last contact as indicated by worker-tracking records, and time of program entry and exit based on official agency records. The length of time based on official records added an average of three months of

worker contact, compared to what was reported in worker-tracking records. However, our estimates using either method do not account for periods of the youth's absence from the program or for the lack of contact by the worker at certain intervals. Therefore, they may overestimate the length of time the worker was in contact with the youth.

The length of the contact period per youth was a median of 26.7 months (as indicated above). Females were in the program about 3 months longer (median = 25.3 months) than males (median = 22.3 months). Latino youth were in the program longer than African-American (median = 22.6 months) or white youth (median = 12.8 months). The youngest age group, 12 to 14 years, was supplied with the longest median period of contact (30 months), compared to 15 and 16-year-olds (28.2 months), and to 17 to 20-year-olds (23.7 months). Whether a youth was a non-delinquent or a serious delinquent did not seem to affect the median length of time the youth was in the program, at least based on police official prior arrest: 0 prior arrests = 23.7 months; 1 prior arrest = 23.7 months; 2 or 3 prior arrests = 22.2 months; 4 or more prior arrests = 23.7 months.

Whether a youth self-reported gang membership made a difference. Self-admitted gang members were in the program longer (median = 28.0 months) than non-gang members (median = 23.7 months). However, the fact that the youth was a self-admitted gang member did not determine the pattern of services he or she was provided with, as we shall see below. It was apparently not easy for outreach youth workers, probation officers, police officers, or school personnel to determine whether the youth was a gang member or not. The views of program workers and of those youth identified as gang members, as to who in fact was a gang member, did not necessarily agree. The workers did not always agree among themselves as to which

program youth (n = 94) were gang members. While one or more program workers identified 85.1% of program youth as gang members, and 11.7% as wannabes or seriously at-risk youth, 67.0% of program youth identified themselves as gang members, and 32.5% as non-gang members.

The workers' perceptions of whether the youth was a gang member matched the specific youth's self-reported gang-member identification in only 63.8% of the cases. In 33.0% of the cases (n = 32), the worker said the youth was a gang member, when the youth said he was not a gang member. In 3.2% of the cases (n = 3), the youth said he was a gang member, but the worker identified him as a non-gang member. It is more likely that workers over-identified program youth as being gang members than that program youth under-identified themselves as being or having been a gang member. In the multivariate analyses in Chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14, we use the youths' self-reported gang member status rather than the workers' perceptions of the youths' gang member status, which proves to be significant in predicting outcome.

#### Nature of Services and Contacts Provided

During the course of the 2½ years of the program in which worker-tracking records were collected, a total of 6439 services were provided to 99 youth, and, as indicated above, were aggregated into 8 categories or types of services and contacts provided. The proportion of services provided in these 8 categories varied considerably: group-oriented services (24.0%); individual counseling (18.7%); case planning (15.4%); suppression activities (14.6%); job-related services (8.5%); school-related services (7.7%); family counseling (6.2%); material support (4.9%).

A large amount of services was carried out on a group basis (i.e., explaining the program, rapport building, recreation, group discussion, and occasionally group crisis intervention), which together we categorized as group-oriented services. Such services were not emphasized in the Model because, based on prior research (Klein 1971) and program experience, they could lead to gang cohesion and to consolidation of gang-delinquent norms and behaviors. However, such services were a major component of the Bloomington-Normal program (24.0%). A good deal of program effort presumably went into case planning which was not identified or explained (15.4%), and to the provision of material support (4.9%), including transporting program youth for various purposes to various destinations. As important as these services might be, they were not regarded as strategic services for purposes of the Model.

The categories of job-related services combined with school-related services comprised the second largest percentage of services (16.2%), and they are indicators of the opportunities provision strategy. One of the Model's assumptions is that gang members and highly at-risk youth do not have adequate access to or are not provided with sufficient job-related and school-related services. The opportunities-provision strategy is, therefore, a key component of the Model.

\_\_\_\_\_The category of suppression activities was regarded as being important to the Model, and consisted of arrest, detention, prosecution, incarceration, statutory notice, and supervision/surveillance; it constituted the third largest category of service or activity provided by the workers, after individual counseling (reported by almost all workers) and group services.

In further analysis, controlling for the number of workers supplying specific types of services/contacts to specific youth over a particular time period, we found that all workers were

providing the following mean types of services/contacts on a monthly basis: employment services – 0.18 per month; school services – 0.13 per month; suppression services – 0.26 per month. Probation/parole provided the largest proportion of these services, as well as coordinated services, to individual youth per month: suppression services – 0.55; coordinated general contacts – 0.40. Outreach youth workers provided the next largest proportion of services: coordinated general contacts – 0.16; employment services – 0.17; school services – 0.14; coordinated suppression contacts – 0.12 (Table 10.3).

The categories of services/contacts were distributed differently over the various phases of the program in somewhat unpredictable ways. Case planning occurred more often later than earlier in the program. Material support declined over the program tracking period. Group-oriented services were emphasized more often in the early than in the later part of the program. The greatest emphasis on individual and family counseling came in the middle part of the program. School-related services were emphasized early in the program, job-related activities increased from the first six-month period through the fourth six-month period, and then tapered off in the final six months of the program. It is possible that these shifting patterns were influenced by certain factors such as the worker's fuller understanding of the needs of youth as the program developed, the changing needs of youth as they aged, the worker's discovery that certain patterns of services (e.g., group services) did not produce meaningful results, and the shifting availability of staff and resources during the course of the program.

As suggested, patterns and amounts of services did not substantially vary for different kinds of youth, including for males and females. Females were provided with relatively more individual counseling as a proportion of total services (20.4%) than males (18.3%), but males

were provided with relatively more group services (24.5%) than females (21.8%). Males were supplied with relatively more job-related services (8.9%) than females (6.8%), and females were provided with relatively more school-related services (9.2%) compared to males (7.4%).

Suppression activities were directed in about equal proportions to females (15.4%) and males (14.7%).

Whether defined by gender, race/ethnicity, age, or gang member status, almost identical configurations of services were provided. The greatest variation was in the configuration of services provided to youth with different prior arrest records. A greater relative proportion of job-related services was provided to youth with 1 prior arrest (11.1%) than to youth with 0 prior arrests (8.5%), 2 prior arrests (6.9%) or youth with 3 or more prior arrests (6.8%). One could argue that the appropriate patterns for these types of youth should have been reversed. Also, as expected, more suppression services generally were provided to youth with more prior arrests: youth with 3 or more = 21.0%; 2 = 16.8%; 1 = 11.8%; and 0 prior arrests = 11.5%. Why youth with 0 prior arrests should have been provided even with this proportion of worker suppression-related activities is not clear. It is likely that youth would develop arrest records in the course of the program simply because a high level of suppression-oriented contacts were made, particularly to youth with fewer prior arrests. The reverse effect could also occur: youth with more prior arrests and fewer services, particularly suppression-oriented services, would be less likely to continue to develop arrest records. This in fact did occur as a regression effect (see Chapters 11 and 12).

## Contacts By Worker Types

In this section we describe the types of workers in contact with different types of youth. We also examine which types of workers coordinated their efforts with which other types of workers around particular youth. We conjecture that the types of workers in contact with the different kinds of youth might better discriminate factors that influenced the youth's outcome than would the patterns of services. It was possible that the various types of workers, especially probation officers and outreach youth workers, provided the "same" services to youth; however, in terms of role and function, contacts by these workers would have different meaning for and impact on youth. The significance of a contact by an outreach youth worker (or job developer, treatment worker and possibly a school person) might be different from a contact by a probation officer (or policeman). We captured these distinctions through an examination of the different types of coordinated contact among the workers.

We already know that relatively more contacts were provided by probation (41.9%), followed by outreach youth workers (25.9%), school personnel, (18.2%), police (2.6%) and other types of workers, i.e., job developers and recreational workers) (11.5%). For purposes of this analysis, we examine the distribution of contacts of all of these kinds of workers, except the smallest "other" category of workers who provided the least services. We look at contacts with these workers as a percentage of total worker contacts for certain categories of youth.

Gender. Youth outreach workers had relatively more contacts with females (35.1%) than with males (23.4%), probation had much more contact with males (45.5%) than with females (28.4%), school personnel more contact with females (21.7%) than with males (17.2%); and police had 2½ times more contact with males (3%) than with females (1.27%). The only surprise in this



descriptive analysis is that the mostly male outreach-youth-worker staff had more contacts with females than with males. This could be related to the fact that the female outreach workers who were providing services to female youth left the Project, and were replaced by male staff members. To what extent this pattern is related to the finding below that program females did somewhat worse in the program than males is not known at this time.

Race/Ethnicity. There were slightly more contacts by outreach youth-work staff (all African-American) with African-American youth (26.8%) than with Latino youth ((21.4%) or white youth (17.9%). On the other hand, probation officers had a relatively higher percentage of total worker contacts with white youth (80.7%) and Latino youth (63.6%) than they had with African-American youth (37.2%). This may due to the fact that more white and Latino program youth were referred to the program from the court.

The difference in patterns of contacts by school personnel was sharp. School staff were in relatively more contact, for purposes of the program, with African-American youth (19.7%) than with Latino youth (12.0%), and not at all with white youth (0%). The pattern of contacts by police was different from that of probation; more contacts were made with African-American (2.8%) than with Latino (1.7%) or white youth (1.4%).

Age. Surprisingly, outreach youth workers had more contacts with the least delinquent age group, 17 to 20 (40.7%), than with the two other age groups which had more prior arrests: the 12 to 14-year-old group (27.2%) and the 15 and 16-year-old group (21.4%). Probation had more contacts with the 12 to 14 group (49.6%) and the 15 and 16 group than with the 17 to 20 group

(4.5%). This small percentage of contact with the oldest-age group could be accounted for by the fact that mainly juvenile probation officers were part of the program. Police contacted program youth in ascending age order: 12 to 14 (1%); 15 and 16 (2.9%); 17 to 20 (3.1%). Again, our percentages are the proportion of contacts of all workers for the particular category of youth by the particular worker type.

Prior Arrest Record. Relative proportions of contacts by Project workers may not have been based on prior arrest records of youth. For example, outreach youth workers paid more attention to youth who had fewer prior arrest records (0 prior arrests = 27.9% and 1 prior arrest = 33.8%) than they did to youth with more extensive prior arrest records (2 prior arrests = 20.5%; 3 or more prior arrests = 19.3%). Also puzzling was that probation paid relatively more attention to youth with 0 prior arrests (45.6%), less to youth who had 1 prior arrest (20.5%), almost as much to youth who had 2 prior arrests (47.8%), and most to youth who had 3 or more prior arrests (58.2%). Again, this was probably due to the fact that a substantial number of youth with 0 prior arrests were arrested during the course of the program.

We are also surprised that police had the least proportion of contacts with youth who had the most prior arrests – 3 or more (11.9%) – but substantial contacts with youth who had 0 prior arrests (16.9%), 1 prior arrest (15.2%) and 2 prior arrests (24.6%). Again, this may have been due to the disproportionate number of youth with 0 prior arrests who were arrested in the program period.

Gang Membership. There was little differentiation in relative amounts of attention focused on

gang or non-gang youth, at least based on the youth's self-report as to whether he had ever been a gang member. Outreach youth workers had about an equal proportion of contacts with gang youth (25.5%) and non-gang youth (26.7%). Also, probation officers paid about as much attention to gang youth (41.7%) as to non-gang youth (44.2%). Outreach youth workers and probation officers were apparently not able to discriminate in their pattern of services or contacts provided to gang and non-gang youth. School personnel seemed best able to discriminate in their relative proportion of services and contacts with gang youth (22.1%) and non-gang (7.3%) youth. Surprisingly, the police paid almost 2½ times as much attention to non-gang (4.6%) as to gang youth (1.9%).

This pattern of worker contacts with the different categories of youth in the program raises a serious question as to whether workers paid appropriate attention to the different categories of youth. A careful diagnosis or assessment of the needs of youth (and the community), in terms of the purpose of the program, may not have been made. Perhaps this was due to a lack of adequate information available to workers about particular youth. It is also possible that in the course of the program certain youth developed problems not related to whether the youth had a prior or substantial arrest record. Also, risks for or actual delinquency or gang membership may not have been a critical criterion in the planning for or nature of services provided, or in the kind of worker contacts provided, although they should have been. In our multivariate analyses in Chapters 11-14, self-reported gang member status is a statistically significant variable in the determination of outcome.

## Coordinated Contacts

A key purpose of the Project was the development of a set of differential but comprehensive or coordinated approaches to services and contacts provision by a variety of workers to gang-involved youth and to youth who were at high risk of gang involvement. This meant that information about targeted youth would be shared, so that a set of contacts for social support, opportunities provision and suppression would be combined and interrelated, both to assist in socialization of the particular youth and to provide for better community protection.

Requirements for implementation of the program in accordance with the comprehensive model for addressing the gang problem at the street or direct-services levels were: 1) appropriate youth would be targeted for the program; 2) members of the team would together and interactively develop key strategies to be carried out, i.e., social intervention, opportunities provision, and suppression; 3) members of the team, especially police, probation, outreach youth workers and school personnel, would be in frequent communication, but would not focus only on traditional agency missions, i.e., the youth outreach worker would communicate and coordinate with other staff, not only to help youth but also to protect the community, and police would not always use coordination to gather information on youth to make better arrests, but also to refer youth for social or educational services, at least through contacts with outreach youth workers; 4) the effectiveness of the team approach would depend on the balance of shared interests and commitments by the team members and their agencies in the implementation of the Model.

We knew which workers initiated contact on behalf of youth with workers from other agencies and organizations over the 2½ years of the worker-tracking period. Outreach youth workers initiated 349 contacts with other Project staff, and were contacted by range of other

workers 294 times; probation/parole initiated 612 contacts and were contacted by other workers 186 times; police initiated contacts with 109 other workers, and were contacted by other workers 144 times; school personnel initiated 261 contacts with other workers and were contacted by other workers 201 times.

Of further interest was that probation/parole initiated contact with outreach youth workers 35.2% of the time over the entire program period, relative to total contacts with other workers; outreach youth workers initiated contact with school personnel 30.3% of the time; school personnel initiated contact with youth outreach workers 26.6% of the time; and police initiated contacts with probation/parole officers 15.2% of the time. As we shall see in the next section, these patterns varied over different periods of the program.

### Changes Over Time

Implementation of the strategy of *organizational change and development* depended to a large extent on the degree to which the worker team developed a balance of strategies in their work, including coordination with each other, based on the Comprehensive Model. We would expect not only an increase of contacts by different types of workers with each other, but also a balanced approach across workers according to the needs of youth for socialization, and concerns for community protection. We did see increased coordination in the number of worker contacts with other workers overall in the course of the 2½ year worker-tracking period. There were 484 coordinated contacts regarding program youth over the first half of the 2½-year worker-tracking period, and 872 coordinated contacts in the second half (Tables 10.4 and 10.5).

What is significant is that the nature of coordination among particular types of workers

(i.e., which types of workers initiated contacts or received contacts) changed considerably between the first half and the second half of the program. During the first half of the program, the proportion of coordinated contacts initiated by outreach youth workers with police was 15.0% out of all of their initiating coordinated contacts; however, coordinated contacts initiated by outreach youth workers with police declined to only 4.1% of their total initiating coordinated contacts in the second half of the program. Similarly, school personnel reduced their initiating coordinated contacts with police from 12.5% to 9.6% between the two time periods. On the other hand, police increased their initiating coordinated contacts with outreach workers from 14.3% in the first half to 28.4% in the second half of the program, although they reduced their initiation of coordinated contacts with school personnel from 25.7% to 13.5%. Furthermore, police increased their initiating coordinated contacts with probation/parole from 2.9% in the first half of the program to 24.3% in the second half of the program. Probation increased their relative percent of initiating coordinated contacts with police over the same periods of time from 11.9% to 16.3%. The relationship between outreach youth workers and school personnel in terms of initiating or receiving of coordinated contacts with and from each other remained stable or balanced at both time periods; youth outreach workers initiating coordinated contacts with school personnel ranged from 24.4% in the first half to 27.9% in the second half; school personnel initiating coordinated contacts with youth outreach workers ranged from 30.5% in the first half to 27.9% in the second half of the program (Tables 10.4 and 10.5).

What we find is that outreach youth workers and school personnel decreased their level of initiating coordinated contacts with police, while police increased their initiating coordinated contacts with outreach youth workers but not with school personnel. On the other hand, police

and probation were both increasing their frequency of coordination with each other. These patterns suggest that police and probation communication and interaction were increasingly interdependent, probably reinforcing their suppression approaches. Outreach youth workers and school personnel probably became aware that a suppression approach was becoming dominant in the program and decided to initiate contacts with police not so often.

What seems to have occurred in the Bloomington-Normal program is a strengthening of the suppression strategy without a commensurate strengthening of the social-intervention and opportunities-provision strategies. Ideally, all of the strategies should have been of appropriate strength, and balanced in relation to each other to fit the needs of particular youth in particular community situations. We have no evidence that the needs of youth (and the problems caused by them) or the concerns of the community changed drastically over time and therefore required a relatively greater emphasis on suppression.

### Summary

The key instrument for gathering data on the scope and nature of services and worker contacts provided to program youth was the worker tracking form, which was to be completed by all workers for each youth once every calendar quarter of the year. Not all workers systematically completed these forms. However, workers who were most in contact with program youth – probation officers and outreach youth workers – did complete most of the forms.

The services and activities provided to youth included mainly individual counseling, group services, school and job-related services, and suppression. The Project provided limited

and infrequent services and worker contacts to youth, although over a fairly long period of time. On average, less than one contact per month was provided by workers together to individual youth. Within the patterns of limited contact, disproportionately more suppression than job or school services were provided.

Also surprising was that, although the amount of services provided to youth varied, a similar configuration of services was provided to youth regardless of characteristics such as gender, race/ethnicity, age group, prior police arrest record, and gang member status. Youth who had more prior arrests and said they were gang members were not always provided with more services and contacts than other types of youth.

Data on which workers were in touch with different youth provided a puzzling picture of the nature and purpose of the program. Outreach male youth workers had relatively more contact with females; probation had more contact with males. Outreach youth workers had more contacts with African-American youth, probation officers had relatively more contacts with Latino and white youth (more of whom, however, were on probation than African-American youth at the start of the program). Outreach youth workers paid relatively more attention to less-delinquent youth. Probation paid more attention to youth who had 0 prior arrests, at least at program entry. This could have been because these youth were increasingly arrested during the course of the program.

Patterns of contact among the types of workers shifted during the course of the program. Outreach youth workers and school personnel decreased their patterns of initiating contact with police; probation and police increased their initiation of contacts with youth outreach workers. It appeared that over time, a suppression strategy was increasingly dominant in the program. The



program failed to develop an appropriate mix and intensity of services and worker contacts in a balanced way – in accordance with the OJJDP Model – to meet the interests and problems of appropriately targeted or selected youth, as well as to address the concerns of the community.

**Table 10.1**  
**Source of Referral of Youth to the Program<sup>1</sup> by Gender, Race/Ethnicity and Age**  
**percent and (n)**

	Source of Referral							Total % <sup>2</sup> (N)
	Direct Outreach/ Project Oz	Schools	Court Services <sup>3</sup>	Another Program Youth	Mother	Self	Don't Know/ No Response	
<b>Male</b>	32.9 (27)	6.1 (5)	54.9 (45)	1.2 (1)	1.2 (1)	1.2 (1)	2.4 (2)	99.9 (82)
<b>Female</b>	11.8 (2)	23.5 (4)	58.8 (10)	5.9 (1)	0	0	0	100.0 (17)
<b>African-American</b>	34.6 (28)	8.6 (7)	50.6 (41)	1.2 (1)	1.2 (1)	1.2 (1)	2.5 (2)	99.9 (81)
<b>Latino</b>	0	14.3 (2)	85.7 (12)	0	0	0	0	100.0 (14)
<b>White</b>	25.0 (1)	0	50.0 (2)	25.0 (1)	0	0	0	100.0 (4)
<b>12 to 14</b>	6.7 (1)	6.7 (1)	73.3 (11)	13.3 (2)	0	0	0	100.0 (15)
<b>15 to 16</b>	16.7 (9)	11.1 (6)	64.8 (35)	0	1.9 (1)	1.9 (1)	3.7 (2)	100.0 (54)
<b>17 to 20</b>	63.3 (19)	6.7 (2)	30.0 (9)	0	0	0	0	100.0 (30)
<b>All</b>	29.3 (29)	9.1 (9)	55.6 (55)	2.0 (2)	1.0 (1)	1.0 (1)	2.0 (2)	100.0 (99)

Instrument: Three Month Worker Tracking Form  
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
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<sup>1</sup>Based on the first worker tracking form for each youth.

<sup>2</sup>At least one worker tracking form was completed for 99 youth who completed a Time I Individual Gang Member Survey (n=101).

<sup>3</sup>Court Services includes primarily juvenile probation, as well as adult probation and juvenile parole.

**Table 10.2**  
**Source of Referral of Youth to the Program by Year and 6-Month Period**  
**percent and (n)**

Source of Referral	Year and 6-Month Period								Total % (n)
	1995	1996		1997		1998		1999	
	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	
Direct Outreach Project Oz	10.5 (2)	33.3 (2)	6.3 (1)	38.0 (8)	73.3 (11)	15.4 (2)	33.3 (3)	0	29.3 (29)
Schools	0	33.3 (2)	18.8 (3)	9.5 (2)	0	7.7 (1)	11.1 (1)	0	9.1 (9)
Court Services <sup>4</sup>	68.4 (13)	33.3 (2)	68.8 (11)	47.6 (10)	26.7 (4)	76.9 (10)	55.6 (5)	0	55.6 (55)
Mother	5.3 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.0 (1)
Self	0	0	0	4.8 (1)	0	0	0	0	1.0 (1)
Another Program Youth	5.3 (1)	0	6.3 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	2.0 (2)
Don't Know/ No Response	10.5 (2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.0 (2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0 (19)</b>	<b>99.9 (6)</b>	<b>100.2 (16)</b>	<b>99.9 (21)</b>	<b>100.0 (15)</b>	<b>100.0 (13)</b>	<b>100.0 (9)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100.0 (99)</b>

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<sup>4</sup>Court services includes primarily juvenile probation, as well as adult probation and juvenile parole.

**Table 10.3**  
**Mean Number of Services and Coordinated Contacts Provided to Youth per Month**  
**By Type of Worker**

Type of Worker	Employment Services <sup>1</sup>		School Services <sup>2</sup>		Suppression Services <sup>3</sup>		Coordinated Contacts <sup>4</sup>		Coordinated Suppression <sup>5</sup>	
	No. of Youth	Per Month	No. of Youth	Per Month	No. of Youth	Per Month	No. of Youth	Per Month	No. of Youth	Per Month
<b>Program Outreach Worker</b>	73	0.17	80	0.14	43	0.08	78	0.16	54	0.12
<b>Probation/Parole Officer</b>	24	0.11	35	0.11	58	0.55	54	0.40	39	0.12
<b>Police Officer</b>	0	0	2	0.04	28	0.09	27	0.10	14	0.06
<b>School Worker</b>	11	0.23	21	0.14	14	0.11	22	0.24	19	0.11
<b>Other Agency Worker</b>	23	0.27	19	0.13	13	0.05	29	0.12	3	0.11
<b>Totals<sup>6</sup></b>	77	0.18	86	0.13	77	0.26	52	0.22	63	0.11

<sup>1</sup>Employment services consist of job preparation, job training, job development, job placement, and an "other" category.

<sup>2</sup>School services comprise advocacy (e.g., school transfers/returns), school placement, GED program, continuing education, junior college or college placement, and an "other" category.

<sup>3</sup>Suppression services consist of supervision/surveillance, statutory notice (e.g., nuisance abatement), arrest, home confinement, monitoring, probation, parole/aftercare, violation of probation/parole, and detention.

<sup>4</sup>Coordinated contacts refer to whether the worker involved with the intervention program (i.e. outreach workers, probation officers, job developers, other agency counselors) contacted one or more other police, probation/parole, outreach, school or other social service agency workers concerning a program youth.

<sup>5</sup>Coordinated suppression represents contacts by a range of workers with police or probation/parole, or vice versa, concerning a particular program youth during the particular calendar quarter.

<sup>6</sup>Totals for the columns *No. of Youth* refer to the total number of program youth who received any of the particular services, or coordinated or suppression contacts. In the totals for the columns *Per Month*, the means for each type of worker were multiplied by the number of youth, summed, and then divided by the sum of youth for all worker types. The total *Per Month* means, therefore, are adjusted for youth who may have received services or contacts from more than one type of worker.

**Table 10.4**  
**Bloomington-Normal**  
**Percentage of Contacts Initiated by Type of Worker and by Type of Worker Contacted**  
**January 1, 1997 to March 30, 1998**  
**percent and (n)**

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted						Total <sup>7</sup> (n)
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other	Within Organization	
<b>Outreach</b>	15.0 (19)	24.4 (31)	24.4 (31)	0	11.0 (14)	25.2 (32)	100.0 (127)
<b>Probation/ Parole</b>	11.9 (19)	0	28.3 (45)	23.9 (38)	20.1 (32)	15.7 (25)	99.9 (159)
<b>Police</b>	0	2.9 (1)	25.7 (9)	14.3 (5)	5.7 (2)	51.4 (18)	100.0 (35)
<b>School</b>	12.6 (16)	14.2 (18)	1.6 (2)	30.7 (39)	6.3 (8)	34.6 (44)	100.0 (127)
<b>Other</b>	0	25.0 (9)	2.8 (1)	44.4 (16)	2.8 (1)	25.0 (9)	100.0 (36)
<b>Total<sup>8</sup> (n)</b>	11.1 (54)	12.2 (60)	18.2 (88)	20.2 (98)	11.8 (57)	26.4 (128)	99.9 (484)

Instrument: Three Month Program Worker Tracking Form  
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
School of Social Service Administration  
The University of Chicago  
Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

<sup>7</sup>Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding.

<sup>8</sup>Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (484) from 314 worker tracking forms. For example, 11.1 percent (54) of contacts from all types of workers were with police officers.

**Table 10.5**  
**Bloomington-Normal**  
**Percentage of Contacts Initiated by Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted**  
**April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999**  
**percent and (n)**

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted						Total % <sup>1</sup>
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Outreach	Other	Within Organization	
<b>Outreach</b>	4.1 (9)	41.4 (92)	27.9 (62)	0	9.0 (20)	17.6 (39)	100.0 (222)
<b>Probation/ Parole</b>	16.3 (74)	0.4 (2)	21.2 (96)	28.5 (129)	19.2 (87)	14.3 (65)	99.9 (453)
<b>Police</b>	0	24.3 (18)	13.5 (10)	28.4 (21)	0	33.8 (25)	100.0 (74)
<b>School</b>	9.6 (7)	17.8 (13)	2.7 (2)	30.1 (22)	4.1 (3)	35.6 (26)	99.9 (73)
<b>Other</b>	0	2.0 (1)	6.0 (3)	48.0 (24)	38.0 (19)	6.0 (3)	100.0 (50)
<b>Total %<sup>2</sup></b>	10.3 (90)	14.4 (126)	19.8 (173)	22.5 (196)	14.8 (129)	18.1 (158)	99.9 (872)

Instrument: Three Month Program Worker Tracking Form  
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"  
School of Social Service Administration  
The University of Chicago  
Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

<sup>1</sup>Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding.

<sup>2</sup>Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (872) from 515 worker tracking forms for the number of program youth who completed a Time I Individual Gang Member Survey. For example, 10.3 percent (90) of contacts from all types of workers were with police officers.

## Chapter 11

### **Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables**

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa)

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#### First Set of Models

In this chapter, we examine the general effect of the program on youth arrests. We are interested in the effectiveness of the program in reducing arrests for program youth, compared to youth from a comparable community who were not provided with services and worker contacts from the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program. We use statistical models which control for differences between program and comparison youth characteristics to tell us whether program youth were different from comparison youth in their change in arrests patterns during the program period, compared to the pre-program period. Specific services or worker contacts are not included in the first set of models.

In the first set of analyses, we incorporate the four outcome or dependent variables—*total arrest change*, which includes arrests for all offenses; *total violence arrest change*, which combines serious violence and general violence arrests; *total property arrest change*; and *total other arrest changes*—to estimate General Linear Model Procedure (GLM) and logistic regression models.<sup>1</sup> The GLM models estimate differences in the mean change in number of

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<sup>1</sup>Refer to Appendix A for a description of the offense categories for the five types of arrests. Because of the small number of comparison youth (n=3) having an arrest for a drug offense during either the pre-program or program periods, neither general linear models nor logistic regression models were estimated for total drug arrests. It should be noted that a combined total of 28 program youth, compared to a combined total of 3 comparison youth, had an arrest for a drug offense in the pre-program and program periods. The number of program youth arrested for a drug offense increased from 4 during the pre-program period to 24 during the program period (see Appendix A, Table A7). The number of comparison youth arrested for a drug offense decreased from 2 during the pre-program period to 1 during the program period (Appendix A, Table A8). The patterns of self-reported drug selling are almost the same for program and comparison youth.

arrests for program and comparison youth between the program and the pre-program period controlling for several background characteristics of the youth.<sup>2</sup> These models provide us with information to answer the question: Did the mean change in arrests decrease, increase or stay the same for specific groups, especially for program and comparison youth? The logistic regression equations address a different question: overall, what factors are associated with the program being a success (the youth having a decrease in arrests or staying arrest free) or the program being a failure (the youth increasing or staying at the same level of arrest)? The models also predict how many youth succeeded and how many failed.

For each of the four outcome variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was standardized by year in order to control for varying lengths of program periods which were matched with pre-program periods for both program and comparison youth. Thus, the outcome variables measure the mean yearly difference in the number of arrests for youth between pre-program and program periods.<sup>3</sup>

The same independent variables as in the GLM models are entered into each equation to explain each of the four dependent variables. The independent variables are: level or category of prior arrests<sup>4</sup> during the pre-program period; age in terms of years at program entry (12 to 14, 15 to 16, and 17 to 20); whether the youth self-reported ever being a gang member at their Time I

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<sup>2</sup>Even after matching comparison youth with program youth, other differences (i.e. number of prior arrests) remained (as discussed in Chapter 9).

<sup>3</sup>First, the yearly mean number of arrests was calculated using the total number of arrests for the program and pre-program period and dividing them by the length in years for each period. Second, the mean yearly change was calculated by subtracting the mean yearly arrests for the program period from the mean yearly arrests for the pre-program period.

<sup>4</sup>The level or category of total yearly prior arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none=no arrest, 2) low=0.26 to 0.98, 3) medium=1.12 to 1.87, and 4) high=2.05 to 12.18.



interview; gender; race/ethnicity, coded as whether or not they were African-American<sup>5</sup>; whether or not the youth was in the program or comparison group; and the interaction terms: program × prior arrests, program × gender, program × gang member status, and program × age categories.<sup>6</sup> The following section presents the findings of selected GLM and logistic regression models.

### Total Arrest Differences

\_\_\_\_\_ In the first GLM model, which includes 101 program and 79 comparison youth (N=180), only total prior yearly arrests is significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) in explaining variance in the dependent variable, i.e., difference in mean total yearly arrests between pre-program and program periods (Table 11.1). This model explains 24.2% of the variance in the dependent variable, and is significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Essentially, prior arrests produce a regression effect. As the level of total prior arrests increases from none to medium, there is varying increase in the mean difference in total yearly arrests (Table 11.1 (b)). However, youth with the highest amount of prior arrests have a yearly mean decrease of almost three arrests during the program period. Eighteen of the 21 youth in this category are program youth, while only 3 are comparison youth.

The second variation of the GLM model, with *total arrest differences* as the dependent variable, excludes sixteen program youth and fifty-two comparison youth who had no arrests both during the pre-program and program periods. The total number of youth in this equation is 112. In general, youth excluded does not change the results of this model compared to the model

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<sup>5</sup>Because the race/ethnicity variable was not significant in any of the models, and only 3 of the 79 comparison youth were not African-American, the race/ethnicity variable was not included in any of the estimated models which are presented.

<sup>6</sup>Interaction terms were generally not significant in the analyses using police arrests as the dependent variable, and are only included in the tables where they were significant.

that includes all youth, with respect to the variable which was found to be highly significant – prior total yearly arrests – or to the percentage of variance explained in the dependent variable (24.2% versus 25.8%) (Table 11.2).

In both of the total arrest models, the key independent variable distinguishing whether the youth was in the program or comparison group is not significant; therefore, there is no statistically significant difference in the change in mean total yearly arrests for program and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods. Program youth do not do any better than comparison youth in terms of change in pattern of arrests.

In the logistic regression model with the dependent variable total arrests<sup>7</sup> (including youth remaining arrest free) for the total sample (N=180), several factors were found to be statistically significant in explaining whether a youth failed (had the same or increasing mean number of total arrests) or succeeded (remained arrest free or decreasing their mean number of total arrests) in the program compared to the pre-program period. Controlling for level of prior arrests, age at program entry, whether the youth self-reported that he was ever a gang member, and gender, we found that program youth were almost 5 times more likely to fail than comparison youth. This variable is highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Youth who self-reported ever being a gang member were nearly 3 times more likely to fail, i.e., remain at the same arrest level or have an increase in total arrests during the program period. Males were twice as likely as females to have an increase in total arrests, or to remain at the same arrest level (Table 11.3).

Certain categories of youth, based on age at program entry and level of prior arrests,

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<sup>7</sup>The differences in total arrests between the program and pre-program periods were coded 1 if youth remained at the same or a greater number of yearly arrests, and they were coded 0 if youth remained arrest free or decreased their numbers of yearly arrests between the program and pre-program periods.

significantly reduced the likelihood of their failing. Youth who were 17 to 20 years old were 3 times more likely to reduce their arrests or remain arrest free than youth in the other age categories, and this variable was significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Youth with the highest level of total prior arrests (2 or more arrests per year) were more than 11 times less likely to fail. Again, we see the effect of prior arrests as a regression effect.

In the second logistic regression model for total arrests, excluding youth who had no arrests during the pre-program and program periods<sup>8</sup> ( $n=112$ ), only the category of youth having no prior arrests who increased their arrests is statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). In other words, when the program and comparison youth are better matched, we find no program effect or significant differences between program youth and comparison youth regarding change in their mean numbers of arrests between the program and pre-program period (Table 11.4).

### Violence Arrest Differences

In the GLM and logistic regression models using the *violence arrests* outcome variable, the serious violence arrest category was combined with the violence arrest category because of the low number of comparison youth who had an arrest for either category (7 and 8 youth, respectively).<sup>9</sup> In the GLM model with all the program and comparison youth ( $N = 180$ ), the dependent variable is the difference in mean total violence arrests between the program period

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<sup>8</sup>Sixteen program youth are excluded, as well as 52 comparison youth.

<sup>9</sup>In Appendix A, Tables A3 to A5, the charges comprising the serious violence and total violence categories are listed along with the number of youth who had an arrest for these categories in the pre-program and program periods. Overall, more than four times more program than comparison youth—31 versus 7—had an arrest for a serious violence offense during the pre-program or the program period. Moreover, the number of program youth who had been arrested for a violence offense was five times higher than the number of comparison youth with prior arrest records (43 versus 8, respectively).

and the pre-program period, and the independent variables include controls for prior violence arrests, age at program entry, gender, self-reported gang member status, and whether the youth was in the program or comparison group. The equation explains almost none of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R-square 0.0002).<sup>10</sup> None of the variables, not even prior violence arrests, is significant (Table 11.5).

When we remove the youth having no arrests during the pre-program and program periods (0-0 group) from both samples, we have a sample of 66 youth. In this GLM model, there is an increase in the explained variance as the adjusted R-square rises to 0.145; however, the only variable that is significant in the equation predicting mean yearly change in total violence arrests is, again, whether or not the youth had any prior arrests for violence. There is no significant difference between program and comparison youth, as both groups experience the same pattern of mean yearly increases in arrests for youth who had no prior arrests for violence during the pre-program period, and the mean yearly decreases in arrests for youth who did have any prior violence arrests (Table 11.6).

In the logistic regression model including the total sample of program and comparison youth (n = 180), the only variable which is significant is whether the youth was a program or comparison youth (p<0.01). Program youth were more than 3½ times more likely to have an increase in or to remain at the same level of violence arrests, compared to comparison youth. This is primarily due to the fact that only 11 of the 79 (13.9%) comparison youth had an arrest

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<sup>10</sup> Because of the low number of comparison youth having any prior arrests for total violence (n=4), the prior violence category is a dummy variable which is coded as 0=none; and 1=any prior arrest for violence. It should be noted that a much larger number of program youth had arrests for prior violence (n=34), including both serious violence charges and other violence charges. A youth could have been arrested for both during the pre-program period, or had a prior arrest for violence.

for violence during the pre-program or program period, compared to 55 of the 101 (54.5%) program youth (Table 11.7). Removing the 0-0 youth with no arrests for violence from both samples, we increase the statistical significance of the second logistic regression model, but none of the variables are significant in this model (Table 11.8).

### Property Arrest Differences

In the GLM model with all program and comparison youth (N=180), the equation explains very little variance (adjusted R-square=0.070) in the dependent variable *change in yearly property arrests*. Although there are significant differences between self-reported gang and non-gang members ( $p < 0.01$ ), and between males and females ( $p < 0.04$ ), there is no significant difference between program and comparison youth. Self-reported gang members significantly increase their levels of property arrests compared to non-gang youth, while males significantly increase their levels of property arrests compared to females during the program period (Table 11.9 (b) (c)).

Excluding the youth who stay arrest free during the program and pre-program periods in both samples, we have a total sample of 72 youth. The adjusted R-square, or the explained variance in the dependent variable, increases to 0.336, and the model is significant. The categories or levels of prior property yearly arrests is statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ).<sup>11</sup> As observed in the models for the other dependent variables, there is a clear regression effect for youth having higher levels of prior arrests showing a greater decrease in arrests, and youth with

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<sup>11</sup>Levels of yearly prior arrests for property crimes were categorized as follows: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.26 to 0.45; 3) medium = 0.51 to 0.98; 4) high = 1.00 to 3.28.

no prior arrests during the pre-program period having an increase in arrests. Although there are small increases in the mean number of property arrests during the program period for program and comparison youth, there is still no statistically significant difference between program and comparison youth in terms of their adjusted means—0.195 and 0.060, respectively. Self-reported gang members and males show a larger increase in subsequent property arrests compared to non-gang members and females, respectively. However, this increase is rather small. The independent variables *gang member status* and *gender* are almost significant  $p < 0.051$  and  $p < 0.075$ , respectively (Table 11.10 (b) (c) (d)).

In the logistic regression models for the total sample (N=180), the model is significant ( $\chi^2 = p < 0.001$ ). Program youth are 75% more likely to fail (remain at the same level of property arrests or have an increase in their arrests) than comparison youth. Gender, self-reported gang member status and some categories of age at program entry are significant. Males are approximately six times more likely to fail than females. Gang members are more than 3½ times more likely than non-gang members to remain at the same level of arrest, or to have an increase in their property arrests (Table 11.11).

When youth who have no property arrests during the pre-program and program period are excluded from the equation, the total sample is reduced to 72 youth (comparison n=17; program n=55). While the overall model is significant, no specific variables are significant. For program youth compared to comparison youth, the likelihood of remaining at the same level of arrest, or increasing arrests (failing) is reduced fourfold. However, this reduction is not significant ( $p < 0.322$ ) (Table 11.12).

## Other Arrest Differences

In the GLM model including all program and comparison youth (N=180) which employs *change in yearly other arrests* (consisting primarily of arrests for minor offenses, including status offenses, disorderly conduct and resisting and obstructing a peace officer),<sup>12</sup> the equation is significant ( $p < 0.001$ ), and explains almost 30% of the variance or change in the dependent variable (adjusted R-square=0.294). The only variable that is statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) is the level or categories of prior other arrests.<sup>13</sup> There is no significant difference in outcome for program and comparison youth (Table 11.13).

In the model which excludes the 0-0 youth from both samples (reducing the total sample to 73 youth), the explained variance increases greatly (adjusted R-square=0.516), and the categories of prior other arrests and whether or not the youth was in the program are significant ( $p < 0.001$  and  $p < 0.021$ , respectively). The interaction term of other prior arrests  $\times$  program group is also statistically significant ( $p < 0.011$ ). Again, we observe a regression effect based on the level of prior other arrests of the youth. Arrests for youth with no or few prior other arrests during the pre-program period increase, while arrests for youth with more prior other arrests decrease. The regression effect for comparison youth (see Table 11.14 (c)) is stronger than it is for program youth, but this may largely be a result of the extremely small cell frequencies for comparison youth.

In the logistic regression models for other arrests, we see the same effect of the

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<sup>12</sup>For a complete listing of other offenses, see Appendix A, Table A11 and Table A12.

<sup>13</sup>Levels of prior yearly arrest for other offenses were categorized as follows: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.26 to 0.43; 3) medium = 0.51 to 0.99; 4) high = 1.12 to 5.26.

independent variables as in the logistic regressions for other models with the dependent variables of total arrests, violence arrests and property arrests. The logistic regression equation for change in other arrests is significant. The variable for whether the youth was in the program or not is significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) in the model when the 0-0 group is included. Program youth are more than 4 times more likely to fail compared to comparison youth. While the variable is not significant ( $p = 0.162$ ), self-reported gang members are twice as likely to fail than non-gang youth (Table 11.15). However, these differences disappear when the 0-0 youth are excluded, and the samples are no longer so mismatched. In this model, none of the variables is significant. Once again, the differences observed between the two logistic regression models, including the 0-0 group and excluding them, is dramatically affected by the large number of comparison youth who had no arrests for other offenses during both the pre-program and program periods (86.1%) (Table 11.16).

In sum, when we compare outcomes for program and comparison youth using the four dependent arrest variables (total arrests, violence arrests, property arrests and other arrests), the arrest models, especially the logistic regression models, show marked differences if we include the 0-0 youth, i.e., those youth who have no arrests during both the pre-program and program periods. Because a substantial number of comparison youth had no arrests (violence, property and other arrests) during either the pre-program or program period, the exclusion of the 0-0 group dramatically reduces the number of comparison youth in the models. When these youth are excluded, which somewhat improves the match between the program and comparison samples, there is no significant difference in the outcomes of program and comparison youth. The only exception to this general pattern is the GLM model ( $n = 73$ ) for other arrests. However,



the small cell frequencies for the comparison youth make any conclusions very tentative. Generally, controlling for prior arrests, age at program entry, gang member status and gender, program youth are not significantly different from comparison youth in their arrest outcomes. In other words, the program makes no significant difference in terms of an increase or decrease in arrests for program youth compared to youth who are not in the program.

A major difference appears to be that program youth, especially those with no prior arrests, seem to do much worse than comparison youth with no prior arrests. Based on this first set of GLM and logistic regression models, including and excluding both program and comparison youth with no arrests in the pre-program and program periods, it is possible to conclude that the program did a poor job of preventing youth without prior arrests from staying arrest free. This could be due to the difference in police arrest policies and practices in Bloomington-Normal compared to Champaign-Urbana. The Community Youth Liaison Council (CYLC)/Youth Impact, Inc. and Project Oz's "accomplishment" of enhancing its pro-active suppression approach for youth in its comprehensive youth gang program could have served to dramatically increase arrests for program youth, including youth with no prior arrests.

On the other hand, the program youth with no prior arrests may simply have been a higher-risk pre-delinquent group than the similar comparison youth with no prior arrests. The pervasiveness of regression suggests that there may be a ceiling effect for a large proportion of youth in the program and comparison samples. Many of the youth will reduce their level of arrests without program involvement, and there are youth who will increase their level of arrests with or without program involvement. We explore this issue further in Chapters 13 and 14, when we employ self-reported offenses as the dependent variable.

Again, it should be noted that a regression effect was observed in almost all of the models for the four dependent variables. Program and comparison youth with the highest level of prior arrests had large decreases in their arrests, while youth with no or a low level of prior arrests tended to have increases. We explore in detail program effects among youth with different levels of prior arrests in the next set of models, using specific types of services or worker contacts as independent variables.

**Table 11.1**  
**Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Total Yearly Arrests  
 Between the Pre-Program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.276 ; Adjusted R-square=0.242)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Total Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	59.583	20.094	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-14, 15-16, 17-20	2	2.654	0.895	0.411
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	3.533	0.1.192	0.277
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	5.542	1.869	0.173
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	6.654	2.244	0.136
Within error	171	2.965	—	—
Total	179	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Total Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	101	0.344	0.195	1	---			0.000***
Low	41	0.550	0.293	2		---		0.000***
Medium	17	0.306	0.452	3			---	0.000***
High	21	-2.795	0.409	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.2**  
**Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=112)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Total Yearly Arrests  
 Between the Pre-Program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square= 0.312;Adjusted R-square=0.258)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Total Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	66.383	14.288	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-14, 15-16, 17-20	2	0.980	0.211	0.810
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	1.185	0.255	0.615
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	8.475	1.824	0.180
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	1.060	0.228	0.634
Within error	103	4.646	—	—
Total	111	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate

Total Prior Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	33	0.972	0.456	1	---			0.000***
Low	41	0.577	0.393	2		---		0.000***
Medium	17	0.310	0.604	3			---	0.000***
High	21	-2.819	0.551	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	---

For differences between groups: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

**Table 11.3**  
**Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs. Success)  
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Project and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=52.219 with  $df=8$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-3.312	0.672	24.273	0.000***	0.036
<b>Prior Total Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			19.373	0.000***	
Low		1.027	0.454	5.108	0.024*	2.791
Medium		-0.922	0.644	2.052	0.152	0.398
High		-2.447	0.834	8.604	0.003**	0.087
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-14	2		6.338	0.042		
15-16		-0.626	0.442	2.009	0.156	0.535
17-20		-1.204	0.483	6.227	0.013*	0.300
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	1.046	0.439	5.681	0.017*	2.845
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	0.707	0.424	2.787	0.095	2.029
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	1.593	0.672	14.349	0.000***	4.918

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.4**  
**Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=112)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs. Success)  
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Project and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=66.449 with  $df=8$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	0.324	7.045	0.002	0.963	1.382
<b>Prior Total Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			16.091	0.001***	
Low		-9.593	27.903	0.118	0.731	0.000
Medium		-11.191	27.907	0.161	0.688	0.000
High		-12.899	27.914	0.214	0.644	0.000
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-14	2			0.183	0.913	
15-16		-0.085	0.632	0.018	0.892	0.918
17-20		-0.319	0.760	0.176	0.675	0.727
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	0.438	0.636	0.475	0.491	1.550
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	1.036	0.687	2.278	0.131	2.819
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	0.670	0.709	0.894	0.344	1.955

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.5**  
**Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Violence Yearly Arrests  
 between the Pre-Program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.026 ; Adjusted R-square=0.002)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Violence Yearly Arrests:</b> Any Violence Arrest vs. None	1	0.080	0.398	0.529
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12 -16 vs. 17 - 20	1	0.122	0.607	0.437
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.0187	0.093	0.761
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	0.202	1.003	0.318
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	0.428	2.121	0.147
Within error	174	0.202	—	—
Total	179	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.6**  
**Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=66)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Violence Yearly Arrests  
 between the Pre-Program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.211 ; Adjusted R-square=0.145)\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Violence Yearly Arrests:</b> Any Violence Arrest vs. None	1	39.491	13.033	0.001***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12 -16 vs. 17-20	1	1.726	0.570	0.453
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	2.502	0.826	0.367
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	1.974	0.651	0.423
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	0.160	0.053	0.819
Within error	60	3.030	—	—
Total	65	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .



**Table 11.7**  
**Logistic Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs. Success)  
 on Violence Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=28.931 with  $df=8$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-4.068	4.320	0.887	0.346	0.017
<b>Prior Violence Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			3.251	0.355	
Low		0.968	0.571	2.874	0.090	2.632
Medium		0.504	0.750	0.452	0.502	1.656
High		-7.373	17.064	0.187	0.666	0.001
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-14	2			3.211	0.201	
15-16		-0.189	0.448	0.177	0.674	0.828
17-20		-0.932	0.526	3.147	0.076	0.394
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	0.363	0.450	0.651	0.420	1.438
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	0.211	0.452	0.218	0.641	1.235
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	1.302	0.462	7.958	0.005**	3.677

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.8**  
**Logistic Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=66)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)  
 on Violence Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=47.580 with  $df=5$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	11.845	43.271	0.075	0.784	139429.42
<b>Prior Violence Yearly Arrests:</b>	1					
Any=1 vs. None=0		-18.768	61.493	0.093	0.760	0.000
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>	1					
12-16 = 1 vs. 17-20 = 0		8.787	43.742	0.040	0.841	6546.748
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	-0.498	0.860	0.334	0.563	0.608
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	-1.197	0.863	1.922	0.166	0.302
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	-1.095	1.320	0.689	0.406	0.334

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.9**  
**Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Property Yearly Arrests  
 between the Pre-Program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.111 ; Adjusted R-square=0.070)\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Property Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	0.101	0.352	0.788
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-14, 15-16, 17-20	2	0.653	2.279	0.106
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	1.935	6.751	0.010**
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	1.231	4.297	0.040*
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	0.620	2.164	0.143
Within error	171	0.287	—	—
Total	179	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect.

Gang Member Status	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Non-gang	48	0.007	0.100	1	---	0.010**
Gang	132	0.249	0.072	2	0.010**	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.9 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gender Main Effect

Gender	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Female	58	0.031	0.097	1	---	0.040*
Male	122	0.224	0.075	2	0.040*	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.10**  
**Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=72)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Property Yearly Arrests  
 between the Pre-Program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.411 ; Adjusted R-square=0.336)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Property Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	9.013	10.089	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-16 vs. 17-20	2	0.085	0.095	0.910
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	3.546	3.970	0.051
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	2.920	3.269	0.075
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	0.050	0.056	0.814
Within error	63	0.893	—	—
Total	71	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Property Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Property Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	25	0.500	0.249	1	---	0.065	0.005**	0.000***
Low	13	-0.158	0.317	2	0.065	---		0.005**
Medium	20	-0.388	0.276	3	0.005**		---	0.012*
High	14	-1.271	0.282	4	0.000***	0.005**	0.012*	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.10 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect

Gang Member Status	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Non-gang	15	-0.612	0.284	1	---	0.051
Gang	57	-0.046	0.177	2	0.051	---

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gender Main Effect

Gender	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Female	12	-0.612	0.291	1	---	0.075
Male	60	-0.046	0.188	2	0.075	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.11**  
**Logistic Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)  
 on Property Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=37.773 with  $df=8$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-4.011	0.855	22.032	0.000***	0.018
<b>Prior Property Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None				3.726	0.293	
Low	3	0.808	0.719			
Medium		0.619	0.598			
High		-0.887	0.841			
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-14	2			7.736	0.021*	
15-16		-0.721	0.473	2.324	0.127	0.486
17-20		-1.445	0.531	7.404	0.007**	0.236
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	1.303	0.519	6.316	0.012*	3.681
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	1.780	0.590	9.098	0.003**	5.930
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	0.562	0.466	1.454	0.228	1.754

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.12**  
**Logistic Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=72)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)  
 on Property Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=52.864 with  $df=7$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-5.613	33.106	0.029	0.865	0.004
<b>Prior Property Yearly Arrests:</b>	3					
None				4.459	0.216	
Low		-18.360	60.320	0.093	0.761	0.000
Medium		-18.776	60.318	0.097	0.756	0.000
High		-20.937	60.335	0.120	0.729	0.000
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>	1					
12-16 = 1 vs. 17-20 = 0		1.068	1.265	0.713	0.399	2.908
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	0.496	0.904	0.302	0.583	1.643
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	10.000	41.636	0.058	0.810	22027.267
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	-1.439	1.454	0.979	0.322	0.237

For differences between groups: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.



**Table 11.13**  
**Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Other Yearly Arrests  
 between the Pre-program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.326 ; Adjusted R-square=0.294)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Other Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	13.281	26.591	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-14, 15-16, 17-20	2	0.481	0.963	0.384
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.355	0.711	0.400
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	0.265	0.531	0.467
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	1.231	2.466	0.118
Within error	171	0.499	—	—
Total	179	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Other Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Other Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	144	0.185	0.070	1	---		0.003**	0.000***
Low	11	0.320	0.219	2		---	0.013*	0.000***
Medium	15	-0.398	0.191	3	0.003**	0.013*	---	0.000***
High	10	-1.817	0.231	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	---

For differences between groups: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

**Table 11.14**  
**Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=73)**  
 An Analysis of Variance Change in Other Yearly Arrests  
 between the Pre-program and Program Periods  
 for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.590 ; Adjusted R-square=0.516)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Other Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	13.523	16.152	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-14, 15-16, 17-20	2	0.176	0.210	0.811
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.270	0.323	0.572
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	0.122	0.146	0.704
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	4.375	5.656	0.021*
<b>Interaction:</b> Prior Other Yearly Arrests x Project Sample	3	3.399	4.060	0.011*
Within error	61	0.837	—	—
Total	72	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Other Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Other Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	37	1.058	0.280	1	---		0.000***	0.000***
Low	11	1.924	0.496	2		---	0.000***	0.000***
Medium	15	-0.377	0.275	3	0.000***	0.000***	---	0.003**
High	10	-2.096	0.508	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.003**	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.14 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Prior Other Yearly Arrests x Project Sample Interaction

Prior Other Yearly Arrests	Project Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean (i) = Adjusted Mean (j)								
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
None	No	0.783	0.193 (33)	1	---							
None	Yes	1.332	0.493 (4)	2		---						
Low	No	0.036	0.295 (10)	3			---					
Low	Yes	3.812	0.947 (1)	4				---				
Medium	No	-0.525	0.335 (10)	5					---			
Medium	Yes	-0.230	0.447 (5)	6						---		
High	No	-1.653	0.326 (9)	7							---	
High	Yes	-2.540	0.950 (1)	8								---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.15**  
**Logistic Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=180)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)  
 on Other Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=15.851 with  $df=8$ )\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-3.133	0.805	15.148	0.000***	
<b>Prior Other Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			2.755	0.431	
Low		1.059	0.729	2.111	0.146	2.883
Medium		0.388	0.738	0.277	0.599	1.475
High		-0.585	1.112	0.277	0.599	0.557
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-14	2			2.785	0.248	
15-16		-0.557	0.515	1.173	0.279	0.573
17-20		-0.951	0.598	2.534	0.111	0.386
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	0.787	0.564	1.952	0.162	2.198
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1vs. Female=0	1	-0.288	0.516	0.310	0.577	0.750
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	1.475	0.566	6.783	0.009**	4.370

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 11.16**  
**Logistic Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=73)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)  
 on Other Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=53.468 with  $df=7$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	3.587	11.098	0.104	0.747	36.125
<b>Other Prior Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			5.377	0.146	
Low		-10.647	44.070	0.058	0.809	0.000
Medium		-12.360	44.071	0.079	0.779	0.000
High		-13.516	44.079	0.094	0.759	0.000
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-16 =1 vs. 17 to 20=0	1	-0.145	0.965	0.023	0.881	0.865
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	0.030	0.975	0.001	0.975	1.031
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	-0.171	1.001	0.029	0.864	0.843
<b>Project Sample:</b> Program=1 vs. Comparison=0	1	-1.400	1.160	1.458	0.227	0.246

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## Chapter 12

### **Program Youth Outcomes: Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Variables**

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa)

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#### Second Set of Models

In the second set of multivariate models, we are interested in the effects of detailed service and worker-contact variables that may contribute to increases or decreases in arrests for program youth. Essentially we ask: do certain strategies or patterns of services and worker contacts contribute to an increase or a decrease in arrests for program youth? The same program youth are included in this analysis as in the first set of models, except for two program youth who were interviewed at Time I but for whom no worker tracking data exists. The size of the program youth sample is 99. We do not include comparison youth in this analysis, since our focus is on the differential effects of program services and worker contacts on arrest patterns during the program period. We use the same control and interaction terms as in the first set of models (age-at-program-entry category, gang member status, and the prior-arrest covariate, along with interaction terms between several of these variables).<sup>1</sup>

In the GLM models, we use the same set of dependent arrest variables: mean yearly change in *total arrests*, *violence arrests*, *property arrests*, and *arrests for other offenses*. In the logistic regression equations, we also use the same dependent variables as those that were used in the earlier analyses of program and comparison youth. The outcome variables in the logistic

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<sup>1</sup>We note that the variable of whether the youth was on probation or parole is highly and significantly correlated with many of the service and coordinated-contact variables, but is less significant than other variables used in the multivariate analyses; therefore, we omit it from the following models. Whether a youth was on probation or parole is included in the model where we use self-reported offenses as the dependent variable (Chapter 14).

models for the four types of arrests are coded: 1 (fail) – if the youth had an increase in arrests or remained at the same level of arrests between the pre-program and program periods; 0 (succeed) – if the youth had a decrease in arrests or remained arrest free during the pre-program and program periods.

The service and worker-contact variables are indicators of four of the five basic strategies of the comprehensive gang approach: social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression and coordination (community or interagency mobilization at the direct-service or worker-contact levels). Our earlier discussion of program services and worker contacts (Chapter 10) indicates that different service and worker-contact patterns may have occurred in the course of the four-year program period. We are unable to directly measure the effects of organizational change on individual youth exposed to the program at different periods in its development. Youth who came into the program later are too few for adequate analysis. In the models in this chapter, our focus will be on dosages of program service/worker contact and coordinated suppression variables, based on worker-tracking records. We introduce them separately in the different analyses to predict program youth outcome, i.e., the four types of police arrests.

One major limitation of these models is that insufficient worker tracking forms are available to fully analyze program effects. Ideally, worker tracking data should represent the full extent of services and worker contacts provided to the youth in the program period. This is not possible because of two gaps in the data provided by the Bloomington-Normal program site, which the Evaluators were unable to remedy. The first gap is that worker-tracking data covered only the last 2½ years of the program. Forty-one of the 99 youth entered the program in the first 1½ years of the program, prior to when worker tracking began, and were probably provided

some services and worker contacts, but we do not have worker-tracking data for this period of time. However, we do have worker-tracking or service data on all of these youth during the following 2½ years of the program. We believe that patterns of services did not differ significantly during the earlier 1½-year time period for which we have no worker-tracking records, compared to the 2½-year period in which we have tracking records, but service and worker-contact variables measuring dosage for individual youth are nevertheless affected by this gap in data.

In order to construct the dosage variables, all youth who entered the program prior to the collection of worker-tracking data—January 1, 1997—were assigned this program entry date to compute a new length of program participation. The difference between this date and the youth’s exit date from the program was calculated in months, and is used as the denominator for the dosage variables. The numbers of particular types of services or contacts were then summed and divided by the new length of program participation. However, this procedure may have produced biases because the 41 above-mentioned youth may have received a different number of services or worker contacts during the first 1½ years of the program than they received during the last 2½ years of the program.<sup>2</sup> For youth who entered the program after the start of the collection of worker-tracking data, their exit date minus their entry date was used to calculate their length of program participation, which was then divided by months to obtain a monthly measure.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>For youth who entered the program prior to the collection of worker-tracking data, we correlated the worker-tracking program-entry gap (length of the time between the youth’s entry and the beginning of worker-tracking data collection, in months) with the total level of services per month. The Pearson correlation coefficient was -0.381 ( $p < 0.014$ ), indicating that youth who came into the program much earlier than the beginning of worker-tracking data collection had lower levels of service during the pre-worker-tracking period.

<sup>3</sup>In Chapter 14, we construct a dummy variable to account for the effects of different lengths of program exposure between the Time I and Time II interviews on variance in reported offenses.



A second gap has to do with the fact that not all types of workers involved with the program provided equivalent numbers of records of their services to and contacts with program youth. As discussed earlier, probation and outreach workers were most often in contact with program youth, and completed the bulk of worker tracking forms. Relatively equivalent numbers of worker-tracking forms by all key workers in contact with program youth were not filled out. School personnel (e.g. vice principals, alternative school teachers), police and other agency treatment personnel were also in contact with program youth, but completed fewer worker tracking forms. Moreover, in some cases, workers did not consistently complete worker tracking forms for the entire period during which they provided program services and contacts to the youth (based on the claims of the Project Director and the Project Coordinator).

To some extent, the gap in service and contact information provided by some of the workers is compensated for by coordination information supplied by workers who submitted tracking forms in which they referred to other workers they contacted about youth, and to the types of services provided to youth by these workers. Several workers were also in coordinated contact with a program youth during a particular reporting period, and therefore, if one worker failed to provide worker-tracking information about the youth, we might still receive information from other workers about the first worker's efforts with that youth for that particular reporting period. Our coordination variable provides extensive data on other workers who may not have completed as many tracking forms as we would have liked. The following sections present selected GLM and logistic regression models which incorporate the aforementioned dependent and independent variables.

## Total Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences

In the first GLM model, the dependent variable is the *mean change in total arrests from the pre-program period to the program period*, and the key independent variable is *coordinated suppression*.<sup>4</sup> The model includes total prior yearly arrests as a covariate; the control variables are *age at program entry*, *self-reported gang member status*, and *gender*. We also use the interaction term *prior total yearly arrests X coordinated suppression*.

The GLM equation explains 34.4% of the variance in the *total yearly arrest* dependent variable (adjusted R-square of 0.293 and  $p < 0.001$ ). The most significant variable in the equation is *prior yearly arrests* ( $p < 0.001$ ), which has essentially a regression effect. The youth with the highest level or category of prior arrests have a decrease of 2½ arrests per year, while the youth with none, low and medium levels of prior arrests have an increase.<sup>5</sup> The other significant variable is *coordinated suppression*. Sixty-four percent of the program youth were provided with coordinated suppression contacts.<sup>6</sup> Those youth with coordinated suppression, regardless of their level of prior arrests, had relatively higher rates of subsequent arrests than those without coordinated suppression contacts (Table 12.1(c)).

The results from the logistic regression are consistent with the findings of the GLM model. In the logistic regression equation for total yearly arrests, prior total yearly arrests, self-reported gang member status, and coordinated suppression are all significant. Program youth

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<sup>4</sup>Coordinated suppression represents contacts by a range of workers, including police or probation/parole, concerning a particular program youth during the particular reporting period.

<sup>5</sup>The levels or categories of total prior yearly arrests are as follows: 1) none=no arrests; 2) low=0.26 to 0.98; 3) medium=1.12 to 1.80; 4) high=2.05 to 12.18.

<sup>6</sup>For many youth, coordinated suppression was provided for a limited period, and for some youth it was provided for the entire time for which we collected worker-tracking data.

provided with coordinated suppression were 12 times more likely to fail (remain at the same arrest level or increase their yearly arrests) than program youth who were not provided with coordinated suppression (Table 12.2).

However, based on the data available, we cannot determine whether coordinated suppression caused a higher rate of arrests during the program period for program youth, or whether the program youths' higher rates of arrests led to coordination among workers with police and/or probation/parole officers. It is possible that coordination or communication among workers, including police and/or probation, did occur prior to arrest, but we do not have sufficient evidence to support this possibility. What is clear is that there is a high correlation between coordinated suppression and subsequent total yearly arrests.

Of special note is the high rate of arrests of program youth with no prior arrests during the program period – 21 out of 37 (56.9%), compared to the low rate of arrests of comparison youth with no prior arrests during the same period – 12 out 64 (18.8%). However, we have no indication that the rate of subsequent arrests for program youth with no prior arrests is higher than it is for program youth with prior arrests.

In other words, while it is evident from our earlier analysis of the total sample (N=180) that program youth were at a significantly greater risk of arrest than comparison youth, it is not evident that the program-area labeling or arrest effect was directed primarily at the program youth with no prior arrests. Based on the present analysis involving program youth only, the most significant program service/worker-contact variable is coordinated suppression, rather than the variables measuring total services, total contacts, employment services, social intervention, etc.

### Violence Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences

\_\_\_\_\_ In the GLM analysis with *change in violence yearly arrests* as the dependent variable, the key independent variable is *level of total services*; the control variables are *age at program entry*, *self-reported gang member status*, *gender*, and *prior violence yearly arrests*. The equation explains 23.5% of the variance in the dependent variable with an adjusted R-square of 0.176 ( $p < 0.001$ ). The only variable that is significant, however, is prior violence yearly arrests ( $p < 0.001$ ).<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that only 34 out of 99 youth (34.3%) had prior arrests for violent offenses. No specific program variable, including level of total services, was found to have any effect on outcome for program youth, or to contribute to their reduction (or increase) in subsequent violence arrests during the program period (Table 12.3).

In the logistic regression model for violence arrests, the only independent variable which is significant is *coordinated suppression*. Program youth who received coordinated suppression were 4½ times more likely to remain at their same level of prior arrests, or to have an increase in arrests, than program youth who did not receive coordinated suppression. As discussed earlier, there is a temporal order problem in terms of whether coordinated suppression came before or after the program youth's arrest, which is a function of insufficient data (Table 12.4).

### Property Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences

\_\_\_\_\_ In the GLM analysis with *change in property yearly arrests* as the dependent variable, the

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<sup>7</sup>Levels or categories of prior yearly violence arrests are grouped as follows: 1) none=no prior arrests, 2) low=0.26 to 0.45, 3) medium to high=0.51 to 12.18. The medium to high category was created because of the relatively low frequencies in the original medium and high categories, 8 and 11 youth, respectively. Only 3 youth had 2 or more priors.

key independent variables are *level of total contacts* along with the control variables *age at program entry*, *self-reported gang member status*, *gender*, and the covariate *prior property yearly arrests*.<sup>8</sup> The equation has an adjusted R-square of 0.351 ( $p < 0.001$ ), and explains 40.4% of the variance in change in property arrests from the pre-program to the program period. As in the other models, the most significant variable is prior property yearly arrests ( $p < 0.001$ ), which indicates a regression effect. However, level of total contacts<sup>9</sup> ( $p < 0.001$ ) and self-reported gang member status ( $p < 0.004$ ) are also significant in predicting change in the dependent variable. Self-reported gang members and males have a smaller decrease in property arrests than non-gang members and females, respectively (Table 12.5). The analysis tells us that both gang and non-gang members reduce their level of property arrests during the program period, but the reduction for non-gang members is significantly greater. Furthermore, the reduction in property arrests is also greater for females than for males.

Most important, we observe that the low and medium levels of total contacts also are associated with a decrease in property arrests; however, high levels of contacts are associated with a slight increase in subsequent property arrests during the program period. This somewhat contradictory effect concerning level of contacts could be due to the fact that youth receiving the highest levels of services and contacts were on probation or parole. Thus, the greater reduction in property crime arrests occurred for about two-thirds of the sample ( $n=66$ ). For youth who were mainly not on probation/parole and were provided with lower levels of worker contacts, the

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<sup>8</sup>Levels of total prior property arrests were categorized as follows: 1) none=no arrests; 2) low=0.26 to 0.45; 3) medium=0.51 to 0.98; 4) high=1.00 to 3.28.

<sup>9</sup>Levels of total contacts per month were categorized as follows: 1) low=0.14 to 1.44; 2) medium=1.49 to 4.67; 3) high=4.89 to 10.28.

reduction (adjusted mean) is -0.617; for youth, half of whom were on probation and the other half not, and who were provided with a medium amount of worker contacts, the reduction (adjusted mean) is -0.687; and for youth who were mainly on probation and provided with the most worker contacts, there is no reduction in property arrests; there is actually a slight increase of 0.008 in their adjusted mean during the program period.

One interpretation of this finding is that a high dosage of contacts is not sufficient to produce a reduction in property arrests. Much of the reduction in arrests depends on other variables, such as prior arrests, probation/parole status, etc.

In the logistic regression equation for property arrests, self-reported gang member status, gender, and level of total contacts are all significant and positively correlated with an increase in the odds of a youth having an increase in his property arrests, or remaining at the same arrest level or number of arrests, during the program period (to fail). Males are almost 12 times more likely to fail than females; and self-reported gang members are slightly more than 5 times more likely to fail than non-gang members. Although medium and high levels of prior property arrests reduce the odds of a youth failing (which is consistent with the findings in the GLM model), none of the variables representing the different levels of prior arrests is significant.

Most important, youth who were provided with a medium level of total contacts were 2½ times more likely to fail, and youth who were provided with a high level were 12 times more likely to fail, than youth who were provided with a low level of total contacts (Table 12.6).

### Other Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences

In the GLM analysis with the dependent variable of *change in other yearly arrests*

(mainly arrests for status offenses, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, and disorderly conduct),<sup>10</sup> the key independent variable in the equation is *level of total services*<sup>11</sup> along with the control variables *age at program entry*, *self-reported gang member status*, *gender*, and the covariate *prior other yearly arrests*.<sup>12</sup> The equation has an adjusted R-square of 0.343 ( $p < 0.001$ ). The only significant variable is prior other yearly arrests ( $p < 0.001$ ), which produces a regression effect.

Of particular interest, however, is that the total amount of services provided at any level contributes to a non-statistically significant reduction in the youth's arrests for other offenses during the program period. Generally, the less service provided, the greater the reduction in arrests during the program period. The fact that this variable is not significant is probably influenced by other variables such as prior arrests, whether the youth is on probation/parole or not, etc., (Table 12.7).

In the logistic regression equation, all levels of coordinated contacts are significant and positive.<sup>13</sup> Compared to youth with a low level of coordinated contacts,<sup>14</sup> youth with medium and

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<sup>10</sup>For a complete listing of other offenses, see Appendix A, Table A11 and Table A12.

<sup>11</sup>Levels of total services per month were categorized as follows: 1) low=0.24 to 1.57; 2) medium=1.64 to 3.10; 3) high=3.17 to 9.39.

<sup>12</sup>Levels of prior yearly arrests for other offenses were categorized follows: 1) none=no prior arrests; 2) low=0.51 to 0.99; 3) medium to high=1.12 to 5.26.

<sup>13</sup>Models using the *level of total services* variable which was not significant did not fit the data as well as the model with *level of total coordinated contacts*. They are not presented in this report. Coordinated contacts could have included (or not included) contacts or communication with probation/parole and/or police.

<sup>14</sup>Coordinated contacts refer to whether the worker involved with the intervention program (i.e. outreach workers, probation officers, job developers, other agency counselors) contacted one or more other police, probation/parole, outreach, school or another social service agency workers concerning a program youth. These contacts, for example, were to provide background information about the youth, to arrange for specific services—drug counseling, family counseling, vocational or employment services, etc. The total number of coordinated contacts provided to a youth during the program period was divided by the youth's program length time in months, adjusted for the beginning date of worker tracking data collection. Thus, youth who entered the program prior to the collection of worker tracking data and remained in the program after the beginning of its collection on January 1,

high levels are more than 7½ times and 4½ times more likely, respectively, to fail (to have an increase in arrests for other offenses or to remain at the same level of arrests). Although no other variables were significant in the model, certain levels of prior arrests are almost significant, and show a regression effect (Table 12.8).

Essentially, the GLM model tells us that specific services or worker contacts had no significant effect on the change in or reduction of other types of arrests—mainly minor offenses—for program youth during the program period. However, the logistic regression model found the level of coordinated contacts to be significant, and to be associated with youth failing. The significance of prior arrests in the GLM model is mainly a regression effect. Youth with more prior arrests for other offenses had a reduction in these kinds of arrests, while those with no prior arrests had an increase during the program period.

In sum, the GLM models indicate that several program variables including coordinated suppression, total services and total contacts are significantly associated with increases among particular groups in their mean yearly arrests (except for property crime) during the program period. As in the GLM models which include comparison youth, there is also a clear regression effect in every model. Youth with the highest level of prior arrests have a large and statistically significant decrease, while youth with no or a low level of prior arrests have an increase.

Because the logistic regression equations in our analysis estimate the odds of a youth failing (increasing his level of arrests or remaining at the same number of arrests during the program period) or a youth succeeding (remaining arrest-free or decreasing the number of arrests), the program variables which were found to be significant – coordinated suppression,

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1997 had their program length date calculated using this date as a substitute for their actual program entry date.



total number of contacts, and total number of coordinated contacts – increased the odds of the youth’s failing. Except for property crimes, there was an increase in the number of program youth arrested for the different types of offenses – total violence, other and drug.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the program variables show a strong association with program youth having an increase or staying at the same number of arrests.

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<sup>15</sup>See Appendix A, Tables A3, A5, A7, A9 and A11.

**Table 12.1**  
**Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Yearly Arrests  
 for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.344 ; Adjusted R-square=0.293)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Total Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	47.018	13.456	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-16 vs. 17-20	1	0.475	0.136	0.713
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	4.302	1.231	0.270
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	1.338	0.383	0.538
<b>Coordinated Suppression:</b> Yes vs. No	1	20.889	5.978	0.016*
Within error	91	3.494	—	—
Total	98	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Total Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	35	0.825	0.382	1	---			0.000***
Low	33	0.367	0.374	2		---		0.000***
Medium	13	0.074	0.598	3			---	0.000***
High	18	-2.551	0.518	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	---

For differences between groups: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

**Table 12.1 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Coordinated Suppression Main Effect

Coordinated Suppression	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
No	36	-0.859	0.385	1	---	0.016*
Yes	63	0.217	0.376	2	0.016*	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.2**  
**Logistic Change in Total Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)  
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth  
 with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=44.330 with  $df=7$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-2.633	1.116	5.565	0.018*	0.072
<b>Prior Total Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			17.244	0.001***	
Low		0.340	0.655	0.269	0.604	1.405
Medium		-2.054	0.878	5.473	0.019*	0.128
High		-3.131	0.912	11.791	0.001***	0.044
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0	1	-0.246	0.651	0.143	0.706	0.782
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	1.331	0.618	4.641	0.031*	3.786
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	-0.049	0.724	0.004	0.947	0.953
<b>Coordinated Suppression:</b> Yes=1 vs. No=0	1	2.495	0.674	13.684	0.001***	12.121

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.3**  
**Change in Violence Yearly Arrests and Total Services (N=99)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Violence Yearly Arrests  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.235 ; Adjusted R-square=0.176)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Violence Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium to High	2	17.382	10.083	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-16 vs. 17-20	1	0.749	0.434	0.511
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.484	0.281	0.598
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	1.007	0.584	0.447
<b>Levels of Total Services:</b> Low, Medium, High	2	2.128	1.234	0.296
Within error	91	1.724	—	—
Total	98	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Violence Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Violence Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	65	0.287	0.222	1	---	0.000***	
Low	15	-0.020	0.373	2	---	0.008**	
Medium to High	19	-1.327	0.370	3	0.000***	0.008***	---

For differences between groups: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

**Table 12.4**  
**Logistic Change in Violence Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)  
 on Violence Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with/without  
 Coordinated Suppression Contacts

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=23.893 with  $df=7$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-4.431	7.093	0.390	0.532	0.012
<b>Prior Violence Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			0.429	0.934	
Low		-0.038	0.657	0.003	0.954	0.963
Medium		-0.499	0.874	0.326	0.568	0.607
High		-8.900	28.085	0.100	0.751	0.000
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0	1	0.902	0.616	2.146	0.143	2.465
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	0.329	0.542	0.369	0.544	1.390
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	-0.498	0.604	0.679	0.410	0.608
<b>Coordinated Suppression:</b> Yes=1 vs. No=0	1	1.538	0.611	6.347	0.012*	4.656

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.5**  
**Change in Property Yearly Arrests and Total Contacts (N=99)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Yearly Arrests  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.404 ; Adjusted R-square=0.351)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Property Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	2	6.331	12.089	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-16 vs. 17-20	1	0.067	0.129	0.721
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	4.521	8.633	0.004**
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	1.843	3.520	0.064
<b>Levels of Total Contacts:</b> Low, Medium, High	2	4.179	7.980	0.001***
Within error	91	0.524	—	—
Total	98	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Property Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Property Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	59	0.146	0.122	1	---		0.020*	0.000***
Low	13	-0.140	0.223	2		---		0.000***
Medium	17	-0.362	0.220	3	0.020*		---	0.001***
High	10	-1.373	0.251	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.5 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect

Gang Member Status	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Non-gang	32	-0.668	0.173	1	---	0.004**
Gang	67	-0.197	0.137	2	0.004**	---

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gender Main Effect

Gender	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Female	17	-0.622	0.212	1	---	0.064
Male	82	-0.242	0.107	2	0.064	---

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Levels of Total Contacts Main Effect

Levels of Total Contacts	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Low	33	-0.617	0.182	1	---		0.001***
Medium	33	-0.687	0.165	2		---	0.001***
High	33	0.008	0.171	3	0.001***	0.001***	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .



**Table 12.6**  
**Logistic Change in Property Arrests and Total Contacts (N=99)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) on  
 Property Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Different  
 Levels of Total Contacts

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=34.640 with  $df=8$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-5.183				
<b>Prior Property Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			4.828	0.185	
Low		0.634	0.747	0.721	0.396	1.886
Medium		-0.088	0.761	0.013	0.908	0.916
High		-2.379	1.273	3.493	0.062	0.093
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0	1	0.716	0.671	1.141	0.285	2.047
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	1.627	0.678	5.752	0.016*	5.088
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	2.467	0.930	7.031	0.008**	11.782
<b>Levels of Total Contacts:</b>						
Low	2			12.085	0.002**	
Medium		0.977	0.757	1.665	0.197	2.657
High		2.457	0.715	11.808	0.001***	11.667

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.7**  
**Change in Other Yearly Arrests and Total Services (N=99)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Other Yearly Arrests  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.397 ; Adjusted R-square=0.343)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
<b>Prior Other Yearly Arrests:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	2	11.642	18.619	0.000***
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b> 12-16 vs. 17-20	1	0.127	0.204	0.653
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.287	0.459	0.500
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	0.016	0.025	0.875
<b>Levels of Total Services:</b> Low, Medium, High	2	1.070	1.711	0.187
Within error	91	0.625	—	—
Corrected Total	98	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Other Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Other Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	70	0.374	0.133	1	---		0.003**	0.000***
Low	10	-0.007	0.261	2		---		0.000***
Medium	10	-0.466	0.290	3	0.003**		---	0.002**
High	9	-1.656	0.284	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.002**	---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.7 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Levels of Total Services Main Effect

Levels of Total Services	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Low	33	-0.639	0.190	1	---		
Medium	33	-0.413	0.183	2		---	
High	33	-0.266	0.198	3			---

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 12.8**  
**Logistic Change in Other Arrests and Coordinated Contacts (N=99)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) on  
 Other Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Different Levels of Coordinated Contacts

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=34.640 with  $df=8$ )\*\*\*

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-1.164	0.960	1.472	0.225	0.312
<b>Prior Other Yearly Arrests:</b>						
None	3			6.870	0.076	
Low		0.313	0.764	0.168	0.682	1.368
Medium		-1.668	0.887	3.535	0.060	0.189
High		-2.109	1.125	3.517	0.061	0.121
<b>Age at Program Entry:</b>						
12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0	1	0.055	0.566	0.009	0.923	1.057
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0	1	0.461	0.522	0.780	0.377	1.586
<b>Gender:</b> Male=1 vs. Female=0	1	-0.263	0.643	0.167	0.683	0.769
<b>Levels of Coordinated Contacts:</b>						
Low	2			11.278	0.004**	
Medium		2.030	0.612	11.003	0.001***	7.611
High		1.533	0.647	5.617	0.018*	4.634

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## Chapter 13

### **Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Self-Report and Mediating Variables**

(Kwai Ming Wa)

#### Third Set of Models

The third set of analyses, similarly to that of the first set, examines the effects of the program without introducing specific patterns of services or worker contacts, but with the same control variables – youth demographics, gang member status, prior offenses – and adding selected mediating variables. These analyses are based on richer data sources and variables than those in the first two sets of analyses, but cover program effects over a shorter period of time. Focus is on a subset of youth in the program sample ( $n = 81$ ) and the comparison sample ( $n = 53$ ) who completed both Time I and Time II interviews. There are some differences in the characteristics of youth in our subsamples, particularly in the characteristics of comparison youth. We have described these characteristics in some detail, and compared them with the original samples of program youth ( $N = 101$ ) and comparison youth ( $N = 79$ ), in Chapter 9.

One of our considerations is, again, program exposure time, but now based on the 1 or 1½- year interval between the Time I and Time II interviews. Our control variables are similar to those used in the first two models, although their values are somewhat different. We now use self-reported offenses as dependent variables, and we categorize them the same way we did the police arrest data: *total offenses*, *serious violence offenses*, *total violence offenses* (minor and serious), *property offenses* and *drug offenses*. In this series of multivariate analyses we include drug offenses (drug selling) which is insufficiently recorded in police data for the comparison sample and subsample (See Appendix A, Tables A7 and A8). The prior offense variables are

categorized into four levels: none, low, medium, and high. The frequencies for each level may vary according to the specific offense, and are described below. We do not use the *other offenses* category, however, which is used in the analyses based on arrest data. The self-reported offenses (see Appendix C) contain fewer variables, and are focused on gang-motivated types of offenses. Change in self-reported offenses (i.e., the outcome measure) is based on the difference between self-reported offenses that occurred during the six months prior to the Time I interview, and those that occurred during the six months prior to the Time II interview.

Mediating variables are used as independent factors in some of the analyses. It is possible that program services/worker contacts have indirect as well as direct effects. Youth characteristics such as gang-related family members, gang, neighborhood circumstances, school performance and obtaining a job may be influenced by different types of worker services or strategies. The changes in these mediating, or intervening, variables may also affect the youth's delinquency pattern. Indicators of these mediating variables are derived from items in the Time I and Time II youth gang member survey interviews. Specific mediating variables selected for inclusion in this third-model set of analyses are: job characteristics, school performance, and the S/W Scale comprising eleven items which bear on family-member gang status, gang friends, the neighborhood gang situation, the gang structure and the youth's current gang member status. The S/W Scale is described in Appendix D.

There are problems in the timing of interviews. The Time I interview is not a baseline interview, and may have occurred months after the youth entered the program. The intervals between the Time I and Time II interviews may not be equivalent for each youth. Nevertheless, the average interval for the program sample is a mean of 1.2 years and a median of 1.1 years; the

average interval for the comparison sample is a mean of 1.5 years and a median of 1.3 years. The interval standard deviations for the program samples are: program = .45; and comparison = .46 respectively. The majority of youth in the samples were interviewed in the year to year-and-a-half between Time I and Time II. We introduce a time variable in our analysis to determine whether outcome is affected by the length of the interval.

We conduct a series of multivariate statistical analyses and attempt to control for sharp differences between program and comparison samples as best we can, especially regarding prior self-reported delinquency background. We also identify differences in other characteristics determining outcome (whether within or across the subsamples) such as age, gender, and gang member status. Our general linear model (GLM) procedure predicts the dependent variable, Time II minus Time I self-reported particular offenses, based on independent program, control, and interaction-term variables.

The GLM equation in this analysis consists of ten independent variables: the dummy variable – program/comparison (no detailed services or worker variables are included in this set of analyses); four control variables – gender (female/male), gang member status (gang/non gang), age at first interview (12 to 14, 15 and 16, 17 to 20); offenses in the six-month period prior to the Time I interview (none = 0, low = 1- 6 offenses, medium = 7-12 offenses, high  $\geq$  13 offenses) – a covariate; four interaction terms – project  $\times$  gender, project  $\times$  gang member status, project  $\times$  age category, and project  $\times$  prior arrests; and the dependent variable *change in offenses* (Time II sum of particular-category offenses minus Time I sum of particular-category offenses). The same set of variables is used in each of the following GLM models, except that the dependent and control (or covariate) variables of self-reported offenses differ in each equation. Sample sizes change in

these GLM equations depending on the number of program and comparison youth who report changes in particular types of offenses. Youth who report zero offenses at both Time I and Time II, and youth with missing values at Time I or Time II, are not included. All program youth are included in the fourth set of analyses (Chapter 14), which focuses on differences in offense outcomes based on specific services/worker contacts provided.

Total Offenses. There are 105 youth (excluding 29 zero-zeroes) who self-reported at least one type of offense or a change in offense pattern (program N = 66; comparison N = 39). The variance accounted for in this model is  $R^2 = 0.44$ . The GLM model is significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The prior total offense variable has four categories: none = 0 offenses; low = 1-6 offenses; medium = 7-12 offenses; high  $\geq 13$  offenses. The outcome variable – total offense change – is measured in actual frequency differences between total offenses at Time I and total offenses at Time II. The only significant main effect is prior total offenses ( $p = 0.001$ ). No other variable comes close to statistical significance. In this multivariate, statistically-controlled model, there is no difference in outcome between program and comparison youth, females and males, gang and non-gang youth, or age categories. Over time, there is a decline in total offenses for youth in both samples. The decline is a normal regression effect: youth who are none (0 offenses) increase (ls mean = 9.1); low (1-6 offenses) increase (ls mean = 3.2); medium (7-12 offenses) decrease (ls mean = -2.7), and high ( $\geq 13$  offenses) decrease (ls mean = -15.3).

Nevertheless, there are interesting though non-significant declines in least square (ls) or adjusted (relative to other variables) mean total offenses for various characteristics of program and comparison youth (not in any tables): program males decline more than program females, but



comparison females decline more than comparison males; the declines are greater for program gang compared to program non-gang youth, but the decline is greater for comparison non-gang compared to comparison gang youth; the 15 to 16-year-old program group shows a sharp decline, but the 12 to 14 and 17 to 20 program groups show a slight increase, while each of the comparison youth age categories show a decline. The strongest subcategory declines, many of which are statistically significant, are based on prior offenses, with almost identical declines or increases occurring across program and comparison samples due to statistical regression (Table 13.1).

In another analysis, with *change in total offenses* as the dependent variable and *program/comparison sample* as the independent (dummy) variable, we also introduce two additional variables, a mediating gang involvement variable and the project  $\times$  gang involvement interaction term. Neither of these additional variables is significant. The prior total offense category is the only significant variable in the equation ( $p = 0.0001$ ). The equation has an  $R^2$  of 0.47 and is statistically significant (Table 13.2). Nevertheless, gang involvement does show a difference for both program and comparison samples in a post hoc comparison. A decrease in gang involvement associated with a decline in total offenses is statistically different ( $p = 0.047$ ) from an increase in gang involvement associated with an increase in total offenses.

Serious Violence Offenses. There are only 37 youth (excluding 97 zero-zeroes) who report serious violence offenses, e.g., aggravated battery, aggravated assault, armed robbery, drive by shootings or murder. Twenty are program males, five are program females, six are comparison males, and six comparison females. The variance accounted for in this model is  $R^2 = .83$ , which

is very large and a function of the small sample and cell sizes bearing on this characteristic. The GLM model is significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The most significant effect is prior serious violence offenses ( $p = 0.001$ ). (The prior serious violence, prior total violence, and prior property offense variables each have four categories of values which are different from those of total offenses: none = 0 offenses; low = 1-3 offenses; medium = 4-6 offenses; high =  $\geq 7$  offenses). The gang member status variable approaches statistical significance ( $p = 0.056$ ) in this equation. No other variable comes close to significance.

Of special interest is that non-gang youth show a least square mean decline of  $6.6 - 2\frac{1}{2}$  times more than the gang youth decline of only 2.5 for serious violence offenses. Nine program youth at Time I, and five program youth at Time II self-report medium and high prior serious violence offenses; three comparison youth at Time I but only one youth at Time II report medium and high serious violence offenses. Gang youth are more likely than non-gang youth to be serious-violence offenders. No variable other than prior serious violence predicts change in subsequent serious violence by youth during the program period (Table 13.3).

Total Violence Offenses. There are 95 youth (program  $n = 61$ , comparison  $n = 34$ , excluding 38 zero-zeroes and 1 missing response at Time I) who self-report any type of violence, serious or less serious, such as simple assault or simple battery. The variance accounted for in this model is  $R^2 = 0.49$ . This GLM model is significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). Two variables show significance: prior total violence ( $p = 0.001$ ) and the interaction term of project  $\times$  gender ( $p = 0.034$ ). Of interest is that total violence declines for program males (ls mean = -2.45) but increases for program females (ls mean = +1.18). The difference is almost statistically significant ( $p = 0.078$ ). Again,

the reverse occurs in the comparison sample: females decline (ls mean = -3.24) but comparison males increase slightly (ls mean = 0.32). This latter difference is not statistically significant. We also note that least square means show almost the same slight decline in total violence for program gang and program non-gang youth. Our cell size for comparison non-gang youth (n = 4), however, does not make an adequate comparison with program non-gang youth (n = 16) possible. Overall, for the different categories of youth, the pattern of decline in self-reported total violence (mainly less violent offenses) is less sharp than for serious violence (Table 13.4).

Property Offenses. There are 87 youth (program n = 53, comparison n = 34, excluding 46 zeroes and 1 missing response at Time I) who self-report any form of property offense, mainly theft or burglary. The variance accounted for in the model is  $R^2 = .51$ . Again, the GLM model is significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). Only one variable shows a significant effect: prior property offenses ( $p=0.001$ ). No other variable comes close to statistical significance. There is little to distinguish comparison subgroup effects, except for a general regression effect, i.e., those youth with fewer self-reported prior property offenses have more subsequent property offenses, and those with more prior property offenses show fewer subsequent property offenses. There is no difference in outcome between program and comparison youth (Table 13.5).

Drug Offenses. First, we observe that 34.6% (n = 35) of all program youth (N = 101) interviewed at Time I, and 43% (n = 35) of the subsample of program youth (N = 81) interviewed at both Time I and Time II, said they were selling drugs at either time period. Also, 36.7% (n = 29) of all comparison youth interviewed at Time I (N = 79), and 41.5% (n = 22) of

the subsample of comparison youth (N = 53) interviewed both at Time I and Time II, said they were selling drugs at either time period. Based on these samples and subsamples of program and comparison youth interviewed at different time periods, it is evident that a substantial proportion of youth in the program and comparison samples and subsamples were selling drugs. It is also likely that equal proportions of comparison youth and program youth were selling drugs.

Based on youth gang member survey responses, we were able to compute the number of days per month that youth sold drugs for the program and comparison subsamples at Time I and Time II. The mean number of days per month selling drugs declined for program youth – from 17.24 (n = 25) to 15.31 (n = 16) – and increased slightly, from 20.77 (n = 18) to 21.38 (n = 16), for comparison youth. A substantial number of youth in each sample appeared to be selling drugs with some frequency. We have not yet computed the type, amount and change in frequencies of particular drugs sold by the two samples. Also, based on survey responses to questions about illegal income, very few of these youths were earning any appreciable income from drug selling.<sup>1</sup>

In the GLM analysis of youth who were interviewed at both Time I and Time II, only 56 reported selling drugs (program n = 34, comparison n = 22). The variance accounted for in the model is  $R^2 = .79$ . The model is statistically significant ( $p = 0.0001$ ). The prior offense variable – selling drugs – is now reduced to three categories: none = 0 days per month; low = 1- 14 days per month; high =  $\geq 15$  days per month. Two variables are significant: prior drug offenses ( $p = 0.0001$ ) and the main effect gang member status ( $p = 0.025$ ). The project as an independent

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<sup>1</sup>Note that 1 program youth who was interviewed at Time II did not respond to drugs questions in the Time I interview.

variable is not significant as a main effect ( $p = 0.364$ ) in its contribution to the reduction of self-reported drug offenses (Table 13.6).

The differences between the program and comparison group are sharp but not statistically significant. There is a reduction of 8.2 days per month selling drugs for the program subsample, but only a slight decrease of 2.96 days per month for the comparison subsample. The largest decrease is for program non-gang youth ( $n = 10$ , -12.3 days), compared to the decrease for program gang youth ( $n = 24$ , -4.1 days). There is a similar effect for the comparison non-gang youth group ( $n = 2$ , -11.6 days). The comparison gang youth increase ( $n = 20$ , +5.7 days). The effects for males and females in the program and comparison groups are very different (program males,  $n = 28$ , -4.0 days; program females,  $n = 6$ , -12.4 days; comparison males,  $n = 8$ , -0.23 days; comparison females,  $n = 14$ , -5.7 days). The declines are greatest for the program youth in the 12 to 14-year-old group and in the 15 to 16-year-old group; the greatest increase is for the comparison 17 to 20-year-olds.

In a further GLM analysis with drug selling as the dependent variable and project as the independent variable, we introduced two additional mediating variables: gang involvement and the interaction term  $\text{project} \times \text{gang involvement}$ . This model had an  $R^2$  of 0.84 and was slightly more significant than the previous equation ( $p = 0.0001$ ). Three variables were statistically significant: prior drug selling ( $p = 0.001$ ), gang involvement ( $p = 0.042$ ) and gang member status ( $p = 0.017$ ). However, the interaction terms  $\text{project} \times \text{age category}$  ( $p = 0.092$ ) came close. While the least square means showed some reduction in drug selling for comparison youth, it showed a more considerable, but non significant, reduction for program youth. Furthermore, for both program and comparison sample youth, a decrease in gang involvement reduced drug

selling, while an increase in gang involvement increased drug selling. This difference was statistically significant ( $p = 0.012$ ). The decrease is evident for both male and female program youth (Table 13.7).

In a second eleven-variable GLM analysis (with drug selling as the dependent variable and project as the independent variable), we introduced two job variables in place of the two gang involvement variables above: a job or employment variable and a project  $\times$  employment interaction term. The model had an  $R^2$  of .86 ( $p = 0.0001$ ). Only three out of the eleven variables were statistically significant or almost significant: prior drug selling ( $p = 0.0001$ ), job/employment ( $p = 0.001$ ), and gender ( $p = 0.060$ ).

In this model, there is a strong regression effect: youths, whether from the program or comparison sample, who are only slightly involved in drug selling (none category) increase dramatically; those in the medium category don't change much; and those in the high category reduce their drug selling significantly. Getting a job, in either sample, significantly reduces drug selling. Program males and females reduce their level of drug selling, while comparison males increase and females decrease. Almost all program youth, regardless of age category, reduce their drug selling to a lower level than their comparison-age counterparts (Table 13.8).

Of special interest is that for each job category – getting a job, no change (youth is in school or remains in his job) or has no job – comparison youth show more of a reduction than program youth. The only exception is that program youth show a greater reduction in drug selling associated with getting a job, although not to a significant degree.

In sum, while the cell sizes were extremely small, especially for the comparison non-gang subsample ( $n = 2$ ), it is possible tentatively to conclude that the program seemed to have a slight

positive effect on the reduction of drug selling (1s mean = 5 days), and that the reduction in drug selling affected gang and non-gang youth, males and females, and especially younger youth. The reduction in drug selling was also associated with getting a job and a decrease in gang involvement. However, it is not clear that the program was more influential than the absence of the program in youth reducing their gang involvement through getting jobs.

The patterns of change in drug crime (based on police arrests) and drug selling (based on self-reports) are not similar, particularly for program youth. In fact, the directions of change are opposite. Based on arrests, drug crime sharply increases for program youth; based on self-reports, drug offenses (selling drugs) declines (see Appendix A, Tables A7 and A8). Pro-active suppression activity by law enforcement and probation officers in Bloomington-Normal may have had a special restraining effect on self-reported responses by program youth. Perhaps more program youth sold drugs than they admitted. The self-report findings on the reduction of drug selling by program youth, if accurate and reliable, do represent a positive effect associated with, but not necessarily caused by, the Bloomington-Normal program.

Drug arrest practices probably varied in the program and comparison areas. If we assume that drug arrests and selling drugs bear a relationship to each other, when we compare drug arrests and self-reported drug selling for program and comparison youth the chance of a drug arrest for program youth is 1 in 8 at the Time I or Time II interview periods, while it is nearly 0 for comparison youth.

### Logistic Regression

We conducted a series of logistic regression analyses to determine not only whether there

is a difference in the change of offense levels for program youth and comparison youth, but also to determine the percent of program and comparison youth who succeeded (remained at 0 offenses or reduced their number of offenses between Time I and II) and who failed (remained the same at a particular level of offenses or increased their offense levels). All program subsample (N = 81) and comparison (N = 53) youth were entered into these models.

We find that, across the five types of offense categories, about three quarters of the youth succeed, i.e., stay at 0 or reduce their level of offenses, between the Time I and Time II interviews. For each category of offenses – total, serious violence, total violence, property, and drug selling – the program youth succeed more often than comparison youth. However, when statistical controls – sex, age category, gang member status, and prior arrests – are introduced into the equations, none of the differences is significant. Program and comparison youth show similar results. Only one model comes close to statistical significance: total violence ( $p = 0.051$ ). The odds ratio in this model is 1.38, i.e., program youth do 38% better than comparison youth, but the probability of the Chi-square value is not at all significant ( $p = 0.56$ ). In sum, we have no convincing statistically controlled evidence that more program than comparison youth succeeded in reducing (or remaining at zero) in their pattern of offenses.

#### Comparing Subsample Police and Self-Report Outcomes for Total Arrests/Offenses

The program and comparison subsamples were apparently better-matched on self-reported total offenses than on police arrests at Time I. Eighty-four and two-tenths percent (84.2%) of the original program sample and only 26.6% of the original comparison sample youth were arrested during the four-year pre-program and the four-year program periods for a similar



variety of offenses; 81.5% of subsample program youth and 73.6% of subsample comparison youth self-reported a variety of offenses between the Time I and Time II interviews. If we assume a similar rate of arrests to offenses, program youth were almost three times more likely to be arrested for similar types of offenses than were comparison youth.

Further, when we compare police arrest data for the program and comparison youth during the interval between the Time I and Time II interview, we find little difference in the pattern of reduction in arrests. The proportion of program youth arrested (Time I = 41; Time II = 28) indicated a reduction of 31.7% in total arrests. The proportion of comparison youth arrested (Time I = 14; Time II = 9) indicated a reduction of 35.7% in total arrests. The Time I-Time II interview period occurred during the program period. We observe mainly a “normal” regression effect for both program and comparison youth with no program effect. Outcomes for program and comparison youth (undifferentiated for type of services/worker contacts) were quite similar when we use statistical controls – whether we used police arrest data (especially when we eliminated the 0-0-arrest youth) or self-report data. The chief difference appears to be that program youth were more likely than comparison youth to be arrested for similar types of offenses.

Of interest also is that for all of the models in this chapter, regardless of type of outcome change variable, prior offenses is the most significant predictive variable indicating a regression effect for both program and comparison youth. Using statistical controls, the program seems to have little responsibility for the decline in self-reported offenses. The only exception (contrary to findings in the first set of model-analyses in Chapter 11) is that the program may have made some positive contribution to the level of decline in drug selling, particularly by non-gang youth

in the program sample, but not to the decline in the number of program youth selling drugs.

We also find that while program males do better than program females in decreasing total offenses, program females do better in decreasing drug selling activities. A decline in gang involvement, and obtaining a job, are also associated with a decline in total offenses, especially for program youth, but it is not clear that this was due to a specific program effect. The primary results of this third set of analyses is that the program had little to do with a decline in offenses for program youth between the Time I and Time II interview interval, except that the program may have made a contribution to reduced drug selling by certain youth in the program. We explore this and other program effects in Chapter 14, when we examine the influence of specific program services and worker contacts on self-reported outcomes.

**Table 13.1**  
**Change in Total Offenses (N=105)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses  
 for both Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.436; Adjusted R-square=0.348)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	0.659	0.00	0.946
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs Female	1	0.659	0.00	0.946
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.991	0.01	0.933
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	114.936	0.82	0.446
<b>Prior Total Offenses:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	2186.356	15.51	0.000***
Gender XProject Sample	1	64.438	0.46	0.501
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	38.942	0.28	0.600
Age XProject Sample	2	45.172	0.32	0.727
Prior Total Offenses XProject Sample	3	2.385	0.02	0.997
Within error	89	140.932	—	—
Total	104	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Offenses Covariate

Prior Total Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	12	9.063	3.766	1	—		0.012*	0.000***
Low	34	3.180	2.581	2		—		0.000***
Medium	22	-2.710	3.277	3			—	0.000***
High	37	-15.312	2.847	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 13.2**  
**Change in Total Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=105)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses for  
 Program and Comparison Youth with Mediating Gang Involvement Changes

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.466; Adjusted R-square=0.354)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	12.555	0.09	0.765
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs Female	1	44.137	0.32	0.576
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	13.783	0.10	0.754
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	122.720	0.88	0.419
<b>Prior Total Offenses:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	2164.718	15.49	0.000***
<b>Gang Involvement:</b> Decrease, Same, Increase	2	289.162	2.07	0.133
Gender XProject Sample	1	20.053	0.14	0.706
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	35.886	0.26	0.614
Age XProject Sample	2	51.725	0.37	0.692
Prior Total Offenses XProject Sample	3	12.655	0.09	0.965
Gang Involvement XProject Sample	2	71.487	0.51	0.601
Within error	85	139.741	—	—
Total	104	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 13.2 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Offenses Covariate

Prior Total Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	12	8.533	3.812	1	—		0.019*	0.000***
Low	34	3.202	2.594	2		—		0.000***
Medium	22	-2.525	3.286	3	0.019*		—	0.000***
High	37	-15.671	2.928	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	—

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Involvement Main Effect

Gang Involvement	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Decrease	47	-4.311	2.837	1	—	0.047*	
Increase	40	1.630	2.624	2	0.047*	—	
Same	18	-2.166	3.115	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 13.3**  
**Change in Serious Violence (N=37)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Serious Violence  
 for both Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.834; Adjusted R-square=0.728)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	9.873	1.13	0.299
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs Female	1	5.674	0.65	0.428
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	35.774	4.11	0.056
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	1.909	0.22	0.805
<b>Prior Serious Violence Offenses:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	125.817	14.46	0.000***
Gender XProject Sample	1	17.899	2.06	0.166
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	21.939	2.52	0.127
Age X Project Sample	2	7.409	0.85	0.441
Prior Serious Violence Offenses XProject Sample	3	4.312	0.50	0.689
Within error	21	8.702	—	—
Total	36	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Serious Violence Covariate

Prior Serious Violence Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	16	2.805	1.196	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	9	-3.058	1.432	2	0.000***	—	—	0.001**
Medium	9	-5.936	1.625	3	0.000***	—	—	0.017*
High	3	-11.888	2.393	4	0.000***	0.001**	0.017*	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 13.3 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect

<b>Gang Member Status</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Adjusted Mean</b>	<b>Std Err</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2</b>
Gang	30	-2.453	0.781	0.056
Non-Gang	7	-6.586	2.070	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 13.4**  
**Change in Total Violence (N=95)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Violence  
 for both Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.487; Adjusted R-square=0.397)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	4.184	0.13	0.720
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs Female	1	0.013	0.00	0.984
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	35.814	1.11	0.295
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	15.699	0.49	0.616
<b>Prior Total Violence Offenses:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	540.505	16.78	0.000***
Gender XProject Sample	1	150.496	4.67	0.034*
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	35.957	1.12	0.294
Age XProject Sample	2	29.715	0.92	0.402
Prior Total Violence Offenses XProject Sample	3	15.270	0.47	0.701
Within error	79	32.205	—	—
Total	94	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Violence Covariate

Prior Total Violence Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	16	5.285	1.805	1	—	0.015*	0.002**	0.000***
Low	32	0.648	1.308	2	0.015*	—		0.000***
Medium	18	-1.451	1.702	3	0.002**		—	0.000***
High	29	-8.672	1.714	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .



**Table 13.4 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Gender X Project Sample Interaction

Project Sample	Gender	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
Comparison	Female	-3.243	2.666 (21)	1	—			
Comparison	Male	0.320	1.983 (13)	2		—		
Program	Female	1.182	2.014 (13)	3			—	0.078
Program	Male	-2.447	1.009 (48)	4			0.078	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 13.5**  
**Change in Property Offenses (N=87)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Offenses  
 for both Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.514; Adjusted R-square=0.420)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	12.241	0.22	0.639
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	45.344	0.82	0.368
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	3.787	0.07	0.794
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15 -16, and 17-20	2	36.311	0.66	0.521
<b>Prior Property Offenses:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	1029.397	18.67	0.000***
Gender XProject Sample	1	21.215	0.38	0.537
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	0.939	0.02	0.897
Age XProject Sample	2	7.541	0.14	0.872
Prior Property Offenses XProject Sample	3	19.612	0.36	0.785
Within error	71	55.135	—	—
Total	86	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Property Offenses Covariate

Prior Property Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	15	5.454	2.112	1	—		0.012*	0.000***
Low	27	1.210	2.033	2		—		0.000***
Medium	12	-2.752	2.605	3	0.012*		—	0.004**
High	33	-11.527	1.959	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.004**	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 13.6**  
**Change in Drug Selling Offenses (N=56)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses  
 for both Program and Comparison Youth

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.797; Adjusted R-square=0.739)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	102.074	0.84	0.364
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	316.332	2.61	0.114
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	654.567	5.40	0.025*
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	68.981	0.57	0.570
<b>Prior Drug Selling Offenses:</b> None, Low, High	2	8197.704	67.68	0.000***
Gender XProject Sample	1	13.859	0.11	0.737
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	81.838	0.68	0.416
Age XProject Sample	2	89.848	0.74	0.482
Prior Drug Selling Offenses XProject Sample	2	127.066	1.05	0.359
Within error	42	121.132	—	—
Total	55	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate

Prior Drug Selling Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	20	11.283	3.398	1	—	0.042*	0.000***
Low	14	2.143	3.952	2	0.042*	—	0.000***
High	22	-30.178	3.832	3	0.000***	0.000***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 13.6 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect

<b>Gang Member Status</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Adjusted Mean</b>	<b>Std Err</b>	<b>Pr &gt;  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2</b>
Gang	44	0.800	2.049	0.025*
Non-gang	12	-11.968	5.215	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 13.7**  
**Change in Drug Selling Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=56)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses  
 for Program and Comparison Youth with Mediating Gang Involvement Changes

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.842; Adjusted R-square=0.777)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	0.065	0.00	0.980
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	7.194	0.07	0.794
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	655.925	6.28	0.017*
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	21.620	0.21	0.814
<b>Prior Drug Selling Offenses:</b> Low, Medium, High	2	3481.249	33.33	0.001***
<b>Gang Involvement:</b> Decrease, Same, Increase	2	360.934	3.46	0.042*
Gender XProject Sample	1	70.519	0.68	0.416
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	103.441	0.99	0.326
Age XProject Sample	2	115.127	1.10	0.343
Prior Drug Selling Offenses XProject Sample	2	19.226	0.18	0.833
Gang Involvement XProject Sample	2	265.383	2.54	0.092
Within error	38	104.459	—	—
Total	55	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 13.7 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate

Prior Drug Selling Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	20	7.125	3.786	1	—		0.000***
Low	14	1.420	3.884	2		—	0.000***
High	22	-26.393	4.052	3	0.000***	0.000***	—

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect

Gang Member Status	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
Gang	44	0.453	2.234	0.017*
Non-gang	12	-12.352	5.031	

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gang Involvement Main Effect

Gang Involvement	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Decrease	23	-11.097	3.367	1	—	0.012*	
Increase	24	-0.422	3.387	2	0.012*	—	
Same	9	-6.329	5.407	3			—

For differences between groups: \* *p* < .05; \*\* *p* < .01; and \*\*\* *p* < .001 .

**Table 13.8**  
**Change in Drug Selling Offenses and Jobs (N=56)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses  
 for Program and Comparison Youth with Mediating Job Changes

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.860; Adjusted R-square=0.803)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Project Sample:</b> Comparison vs. Program	1	83.642	0.91	0.347
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	347.186	3.76	0.060
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	117.735	1.28	0.266
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	179.336	1.94	0.157
<b>Prior Drug Selling Offenses:</b> None, Low, High	2	7167.106	77.69	0.000***
<b>Jobs:</b> Gets job, No change, No job	2	744.932	8.08	0.001***
Gender XProject Sample	1	26.337	0.29	0.596
Gang Member Status XProject Sample	1	0.117	0.00	0.971
Age XProject Sample	2	108.408	1.18	0.320
Prior Drug Selling Offenses XProject Sample	2	77.939	0.84	0.438
Jobs XProject Sample	2	161.865	1.75	0.187
Within error	38	92.247	—	—
Total	55	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 13.8 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Drug Selling Covariate

Prior Drug Selling Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	20	14.862	3.301	1	—	0.004**	0.001***
Low	14	2.466	3.637	2	0.004**	—	0.001***
High	22	-27.017	4.459	3	0.001***	0.001***	—

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Jobs Main Effect

Jobs	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Gets Job	20	-12.086	3.203	1	—	0.006**	0.001***
No Job Change	21	0.414	3.425	2	0.006**	—	
No Job	15	1.983	4.003	3	0.001***		—

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gender Main Effect

Gender	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
				Female
Male	36	0.583	2.418	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .



**Table 13.8 continued**

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project Sample × Jobs Interaction

Project Sample	Jobs	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Comparison	Gets Job	-12.999	5.418 (7)	1	—	**	**			
Comparison	No Job Change	7.538	5.900 (8)	2	**	—		**	*	
Comparison	No Job	3.289	6.422 (7)	3	**		—			
Program	Gets Job	-11.174	3.420 (13)	4		**		—		*
Program	No Job Change	-6.710	3.480 (13)	5		*			—	
Program	No Job	0.677	4.781 (8)	6				*		—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## Chapter 14

### **Program Youth Outcomes: Self Report, Services/Contacts and Mediating Variables**

(Kwai Ming Wa)

#### Fourth Set of Models

In the following set of analyses, we examine particular patterns of services/worker contacts that contribute to specific offense change outcomes for program youth, using self-report data. Particular service and worker-contact patterns appear to be predicted directly (more than indirectly) through the mediating variables of program youth offense change. As in the earlier analyses (in Chapters 11, 12, and 13), prior offense or police arrest covariates are generally the most significant variables in our models, and generally contribute to regression effects, i.e., the major change in offense patterns between the Time I and Time II interview periods simply signifies that youth who had low levels of particular offenses at Time I were likely to have high levels of offenses at Time II, and youth who had high levels of offenses at Time I were likely to have low levels of offenses at Time II.

This fourth set of analyses includes only program youth who have been interviewed both at Time I and Time II (N = 81). The models are developed in the same format as in Chapter 12, with: one independent or program variable related to a specific program pattern of services/contacts; four control variables – *gender*, *gang member status*, *age category at the Time I interview*, and a particular *prior offense covariate*; the independent variable in interaction with each of the four control variables; and the dependent variable, i.e., the difference between the specific offense frequencies at Time I and Time II. The dependent variables in the models in this section are, again, *total offenses*, *serious violence offenses*, *total violence offenses*, *property*

*offenses*, and *drug offenses* (selling drugs).

In the following general linear model (GLM) analyses, we examine main effects and also subcategory effects which may be attributable to such variables as age, gender, and prior arrests in interaction with specific program strategy, service, or worker effects. There are five value categories for each of the prior offense variables – zero-zero, none, low, medium, and high. The measures for each of the prior offense categories used as control variables differ with the particular type of offense. The components of the offense-category variables are listed in Appendices A and C.

Again, we do not include the *other offense* category, since the self-report scale of 26 items focuses on gang-related offenses typically committed by gang youth. We do not include offenses such as status offenses, mob action, and disorderly conduct, but they are included in the Model I and Model II analyses based on police arrest data (Chapters 11 and 12). Program effects occur over the 1 to 1½ year period between the Time I and Time II interviews. This is shorter than the period in which we use program-exposure data (a four-year program period) or when we use both worker-tracking and police-outcome data (approximately a 2½-year period).

Total Offenses. Two different independent worker-contact/service variables, measured between the Time I and Time II interviews, are introduced in each of the two model analyses predicting change in total offenses: coordinated suppression and total services. In the first analysis, the dependent variable is *total offenses*, and the independent (or program) variable is *coordinated suppression*. Again, coordinated suppression indicates worker contacts among police and/or probation and outreach youth workers, school personnel and/or others. Non-suppression

coordination includes contacts by various workers with each other, but excludes police and probation contacts. (Only 1 youth had a non-coordinated contact of any kind.) The total prior offense variable has five values at Time I: 1s mean 0-0 = 0 offenses at both Time I and Time II; none = 0 offenses; low = 1- 6 offenses; medium = 7- 12 offenses; high  $\geq$  13 offenses. The outcome total offense change variable is measured in actual frequency, i.e., differences between total offenses at Time I and Time II. Again , we note that in these subtables the category 0 - 0 is added. This least square or adjusted mean is not the same as the actual mean. It reflects the influence of other characteristics of youth and their effects on the dependent variables, even if the youth have no prior and subsequent offenses. The control variables are: gender, gang member status, age, the covariate prior total offenses, and the interaction terms: coordinated suppression  $\times$  gender, coordinated suppression  $\times$  gang member status, coordinated suppression  $\times$  age and coordinated suppression  $\times$  prior total offenses.

The GLM model with coordinated suppression has an  $R^2 = 0.51$ , and is significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The most significant predictor of outcome is the prior-total-offense-category variable, which indicates a regression effect: youth with fewer prior total offenses at Time I increase at Time II; youth with higher levels of total offenses at Time I decrease at Time II. No other variable is significant as a main effect. However, the interaction term of coordinated suppression  $\times$  gang member status in a subtable is somewhat (but not significantly) more effective than the absence of coordinated suppression in reducing total offenses for gang members. Coordinated suppression is least effective with non-gang youth; it may in fact increase total offenses for non-gang program youth (Table 14.1).

The second GLM model with total services as the independent variable has an  $R^2 = 0.63$ ,

and is statistically significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The total services variable is divided into four categories: none, low, medium, and high. Few youths ( $n = 8$ ) receive no services. Cutoff points for low, medium, and high services are equally divided into three categories based on frequencies. Again, the most significant predictive variable is prior total offenses, which produces a regression effect. There is also a marginal total-service age category effect ( $p = 0.052$ ), in which, regardless of age category, the more total services provided the higher the subsequent total self-reported offense patterns, except for 15 and 16-year-old youth who are provided with a lower amount of services (Table 14.2).

In the following equations, using other dependent variables, we will see that a higher dosage of services does contribute to a statistically significant (or almost significant) reduction of specific types or categories of offenses.

Serious Violence Offenses. In this model, *total services* is introduced as the independent variable, and *change in serious violence offenses* as the dependent variable. The prior serious violence, prior total violence and prior property offense variables each have the same five categories of offenses, although the values are different from those of total offenses: Is means zero-zero = 0 offenses at Time I and Time II; none = 0 offenses; low = 1-3 offenses; medium = 4-6 offenses; high =  $\geq 7$  offenses. The model is highly significant and accounts for an  $R^2 = 0.90$  ( $p=0.001$ ). The high  $R^2$  is due in part to a single predictor: prior serious violence. Actually, few program youth self-reported serious violent behavior, e.g., aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and drive-by shooting. In this model, total services as a main effect is marginally significant ( $p = 0.071$ ), this time predicting a lowering of serious violence. The more services provided, the

lower the arrests for serious violence at Time II.

The most significant predictor variable is still the prior category of serious offenses ( $p=0.001$ ). Most of the youth are located in the 0 - 0 or low category of prior serious offenses. Males compared to females generally show a larger reduction in subsequent serious violence offenses (in part because they commit more of them) ( $p = 0.01$ ). Total services is more influential in producing a lowering of serious violence for males than for females ( $p = 0.031$ ). The dosage of services is effective for females when the adjusted least square mean of prior serious violence offenses is in the medium category, and when total services also are in the medium category ( $p = 0.01$ ) (Table 14.3).

There is also a highly significant main effect of the interaction term: prior serious violence offenses  $\times$  total services ( $p = 0.004$ ). The more services provided to youth with high levels of prior serious violence offenses, the lower the level of subsequent serious violence offenses. Amount of service plays an important role in reducing serious violence for youth with a history of such prior self-reported offenses.

Violence Offenses. The variable of total violence comprises serious, but mainly less serious, violence offenses. The GLM model accounts for a considerable amount of variance,  $R^2 = 0.60$ , which is highly statistically significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The most significant variable is prior violence offenses as a covariate, and provides a regression effect. Gender is significant as a main effect ( $p = 0.017$ ). Males do better than females in lowering their level of violence offenses (probably they start at a higher level). The pattern is similar to that in the previous GLM equation on serious violence (above). Coordinated suppression is marginally significant as a

main effect ( $p = 0.11$ ), but the interaction term of coordinated suppression  $\times$  gender is highly significant ( $p = 0.003$ ), and more significant than gender alone. Males do better (lower their total violent offenses) than females when they are provided with coordinated suppression contacts. However, females may increase their level of total violence offenses when provided with coordinated suppression contacts. This difference is significant ( $p = 0.012$ ), but the number of females provided with coordinated suppression contacts is small ( $n = 6$ ). Some females do significantly better without coordinated suppression contacts than females with coordinated suppression contacts ( $p = 0.024$ ). Males reduce their level of total violence offenses with or without coordinated suppression contacts, but more so with coordinated suppression (Table 14.4).

In other words, the greater value for reduction of violence offenses may be for workers to avoid contact with police or probation officers, particularly in regard to the behavior of some of the females. Again we note that the level of violence committed by females is quite low to begin with.

In a second model with changes in total violence offenses as the dependent variable, the independent variable is dosage of worker contacts. The dosage of contacts (the number of contacts provided by program workers) is correlated with, but different from, dosage of services, which comprises the number of different types of services per contact. Total services usually connotes more frequency than number of contacts. The category measures of worker contacts are the same as dosage of services (see above). This model accounts for a good deal of variance,  $R^2=0.61$ , but is not as significant ( $p = 0.01$ ) as in the immediately previous models.

Prior total violence offenses in this model is still the most statistically significant variable

( $p = 0.003$ ), and is again associated with a regression effect. No other variables are significant in this model, except that the interaction term dosage of contacts  $\times$  gender is marginally significant ( $p = 0.07$ ). The effects are opposite for males and females. The greater the number of worker contacts with males, the greater the reduction in self-reported total violence. The greater the dosage of worker contacts with females, the greater the increase in self-reported total violence offenses. This pattern occurs mainly in the provision of the highest level of contacts for males and females ( $p = 0.01$ ) (Table 14.5). A great deal of program worker-contacts or services seems to be useful in the reduction of total violence and serious violence, particularly for males in the Bloomington-Normal gang program.

Property Offenses. In the first GLM model, with changes in property offenses as a dependent variable and probation/parole contacts as the independent variable, the equation produces an  $R^2$  of 0.62, and is statistically significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The most significant variable predicting a change in property offenses is prior property offenses. Youth with low levels of self-reported property offenses at Time I report higher levels at Time II, and those youth with higher levels at Time I report lower levels of property offenses at Time II.

Probation/parole is not a significant main effect in the reduction of self-reported property offenses. However, there is a marginally significant effect for probation/parole contacts in interaction with prior self-reported property arrests ( $p = 0.072$ ). There is also a marginally significant effect for probation/parole in interaction with gang member status ( $p = 0.10$ ). Probation/parole appears to be somewhat (but not significantly) more effective with gang youth than with non-gang youth in lowering property offenses (Table 14.6).



In the second model with changes in property offenses as a dependent variable and total contacts or dosage of contacts by program workers as the independent variable, the  $R^2$  is 0.77, and is highly significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). Prior category of property offenses has a significant main effect ( $p = 0.0001$ ). Again, the regression effect is clearly demonstrated. However, prior property offenses in interaction with total contacts produces a strong significant main effect, lowering subsequent property offenses ( $p = 0.005$ ). Gender itself has a significant main effect ( $p=0.046$ ). Males decrease slightly more than females, but apparently this is not due to any pattern of program contacts (Table 14.7).

In sum, the program has had some effect on the reduction of self-reported property offenses, particularly through the provision of a high level worker contacts. We shall observe in the section on changes in aggregate-level gang offenses and/or total gang and non-gang arrests that, in fact, there was a reduction in gang-related property offenses and total property arrests at the community level. However, it is likely that the Project made little or no contribution to this change, as we explain in Chapter 15.

Drug Offenses (Drug Selling). In the final set of GLM analyses, we find that the program made no contribution to a reduction in drug selling by program youth. The independent program services/contacts variables in the respective equations are *coordinated suppression* and *total services*. The dependent variable is change per month in frequency of selling drugs. The prior offense variable, selling drugs at Time I, has four categories: Is mean zero-zero = 0 days per month at both Time I and Time II; 0 = 0 days per month at Time I; low = 1-14 days per month at Time I; high =  $\geq 15$  days per month at Time I. Again, the change score at Time II is based on the

actual difference in frequency between Time I and Time II for each youth.

In the first GLM model, the dependent variable is *change in selling drugs* and the independent variable is *coordinated suppression*, i.e., workers being in touch with each other about a particular youth and involving a police or probation officer, versus coordinated contact not involving a police or probation officer. The control variables in the equation are: gender, gang member status, age at first interview, and self-reported drug offenses as a covariate. The interaction terms are the four control variables in interaction with the independent variable *suppression coordination*.

This first model (Table 14.8) produces an  $R^2$  of 0.752, and is statistically significant ( $p=0.0081$ ). Only one variable is significant in this equation: category of prior drug selling ( $p=0.001$ ). Again, we find that youth with zero frequencies of drug selling at Time I have the highest increase in drug selling at Time II. Youth with a high category of drug selling have the greatest decrease. The difference between the high and the none group is highly significant ( $p=0.001$ ).

The strongest effect of suppression coordination is on youth with a high frequency of prior drug selling offenses. These youth share a significant decline compared to youth who self-reported low or none categories of drug selling at Time I, and who were not provided with suppression coordination contacts ( $p = 0.001$ ).

Of interest also is that females with or without suppression coordination generally reduce their drug selling more than males. Females with suppression coordination worker contacts reduce their drug selling almost significantly more than males with suppression coordination contacts ( $p = 0.09$ ).

In our second model, with *change in frequency of drug selling* as the dependent variable, the independent variable is *total services or dosage of all types of services together per youth*. Again, the control variables are gender, gang member status, age and prior drug selling. The interaction terms are the four control variables, each in interaction with total services. This model results in an  $R^2$  of 0.83 and is highly statistically significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The significant covariate – prior drug offenses – is highly significant ( $p = 0.0001$ ), and there is one significant main effect – gender ( $p = 0.044$ ). The total service variable is not significant. However, the more services provided to program youth the greater the reduction in drug selling (although not significantly). High amounts of services produce lower levels of subsequent drug selling compared to low levels of services (Table 14.9).

We find that program services have a more positive effect on females than males in the reduction of subsequent drug selling. However, males also reduce their level of drug selling, but not by as much. Males provided with a low frequency of total services do worse than females with the same frequency. Non-gang members do better than gang members in the reduction of drug selling when provided with more services.

In general, a high dosage of services seems to have a consistent (but non-significant) effect on the reduction of program youth selling drugs, but the effectiveness of total services is stronger for youth with high prior drug-selling backgrounds, particularly for females. The dosage of services is not as effective in the reduction of subsequent drug selling for males, except for males with the highest frequency of drug selling.

In sum, the findings on specific service/worker contact variables indicate that the Project generally had some positive effects in lowering self-reported offenses. (We have yet to examine

the views of the youth themselves about which services and contacts they received, and which were most helpful.) The specific service/worker contact effects were not always strong or even statistically significant; they tended to be marginally significant but nevertheless consistent across the various analyses. The strongest changes were a function of the regression effects of prior offense variables. Based on self-reports, program and comparison youth generally became less delinquent over time.

The service/worker contact approaches that had the most positive effect on reduction of self-reported offenses were total services, total contacts, coordinated suppression and probation/parole. Total services and total contacts were somewhat stronger than coordinated suppression or probation/parole contacts in reducing specific types of self-reported offenses between Time I and Time II. Total services and total worker contacts were more effective with males in reducing violence and property offenses, and were more effective with females in reducing drug selling.

### Services, Mediating Variables, and Outcomes

We expected that services would both directly and indirectly affect outcome. We have already described the direct effects of services and worker contacts on outcomes, using interview and self-report data. We now turn briefly to a further examination of the effects of specific services/worker contacts on mediating variables, and to the effects of mediating variables on outcomes for program youth. Ideally, we would expect certain service variables to affect certain mediating variables, and that these same affected mediating variables would then directly influence the dependent or outcome variables.

We originally thought that our selected service/worker contact variables, such as probation/parole, suppression contacts, coordinated suppression and total services – or their absence – might have some effect on mediating variables, particularly school achievement, jobs, gang involvement, legal income and illegal income.

### Logistic Regression

The logistic regression statistical procedure is used first to determine whether the particular service or worker contact variable, or its absence, has an influence on the mediating variable; we then use the same logistic regression procedure to determine whether the influenced mediating variable has a significant effect on the particular offense variable. However, our logistic regression models are handicapped by very small sample sizes. For example, only 5 youths out of 81 indicated that they had some illegal income at Time I or Time II, and there was no change – increase or decrease – in this type of income. We have eliminated this partially-mediating variable from the analysis. We do include analyses involving mediating variables with slightly larger cell sizes, particularly if the model is statistically significant. Our analysis using various mediating variables is largely exploratory at this time.

We find that only one program variable – probation/parole – has any statistical influence on a mediating variable – gang involvement – which in turn has a significant effect on outcome. There are other program variables which have an effect on mediating variables, and a few mediating variables that have an effect on outcome; however, we cannot clearly make the connection generally between service/contact variables and specific mediating variables, and then between the same specific mediating variables and outcome. We briefly describe these analyses,

which appear to be interesting and promising.

Probation/Parole. We observe that the presence of probation/parole is almost 2½ times more effective than the absence of probation/parole on the mediating school variables: getting a youth to stay in school, to go back to school, or not to leave school (Table 14.10). This may translate in a peculiar way to an effect on change in self-reported total offenses. Youth who go back to school or stay in school seem to do worse than youth who leave school (Table 14.11).

However, probation/parole has a positive effect on another mediating variable: gang involvement. Probation/parole is about 1.4 times (or about 40%) more effective than non-probation/parole in reducing a youth's gang involvement, particularly for younger youth who may have been administered a Time II survey a little later than required, i.e., the probation/parole effect occurs over a longer rather than a shorter time period (Table 14.12).

A medium level or high level of program services may also be more effective than a low level of program services in getting youth to return to school, stay in school, or not leave school. The odds ratio is 1.11, i.e., a higher level of services is about 11% more effective than a low level of services (Table 14.13). Further, we find that both a medium and a high level of services are more effective than a low level of services in reducing youths' gang involvement. A higher level of services is about 50% more effective than a lower level of services (Table 14.14).

Coordinated suppression contacts, like probation/parole contacts, are more effective in getting youth to stay in school, go back to school, or not leave school than low or no coordinated suppression contacts. They are about 70% more effective, with an odds ratio of 1.7 (Table 14.15).

Finally, we observe that a decrease in the mediating variable – gang involvement – has the effect of reducing self-reported total offenses. Decreased gang involvement, remaining not gang involved or slightly gang involved, between Time I and Time II, reduces total self-reported offenses. The odds ratio is 1.5 that a decrease in gang involvement reduces self-reported gang offenses by 50% (Table 14.16). Youths’ decreases in gang involvement also reduce self-reported total violence offenses by an odds ratio of 1.24, or 24% (Table 14.17). Further, youths’ decreases in gang involvement reduce property offenses with an odds ratio of 0.52, or about 50% (Table 14.18).

In other words, only probation/parole seems to have an effect on youths’ decreases of gang involvement, which in turn have a positive effect on the reduction of violence and property offenses. Thus, probation/parole appears to have an important indirect effect on the reduction of gang delinquency, based on self-report data.

In general, self-report data indicate that the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Program had some limited positive effects. Unfortunately, GLM and logistic analyses using police arrest data show the reverse.

In summary, the strongest effects on the reduction of self-reported offenses were generally levels of prior offenses. The program had several specific, though limited, positive effects. Service/worker-contact approaches had little direct effect on total offenses. However, the program made a marginal contribution to the reduction of serious violence, total violence, and property offenses, mainly through total services, worker contacts, coordinated suppression and probation/parole. These services and contacts were relatively more effective with males than with females in lowering rates of serious total violence and property offenses. However,

coordinated suppression was marginally effective in the reduction of drug-selling activities for males compared to females. Probation/parole also had an effect on the reduction of gang involvement, which in turn had an effect on the reduction of violence and property offenses.



**Table 14.1**  
**Change in Total Offenses and Coordinated Suppression (N=81)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses  
 for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.514; Adjusted R-square=0.393)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs Female	1	11.148	0.09	0.760
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	29.292	0.25	0.621
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	126.252	1.07	0.350
<b>Prior Total Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, Medium, High	4	975.608	8.24	0.000***
<b>Coordinated Suppression:</b> Yes vs. No	1	74.011	0.63	0.432
Gender XCoordinated Suppression	1	220.188	1.86	0.178
Gang Member Status XCoordinated Suppression	1	371.182	3.14	0.081
Age XCoordinated Suppression	2	17.991	0.15	0.859
Prior Total Offenses XCoordinated Suppression	4	109.621	0.93	0.454
Within error	63	118.331	—	—
Total	80	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 14.1 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Offenses Covariate

Prior Total Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)					
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5
0-0	15	0.901	3.837	1	—				0.001**
None	6	7.811	5.112	2		—			0.000***
Low	18	2.878	3.236	3			—		0.000***
Medium	14	-2.578	3.433	4				—	0.003**
High	28	-14.303	2.555	5	0.001**	0.000***	0.000***	0.003**	—

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Gang Member Status × Coordinated Suppression Contacts Interaction

Gang Member Status	Coordinated Suppression Contacts	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
Gang	No	-0.580	2.817 (24)	1	—			
Gang	Yes	-3.142	3.478 (30)	2		—		
Non-gang	No	-4.692	3.523 (17)	3			—	
Non-gang	Yes	4.182	4.500 (10)	4				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 14.2**  
**Change in Total Offenses and Total Services (N=81)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.625; Adjusted R-square=0.400)\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs Female	1	12.369	0.11	0.745
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	105.104	0.90	0.348
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	249.782	2.13	0.129
<b>Prior Total Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, Medium, High	4	905.895	7.73	0.000***
<b>Total Services:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	120.318	1.03	0.389
Gender XTotal Services	3	33.301	0.28	0.837
Gang Member Status XTotal Services	3	90.975	0.78	0.513
Age XTotal Services	5	278.332	2.38	0.052
Prior Total Offenses XTotal Services	8	99.264	0.85	0.566
Within error	49	117.130	—	—
Total	80	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 14.2 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Offenses Covariate

Prior Total Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)					
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5
0-0	15	NE	--	1	—				
None	6	NE	--	2		—			
Low	18	NE	--	3			—		
Medium	14	NE	--	4				—	
High	28	NE	--	5					—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

**Table 14.2 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview × Total Services Interaction.

Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	Total Services	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)												
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
15-16	None	NE	--	1	-											
15-16	Low	-0.907	4.250	2		-										
15-16	Med	NE	--	3			-									
15-16	High	9.195	6.879	4				-								
12-14	None	NE	--	5					-							
12-14	Low	0.727	6.957	6						-						
12-14	Med	NE	--	7							-					
12-14	High	5.533	6.637	8								-				
17-20	None	NE	--	9									-			
17-20	Low	3.155	5.387	10										-		
17-20	Med	NE	--	11											-	
17-20	High	6.851	5.572	12												-

For differences between groups: \* *p* < .05; † *p* < .01; and ‡ *p* < .001 .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

**Table 14.3**  
**Change in Serious Violence and Total Services (N=81)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Serious Violence  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.904; Adjusted R-square=0.846)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Female vs Male	1	7.729	4.95	0.031**
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.002	0.00	0.971
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	0.101	0.06	0.937
<b>Prior Serious Violence Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, Medium, High	4	99.442	63.63	0.000***
<b>Total Services:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	3.902	2.50	0.071
Gender XTotal Services	2	7.197	4.61	0.015**
Gang Member Status XTotal Services	2	0.121	0.08	0.926
Age XTotal Services	6	0.334	0.21	0.971
Prior Serious Violence Offenses XTotal Services	8	5.295	3.39	0.004**
Within error	49	1.563	—	—
Total	80	—	—	—

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Total Services Main Effect

Total Services	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	8	NE	--	1	—			
Low	25	NE	--	2		—		
Medium	24	-3.670	0.569	3			—	0.021*
High	24	-1.533	0.687	4			0.021*	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .  
 NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

**Table 14.3 continued**

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Gender X Total Services Interaction

Gender	Total Services	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)								
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Female	None	NE	-- (3)	1	—							
Female	Low	NE	-- (6)	2		—						
Female	Med	-3.726	0.847 (5)	3			—	**				
Female	High	0.145	1.009 (3)	4			**	—			**	**
Male	None	NE	-- (5)	5					—			
Male	Low	NE	-- (19)	6						—		
Male	Med	-3.614	0.456 (19)	7				**			—	
Male	High	-3.211	0.645 (21)	8				**				—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

**Table 14.3 continued**

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Serious Violence X Total Services Interaction

Prior Serious Violence Offenses	Total Services	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)																		
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	
0-0	None	0.000	0.579	1	-				†	‡	*	‡					†	‡	‡	‡	‡	
0-0	Low	0.000	0.345	2		-			†	‡	*	‡					†	‡	‡	‡	‡	
0-0	Med	0.024	0.492	3			-		†	‡	*	‡					†	‡	‡	‡	‡	
0-0	High	1.435	0.787	4				-	*	‡		†	*	*			‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	
None	None	5.000	1.555	5	†	†	†	*	-			†	†	†			‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	
None	Low	6.667	0.895	6	‡	‡	‡	‡		-	‡	*	‡	‡	‡		‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	
None	Med	1.950	0.663	7	*	*	*			‡	-	*	*	†	*		‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	
None	High	4.096	0.793	8	‡	‡	‡	†		*	*	-	†	‡	†		‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	
Low	Low	-2.000	1.451	9				*	†	‡	*	†	-				*			‡	*	
Low	Med	-1.532	1.040	10				*	†	‡	†	‡		-			‡	*	‡	†		
Low	High	-1.950	1.476	11					†	‡	*	†			-		*			‡	*	
Med	None	NE	--	12												-						
Med	Low	-5.000	1.410	13	†	†	†	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡					-			‡		
Med	Med	-5.976	0.934	14	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	*	‡	*			-		‡		
Med	High	-4.652	1.053	15	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡		*						-	‡	
High	Med	-12.82	1.489	16	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡		‡	‡	‡	-	†	
High	High	-6.945	1.507	17	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	‡	*	†	*						†	-

For differences between groups: \* *p* < .05; † *p* < .01; and ‡ *p* < .001 .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.



**Table 14.4**  
**Change in Total Violence and Coordinated Suppression (N=81)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Violence  
 for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.595; Adjusted R-square=0.494)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	110.847	6.06	0.017*
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	0.081	0.00	0.947
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	15.506	0.85	0.433
<b>Prior Total Violence Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, Medium, High	4	283.592	15.49	0.000***
<b>Coordinated Suppression:</b> Yes vs. No	1	49.967	2.73	0.105
Gender XCoordinated Suppression Contacts	1	179.087	9.78	0.003**
Gang Member Status XCoordinated Suppression	1	0.780	0.04	0.837
Age XCoordinated Suppression	2	0.618	0.03	0.967
Prior Violence Offenses XCoordinated Suppression	4	38.031	2.08	0.094
Within error	63	18.303	—	—
Total	80	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 14.4 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Violence Covariate

Prior Total Violence Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)					
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5
0-0	20	1.798	1.224	1	—	0.024*			0.000***
None	10	6.099	1.620	2	0.024*	—	0.023*	0.000***	0.000***
Low	18	1.588	1.307	3		0.023*	—		0.000***
Medium	10	-1.473	1.666	4		0.000***		—	0.004**
High	23	-6.643	1.054	5	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.004**	—

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Gender × Coordinated Suppression Contacts Interaction

Gender	Coordinated Suppression Contacts	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
Female	No	-1.539	1.553 (11)	1	—	0.012*		
Female	Yes	5.559	2.262 (6)	2	0.012*	—	0.015*	0.001***
Male	No	-0.598	0.940 (30)	3		0.015*	—	
Male	Yes	-2.326	0.920 (34)	4		0.001***		—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 14.5**  
**Change in Total Violence and Total Contacts (N=81)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Violent Offenses  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.606; Adjusted R-square=0.343)\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	1.308	0.05	0.816
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	3.211	0.13	0.716
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	1.816	0.08	0.927
<b>Prior Total Violence Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, Medium, High	4	109.366	4.58	0.003**
<b>Total Contacts:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	14.524	0.61	0.613
Gender X Total Contacts	3	60.489	2.53	0.068
Gang Member Status X Total Contacts	3	9.258	0.39	0.762
Age X Total Contacts	6	1.857	0.08	0.998
Prior Violence Offenses X Total Contacts	10	11.579	0.48	0.891
Within error	47	23.877	—	—
Total	80	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 14.5 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Violence Covariate

Prior Total Violence Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	
0-0	20	0.153	1.485	1	—	0.049*				0.006**
None	10	5.396	2.402	2	0.049*	—				0.000***
Low	18	NE	--	3				—		
Medium	10	NE	--	4					—	
High	23	-6.542	1.825	5	0.006**	0.000***				—

For differences between groups: \* *p* < .05; \*\* *p* < .01; and \*\*\* *p* < .001 .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Gender X Total Contacts Interaction

Gender	Total Contacts	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)								
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Female	None	NE	-- (3)	1	—							
Female	Low	0.764	2.892 (4)	2		—						
Female	Med	NE	-- (5)	3			—					
Female	High	4.671	2.834 (5)	4				—				**
Male	None	NE	-- (5)	5					—			
Male	Low	-0.570	1.626 (21)	6						—		
Male	Med	NE	-- (18)	7							—	
Male	High	-2.695	1.662 (20)	8				**				—

For differences between groups: \* *p* < .05; \*\* *p* < .01; and \*\*\* *p* < .001 .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

**Table 14.6**  
**Change in Property Offenses and Probation/Parole (N=81)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Offenses  
 for Program Youth with/without Probation/Parole Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.616; Adjusted R-square=0.520)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	2.093	0.06	0.806
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	4.855	0.14	0.709
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	21.569	0.63	0.539
<b>Prior Property Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, Medium, High	4	483.588	14.02	0.000***
<b>Probation/Parole:</b> Yes vs. No	1	9.169	0.27	0.608
Gender X Probation/Parole	1	18.429	0.53	0.468
Gang Member Status X Probation/Parole	1	98.534	2.86	0.096
Age X Probation/Parole	2	6.483	0.19	0.829
Prior Property Offenses X Probation/Parole	4	78.118	2.26	0.072
Within error	63	34.504	—	—
Total	80	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 14.6 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Property Offenses Covariate

Prior Property Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	
0-0	38	0.596	1.305	1	—	0.015*				0.000***
None	6	7.458	2.543	2	0.015*	—	0.030*	0.005**		0.000***
Low	19	0.315	2.103	3		0.030*	—			0.001***
Medium	10	-2.274	2.313	4		0.005**		—		0.005**
High	28	-9.970	1.504	5	0.000***	0.000***	0.001***	0.005**		—

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Gang Member Status × Probation/Parole Contacts Interaction

Gang Member Status	Probation / Parole	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)					
				i/j	1	2	3	4	
Gang	No	0.828	1.646 (22)	1	—				
Gang	Yes	-2.977	1.530 (32)	2		—			
Non-gang	No	-1.274	1.932 (16)	3			—		
Non-gang	Yes	0.324	2.343 (11)	4				—	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 14.7**  
**Change in Property Offenses and Total Contacts (N=81)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Offenses  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.771; Adjusted R-square=0.618)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	116.235	4.21	0.046*
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	3.013	0.11	0.743
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15-16, and 17-20	2	22.364	0.81	0.451
<b>Prior Property Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, Medium, High	4	197.077	7.14	0.000***
<b>Total Contacts:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	6.668	0.24	0.867
Gender X Total Contacts	3	58.718	2.13	0.110
Gang Member Status X Total Contacts	3	13.722	0.50	0.686
Age X Total Contacts	6	39.253	1.42	0.226
Prior Property Offenses X Total Contacts	10	83.605	3.03	0.005**
Within error	47	27.612	—	—
Total	80	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table 14.7 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gender Main Effect

Gender	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2	
Male	64	NE	--	0.046*	
Female	17	NE	--		

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Property Offenses Covariate

Prior Property Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)					
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5
0-0	38	-0.536	1.372	1	—	0.009**			0.001***
None	6	7.453	2.868	2	0.009**	—			0.000***
Low	19	NE	--	3			—		
Medium	10	NE	--	4				—	
High	28	-9.038	1.712	5	0.001***	0.000***			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.



**Table 14.7 continued**

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Property Offenses X Total Contacts Interaction.

Prior Property Offenses	Total Contacts	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)																		
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
0-0	Non	0.125	3.476	1	-					†									*		†	
0-0	Low	-0.229	2.020	2		-				‡										†	‡	
0-0	Med	-2.313	2.835	3			-			‡									*		†	
0-0	High	0.275	2.436	4				-		†										†	‡	
None	Non	2.125	6.993	5					-	†											*	
None	Low	22.106	5.803	6	†	‡	‡	†	†	-	*	*	‡		†	‡	‡		‡	‡	‡	‡
None	Med	0.723	6.204	7						*	-											*
None	High	4.857	3.240	8						*		-					*			‡	*	‡
Low	None	-1.005	2.522	9						‡			-							†		‡
Low	Low	6.085	5.978	10										-			*			*		†
Low	Med	1.061	2.961	11						†					-					†		‡
Low	High	-4.250	3.504	12						‡						-						*
Med	None	-6.547	3.125	13						‡		*		*			-	*				*
Med	Low	8.265	5.914	14												*		-		†		‡
Med	Med	-6.625	5.088	15						‡									-			
Med	High	-10.73	2.904	16	*	†	*	†		‡		‡	†	*	†			†		-		
High	Med	-3.794	2.409	17						‡		*									-	†
High	High	-15.00	2.603	18	†	‡	†	‡	*	‡	*	‡	‡	†	‡	*	*	‡			†	-

For differences between groups: \* *p* < .05; † *p* < .01; and ‡ *p* < .001 .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

**Table 14.8**  
**Change in Drug Selling and Coordinated Suppression (N=80)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses  
 for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.752; Adjusted R-square=0.699)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	95.976	1.97	0.164
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	56.545	1.16	0.285
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15 -16, and 17-20	2	53.447	1.10	0.339
<b>Prior Drug Selling Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, High	3	1900.067	39.09	0.000***
<b>Coordinated Suppression:</b> Yes vs. No	1	2.501	0.05	0.821
Gender XCoordinated Suppression	1	57.145	1.18	0.283
Gang Member Status XCoordinated Suppression	1	0.126	0.00	0.960
Age XCoordinated Suppression	2	103.172	2.12	0.128
Prior Drug Selling Offenses XCoordinated Suppression	3	45.217	0.93	0.431
Within error	64	48.603	—	—
Total	79	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 14.8 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate

Prior Drug Selling Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)					
				i/j	1	2	3	4	
0-0	45	-2.179	1.384	1	—	0.000***		0.000***	
None	10	9.477	2.427	2	0.000***	—	0.006**	0.000***	
Low	10	0.386	2.377	3		0.006**	—	0.000***	
High	15	-24.536	2.456	4	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	—	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 14.9**  
**Change in Drug Selling and Total Services (N=80)**  
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses  
 for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.829; Adjusted R-square=0.735)\*\*\*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
<b>Gender:</b> Male vs. Female	1	183.693	4.28	0.044*
<b>Gang Member Status:</b> Gang vs. Non-gang	1	97.721	2.28	0.138
<b>Age at 1<sup>st</sup> Interview:</b> 12-14, 15 & 16, and 17-20	2	8.321	0.19	0.824
<b>Prior Drug Selling Offenses:</b> 0-0, None, Low, High	3	2209.33	51.46	0.000***
<b>Total Services:</b> None, Low, Medium, High	3	33.479	0.78	0.511
Gender XTotal Services	2	23.244	0.54	0.656
Gang Member Status XTotal Services	2	11.888	0.28	0.842
Age XTotal Services	6	53.675	1.25	0.297
Prior Drug Selling XTotal Services	7	63.74	1.48	0.194
Within error	50	42.93	—	—
Total	79	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 14.9 continued**

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate

Prior Drug Selling Offenses	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
0-0	45	-1.613	1.778	1	—			
None	10	NE	--	2		—		
Low	10	-0.981	3.495	3			—	
High	15	NE	--	4				—

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gender Main Effect

Gender	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
Male	63	NE	--	0.044*
Female	17	NE	--	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .  
NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean.

**Table 14.10**  
**Logistic Change in School Effect and Probation/Parole (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of School Effect (Positive vs No & Negative)  
 for Program Youth with and without Probation/Parole Contact

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (School) Effects

Probation/Parole	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Yes	30	13	43
No	20	18	38

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=18.285 \*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	2.725	1.652	0.099	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	0.561	0.692	0.417	1.753
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	-0.768	0.375	0.041*	0.464
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	0.112	0.556	0.840	1.118
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	-0.999	0.354	0.005*	0.368
Probation/Parole (Yes, No)	1	0.833	0.558	0.136	2.301

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 14.11**  
**Logistic Change in Gang Involvement and Probation/Parole (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Gang Involvement Effect  
 (Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth  
 with and without Probation/Parole Contact

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No & Negative (Gang Involvement) Effects

Probation/Parole	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Yes	22	21	43
No	21	17	38

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=32.190 \*\*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-0.287	1.702	0.866	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	1.815	0.806	0.024*	6.140
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	0.569	0.392	0.146	1.768
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	-2.896	0.725	0.001***	0.055
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	0.661	0.409	0.106	1.937
Probation/Parole (Yes, No)	1	-0.527	0.621	0.397	0.591

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 14.12**  
**Logistic Change in School Effect and Total Services (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of School Effect (Positive vs No & Negative)  
 for Program Youth with Low/None and Medium/High Levels of Total Services

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (School) Effects

Levels of Total Services	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Medium/High	32	16	48
Low/None	18	15	33

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=16.157 \*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	3.270	1.819	0.072	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	0.417	0.675	0.537	1.517
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	-0.898	0.370	0.015*	0.408
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	0.015	0.548	0.979	1.015
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	-0.866	0.344	0.012*	0.421
Levels of Total Services (Low/None, Medium/High)	1	0.108	0.269	0.688	1.114

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .



**Table 14.13**  
**Logistic Change in Gang Involvement and Total Services (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Gang Involvement Effect  
 (Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with  
 Low/None and Medium/High Levels of Total Services

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Gang Involvement) Effects

Levels of Total Services	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Medium/High	28	20	48
Low/None	15	18	33

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=33.093 \*\*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-2.595	2.029	0.201	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	2.143	0.870	0.014**	8.525
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	0.769	0.392	0.049*	2.157
Gang Member Status at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (Gang, Non-gang)	1	-2.721	0.712	0.000***	0.066
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	0.699	0.420	0.096	2.013
Levels of Total Services (Low/None, Medium/High,)	1	0.398	0.315	0.206	1.489

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 14.14**  
**Logistic Change in School Effects and Suppression Contacts (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of School Effect  
 (Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with  
 Low/None and Medium/High Levels of Suppression Contacts

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (School) Effects

Levels of Suppression Contacts	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Medium/High	32	16	48
Low/None	18	15	33

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=19.380 \*\* with 5 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	2.068	1.754	0.239	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	0.772	0.724	0.286	2.165
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	-0.827	0.370	0.025*	0.437
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	0.124	0.557	0.824	1.132
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	-1.092	0.368	0.003**	0.336
Levels of Suppression Contacts (Medium/High, Low/None)	1	0.525	0.292	0.072	1.690

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 14.15**  
**Logistic Change in Total Offenses and School Effect (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Total Offenses Effect  
 (Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with School Condition Changes

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Total Offenses) Effects

School Changes	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
In School or Back to School	37	13	50
Not In School or Left School	26	5	31

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=15.610 \* with 6 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-3.985	2.317	0.086	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	1.966	1.125	0.080	7.143
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	0.165	0.405	0.684	1.179
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	0.367	0.695	0.597	1.443
Total Offenses Prior to 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	1	0.893	0.401	0.026*	2.442
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview (< 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	0.964	0.503	0.055	2.621
School Changes (In/Back, Not In/Left)	1	-0.505	0.685	0.461	0.603

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 14.16**  
**Logistic Change in Total Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Total Offenses Effect  
 (Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with Gang Involvement Changes

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Total Offenses) Effects

Gang Involvement Changes	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Decrease/Stay Low	37	6	43
Increase/Stay High	26	12	38

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=16.296 \* with 6 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-4.512	2.267	0.047*	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	1.569	1.144	0.170	4.806
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	0.197	0.398	0.620	1.218
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	0.789	0.802	0.325	2.201
Total Offenses Prior to 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	1	0.904	0.408	0.027*	2.470
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	0.974	0.493	0.048*	2.649
Gang Involvement Changes ( Decrease/Low, Increase/High )	1	-0.402	0.364	0.263	0.669

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**Table 14.17**  
**Logistic Change in Total Violence and Gang Involvement (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Total Violence Effect  
 (Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with Gang Involvement Changes

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Total Violence) Effects

Gang Involvement Changes	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Decrease/Stay Low	36	7	43
Increase/Stay High	26	12	38

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=17.959 \*\* with 6 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-2.902	2.004	0.148	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	0.879	0.943	0.351	2.410
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	-0.083	0.402	0.836	0.920
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	0.391	0.729	0.592	1.478
Total Violence Prior to 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	1	0.733	0.379	0.053	2.082
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	1.387	0.542	0.010*	4.003
Gang Involvement Changes ( Decrease/Low, Increase/High )	1	-0.217	0.369	0.557	0.805

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

**Table 14.18**  
**Logistic Change in Property Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=81)**  
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Property Offenses Effect  
 (Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with Gang Involvement Changes

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Property Offenses) Effects

Gang Involvement Changes	Effect: Positive	Effect: No & Negative	Total †
Decrease/Stay Low	40	3	43
Increase/Stay High	29	9	38

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $\chi^2$  for covariates=6.642 with 6 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $\chi^2$	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-0.601	2.190	0.784	—
Gender (Male, Female)	1	0.746	1.149	0.526	2.108
Age at 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview (12-14, 15-16, 17-20)	1	0.077	0.430	0.858	1.080
Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang)	1	0.352	0.786	0.655	1.421
Property Offenses Prior to 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	1	0.306	0.405	0.450	1.358
Time Gap between 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Interview ( < 1 yr, 1-1½ yrs., > 1½ yrs )	1	0.429	0.481	0.372	1.537
Gang Involvement Changes ( Decrease/Low, Increase/High )	1	-0.651	0.414	0.116	0.522

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## Chapter 15

### **Gang and Community Crime Effects**

Our evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in Bloomington-Normal discussed in the immediately preceding chapters has focused on the effects of the program at the individual-youth level. We were not sure that the effects of the Project would be related to changes in aggregate gang-offense and crime levels. We have already described community concerns, changes in organizational policies and practices, patterns of service provided and individual youth outcome. We now turn to an assessment of gang and community crime-level changes that occurred in Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana in the program during the 1 or 1½ year interval between the Time I and Time II youth interview, and during the 4-year pre-program and 4-year program interval, i.e., the full program and an equivalent pre-program period.

We did not expect the program to produce measurable aggregate gang-crime-level changes because of the limited scope of program efforts, i.e., the size and nature of the program effect in relation to the size and nature of the prevailing gang and community problem. We could not easily demonstrate a causal connection between changes at the individual-youth, gang-as-a-unit, and community area gang-crime levels due to the relatively small number of youth in the program from the several Bloomington-Normal gangs. But it was possible that development or change in the overall gang and community gang-crime problem in Bloomington-Normal could influence or parallel that of program youth changes. We considered it important to describe aggregate-level gang-crime changes, and to see if there was some association with individual program-youth gang-crime changes. Specific gang-as-a-unit changes could more likely be

associated with individual-youth program effects than could community-wide gang-crime changes, particularly if sizable numbers of program youth were from gangs that showed change.

One key limitation of the analysis of program effects at the gang-as-a-unit and community levels in Bloomington-Normal was that only 10% of the broader community population of gang members arrested for gang crimes was 16-years-and-under. More than two thirds of the youth at program entry were 16-years and younger. Also, based on their prior arrest histories, program youth who were 17 to 20 years old at program entry were not as likely to commit crimes as younger gang members. Furthermore, about half of the program sample did not self-report that they were gang members, although Project workers at some point regarded almost all of the youth in the program as gang members. We had access to four sources of data that would give us information about the nature of aggregate gang or general crime changes: the self-reports of youth in our sample as to gang membership, the observations and data of police gang specialists about gang characteristics, and official police statistics on gang incidents in the program and comparison areas. Further, we were able to obtain aggregate city-wide arrest data for the two areas from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (the state criminal justice planning agency) but such arrest data did not differentiate gang from non-gang crime arrests.

In this discussion, we first examine changes in the youth's gang membership status and the youth's perception of changes in gang size between Time I and Time II, based on self-reports; then we look at changes in gang size and the severity of types of crime by specific gangs, as reported by police gang specialists over three data-gathering interview sessions, each about 9 or 10 months apart, during the program period; and finally, we look at changes in gang offense patterns and total arrests (including gang and non-gang arrests) over a three-year program and



three-year pre-program period. We cannot strictly interrelate findings from these different sources of data, units of analysis, and time frames, but we can do a limited analysis of trends and percentage changes across data sets.

### Gang Membership Changes – Youth Self-Reports

We thought that if enough program youth said they were no longer gang members at a Time II interview, this could be a sign that a particular gang's size was reduced, assuming recruitment of other youth was not occurring at the same time. One objective of the program, although not strongly emphasized, was to get the youth to disaffiliate with the gang. We expected that fewer youths would be gang members at Time II based on normal social developmental factors, and that this normal socializing effect would apply to comparison as well as to program youth. Should relatively more program than comparison youth say they were no longer gang members at the Time II than at the Time I interview, such a change could be expected to be associated with smaller sizes of gangs or younger segments of gangs. Smaller gang size would or should be associated with a reduction in offenses for particular gangs.

The local field interviewers asked each youth if he had ever been in a gang (or associated with a gang), had associated with a gang in the prior six months, or was currently a gang member. Gang member status had negative socializing connotations and serious criminal justice consequences. Gang membership could constitute a probation violation, or contribute to enhanced police attention and more severe justice-system punishment for a crime that the youth had committed. The pattern of interview questioning permitted the youth to avoid saying he or she was currently or recently a gang member, when in fact he or she was. The analysis focused

on whether the youth said he was ever a gang member.

If the youth answered “yes” to the question: “Have you ever been in a gang or associated with a gang?,” then the next question posed by the interviewer was: “what is/was the name of your present (or most recent) gang?” We computed the number of youth who said they were gang members associated with the particular gangs, the mean and median change scores per gang, and the mean and median change scores per the aggregate of gangs in the program and comparison areas, between the Time I and Time II interviews.

There was a relatively small number of gangs in either area identified by the youth and police, mainly African-American gangs. Gangs in the Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana areas had the same Chicago-derived major gang names, although members of gangs with the same names across the two areas did not usually know each other. However, members of the different gangs were more likely to know and sometimes associate with each other within each of the program and comparison areas. A small number of youth transferred from one gang to another. Turf-related intergang conflict hardly existed within or across the sites. Instead, drug territories were established with occasional collaboration or conflict over drug selling issues.

Local gang names had originated with Chicago gangs decades ago, when Chicago gang members personally came to the program and comparison areas. Some Chicago gang members continued to travel or settle in the program and comparison cities. Nearly all of the Chicago gang members, past or current, were older and not represented in the program or comparison samples. The gang youth in both the program and comparison samples were essentially local, except for the Rantoul youth-gang sample, who had recently moved out of the Champaign-Urbana area but continued to “hang out” there. For purposes of the aggregate-level gang and community-level

crime analyses, we considered these youth also to comprise local Champaign-Urbana gangs and to be part of the gang problem in that area. We did not separate them out as we did at the individual level of analysis.

Our focus, nevertheless, was on youth who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II. Of the program subsample (n = 81), 54 (66.7%) reported they were gang members at Time I. Nine additional program youth reported they were gang members at Time II. This was *an increase* of 16.7% in program sample youth who became gang members.

Of the true comparison-subsample youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II (n = 53), 43 (81.1%) said they were gang members at Time I. However, 5 fewer reported they were gang members at Time II, *a decrease* of 11.6%. Some of the too-young and too-old comparison sample youth and the Rantoul comparison-sample youth were also interviewed at both Time I and Time II (n = 23), but there was no change overall in the number of youth in these two samples combined who said they were gang members at Time II (two youths in the too-young and too-old group became gang members, but two Rantoul youths said they were no longer gang members at Time II). When we compared the changes for the entire comparison sample, there was still a decrease of five youths who became gang members, but the percent of decrease for the total comparison sample dropped to 7.6%.

In other words, *the Bloomington-Normal Project sample was associated with an increase in gang membership of the youth served, in relation to the comparison sample not served*. If youth gang membership per se is regarded as an indication of the gang problem, then the gang problem got worse for the youth served by the program. However, the samples were not entirely comparable. Program-sample gang members had significantly more official prior arrests or self-

reported offenses than comparison-sample gang members.

Gang youth in the program and the comparison subsamples identified with fewer gangs at Time II than at Time I. Two program youth and one true comparison youth switched to other gangs. At the Time II interview, fewer youth in each of the samples identified themselves as members of the dominant gangs in the program and comparison areas. The numbers of youth affiliated with the dominant gangs (Black Disciples, Gangster Disciples, Black Stars, Mickey Cobras, and Vice Lords) declined by 18.6% in the program subsample, and by 33.3% in the true comparison subsample. A sizable number of program youth were members of clusters of smaller gangs (n = 11 at both Time I and at Time II). The under and over-age comparison sample declined by 66.7%, and the Rantoul sample by 66.7%.

Gang Size. We were interested in the size of the gang that the youth hung out with. The two specific questions asked of both male and female interviewees at I and Time II were: “How many active male gang members are currently in the gang group you hang out with?” and “How many active female gang members are currently in the gang group you hang out with?” We look first at aggregate findings for the program and comparison subsamples, with special interest in changes between Time I and Time II. The findings are based on mean and median changes; however, we believe median averages are more reliable, since they minimize exaggerated estimates by some of the youth.

More program youth made estimates of gang size at Time II (n = 45) than at Time I (n=42). Relatively fewer comparison youth made estimates of gang size at Time II (n = 53) than at Time I (n = 69). Program youth generally perceived gang size to be larger at Time I

(mean=124.2; median = 50) than at Time II (mean = 51.6; median = 33). Comparison youth also perceived gang size to be larger at Time I (mean = 107.7; median = 52.6) than at Time II (mean = 55.1; median = 36). The change score represented a reduction in gang size for both program youth (mean = 58.4%; median = 34.0%) and comparison youth (mean = 48.8%; median = 31.6%). If we use median estimates, the overall reductions in perceived gang size are approximately the same.

When we examine the change patterns for males and females in each of the subsamples – program and total comparison youth (there is almost no difference in change pattern across the three comparison samples) – we find that the decreases are greater for the program males (n = 36 at Time I, mean = 103.4, median = 50.0); (n = 32 at Time II, mean = 56.4, median = 25) – a drop of 45.5% using the mean and a drop of 50% using the median. The trend is similar for comparison males (n = 43 at Time I, mean = 110.4, median = 32); (n = 34 at Time II, mean = 58.9, median = 24). The drop is slightly greater for comparison male youth using the mean, (51.5%), but less sharp using the median (23.5%). The drop in gang size is greater for the program males than for the comparison males, if we use the median change score.

The patterns are different for the females. While program females appear to do better than comparison females using the mean, in fact only the program female group (of all groups, male or female) increases its median estimates of the size of the gang: (n = 9 at Time I, mean=200.7, median = 23.0); (n = 10 at Time II, mean = 36.3, median = 36.5) – a drop in the mean of 81.9%, but an increase of 58.7% in the more important median. The change is more consistent for the comparison females (n = 26 at Time I, mean = 103.1, median = 42.5); (n = 19 at Time II, mean = 48.3, median = 30) – a drop of 53.2% using the mean, and a drop of 29.4%

using the median.

In sum, relatively more program youth said they were gang members at Time II than did comparison youth. This was a change for the worse. As suggested above, the level of delinquency (using police data) and, perhaps, commitment to the gang was greater for program than for comparison youth to begin with. Program youth more often retained their identification with dominant-name gangs, while perceptions of changes in gang size were little different overall for program and comparison groups. Youth generally said that the gangs they were affiliated with were smaller at Time II. Program males perceived a somewhat greater drop in gang size than did comparison males; the opposite seemed to be the case for program female gang youth, who perceived their gang size to be greater than did comparison females at Time II, at least using median estimates.

The issue remains that the interview samples may not have adequately represented the scope and nature of the larger gang-problem population in each of the areas. Both the program and comparison samples represented essentially younger gang youth who were probably less delinquent or criminal than other youth in each area's gang population, at least based on arrest statistics. This may have been particularly true in the Champaign-Urbana area, as we shall demonstrate shortly.

#### Gang-as-a-Unit Changes – Gang Specialist Perceptions (Lorita Purnell)

We sought the views of the Crime Analyst in the police department of Bloomington (Normal) and the gang specialists in Champaign-Urbana, during three waves of interviews, regarding changes in the size, criminal nature, rivalries, and history of specific gangs,

commencing at the middle of the program period, November 1998, and extending through June 2000, several months after the close of OJJDP program funding. The police gang-crime Analyst/gang specialists were interviewed at 7 to 9 month intervals. They were asked to use gang membership lists and to refer to actual arrest data to provide estimates. One of the National Evaluators conducted telephone interviews with the same gang specialists (one in Bloomington-Normal and two in Champaign-Urbana) at each of the three time periods. Repeat telephone interviews were made to clarify or verify estimates when police information differed, particularly in Champaign-Urbana.

Emphasis by the Evaluator was on the police making estimates as reliable as possible.<sup>1</sup> The estimates made by the police about the size of specific gangs were considerably larger than those made by program and comparison youths. This could be the result of a combination of factors. Police estimates were based on lists of gang members that were inclusive of active and less active (or non-active) gang members. The police estimate could have covered a longer period of time than the estimates supplied by the interviewed youth. Police estimates could have included certain youth, or sections of the gang, with whom the interviewed youth were not familiar. Program and comparison youth estimates were smaller, probably based on perceptions of gang youth with whom they directly interacted. There could be other explanations as well.

Gang Size. The changes in gang size are based on the difference between first and third police –

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<sup>1</sup> Estimates provided by the Champaign-Urbana police to the National Evaluator were different from those provided to the National Youth Gang Center, Tallahassee, Florida, for somewhat similar time periods. We believe the data supplied to the Gang Center underestimated the scope and nature of the gang problem in these two cities. However, estimates provided by Bloomington and Normal police to the National Evaluator and Gang Center were equivalent.

interview estimates (Police Interview Times I-III), approximately 19 or 20 months apart. The largest gangs in both the program and comparison areas were the Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords. The Black P Stones and Black Disciples, also located in both areas, were somewhat smaller. The Latin Kings were present in Bloomington-Normal, but apparently not in Champaign-Urbana. Micky Cobras were present in both areas, but police had insufficient knowledge of their size in Champaign-Urbana. Other smaller gangs were present in each of the areas.

Based on police estimates of all the gangs, the total number of gang members declined from 1,290 to 1,246 in Bloomington-Normal between November 1998 and June 2000, a decrease of 3.4%. The number of gang members increased 47.1%, from 1,910 to 2,810, for the same period in the comparison area. The membership size of each of the major gangs ( $n = 6$ ) in the program area decreased, but the membership size of each of the major gangs ( $n = 3$ ) in the comparison area increased. The largest increase in the comparison area occurred with the Vice Lords gang, the dominant gang in the area. Smaller gangs showed an increase in the program area, but a decrease in the comparison area. It was unclear whether the decrease in the size of gangs in the program area was related to any program effect (Table 15.1). However, during the interviews conducted by the National Evaluation, the Bloomington Police said that the gangs whose members had been targeted by the program decreased in size.

Gang Problem Severity. Each of the police respondents was also asked to rate the severity of three types of crime that characterized each of the major gangs in their area: violence, drugs, and property. The ratings ranged from 0 (no involvement) to 10 (serious and frequent involvement).



The highest ratings were generally for drug and violence crimes, across the areas and the time periods. The Crime Analyst for the program area provided data which indicated that the severity of the crime levels of gangs, on average, had decreased (violence - 1.4; drugs - 1.5; property - 0.2) over the 19 or 20 month interval that covered the later part of the program period; the gang specialists in the comparison area rated the crime levels of gangs generally higher (violence +0.5, drugs - .25, property +3.50) during the same period. The large, dominant, more criminal gangs – Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords – seemed to decrease their crime levels in the program area but to increase their crime levels in the comparison area (Table 15.2).

The views of police about change in the size of gang membership and the severity of gang crime indicated a consistent decline in the program area but not in the comparison area. The gang problem was larger and more serious to begin with in the comparison area, and seemed to grow worse over time. The comparison-area police attributed this to proliferation of turf battles for the sale of drugs. The gang situation seemed to be improving in the program area. These views were not necessarily compatible with the views and behaviors of the program and comparison youth interviewed. The views and data supplied by the Crime Analyst and specialist gang officers, however, appeared to be somewhat better supported by police gang-incident and total-arrest data trends in the two areas, which we describe next.

### Gang Incident Changes (Ayad Jacob)

We gathered gang-incident data from official records in the police departments of Bloomington, Normal, Champaign, and Urbana for a three-year program and a three-year pre-program period. These data were independent of estimates supplied by the Crime Analyst and

the gang specialists. We were interested in aggregate, community-wide gang incident changes that might be associated with the presence of the program. Selected offenses were classified into four categories: *violence offenses* – murder, sex offenses, armed robbery, robbery (non-armed), battery (with a firearm), battery (with or without a weapon), battery (with a weapon), assault (with a firearm), assault (non-armed), arson, intimidation; *property offenses* – burglary, theft, auto theft, possession of stolen property, criminal damage to property, damage to property (vehicle), criminal trespass; *drug offenses* – possession of cannabis, manufacture/delivery of cannabis, possession of other drugs, manufacture/delivery of other drugs, other drug offenses; *other offenses* – weapons violations, alcohol offenses, disorderly conduct, mob action, curfew violation, other.

#### Summary of Data Collection Procedures

Bloomington-Normal program-period data on gang incidents were collected using motivation-based criteria. The Bloomington Police Department defined a gang incident as any illegal act arising out of a gang-motivated circumstance which encompassed intergroup or interorganizational conflict, or vice-related offenses. All offense incidents were evaluated under the criteria and flagged in the police database.

Gang-incident data for the pre-program period needed to be reconstructed, as a result of there being no collection procedure in place prior to the start of the programs. To accomplish this, Bloomington-Normal identified gang members active between 1992 and 1994 using the LEADS database, Bloomington Police Department's Old Gang Book, Task Force 6 conspiracy cases, and gang meeting notes. The names of the active gang members were then placed in a

database and cross-referenced with the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments' records for incident matches. These incidents were then reviewed to determine which incidents were gang-motivated, using the same gang criteria stated above.

To collect pre-program/program data, Champaign-Urbana utilized a list of identified gang members compiled by the Police Departments. This list was used to create a database of gang members, which was then cross-referenced with the police records in Champaign and Urbana, and the University of Illinois police data bases. All the reported incidents involving identified gang members were flagged and placed in a database. The general offenses compiled were not representative of the full official range of offenses available, but were mainly those that we believed (and previous research affirmed) were more often typically committed by gang youth.

The analysis compares changes in gang incidents in Bloomington-Normal with changes in Champaign-Urbana for the program and pre-program periods. Based on the availability of official police gang-incident data in the program and comparison areas, the pre-program period is January 1992 through August 1995, i.e., 3 years and 8 months; the program period is September 1995 through May 1999, i.e., 3 years and 9 months. The periods do not exactly match those of the program exposure period or its matched pre-program period.

It is also important to reiterate that police in different jurisdictions classified gang or non-gang offenses using different criteria. Champaign-Urbana gathered gang-incident data based on a membership definition (i.e., if an incident were committed by a person identified as a gang member, it would be classified as a gang-related incident). In contrast, Bloomington gathered gang-incident data based on a functional, interest, or gang-motivated definition (i.e., the offense was defined as gang-motivated if it was related to specific interests or functions of the gang). If a

youth engaged in gang recruitment, gang intimidation, intergang fighting, drivebys, it was regarded as gang-motivated, and classified as a gang offense in both areas. But if a gang member committed a theft or burglary and the incident was related strictly to personal interests, then it was not regarded as a gang offense under the gang-motivational definition. It was unclear how the Normal police department defined a gang incident, but based on our analysis of their gang-offense data reports, which seemed similar to those of Bloomington, we decided to view it as also based on a gang-motivational or functional definition.

As expected, the application of a gang-membership definition resulted in almost twice as many gang-incident statistics as the application of a gang-motivational definition, at least for serious gang incidents. We did not establish a computational factor that would equalize the different offense categories based on the definitions employed; our focus was simply on change among different criminal gang categories, across the program and comparison areas, using percent changes. The magnitude difference in numbers across the areas was therefore controlled by the percentage difference scores.

Nevertheless, we note that the absolute number of gang offenses recorded in Champaign-Urbana, compared to Bloomington-Normal, was indeed much higher in the pre-program period by the following factors: *total offenses* – 5.4 times higher; *violence* – 4.9 times higher; *drugs* – 3.3 times higher; *property* – 7 times higher; and *other offenses* – 5.5 times higher. In other words, even grossly controlling for magnitude based on different definitions of gang offenses, the number of gang-incident offenses was still higher by at least a factor of three in the comparison area relative to the program area (Table 15.3).

The changes among gang offense categories across the 3 year, 8 month pre-program

period, and the 3 year, 9 month program period were not similar or consistent within and across the program and comparison areas. Overall percentage increases in *total gang offenses* for Bloomington-Normal were lower than for Champaign-Urbana, 27.85% versus 44.73% respectively. However, *violent gang offenses* rose more (24.44%) and *drug gang offenses* relatively less (158.82%) in Bloomington-Normal, compared to Champaign-Urbana, where *violent gang offenses* rose 7.19% and *drug gang offenses* rose 185.71%. *Property crime* dropped sharply in Bloomington-Normal – (-41.79%) but rose substantially in Champaign-Urbana (52.40%). There was little difference in the increase for *other gang offenses*: Bloomington-Normal = 39.13%, and Champaign-Urbana = 34.51% (Chart 15.1).

The pattern of change in gang offenses differed in the program and comparison areas on a year-to-year basis. In Bloomington-Normal, gang violence offenses rose and dropped in the pre-program period, rose sharply and remained high during the early and middle part of the program period, then dropped sharply from the middle to the end of the program period. Gang drug offenses showed an entirely different pattern: they were minimal in the early part of the pre-program period, rose in the pre-program period and continued to rise through the end of the program period, the sharpest increase occurring from the middle to the end of the program period. Property offenses peaked at the beginning of the pre-program period and then declined gradually, if unevenly, until the end of the program. Other gang offenses were evenly distributed during the pre-program period and rose slightly during the program period (Figure 15.1).

The pattern was quite similar for the different categories of gang offenses in the comparison area, with all gang offense types beginning to rise in the pre-program period, from January 1992 - August 1992, and peaking between September 1996 - August 1997 (with the

exception of gang drug offenses, which peaked in the following period, September 1997 - August 1998). The decline then was sharp for each of the types of gang offenses through September 1998 - May 1999 (Figure 15.2).

Fluctuations in specific gang offenses in the program area could be a function of the relatively small absolute numbers of reported gang incidents on a year-to-year basis, which artificially accelerated changes. If we compare patterns in the aggregate of all types of gang offenses for Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana, we observe much less fluctuation in Bloomington-Normal over time. There is a gradual rise in reported total gang incidents in the program period – only slightly more than in the pre-program period (Figure 15.3).

In sum, total gang offenses in Champaign-Urbana rose during the pre-program period, peaked around the middle of the program period, then declined sharply. We have to conclude that, overall, there was a higher rate of increase in aggregate gang offenses in the comparison area than in the program area. Bloomington-Normal seemed to do better than Champaign-Urbana in respect to controlling the rise in gang offenses during the program period.

It is difficult to interpret these findings. A key problem is the large difference in numbers of gang incidents in Champaign-Urbana compared to Bloomington-Normal, even factoring in the discrepant definitions of a gang offense. We require an alternate set of aggregate-level crime data to verify these findings.

### Total Arrest Statistics

Our attempts to obtain gang-incident data (exclusive of non-gang incidents) were not successful. We did obtain a combined gang and non-gang arrest data set from the Illinois

Criminal Justice Information Authority, which we believe has some value in comparing overall criminal trends. A further limitation in this data is that it covers slightly different time periods: the gang-incident offense pre-program period is January 1992 to August 1995, and the program period is September 1995 to May 1999; the arrest data is provided on a calendar year basis, 1993 to 1995 and 1996 to 1998.

In comparing findings from the two data-sets we make the assumption that the changes in the level of arrests bear a close relationship to the changes in the aggregate level of gang offenses. We also assume that the trends based on percentage change of total and specific categories of arrests bear a close relationship to trends based on percentage changes in total gang-incident offenses and specific categories of gang-incident offenses.

In general, we find that the trends and changes in rates of total, violence, drug, and property gang offenses (but not their specific magnitudes) indeed have some mixed approximation to trends and changes in patterns of arrests in the program and comparison areas. Surprisingly, the magnitude of arrests by categories of arrests does not seem to vary much between the program and comparison areas in the pre-program period (Table 15.4). Total arrests and gang offenses increase relatively more in the comparison area than in the program area in the program period, but there is some variation by categories of crime. While violence arrests (including gang and non-gang arrests) decrease slightly in the program area, they increase in the comparison area. This pattern is reversed in the program area when we use gang offense data. Gang violence offenses show greater increase in the program area. The patterns for property arrests and offenses across data sets are not consistent. There is a decline in property arrests and gang property offenses in the program area, but a sharp increase in property arrests in the

comparison area. The trend for gang drug offenses and drug arrests is consistent across the areas. The drug problem, whether using gang drug offenses or drug arrests (gang and non-gang), is growing worse in both areas; however, gang drug offenses seem to be increasing at a slightly slower pace in Bloomington-Normal. The pattern is reversed for general drug arrests, which are increasing at a faster pace in Bloomington-Normal.

Thus, the program area seems generally to be doing better during the program period in respect to smaller increases, or larger decreases, in various types of gang offenses and arrests, except for gang violence offenses and drug crime arrests, which have increased more than in the comparison area.

Especially troublesome for assessing the value of the program is that Bloomington-Normal has done worse in respect to those incidents and arrests which are of special concern to the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Approach (Table 15.5).

### Summary

The gang problem is growing worse in the program area, if we use individual-level police arrest data and, to some extent, individual-youth survey data. Relatively more program than comparison youth are becoming gang members and remain attached to gangs, especially to major criminal gangs. The gang problem seems to be improving slightly if we use individual youth self-report data. The picture is also different when we look at gang-as-a-unit and community-level data, based on the Crime Analyst and Police gang specialist's views of aggregate gang offenses, or when we examine general arrest statistics. The size and severity of the gang problem in the program area, while not as serious, seems to be improving relative to the comparison area,



with the possible exceptions of the gang violence offense problem and the general drug-crime arrest problem.

The connections between changes at the individual, gang-as-a-unit, aggregate gang-offense, and community-arrest levels were difficult to make. The program and comparison youth samples that were analyzed were neither comparable in terms of prior arrest records, nor representative of the gang populations in either community. Program and comparison youth were generally younger, and comparison youth were especially less delinquent than the respective gang populations known to the police in each area.

Police practices were probably different in each area. It is likely that Bloomington-Normal police were more active in their crackdown on gang members and gang offenses than the police in Champaign-Urbana. There were apparently more gang members and a more serious levels of gang crime in the comparison area. Arrest rates may have been higher per gang-offense or per general-crime incident in Bloomington-Normal. This could explain the higher rate of criminal justice attention paid to gang offenders in the program area than in the comparison area. This was the case for both minor and more serious offenses, as seems evident from our earlier analysis of individual-youth arrest data. But we cannot be sure enough that program and comparison youth samples were sufficiently similar to come to this conclusion.

While community concerns and interests along with police practices probably contributed to a higher level of arrests of gang offenders and a lower gang-incident offense rate in Bloomington-Normal, this could mean that relatively more gang members in the program area had been in detention, jail, or prison for similar offenses than had gang members in the comparison area. Pro-active policing and suppression is one way of controlling the level of

community gang offenses in the short term, but it probably increases the likelihood of arrests in the long term, particularly after incarcerated youth leave confinement. Youth will experience fewer pathways to productive social development because of their detention and incarceration records.

Table 15.1  
 Gang Size Changes<sup>1</sup>: Police Interview Time I-Time III<sup>2</sup>  
 Bloomington-Normal (Program Area) and Champaign-Urbana (Comparison Area)  
 percent and (n)

Gang	Date	Bloomington Gangs	Champaign Gangs
Gangster Disciples	11/1998	46.4 (599)	28.8 (550)
	6/2000	47.3 (590)	28.5 (800)
	difference	-9	+250
Vice Lords	11/1998	20.6 (266)	45.0 (860)
	6/2000	20.9 (260)	57.3 (1,610)
	difference	-6	+750
Latin Kings	11/1998	10.5 (135)	0
	6/2000	10.0 (125)	0
	difference	-10	—
Black P. Stones	11/1998	7.8 (100)	— <sup>3</sup>
	6/2000	6.4 (80)	— <sup>4</sup>
	difference	-20	—
Mickey Cobras	11/1998	6.2 (80)	0
	6/2000	6.3 (78)	0
	difference	-5	-50

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<sup>1</sup>The data on gang size for Bloomington-Normal is based on police-record data for all gangs known to police where arrests were made; Champaign-Urbana gang size is based on a consensus estimate of two gang officers, one from each city/town, and also based on police records. One officer in Champaign and one officer in Urbana identified the size of the gangs respectively for each of the two “cities” (Champaign is classified as a city and Urbana as a town in the U.S. Census).

<sup>2</sup>Change for each gang is a proportion of total gang size in each set of cities at Police Interview Times I and III.

<sup>3</sup>Insufficient knowledge.

<sup>4</sup>Insufficient knowledge.

Table 15.1 continued

Gang	Date	Bloomington Gangs	Champaign Gangs
Black Disciples	11/1998	1.6 (20)	15.7 (300)
	6/2000	1.2 (15)	8.9 (250)
	difference	-5	-50
Other Gangs	11/1998	6.9 (90)	10.5 (200)
	6/2000	7.9 (98)	5.3 (150)
	difference	+8	-50
Total	11/1998	N1 = 1,290	N1 = 1,910
	6/2000	N3 = 1,246	N3 = 2,810
	difference	-3.4% (-44)	+47.1% (+900)

Table 15.2  
Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime: Police Interview Time I – Time III<sup>1</sup>  
Bloomington-Normal (Program Area) and Champaign-Urbana (Comparison Area)

Gang	Date	Bloomington-Normal			Champaign-Urbana		
		V	D	P	V	D	P
Gangster Disciples	11/1998	7	9	9	10	10	7
	6/2000	5	8	5	10	10	10
	difference	-2	-1	-2	0	0	3
Vice Lords	11/1998	8	8	7.5	8.5	8	7
	6/2000	5	5	5	10	10	10
	difference	-3	-3	-2.5	1.5	2	3
Latin Kings	11/1998	8	10	n/r	n/r	n/r	n/r
	6/2000	5.5	8	n/r	n/r	n/r	n/r
	difference	-2.5	-2	n/r	n/r	n/r	n/r
Black P Stones	11/1998	0	9	8	8	9	0
	6/2000	5	8	5	7	7	7
	difference	5	-1	-3	-1	-2	7
Mickey Cobras	11/1998	6	6	0	n/r	n/r	n/r
	6/2000	0	4	6.5	n/r	n/r	n/r
	difference	-6	-2	6.5	n/r	n/r	n/r
Black Disciples	11/1998	0	8	0	5	9	5
	6/2000	0	8	0	6.5	8	6
	difference	0	0	0	1/5	-1	1
All Gangs: Average difference <sup>2</sup>	—	-1.4	-1.5	-0.2	0.5	-0.25	3.50

<sup>1</sup>The data on gang crimes severity is based on police estimates. The Crime Analyst and the gang specialist officers ranked each gang on the severity of violent crimes (V), drug crimes (D) and property crimes (P), ranging from 0 (no involvement) to 10 (serious and frequent involvement). N/R = no response or insufficient knowledge.

<sup>2</sup>Average difference excludes no responses (n/r) in the computations.

Table 15.3  
 Gang Offense Changes: Program and Comparison Areas  
 (Pre-Program Period versus Program Period)<sup>1</sup>

Type of Gang Offense	Bloomington-Normal			Champaign-Urbana		
	Pre-Program	Program	Percent Change	Pre-Program	Program	Percent Change
Total	237	303	27.85%	1281	1885	44.73%
Violent	90	112	24.44%	445	477	7.19%
Drug	34	88	158.82%	112	320	185.71%
Property	67	39	-41.79%	469	714	52.24%
Other	46	64	39.13%	255	343	34.51%

Source: Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana Police Departments

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<sup>1</sup>The pre-program period extends from January 1, 1992 through August 31, 1995 (3 years and 8 months). The program period extends from September 1, 1995 through May 31, 1999 (3 years and 9 months).

Table 15.4  
Arrest Changes: Program and Comparison Areas

Type of Offense	Total Arrests					
	Bloomington-Normal			Champaign-Urbana		
	1993-1995 Pre-program Period <sup>1</sup>	1996-1998 Program Period <sup>2</sup>	Percent Change	1993-1995 Pre-program Period	1996-1998 Program Period	Percent Change
Total	5211	5901	13.2%	5273	6275	19.0%
Violent	1017	988	-2.9%	1295	1406	8.6%
Property	2991	2486	-16.9%	2795	2590	-7.3%
Drug	1203	2427	101.7%	1183	2279	92.6%

Source:  
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority  
Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana Police Departments

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<sup>1</sup>The periods covered using arrest data are on a calendar 3-year basis, 1993-1995 and 1996-1998.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

Table 15.5  
Total Arrest and Gang Offense Changes By Area

Area	Type of Arrest	Percent Gang Offense Change <sup>1</sup>	Percent Total Arrest Change <sup>2</sup>
Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana	Total	27.9%	13.2%
		44.7%	19.0%
Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana	Violent	24.4%	-2.9%
		7.2%	8.6%
Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana	Property	-41.8%	-16.9%
		52.4%	-7.3%
Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana	Drug	158.8%	101.7%
		185.7%	92.6%

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<sup>1</sup> The gang offense pre-program and program periods were January 1992 through August 1995; September 1995 through May 1999.

<sup>2</sup> The arrest pre-program and program periods were the calendar years 1993-1995 and 1996-1998.



Chart 15.1  
Percent Change in Types of Gang Offenses Across Areas




Figure 15.1  
Bloomington-Normal Gang Offenses




Figure 15.2  
Champaign-Urbana Gang Offenses





Figure 15.3  
 Gang Offenses by Area  
 Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana



## Chapter 16

### **Conclusions Drawn and Lessons Learned**

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program was based on the proposition that the development of a cohesive, well-organized community with a balanced set of strategies, including social intervention, provision of social opportunities, and suppression services and contacts – targeted to gang youth and those highly at risk for gang involvement – would reduce delinquency and crime, including violence and drug selling at the individual level and possibly at the gang and community levels.

The OJJDP Model was not adopted, and an alternative local Bloomington-Normal model was implemented, one which over-emphasized suppression. Little attention was paid to the participation of grassroots community elements, and to the development of a youth-outreach approach that targeted gang youth in their hangouts at night and on weekends. The Project police, probation and outreach youth workers, school personnel, and others were pro-active in targeting the low-income, socially-disadvantaged African-American youth who comprised the bulk of the program. Program services and worker contacts were generally not intensive or differential (based on the backgrounds, interests, and needs of program youth).

A highly cohesive white community and its justice system and school representatives sought primarily to suppress, isolate, and control African-American youth identified as gang members. The Project, drawing on its coordinated law enforcement, probation, school and outreach youth workers, succeeded in controlling or stabilizing the youth-gang problem, mainly through increased arrests of at-risk youth and youth who already had arrest records.

Not all youth in the program were delinquent, or gang members, or at high risk. The youth who showed some improvement resulting from or associated with the Project were primarily highly delinquent 15 and 16-year-olds and those who received less program services or worker contacts. Females seemed to do worse overall in the program. This could have been due to the lack of continuity in the female outreach-worker staff, and to the fact that female gang-youth in the program were not as delinquent as the males, so their patterns of arrests and offenses did not decline as much. The youth who probably fared worst in the program were those who had no prior arrests. More of these program youth came to the attention of the police, and were more frequently arrested for a variety of generally minor crimes (including status offenses and disorderly conduct) than were comparison youth who had no prior arrests.

The Bloomington-Normal program probably contributed to an increase in arrests of program youth. Program youth did not vary in their commitment to gangs over the course of the program. There was a sharp increase in drug and minor offense arrests. However, there was some evidence that the program was successful in the reduction of self-reported offenses for certain subgroups in the program. Females who were on probation seemed to reduce their self-reported property and drug offenses. Males reduced their offenses and arrests for violence, but were not affected by a coordinated-suppression approach, at least in respect to drug selling behavior. Access to jobs was an important mediating variable and had some positive effect in reducing self-reported offenses. The provision of more services and more contacts also had positive effects for certain subgroups of youth.

While we can point to specific benefits and specific disadvantages of the program for certain kinds of youth in regard to certain types of offense outcomes, we cannot discern any

overall benefits to individual youth who were provided with services or worker contacts, in relation to comparison youth who were not provided with services or contacts, particularly if we use police arrests as outcome variables. At the gang-as-a-unit and community levels, however, the program may have had some positive benefit associated with the stabilization of the gang problem, more so in relation to violence than to drug activities, which increased sharply. The shortcoming of the program was the its contribution to the increase of arrests for individual program youth.

In essence, a comprehensive, community-wide approach incorporating OJJDP Model strategies in a balanced way was not adopted in Bloomington-Normal. A highly cohesive white community characterized by a “moral panic” utilized the OJJDP Model and funds to enhance its proactive suppression approach, without adequate attention to the development of social and educational services, job training and placement and more socially-enlightened youth agency and police policies and procedures. The Bloomington-Normal community was not disorganized; rather, it was well-organized, fearful and threatened by the growing population of African-American youth identified as gang members, and adopted a punitive approach to the problem.

### Lessons Learned

1. A community-wide program addressed to the gang problem which has a dominant suppression approach, but not a well-balanced social-intervention and opportunities-provision approach, will contribute to an increase in youth arrests.
2. A mobilized community incorporating various established agencies and organizations, but excluding grassroots elements, is insufficient for understanding and successfully addressing

the gang problem.

3. Outreach youth workers need to come primarily from the targeted gang neighborhoods. As an integral part of a Project street-team approach, they must be able to identify with the community generating the gang problem, to penetrate gang structures and to effect changes in the behavior of gang youth.

4. The police and probation need training that emphasizes not arresting youth, but referring them for social services, particularly for minor offenders. The police especially need training in the meaningful use of discretion in making arrests and graduated sanctions.

5. For program purposes, the comprehensive, community-wide team approach needs to target primarily youth who are delinquent and gang-involved, rather than primarily targeting peripheral gang youth who have no prior arrest records and are at low risk for delinquent gang involvement.

6. Gangs and gang-involved (or highly at-risk) youth are not all the same. Special attention must be paid to characteristics of age and gender, on a continuing basis, and to differential plans for social control and social development for each gang and youth.

7. Project and community leadership must be prepared to address a variety of conditions that create gang problems – conditions such as racism and lack of adequate school, training, and job opportunities, which directly contribute to the isolation of low-income minority youth and encourage them to resort to gangs for personal identity and social esteem.

8. Special attention must also be paid to the social needs and problems of families (including parents and siblings of gang youth), especially to family conflict, but also to housing, health, drug use, and employment problems, which usually provide the more proximate



circumstances for the development of the gang problem.

9. The schools must establish a special moratorium on “zero tolerance” practices, especially summary suspension and expulsion of minority youth for minor gang and non-gang behaviors. More creative and culturally sensitive attention must be directed to the development of combined social-support, social-control, and more meaningful educational opportunities for such youth in regular schools.

10. State and national leadership must assure that local businesses, public leadership, public and non-profit agencies and especially school administrators do not exploit the gang problem for economic, “moral panic,” political or narrow community-establishment interests, but address it in ways that enhance both community safety and the individual youth’s social development.

## Chapter 17

### **Executive Summary**

The Evaluation was a test of the implementation and outcome of the Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program initiative of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) as adapted by the Bloomington-Normal (Mc Lean County), Illinois Project, 1995-1999. Bloomington-Normal, through its lead agency, Project OZ, was one of five sites awarded four- or five-year grants by OJJDP. Special interest was in project development and program processes particularly as they contributed to change in patterns of arrests or self-reported offenses by program youth. The focus of the Evaluation was on the effects of the Project on individual program youth, compared to similar youth not in the program, who were located in a comparable gang problem community, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois.

The Model. The Comprehensive Gang Model was based on five key interrelated strategies: community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, suppression, and organizational change and development. Program structures or elements involved were to be a steering committee, an interagency street team, grassroots groups, social service agencies, criminal justice agencies, schools, employment and training organizations, and a lead agency. Implementation principles included targeting gang communities, gangs, and gang members, as well as a balance of social intervention, opportunity and suppression strategies, intensity and continuity of services and contacts, and strong commitment by staff and steering committee to the Model.

The Gang Problem. The Bloomington-Normal twin cities, with a predominantly white middle-class population of 110,194 as of the 2000 U.S. Census, began to deal with an emerging gang problem in the early 1990s. Based on official arrest data, the gang problem consisted mainly of gang incidents such as simple battery and assault, theft and burglary, disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, status offenses, and domestic violence. Gang violence occurred sporadically, but the gang problem was defined primarily as a drug problem, caused largely by gang members migrating from Chicago (although most of the gangs and gang members of concern to the police were, in fact, local). There were approximately six major African-American gangs, some of which included Latinos and whites, containing approximately 460 gang members. The number of gangs and gang members remained relatively stable during the course of the Project, but the gang-related drug problem, for which African-American youth and young adults were held responsible, continued to worsen.

The Response. The Mayor's Task Force to study gangs, established in 1990, emphasized a proactive suppression approach by law enforcement agencies in the twin cities and the county, coordinated by the Bloomington Police Department. The task force became the Community Youth Liaison Council (CYLC) in 1992, and then the steering committee for the Project OZ comprehensive gang program in 1994-1995. Its name changed to Youth Impact, Inc. in 1997. CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc. represented a wide array of governmental, private, non-profit, criminal justice, social service, business and some religious organizations, principally from Bloomington-Normal. The structure of CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc. included prevention, intervention, and suppression committees.

Project policy was largely determined by the chairperson of CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., representing the public schools, and by the chiefs of the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, the director of McLean County Court Services, and the executive director of Project Oz, a major youth-serving agency in the twin cities. The operational leaders were the Director of Project OZ as Gang Project Director, the Gang Project Coordinator, and the Crime Analyst of the Bloomington Police Department. The Project received extensive support from the community, particularly its community organizations and well-established agencies. The Project developed a well-coordinated suppression, and to some extent a services approach for gang-involved and gang at-risk youth. However, program process was characterized by the dominance of probation and police, with less influence exercised by schools and Project OZ youth outreach workers.

Community Mobilization. The Project improved the “partnerships” of concerned, well-established agencies including the police, probation, the state’s attorney’s office, juvenile and adult probation, juvenile parole, the schools and Project OZ in making the community safe from gangs. The agencies and their staffs began to work more closely together. Agencies such as Big Brothers and Big Sisters, Boys and Girls Club, Catholic Charities and an alternative school received funds to serve at-risk youth. However, grassroots organizations such as churches, public housing tenant groups, Latino community groups, and a local community center remained relatively isolated from the Project.

Social Intervention. Outreach youth workers and probation officers were both engaged in the

delivery of controls and services. Probation provided supervision and social services within a framework of court constraints. Youth outreach services to gangs and gang members were only partially developed. Youth outreach workers served in a mediating role between youth and the schools, and provided support services to youth. They were not in contact with gang youth in the neighborhoods at night or on weekends in order to understand and adequately address gang structures and processes.

Provision of Social Opportunities. The schools maintained a “zero tolerance” policy for youth who manifested gang-related behaviors. Many program youth were referred to an alternative “SAFE” school, where counseling, tutorial work, and various forms of mediation could take place. The school system no longer had to suspend and expel gang youths to the streets. A vocational training laboratory, “Scoop Dreams,” was also established, based in an ice cream parlor. Offices in the same building offered job preparation, computer training, tutorial opportunities and the possibility of earning school credits to a small number of youth. A manpower specialist developed job opportunities and referred youth for jobs.

Suppression. Community leadership and the police saw the OJJDP grant as a means to mount an aggressive, no-nonsense campaign to repress African-American gangs. At first, the Bloomington Police Department did not see itself as operationally involved in a Project-team approach which included social intervention. The Juvenile Probation unit of McLean County Court Services assigned a Juvenile Intervention Probation Service (JIPS) officer (supported initially by Project funds) to work closely with outreach youth workers, school personnel, and police. A well-

developed and coordinated approach which emphasized suppression and the provision of some social services and opportunities to gang and delinquent youth evolved. Toward the end of the program, key project personnel thought that the program created “an us-against-them mentality and ... extreme animosity between gangs and the so-called establishment.”

Organizational Change and Development. The steering committee and Project administrators believed that the most significant Project achievement was its “organizational change strategy,” which strengthened the various suppression units. Project administrators continued to be proud of their reputation “as a suppression-oriented city,” and of the community’s improved coordination which also “enhanced intervention and prevention,” especially combined with more effective control. However, Project leadership did not incorporate key components of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model such as grassroots involvement, neighborhood outreach youth work, and a balanced approach to suppression and social services. Project leadership sought mainly to elaborate and better coordinate its pre-existing, pro-active suppression approaches against gangs.

#### Program Services/Worker Contact

The key workers involved in the program – though not usually on a team basis – were juvenile probation, outreach youth workers and school personnel, as well as juvenile probation, manpower specialists and drug counselors. Based on worker tracking (process) records, the median length of time that Project youth (n = 99) were in the program was 26.7 months, with a range from one to four years. Youth were seen only about three times per month. Workers were in contact with each other around a particular youth, on average, once every six weeks.

Generally, there was little differentiation in the pattern of worker services provided to youth based on the youth's age, gender, race/ethnicity, prior arrest record, or gang member status. Most program youth were provided with group or recreational services, some brief counseling services, coordinated suppression contacts and considerably less educational or job-related services. Probation officers and youth workers were the primary referral and service/contact persons for youth in the program.

An intensive services or worker-contact program was not developed. The mean numbers of services and/or coordinated contacts provided to youth were: suppression services – 0.26 per month; coordinated contacts (of all types) – 0.22 per month; employment services – 0.18 per month; school services – 0.13 per month; and coordinated suppression – 0.11 per month. Social intervention services were excluded from this particular analysis, since almost all types of workers claimed to be engaged in some form of social intervention. Individual or family counseling, group services, crisis intervention, the strategy of social intervention or outreach youth-worker contacts were included in the categories of coordinated contacts and coordinated suppression. Social intervention services of various kinds or the role of the outreach youth worker did not show up as a significant or main effect in the multivariate analyses. It was clear that the dominant but not exclusive strategy of the program was suppression, both directly and indirectly. Probation officers provided the most frequent suppression contacts (0.55 per month), and were the primary workers involved in coordinated contacts with other staff (0.40 per month).

### The Program and Comparison Youth Samples

Although the two sets of cities, Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana, appeared

to have similar gang problems, the samples of program and comparison youth were not well matched. A variety of statistical and measurement procedures were used to control for differences and to make comparisons. Differences in police practices in the program and comparison cities, and differences in the timing of youth interviews and the provision of services, also had to be considered and controlled for. These differences required the development of various models to analyze the data, using multivariate statistical procedures – General Linear Modeling (GLM) and Logistic Regression.

The basic samples consisted of 101 program youth and 79 comparison youth. The large majority of program youth (80.2%) and comparison youth (96.2%) were African-American. Also, 81.2% of the program sample youth were males, but 50.6% of the comparison sample youth were males; 18.8% in the program sample were female, but 49.4% in the comparison sample were females. One-third of each sample was 12 to 14 years old, 15 and 16 years old, and 17 to 20 years old. While 56.7% of the program sample, and only 19.0% of the comparison sample, had pre-program arrest records, program youth had multiple prior arrest records more often than comparison youth. On the other hand, more of the comparison sample youth said they had been gang members prior to program entry (80.0%), compared to program youth (68.3%).

### Testing the Models

The Evaluation research was handicapped by a series of problems: mismatched samples, i.e., sharp differences in gender and prior arrest characteristics in the program and comparison youth samples; mismatched data time lines, i.e., youth interviews, program services/worker contacts, arrests, and self-report offenses covered overlapping, but not always equivalent, time



periods; and the sample sizes were too small for fully adequate multivariate analyses. These problems were addressed and overcome, to the extent possible, through a series of analytic and statistical procedures.

First Model Analyses: Arrests. In the first GLM analysis, we compared program youth (N=101) who had varying exposures to program services and worker contacts with comparison youth (N=79) who did not have program services/worker contacts. We controlled for age category, gender (but not for race/ethnicity, since the samples were predominantly African-American, and the differences were not significant in earlier analyses), prior specific types of arrests and gang member status. We used *change in different types of official arrests* (total, violence, property, drugs, and others) as dependent variables in the various equations. However, program youth had much higher levels of arrests than comparison youth. The majority of youth in the comparison sample had no prior arrests in both the 4-year pre-program and 4-year program periods, and the samples, as indicated, were not adequately matched. When we removed all youth (program and comparison) with zero arrests in both the pre-program and program period, our sample size was reduced (n = 112; program = 85; comparison = 27). We entered the same set of variables in a GLM analysis and found that there was no difference in outcome for program and comparison youth when the dependent variables were either total arrests, violence arrests, property arrests and other (usually less serious) offenses.

In a logistic regression model, we were interested in the proportion of youth who “succeeded”, i.e., remained without arrests or lowered their number of arrests in the program period compared to the pre-program period. When we included all program and comparison

youth (N = 180), the risk of arrest was almost five times higher for program youth compared to comparison youth during the program period. When we excluded those program and comparison youth who had no arrests in both the program and pre-program periods, there was no difference between program and comparison youth (n = 112). The program, controlling for the mismatched delinquency backgrounds of youth in the two samples, had no effect on youth, particularly in terms of total arrests and various types of “other” arrests during the program period.

Second Model Analyses: Arrests and Services/Worker Contacts. In our second set of models, still using *changes in arrests* as a dependent variable, we were interested in the reasons for the absence of a positive program effect using specific program service/worker-contact strategies. We included only program youth who had worker tracking records (n = 99). In the GLM analysis we introduced the same variables as above, and also particular types of services/contacts as the independent program variables. In all four equations, program youth again increased their level of arrests for all types of crime (except for property crime) during the program period. The significant independent program variables – coordinated suppression, total services and total contacts – were usually associated with an increase in total arrests, violence arrests, or other types of arrests. However, these program variables were also associated with a decrease in property arrests, although the less services provided, the higher the decrease in property arrests.

In a logistic regression analysis, which again included only the program sample youth (n=99), the results were similar to the GLM analysis. The coordinated suppression-type service variable predicted a greater likelihood of arrests for program youth, regardless of number of prior arrests, compared to program youth who were not provided with a coordinated suppression

contact. Also, a higher level of program worker contacts was not effective in lowering levels of property arrests.

Third Model Analyses: Self-Report Offenses. In our third set of GLM analyses, in which we used *change in self-report offenses* as a dependent variable, we compared a subset of youth who had been interviewed at both Time I and Time II – both in the program sample (n = 81) and in the comparison sample (n = 53). These youth were fairly well-representative of the original samples. The comparison Time I-Time II equivalent-youth subsample, however, contained relatively more youth with prior arrests than was the case in the original comparison sample. Thus, program and comparison youth subsamples were somewhat better matched than the original samples. As dependent variables, we used a 26-item scale of self-reported offenses which more specifically reflected traditional gang-related offenses, such as battery with a weapon, intimidation, drive-by shootings and damage to property, as well as theft, burglary, and drug selling. We used the same dependent variables. For some of the equations, we introduced mediating variables (e.g., jobs, school participation, and level of gang involvement) that service/worker contacts could affect, which in turn could be responsible for changes in the outcome variables, i.e., differences in self-reported offenses between the Time I and the Time II interviews (approximately a 1 to 1½-year interval).

Contrary to findings of the first and second sets of GLM analyses, program and comparison youth reported a decline in various types of offenses – total offenses, serious violence, total violence, property, and drug-selling offenses. The decline in total offenses was associated with a reduction in gang involvement over time (p = 0.047). Both the program and

comparison youth were associated with a decline in serious and total violence, but with a greater decline for non-gang youth than for gang youth. There was no evidence overall of a significant difference between program and comparison youth.

Self-reported drug selling also declined for both program and comparison youth, particularly for youth who reported high levels of drug selling at the Time I interview. Non-gang youth had a statistically significant decline, compared to gang youth who had a slight increase in drug selling ( $p = 0.017$ ). The decline in drug selling was also significant ( $p = 0.001$ ) when jobs (getting a job, compared to having no job) was introduced into the GLM equation. Again the effects were the same for program and comparison youth. There was no evidence of a distinct program influence.

Fourth Model Analyses: Self-Report Offenses and Service/Worker Contacts. The effects of the program (only including program youth) were somewhat different when we used specific types of program services and/or worker-contacts variables. In the GLM equation with *change in total offenses* as the dependent variable, coordinated suppression had a non-significant effect in reducing total offenses for gang versus non-gang youth. Again, as in the first set of analyses using arrest data, we found that an increase in total services was associated with an increase in self-reported total offenses, particularly for the youngest program youth, 12 to 14, and for the oldest, 17 to 20.

Certain program services and worker contacts were useful in the reduction of particular patterns of offenses for certain youth. There was a significant program effect in the GLM equation with *serious violence* as the dependent variable. Higher levels of total services

contributed to a significant reduction in serious violence at the Time II interview for the few program youth who had self-reported records of serious violence at Time I ( $p = 0.004$ ). We also observed that males provided with medium and high levels of total services usually did better than females with high levels of total services in the reduction of total violence ( $p = 0.01$ ). Males provided with coordinated-suppression contacts reduced their level of total violence, while females provided with coordinated-suppression contacts increased their level of total violence ( $p = 0.001$ ). Youth with higher property offenses and high amounts of worker contacts did better than youth with low prior property offenses and low amounts of worker contacts ( $p = 0.01$ ).

Of special interest is that both probation/parole and total worker contacts contributed to a reduction of property offenses for program youth. This is particularly the case for gang youth. The more total contacts, the greater the reduction of self-reported property offenses, particularly for those youth with high levels of prior property offenses. We find again that gender is a main effect; males did better than females in the reduction of property offenses ( $p = 0.46$ ). Also, while the program did not have an effect on the reduction of drug selling by youth generally, females were more likely to reduce their level of drug selling compared to males ( $p = 0.044$ ).

We also attempted to discover whether specific patterns of program services or worker contacts had an effect on the reduction of self-reported offenses through mediating variables such as school achievement and decreased gang involvement. In a series of logistic regression equations, we found that probation/parole had a positive effect on getting youth back to school. A high to medium level of services also contributed to youth going back to school. On the other hand, if the youth left school, the level of his total offenses decreased more than if he went back to school or remained in school. Most important, probation/parole contributed to an 80%

reduction in gang involvement for program youth.

We were especially interested in the effects of decreased gang involvement on self-reported outcome variables. In a series of logistic regression equations, we found that a decrease in gang involvement resulted in a 40% reduction in total offenses, a 20% reduction in total violence offenses, and a 50% reduction in property offenses for program youth. We observe that the only specific program variable associated with a decrease in gang involvement was probation/parole contacts.

In sum, when we used self-reports, an increase in total services and total contacts was related to a decrease in certain offenses for certain program youth, especially for males. Coordinated suppression contributed to a reduction in drug selling for females more than for males. Perhaps the most important program effect was the connection between probation/parole and gang involvement. Probation/parole contributed to a decrease in gang involvement, which may in turn have resulted in a reduction in total offenses, total violence offenses and property offenses.

### Community Gang-Incident and General Arrest Changes

The Evaluation also paid attention to community-wide or aggregate-level gang-as-a-unit, gang incident and gang arrest trends that might have been associated with, or parallel to, changes that occurred at the individual-youth level. We found that, based on Time I and Time II interviews, more of the program subsample were becoming gang members – an increase of 9 youth (11.0%) – while fewer of the comparison youth were becoming gang members – a decrease of 5 youth (-9.4%). At Time II, there was a perception by both program and comparison youth

that their gangs decreased in size. Thus, program youth seemed to be more attached to their gangs at Time II than were comparison youth, although there appeared to be a similar decrease in the estimated size of gangs for both program and comparison youth.

Based on estimates of the Bloomington-Normal police Crime Analyst, total gang membership decreased from 1290 to 1246 (-3.4%) during a 20-month program period. Based on the estimates of police gang specialists in Champaign-Urbana, the size of gang membership in the comparison area increased from 1,910 to 2,810 (47.1%) during the same 20-month program period. Furthermore, based on official police statistics, there was an increase in gang incidents in both the program and comparison areas over an approximately 4-year program compared to pre-program period, but the increase in Bloomington-Normal was 27.9%, while in Champaign-Urbana it was 44.7%. The increase in overall arrest rates (gang and non-gang) was generally lower for total arrests (gang and non-gang) in the program area than in the comparison area.

While there appeared to be a relative improvement in the gang picture at the general community gang and gang-incident levels in the program area compared to the comparison area, this was not the case when we examined the effects of the program on individual youth. Based on arrest data, the program youth increased their level of arrests (except for property crime), although the level of self-reported offenses decreased. Drug arrests sharply increased for program youth in Bloomington-Normal.

The Bloomington-Normal program did not follow the OJJDP model. It emphasized a suppression approach. It did not include grassroots groups, and did not develop an adequate outreach youth-worker approach. Little attention was paid to an appropriate mix of strategies for different youth, to the modification of the roles of the different types of workers, and to how

different agency workers were to function together to create an improved, interorganizational, street-level-worker structure and process to meet the interests and needs of gang youth, and the needs of the community, within the framework of the Model.

The program unfortunately contributed to an increase in arrests for program youth, particularly those youth without prior arrest records. However, there was evidence (based on self-reports) that parts of the program were useful in reducing subsequent offenses for certain youth.

In conclusion, we find that the program had no effect on the gang or delinquency problem at the level of individual youth in the program, compared to similar youth in the comparison site, when appropriate statistical controls are used.



## Appendix A

### Types of Arrests

Program and Comparison Youth

Pre-Program and Program Periods

Appendix Table A1  
 Program Youth Percentage of Type of Arrest Charge<sup>1</sup>  
 By Pre-Program and Program Period

Type of Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Serious Violence	8.6 (12)	11.2 (31)	10.3 (43)
Other Violence	14.3 (20)	14.1 (39)	14.1 (59)
Drug	2.9 (4)	10.5 (29)	7.9 (33)
Property	37.9 (53)	30.0 (83)	32.7 (136)
Other	36.4 (51)	34.1 (94)	34.9 (145)
<b>Totals<sup>2</sup></b>	100.1 (140)	99.9 (276)	99.9 (416)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>3</sup></b>	64	68	85

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>The type of arrest charge refers to the five types of arrest charges for which a youth was arrested. If a youth was arrested for more than one charge, it refers to the most serious charge for that particular arrest. The five types of charges are categorized as follows: 1) **serious violence** which includes murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault or battery, criminal sexual assault or abuse, armed robbery, and armed violence; 2) **serious violence** which includes domestic battery, simple battery, robbery, home invasion, simple assault, arson, intimidation, unlawful restraint, mob action, street fighting, telephone harassment, and hijacking a motor vehicle; 3) **drugs** which includes manufacture/ distribution/ delivery of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis/marijuana, possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence of drugs, and possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; 4) **property** which includes shoplifting, theft, criminal damage to property, burglary, criminal trespass to property, possession of stolen property, criminal damage to motor vehicle, auto theft, possession/receipt of stolen motor vehicle, attempted theft, criminal trespass to land, criminal trespass to residence, attempted burglary, and criminal trespass to motor vehicle; and 5) **other** which includes curfew violation, status offense, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, motor vehicle act, minor drinking, obstruction of justice, possession of alcohol minor, unlawful use of weapons, unlawful possession of firearms/weapons, drinking, transportation of open alcohol, possession of firearm and ammo, and aggravated discharge of firearm. (See Appendix C for a complete list of individual arrest charges.)

<sup>2</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>3</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 85 of the 101 (84.2%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A2  
Comparison Youth Percentage of Type of Arrest Charge<sup>1</sup>  
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Type of Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Serious Violence	12.9 (4)	10.1 (8)	10.9 (12)
Other Violence	6.5 (2)	17.7 (14)	14.5 (16)
Drug	6.5 (2)	2.5 (2)	3.6 (4)
Property	45.2 (14)	34.2 (27)	37.3 (41)
Other	29.0 (9)	35.4 (28)	(37)
<b>Totals<sup>2</sup></b>	100.1 (31)	99.9 (79)	99.9 (110)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>3</sup></b>	15	22	27

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

<sup>1</sup>The type of arrest charge refers to the five types of arrest charges for which a youth was arrested. If a youth was arrested for more than one charge, it refers to the most serious charge for that particular arrest. The five types of charges are categorized as follows: 1) **serious violence** which includes murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault or battery, criminal sexual assault or abuse, armed robbery, and armed violence; 2) **violence** which includes domestic battery, simple battery, robbery, home invasion, simple assault, arson, intimidation, unlawful restraint, mob action, street fighting, telephone harassment, and hijacking a motor vehicle; 3) **drugs** which includes manufacture/ distribution/ delivery of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis/marijuana, possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence of drugs, and possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; 4) **property** which includes shoplifting, theft, criminal damage to property, burglary, criminal trespass to property, possession of stolen property, criminal damage to motor vehicle, auto theft, possession/receipt of stolen motor vehicle, attempted theft, criminal trespass to land, criminal trespass to residence, attempted burglary, and criminal trespass to motor vehicle; and 5) **other** which includes curfew violation, status offense, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, motor vehicle act, minor drinking, obstruction of justice, possession of alcohol minor, unlawful use of weapons, unlawful possession of firearms/weapons, drinking, transportation of open alcohol, possession of firearm and ammo, and aggravated discharge of firearm. (See Appendix C for a complete list of individual arrest charges.)

<sup>2</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>3</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 27 of the 79 (34.2%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A3  
 Program Youth Percentage of Serious Violence Arrest Charges  
 By Pre-Program and Program Period

Serious Violence Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Aggravated Assault	41.7 (5)	9.7 (3)	18.6 (8)
Aggravated Battery	33.3 (4)	61.3 (19)	53.5 (23)
Criminal Sexual Assault/ Abuse	25.0 (3)	9.7 (3)	14.0 (6)
Attempted Murder	0	9.7 (3)	7.0 (3)
Armed Robbery	0	6.5 (2)	4.7 (2)
Armed Violence	0	3.2 (1)	2.3 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (12)	100.1 (31)	100.1 (43)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	10	24	31

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 31 of the 101 (30.7%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A4  
 Comparison Youth Percentage of Serious Violence Arrest Charges  
 By Pre-Program and Program Period

Serious Violence Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Aggravated Battery	75.0 (3)	50.0 (4)	58.3 (7)
Attempted Murder	25.0 (1)	0	8.3 (1)
Armed Robbery	0	25.0 (2)	16.7 (2)
Aggravated Assault	0	7.5 (1)	8.3 (1)
Murder	0	7.5 (1)	8.3 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (4)	100.0 (8)	99.9 (12)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	3	6	7

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 7 of the 79 (8.9%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

**Appendix Table A5**  
**Program Youth Percentage of Other Violence Arrest Charges**  
**By Pre-Program and Program Period**

Other Violence Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Battery	72.2 (26)	23.1 (9)	46.7 (35)
Domestic Battery	13.9 (5)	56.4 (22)	36.0 (27)
Assault	5.6 (2)	7.7 (3)	6.7 (5)
Arson	2.8 (1)	0	1.3 (1)
Intimidation	2.8 (1)	0	1.3 (1)
Unlawful Restraint	2.8 (1)	0	1.3 (1)
Mob Action	0	5.1 (2)	2.7 (2)
Telephone Harassment	0	2.6 (1)	1.3 (1)
Robbery	0	2.6 (1)	1.3 (1)
Home Invasion	0	2.6 (1)	1.3 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.1 (36)	100.1 (39)	99.9 (75)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	29	26	43

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 43 of the 101 (42.6%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A6  
Comparison Youth Percentage of Other Violence Arrest Charges  
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Other Violence Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Battery	100.0 (2)	71.4 (10)	75.0 (12)
Street Fighting	0	14.3 (2)	12.5 (2)
Hijacking/Motor Vehicle	0	7.1 (1)	6.3 (1)
Home Invasion	0	7.1 (1)	6.3 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (2)	99.9 (14)	100.1 (16)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	2	6	8

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 8 of the 79 (10.1%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A7  
Program Youth Percentage of Drug Arrest Charges  
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Drug Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Manufacture/Distribution/ Delivery of a Controlled Substance	100.0 (4)	48.3 (14)	54.5 (18)
Possession of Cannabis /Marijuana	0	34.5 (10)	30.3 (10)
Possession of Controlled Substance	0	10.3 (3)	9.1 (3)
Driving Under the Influence of Drugs	0	3.4 (1)	3.0 (1)
Possession of a Non- Narcotic Controlled Substance	0	3.4 (1)	3.0 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (4)	99.9 (29)	99.9 (33)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	4	24	28

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 28 of the 101 (27.7%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.



Appendix Table A8  
 Comparison Youth Percentage of Drug Arrest Charges  
 By Pre-Program and Program Period

Drug Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Possession of Cannabis /Marijuana	100.0 (2)	0	50.0 (2)
Possession of Controlled Substance	0	100.0 (2)	50.0 (2)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (2)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (4)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	2	1	3

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 3 of the 79 (3.8%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A9  
Program Youth Percentage of Property Arrest Charges  
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Property Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Shoplifting	37.7 (20)	27.7 (23)	31.6 (43)
Theft	13.2 (7)	26.5 (22)	21.3 (29)
Criminal Damage to Property	11.3 (6)	4.8 (4)	7.4 (10)
Burglary	11.3 (6)	6.0 (5)	8.1 (11)
Criminal Trespass to Property	7.5 (4)	6.0 (5)	6.6 (9)
Possession of Stolen Property	5.7 (3)	4.8 (4)	5.1 (7)
Criminal Damage to Motor Vehicle	5.7 (3)	4.8 (4)	5.1 (7)
Auto Theft	1.9 (1)	8.4 (7)	5.9 (8)
Possession/Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle	1.9 (1)	3.6 (3)	2.9 (4)
Attempted Theft	1.9 (1)	0	0.7 (1)
Criminal Trespass to Land	1.9 (1)	0	0.7 (1)
Criminal Trespass to Residence	0	3.6 (3)	2.2 (3)
Attempted Burglary	0	2.4 (2)	1.5 (2)
Criminal Trespass to Motor Vehicle	0	1.2 (1)	0.7 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (53)	99.8 (83)	99.8 (136)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	40	34	55

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 55 of the 101 (54.5%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A10  
Comparison Youth Percentage of Property Arrest Charges  
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Property Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Shoplifting	21.4 (3)	22.2 (6)	22.0 (9)
Theft	50.0 (7)	33.3 (9)	39.0 (16)
Criminal Damage to Property	14.3 (2)	11.1 (3)	12.2 (5)
Burglary	14.3 (2)	3.7 (1)	7.3 (3)
Criminal Trespass to Property	0	14.8 (4)	9.8 (4)
Auto Theft	0	7.4 (2)	4.9 (2)
Criminal Trespass to Land	0	7.4 (2)	4.9 (2)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (14)	99.9 (27)	100.1 (41)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	7	14	17

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 17 of the 79 (21.5%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

**Appendix Table A11**  
**Program Youth Percentage of Other Arrest Charges**  
**By Pre-Program and Program Period**

Other Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and(n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Curfew Violation	33.3 (17)	12.8 (12)	20.0 (29)
Status Offense	21.6 (11)	11.7 (11)	15.2 (22)
Resisting/Obstructing A Peace Officer	11.8 (6)	19.1 (18)	16.6 (24)
Disorderly Conduct	9.8 (5)	5.3 (5)	6.9 (10)
Motor Vehicle Act	3.9 (2)	14.9 (14)	11.0 (16)
Minor Drinking	3.9 (2)	8.5 (8)	6.9 (10)
Obstruction of Justice	3.9 (2)	7.4 (7)	6.2 (9)
Possession of Alcohol By Minor	3.9 (2)	2.1 (2)	2.8 (4)
Other	3.9 (2)	5.3 (5)	4.8 (7)
Unlawful Use of Weapons	2.0 (1)	4.3 (4)	3.4 (5)
Unlawful Possession of Firearms/Weapons	2.0 (1)	2.1 (2)	2.1 (3)
Drinking	0	3.2 (3)	2.1 (3)
Transportation of Open Alcohol	0	1.1 (1)	0.7 (1)
Possession of Firearm and Ammo	0	1.1 (1)	0.7 (1)
Aggravated Discharge of Firearm	0	1.1 (1)	0.7 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	100.0 (51)	100.0 (94)	100.1 (145)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	29	46	62

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 62 of the 101 (61.4%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

Appendix Table A12  
Comparison Youth Percentage of Other Arrest Charges  
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Other Arrest Charge	Period		Totals percent and (n)
	Pre-Program	Program	
Status Offense	44.4 (4)	42.9 (12)	43.2 (16)
Motor Vehicle Act	33.3 (3)	10.7 (3)	16.2 (6)
Resisting/Obstructing A Peace Officer	11.1 (1)	10.7 (3)	10.8 (4)
Obstruction of Justice	11.1 (1)	0	2.7 (1)
Curfew Violation	0	21.4 (6)	16.2 (6)
Disorderly Conduct	0	10.7 (3)	8.1 (3)
Unlawful Use of Weapons	0	3.6 (1)	2.7 (1)
<b>Totals<sup>1</sup></b>	99.9 (9)	100.0 (28)	99.9 (37)
<b>Number of Youth<sup>2</sup></b>	7	8	11

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

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<sup>1</sup>This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one arrest.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 11 of the 79 (13.9%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods.

## Appendix B

### Glossary of Service Activities/Worker Contacts

## Glossary of Service Activities<sup>1</sup>/Worker Contacts

### 1. Contact/Service Planning

a. **Assessment, Contact/Service Planning** - Includes activities usually done at an initial contact to assess the history, current situation and needs of individuals for services. Specific activities include tasks such as obtaining a psychosocial history of the individual, evaluating the individual's strengths, problems and needs, prioritizing the problems and needs of the individual, formulating goals and determining services to meet client needs.

b. **Monitoring of Contact/Service Planning** - Includes actions taken to monitor a client's compliance and/or progress related to service plans. Activities may include contacts with the client, significant others, and service providers to determine how the client is doing, whether contact was made, services received and so on.

c. **Other** - Other activities, apart from those listed above, related to contact and service planning with individuals receiving services.

### 2. Group (Gang) Contact/Service

a. **Crisis Intervention** - Crisis intervention activities in a group context include activities which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services directly to a group of individuals (gang members) who are in an immediate or pending crisis situation. Examples of activities include intervening in inter or intra-gang exchanges that are escalating toward violence, counseling gang members who are tempted to engage in violence or illegal activities, or forestalling arrest for activities such as gang loitering.

b. **Mediation** - Mediation activities include steps taken to move a dispute between two parties or groups to a peaceful and mutually agreed upon resolution. It may include actions typically involved in conflict resolution such as provision of feedback, increasing opportunities for dialogue between disputing parties (gangs and/or other groups of individuals), and other similar activities. It may or may not be used as a crisis intervention technique.

c. **Supervision/Surveillance** - Supervision and surveillance activities reported here should include any actions taken to increase awareness of group activities whether directly through visual observation or through overt or covert intelligence-related activities. These activities may be part of and/or result in social intervention, suppression or community mobilization.

d. **Explaining Service** - Encompasses activities related to clarifying the purpose and function of the project and its various services and components to groups of youth. May include providing definitional information about services as well as giving specific examples.

e. **Rapport Building** - Activities related to building rapport and understanding between staff and youth participating in the program. May involve actions such as "hanging out" on the

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<sup>1</sup> Portions of this glossary were taken from the Cooperative Agreements for Research Demonstration Projects on Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Treatment for Homeless Persons, Glossary of Service Activities, NIAAA, Washington, DC., 1992.

street with groups of individuals, attempts to engage youth in casual conversations, meeting parents, teachers, friends and other actions focused on building a working, i.e., purposeful project-related relationship between program youth, staff and others.

f. **Statutory Notice** - Actions performed in order to give notice to individuals related to complying with statutory regulations such as curfew laws or nuisance ordinances pertaining to gang congregating/loitering.

g. **Recreation** - Includes spontaneous or scheduled group recreational or social activities such as trips to the movies, attending sports events, organizing activities like baseball or basketball, camping trips and other group events. This category does not include activities usually done alone like reading or individual exercise unless the latter is done in a group context.

h. **Community Service** - Activities which are conducted with a group of individuals (gang members) that involve acts of service to the community such as graffiti paint outs, neighborhood clean ups, housing repairs, tutoring of community youth by gang members, and so on. Activities which are performed may be voluntary or ordered by the court. The youth engaged in providing services should not be paid for their activities. Further, the services should be aimed at improving the community in some way.

i. **Group Discussion** - Includes activities designed to facilitate and carry out conversations in a group format, whether spontaneous or scheduled, in which specific issues or problems are discussed. Topics may include any issue of interest from gangs to health or personal issues. Discussions can be educational, therapeutic or otherwise as long as there is some attempt to encourage group participation and discussion of the topic presented.

j. **Other** - This category should include any other activities conducted in a group setting which are not delineated above. Please be specific.

### 3. Counseling (Interpersonal Helping) - Individual

Counseling activities, at the individual level, regardless of focus, are generally process oriented and are intended to change the individual's attitudes, beliefs, affective responses and/or behaviors.

a. **Individual Counseling Related to Gangs** - Includes activities in which an individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other assistance during one-to-one "therapeutic" interaction with a professional or paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a gang-related problem, including his or her desire to leave the gang; removal of tatoos; friction between individuals in the same gang, etc.

b. **Individual Counseling Related to Family Issues** - Includes activities in which an individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other assistance during a one-to-one "therapeutic" interaction with a professional or paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem related to family issues. This may include issues related to the individual's family of origin as well as his or her family of procreation.

c. **Individual Counseling Related to Other Issues** - Includes activities in which an individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other assistance during a one-to-one "therapeutic" interaction with a professional or



paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem other than gang-related or family issues. Other issues may include problems such as school-related issues or problems pertaining to non-gang friends. Specify the issues discussed most often if more than one problem was addressed.

**d. Family Counseling Related to Gang Issues** - Therapeutic services that are provided to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues that are related to gangs. This may include, but is not limited to issues related to leaving the gang. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present.

**e. Family Counseling Related to Family Issues** - Therapeutic services that are provided to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with family-related problems. This may include problems with an individual's family of origin as well as his or her family of procreation. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present.

**f. Family Counseling Related to Other Issues** - Therapeutic services that are provided to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues other than gang-related or family problems. This may include, but is not limited to school problems, substance abuse or problems with non-gang friends. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present.

**g. Crisis Intervention** - At the individual or family level, crisis intervention includes activities which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services directly to a person who is in a crisis situation. Examples of activities include referring a person for emergency mental health care or an appropriate treatment unit, helping an individual who is being treated for a substance abuse problem to avoid use of alcohol or illegal drugs when he or she is tempted, preventing or forestalling an individual's eviction from housing or his or her committing an act of violence against another individual.

**h. Other** - Includes other counseling or helping activities to individuals and/or their family members not listed above.

#### 4. Prevocational and Vocational Services --Individual

Note that the activities in this category may all be performed in the course of obtaining employment for an individual and may overlap at times.

**a. Job Preparation** - Activities conducted with the goal of preparing individuals to look for and secure employment. May include activities such as providing information about dress codes, conducting mock interviews, helping individuals fill out employment applications, assisting with résumé writing and instructing individuals on how to compile a list of job references.

**b. Job Training** - Activities conducted for the purpose of preparing someone for a specific job or occupation. Includes actions taken to evaluate an individual's current

employability and job skills as well as activities and/or structured programs designed to help individuals acquire or improve job skills.

c. **Job Development** - This includes activities such as searching for jobs or contacting employers in agencies to identify a range of jobs for which program youth might possibly qualify. In addition, job development activities involve the use of explanation as to the purpose and nature of the program and persuasion of potential employers to contact or reach out to gang youth in the program.

d. **Job Placement** - Activities that are performed as part of placing individuals in employment situations. In contrast to job referral, job placement involves actually knowing about a specific job and placing an individual in the position.

e. **Other** - Includes other activities performed in the course of providing job-related or vocational services.

#### 5. Educational Services - Individual

a. **Advocacy (e.g., school transfer/returns)** - Encompasses activities performed to support or promote individuals related to educational matters, including individuals' opportunities to complete elementary, special school or high school programs. Actions may involve working with school administrators or school counselors to facilitate returns to school for individuals who have been suspended or expelled or helping with transfers to alternative educational programs.

b. **School Placement** - Activities related to placing individuals in schools, including alternative school programs.

c. **GED Program** - Activities performed in relation to placing individuals in GED programs. Includes gathering information about programs, helping with applications, and so on.

d. **Continuing Education** - Activities performed, whether formal or informal, which facilitate individual's obtaining continuing education or specialized skills, often on a part-time basis. Actions may include providing information about programs, helping individuals gain admission, or directly providing continuing education programs.

e. **Junior College Placement** - Activities related to placing individuals in junior or community college programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as well as helping individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities intended to facilitate placement.

f. **College Placement** - Activities related to placing individuals in four-year college programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as well as helping individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities intended to facilitate placement.

g. **Other** - Other activities, not included above, related to education including tutoring or other similar activities.

6. Criminal Justice - Individual

a. **Advocacy/Legal Assistance** - Activities undertaken to support or defend individuals related to legal problems. Includes services provided by a lawyer or trained legal paraprofessional to assist with an individual's legal problems.

b. **Arrest** - Includes arrest by sworn law enforcement officials.

c. **Home Confinement** - Includes actions related to enforcing and carrying out sentences involving home confinements for individuals when they have been mandated.

d. **Monitoring** - Includes activities related to ensuring compliance of individuals with mandated activities, such as home confinement, community service, or other judicial requirements that are part of sentencing decisions. Actions may include contacts with the individual him or herself as well as significant others to determine how the individual is doing.

e. **Probation** - Activities performed as part of court mandated overseeing of an individual's probation. Pertains to sworn probation officers only.

f. **Parole/Aftercare** - Activities conducted as part of overseeing an individual's parole or aftercare plan, i.e., usually when the individual is released from the jurisdiction of a correctional institution. Includes all actions undertaken as part of executing the plan such as counseling, job referral, housing location and so on. (However, you should report such activities in the appropriate sub-categories as well, i.e., also under housing location or counseling, if applicable).

g. **Violation of Probation** - Activities performed in relation to violating a probationer (i.e., revoking probation). Pertains to sworn probation officers only.

h. **Detention** - Actions undertaken related to placement of an individual in detention, whether the detention is in a city, county, state or federal facility. Pertains to sworn law enforcement personnel only.

I. **Prosecution (Assisting With)** - Activities related to prosecuting individuals for alleged criminal activities. Includes investigating, locating and obtaining testimony from victims, trial activities, recommending dispositions and so on.

j. **Witness Protection** - Includes actions taken to protect individuals who have served as witnesses in criminal proceedings. Activities include assisting with relocation as part of the protection effort, helping to secure necessary identification documents as well as actions directed against persons who may or actually do intimidate witnesses.

k. **Other** - Includes other activities related to criminal justice matters not included above.

7. Benefits, Assistance, and Money Management - Individual

a. **Welfare Assistance** - Includes activities undertaken to obtain resources, services or benefits such as Social Security, unemployment or victim's compensation, general assistance programs, food stamps, family assistance programs, or Veteran's Administration benefits for individuals. Involves acts such as helping individuals to apply for benefits; arranging a transfer of records; gathering information about potential welfare programs; completing required referral forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual for benefits; working with

other organizations or professionals or staff within your own agency/program to plan and/or coordinate services related to welfare benefits on behalf of a specific individual; and interceding or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or return necessary benefits.

**b. Medical Insurance** - Involves actions related to securing medical insurance for individuals including linking individuals to resources, helping them to contact agencies to apply for insurance, arranging for transfers of records, gathering information about potential programs, completing required referrals forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual for benefits, interceding or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or retain necessary insurance and referring individuals to insurance programs.

**c. Money Management** - This category includes activities related to assisting individuals with money management issues and can involve actions helping an individual to open and manage a personal bank account; working with an individual to budget personal expenses and pay bills; and becoming the officially designated representative payee for an individual directly receiving Social Security and other income on behalf of that individual.

**d. Practice Supports (concrete provision)** - Includes actions taken to directly provide to individuals concrete and necessary supports such as food, clothing, laundry facilities, bathing facilities, cash or vouchers, access to a telephone or mail service.

**e. Other** - Includes any other activities performed in the course of helping individuals to obtain benefits and other assistance or to manage their money.

#### 8. Housing Location/Provision - Individual

Actions taken to assist individuals in securing temporary or long-term housing. Specific activities can include locating affordable housing units, talking with landlords and management companies, assisting individuals with rental applications or housing subsidy applications, or directly providing housing, either temporary or long-term. This category does not include referrals to residential treatment programs.

#### 9. Alcohol/Drug Abuse Treatment Services - Individual

Includes activities taken in order to provide alcohol and/or drug abuse treatment services to individuals. May include initial assessment, physical evaluation, initiation and/or provision of recovery activities (i.e., running AA meetings), ongoing treatment, treatment planning and monitoring related to substance abuse problems. Referrals for substance abuse treatment should also be included as should referrals to residential treatment programs (as referrals for service).

#### 10. Medical Services - Individual

Includes diagnostic and treatment services provided by licensed physicians, nurses or other health care professionals or technicians. Also include activities related to prescribing, administering and monitoring of medication as well as the provision of educational information about health care issues such as birth control, HIV/AIDS education and other health matters. Referrals for medical services should be counted as referrals in this category.

## 11. Other Services Individual

a. **Transportation** - Activities conducted for the purpose of transporting (or accompanying) individuals to a service activity, service agency, job interviews and so on, or providing individuals with cash or bus tokens for them to use on public transportation.

b. **Child Care** - Activities including the supervision, care and execution of age-appropriate activities for children of individuals who are participating in the program.

c. **Other** - All other activities not included in any of the above categories. Specify.

## Appendix C

### Lists:

1. Police Arrest Charges
2. Self-Report Offenses

## List of Police Arrest Charges Generalized to All Sites<sup>1</sup>

Murder (M)<sup>2</sup>  
Unlawful Restraint (UR)  
Armed Violence (AV)  
Protection Order (PO)  
Armed Robbery (AR)  
Possession of Burglary Tools (PBT)  
Receipt of Stolen Property (RSP)  
Theft of Lost Property (TLP)  
Possession of Stolen Property (PSP)  
Criminal Damage to Property (CDTP)  
Criminal Damage to Land (CDTL)  
Graffiti (GR)  
Criminal Trespass to Land (CTTL)  
Criminal Trespass to Property (CTTP)  
Shoplifting (SHP)  
Domestic Assault (DA)  
Domestic Battery (DB)  
Mob Action (MA)  
Street Fighting (SF)  
Loitering (L)  
Gang Loitering (GL)  
Gang Assembly (GA)  
Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer (R/O-PO)  
Maintaining a Public Nuisance (MPN)  
Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW)  
Unlawful Possession of Firearms (UPF)  
Unlawful Possession of Weapons (UPW)  
Aggravated Discharge of Firearm (ADF)  
Possession of Firearm and Ammo (PF/A)  
Unregistered Gun Carriage (UGC)  
No FOID (UGC)  
Unlawful Sale of Weapons (USW)  
Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle (CTTV)  
Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle (CDTV)  
Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV)  
Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV)  
Motor Vehicle Act (MVA)

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<sup>1</sup>These individual arrest charges were compressed into five major arrest categories (See Appendix A).

<sup>2</sup>Acronyms for National Evaluation purposes.

Sex Crime (SXC)  
Possession of Alcoholic Beverage (PAB)  
Possession of Alcohol/Minor (PAM)  
Drinking (DR)  
Minor Drinking (MDR)  
Intoxication of Minor (IOM)  
Transportation of Open Alcohol (TOA)  
Child Care Referral (CCR)  
Exhibitionism (EX)  
Telephone Harassment (TH)  
Child Abuse (CA)  
Attempted Suicide (AttSU)  
Curfew Violation (CV)  
Battery (B)  
Aggravated Battery (AB)  
Assault (A)  
Aggravated Assault (AA)  
Robbery (R)  
Burglary (BG)  
Theft (T)  
Disorderly Conduct (D/C)  
Other (OTH)  
Trespass (TR)  
Attempted Aggravated Battery (AttAB)  
Attempted Murder (AttM)  
Kidnapping (KDN)  
Attempted Burglary (AttBG)  
Attempted Theft (AttT)  
Child Neglect (CN)  
Attempted Robbery (AttR)  
Educational Intimidation (EI)  
Reckless Conduct (RC)  
Vandalism (VDL)  
Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse (CSA)  
Unlawful Assembly (UA)  
Contributing to the Delinquency of Minor (CDM)  
Hijacking/Motor Vehicle (HJK/MV)  
Manslaughter (MNS)  
Contempt of Court (C/C)  
Obstruction of Justice (OJ)  
Stalking (STK)  
Hate Crime (HTC)  
Intimidation (INT)



Status Offense (SO)  
Adjusted at Screening (AS)  
Home Invasion (HI)  
Fraudulent/Unlawful ID (FID)  
Sale of Alcohol/Minor (SAM)  
Criminal Trespass to Residence (CTTR)  
Public Indecency (PI)  
Ethnic Intimidation (ETHI)  
Arson (AN)  
Racial Incident (RI)  
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI)  
Bribery (BR)  
Peddling/Panhandling (PDL)  
Drive-By Shooting (DBS)  
Auto Theft (AT)  
Possession of Controlled Substance (PCS)  
Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana (PC)  
Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of Controlled Substance (M/D/D-CS)  
Under the Influence of Meth (UIM)  
Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana (UIM)  
Under the Influence of Cocaine (UICO)  
Driving Under the Influence of Drugs (DUID)  
Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance (PNCS)

Self-Report Offenses – Individual Gang Member Survey

Now I am going to ask you some questions about your activities involving crime, drugs, and alcohol over the last six months. **(IF YES) TO ANY OF THE CRIMES, CONTINUE ACROSS THE GRID . . . . p. 5 →**

Type Of Criminal Activity	Have You Committed This Activity In The Last 6 Months?				(IF YES) How Many Times?	Did You Ever Do This Crime With Other Gang Members?			
	Yes	No	DK	NR		Yes	No	DK	NR
1. Written gang graffiti on school property, neighborhood houses, stores, etc	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(GNGGRA)				(GNGGRF1A)	(GNGGRF2A)			
2. Written nongang graffiti on school property, neighborhood houses, stores, etc	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(NONGRFA)				(NONGRF1A)	(NONGRF2A)			
3. Thrown rocks or bottles at persons, vehicles or property	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(THROWA)				(THROW1A)	(THROW2A)			
4. Destroyed property worth less than \$300	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(LSPROPA)				(LSPROP1A)	(LSPROP2A)			
5. Destroyed property worth \$300 or more	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(MRPROPA)				(MRPROP1A)	(MRPROP2A)			
6. Set fire to building or property (arson)	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(ARSONA)				(ARSON1A)	(ARSON2A)			
7. Stolen a bicycle or bike parts	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(BIKEA)				(BIKE1A)	(BIKE2A)			
8. Stolen parts or property from a vehicle (e.g., hubcaps or stereo)	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(PARTSA)				(PARTS1A)	(PARTS2A)			
9. Stolen a motor vehicle	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(MOTORA)				(MOTOR1A)	(MOTOR2A)			
10. Fenced or sold stolen goods (other than weapons)	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(FENCEA)				(FENCE1A)	(FENCE2A)			
11. Shoplifted	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(SHOPA)				(SHOP1A)	(SHOP2A)			
12. Entered a house, store, or building to commit a theft	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(ENTERA)				(ENTER1A)	(ENTER2A)			
13. Broke into a house, store, or building to commit a theft	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(THEFTA)				(THEFT1A)	(THEFT2A)			

**INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT: IF YES TO ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES, GO ACROSS THE ROW ON BOTH PAGES. IF THE RESPONSE IS NO, GO TO THE NEXT ITEM.**

Were You Arrested?				(IF YES) How Many Times?	Did A Gang Leader Or Influential Order You To Do This?				Did You Make Money From This Activity?				(IF YES) Did the Money Go To The Gang, In Your Pocket, Or To Someone Else? (ANSWER EACH CATEGORY)					
Yes	No	DK	NR		Yes	No	DK	NR	Yes	No	DK	NR	Gang	In Pocket	To Someone Else			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(GNGGRF3A)				(4A)	(GNGGRF5A)				(GNGGRF6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(NONGRF3A)				(4A)	(NONGRF5A)				(NONGRF6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(THROW3A)				(4A)	(THROW5A)				(THROW6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(LSPROP3A)				(4A)	(LSPROP5A)				(LSPROP6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(MRPROP3A)				(4A)	(MRPROP5A)				(MRPROP6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(ARSON3A)				(4A)	(ARSON5A)				(ARSON6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(BIKE3A)				(4A)	(BIKE5A)				(BIKE6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(PARTS3A)				(4A)	(PARTS5A)				(PARTS6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(MOTOR3A)				(4A)	(MOTOR5A)				(MOTOR6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(FENCE3A)				(4A)	(FENCE5A)				(FENCE6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(SHOP3A)				(4A)	(SHOP5A)				(SHOP6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(ENTER3A)				(4A)	(ENTER5A)				(ENTER6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1	2	1	2	1	2
(THEFT3A)				(4A)	(THEFT5A)				(THEFT6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)			

Type Of Criminal Activity	Have You Committed This Activity In The Last 6 Months?				(IF YES) How Many Times?	Did You Ever Do This Crime With Other Gang Members?			
	Yes	No	DK	NR		Yes	No	DK	NR
14. Fenced or sold weapons or firearms	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(WEAPONA)				(WEAPON1A)	(WEAPON2A)			
15. Made money pimping	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(PIMPA)				(PIMP1A)	(PIMP2A)			
16. Had sex for money or drugs (prostitution)	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(PROSTA)				(PROST1A)	(PROST2A)			
17. Threatened to attack a person <i>without</i> using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(THREATA)				(THREAT1A)	(THREAT2A)			
18. Threatened to attack a person using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(THRTWPA)				(THRTWP1A)	(THRTWP2A)			
19. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force <i>without</i> using a weapon	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(ROBA)				(ROB1A)	(ROB2A)			
20. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force using a weapon	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(ROBWPA)				(ROBWP1A)	(ROBWP2A)			
21. Beaten up or battered someone <i>without</i> using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(BEATA)				(BEAT1A)	(BEAT2A)			
22. Beaten up or battered someone using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(BEATWPA)				(BEATWP1A)	(BEATWP2A)			
23. Forced someone to have sex with you (rape)	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(RAPEA)				(RAPE1A)	(RAPE2A)			
24. Participated in a driveby shooting	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(DRIVEA)				(DRIVE1A)	(DRIVE2A)			
25. Participated in a homicide	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(MURDERA)				(MURDER1A)	(MURDER2A)			
26. Participated in other crime	1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9
	(OTH CRA)				(OTH CR1A)	(OTH CR2A)			

C.6

Were You Arrested?				(IF YES) How Many Times?	Did A Gang Leader Or Influential Order You To Do This?				Did You Make Money From This Activity?				(IF YES) Did the Money Go To The Gang, In Your Pocket, Or To Someone Else? (ANSWER EACH CATEGORY)		
Yes	No	DK	NR		Yes	No	DK	NR	Yes	No	DK	NR	Gang	In Pocket	To Someone Else
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(WEAPON3A)				(4A)	(WEAPON5A)				(WEAPON6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(PIMP3A)				(4A)	(PIMP5A)				(PIMP6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(PROST3A)				(4A)	(PROST5A)				(PROST6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(THREAT3A)				(4A)	(THREAT5A)				(THREAT6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(THRTWP3A)				(4A)	(THRTWP5A)				(THRTWP6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(ROB3A)				(4A)	(ROB5A)				(ROB6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(ROBWP3A)				(4A)	(ROBWP5A)				(ROBWP6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(BEAT3A)				(4A)	(BEAT5A)				(BEAT6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(BEATWP3A)				(4A)	(BEATWP5A)				(BEATWP6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(RAPE3A)				(4A)	(RAPE5A)				(RAPE6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(DRIVE3A)				(4A)	(DRIVE5A)				(DRIVE6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(MURDER3A)				(4A)	(MURDER5A)				(MURDER6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)
1	2	8	9		1	2	8	9	1	2	8	9	1 2	1 2	1 2
(OTHCR3A)				(4A)	(OTHCR5A)				(OTHCR6A)				(7A)	(8A)	(9A)

## Appendix D

### S/W Gang Involvement Scale

### S/W Gang Involvement Scale

There is an extensive literature that consistently demonstrates that gang members commit more crime, and more serious crime (especially violence), than either delinquent non-gang members or non-delinquents. However, many self-report, survey, and cohort studies simply ask the youth respondent whether he or she is or has been a gang member, which then becomes the all-important independent variable predicting highly-frequent and/or serious levels of crime participation. Gang membership in this type of quantitative (although not observational or ethnographic) study is viewed as a categorical variable. The youth is a gang member – an invariable status – at a particular point or set of points in time. However, for purposes of program development, based on the youth’s life course changes (Sampson and Laub 1993), it is important to emphasize the variability of this status.

The reality is that there are different degrees of gang membership, and different circumstances which influence the youth’s gang status and role over time. The degree of the youth’s commitment to the gang role may determine his gang delinquent behavior. The variability of gang membership and its relationship to delinquency, within and across time periods, has not been adequately factored into gang research, policy, program development and evaluation. It is critically important, therefore, to test the proposition that all gang members are not the same; that they all have not been and will not be subjected to the same influences; that they all are not and will not be involved in gang structures and processes to the same degree over time; and, consequently, that the nature and levels of their delinquent behaviors identified as gang-related can be expected to vary. In other words, while it is important to know whether the youth is a gang member or not, this fact alone is not sufficient to account for or to predict the

level of the youth's subsequent delinquency. It is important also to assess the changing nature and processes of the youth's specific context of gang involvement which, along with other variables such as his changing patterns of educational achievement, employment status, and sources of income, may more substantially account for the level of delinquency of the gang youth.

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale may be useful for determining the youth's level of risk for gang delinquency, and may provide guidance for policy and program planning as to what measures to take in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of the youth's actual or potential gang behavior, after he has been initially identified as a gang member. The nature of gang involvement must be broken down into components that characterize the youth's prior and current gang status, and the prior and current conditions that proximately contribute to it. These temporal and contextual factors continuously interact with each other, and may have an effect on the youth's delinquent behavior.

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale, for research purposes, provides the Evaluators with a way to measure effects of the program in terms of the youth's degree and context of gang involvement, at different points in time, which may result in delinquent behavior. It is important not only to measure the effect of the program on the youth who may or may not have been a gang member when he entered the program, but also to measure to what extent the program was successful in preventing or reducing the youth's gang involvement during the program period. The S/W Scale has not yet been tested or validated, and is used in an exploratory way in the present analysis to measure changes in the youth's gang involvement, which, in turn, may cause changes in the youth's total offenses during the course of the Bloomington-Normal program.

## D.2



The present scale contains 11 items obtained from the Individual Gang Member Survey: whether parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household has ever been a gang member (yes = at least 1, no = not in the household); ratio of close gang to non-gang friends (yes = a few and some, no = none or no close friends); time spent with gang friends (yes = some, no = none); areas in neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related concerns (yes, no); whether any close relative of the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth is currently an active gang member (yes, no); the most recent rank of the youth in the gang (yes = leader, core, regular; no = peripheral, associate, wannabe); the youth's knowledge of current gang size (yes, no); whether the youth has ever received a gang violation (yes, no); if the youth thinks he will ever leave the gang (yes, no).

Scores are established for the Time I and Time II interview responses. A maximum score of 11 is possible at each interview, if all responses are "yes." A difference score between Time II and Time I measures the amount of change in gang involvement that has occurred. We anticipate that the difference score will enable us to predict program effects on gang involvement of the youth, and that changes in gang involvement will help us predict changes in levels of offenses.

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## Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Project Evaluation

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### Particular Gang or Youth Grouping Effects

While there were no significant differences in patterns of change in delinquent or criminal behavior at the individual level between the program and comparison-sample youth, there may have been differences in the effect of the program based on the youth's particular gang or youth grouping.<sup>1</sup>

The Bloomington Crime Analyst claimed that the Project Oz program was associated with positive changes for program youth from certain gangs. He believed there was a reduction in delinquency or crime rates for youth in the smaller gangs compared to youth in the larger gangs, especially the Gangster Disciples – the largest and most criminal gang in the program area. We have not yet fully analyzed data from a group perspective, so we decided to test this proposition with some of the data available.

The questions that guided this additional but still partial analysis were: 1) was there a difference in the delinquency and crime patterns of youth depending on which gang or youth grouping they were in?; and if such difference were demonstrated, would the difference have affected the overall results of the program, i.e., if Gangster Disciples program youth were removed from the analysis, would the program youth that remained have done better than the

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<sup>1</sup>A grouping refers to a cluster of similar youth, whether gang-related or not, whether from the same gang or not. See page 2 for a classification of the gangs and youth groupings used in this analysis.

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comparison (non-served) youth? The analysis was conducted using a general linear regression model (GLM) with both self-report data (particularly self-reported total offenses and drug selling) and police total-arrest and drug-arrest data, comparing program youth from the different gangs or youth groupings. Also, with the elimination of program youth from the Gangster Disciples, we compared outcomes for the program sample, now reduced in size, with those for the total comparison sample.

#### Characteristics of Program Youth on a Gang/Youth Grouping Basis

Identification of program youth in the different gangs or groupings (whether we used self-report or police data) was based on the youth's self-reported gang affiliation or non-gang affiliation, and the type of change in the youth's gang affiliation or grouping between the Time I and Time II interviews. The same time periods were used in analyzing change in the youth's self-reported offenses or official arrests, i.e., six months prior to the Time I and Time II interviews – an interval of between 12 to 18 months.

We were able to classify the program sample (N = 101) into the following six categories: Gangster Disciples (n = 16); Mickey Cobras (n = 12); youth, combined, from other, smaller, gangs (n = 15); former gang members (n = 11); youth who were not gang members at Time I but became gang members at Time II (n = 12); youth who were non-gang members at both Time I and Time II (n = 15). The youth who were interviewed at Time I but not at Time II (n = 20) were eliminated from the analysis, since there was no interview-interval period. The small size of these subsamples limited the nature of the analysis, especially since each gang or grouping also

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varied in gender and age composition. Almost all youth in each of the gangs or groupings were African-American. The variations in gender and age were controlled at the individual level in the multivariate model analyses.

Some of the key variations at the group level were as follows: the youth in Gangster Disciples had the highest proportion of 12 to 14-year-olds (31.3%), followed by the Mickey Cobras (25.0%). All of the groups were predominantly male, except for the Mickey Cobras (50% male and 50% female); the largest proportion of males was in the non-gang group (93.3%), followed by the Gangster Disciples (87.4%). Each group had a majority of youth who self-reported prior offenses. However, the proportion of youth in the gangs or groupings who could be regarded as chronic offenders at Time I (i.e., medium = 7 to 12 offenses; high = 13 or more offenses) was as follows: Gangster Disciples (69.0%), Mickey Cobras (66.6%) and former gang members (63.7%).

### Self-Report Offense Models

Based on a GLM model which included only program youth with self-reported offenses at either Time I or Time II ( $n = 65$ ), the R-square was 0.538, significant at  $p = 0.001$ . The independent and control variables in the equation were *gender*, *age category* (12-14, 15-16, and 17-20), *gangs/groupings* (six different categories), and *categories of prior (six-month) self-reported total offenses* (none = 0; low = 1-6 offenses; medium = 7-12 offenses; high = 13 or more offenses). The dependent variable was *change in number of self-reported offenses between Time I and Time II*. Prior self-reported offenses ( $p = 0.001$ ) and gangs/groupings ( $p = 0.035$ )



were statistically significant in the equation.

Youth from the Gangster Disciples, former gang members and youth who became gang members at Time II increased their self-reported total offenses, while youth from the smaller gangs, from the Mickey Cobras, and non-gang youth reduced their total self-reported offenses. We found statistically significant differences (least square means) between youth from the smaller gangs compared to youth who were former gang members ( $p = 0.008$ ), youth who became gang members at Time II ( $p = 0.01$ ), and youth from the Gangster Disciples ( $p = 0.02$ ).

In a similar GLM model for changes in self-reported drug-selling behaviors, which included only program youth with self-reported drug selling ( $n = 35$ ), the R-square was 0.674, significant at  $p = 0.001$ . The independent and control variables were *gender*, *age category*, *gangs/groupings* and *categories of days selling drugs* (none = 0 days per month selling drugs; low = 1-14 days per month; high =  $\geq 15$  days per month). The dependent variable was *change in numbers of drug-selling days per month*. Only the categories of prior numbers of days selling drugs ( $p = 0.001$ ) and age were significant in the model. Youth aged 17-20 increased their number of days selling drugs, while youth 12-14 and 15-16 decreased their number of days selling drugs. The least square mean differences between the 17-20 and the 12-14 age groups was statistically significant ( $p = 0.013$ ). The analysis also revealed that youth from three of the groupings – Gangster Disciples, former gang members, and youth from smaller gangs – reported increased drug selling. Youth from the smaller gangs, from the Mickey Cobras, the non-gang youth, and the youth who became gang members at Time II all reported decreases in drug selling activities. Youth from the Gangster Disciples showed the largest increase in drug selling, and

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youth who became gang members at Time II showed the largest decrease ( $p = 0.003$ ). The differences between youth from the Gangster Disciples and other gangs/groupings which decreased were: Mickey Cobras ( $p = 0.027$ ); non-gang youth ( $p = 0.039$ ).

We observed that youth in all of the gangs and groupings reported selling drugs at Time I, but the proportion of youth selling drugs varied in each gang/grouping: Gangster Disciples – 75%; smaller gangs – 26.7%; non-gang youth – 26.7%; youth who were gang members at Time I but not at Time II – 18.2%; youth who became gang members at Time II – 16.7%; Mickey Cobras – 16.7%. The proportion of youth selling drugs at Time II declined for all gangs and groupings: Gangster Disciples – 56.2%; smaller gangs – 13.4%; non-gang youth – 13.3%; former gang youth – 9.1%; Mickey Cobras – 8.3%; and youth who became gang members at Time II – 0%.

Of special interest was that the fewer youth from the Gangster Disciples, the former gang members, and the youth from the smaller gangs increased their number of days selling drugs at Time II. This was especially the case for the Gangster Disciples. Youth who became gang members at Time II were least involved in drug selling. (It is important to note that some non-gang members were involved in drug selling at Time I and/or at Time II.)

It was evident that youth from the Gangster Disciples, the largest and most criminal gang (based on aggregate-level police data), did the worst overall during the program period. Youth from the smaller gangs improved, particularly in regard to a reduction in total offenses. Youth who became gang members at Time II increased their levels of delinquent activity, but apparently not drug dealing. Factors of age and gender contributed, to some extent, to these differences.

For example, youth from the Mickey Cobras reduced their levels of delinquency and drug selling probably because a large proportion of them were females.

### Arrest Models

There were fewer arrests than self-reported offenses of program youth, particularly between the Time I and Time II interviews. While patterns of increase or decrease in arrests are generally not statistically significant, they do reveal somewhat similar trends compared to self-report findings. The majority of program youth from each of the gangs or groupings had a record of arrests in the pre-program period: Mickey Cobras = 83.3%; non-gang youth = 66.7%; former gang members at Time II = 63.6%; Gangster Disciples = 62.5%; youth from smaller gangs = 53.3%; and youth who became gang members at Time II = 50%.<sup>2</sup>

Differences in the proportions of youth chronically arrested (i.e., two or three times in the pre-program period) are a little sharper: Mickey Cobras = 58.3%; Gangster Disciples = 46.7%; former gang members = 45.5%; youth from the smaller gangs = 26.7%; youth who became gang members at Time II = 25.0%; and non-gang youth = 13.3%.<sup>3</sup> Based on official police records, youth from the Mickey Cobras, the Gangster Disciples, and former gang members were the most delinquent at the pre-program period.

Based on a GLM model which included only program youth with official police arrest records at either Time I or Time II (n = 68), the R-square was 0.217, not statistically significant at

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<sup>2</sup>Youth interviewed at Time I but not at Time II = 65.0%.

<sup>3</sup>Youth interviewed at Time I but not at Time II = 45.0%

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$p = 0.195$ . The independent and control variables in the equation were again *gender*, *age category* (12-14, 15-16, and 17-20), *gangs/groupings*, and *categories of prior (six-month) arrests* (none = 0; low = 1; medium = 2; high = 3 arrests). The dependent variable was *change in number of police arrests between pre-program and program periods*. No independent or control variable except prior arrest category ( $p = 0.107$ ) came close to approaching statistical significance. In other words, there were no significant main effects.

There were generally non-statistically significant least square (adjusted) mean increases or decreases for youth in each of the gangs or groupings. Youth from four of the gangs/groupings increased their numbers of arrests: former gang members, Gangster Disciples, youth who became gang members at Time II, and youth from the smaller gangs. The least square mean declines were for youth from the Mickey Cobras and for non-gang youth. The least square mean increase for the youth from the Gangster Disciples (+1.02) was almost significantly different from the least square mean decline (-0.92) for non-gang youth ( $p = 0.07$ ). We also noted a slight least square mean decrease in arrests for the 17 to 20-year-olds, and a more substantial increase for the 12 to 14-year-olds, and also for the 15 and 16-year-olds. None of these differences were statistically significant.

In a similar model which included only program youth arrested for drug offenses ( $n = 23$ ), the R-square was 0.711, significant at  $p = 0.019$ . The independent and control variables were *gender*, *age category*, *gangs/groupings*, and *categories of prior arrests for drug offenses* (none = 0; low = 1). The dependent variable was *change in number of drug arrests between the prior pre-program and program periods*. The only main effect that predicted change in drug arrests

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was categories of prior drug arrests ( $p = 0.001$ ). Youth who were arrested at Time I for drug offenses were highly likely to lower their arrests during the program. Unlike the GLM findings for total arrests, drug arrest rates for older youth (17-20) increased, and those for younger youth (12-14 and 15-16) decreased. The least square mean difference for drug arrests was statistically significant between the 17 to 20-year-olds and the 12 to 14 year-olds ( $p = 0.021$ ).

Arrests for youth from three of the gangs/groupings increased: former gang members, Gangster Disciples, and youth from the smaller gangs. Arrests of youth from the remaining three gangs/groupings decreased: youth who became gang members at Time II, the Mickey Cobras, and non-gang youth. Youth who were former gang members showed the greatest increase, and non-gang youth the greatest decrease; the least square mean difference between the two ( $p = 0.070$ ) did not quite reach statistical significance. Drug arrests, although they increased overall, were minimal (even at Time II) compared to the numbers of youth who self-reported drug selling.

In general, using self-report offense and police arrest data, youth from the Gangster Disciples were the most seriously delinquent or criminal, and did the worst over the course of the program compared to youth from the other gangs/groupings (including youth from the smaller gangs). Factors of age, gender, and prior arrests probably accounted for some of the changes that occurred. We do not yet know to what extent certain specific aspects of Gangster Disciple gang structure and process made a difference in the findings.

Project Oz appeared to target the hardcore youth, with little apparent effect, however. Youth from the Gangster Disciples received more program contacts during the course of the program, by different types of workers, than did youth from the other gangs/groupings – 153.3

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contacts per youth (more, for example, than the 119.6 contacts per youth from the smaller gangs).

There were 15.5 suppression contacts per youth from the Gangster Disciples; the average number of suppression contacts per youth from the smaller gangs was 7.8. There were 74.0 probation contacts per youth from the Gangster Disciples, compared to 45.3 contacts per youth from the smaller gangs.

### Eliminating the Gangster Disciples from the Analysis

It is possible to argue that both the Gangster Disciple gang itself and its members were qualitatively different from other gangs and gang youth represented in the Project Oz program. It is possible to speculate that had Project Oz not dealt with the youth from the Gangster Disciples, the program would have been evaluated as achieving success.

To test this latter notion, a further series of GLM analyses was carried out, at the individual level, again using the same variables of *self-reported total offenses*, *self-reported drug selling*, *total arrests*, and *drug arrests* in separate models, but excluding youth from the Gangster Disciples from each model. The differences in patterns of outcome for the program and comparison samples, now using individual-level data (i.e., excluding group variables), were the same as in the individual-level analyses which included youth from the Gangster Disciples. There was no differential program effect, even when fewer delinquent program youth were included, and when program and comparison sample youth characteristics were more similar.

It is possible that, with further analyses of gang or group-level variables for program (and comparison) youth, we may find that group-level variables such as youth perceptions of gang

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size, degree of gang organization, relationships to criminal adults, family structures of youth, different patterns of peer relationships and different group-related perceptions of community factors can be related to increases or decreases in both gang activity and delinquency/crime among youth from the different gangs. These analyses remain to be done, but we doubt that they will affect the findings thus far obtained.