

The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Evaluation of the San Antonio Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program

Author(s): Irving A. Spergel; Kwai Ming Wa; Rolando V. Sosa

Document No.: 209189

Date Received: May 2005

Award Number: 97-MU-FX-K014

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Evaluation of the San Antonio Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to
Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program

Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment, and Support Program – GRAASP

Irving A. Spergel, Kwai Ming Wa, Rolando Villarreal Sosa

with

Elisa Barrios and Annot M. Spergel

School of Social Service Administration
The University of Chicago
969 East 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637

June, 2004

© School of Social Service Administration, The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

This evaluation was supported by a grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (D.O.S. Agreement # 97-MU-FX-K014-S-4). Points of view are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the United States Department of Justice.

Acknowledgments (San Antonio)

Many thanks to all who helped with the National Evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in San Antonio, Texas. The Evaluation could not have been completed without their cooperation. The burden of a complex evaluation was added to the challenge of the implementation of a comprehensive youth gang program. Project-related agency workers went to extensive efforts to complete program reports and assist with interviews of program and comparison youth and provide access to police histories of these youth, and tolerate repeat visits and observations of their program activities.

All of these Project-related administrators and workers were collaborators in the research Evaluation. Thanks to them, we now know better what needs to be done to reduce the youth gang problem, and how to do it.

We extend special thanks to Lieutenant Daniel Akeroyd, Project Director and Commander of the San Antonio Police Department, the lead Project agency, and his very helpful associates: Amy Guthrie, Program Coordinator; Michael Tapia and Noah Rodriguez, Youth Workers; and also Jennifer Arruza, Police Data Analyst. Detective Rodney Tubergen, and Rocky Dyer were also closely connected to the Project and provided knowledge of program youth and gang activities. A variety of other persons associated with the Evaluation, including John Rubalcava, Parole Officer, Texas Youth Commission, Roger Lozano, Bexar County Probation Department, and Lisa Rodriguez-Holquin, Director of Excel Youth Center were very helpful.

Special assistance was provided by a group of local program evaluators from the Metropolitan Policy Institute, University of Texas, San Antonio, including Derral Cheatwood, Director and his assistants, Dr. Milo Colton and Dr. Steve Blanchard, and their program and comparison-youth interviewers, Maria Gonzales and Adrian Bueno. There were many others who were also helpful in the completion of the San Antonio program evaluation.

Irving A. Spergel and Staff, National Evaluation

Evaluation of the San Antonio Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to
Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program

Gang Research, Evaluation and Technical Assistance (GRETA) Projects

Staff

Irving A. Spergel, Principal Investigator
Candice Kane, Co-Principal Investigator
Kwai Ming Wa, Assistant Research Director
Rolando V. Sosa, Senior Research Analyst
Elisa Barrios, Assistant Projects' Manager
Annot M. Spergel, Editorial Coordinator

Evaluation of the San Antonio Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to
Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program

The University of Chicago, School of Social Service Administration
© 2004 by the University of Chicago
All rights reserved.

Table of Contents

Chapters

1. Program and Evaluation Background	1.1
2. Evaluation Issues and Problems	2.1
3. The Program and Comparison Areas	3.1
4. Project Development	4.1
5. Organizations' Perceptions of Crime/Program Performance Assessments	5.1
6. Research Method: Data Management, Measurement and Analysis	6.1
7. Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth	7.1
8. Program Services and Worker Contacts	8.1
9. Arrest Outcomes	9.1
10. Gang and Area Effects	10.1
11. Summary	11.1
Appendix A – Police Arrest Charges	Appendix A - Page 1
References	References - 1

Illustrations

Charts

Chart 1.1 – Comprehensive Gang Program Model	1.38
Chart 1.2 – Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model	1.39
Chart 2.1 – Evaluation Model	2.24

Tables

Chapter 5

Table 5.1 – Organization Survey: Mean Ratings of the Seriousness of Gang and Non-Gang Crime in Program Area	5.9
Table 5.2 – Organization Survey: Seriousness of the Gang Problem Experienced by Organizations	5.10
Table 5.3 – Organization Survey Perceptions of the Success of Program Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem	5.11
Table 5.4 – San Antonio Project Performance Indicators: Mean Scores, by Rater	5.13
Table 5.5 – San Antonio Project Performance Scale Distribution (All Raters)	5.14

Chapter 7

Table 7.1 – Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples: Gender	7.10
Table 7.2 – Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples: Race/Ethnicity	7.11
Table 7.3 – Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples: Age Categories	7.12
Table 7.4 – Arrest Histories, Prior-to-Pre-Program, Pre-Program and Other Periods Only ..	7.13
Table 7.5 – Types of Arrests in the Pre-Program Period	7.14
Table 7.6 – Arrest Patterns All Youth – All Periods	7.15
Table 7.7 – Percent of Confinement Experience for Youth With Arrests in the Pre-Program Period	7.16

Table 7.8 – Association with Gang Members and Non-Gang Youth – Time-I Interview	7.17
Table 7.9 – Youth Gang-Membership Status: Congruence of Self-Reported and Worker Estimates – Time-I Interview	7.18
Table 7.10 – Self-Reported Gang-Membership Status: Sample Youth – Time-I Interview . .	7.19
Table 7.11 – Project-Worker-Reported Gang Affiliation by Gang or Street Group	7.20

Chapter 8

Table 8.1 – Source of Youth Referral to Program By Year and 6-Month Period	8.18
Table 8.2 – Selected Demographic Characteristics of Program Youth at Program Entry By Year and 6-Month Period	8.19
Table 8.3 – Dosage of Services and Contacts: Program Youth	8.20
Table 8.4 –Number (Percentage) of Types of Services by 6-month Period for All Youth . . .	8.21
Table 8.5a – Number (Percentage) of Types of Services by Gender	8.22
Table 8.5b – Number (Percentage) of Types of Services by Age Category	8.23
Table 8.5c – Number (Percentage) of Types of Services by Race/Ethnicity	8.24
Table 8.5d – Number (Percentage) of Types Services by Gang-Membership Status	8.25
Table 8.5e – Number (Percentage) of Types of Services by Prior-to-Pre-Program and Pre-Program Level of Arrests	8.26
Table 8.5f – Number (Percentage) of Types of Services by Types of Pre-Program-Period and Program-Period Arrests	8.27
Table 8.6 – Number (Percentage) of Types of Services by Type of Worker	8.28
Table 8.7a – Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Gender and Type of Project Worker .	8.29
Table 8.7b – Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Age Category and Type of Project Worker	8.29
Table 8.7c – Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Race/Ethnicity and Type of Project	

Worker	8.30
Table 8.7d – Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Gang-Membership Status and Type of Project Worker	8.30
Table 8.8 – Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Type of Arrest and Type of Project Worker	8.31
Table 8.9 – Coordinated Contacts By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted	8.32

Chapter 9

Table 9.1 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests	9.11
Table 9.2 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests	9.13
Table 9.3 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Drug Arrests	9.15
Table 9.4 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Property Arrests	9.17
Table 9.5 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total “Other” Arrests	9.19

Chapter 10

Table 10.1 – Gang-Membership-Status Change: Time I – Time II	10.8
Table 10.2 – Change in Types of Arrests: Comparison and Program Youth; Pre-Program and Program Periods	10.9

Chapter 1

Program and Evaluation Background

Introduction

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (O.J.J.D.P), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, developed a collaborative process to respond to America’s gang problem. OJJDP wanted to implement a comprehensive approach of gang prevention, intervention, and suppression through local programs around the country. Five cities – Bloomington-Normal, Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds for periods of four or five years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated local efforts to assess the nature and extent of their local gang problem, and to plan and implement comprehensive, community-wide programs. The comprehensive initiative also provided funding for technical assistance, and for an evaluation of the development and impact of these programs. The report of the San Antonio Project (GRAASP)¹ is the fourth in a series of evaluations of each of the five programs.

The San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) submitted an application to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice to fund a local Comprehensive Community Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program in September 1994. It proposed a program to address “an emerging gang problem on

¹ Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment, and Service Program.

the south side of San Antonio.” The goals of the first year, the planning phase of the Project, were to “establish a community-based task force to develop a comprehensive, collaborative program,” mainly to address issues of planning, development of a steering committee, assessment of the gang problem with focus on the provision of educational opportunities, job training and placement, and parenting classes. It also wanted to enhance and broaden “current suppression strategies by targeting, arresting, and incarcerating known gang leaders and repeat violent gang offenders (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994). To what extent strategies and activities to implement objectives of community mobilization, social intervention and opportunities-provision on the one hand, and enhanced suppression on the other, were developed and integrated across local agencies and community groups was a key issue the Project had to demonstrate during the four years of its operations (1995-1999).

General Gang-Problem Background. Youth gangs were in existence and had been troublesome for many decades in large cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, San Antonio, and Cleveland (Miller, 2001). Violence was increasingly lethal in several of these larger cities, particularly in Los Angeles and Chicago. Drive-by shootings claimed the lives of rival gang members as well as those of innocent bystanders. Entrepreneurial gang members became active in the distribution of illegal drugs. A range of other types of organized crimes committed by youth groups was also prevalent (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

A disturbing trend during the 1980s and 1990s was the emergence, or re-emergence, of the gang problem in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. Youth gang violence,

gang-related drug activities, and other forms of gang crime became increasingly prevalent in cities and towns of varying sizes, and in rural areas as well. However, the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions was not clearly determined, and “successful” approach(es) – if any – for addressing the problem were not identified, at least based on “hard” data.

In an early national survey of law-enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest U.S. cities reported having youth gang problems (Curry, Fox, Ball and Stone, 1992). It conservatively estimated that during 1991 there were 4,881 gangs, with nearly 250,000 gang members. In 1998, an estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 youth gangs. This was a decrease from 1997's figures of 816,000 gang members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth Gang Center, November, 2000). In 1996, 1997, and 1998, Curry, Maxson, and Howell examined gang homicide trends in 1,216 cities with populations greater than 25,000. A total of 237 cities reported both a gang problem and at least one gang-related homicide for each of these years. However, relatively few of the cities, excepting Los Angeles and Chicago, reported large numbers of gang homicides (Curry, Maxson, Howell, 2001).

The characteristics of the gang problem, including such terms as gang, gang member, and gang incident, have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, for program and policy-development purposes, is often differentiated from adult crime gangs, prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist and terrorist groups, or even minor delinquent groups. Categories of youth gangs, adult crime organizations, threat groups or delinquent groups overlap at particular places and times. What generally distinguishes the youth gang is group symbolism and cohesion, identification with turf, commitment to intergang

violence and (increasingly) drug use and drug selling, and a chronic and wide range of delinquent activity.

Most active youth-gang members are between the ages of 12 and 21, sometimes younger or older. While gangs comprise mainly males, females increasingly are identified as gang members, though they tend to be less violent than males, less chronically delinquent, and less committed to the gang. Different youth in the same gang may have joined for different purposes, and engage in variable patterns of delinquent behavior. They usually have different statuses in, and degrees of attachment to, the gangs, which further vary over time. Gang youth, as identified in police data and most research, generally come from low-income, minority, problem families from particular, often-segregated, neighborhoods in cities undergoing considerable population change. The definition of a gang or a gang member may vary from state to state, or city to city. The definition of a gang incident or a gang crime may vary depending on: 1) gang membership criteria – whether the youth has been identified as a member of a criminal gang, or associates with gang members and/or is on a police gang-membership or gang-associate list; or 2) gang-motivated criteria – whether the youth has been involved in an incident involving certain distinctive gang characteristics, such as drive-by shooting, intimidation, retaliation, use of symbols, signs, or graffiti (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995). The gang-membership definition generally results in identification of larger numbers of gang youth than does the gang-motivational definition (Maxson and Klein, 1990). Furthermore, the definitions incorporated in state law often become a basis for increased law-enforcement activity and differential justice-system processing.

Some progress has been made in describing and explaining the gang problem, but we

know little about why gang problems of variable scope and severity arise and develop in some cities and not in other, apparently similar, cities. Very little progress has been made in learning or demonstrating how to deal successfully with the problem. In recent decades, law enforcement has been the dominant agency attempting to control or resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and spread in cyclical, seemingly unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program operators, and researchers have concluded that the youth-gang problem is highly complex, and that therefore a better-informed and coordinated effort is required from key community and public-agency elements to correctly identify and target problem gangs and gang youth, and to develop an appropriately complex and interrelated approach to successfully addressing the problem. The assumption is that attempting to address the gang problem systematically, and carefully researching program process and effect, will also provide basic knowledge about the nature and scope of the problem and how best to address it.

Preliminary Efforts. In 1987, OJJDP funded The Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, a preliminary research and development initiative, to investigate and describe conditions that perpetuate the youth-gang problem and to develop a model for local community efforts to reduce it. Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, and intervention and technical assistance models were produced (Spergel and Curry, 1992). The research and development reports of the four-year program (1987-1991) concluded that the gang problem varied somewhat from community to community, but that it was a result of a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the

development of youth-gang subcultures, and, in particular, community disorganization, including fragmentation of organizational and interorganizational efforts, and inadequate policies, structures and resources to address the problem (Spergel, 1995).

A model approach was developed based on the notion that local institutions had to coordinate their efforts, and target particular community sectors and unsatisfactory organizational arrangements, as well as particular gangs, gang members and youth highly at risk of gang involvement (Spergel, 1995). In 1994, OJJDP solicited applications for, and subsequently funded, a five-site demonstration of its Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program (the “Comprehensive Gang Program”). Systematic evaluation, training and technical assistance efforts, and the creation of a national advisory board were to be closely associated with and related to these demonstration programs (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

Theory

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model derives from Community Social Disorganization theory and, to some extent, from theories such as Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control. The community-based program model builds on the ideas and research of Battin-Pearson, Thornberry, Hawkins and Krohn (1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein (1971, 1995), Kobrin (1951), Kornhauser (1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), Shaw and McKay

(1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey (1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and Messner (1999) and Zatz (1987).

Gang-problem cities, communities or sectors of communities are viewed as comprising two overlapping types – *emerging* and *chronic*. The first is characterized by a recently-arrived, less-marginalized population and a less-serious gang problem. The second is characterized by an established, marginalized, minority-group population (usually Latino and/or African-American) and a long-term, serious gang problem. A range of minor offenses, less-serious violence and increasing drug-crime activities seems to be more prevalent in emerging gang-problem communities. Scope, duration, and severity of both adult and juvenile crime (including gang crime) tend to be greater in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime communities. Turf-based gang violence and (increasingly) drug-crime markets, although not always closely related, seem to be more characteristic of chronic gang-problem communities. The nature of the gang problem and the response to it are also based on state, city or community leadership perceptions of the problem, the level of their concern, and on organizational and political interests in addressing the problem.

Organized crime and youth-gang crime are often more highly developed and interrelated in chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Local conventional, or legitimate, institutions are relatively stronger in the emerging gang-crime community, and are also better integrated with conventional institutions of the city or the larger community. Moral panic, fear, and (presumed) defense against and control of newcomer, low-income, minority populations often characterize the response of once-stable (but recently-changing or re-locating) populations and their established community leaders in emerging gang-crime communities (Cohen, 1980;

Zatz, 1987). Levels of victimization due to violence are lower in emerging gang-crime communities, but higher in chronic gang-crime communities.

In the chronic gang-problem community, socialization of youth to the gang is more likely to occur because of the presence of established criminal organizations; weak or apathetic and highly competitive or conflictual conventional agency systems; and extensive alienation and lack of social, economic and educational opportunities for the now-established but still-marginalized population (Venkatesh, 1999). Access for youth to illegitimate opportunities and to organized gangs may not be as well-developed in the emerging gang-problem community, where legitimate opportunities may be relatively more available, and pressures for conventional behavior may be greater (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Social-intervention and suppression strategies are relatively more poorly integrated in chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. The police (more interested in suppression) may pay more attention to serious gang crime, while social agencies and grassroots organizations (more interested in early intervention or prevention) provide some social support for youth, mainly for those who are at risk but not necessarily gang-involved. Suppression and social-intervention strategies are employed in a manner unrelated, or not effectively related, to each other. In emerging gang-problem communities, these strategies are somewhat better-integrated when targeted to youth committing less-serious gang offenses. In both chronic and emerging gang-problem communities, the schools, the justice system and social-service agencies seem to overreact, react inappropriately, or underreact to the presence of low-income minority (especially Latino and African-American) youth, who are increasingly identified or defined as gang-at-risk, or as actual gang youth.

Efforts to address dysfunctional social and economic conditions that, at the local level, produce or contribute to the gang problem require mobilization of political and government leadership, agency and citizen interest, social intervention, and the provision of social opportunities, as well as suppression, and especially organizational and policy-and-practice changes, although in different degrees and combinations in the chronic and emerging gang-problem communities. In the chronic gang-problem community, particularly for those youth committed to the gang lifestyle, greater responsibility may be necessary at the city or county (and state and national) levels for mobilizing and changing local and area-wide entrenched institutions, coordinating strategies and efforts, and developing and extending resources to control and reduce serious gang problems. In the emerging gang-problem community, particularly for youth at risk and those less committed to the gang lifestyle, greater capacity may exist and responsibility be taken at the local-neighborhood or community levels for mobilizing and integrating local institutions, while focusing on the coordination of prevention and social-intervention strategies addressed to less-serious gang problems. However, chronic and emerging gang-problem sectors of a community or region may overlap and interact, so that variable strategies, targets, and institutional arrangements may be required in different places over time. In any case, the mayor's office and/or the city council must play a key role in the creation and support of the project, and in assisting the project and law enforcement in organizing a consortium of agencies and local groups for developing the program.

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of key interrelated components: *program elements*, *strategies*, and *implementation principles*, all directed to the nature and scope of the gang problem and related population-change, demographic, socio-economic, organizational and other local community factors (Chart 1.1). Coordinated policies, and program and worker efforts have to be developed at the targeted-individual, youth-gang, organization and community levels. Ideally, all components of the Model have to be present and effectively developed in order for the gang problem – particularly its distinctive characteristics, violence and to some extent drug crime – to be significantly reduced. A generalized public-health, non-targeted prevention or community-development approach is not the primary purpose of the Model, but may contribute to broader but related purposes.

Program Elements

A series of program structures and processes are necessary to implement the Model, which comprises a steering committee, lead-agency management, an interagency street team (including youth outreach workers), grassroots involvement (including faith-based organizations), social services, criminal-justice agencies (including police, probation, and parole), schools, and employment and training.

The Steering Committee has to engage (or be engaged by) the leadership of the community – particularly the mayor’s office and city council, but also police and probation departments, other public agencies, local schools, and grassroots and community-based

organizations – in a comprehensive effort of gang-problem assessment and analysis, policy planning, strategy development, acquisition of resources, pilot-program implementation and refinement, and institutionalization of the Model. The Comprehensive Gang Program Model requires justice-agency (especially police) leadership, criminal-justice-system (especially probation and parole) support, and the participation and collaboration of community-based youth agencies, schools, business and employment sources, as well as local grassroots groups (particularly churches and neighborhood groups) and even former gang members themselves. With the inducement and support of the mayor, city council, or city administrator’s office, the Steering Committee has to bring together key community leaders who are committed to interrelated policy and practice approaches and the development of a cohesive structure in order to effectively adapt the Gang Program Model approach, which is to protect the community and interactively contribute to the socialization of targeted, delinquent gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth.

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and coordinate the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. A qualified organization must have a background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth, and a broad understanding of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize its own agency resources (as well as those of other agencies) and especially to enlist the support and cooperation of youth agencies, grassroots organizations, justice-system and other community agencies, and governmental leadership to develop and sustain the program. A police department (optimally), and possibly a public school system, community mental-health agency, probation department, or a special youth authority may be best positioned to undertake leadership and

responsibility for program and project-related interorganizational development. Much depends on the lead agency's commitment to an approach consisting of outreach work and broad, well-balanced social services and community participation, as well as suppression (including social control) – all targeted to highly at-risk and delinquent gang youth, with special attention directed to those youth who are violent or potentially violent, and who engage in drug crimes.

A primary and sustaining requirement for qualification as a lead agency is not only to have capable management staff and experience in dealing with the gang problem, but also genuine commitment to a comprehensive community-wide gang approach. The normal, bureaucratic impulse to acquire and use resources to meet ongoing organizational interests and the provision of services in traditional terms must be restrained. It is inappropriate for the lead agency (or consortium of agencies) to “buy into the approach simply to split the pie,” so that they can continue to do what they usually do, now with additional resources. The lead agency must be truly committed to a new, institutional and community-participatory approach, which ensures that appropriate organizational policies and practices are developed to implement the Model.

The Interagency Outreach Street Team should comprise direct-service personnel (especially police, probation, youth workers and case managers, but also school officials, job developers, and community organizers) who will formally and continually interact with each other in regard to ongoing assessment of youth and gang situations, differential planning, provision of services and contacting gang-involved and/or highly-at-risk youth and their families in the program or target area. The outreach street team and their agencies – in relation to and in coordination with Steering Committee concerns – must address the neighborhood social organizations and contexts, including gangs, that influence the behavior of targeted gang youth.

The street team is the key youth direct-service component of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Its members are in communication with local groups and neighborhood residents; it operates as needed – during the week in the daytime as well as evening and late night hours, and on weekends and especially at crisis times.

The outreach youth worker has an important role to play. He may be a former influential gang member from the target neighborhood who is now fully identified with the norms and values of legitimate society with a conventional work record. He should be someone who is “streetwise,” not over-identified with but able to relate comfortably and professionally to targeted youth. His knowledge is essential to the assessment of the nature of youth-gang problem situations, and to facilitating the outreach efforts of the rest of staff. Qualified and trained outreach youth workers should be able to provide ready access to youth-gang members and their families, to help define the gang problem, and to serve as mediators between the gangs, their families, and established local institutions, including the criminal-justice system. While the use of outreach youth workers, especially if they are former gang members, has inherent risks, the benefits to program development and outcome outweigh the variety of problems that may occur, if there is strong supervision and interagency coordination of their activities.

Grassroots Involvement. Key parts of the community that must be involved in the comprehensive gang-program approach are not only: 1) established agencies such as police, schools, key governmental organizations, and other organizations concerned with the youth gang problem in the local and larger community; but also 2) the indigenous grassroots community, more often comprising families, neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen groups, churches and other organizations, whose members tend more often than agency

personnel to live in the program area and interact on a daily basis with each other and the gang youth. Established agencies may have substantial resources, often controlling access to opportunities for education and jobs. They tend to set key program policies (affecting the lives of the program-area residents) which may be based primarily on the values and interests of middle-class communities or the city at large. The indigenous grassroots organizations in the gang-problem community with limited resources often focus on social-support, crisis-intervention and socialization issues more directly related to the expressed needs of a local (usually lower class) segregated and alienated minority population. Neighborhood organizations and groups, on the other hand, may be weak, ephemeral and in conflict with each other over leadership, ideas or ideology as well as resources.

Communication and interaction between the formal and more structured, and the informal and less structured parts of the local community in respect to the gang problem are often characterized by lack of common understanding, social distance, and ambivalence or antagonism as certain gang-related problems or issues are variously denied, emphasized or exaggerated. A gang-problem community is usually characterized not only by a lack of resources, but by a lack of sufficient interdependence and cooperation across established agencies and grassroots organizations. It may be particularly difficult for the lead agency to overcome the fragmentation, apathy, or hostility of neighborhood organizations to each other as well as to itself. However, for the Comprehensive Gang Program approach to succeed, grassroots elements as well as established agencies must interact, and collaborate in both determining the direction of the program, and participating significantly in its operation.

Social Services. A variety of social services have to be provided to gang-involved

program youth and their families, including younger siblings who may be at high risk of gang membership and delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis intervention and referral, direct help with school, employment, and drug-use problems and personal-development issues, as well as gang-related controls. Social services should also be provided to families of targeted youth who may need assistance with housing, public aid, health care, family dysfunction and conflict-resolution, employment, immigration, racism, and other problems which directly affect gang youth and contribute to their alienation and possible criminal behavior.

The street team provides front-line preliminary contacts with and services to gang-involved and highly gang-at-risk youth. The outreach youth worker and other team members – police, probation, the school teacher or disciplinarian, the neighborhood organizer, as well as lead-agency staff – are collectively responsible for the delivery of an appropriate combination of support and control services for particular youth and gangs. Each member of the team must share some responsibility for an interrelated and interdependent approach to the youth's and community's gang problem.

Criminal Justice Participation. Police (including gang detectives and tactical, patrol, youth-division, school-resource, and narcotics officers), juvenile and adult probation, juvenile and adult parole, and prosecutors and judges must be knowledgeable about the scope and nature of gang-crime in the target area, and interact appropriately and consistently in their response to it. They must also be closely identified with the purpose of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Police and probation must be collectively involved in the day-to-day social control and suppression of activities of targeted youth, mainly those who are delinquent and gang-involved. They must be careful not to target and label as gang members those youth who are not at high

risk for gang involvement. Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice-system processes must support the Project street team in such a way as to facilitate the youth's social development and rehabilitation, as well as to protect the community.

Police and probation administrators must encourage, if not require, the Project street-level officers to collaborate with each other, as well as with other members of the street team (including the outreach youth workers, educators and job-development personnel) in an integrated social-development and social-control approach. The police have a special front-line responsibility to accurately assess the gang problem, refer youth for services, impose controls, and especially to address the gang problem in as balanced and rational a way as possible, recognizing the close connection between the gang problem, race/ethnic issues, poverty, population change, and family and neighborhood concerns and pressures.

School Participation. Principals, teachers, and disciplinarians of regular public, parochial, alternative, community, charter, opportunity, and gang-at-risk schools should be key participants in the Comprehensive Gang Program. Schools may be overwhelmed with a range of educational and organizational problems, and reluctant to deal in a balanced way with the gang problem, preferring to transfer, suspend, or expel antisocial gang youth. The district school superintendent, the Steering Committee, and the lead-agency administration have to facilitate better understanding of the school gang problem, and (especially) to persuade and assist local school personnel to modify their "zero-tolerance" practices and to develop special programs within the normal school context to provide gang-involved, at-risk and non-gang youth with a positive educational experience. The Project street team needs to fully participate in the life of the school and assist school staff in addressing gang-related issues, thereby encouraging better

access to educational opportunities for gang youth, conformity to school rules, and protection of other students as well as school personnel.

The use of alternative or special schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational and behavioral problems of gang youth. Tutorial assistance and collaborative arrangements with social agencies and therapeutic programs may assist gang youth to remain in regular school, and to make better use of available educational opportunities. If the youth is referred to an alternative school, a high-quality educational program (often with therapeutic and effective controls) must be provided, along with a firm commitment to return the youth to a mainstream school as soon as possible. Project youth workers, probation officers and police officers together have a special responsibility not only to help program youth make the best use of learning opportunities, to advocate on his/her behalf, and mediate conflicts with teachers, but also to assist school staff to better understand the nature of gang pressures on program youth arising from situations and crises both inside and outside the school. They should be available to control or neutralize some of these pressures.

Employment and Training. Obtaining adequate employment training, a job, and support once on the job is critical to the transition of youth from a gang life to legitimate and personally satisfying adult roles. Adolescent (particularly older-adolescent) gang youth regard a job as a sign of meaningful entry into the conventional adult world and of obtaining the social and economic rewards that job status brings, with a consequent departure from the pattern of destructive norms and behaviors of gang membership. Getting a job is often more acceptable than returning to school. Getting and holding a full-time job indicates the youth no longer needs the gang, nor has the time and motivation to associate with gang members in delinquent gang

activities. Job and work-skills training provide a legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang. Success on the job may later be a basis for returning to school. Furthermore, education and job development can often be combined and facilitated through creative arrangements between schools, businesses and industry.

The Project outreach youth workers, probation officers, and job developers or specialists may be the key personnel responsible for motivating youth to participate in training programs and get jobs, and for helping them sustain a job once employed. A major task of the job developer is contacting employers and training institutions to facilitate access to job and training opportunities for gang youth. Special incentives (such as tax breaks) may be necessary to enable employers to hire gang youth. Neighborhood residents, former gang members, and the youth's family are also important sources of information about hiring opportunities, and for referring and sustaining youth on jobs. Steady girlfriends or wives play an especially important part in urging male gang youth to get and keep a job, leave the gang and stay away from gang activity.

Steps in the Approach

The steps in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model (Chart 1.2) are as follows:²

- The community leadership – including those in established agencies and grassroots groups – the mayor's office, political and business leaders and the media must acknowledge that a youth-gang problem exists.
- The Steering Committee – including criminal-justice and youth agencies, schools, and

² Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000.

other major public, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations – together with grassroots groups must: 1) conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem in the identified target community where gang crime (particularly violence and often drug selling) is most prevalent; 2) develop and use appropriate definitions or descriptions of a delinquent/criminal gang, a gang member, or a youth who is at high risk of gang membership; 3) select which particular gangs are to be targeted; and 4) identify the organizations available to address the gang problem in its various interrelated aspects.

An assessment team, including university researchers, should assist in this process. The researchers must be competent, and given responsibility for objectively assessing program development and evaluating individual-youth and area outcomes.

- Once the Steering Committee is established, a process is undertaken, with the assistance and involvement of the lead agency and community leaders at influential and grassroots levels, in which a set of goals and objectives is determined. The goals and objectives must address the identified gang problem and its causal factors (based on the results of the assessment) and be refined over time as a better understanding of the gang problem, and what organizations are doing about it, emerges. Because of the lack of effective communication, congruence of operations, or meaningful interaction of key organizations and community agencies and groups, special meetings will be necessary, with resulting documentation describing organizational roles, responsibilities, and issues.
- The key goal of the program must be the reduction of youth-gang crime, through effective social-development and control of gang youth and those youth at high risk for gang involvement. This is to be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community

agencies and grassroots groups to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational change and development targeted to the particular gang problem.

- Community leaders, the Steering Committee members, and the lead agency administrators often change, but must interact with each other, over time, to produce and sustain relevant and increasingly-effective programming, i.e., strategies, services, tactics and procedures consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, particularly its five “core strategies” (see below).
- The community leaders and Steering Committee, as indicated above, must develop an effective, ongoing process to assess the operation, outcome and impact of the program, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If program results are positive – i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced – then sufficient resources must continue to be provided to sustain program activity and development, and especially to institutionalize its structure and assure long-term funding.
- The processes of program development, intervention and attempting to cope with the youth-gang problem not only contribute to a determination of whether the Model has been appropriately applied, but to an ongoing assessment and understanding of the basic structural nature and changing scope of the gang problem.

Strategies

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model is multi-faceted, involving multi-layered

interacting strategies addressed to individual gang youth, their family members and gang peers, and to key agencies in the local and larger community. It is based on theory, research, and practice which proposes that the gang problem is systemic, and a response to rapid social change, lack of social-development opportunities, poverty, institutional racism, existing criminal organizations and opportunities, and, more immediately and directly, to the fragmentation and inadequacy of approaches to the problem across multiple organizations. The five core Model strategies and their associated cultural elements are as follows:

Community Mobilization

- Key established organizations – police, probation, social agencies, schools, manpower agencies, business groups, community organizations (including local community grassroots groups), as well as churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents and even former gang members – must be involved in and advise on problem-definition, analyses, policies, planning and the program measures to be undertaken. These efforts should be developed and coordinated by the Steering Committee and the lead agency. This is not an easy process to consummate successfully, and requires judgement, selectivity, timing, and the participation of various critical organizations and community groups that are or should be concerned with the gang problem, within the framework and purposes of the Model.
- A Steering Committee made up of representatives of the key established agencies and community organizations is closely involved in the development of program policies and practices, across agencies and community groups, in support of the operation of the multi-

disciplinary street team. Key established agencies will generally have to modify their policies and practices in order to participate in and support the work of the street team and achieve the objectives of the Model. The lead agency takes special responsibility for aiding agency administrators and community-group leaders to cross organizational boundaries, and getting the Steering Committee to take collective ownership of the Model initiative.

- The lead agency along with the Steering Committee initiates, develops, and maintains communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. A special challenge is modifying established law-enforcement, school, and governmental policy to accommodate the participation of faith-based and grassroots groups, as well as former youth-gang members, in steering-committee, program-development and operation processes. Awareness of population change, and sensitivity to the neighborhood and its culture, its varied organizational problems and interests, the needs of gang youth, and the concerns and complaints of local residents, are essential issues for consideration in the operation of the Steering Committee, the street team, and the lead agency. The multi-disciplinary street team contributes directly to Steering-Committee activities, and assists in a broad array of community and neighborhood gang-program-focused development efforts, which may evolve from both Steering-Committee considerations and direct field operations.

It is essential that the lead agency genuinely “buy into” the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, and not use the Steering Committee as a “cover” to obtain additional resources to pursue its own particularistic organizational objectives.

Social Intervention

- The street team, especially the youth outreach-worker staff, must collaborate with social service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, and faith-based and other organizations in directly providing gang and highly at-risk youth with appropriate combinations of prevention, intervention, and social-control services, tailored to individual youth and community needs. Gangs and their members are different from each other, and change over time; on-going differential diagnoses and treatment/intervention-planning must occur. Not necessarily all gang-involved youth should be provided with the same pattern or dosages of social controls and services, or even with highly-coordinated services or contacts. Issues of labeling youth as “gang involved” or “highly at risk for gang involvement” should be carefully addressed. The lead-agency director and/or coordinator has special responsibility for guiding this process.
- Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens (including gang youth) from gang crime, enforcing the law, serving the interests and needs of targeted youth and their families, and on assuring the linking of youth to social services, and the case-coordination of these services.
- Group activities are carefully targeted to appropriate youth, and developed so as not to cohere delinquent or gang youth to each other. Primary attention is on individualized youth interests, problems, and the needs of gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better transition from gang behavior and attachment to mainstream institutions of school, training and employment, and to association with non-gang peers.

- Sensitivity to the influence of gang structures and norms, and street-team skill in the use of group, organization (especially law enforcement), community and situational structures and processes, are important, particularly at times of crisis when violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be prevented and controlled.
- The outreach youth worker has a specific and difficult role to play in street-team operations, one not readily understood or accepted by established agencies. He must have the capacity to establish effective relationships with gang youth in the open community as well as in the agency setting. He must be a mediator between the world of gang-involved youth and the legitimate society. He must be able to communicate with, relate to, and gain the trust and respect of other team members, particularly police and probation/parole officers. An appropriate mix of former gang members (influentials) and college-trained youth, preferably from the gang-problem neighborhood and under careful supervision, often provides the best combination of outreach youth workers in the interdisciplinary street team.
- A mutually-understood and accepting relationship among members of the street team, and between the street team, the individual youth and the gang, must be established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the purpose of the program, the nature and scope of the street team's operation, and the interdependent roles of the street-team members. This may take months to develop effectively.
- Social-intervention and social-control/suppression workers should not be restricted to a "9 to 5" normal, agency-based workday routine. Outreach work (including social intervention) focuses on contacts with youth in the neighborhood – at home and in

hangouts during evenings, on weekends, and in crisis times – and assisting youth to assume legitimate obligations to his family, spouse, neighborhood, the justice system, and the larger society.

- The staffing of the social-intervention component is not a simple matter. Outreach youth workers must be qualified through an appropriate background of experience, a high order of understanding of the local gang culture and the community, personal maturity, and an ability to establish appropriate relationships, not only with gang youth on their turf, but with criminal-justice, school, and social-agency personnel. Close field supervision and continual in-service training are essential to the development of an effective outreach component.

Provision of Social Opportunities

- Access to opportunities, especially for further adequate education, training, and/or jobs, must be provided to gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access has to be structured with appropriate guidance from team members, and supported through the collective policy and administrative efforts of the Steering Committee, the lead agency, and local community agencies, and through the availability of appropriate educational and employment resources.
- The members of the Steering Committee should be in a position to provide special and/or additional and sustained access to opportunity systems in their own agencies and across organizations, in order to carefully mainstream program youth into legitimate society. Appropriate arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth from

mainstream society in the course of providing these opportunities.

- The street team (especially the outreach youth workers and case managers) serves to mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that targeted youth have access to, and are prepared to make use of, educational and training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel must be willing and prepared to assist these vulnerable youth, who have special needs and social limitations. Social-control and social-intervention tactics have to be carefully integrated in this process.
- The street team collaborates with local residents and families (as well as with grassroots groups, businesses, schools, and social-agency personnel) in the provision of, and access to, opportunities for gang-involved and highly at-risk youth.
- The opportunity-needs of siblings, parents and peers of program youth are also addressed, to the extent possible; particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may assist in facilitating the transition of program youth to a non-delinquent and non-gang life style.
- Of special importance is the encouragement of the contributions of businesses, industry, educational institutions, government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youth, in part through not excluding those youth who may already have criminal records. In this process, appropriate interrelated social-control and social-support measures may also be necessary in order for youth to make the best use of opportunities provided.

Suppression/Social Control

- The development (by street teams and other agency staff) of formal and informal procedures of social control, in order to hold youth accountable for their behavior, is integral to a comprehensive approach to helping gang youth. Highly-targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth who are about to engage in (or who have actually engaged in) criminal acts are appropriate, but labeling as gang members those youth who are not gang members, and simply targeting or “profiling” minority youth for a whole range of minor and questionable offenses, is highly inappropriate. Social control must be based on a combination of factors: understanding of the gang youth’s behavior and his context; respect for youth; mutually-positive communications; youth accountability; and the scope of agency responsibility, and law-enforcement discretion in use of appropriate tactics. Suppression must focus on youth who are involved (or strongly suspected to be involved) in serious delinquent behavior.
- Social controls are broadly conceived, and range from arrests and warnings to behavior-modeling and advice, all within a context of crisis-intervention and attention to youth interests and needs by members of the street team. Carefully structured arrangements may be required in which recreation, athletic events, holiday and family celebrations, cultural, ethnic, and religious events, group meetings, or conflict-mediation sessions are provided, involving police, probation, youth workers and the gang youth themselves in sharing mutual or communal experiences, obligations and benefits. At the same time, information-sharing among all team members about serious criminal acts by gang members is required so that offenders are accurately identified, lawfully arrested and

prosecuted.

- Suppression involves the street team's organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods and report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, and getting gang youth not to hang on the streets, not to incur neighborhood disapproval, and to help clean up litter and remove graffiti.
- Social control also requires the defense of gang youth from false accusations and prosecution, from illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, and defending or vouching for youth in court when they are falsely accused or brought in for violations of local laws (which themselves may prove to be illegal and/or unconstitutional). The street team, lead-agency administrators, Steering-Committee members and community leaders must not only contribute directly and indirectly to the suppression of unlawful (especially serious) criminal behavior, but to the modification of criminal-justice-system policies and practices that unjustly target and criminalize and/or punish gang youth.
- Valid definitions of the nature and scope of gang crime, especially gang incidents, must be developed, and appropriate data collected, managed, and used. Accurate and meaningful gang information should be routinely collected and shared among members of the street team and the Steering Committee – with due regard to issues of confidentiality – as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the gang problem and the development of effective policies and programs.
- Special commitment from police administrators to accept and implement the Model, and

special training sessions for gang specialists or team police to implement the Model correctly, are required to assure that police and criminal-justice personnel participate constructively in the Comprehensive Gang Program. The purpose of the Program is not simply to assist police or probation to acquire intelligence in order to make better arrests, but also to train the police to more effectively protect and serve the community, which includes appropriately referring troublemakers and troubled gang youth to social and mental-health services.

- For suppression to be effective, there must be coordination among criminal justice personnel, especially probation/parole and law enforcement officers. Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities-provision, and relevant organizational change, should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent community-building process focused on reducing gang crime. The lead agency, the members of the street team and the Steering Committee all share responsibility for coordinated suppression or social-control functions critical for building a lawful and “good” community, one of benefit to the gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger communities. Not all gang members are likely to be, or to become, delinquents and/or serious offenders. Most gang youth in gang-crime communities will normally grow out of their delinquent and/or criminal gang involvement.

Organizational Change and Development

- The idea of organizational change and development underlies the strategies of the Comprehensive Gang Program. The youth-gang problem is a function of misdirected,

often over-specialized behaviors of organizations, as well as of the illegitimate and illegal behaviors of youth who are defined as gang-involved. Local institutions must change, and local agency and community-group procedures must be developed both to reduce gang crime and to interactively meet the social (including control) needs of gang youth. Enhanced law enforcement alone, or enhanced preventive and treatment services alone, may be ineffective and may even exacerbate the gang problem.

- Positive change in individual youth-gang-member behavior may occur naturally in due course, but can be hastened and facilitated through interrelated, interdisciplinary and collaborative activities of team workers, within a context of agency and community-group support for the Model. The activities of street-team personnel – in community groups and across agencies – may have to be modified to achieve a more generalist mission, e.g., police taking some responsibility (and probation officers even greater responsibility) for social intervention, outreach workers assisting with the identification and suppression of serious crime and violence, and community organizers encouraging distrusting, fearful neighborhood residents to communicate with the police about gang-crime incidents and collaborate with law enforcement on ways to address the problem.
- Organization policies, practices, and worker responsibilities have to become more community-oriented, even communal, and take into consideration the particular interests, needs, and cultural backgrounds of the local residents, including those of the targeted gang youth themselves. Panicked and punitive responses to the gang problem by established members of the community, together with arrogant, bureaucratic, non-community-oriented agency approaches to gang youth, are counter-productive.

- Special training for administrative, supervisory and direct-service workers from the different organizations may be required so that all levels of staff across agencies understand what Project street-team staff are doing (and should be doing) with gang-involved youth and other components of the community.
- Staff development and training of the Project street team has to be collaborative, and developed on a separate, subunit, disciplinary basis. Appropriate measures must evolve for data-sharing, interactive social intervention, suppression-planning and other implementation activities. Not all types of data about youth gang-member activities have to be shared, nor all types of team-member activity planned together; only those that significantly contribute to and impact the achievement of program objectives and goals.
- Data systems and case-management are established so that contacts and services provided by all members of the street team can be documented and monitored for effective targeting and ongoing assessment of youth, program planning, coordination of effort, and for measuring program-service quality and effects. These data then become the basis for evaluating outcomes at individual, gang, program, agency, interagency, and community levels.

Program Implementation Principles

A special set of principles guides the practice of the various organizations, community groups, and agency staffs (including the street team) in the implementation of the Model strategies. These implementation principles constitute the way to develop, successfully carry out, and ultimately sustain the Program Model.

Targeting

It is critically important that the Steering Committee and lead agency select the right neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community who account for the gang problem, and that they identify the organizations that address (or should be addressing) the problem. This includes identifying the most significant aspects of the gang problem, based on careful ongoing assessments of gang situations, the specific youth involved, and the locations and contexts of gang activities. There are many cultural and organizational myths which create obstacles to appropriate assessment of the gang problem. Police may claim that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city, when in fact gang incidents, gang hangouts, and where gang youth live tend to be concentrated only in certain parts of a community. Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang-involved youth, when they are not. Schools may be committed to indiscriminate, rigid “zero tolerance” and suspension policies for minority youth who may (or may not) be gang members.

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street-based as well as an agency-based perspective is necessary to determine which gangs and gang members are most involved in serious crime (particularly violence and/or drug selling), where and when the gang offenses are being committed, and what specific community situations and organizational policies and practices are critical to understanding and addressing the specifics of the problem. It is important not only to regard the gang problem as systemic, but to focus on the most serious aspects of the problem first, particularly in the chronic gang-problem community. Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influentials, are the critical focus of initial attention, as much to develop access to other gang members and (ultimately) focus on gang activity by at-risk youth, as to

control and prevent serious gang crime.

Unfocused violence-prevention, general public-health approaches, non-targeted suppression, and reactive citizen demonstrations (such as neighborhood marches or protest meetings) may be useful for particular agency- or community-cathartic purposes, but may be of little value for problem-solving and positive community approaches in regard to the gang problem. Meetings by interagency coalitions that are strictly ceremonial may simply become devices to avoid dealing with the gang problem. Responses based strictly on narrow political or organizational interests, restrictive agency missions, professional turf considerations, ignorance of the details of the problem, and impulsive collective action are to be avoided.

Balance of Strategies

Once the specific problem(s) – including target area(s), target gang-youth, and problematic institutional or agency policies and practices – are identified, a set of balanced and interrelated strategies must be considered and operationalized. Dominance of over-specialized strategies in regard to program development may be inappropriate. A single type of program service and/or set of control activities will not be suitable in all circumstances, or for all youth. There are varying community gang-problem situations. Gang youth have varying commitments to the gang lifestyle and varying types and degrees of personal problems relating to their gang behavior to contend with during the course of their gang careers. Targeting hardcore gang youth only for suppression, younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention services, and “creaming” selected youth for jobs are not consistent with the Model. A differential mix (and dosage) of multiple strategies is required for specific categories of program youth at different stages of their

gang careers.

An imbalanced strategy may result in a dominant suppression approach, which contributes to excessive arrest and imprisonment of youth who could have been readily served in the community with a combination of treatment, opportunities-provision and graduated sanctions. An imbalanced strategy may serve to label at-risk (especially minority) youth as gang members, and subject them to more arrests for minor offenses (or even non-offenses). An approach which focuses only on recreation and group activities may increase gang cohesion and solidify delinquent norms, and may not meet the individual-youth-treatment or longer-term socialization and community-integration needs of alienated gang youth.

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A basic goal of the Model – to improve community capacity to address youth-gang crime – cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components are involved in the program’s development. The Model is not served if only established social/youth agencies or law enforcement organizations participate (or only half-heartedly participate). On the other hand, if the program is primarily based on grassroots participation, adequate resources may not be available to implement, sustain, or institutionalize the Model. Community-building and social integration relevant to the gang problem have to take place across different community sectors.

Intensity (Dosage) of Services/Contacts

Dosage refers to the frequency and duration of particular worker contacts, services and strategies carried out for different categories of youth. An optimum dosage may be necessary for

a positive outcome. A different balance of strategies, types of workers, coordination of worker contacts, and the nature of specific services and controls may be more important than the sheer amount or intensity of services or contacts provided to specific categories of youth. Coordination among team workers in relation to particular types of youth may be more important than the specific range or intensity of services or strategies provided separately by each of the types of workers. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be beneficial for him to disassociate from the program. The particular purpose and appropriate intensity of relationships among particular workers and particular types of youth are important in predicting outcome for different categories of youth in the program.

Continuity of Services/Contacts

On the other hand, the same worker or same combination of workers providing services and contacts for a substantial period of time may be more important in determining positive outcome for hardcore gang youth than different workers contacting him for only short periods of time. Continuity of personalized, positive contact is important, particularly for gang-delinquent youth who have special needs for social support and control, and for building trusting relationships with adults. Gang youth are often distrustful of adults and exploitive of relationships with them. They may view workers as undependable, rejecting, hostile, or easily manipulated. It takes a good deal of time for the worker(s) to develop useful working (controlling and helping) relationships with certain gang youth. Service-interruption and lack of continuity of contact may result in further alienation of the youth, and interfere with the program's plan for his or her rehabilitation. A return to, or intensification of, the youth's gang

behaviors may result from the absence of dependable relationships with a worker during periods of crisis; an accessible and responsive worker whom the youth trusts and needs may be critically important at such junctures.

Commitment

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model challenges existing agency policies and practices and overly-specialized professional norms. It requires the development of new knowledge and skills, and at the same time creates extra work and distress for personnel involved with the program. Commitment by community leaders and program operators to the premise of the program, and early evidence of success of the approach, are essential. Appropriate Steering-Committee, lead-agency-management, and interdisciplinary-team efforts, and extra supervisory arrangements have to be developed to sustain program efforts. Program lead-agency administrators and supervisors and Steering-Committee members may not be fully aware of the difficulties and challenges faced by direct-service, street-team workers, the special needs of street-team staff for support (and sometimes controls) in their outreach activities, or (particularly) of the problems and frustrations of outreach workers on the streets. Political, legislative, and community support for funding and sustaining a program that cuts across agency functions may not be easy to achieve. Steering-Committee members and program administrators must persevere in their program-support efforts, and they must find ways to periodically renew their commitment to the Comprehensive Gang Program approach.

Work with gang youth and gang problems is complex, difficult and frustrating. Gang youth are generally undependable, elusive in their behaviors, and hostile in their relationships

with adults and peers. They require a high level of understanding, sensitivity, firmness and concentrated attention by workers. Traditional agency, school, and other institutional leaders may not be sufficiently interested in, prepared for, or possess adequate resources to work with troublesome gang youth. Community leaders, lead-agency managers, and Steering-Committee members together must be convinced that a comprehensive gang-program approach is the most efficient and effective way to address the gang problem.

Chart 1.1
 Comprehensive Gang Program Model
 Goal 1: Improve Community Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime
 Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime

**Community Context
 Social Disorganization Factors:**

- Demographic
- Socio-economic
- Family Characteristics
- Ecological
- Cultural





Chart 1.2
 Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model
 Steps in the Application of the Approach



Adapted from Candice Kane Chart, GRETA Projects, The University of Chicago

Chapter 2

Evaluation Issues and Problems

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or gang violence) prevention, intervention, or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry, 1995; Decker, 2003; Howell, 2000; Klein, 1995; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen, 2001; Reed and Decker, 2002; Sivilli, Yin and Nugent, 1995; Spergel, 1995). Gang programs in earlier decades emphasized single-strategy approaches to gang prevention, i.e., social intervention, crisis intervention, community organization, street work, interagency coordination, and community organization. Evaluations of these programs suggest negative, indeterminate, or, in a very few cases, limited positive results (Howell, Egley and Gleason, 2000). Community-based gang programs have failed for a range of reasons: poor conceptualization, vague or conflicting objectives, weak implementation, organizational-goal displacement (particularly by police and youth agencies), interagency conflict, politicization, lack of sustained effort, insufficient resources, etc.

The evidence that a particular approach does or does not work, however, may be due not only to failure of program design or implementation, but also to the failures of public policy and the limitations of evaluation research methodologies (Curry, 1995). Gang-program approaches assessed as successful by community leaders, politicians, and policy makers may not necessarily be sustained, and those assessed as failures (sometimes based on inadequate “research” evaluations), which are nevertheless consistent with community myth and traditional agency missions, may continue to flourish. Thus far, evaluation research, particularly outcome research,

2.1

has generally had little or no impact on policy or gang-program development. It has not contributed to the creation of alternate or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be due in large measure to the complexity of community-based gang programs, and to the difficulties of designing and implementing complex evaluations of such programs.

Below, we briefly discuss those elements of gang research methodology which we believe are essential for the effective evaluation of gang-programs implemented within a comprehensive community or interagency framework. We focus on some of the issues or obstacles relevant to gang-program evaluations. Ideally, program-evaluation models require experimental and quasi-experimental designs and rigorous procedures which cannot easily be applied in the real world of gang-program development, policy changes and difficult-to-observe program operations. Evaluation research is expected to be objective and, preferably, independent of program operations. However, the complex, difficult and often politicized nature of community-based gang programming requires not only an objective but an interdependent and sustained relationship between evaluation and program personnel, from program-start (or even conception) to finish. This characterizes – to some extent – the best of classic community-based gang program research (Gold and Mattick, 1974; Klein, 1968, 1971; Miller, 1962), limited as they are by the present-day methodological and statistical standards.

There are issues, not adequately addressed or resolved in past or current evaluations of comprehensive and/or community-based gang programs, which we have had to contend with in our present evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program.

2.2

Cooperation with Program Operators and Data Managers

Project directors and program operators are prone to distrust gang researchers, who may not be sufficiently knowledgeable of their various organizational interests and program operations. Gang-project or program directors are under conflicting pressures to accommodate program development to the interests and needs of funders, community residents, steering committees or advisory boards, partner agencies (including criminal-justice and social-service agencies), as well as the media, government officials, politicians, and the program youth themselves. This is particularly so in the case of a program which is not expected to last more than four or five years. The evaluator also enters the chaotic, community gang-problem arena without sufficient understanding of complex agency/community-group relationships and conflicts, and the diverse interests of the various influential actors associated with the program. These actors usually control various kinds of program-process or outcome data essential to the evaluator for achieving research-evaluation objectives.

Program operators generally regard evaluators as a necessary evil, since they may affect the flow of funding for the program, and are costly in terms of their demands for time and effort spent on evaluation activities, which they believe should be directed instead to ongoing program or agency operations. Evaluations not only interfere with program operations, but burden agency information systems. Program administrators can be skilled at avoiding, or partially complying with, the evaluator's requests for data; and even when pressured or compelled to comply, they may provide incomplete or inadequate data for evaluation purposes. The gang program administrator's interest and desire to comply with the evaluation-research design and need for data are tempered by his agency's need to survive in a limited-resource environment. Gang-

program operators tend to be over-stressed by the complexity, frustration and unpredictability of community-based gang-program operations. They may have a pervasive sense of impending program failure. They tend not to know much about gangs or gang youth, or how or whether they can conduct a community-wide or street-based program that will provide clearly positive results.

Therefore, the evaluator must expend considerable effort in learning to understand local-community and program-contextual factors, and establishing a basis for positive relationships with program operators and others who control data sources. The commitments and procedures for access to evaluation data often have to be negotiated and renegotiated. The gang-program evaluators have to engage key program-related personnel as soon as possible, and regard them not only as providers of data but in fact as partners in the development of a successful evaluation, if valid data are to be obtained and findings are to be both objective and meaningful to the key community constituents, funders, program operators, and the research community.

Research Design

Ideally, good program evaluation should be designed to assess program process, individual outcome, and the program's impact on the gang and the community, based on an explicit (hopefully well-developed) program model which is theoretically relevant and operationally practicable. However, the program evaluator's primary purpose is not to test theory, but to test a program model which usually contains elements of several theories. Gang programs in the real world cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or policy interests. This is a particularly difficult challenge for social scientists, including criminologists, who are often

more interested in testing theoretical propositions than in describing the specific nature, and determining the effects, of a program model, especially a comprehensive program model.

While funders are interested in testing general policy, which is not usually clearly formulated and embodied in the projects they support, program managers are mainly concerned with matters of program development and its contribution to their agency's value – economic, political and organizational. A consensus must be reached in the funder+program operator+evaluator relationship as to the mutually-acceptable goals and specific objectives of the program to be tested. This process may drag on a long time, with consensus and satisfaction among those involved never fully achieved.

The purposes, program components, objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent behavior, especially violence, need to be specified and agreed to by the program operator, key influentials and the evaluator: which key-agency services and worker contacts are to be provided, for which types of youth, for what purposes and how (i.e., which project activities are expected to produce what intended results). Research variables, i.e., independent, mediating, outcome, and controlling factors (e.g., youth demographics, gang-membership status and delinquency characteristics), must be articulated and related to the program model, as well as conditioned by the reality of program structure and operation. Ultimately, the main job of the evaluator is to know what the program components are, what they are intended to do, and what they in fact do. This process occurs through ongoing dialogue and mutual accommodation between the project operator and evaluator. The evaluator+program-operator relationship determines what and how evaluation-design procedures for data collection and analysis are implemented and related to the program model. Obviously, some flexibility has to be built into

the implementation of both the program and evaluation models. The researcher and program operator have to negotiate continually to accommodate the needs of both program and evaluation implementation.

At the present time, community-based gang program evaluation research usually is not experimental, with random selection of subjects, and random assignment of treatment, in which all elements are (ideally) rigidly controlled. At best, community-based gang research is quasi-experimental, with room for limited change in research design and modification of program practices.

Technical Assistance

An intermediary may be required to assure that informed and focused program development is initiated and sustained, which meets the needs of the program operator as well as serves the interests of the funder and the evaluator. Ideally, the technical-assistance team is established to warrantee or monitor the investment of the sponsor or funder, and serve as a guide to program development, i.e., provide knowledge and expertise to the program operator. While technical assistance is provided mainly to assist the program operator, the evaluator is also required to insure that he, the program operator, the technical-assistance team, and the funding agency are on board together as to the nature of the program model and how it is to be implemented.

The program and evaluation models have to be effectively articulated and sustained. Additions, gaps, failures, and changes in program and evaluation operations have to be identified, accepted as early as possible, and accounted for. These include those of the technical assistance

team, the evaluator, and the funder as well as the program operator and corrected to the extent possible with limited politicization. In any case, the evaluator has a special responsibility (with the funder as monitor) for controlling the integrity of the program model for research purposes. This complexity of relationships, which can support or handicap mutual understanding and effective implementation of the program model, is to a considerable extent avoided when the program operator and the evaluator are the same person, when the evaluator and the technical-assistance person are partners with the program operator in the development of the program model, and/or when the funder or sponsor of the program is knowledgeable and strongly identified with the evaluator's conception of the program model and its implementation.

Start-Up Problems

Program-Youth Selection. An initial problem in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model arises when youth who are selected for the program are not representative of the expected program-youth universe, i.e., they are not gang members, or youth clearly at high risk for gang involvement. The problem may be compounded because the program operator and the evaluator often do not know what the characteristics of gang youth in the community truly are until a sufficient number of youth have actually entered the program. Procedures for who is eligible for and admitted to the program may not be adequately developed, accepted, or clearly communicated to program staff and/or referring agencies. Certain gang or highly-at-risk youth may not be available or easily recruited, or even allowed into the program. Conflicting views may arise early as to who is or should be eligible for the program.

Sources of reliable information about target-youth characteristics (e.g., gang membership)

may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, schools, or in-house-oriented youth-agency workers may not know the identity and location of gangs, the specific character of their activities, and which youth identified or associated with the gang are at what level of risk. Gang-related information about youth referred to the program ideally should be obtained from multiple sources: official police records, established youth agencies, neighbors, local community groups, sometimes family members, peer groups, and former and (especially) present gang members themselves. Constraints of law, police practice, community attitudes, and level of program-interviewer/researcher skill may not make this a simple task.

The evaluator must know as soon as possible which youth are selected in terms of age, race/ethnicity, gender, justice-system background, and gang-membership status, as well as why they are referred to the program, and by whom. We know from previous research that these may be critical factors in determining both eligibility for the program and expected outcomes: females are less likely than males to be serious or chronic delinquents, or gang members; younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 years of age, are more likely to show increasing levels of gang delinquency than older gang youth; gang members tend to be more seriously and chronically delinquent than associate gang members; youth identified as gang members tend primarily to be members of minority groups, and to have prior arrests.

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close examination of who the program youth are, and why they got into the program. He may be less interested in the types of youth who should be in the program (according to the program model) than in the specific characteristics of youth or gangs which may be useful in his own ongoing research or theory-development. He may focus too much on hardcore or at-risk youth, males

rather than females, or the psychological or structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the selection of youth consistent with the program model. The acquisition of simple, basic data on youth who enter the program – age, gender, race/ethnicity, and (as soon and reliably as possible) gang-membership status and offense or arrest history – is essential for program-development and evaluation purposes. These data become the basis for comparison-youth sample selection, and the use of control variables in multivariate analyses of program outcome.

Gang-Membership Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a very close relationship between gang membership and the youth's delinquent behavior, especially during the youth's active or self-declared gang-membership phase. Obviously, the evaluator's task is to determine when and to what extent the youth is a gang member as well as a delinquent (and what types of delinquency he or she commits) in relation to criteria for selection into the program. Each of these two complex factors must be considered as variables, yet they may not be known to program staff, and not necessarily clearly revealed by the gang youth themselves. A key proposition not recognized or accepted by many policy and program operators, or even by researchers, is that not all gang youth are or will become delinquent, and not all delinquents are or will become gang members. Most community-based gang programs probably deal with a varied sample of gang and non-gang, delinquent and non-delinquent youth.

A variety of sources of data on gang and delinquent behavior in different contexts over time are necessary. Multiple sources of data from field observations, youth self-reports, police records, and program-worker reports may be required to determine eligibility of youth for the program. Consistency of findings about the nature and level of gang identification and delinquency provides reliability and sometimes validity as to how the youth is to be classified.

Delinquency and gang-involvement scales may have to be developed. Different types of delinquency and different patterns of peer association must be identified and addressed, prior to and over the course of the youth's involvement in the program. Gang youth may change their patterns of offending (from turf or interpersonal violence to relatively more criminal-gain behavior, including drug selling), or may build legitimate careers, with or without program intervention.

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995; Fagan, 1989; Spergel and Wa, 2003). The nature and purpose of the program and some assessment of the community's actual gang problem should determine the gang and/or pre-gang youth universe from which to select the program sample. Characteristics of the universe of gangs and youth at-risk, and their location in a particular community, may be based on police, other criminal-justice, school, youth-agency, and media information, and occasionally on community surveys. Youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of gang youth, or youth highly at risk for gang involvement known to the police or other agencies.

In earlier decades, youth in community gang programs were selected based on field or street observations of, and work with, particular gangs and their membership. Based on these observations, youth in specific gangs were the primary targets of service, research and evaluation. More recently, program youth appear to be derived from youth who are on agency, probation, school, and correctional caseloads. This may reflect the increased prevalence and dispersion of the youth-gang problem, but may also indicate a lack of familiarity with the gang problem in its community context by established agency personnel and researchers.

Another essential task of the evaluator in quasi-experimental research is to select a

comparison-group sample, i.e., non-served youth with characteristics similar or equivalent to program youth. However, as suggested earlier, both the program operator and evaluator may not clearly know *a priori*, up front, or even during the program period what the gang or delinquency characteristics of program youth are. A time lag usually exists between selecting program and comparison youth. Finding, selecting and interviewing appropriate comparison youth may not be easy. Police, probation, and youth agencies may have insufficient information about the characteristics of gang youth selected for the program, and even less information about appropriate comparison gang youth – where they are located and how they are to be contacted. Comparison gang-youth often may be less delinquent or problematic than program youth. When a community-wide consortium establishes a gang program, it usually tries to focus on the most eligible, problematic gangs (and sometimes gang members) in the most gang-problematic neighborhoods, often as identified by a justice-system agency. However, gang youth arrested for very serious crimes and/or violence tend not to be eligible for community-based gang programs; they are usually confined.

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining or developing similar, let alone equivalent, samples in the open community (other than random selection, which may be possible under certain conditions not discussed here), is to use several types of comparison groups, if funding permits. Co-arrestee gang members from the same gangs are often similar; youth from other (or the same-named) gangs in an equivalent gang area in the same city may be sufficiently comparable. Individual program youth may be used as their own controls, matched for an earlier and equivalent age period when they were not served (i.e., using a growth-curve model for analysis purposes). This option assumes that community contexts, gang patterns, and police

practices have been comparable during the pre-program and program periods, which may not be the case. Researchers may select a comparison group from a comparable city, but this may create special problems for analysis, unless community context factors are controlled.

Appropriate measurement and multivariate analytic techniques can, within limits, compensate for not randomly selecting program and comparison youth.

Sources of Data and Data-Collection Instruments

Multiple sources of data and multiple units or levels of analysis are essential in community gang-program research. Gang- and community-level gang incident or arrest data, as well as ethnographic observations of field situations, are important for interpreting and explaining both individual-level and field findings. Researcher field-observation and police-arrest or individual-youth-interview data alone may not be a sufficient basis for program evaluation. Interviews, field observations and police and agency-worker program records of individual youth, together, are required to measure program-effect patterns. However, the traditional use of field observations or area-level police data as a primary basis for determining program effects alone – unrelated to what the worker(s) specifically do with particular youth – is not adequate for policy or program evaluation research (Miller, 1957; Klein, 1971; Short and Strodbeck, 1965; Decker, 2003).

Program Process Data. Special worker-service or program-tracking devices have to be created to describe the key program activities or worker contacts provided to, and or/received by, program youth. Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social-agency) may be

insufficient for purposes of testing the program model. Evaluation of comprehensive gang programs must develop commonly-understood terms for use across different agencies, community groups and staffs, which also take unique organizational missions and worker roles into consideration. The problem of collecting data from multiple sources across multiple agencies is further compounded when information has to be integrated for analysis purposes.

Common definitions of program measures must be established, since services or contacts may have different meanings and purposes for different agencies and worker disciplines. The nature of collaboration and coordination among workers and agencies in the provision of services and controls has to be viewed as an important program variable. The changing pattern in the coordination of different worker contacts may be an important measure of program development with effects on program outcome. The variety of measures developed to obtain data on meaningful program effects also has to include the types and dosages of services provided by the different workers.

Measurement

The need to integrate data sets, and to control for differences in background between program and comparison youth and the differences in program-exposure period, all create formidable measurement problems in community-wide, gang-program research. Meaningful connections across variables have to be established. The use of factor-analytic procedures may not be sufficient. Key program-model concepts and propositions are critically important as a basis for selecting and combining variables or interaction terms and interpreting findings. Appropriate scales may be required to reduce ratio or interval data to ordinal or nominal-level

data, especially when program and comparison-youth characteristics are highly disparate and sample size is small.

Special measures or indices have to be created to test program-model effects. For example, a gang-involvement scale may have to be conceptualized and specific items introduced to measure change over time, not only in terms of the youth's original gang- or non-gang-membership status, but in terms of an associated or causal cluster of items such as rank in the gang, level of gang participation, time spent with gang friends, gang victimization, gang-membership status of parents or siblings, etc.

Analysis

Differences in findings of the key characteristics of program and comparison youth have to be related to the specific effects of the program. Whether the program or parts of the program are successful or unsuccessful in predicting or accounting for differences between program youth and the non-served comparison youth may best be determined through the use of multivariate analytic procedures, particularly the use of General Linear Modeling and Logistical Regression. Such analyses may still be unconvincing unless other sources of data, using both the same and different units of analysis (such as gang, program-structure, and community-level arrest changes), are available to throw light on the reasons for, or consequences of, the individual-level change findings. In other words, the analysis of program effects based on individual-level findings may not be sufficient to determine what the program accomplished or failed to accomplish unless there is some evidence of similar effects at the gang-youth or community-area levels. A key proposition to be tested is that changes at the individual program-youth level have consequences

at the aggregate or program-community level.

The congruence of findings in the relationships of the same or similar variables using different sources of data (e.g., individual youth self-reports, police arrest data, field observations, agency progress reports) and different units of analysis (e.g., group, community-level), and their possibly-reciprocal relationships, are the bases for making judgements about the value of the program. Furthermore, researcher and program-operator qualitative and quantitative observations, as well as theory and prior research findings, provide reference points against which to measure not only the reliability and validity of the findings, but their interpretation. The degrees of rigor of the different program-related evaluation analyses have to be duly acknowledged.

The Evaluation Model

The San Antonio Project (GRAASP) Evaluation examined the nature of Project implementation and the services and contacts provided to individual youth. It examined individual-youth outcome in relation to the nature and scope of services and contacts provided by different workers, and to some extent the impact of the program on gang and non-gang crime at the community level. Sufficient qualitative and quantitative data from different sources were examined at different levels of analysis to determine the value of the Gang Program Model as developed and tested in San Antonio.

The Evaluation Model was based on the relationship of factors which interact with or influence each other, beginning with context (including community social-disorganization factors) and ending with changes-in-crime factors at the individual-youth, gang, and community

levels. A variety of intermediate factors (such as organizational relationships, program structure, services and worker contacts provided, changes in youth life-course/life-space behaviors and law-enforcement policies and practices) were also identified, and the direction and strength of their influence analyzed (Chart 2.1).

I. Community Social-Disorganization Factors

Certain ecological, economic, social, and cultural conditions or changes were expected to create the community circumstances favorable to the development of the gang problem, which included groups of youth engaged in violence, drug-selling and other criminal activities. The generating circumstances included: the rapid movement, expansion, and/or shift of population (particularly of low-income minority groups) into the program area, and the relative decline of a stable, often middle-class, non-minority population; the concentration of a large adolescent, male, minority population weakly supported by and integrated into basic socialization, educational and employment systems in the community; and the development of criminal structures providing alternate opportunity systems.

II. Organizational and Interorganizational Factors

Local institutions were unable to accommodate the interests and needs of a population that required increased access to services, social and economic opportunities, and controls on youth who were in gangs and at high risk for gang membership. Key city, county, and local governmental and non-governmental interests and leadership were not able adequately to coalesce in order to address these problems, without the aid of federal resources. Key mandated

organizations and strategies had to be included in the development of a comprehensive program. To what extent and how they were included, and the nature of change (if any) in strategies and practices directed to the gang problem had to be assessed. Organizational and interorganizational factors would determine the way the program evolved and developed.

III. Program Implementation Structures

A Steering Committee had to be established – comprising representatives of mandated organizations including criminal-justice and social agencies, grassroots and community-based groups, businesses and religious groups – with the leadership, support, and participation of local governmental officials in setting and advising on policy for the program. A program structure was to evolve from and/or closely relate to the Steering Committee, which would be responsible for implementing the program, characterized by interrelated strategies of community mobilization, outreach youth services, provision of social opportunities, suppression/social control, and organizational change and development in the selected community sector(s). A key component of the program structure was to be an interagency street team to target both gang-involved youth, and those youth at high risk for gang involvement.

IV. Services and Worker Contacts

The team of police, probation officers, outreach youth workers, case managers and others was to target eligible youth referred to the program from court, police, schools, youth agencies, neighbors, and even fellow gang members. The team was to collaboratively provide a range of services, opportunities, and controls for the targeted youth.

V. Changes in Youth Circumstances and Behaviors

The key objectives of the street team (within the framework of Steering-Committee and program leadership) was to control and change the criminal behavior, particularly the violent behavior, of program youth to more pro-social behavior patterns, while protecting established community values and interests. This was to be done especially by reducing the youth's gang involvement, facilitating the youth's school achievement and conformity to school rules and responsibilities, and providing him/her with access to training and jobs. Increased resources and access to treatment services for the youth and his family, as well as additional social and cultural opportunities and appropriately-targeted suppression services, were to be provided.

VI. Individual-Youth Outcome

Changes in the life space and life course of program youth were expected to result in a reduction of criminal behavior, particularly violence and drug-selling and drug-use. Evidence of the success or failure of the program at the individual-youth level was to be a reduction, increase, or no-change in the youth's self-reported offenses and official arrests, especially in relation to similar youth not exposed to the program.

VII. Law-Enforcement Policy and Practice

Effective participation by police and probation officers on the street team, and the involvement of criminal-justice administrators on the Steering Committee (in conformity with the Model) were expected to contribute not only to greater understanding of target-community and family social problems, greater collaboration with social-agency functions, and better

understanding of program-youth problems, but also to improved and targeted surveillance of program-youth behaviors. This was to lead to better control of the area gang problem, and relatively lower rates of arrests of program youth. The nature and extent of police-department leadership in the program would be the key determinant of the way the Model was adapted, and any resulting change or non-change in the scope of the problem at individual, gang, and area levels.

VIII. Gang-as-a-Unit Crime Change

Program effects at the individual-youth level were expected to result in gang-level behavioral changes, such as gang size and the reduction of violence, depending on the degree to which program youth were representative of active, delinquent members of the target gangs, and the extent to which program workers reached out to targeted gang youth and their gangs in the neighborhood.

IX. Target-Area Crime Change

In the Model, changes in target-area crime (particularly gang-related violent incidents) were primarily contingent on aggregate changes in and/or control of program-youth behavior, and to a lesser extent on gang-as-a-unit behavior. In general, the program was expected more directly and powerfully to influence program-youth behavior than to contribute to change in gang-as-a-unit behavior. These changes were also expected to have an effect on the rates of crime generally in the area.

Implementing the Evaluation

The Evaluations of the Program Model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – were simultaneous and complex, requiring extensive collaboration among local Project personnel, Local Evaluators and Technical-Assistance and National-Evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of a National Advisory Board. Major problems of program implementation, research design, sampling, data collection, and analysis had to be addressed and resolved at the various stages of the evaluations. The National Evaluator at the University of Chicago was responsible for overall research design, instrument development, coordination of data collection and management within and across sites, and the interim and final analyses and reports. The National Evaluator had no responsibility for day-to-day program operations, and limited control over the selection of the program- and comparison-youth samples and the implementation of data-collection procedures. The Local Evaluator at each site was selected and funded by the local Program Director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator and OJJDP.

Overcoming problems of the Evaluation was dependent in large measure on the satisfactory resolution of program-development issues, e.g., problems getting the program off the ground, a lack of understanding of the Program Model and how to implement it, as well as full acceptance of required data-collection procedures by program operators at the local sites. Not all components of the Model were necessarily accepted or adequately implemented by the local site operators; not all procedures for local data collection were followed. For example, the difficulties in recruiting and selecting program (and especially comparison) youth, and in

collecting youth-interview data, were not fully anticipated. Some site program and Evaluation problems were resolved, some were not.

Many of the early problems of Program-Model implementation and Local-Evaluation data collection surfaced around the issue of which youth were to be selected for the program. At first, some of the local Program Directors assumed that the focus of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e. targeting at-risk, usually younger youth, not yet gang members, or those with less-serious police records. Some of key organizations at various sites assumed that the funds they received were to help them keep doing what they had been doing all along, not necessarily targeting gang youth and/or coordinating their efforts with other organizations.

The selection of comparison-youth samples would require special Evaluation efforts, particularly by the Local Evaluators. A comparable gang-problem community, where the program was not established, had to be selected. It was not clear which areas and which kinds of youth would be selected for the comparison samples until substantial numbers of program youth were in the Project. At four of the five sites, another part of the same city was selected as the comparison area; at the fifth site, another city (or set of twin cities) was chosen. Each Local Evaluator had his or her own research interest, which sometimes was complementary to the Evaluation mission, sometimes not. There was turnover in the Local Evaluators' staff, and long delays in initiating the data-collection process.

The initial funding applications to OJJDP may not have clearly articulated or specified the criteria for the selection of youth into the program. Few of the lead agencies, and only one of the Local Evaluators, had the experience or know-how to reach gang delinquents on the streets. No grassroots organizations, neighborhood groups or former gang members with access to gangs

or gang youth were involved in program planning, generally not even later in the program implementation. The programs turned out to be based on referrals of gang youth who were on juvenile probation, but who mainly were not serious offenders, or youth from existing youth and family agencies. Schools often referred youth who had been suspended or expelled, or who were regarded as troublesome, but not necessarily gang-involved or at serious risk for gang involvement. Relatively few youth were referred through the efforts of outreach youth workers or police.

Collection of data was a great burden for local Project personnel, as well as for the National and Local Evaluators, at all the sites. A variety of obstacles had to be overcome. The original plan for data collection included: individual-youth surveys of 100 program and 100 comparison youth, to be administered annually by Local Evaluators; detailed program-service records of contacts with each youth, to be gathered every three months by the different Project workers at each site; and complete police-arrest and confinement histories of all program and comparison youth to be collected by Local Evaluators with the aid of Project administrators. These objectives were generally achieved. The efforts to obtain official school records, misconduct histories and complete attendance or grade records for each program and comparison youth had to be abandoned because of they were unavailable.

Gang-as-a-unit and area-level crime data for all gangs in the program and comparison areas were to be obtained by the National Evaluation staff – at three time periods during the course of the Project – directly from gang-crime police and crime analysts. Organization surveys were also to be collected by the National Evaluation staff, over two time periods, from 20-25 administrators of key agencies and organizations addressing the gang problem in each of the 5

program and 5 comparison areas. These objectives were not fully or adequately achieved at any of the sites.


The data collected included: on-site observations of program operations by Local and National Evaluation staff; periodic interviews of Project staff; minutes of Steering-Committee meetings; minutes of cluster (multi-site program staff) meetings; minutes of monthly telephone conferences with key Project staff from each site; reviews of yearly funding applications, and progress reports and records of special communications from each site to OJJDP; and, lastly, program-performance measures based on interviews with key local-agency and Steering-Committee personnel at the end of the 4- to 5-year program periods. Site visits by the National Evaluation staff were made two or three times per year. Visits to the National Evaluation office in Chicago were also made periodically by some site Project Directors and Local Evaluators to provide and clarify information and resolve Evaluation issues.

Data collection represented a very difficult and time-consuming part of the Evaluation process, extending well into the data-organization, cleaning, and data-analysis phases. This happened in large measure because multiple sources and many years-worth of data had to be gathered from different service providers, and because problems of data reliability or consistency were sometimes not discovered until later in the program, often at the analysis stage of the Evaluation, when the different data sets had to be integrated. Missing and incorrect data were often discovered and resolved at considerable expense to program providers and the Evaluators. These issues contributed to the delay in the production and delivery of the final, complex, valid and useful Evaluation reports.

Chart 2.1

Evaluation Model
 (Comparison-Area Components = I, II, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX)

Levels of Effect



Chapter 3

The Program and Comparison Areas

The initial OJJDP funding application from the San Antonio Police Department (1994) described San Antonio as the tenth-largest city in population size in the United States. It is located approximately 100 miles south of the geographic center of Texas, 150 miles inland from the Gulf of Mexico, and is the Bexar County seat. In 1990, the city had a diverse population: 55% Hispanic; 36% non-Hispanic; and 7% African American. San Antonio's economy was based primarily on services and military defense installations, as well as increasingly on tourism, and health-care and business services. The largest employers were the local government, including its school districts, and several military installations.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, San Antonio suffered a sharp decline in its economy due to the declines in the oil and gas industry, the Savings and Loan financial crisis and a related real-estate crash, and closing down of the military installations. Rapid growth and shift of populations and increased poverty rates accompanied the decline in the economy. The city's population grew from 900,200 in 1980 to 1,014,300 in 1990, and continued to expand to 1,888,580 in 2000. A growing concentration of Hispanic population took place in certain areas of the city, including the program area.

The initial area proposed by the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) for implementing the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program included the entire west side of San Antonio, an area containing 297,089 residents, or 32% of the city's population (U.S. Census 1990). In a revised funding

application, the SAPD selected a problem area of 24,370 persons on the far southwest side of the city with a burgeoning gang problem.

The population and economic characteristics of the program area and its closely matched comparison (or non-served) area were similar, yet somewhat distinctive. According to the Local Evaluator at the University of Texas-San Antonio (UTSA), the criteria for selection of the comparison area were a location that approximated the target area in distance from central city services, with a low level of community resources similar to that in the program area. This would distinguish program and non-program effects on gang crime in two similar communities (Cheatwood, Colton, Blanchard, Diaz, 1996).

Both areas had similar general crime and gang problems. The population of the program area grew by 25.0% between 1980 and 1990, which was more than the increase of the citywide population – 19.1% – over the same period. Much of the increase and change in population in the program area was due in large part to the downsizing of the nearby military installations, which resulted in lost jobs and home mortgage foreclosures for area residents. The federal government's purchase of homes in a Section 8 housing program brought an inflow of low-income population, resulting in a loss of white non-Hispanic population (from 43.7% to 23.5%) and an increase in Hispanic (Mexican origin) population (from 22.4% to 68.0%). The population of the comparison area was already predominantly Hispanic (Mexican origin) – about 92.0% – and remained stable, with a slight population loss – from 24,525 to 24,497.

Both program and comparison-area populations experienced economic hardships in the 1980s and early 1990s, as measured by declines in family and household income and by increases in poverty. The percentage of families below the poverty line in 1990 was 26.7% in the program

area and 32.4% in the comparison area, but lower (18.77%) citywide. The contrasts were greater between the program and comparison areas and the city as a whole in respect to educational achievement. The percentage of population 25 years old and over with less than a 9th-grade education was 32.3% in the program area, 62.5% in the comparison area, and 17.0% citywide. Unemployment rates were 10.7% in the program area, 15.2% in the comparison area, and 9.2% citywide in 1990.

On the other hand, between 1975 and 1985 the percentage of owner-occupied housing units was higher in the comparison area (65.6%) than in the program area (53.2%) or citywide (54.0%); and a greater percentage of persons had resided in the same house in the comparison area (69.2%) than in the program area (42.1%) or citywide (51.6%). In other words, while income and education levels were higher in the program area, home-ownership and population stability were higher in the comparison area. If social factors could be distinguished from economic factors, it could be argued that social disorganization was relatively more likely to have generated the gang problem in the program area, and economic factors more likely in the comparison area – whatever the level and character of the gang problem.

Gang Problems

According to the GRAASP Project Director, “San Antonio was the gang drive-by capital of Texas in 1993” (Kansas City meeting transcript 1995). The SAPD Gang Intelligence Unit had identified 5,485 known gang members and gang associates in the city, and 137 gangs or subunits of gangs, of which 25% were located in the originally-proposed larger program area (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994). Forty-three percent(43%) of the city’s drive-by

shootings and 34% of homicides took place in this area. In one citywide police survey, 65% of gang members had been previously arrested, and 42% admitted participating in a drive-by shooting. Gang members generally were reported to be almost exclusively male, and 80% were 16 years of age or younger. To what extent the gang problems in the program and comparison areas were representative of these larger program-area characteristics was unknown.

In its original 1994 funding application, the SAPD claimed it would address an emerging gang problem in San Antonio. In its second-year 1996 funding application, it noted that “the city of San Antonio has characteristics associated with an emerging youth gang area, as well as that of a city with a chronic gang problem.” But it was not clear from available data what the specific character and severity of the gang problem was, or what the numbers of gangs and gang members in the program and comparison areas were. Field visits and conversations with Project staff early in the program period suggested the presence of gangs associated with gang-related assaults in both the program and comparison areas, but few homicides were noted. Burglary, theft, vandalism, graffiti, joyriding, torching of houses, alcohol and marijuana use, and a little drug dealing were said to be common gang-member activities. Gang fighting involving youth from both areas occurred just outside the program and comparison areas, according to the police (Spergel Field Notes, Nov. 1995).

In a later field visit by the National Evaluation team, the Project Director and one of the youth workers (himself a former gang member) noted that many of the program-area residents had arrest histories dating back to their earlier residence in public housing projects, even before moving to the program area. More than 100 prison inmates had been recently released back to the program area. Program youth were reported to be from multi-generational gang families,

many of whose members had spent extensive time in prison (Spergel Field Notes, August 1997).

Some of the gangs in the program and comparison areas had names similar to those associated with Los Angeles and Chicago gangs, but there was little evidence of a direct connection or any communication with these gangs. Several of the larger gangs had distinctively local names. Most of the youth identified as gang members in the program or comparison areas were male, Hispanic (Mexican-American background) and from a variety of street groups, including party groups, as well as more clearly identifiable gangs. Many of the street groups were small ephemeral groups. Only 3 or 4 gangs were identified as large, i.e., containing between 30 and 100 members. Ninety-four (94) of the 107 program youth were later identified as associated with 37 different gangs or street groups in the program area. Apparently, there was a good deal of group name-change; youth seemed to move readily from one gang or street group to another. Gangs with the same names were present in the two areas. Program and comparison youth were identified with 15 of the same-name gangs in their respective areas. Five gangs were identified by the police as predominantly into violence, 13 mainly into drugs (possession and use) and 10 into property crime. There was a lack of clarity about the nature and scope of the gang problem in both areas.

The SAPD had initially identified the fragmentation of criminal-justice efforts to understand and address the gang problem in both San Antonio and Bexar County. Various law-enforcement organizations and a task force had been developed over time to address the gang problem. An SAPD gang-intelligence unit as well as a gang-operations unit had been in existence earlier. A violent-crimes task force, including a variety of gang-suppression groups and special activities, had been spasmodically developed. School districts and the Bexar County

Sheriff's Office each had active gang units. The San Antonio Police Department, the Bexar County Sheriff's Office, the County Probation and Parole Department, and the District Attorney's Office each separately assessed the presence of gangs and their activities in the city. These various efforts were characterized by overlapping scope and purpose (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September, 1994).

The Texas Penal Code (Section 71.01 (d) states that a "criminal gang means three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or identifiable leadership who continually or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities." The UTSA community-assessment report referred to the Bexar County Gang Profile Information System (GPIS), a central source of definition, which identified a gang member based on the following:

- Subject admits being a gang member.
- A reliable person identifies another individual as a gang member and it is corroborated by independent information.
- A person of untested reliability identifies another person as a gang member, and it is corroborated by independent information.
- An individual resides in or frequents a particular gang's area and affects his/her [gang] style, dress, use of hand signs, symbols or tattoos, and associates or is photographed with known gang members.
- An individual has tattoos, wears or possesses clothing and/or other paraphernalia that is only associated with a specific gang.
- An individual is arrested participating in delinquent or criminal activities with known, documented gang members.

- An individual associates with gang members (Cheatwood, Colton, Blanchard, Diaz, 1996)

The UTSA report raised questions about the various definitions of a gang used by different organizations, and the different procedures used in collecting gang data. Apparently, numerous subsets or factions of gangs were identified separately as gangs; gangs targeted by law enforcement altered their names to elude detection (“Some gangs may change names on a whim”); there was duplication of gang members’ names on the GPIS; youth used different names and aliases when contacted or arrested by different agencies using GPIS. There was “no common automated or manual database concerning gangs and gang information for all organizations addressing gang-related problems” (Ibid). The implication of the UTSA report was that the scope and nature of the gang problem was not known in San Antonio, or in the program and comparison areas, due to the lack of reliability of criminal-justice-agency information and coordination of procedures. The lack of clarity and focus about the scope and nature of the gang problem may well have handicapped the development of the GRAASP program, and affected the overall Project results achieved.

Chapter 4

Project Development

In its first funding application the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) stated its goals for the GRAASP Project as follows: 1) establish a community-based task force to develop a comprehensive, collaborative gang program, including a plan to provide educational programs for current and potential gang members, initiate an assessment of job-training needs of the program youth, and develop parenting classes, crisis-intervention, and mediation training for participants and parents, and 2) collaboratively develop strategies to minimize gang activities and violent crimes, including enhancing and broadening current suppression strategies, expanding current law enforcement gang-reduction activities, and collaborating with community police officers (First-Year OJJDP Application, September, 1994).

The SAPD appeared to have two major objectives in the development of GRAASP. In its first funding application, it proposed to reduce the fragmentation of gang-control planning and suppression efforts among diverse agencies in the city and county; in its second funding application, its objective was to improve the level of cooperation between local citizens and the police department in the program area with regard to a range of specific community-service problems. The Project apparently did not address the first objective in its application(s), but focused on improved collaboration with local neighborhood groups as well as providing outreach social services to target gang youth. The development of access to services was of primary concern to local neighborhood groups, while the improvement of relationships with neighborhood groups in the provision of such services was of major interest to the SAPD.

4.1

The program area at first included three small neighborhoods – Indian Creek, Hidden Cove and Sky Harbor; Valley Hi and Valley Forest were added later. Although there were concerns about gang crime activities, apparently they were not of primary importance to the neighborhood groups and possibly to the SAPD. No extra police patrols had been designated for the program area. Nevertheless, there seemed to be a wealth of understanding and practical experience that could be mobilized within the larger community as well as in the SAPD in developing a successful project. But it was soon clear that the SAPD leadership, and key “players” from relevant citywide and local agencies, were not on board. There were questions about the SAPD Chief’s level of commitment to the Project Model. No other SAPD officers would be specifically assigned to the Project, and no other police support would be requested for the program area in funding applications in years two, three and four (see C. Kane, Site Visit Notes, December 1, 1995).

Steering Committees

In May 1996, a Steering Committee was formed comprising mainly representatives from the neighborhood associations in the three original target neighborhoods. The local community-policing officer from SAFFE (San Antonio for a Free and Fearless Environment) was a key participant. Major justice-system or social-service agencies were not initially to become regular participants. Also, the Steering Committee initially did not include representatives from the schools, juvenile probation, churches, the city manager’s office or key community-based agencies. There were continuing gaps in the development of the Steering-Committee structure, and irregular participation in meetings. Agency administrators who said they would serve on the

Steering Committee and attend meetings (or send representatives) did not do so. Other agency representatives made occasional and brief visits to meetings. The Police Lieutenant himself, the Project Director, did not always show up for Steering-Committee meetings.

The Project was off to a shaky start, with limited attention paid to the gang problem. Early Steering-Committee discussions (and later ones as well) were primarily concerned with community clean-ups, participation of citizens and officers in general marches against crime, preparation for a community health fair, and resolution of differences between the SAPD and neighborhood groups requesting greater SAPD support. Much of the discussions centered on the development of more local community services, and additional support for the SAPD.

The Project administrators and neighborhood leaders may not have clearly understood the purpose and nature of the Steering Committee and the need to assemble organizations and agencies specifically to address the program-area's gang problem.

In its application for second-year funding, the accomplishments of the Steering Committee were listed as follows:

- Facilitating a positive change in the relationship between police officers and residents in the target neighborhood, and heightening the level of trust between these two groups.
- The primary facilitator of this change has been the San Antonio Fear Free Environment (SAFFE) officers...
- Sponsorship of the Southwest Opportunities fair held in the target neighborhood ... services at the fair included: medical screening ... information from various colleges, trade schools ... community service information... (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, November, 1996).

In a visit to the San Antonio site in late 1996, the OJJDP Program Manager and National Technical Assistance consultant expressed concern about “the level of commitment of SAPD as well as the Steering Committee members’ GRAASP focus ... in reducing gang activity and crime in the target neighborhood. The Program Manager suggested that a (special) community mobilization group be formed to develop such a focus” (Summary GRAASP Steering-Committee Meeting Minutes, December 11, 1996).

Neighborhood Steering Committee. An enlarged community-mobilization group, “GRAASP Roots,” was “re-formed” during the second program year, consisting mainly of representatives of the same organizations: the Pearsull Road Baptist Church, Divine Providence Catholic Church, Miller’s Pond Recreation Center, PACE (People Active in Community Effort), Indian Creek/Hidden Cove Neighborhood Association, Southwest Community Association, the local SAFFE officer, GRAASP itself, and, later, the Southwest San Antonio Independent School District. But it was still not clear that GRAASP Roots would support the GRAASP program and its focus on gang youth. The group’s concerns and discussions continued to be on the general-service needs of the residents in the area, although graffiti-paintout activities and a basketball league that might involve gang youth were developed. Justice-system agencies (such as the Juvenile Probation Department and the City District Attorney’s Office) did not send representatives to the GRAASP Roots meetings. At the same time, the Juvenile Probation Department continued to refer the majority of the program youth to the Project. There was an obvious disconnect between the neighborhood Steering Committee and program operations.

The GRAASP Roots Steering-Committee meetings and the later-developed Steering Committee’s meetings blended into the regular weekly program staff meetings, still without any

clear understanding of program structure or purpose. The GRAASP Roots community-mobilization effort formed in May 1997 operated for approximately one year. In April of 1998, the group decided to disband; the primary reason, according to the SAPD, being a lack of interest and leadership in the community. The SAPD administrators supported the group in this decision (SAPD Progress Report for period 9/1/98 – 12/31/98; March 23, 1999).

During its eleven months of existence, GRAASP Roots sponsored a wide variety of social and youth-development activities including a local community fair, neighborhood clean-ups, a youth basketball league, neighborhood paint-outs, National Nite Out, A Walk Down Five Palms Avenue, church picnics, and games and bible study. However, few of these activities were specifically designed to address the youth-gang problem.

Community-Wide Steering Committee. The SAPD developed a Steering Committee which included a broader array of citywide organizations and local groups. In May of 1996, the SAPD (principally the GRAASP Project Director and Project Coordinator) organized monthly, comprehensive Steering-Committee meetings, but still there were no meetings between late October, 1998 and early February, 1999. Sign-in sheets and summary minutes indicated that representatives of between 3 and 14 organizations (on average only 7 agencies) attended. The participating agencies and neighborhood groups were the San Antonio Police Department, GRAASP staff, Hidden Cove/Indian Creek Neighborhood Association, Southwest Community Association, San Antonio Department of Community Initiatives (including the Youth Services Division), Bexar County Adult Probation, Texas Youth Commission (Juvenile Parole), Mexican American Unity Council, Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Dominquez State Jail), and the Margarita Huantes Learning, Leadership and Development Center. These agencies were only 7

of the 11 types of mandatory agency components required under the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model.¹

Minutes of these broader community Steering-Committee meetings indicate that discussions addressed the following important issues: ensuring that the Steering Committee had the mandatory 11 members; deciding what services would be provided to GRAASP program participants under the social- and economic-opportunities strategy; determining which agencies would provide each of the services; reviewing the program intake assessment instruments; examining aspects of the community design model; assessing the program time frame; and hiring of personnel. During these discussions, agencies were collectively categorized as primarily providing intervention, suppression or prevention, but the specific roles and responsibilities of Committee members were never defined – either by the Committee or the SAPD leadership – or elaborated in a written action plan. The Steering Committee never developed a set of specific goals and objectives. Substantial involvement on the part of the Steering Committee and a sense of ownership of the GRAASP Project did not occur.

A lack of full, mandatory organizational representation, changes in the membership make-up of the Committee, and infrequent Committee meetings demonstrated the local Steering Committee's limited interest in the Project's development. At first, there was little or no participation by schools, juvenile probation, justice-system agencies, community churches, the city manager's office or employment agencies. Schools and juvenile probation eventually began

¹ In the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's (OJJDP) *FY 1994 Discretionary Competitive Program Announcements and Application Kit* (NCJ# 147529), the 11 mandatory agency components were: 1) schools; 2) youth-employment agencies; 3) grassroots organizations; 4) community-based youth agencies; 5) community-mobilization groups; 6) law enforcement; 7) prosecution; 8) judiciary; 9) probation; 10) corrections; and 11) parole. For further discussion, see pages 44-45 of this document.

to take part, but other types of agencies never fully participated. Moreover, representatives at the Steering-Committee meetings tended to be mid-level or line staff of their agencies. The SAPD failed to send anyone more senior than the Lieutenant who was the GRAASP Project Director. This further limited the usefulness of discussions bearing on the agency policy-level changes necessary for dealing with gang youth, or the development of systematic inter-organizational ties around the gang problem. Later, when the Steering Committee began to address sustaining GRAASP, no policy or administrative staff of key organizations, including the SAPD, were present to support the Project, or commit resources to its continuation once OJJDP funding ceased.

We note that while there were many limitations to the implementation of the community-mobilization strategy and the development of a stable, effective Steering Committee, the GRAASP project was in operation, and visible to the justice, social-service, and educational systems and the local neighborhood organizations in San Antonio. A variety of contacts with agencies and organizations were made to provide program youth with a variety of services. Among those contacted were: Project Quest, Helping Hands, Goodwill, Texas Department of Health Care Management services, John Jay High School, South West High School, Youth Initiatives, Home Care Employment, McCauliffe Middle School, St. Phillips Admission and Continuing Education Department, Southtown Road Juvenile facility, Prosecuting District Attorneys.

Administration

Insufficient SAPD commitment to the use of its own staff, as well as limited allocation of

funds to other justice-system agencies involved in the Project impeded the development of the GRAASP Project. After the first year, the SAPD funding application to OJJDP requested and allocated less than 5% of total Project funds for police services. Probation/police services were not at all included in budget requests or arrangements. The SAPD Project Director was assigned only 20% of time for program and Steering Committee tasks, and was given further administrative responsibility unrelated to GRAASP at the end of the first year of program operations. He was not given the necessary time and support to develop and direct the Project. He was not consistently in attendance at Steering-Committee or program-staff meetings. A SAFFE or community-policing officer already assigned to the area and local gang-unit officers were only periodically involved in the program. The Project Director observed that the SAPD did not provide sufficient police manpower to staff the suppression component of the program, or for the other needs of the program area.

Administrative assistance for the Project Director was not adequately developed. A Project Coordinator (not a member of the SAPD) was not hired until October, 1995 (ten months after the Project Director was assigned), and resigned eight months later. A new Project Coordinator (also a “civilian”) was not hired until June, 1996. Part of the delay in staff hiring may have been due to the cumbersome process requiring all public-agency staff hiring to be approved through ordinances of the City Council. Further delays or deficiencies in Project development may have been due to the limited criminal-justice and community-organizational experience of the Project Coordinator, and the Project Director’s limited and inadequate time to spend on Project administration. GRAASP did not begin enrolling program participants until May, 1997, more than two years after federal approval of Project funding. Planning for Steering-

Committee, program-staff, or OJJDP and National Evaluator visits was not always adequate. Outreach youth workers complained that both the Project Director and Coordinator were rarely, if ever, available in the evening to monitor or supervise staff. Adequate and sufficient Project leadership did not develop.

Project leadership may never have come to understand the nature of the Comprehensive Gang Program initiative, and the necessary structure required to develop and implement it in San Antonio. The Project became a social-service, youth outreach program for gang-involved youth, with little structured or coordinated input into Project-development plans from social service, suppression or local neighborhood groups, and actually with little connection to the SAPD's operations. In the last year of operations, the Project was defined by its youth-outreach staff as essentially a social-services program "made up of a team of social workers from the City of San Antonio..." (*Neighborhood News*, Issue I, Winter 1999). During a site visit from the OJJDP Program Manager and the National Technical Assistance consultant, the Deputy Chief of Police stressed the SAPD's commitment to the Project, but the Project Director indicated that "GRAASP was really more social services than law enforcement and would be more appropriately housed somewhere else" (Kane Memorandum to Spergel, March 11, 1999).

Program Strategies

From the delayed inception of the San Antonio GRAASP program in May, 1997, to Project termination in June, 1999, direct-service activities to youth were provided for only 2½ years. The majority (58.9%) of the youth in the program were referred by the Bexar County Juvenile Probation Department and the Texas Youth Commission (Juvenile Parole). Outreach

youth workers and schools together referred approximately 25% of youth. Family, other program youth, police and community youth agencies were the additional sources of referrals (15.9%).

The pattern of referrals of youth to the program did not change during the program period.

GRAASP focused on individual program youth (and to some extent their families) using a case-method approach. Probation and parole officers, school officials and the SAFFE officer shared a good deal of information with the outreach youth workers on a case-by-case basis.

Workers from other agencies occasionally attended GRAASP staff meetings, where outreach youth workers facilitated discussions and cooperation. There was no structural or systematic means for the provision of services to, and interrelated controls for, program youth.

Coordination of services, if it occurred, was on an ad hoc basis, stimulated by GRAASP outreach youth workers.

The SAPD's SAFFE officer had been in the program area prior to and during the program period. He knew many of the program youth and their families, but the program youth did not necessarily identify him as part of the GRAASP program (Monthly Conference Call, December 9, 1997). No procedures for common assessment, or provision of services, for program youth and their families were developed, as described in the first-year funding application. The outreach youth workers attempted to develop and integrate service strategies on a case-by-case basis.

Representatives of youth-serving agencies, schools, grassroots groups, churches, police and other criminal-justice organizations were expected to reach out, in collaboration with the outreach youth workers, to target gang-involved youth and those highly at risk for gang involvement. This meant that workers from the various agencies were expected to collectively

participate with outreach youth workers in linking targeted gang youth and their families to the program, and to other conventional institutions. Instead, the outreach youth workers became primarily engaged in contacting and supporting youth in their relationships with other institutions.

Outreach youth workers and case managers were hired, and originally housed at police headquarters. In November, 1997, they were relocated from the SAPD downtown offices to the Valley Hi neighborhood, contiguous to the three original program target areas. This made it easier to contact youth in their natural environment – at home, in school, or the streets, and at the local recreation center. Several of the outreach youth workers and case managers lived in or close to the program area.

There was some expectation that the outreach youth workers would develop informal contacts with program youth and other members of their gangs in street contacts. This did not generally occur. The majority of contacts between youth workers and program youth were in structured settings: the GRAASP Office, recreation center, youth's home, and in automobiles while transporting youth to social-service agencies. Youth workers were usually not available for service contacts at night, although occasional crisis contacts did take place in the evenings and on weekends. Nevertheless, youth workers provided a substantial range of social-intervention and opportunities-provision contacts with youth.

Social Intervention

Specific social-intervention services included:

- referring program youth to a subcontracted community-based youth organization

- (EXCEL) for anger management, drug-abuse counseling, and group counseling;
- administering and staffing a young men's basketball league for program and neighborhood youth;
 - assisting youth and their families with obtaining material support (e.g., monetary assistance for unpaid utility bills);
 - establishing and managing community-service programs (e.g., graffiti paint-outs or clean-ups) to assist program youth in completing their court-ordered service hours;
 - advocating for youth at court hearings;
 - transporting youth to offices and agencies providing many of the aforementioned services;
 - intensive crisis-counseling for program youth on the worker's own time, sometimes at night;
 - assisting youth to remove gang tatoos;
 - providing camping and fishing trips for program youth.

Opportunities Provision

Vocational Opportunities. It was extremely difficult for youth to obtain jobs in the local area. There were only 5 businesses in the program area, and youth had to take long bus rides to seek and hold jobs elsewhere. It was not clear that GRAASP personnel were taking adequate advantage of employment agencies such as the Texas Work Commission to assist youth with job referrals. During the first two years of the Project, GRAASP outreach youth workers and case-workers (and occasionally probation, parole, and police officers) assisted program youth with

finding jobs, helping them fill out applications, and obtaining job references. These efforts were made through searches over the internet, word-of-mouth contacts, direct inquiries about job opportunities with various employers, referrals to job-placement agencies, and, in some cases, transporting youth to job interviews. A file of job applications and a list of employers was maintained by the Project to help program youth in their job searches.

Initially, no Project staff member was assigned responsibility for coordinating these youth-employment efforts. In due course, the GRAASP administration realized that the Project could benefit by hiring a job developer, and finally did so in March, 1999, 3 or 4 months prior to the Project's termination. The GRAASP Job Developer worked with approximately 55 program youth and helped 27 of them to find jobs. He organized job-preparation workshops, in which youth were counseled on work attitudes and employment goals, how to locate jobs, interviewing for a position and keeping a job. In many cases, the Job Developer transported youth to meet with employers, helped them fill out job applications, and even attended job interviews with them. Follow-up contacts were conducted with each youth who got a job, to learn how it was working out.

Educational Opportunities. Over the 1½ years of the program, local school personnel became more fully involved in providing information to the Project about gang members and gang activity in their schools, and working with program youth in school. In several instances, GRAASP outreach youth workers went to the local middle school or high school to resolve program-youth/school conflicts, and keep gang situations from escalating into violence. School principals, vice principals, and counselors increased their contacts with Project youth workers. Toward the end of the Project period they began to attend the occasional Steering-Committee and

GRAASP meeting.

Outreach youth workers and caseworkers advocated for program youth at school discipline hearings (Assessment, Review and Dismissal) so that they might be re-admitted to regular school, or to an alternative program. They assisted approximately 12 older program youth to enroll in GED courses, local community colleges, and other educational programs. Five program youth earned their GEDs, and one enrolled in college; 3 program youth graduated from high school. Despite limited access to opportunities in the isolated program target area, GRAASP staff and related agency representatives made some positive strides in assisting youth and local schools to make better use of services.

Suppression

The suppression strategy meant the exercise of formal and informal social controls, including close supervision or monitoring of gang youth by agencies of the criminal-justice system, and also by community-based agencies, schools, and grassroots groups, as well as by GRAASP direct-service Project workers.

Police. According to the Project Director, the SAPD did not assign police to work directly with the program because grant funding was not permanent, and the city council would not permit temporary assignment of police officers to the Project.

Based on a preliminary review of police arrest data compared with program youth self-report data, there was also some question as to whether the SAPD paid sufficient attention to a range of delinquent youth behaviors in the program area. Self-reported youth crime behavior was far more extensive than official arrest data indicated, even accounting for the differences in the

nature of the data sources. The program area was physically distant and isolated from the San Antonio city center, and it was not clear how well-policed it was. Patrol and tactical officers in the program area were not closely affiliated with the Project. The SAPD's SAFFE officer assigned to the program area visited the GRAASP office weekly to provide information about the program youth whom he contacted. However, the officer worked 9 AM to 5 PM, and was not always privy to what gang activities occurred at night. The GRAASP Project Coordinator observed in the middle of the Project period that program workers had yet to meet police from the area at a police roll call or informally as a group (for example, at lunch). The Coordinator did not understand why the Project Director had not introduced the GRAASP workers formally to police in the area. She speculated that the "Lieutenant may have been embarrassed to do so."

Probation/Parole/Judiciary. A Texas Youth Commission (Juvenile Parole) officer met weekly with program youth on his caseload at the GRAASP office, and also discussed the youth with GRAASP Project staff. Youth workers and caseworkers were also in frequent contact with probation officers to obtain background information about program youth, find out about the conditions of probation, exchange information, and ensure that youth were not in violation of these conditions. GRAASP outreach youth workers attended parole or probation hearings during juvenile court proceedings (youth were often assigned to the Project as a condition of their probation or parole). Much of the collaboration of the Project workers with representatives of the criminal-justice system grew out of the pro-active efforts of outreach youth workers, and the awareness of criminal-justice officers of the social needs of gang youth and the lack of resources in the target area.

Organizational Change and Development

The strategy of organizational change and development meant change and implementation of agency policies and procedures which would result in the most effective use of available and potential resources, within and across agencies, in accordance with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model.

The GRAASP staff contributed to a non-systematic, limited development of interagency case coordination. However, there was no explicit change in agency policies and procedures to insure Project-related functions during the Project period and provide for its continuation after Project termination (e.g., by the Texas Youth Commission [Juvenile Parole], the San Antonio Police Department, the Bexar County Probation Department, South San Antonio Independent School District, and/or Southwest Independent School District). Again, most interagency operations were of a case nature, based on the youth's participation in the Project and the input of outreach youth workers at probation or parole hearings or during school discipline hearings. Project staff provided the beginnings of an integrative, social-intervention advocacy with a limited suppression function, which was not appropriately sustained, even during the program period. Without the presence of the Project, most of these organizations were expected to revert to pre-program operating patterns.

Summary

The creation of an appropriate Steering Committee and the development of the San Antonio Gang Project got off to a very slow start, and were only partially developed. A viable and strong Steering Committee was never formed. Questions were raised about the commitment

of the SAPD and several key community groups and agencies to the Project. The SAPD did not pro-actively support the development of the Project as specified by the OJJDP Model. GRAASP Project administration made very limited efforts to address deficiencies in creating a comprehensive, community-wide gang program. Project staff, particularly outreach youth workers, succeeded in creating an extensive intervention program to provide services to gang youth, in some cooperation with individual staff of local schools, probation, parole, community police officers and community organizations. While Project youth workers and caseworkers fostered connecting program participants to some access to important economic and educational opportunities and services (e.g., re-enrollment in school, GED programs, jobs, counseling, drug treatment, parent training, material support, public aid), adequate suppression services targeted to program youth were not provided as part of a systematic interagency- and street-level-worker team effort.

The program area and its environs did appear to have a gang problem, although its dimensions were not specifically defined. There was a major lack of human-service and economic resources. An integrated interagency and opportunity-providing approach to the gang problem was needed, but never developed. A large social and institutional-change effort should have been made even prior to the beginning of the Project. Community and citywide leadership and motivation was lacking for the task. The direct-service staff – rather than community leaders, the SAPD or administrators of assorted agencies – made a limited effort to meet the social-development and social-control needs of program youth. Whether it was sufficient to affect or change gang or delinquency patterns will be addressed in later chapters.

Chapter 5

Organizations' Perceptions of Crime and Program Performance Assessments

We attempted to measure changes in organizations' perceptions of the gang and non-gang problem, and of changes in their own program strategies, between the first and third year of the Project. These perceptions could possibly indicate the nature and extent to which the Model strategies were adapted by the key organizations who were affecting the development of the program. We also assessed how well Model elements, strategies and principles were achieved, based on the views of the San Antonio community and agency leaders closest to the program at the end of the Project period (and also based on the observations of the National Evaluators). We measured these changes comparatively across the five demonstration sites, but with focus here on changes in San Antonio.

Organization Survey (Rolando V. Sosa)

The purpose of the survey of the Project-related organizations was to discover whether and how the executives' or administrators' (and sometimes supervisors') perceptions of gang and non-gang crime – and their own programs' strategies about the gang problem in their areas – changed between the first and third years of the Project period. Key organization representatives were surveyed at each of the five Project sites. The lead-agency administrator at each site provided a list of local organizations and contact persons prior to the initial (Time I) survey, and the list was revised or updated prior to the follow-up (Time II) survey. During the Time-I survey,

representatives of 132 organizations across the five sites were interviewed; representatives of 104 organizations were interviewed during the Time-II survey. At Time II, several organizations were either no longer active or related to the program, some didn't respond to the survey, and several new organizations were added. Organization representatives interviewed at both Time I and Time II represented the relatively more active Project participants. Several of the organizations responding to the Time-II survey were only peripherally involved in the program at Time I, but became more active at Time II.

Representatives of 13 San Antonio Project-related organizations completed interviews at both Time I and Time II (somewhat less than the average response rate for the five sites as a whole – 20.8). The same respondent at a particular organization did not necessarily complete both the Time-I and Time-II survey.

The 13 organizations in San Antonio completing the survey at both Time I and Time II were:

San Antonio Police Department

District Attorney's Office

Bexar County Adult Probation

Bexar County Juvenile Probation

Texas Youth Commission (Juvenile Parole)

Huantes Learning and Leadership Development Center

Mexican-American Unity Council

Project Quest

Southeast High School

Shepard Middle School

South San Antonio ISD, West Campus High School

San Antonio Department of Community Initiatives

EXCEL

Crime Problems. Respondents across program sites were able to differentiate gang and non-gang delinquency or crime problems. In general, gang crimes of all types were regarded as a more serious community problem than non-gang crimes, both at Time I and Time II. At Time I, gang crime was regarded as a very serious program-area problem at three of the five sites, including San Antonio, but fell significantly to the level of moderately serious at Time II (Table 5.1).

At both Time I and Time II, across all of the sites, gang drug-crime was generally regarded as the most serious of all types of crime. Gang violence was seen as a very serious problem in San Antonio. Gang property-crime was also viewed as very serious. The differentiation between all types of gang crime was less pronounced in San Antonio than in most of the sites, and there was a perception at Time II of a significant drop in less-serious gang violence and gang property crime.

Gang-related crimes were generally perceived as declining at all of the sites, but as significantly declining only in San Antonio and one other site. Nevertheless, gang crime remained higher in San Antonio than in the average of the other sites. Despite a perception of a significant decline among San Antonio residents, gang property-crime at Time II was rated at the highest level by San Antonio respondents compared to all other respondents.

In general, non-gang-related crime was not regarded as consistently declining across all

the sites. Non-gang property crime was generally viewed as increasing in San Antonio. Non-gang less-serious violence, drug, and property crime were perceived as getting worse, although not significantly worse.

Gang Problems Affecting the Organizations. In the organization survey we asked not only how serious the gang problem was in the program area, but also how serious it was as it was confronted by the particular organization in its particular operations. Each organization may have experienced the gang problem differently in terms of its varied purposes, and the scope and nature of its operations.

On average, all organizations at each site felt that the gang problem it was confronting was becoming less serious; three sites felt it had significantly improved. The least improvement was perceived in San Antonio, but it still was perceived as getting less serious (Table 5.2).

Implementation of Program-Related Strategies. At both Time I and Time II, organization respondents were asked to rate the general effectiveness of the program strategies in addressing the gang problem across the program communities. The program strategies were identified as *community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, suppression, and organizational change and development.* Community mobilization was identified as particularly important in the first years of the Project across all the sites. A great deal of attention was directed to its component strategies or substrategies: coordination in defining the problem; coordination in information sharing; community participation and planning. Organization-consensus in defining the gang problem and information-sharing among agencies were regarded

as particularly important in San Antonio early in the Project period. Community participation and planning was also important. However, there was a perceived deterioration (although not significant) in overall community-mobilization strategy only in San Antonio.

At Time II, organizations at the various sites viewed their community-mobilization strategies as “fair” to “good” in respect to coordination in defining the gang problem, sharing information, and community participation and planning, and as generally improving, particularly in respect to information-sharing – except in San Antonio, where it was deteriorating. There was a general perception across sites of some decline in community participation, particularly citizen participation, especially in San Antonio. Community participation and planning had also not improved. At Time II, the suppression strategy was generally regarded as “good” or close to “good” across the sites, and even slightly improved – except in San Antonio, where it was viewed as worse. Improvement was seen at all sites – including San Antonio – in the implementation of the strategies of social intervention and social-opportunities provision. However, social intervention and the provision of social opportunities was still seen as only “fair,” or “average” across all sites; the rankings of these two strategies were lowest of all the sites in San Antonio at Time II (Table 5.3).

In sum, San Antonio organization respondents perceived the gang problem to be a serious one at Time I, but a somewhat less-serious (or moderate) problem at Time II. More progress was made in the reduction of gang violence than in the reduction of the gang drug problem, which clearly remained a serious problem. Relative to other sites, San Antonio respondents at Time I were slightly sanguine, believing their particular organizations were facing a gang problem that was somewhat improving. They perceived that their strategies of community

participation/planning and interagency coordination in respect to information-sharing were average or fair, but getting worse. They perceived some progress between Time I and Time II in their community-agency provision of social opportunities (particularly employment training and placement), and in social intervention or social services for gang youth, but the improvement was slight. Overall, organization representatives in San Antonio viewed community success in respect to addressing the gang problem at a lower level than at other program sites.

Project Performance Indicators (Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios)

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key program-agency administrators, Steering-Committee members and other local community leaders to assess how well the local Projects were implemented in respect to certain OJJDP Model criteria. A series of performance-rating scales derived from the Comprehensive Gang Program Model were used to measure the assessments. Seven agency and local Project-related personnel supplied the ratings, including the Project Director, two representatives of the local School District, a Texas Youth Commission Parole Officer, a Juvenile Probation Officer, a Project youth worker, a community activist, and the Dean of a Baptist college – all involved with the Project throughout its operational period. Assessments were also made by four members of the National Evaluation team, who were closely associated with the Project (having visited and observed program operations on several occasions) and who were familiar with Project achievements and problems.

The rating scales covered the key Model indicators: the *program elements* – team approach, Steering Committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal justice, school participation, employment/training, lead-agency management; the *program strategies* –

community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression/social control, organizational change and development; and the *program implementation principles* – targeting, balance, intensity, continuity, commitment. (There were varying numbers of subcategories for each of the major categories, e.g., team approach, community mobilization, targeting, etc.). The scale for each subcategory was: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. The largest numbers of subcategories were in four major categories: lead-agency management, suppression/social control, criminal-justice, and schools. There were missing responses, mainly due to raters’ lack of knowledge about particular aspects of the Project operations (Table 5.4).

The scores per category for all respondents were first summed and averaged (not counting missing scores). The scores of the San Antonio Project raters (n = 7) and the scores of the National Evaluators (n = 4) were summed, averaged separately then combined (without weighting) and compared. The score for all raters together (n = 9) was 2.36, in the lower half of the “fair” range. The only scores that were in the “good” range were targeting the right youth and youth-worker outreach. The scores in the “poor” range were Steering Committee, grassroots involvement, lead-agency management, community mobilization, and organizational change and development (Table 5.4 and 5.5).

Of special interest was the difference in the scores of the San Antonio Project and the National Evaluation raters; the local Project’s ratings were generally higher (2.86; “fair”) than the National Evaluators’ (1.87; “poor”). The local-Project and National-Evaluator ratings that came closest were: targeting, youth outreach, social intervention, opportunities provision, and suppression. The ratings that were furthest apart were Steering Committee, organizational change and development, balance, commitment, and lead-agency management. Nevertheless,

there was relative consistency across the scores of the two groups of raters. Both groups indicated which factors or criteria were relatively “best” in the program, and which were relatively “worst,” in their respective scales. The ratings were consistent with Project-staff field observations and actual changes occurring during the program period.

Table 5.1
Organization Survey
Mean Ratings^a of the Seriousness of Gang and Non-Gang Crime in Program Area
By Site and By Time Period

Type of Crime ^b	San Antonio (n=12)		Tucson (n=18)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=24)		Riverside (n=15)		Total ^c (N=86)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Gang												
Total	4.27	3.61*	4.27	3.97	3.66	3.09*	3.07	3.11	4.00	3.29	3.74	3.36***
Serious Violence	4.32	3.45	4.40	3.92	3.55	3.08*	3.25	3.10	3.66	3.39	3.76	3.35***
Other Violence	4.27	3.50*	4.21	4.07	3.62	2.85*	3.07	2.93	3.88	3.46	3.72	3.30***
Drugs	4.33	4.04	4.50	4.38	3.94	3.62	3.85	4.04	4.13	4.15	4.11	4.04
Property	4.27	3.76*	4.00	3.64	3.47	3.06	2.41	2.53	3.70	3.35	3.41	3.16*
Non-gang												
Total	2.93	2.95	3.15	3.37	2.87	2.31	2.39	2.40	3.06	2.45	2.81	2.64
Serious Violence	2.89	2.60	2.63	3.09*	2.54	2.11	2.31	2.15	2.68	2.35	2.55	2.41
Other Violence	2.55	2.80	3.14	3.43	2.82	2.03*	2.18	2.11	2.88	2.35*	2.67	2.47
Drugs	3.09	3.36	3.72	3.91	3.47	2.88	3.21	3.31	3.67	3.53	3.43	3.39
Property	3.11	3.41	3.21	3.19	3.16	2.43*	2.29	2.33	3.10	2.70	2.89	2.71

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
 School of Social Service Administration
 The University of Chicago
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

^a Rating Scale: 1=No Problem; 2=Small Problem; 3=Moderate Problem; 4=Serious Problem; 5=Very Serious Problem.

^b The survey item was: "For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in [specific program area for each site] in the last 6 months." Specific crimes were: 1) **serious violence** – robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, and drive-by shootings; 2) **other violence** – threats/intimidation, possession of a knife, and possession of a gun; 3) **drugs** – both selling drugs and using drugs; and 4) **property** – vandalism/graffiti, breaking and entering, and car theft.

^c Number of organizations providing a valid response; the total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods was 104.

Table 5.2
Organization Survey
Seriousness of the Gang Problem Experienced by Organizations
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Ratings

Survey Item	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=15)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=23)		Riverside (n=15)		Total (N=83) ^a	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Gang Problem Experienced by Organization^b	1.92	2.23	1.33	2.13**	1.59	2.12**	1.74	2.35**	1.87	2.67	1.69	2.30***

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
 School of Social Service Administration
 The University of Chicago
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

^a Number of organizations providing a valid response; the total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods was 104.

^b Rating Scale: 1=Become Worse; 2=Stayed About the Same; 3=Became Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question was: "Over the last 3 years, would you say the youth gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?" In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in reference to the time period: "Over the last year, would you say the gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?"

Table 5.3
Organization Survey
Perceptions of the Success of Program Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Ratings

Strategy ^a	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total ^b (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Community Mobilization												
Coordination: Organizations Defining the Gang Problem	3.81	3.62	3.53	3.78	3.53	3.56	3.70	4.07	3.20	3.53	3.55	3.74
Agreement On What a Gang Is	4.23	3.95	3.84	3.95	3.76	3.76	3.80	4.28	3.53	3.92	3.82	3.99
Agreement On Which Individuals Are Gang Members	3.77	3.69	3.68	4.00	3.59	3.71	3.64	4.00*	3.00	3.44	3.53	3.78
Agreement On What A Gang Incident Is	3.46	3.69	3.63	3.89	3.76	3.47	3.88	4.12	3.16	3.58	3.61	3.79
Agreement On What Should Be Done About The Youth-Gang Problem	3.77	3.23	2.90	3.35	3.00	3.29	3.48	3.88	3.16	3.18	3.25	3.41
Coordination: Organization Information-Sharing	3.38	3.25	3.08	3.44	3.06	3.53	3.33	4.27*	2.69	3.36	3.11	3.64***
Sharing Information About Criminal Actions Of Specific Gang Youth	3.77	3.38	3.30	3.60	3.24	3.65	3.38	4.38*	2.81	2.42	3.27	3.73
Sharing Information About Service Needs Of Specific Gang Youth	3.08	3.17	2.89	3.42	2.88	3.41	3.20	4.16*	2.66	3.26	2.95	3.55
Community Participation and Planning	2.88	2.31	2.79	2.84	3.03	3.00	3.68	3.72	2.72	2.61	3.08	2.98
Citizen Action Regarding Gangs	3.23	2.23	2.67	2.81	3.00	2.82	3.52	3.32	2.45	2.42	2.99	2.78
Community Planning Regarding Gangs	2.54	2.38	2.90	2.86	3.06	3.18	3.84	4.12	3.00	2.79	3.16	3.15

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001.

^a Rating Scale: 1=Poor; 2=Fair; 3=Average; 4=Good; 5=Excellent.

^b Number of organizations providing a valid response; the total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods was 104.

Table 5.3 (continued)
Organization Survey
Perceptions of the Success of Program Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Ratings

Strategy	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Social Intervention Local Service-Agency Programming To Deal With The Gang Problem	2.62	2.85	3.00	3.15	3.06	3.29	3.60	3.64	2.42	3.84	2.99	3.28*
	2.62	2.85	3.00	3.15	3.06	3.29	3.60	3.64	2.42	3.84	2.99	3.28*
Social Opportunities Employment Opportunities For Gang Youth Access To Education Programs For Gang Youth	2.31	2.38	2.39	2.47	2.47	2.79	2.35	2.85	2.32	2.81	2.37	2.69*
	2.23	2.08	1.95	2.15	2.06	2.35	1.83	2.46	1.62	2.38	1.93	2.28*
	2.38	2.69	2.80	2.85	2.88	3.24	2.88	3.25	3.14	3.22	2.84	3.07
Suppression Law Enforcement Efforts Regarding Gangs	3.83	3.58	3.95	3.95	3.82	4.00	4.40	4.48	3.37	3.84	3.92	4.01
	3.83	3.58	3.95	3.95	3.82	4.00	4.40	4.48	3.37	3.84	3.92	4.01

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
School of Social Service Administration
The University of Chicago
Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

Table 5.4
San Antonio Project Performance Indicators: Mean Scores,^a by Rater

Model Indicators	Raters		Combined Mean
	San Antonio Project-Related Personnel (N = 7)	National Evaluation Staff (N = 4)	
Program Elements			
Team Approach	2.83	1.93	2.38
Steering Committee	2.66	0.82	1.74
Grassroots Involvement	2.28	1.17	1.73
Youth Outreach	3.50	3.03	3.26
Criminal Justice	3.11	1.94	2.53
School Participation	2.71	1.61	2.16
Employment/Training	2.66	1.95	2.31
Lead-Agency Management	2.52	1.28	1.90
Program Strategies			
Community Mobilization	2.03	1.11	1.57
Social Intervention	2.95	2.17	2.56
Opportunities Provision	2.73	2.22	2.48
Suppression/Social Control	2.99	2.52	2.76
Organizational Change and Development	2.82	1.14	1.98
Program Implementation Principles			
Targeting	3.75	3.63	3.69
Balance	3.14	1.88	2.51
Intensity	2.97	1.81	2.39
Continuity	2.75	1.63	2.19
Commitment	3.07	1.78	2.42
Totals	2.86^b	1.87^b	2.36

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
School of Social Service Administration
The University of Chicago
Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios

^a Rating Scale: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good.

^b Pearson Correlation (N = 18, R = 0.63, p = 0.005).

Table 5.5
San Antonio Project Performance Scale Distribution
(All Raters)

Model Indicators ^a	Ratings					Missing Response	Total Responses	Combined Mean
	0 no good	1 poor	2 fair	3 good	4 very good			
Program Elements								
Team Approach	4	15	27	48	27	0	121	2.38
Steering Committee	20	24	27	27	21	2	121	1.74
Grassroots Involvement	13	26	23	32	4	1	99	1.73
Youth Outreach	1	4	14	1	63	81	164	3.26
Criminal Justice	12	17	58	60	62	0	209	2.53
School Participation	21	24	54	66	33	0	198	2.16
Employment/Training	4	10	10	21	9	0	44	2.31
Lead-Agency Management	39	52	57	82	33	1	264	1.90
Program Strategies								
Community Mobilization	23	32	30	45	2	0	132	1.57
Social Intervention	4	14	28	62	24	0	132	2.56
Opportunities Provision	6	15	21	49	18	1	110	2.48
Suppression/Social Control	5	14	53	89	50	9	220	2.76
Organizational Change and Development	11	19	16	34	10	9	99	1.98
Program Implementation Principles								
Targeting	0	0	1	11	32	0	44	3.69
Balance	0	3	7	6	6	0	22	2.51
Intensity	3	6	9	16	10	0	44	2.39
Continuity	4	10	7	13	10	0	44	2.19
Commitment	2	8	7	15	12	0	44	2.42

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey
Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to
Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
School of Social Service Administration
The University of Chicago
Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios

^a Each of the Elements, Strategies and Implementation Principles contain varying numbers of subcategories.

Chapter 6

Research Method: Data Management, Measurement and Analysis

The Evaluation attempted to answer several interrelated questions: 1) how, and to what extent, was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model implemented?; and 2) did the San Antonio program contribute to a relative reduction in youth gang crime, particularly at the individual-youth level, and possibly at the program-area level? We addressed the first question in the previous chapters in terms of the Project's origin and structure, the development of its response to the gang problem, and the extent to which the program elements, strategies, and principles were adapted in a manner consistent with the OJJDP Model.

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker contacts, and arrest and to some extent self-report outcomes for individual youth. Our expectation was that, ideally, certain patterns of program services and worker contacts would contribute to a change in key life-course or life-space characteristics of program youth and subsequently to a reduction in delinquency or crime. Before we proceed, however, we need to describe the methods used, i.e., research design (including the instruments employed to gather data) and the resolution of problems we encountered in data collection and analysis to obtain our findings, particularly at the individual-youth level. We pay special attention to data-collection, data-integration and sample-comparability problems, and measurement and analysis procedures used to overcome many of them.

At the start of the program, we planned for a sample at each site of at least 100 program and 100 comparison youth identified as gang members (or youth at high risk of gang

6.1

involvement) and whom we would be able to interview at least twice. The youth were expected to be mainly between the ages of 12 and 20 years at program entry, predominantly male (but with a substantial number of females), mainly Latino and/or African-American and (to a lesser extent) non-Hispanic white, Asian, and Native American. We expected the samples to reflect the nature of the gang-delinquency problem at each of the selected sites, based on community and agency perceptions, and especially on police arrest data. Gang-problem program and equivalent comparison areas, and program and equivalent comparison youth were to be chosen by Project-site program and Local-Evaluation personnel, based on criteria consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, i.e., focus on gang-involved youth who had arrest records or were at high risk for arrest. Many of these expectations were met.

Data Management

A great deal of extra and unanticipated research time and effort was involved in resolving data-management problems, especially data-reliability. The time needed to determine the reliability and accuracy of data extended into the analysis period, since we often discovered discrepancies in information about a particular youth obtained from different sources, e.g., probation and police. We describe how these problems were resolved under the following headings: *data collection, collaboration, data-infrastructure development, accessing and transferring data, and sample comparability.*

Data Collection

Our key individual-level data-collection instruments were the Individual Gang-Member

Survey for program and comparison youth, the Worker Tracking Form for program youth only, and police arrest histories for both program and comparison youth (interviewed and non-interviewed). Somewhat simpler and shorter forms were used to collect data on program exposure (i.e., dates of entry to and exit from the program) and risk period (i.e., the amount of time the youth spent in detention or corrections and was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in the community).

After youth (and/or parental) informed consents were obtained, the gang-member survey was administered to program and comparison youth by the Local Evaluator's interview staff from the University of Texas – San Antonio (UTSA). The hour-long interview requested information from the youth regarding: demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, age); gang activity; school performance; employment; leisure time and friends; crime and fear in the neighborhood; the youth's neighborhood relationships; gang-membership status; gang structure, size, and activities; family composition and relationships; self-reported delinquency; self-reported arrests; criminal-justice experience; and the nature of his or her response to program activities and worker contacts. Information on self-esteem and alienation was also gathered. The interviews were administered at yearly intervals, approximately one year apart – Time I and Time II. However, while 100 program youth completed a Time I interview, only 68 of these completed a Time II interview. One-hundred-twenty (120) comparison youth were interviewed at Time I, and 86 of these were interviewed at Time II. The reinterview rate was 68% for program youth and 71.77% for comparison youth.

A program-services tracking form was completed by each worker having contact with youth. Basic socio-demographic information about the youth was collected, as well as Project

worker's perceptions of the youth's gang-membership status, dates of the youth's contacts with the worker, average number and duration of contacts with the youth, reasons for the youth being in the program, sources of referral, types of services the worker provided, types of referrals made, the worker's perception of his own helpfulness in providing services to youth, and which other Project workers were contacted in servicing program youth. The Worker Tracking Form was completed on a quarterly basis for each individual program youth contacted by the worker – mainly probation officers, outreach youth workers and police.

The local-site police Crime Analyst and/or Local Evaluator completed the collection of an entire police history for each program youth (N = 110) and comparison youth (N = 120), whether the youth was interviewed or not. The criminal history included information on all juvenile and adult arrests, warrants or suspect cases in the city of San Antonio: dates and locations of arrests; home addresses of the youth; gang-involvement characteristics; arrest charges; nature of weapons used; brief description of each arrest incident; disposition of the incident; and whether the youth was placed in custody. In San Antonio, as at the other four demonstration sites, police histories included all of the youth's contacts with the police, prior to his/her program entry and updated through the end of the youth's program period.

Collaboration

The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the Evaluation. Those directly involved in the Evaluation included a National Evaluation team at the University of Chicago, Local Evaluators at each of the five sites, program and evaluation management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department

of Justice, and a National Advisory Board. A Technical Assistance team was closely associated with, if not integrated into, the complex program/research Evaluation structure. The National Evaluation was directed by the Principal Investigator from the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. He and his team were responsible for the design of the Evaluation, including sampling frames, data-collection instruments, and management of the Evaluation across the local sites. Local Project personnel administered program and comparison youth interviews, collected individual police arrest histories, and completed program worker-tracking forms. Community-crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program-performance-indicator, organization-survey and qualitative, on-site observational and other data were collected mainly by the National Evaluation team, with the aid of local agency personnel. All individual-level and aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, and analyzed by the National Evaluation staff in Chicago.

The OJJDP Special Emphasis and Research and Development Divisions' program managers and other OJJDP administrative staff played significant roles in the development and coordination of the program and the Evaluation research. OJJDP staff worked to assure the proper implementation of the Model. Most importantly, they assisted and pressured the Local Evaluators and Project Directors to complete their Evaluation-related assignments in conformity with the National Evaluation and Program-Model designs. The OJJDP staff mediated conflicts that arose between National Evaluators, Local Evaluators and local program staff. The National Evaluators also participated in resolving differences between local program staff and Local Evaluators, who were not always in close communication and collaboration with each other, particularly in respect to the collection of individual gang-member survey data. Collection of

worker-tracking data from service providers, particularly from probation and police, presented special problems for the National Evaluation staff.

Collaboration between local program-development and local evaluation staffs was structured to an extent into the combined local-program and evaluation budgets. Local Evaluation funding came out of the local-site's program budget, as determined by the local Project Director. The National Evaluation and Technical Assistance staffs were also closely integrated; their functions were carried out by some of the same people, although funded from different budgets. Since the Model and ways to implement it were developed at the University of Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for the National Evaluation; the Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation took primary responsibility for Technical Assistance. Both worked in close collaboration with each other.

A National Advisory Board was established, comprising three national experts in the areas of gang research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with OJJDP program and research managers and the National-Evaluation and Technical-Assistance teams to generally advise on research design, review Evaluation objectives and procedures, assess Evaluation progress, and recommend modification of Evaluation strategies. They also participated in selected cross-site program-leadership meetings. However, the Advisory Board was not directly involved in the development of local-program and/or local-evaluation procedures, or resolution of issues that arose.

Data-Infrastructure Development

Relevant information had to be collected and data processing systems developed at the

local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful data that would be comparable across sites. It was not always clear on what basis certain youth were included in the program and others not, what the relevant gang and non-gang characteristics of the youth were, how the youth's problems were diagnosed, what activities or treatments were appropriate, etc. Youth-and-family and other social agencies, as well as some probation departments, did not collect identifying, contact or service-provision data that were systematically useful for National Evaluation purposes. There was a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident or offense data from police sources. The definition and procedures for collection of these data at the individual-youth or community levels were not established prior to the beginning of the Project period.

A definition of a gang incident simply may have referred to a situation involving a drive-by shooting or a graffiti incident. A gang incident at most sites was essentially a criminal event in which an identified gang member had been involved. The police departments at the different sites had yet to develop specific mechanisms for identifying a gang or non-gang-related incident; whether a gang incident was based on gang function or purpose, or whether it was based simply on the youth's identification as a gang member. In San Antonio, a gang incident was based on the involvement and identification of a subject – offender or victim – who was classified (sometimes differently by various law enforcement agencies in the area) as a gang member. Juvenile or youth gangs were not always clearly distinguished from tagger groups or motorcycle, prison, or adult criminal gangs. Existing police data systems had to be designed or redesigned to accommodate both national and local operational definitions, and data-collection and data-organizing procedures. The development of criminal histories for youth known to one or more

police jurisdictions for crimes committed in San Antonio sometimes required the integration of police-history data from several sources in the same or overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions (e.g., San Antonio Police Department and Bexar County Sheriff's Department).

A further problem was clarification of whether individual youth in the police histories were suspects, offenders, or were arrested on a warrant. A suspect might not necessarily be arrested, yet could be regarded as equivalent to an arrestee in some sites. Also, a warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred; the youth may simply have violated a probation condition. In San Antonio, the problems of interpreting police data were resolved in part by focusing only on individual-youth arrests, not on suspect cases.

The collection of aggregate or community-level police data created additional problems for the local police Crime Analyst and/or Local Evaluator. It required the realignment of police beats and districts for criminal-incident or arrest-reporting purposes, using program and comparison-area boundaries determined by the National Evaluation, further specified by where program and comparison youth hung out, their residence locations, and where they were arrested.

Accessing and Transferring Data

Data Sources. Access to data sources was closely related to the problem of developing appropriate data systems at the local sites which would be useful both to the Local and National Evaluators. The data were often located in different sections or bureaus of the police department, i.e., juvenile, adult, and drug-crime units might have to be accessed separately to obtain a complete youth history. Arrest dispositions might not be located in police records, but only at corrections departments or detention centers; criminal-case data were sometimes available in

computerized form, sometimes only in hard copy; the police and sheriff dealing with the same youth in the program or comparison area might not customarily share data; police crime analysts and court clerks were generally reluctant to provide access to case records to outsiders. Access to confinement information about youth was also difficult to obtain from probation, court or corrections systems.

Furthermore, criminal-justice data were particularly difficult to access and use for cross-site comparison purposes. Special arrangements had to be made through local police chiefs, chief probation officers, and sometimes presiding judges to accommodate Local and National-Evaluation needs. Official data systems varied; offense codes differed at each site. Data was sometimes provided in a local-police computer format and submitted on a disk. These data often contained local classification errors which had to be corrected as well as converted to the National Evaluation system. Police-department data systems changed over time, and different local data analysts could not always readily access data from the department's previous system. Errors in data transfer from local police crime analysts to Local Evaluators and then to the National Evaluators were numerous. Software systems might be different and incompatible across the Police-Department, Local-Evaluator, and National-Evaluation operations.

Interviews. Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement presented another series of problems. Local interviewers were often students and women from middle-class backgrounds who had little familiarity with gang youth or gang-problem neighborhoods. Many of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth at their homes or in public areas, particularly in the evening or on weekends. Interview locations that assured privacy, safety, and some comfort for both the youth and the interviewees were difficult to

arrange. Interviewing youth at local Project offices, where police or probation staff might be present, was inappropriate. Special skills, sensitivity, and Spanish-language ability were also often required to adequately explain the purpose of the research and obtain informed consents from the youth (and a parent if the youth was a juvenile). Contacting and obtaining informed consents from comparison youth was particularly difficult at some sites, although not in San Antonio. Considerable effort was required to reestablish contact with a youth in the open community to obtain second or third interviews. As time went on, the youth might no longer have contact with the Project or comparison area's "broker" or intermediary organizations.

Worker-Contact Data. Obtaining permission from agency directors, and cooperation from their Project workers, to complete program-process data (i.e., standardized worker-service or contact-activity records from the different types of workers) proved to be another formidable challenge. Project-related agencies had their own systems of recordkeeping, and their workers did not welcome the additional bureaucratic burden of keeping extra records. It was difficult for police or probation to understand why the recordkeeping they did for their own agencies was not sufficient for Project purposes. Some of the workers did not believe the National Evaluation Worker Tracking Form was adequate to document all that they were doing in the Project.

Cooperation and Training. Inherent in the process of obtaining good data was not only training local data collectors, but also developing cooperation with local Project management staffs. Local Evaluators and their data collectors not only had to have permission to access different existing local-agency data sources – whether police, court, or school records – but required training in how to use them. National Evaluation staff conducted special training sessions on the individual gang-member survey forms with the data collectors at each of the local

sites. Refresher training sessions took place when new local data collectors were hired.

Sample Comparability

A major challenge was establishing comparability of gang-involved and highly gang-at-risk youth in the program and comparison areas. We needed to find non-program-served comparable youth from a comparable gang-problem area or community. We expected that Local Evaluators could identify such communities and would have sufficient know-how and skill to obtain interviews from such youth. Police usually provided information on comparable gang-problem areas, but finding specific youth, or groups of youth, to match program youth was no easy matter.

Ideally, the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem, and specific information about the youth-gang population in both the program and comparison areas, should have been known before the program was implemented and the Evaluation developed. This was not the case. The details of program-youth gang membership status, gang structure, gang process, and the delinquency problems in the program area were just becoming known to program personnel and the Local Evaluators as the Projects were starting up. There was usually less specific knowledge of the gang problem and the gang population in the comparison communities than in the program communities. While it was not clear how representative program youth were of the general youth-gang population in the program area, at least gang youth characteristics in the program area ordinarily would become known over time, and these youth would be more reachable than gang youth in the comparison areas. Fortunately, in San Antonio the Local Evaluator was already familiar with gang youth in the comparison area.

Measurement

We had to overcome problems of: 1) not-clearly matched samples; 2) different police-arrest practices in different local city jurisdictions or across cities; 3) erratic timing of interviews; 4) missing worker-tracking data, especially from the early days of the program; and 5) different time periods for collection and integration of various types of data. Nevertheless, while the collection of youth-specific data from different sources initially made for extra National Evaluation staff burdens, it served to indicate gaps and contradictions in the data, and allowed the National Evaluation staff to go back to Local-Evaluation and program personnel to supplement the data, and develop more accurate and relevant information.

Mismatched Samples. While youth in the program and comparison samples were usually 12 to 20 years of age, both samples sometimes contained a number of youth who were older than 20 years. We included all of these youth in the analyses. (Generally, there were no youth in our samples under 12 years of age.) To facilitate age comparisons between program and comparison samples we adjusted for specific youth-age differences by placing youth in three general age categories – 14 years and under, 15 to 16 (or 15 to 17) years, 17 to 18 years, and 19 years and over – depending on the age distribution at the sites, and especially on state criminal law specifying the age cut-off between juvenile and adult status. In general, program and comparison youth at each site were mainly between 14 and 18 years of age, predominantly male, mainly Latino (Mexican-American), to some extent African-American, and to a very limited extent non-Latino white, Native American, and Asian-American.

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Program youth were not always administered a Time-I interview immediately when they came into the program. In a few cases, Time-I interviews took place before the program officially began, but they were mainly administered at any time within the first three to six months after the youth entered the program. The interval between the Time-I and Time-II interviews of program youth was generally a year to a year-and-a-quarter, but a handful of youth were administered Time-II interviews slightly before the end of the one-year interval, or slightly after the 1¼-year interval. We tested (or compared) youth interviewed at somewhat different Time-I and Time-II periods; in all cases, the differences in interview intervals did not significantly affect outcome findings.

Comparison youth were generally interviewed at a slightly later time period than were program youth. Comparison youth had to be matched to program youth by gender, and their ages had to be adjusted to match those of program youth, either at the time of the program youths' initial interviews or when they entered the program. In addition, criminal-history periods of comparison youth had to be matched to those of individual program youth, using age, gender, program entry and length of time in the program (see Matching Youth Samples, below).

Missing Worker-Tracking Data. Another research problem was not simply that certain workers were reluctant to complete worker tracking forms describing the kinds of services they provided to youth and/or the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. At some sites, worker-tracking did not commence until several months after the program had been underway. For the period prior to worker-tracking data collection, we sometimes had no detailed evidence of services or worker contacts provided to specific youth. However, we did have relatively

accurate official Project-entry dates, criminal histories, and youth-confinement records for all program youth, as well as the youth's own record of services received (from the individual gang-member survey). We were able to determine statistically whether projected, additional services-data would have made a difference in outcomes for program youth.

Different Arrest Patterns Across Areas. We learned belatedly that the arrest and gang-member-identification procedures and practices of police in the program and comparison areas might differ. The police might arrest youth for certain status offenses and not for others, or they could be more pro-active in identifying gang youth and arresting them for a different range of offenses or crimes, minor or major, in one area of the city than another, or in different and/or comparison cities. This could explain why frequency of arrests varied among program and comparison youth. Based on interview and self-reported offense data, and controlling for key youth characteristics (e.g., school performance, employment, family structure, household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs), the youth samples from the program and comparison areas might be similar, but might differ because of different arrest practices. This was a problem when comparison youth came from a different city than program youth.

The best we could do to show that an adequate match existed between the program and comparison-youth samples was to use different sources of gang-membership-identification and outcome data (i.e., Project-agency worker perceptions, and youth self-report and police offense and arrest data – sometimes in separate multivariate analyses), and test whether similar, or explainable, change patterns would emerge. We could also examine trends within the program and comparison areas, and compare similarities and differences at the individual-youth arrest and

gang-offense levels with those at the gang-as-a-unit and general-community levels.

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally, all of the data at the individual-youth level (gang-member-survey, worker-tracking, police-arrest, program-exposure, and confinement-period) should have been integrated into one data set. But this assumed that the time frames for the data collected for each youth would match, i.e., that interviews, services provided, worker contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. They did not.

Official police data at some sites covered a longer period than the interview interval or even the program period. The police arrest-history period was selected to include both a matched pre-program and program exposure period. The total program worker-tracking period was about 2½ years; the interval between the Time-I and Time-II interviews was usually shorter – 1 to 1¼ years – and generally represented only a part of the total program and criminal-history periods. Our preferred analysis time period became the longer police arrest-history period, matched to program-exposure and equivalent pre-program periods.

Analysis

In order to account for any youth-outcome changes due to program effects, we utilized a minimum of one month of time during which the program could reasonably have had an effect (based on detailed program-service, program-exposure, police-history, and to some extent self-reported offense data). This would be the basis for determining the Project's success or failure in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of delinquency and crime, particularly at the

individual-youth level. At some of the sites, we analyzed the data in different stages, moving from simpler, larger sample analyses with less extensive data, to more complex and richer analyses using smaller youth samples. The major steps in our approach – across sites when time and resources permitted – were:

1. Compare the effects of the program using police data and amount of program exposure over the full program period (based on program-entry and exit data) for matched program and comparison youth. We determined what the effects were on youth during their full program-exposure period, compared to an identical period for matched comparison youth. While the advantage of this approach was the utilization of the longest period of possible program effect, it did not include detailed data on characteristics of program youth obtained from worker-tracking and interview records. All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, for whether the youth (or Project personnel) said he had been a gang member, and for pre-program arrests. We determined the effects of the program on youth using the police outcome variables of *changes in total arrests, serious violence arrests, total violence arrests* (serious and less serious), *property arrests, drug arrests, and other arrests* (usually for minor offenses) in a series of multivariate analyses.

2. Next, compare the effects of the program on youth using not only police-arrest change data, but also specific worker-tracking service and contact data. These program service/contact variables were indicators of key elements of the Model strategy at the individual-youth level. A limitation at some sites – but not in San Antonio – was that we might not have a genuine baseline for when program effects could have started. We used the same control, dependent and independent variables as we did in the analysis described in the paragraph above. We compared

arrest changes for program youth during the program period compared to the pre-program period.

3. As in (1) above, compare the possible effects of the program – now using self-report (program and comparison youth) data instead of police arrest data – and the general or imputed (but non-detailed) program-exposure effects during the 1 to 1¼ -year period between the Time-I and Time-II interviews. The advantage of this approach was in using the youth’s self-reported offenses (including specific gang-related behaviors) as well as contextual data (neighborhood, family, gang, etc.) more extensively over the six-month-prior-to-Time-I and six-month-prior-to-Time-II interview periods, 1 to 1¼ years apart. Again, controlling for age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang-membership status and pre-program self-reported offenses, we looked for differences in total offenses, serious violence offenses, total violence offenses, property offenses and drug-selling offenses over time. Limitations in measuring change were the short interview-interval period and the smaller size of the samples. We were not able to carry out this part of the analysis in San Antonio for lack of OJJDP evaluation-research resources.

4. Compare the effects of the pattern of program services and contacts on program youth and introduce mediating variables derived from the interview findings, such as *changes in youth neighborhood and life-space/life-course characteristics* (e.g., gang membership, gang involvement, size of the gang, school participation and employment). The key outcome variable was *differences in number of police arrests* assuming that mediating change factors in the Time-I/Time-II interview intervals were related to outcome based on differences between the pre-program and program arrest periods. Similar control and outcome variables using police arrest data were employed. We were interested in the effects of the program variables (e.g., individual and family counseling services, suppression, etc.) on the mediating variables, and finally in the

effects of the changes in the mediating variables on the changes in the outcome variables for different program youth. This analysis would be particularly useful depending on whether there were significant differences already found in the analysis conducted in (1) above. Again, we were not able to carry out this part of the analysis in San Antonio for lack of OJJDP evaluation-research resources.

Matching Youth Samples (Kwai Ming Wa)

Our analysis strategies depended on establishing equivalency in the program and comparison-youth samples, particularly for program youth who had demographic, worker-tracking, and arrest data. We had to make sure that our comparison youth and those program youth with no worker-tracking records and less than one month of services/contacts were adequately matched on key demographics (especially age and gender) and program-exposure time to our program youth who had tracking records and a month or more of services/contacts. Special assessment and matching procedures were required.

Our total sample consisted of 230 youth. We compared the program and comparison samples, concentrating on the program youth with worker-tracking records and a month or more of services/contacts (n = 104), and the comparison youth with no worker contacts or services (n = 120). (There were six youth in the program with no worker-tracking records.) The program-youth sample comprised those identified in a full Project list of all youth who were provided with worker contacts or services (n = 110), which included 100 youth who were interviewed at Time I and an additional 7 youth who were provided with services but had no interviews. Project workers provided information through program-tracking records for 107 of these youth, of whom

100 had a program-exposure period of one or more months.

The purpose of the matching procedure was to establish appropriate program and pre-program periods in which to compare youth from the two samples using gender, age, and length of program exposure as criteria. The initial objective was to match comparison youth who had arrest records with program worker-tracked youth who had arrest records. This would provide each comparison youth with a hypothetical program entry and exit date, determined by the matched program youth's entry and exit dates. The number of arrests could then be counted for both program and comparison youth in equivalent program and pre-program periods. When a youth had no arrest history, the estimated length of time in the program (or its equivalent), whether long or short, had no effect on the arrest-count procedure. Arrests in the program and pre-program periods would always sum to zero.

We identified a sample of 95 worker-tracked program youth (including the 6 youth with no worker-tracking records) with one month or more of program exposure, as well as a sample of 75 comparison youth, who had arrests before July 1, 1999, i.e., the end of the Project period. Of the program worker-tracked group, 91 youth had arrest histories; of the program non-worker-tracked group, 5 had arrests histories prior to July 1, 1999. In our analyses, we focused on those youth arrested in the program and pre-program periods only (program youth $n = 68$; comparison youth $n = 49$). The basic matching strategy was to pair comparison youth with arrests with program worker-tracked youth with arrests by gender and also by age (closest birthday), on a one-comparison-youth to one-program-youth basis. Generally, the birthdays of the matched comparison and program youth occurred within a month or two of each other. We did not include the 6 program non-worker-tracked youth who had some arrest history prior to July 1,

1999, since 5 out of the 6 had only 1 arrest in the pre-program or program period. Finally, the comparison youth without arrests were matched to the remaining program youth – worker-tracked and non-worker-tracked, with and without arrests – on the basis of gender and age, in order to estimate their program and pre-program period lengths.

Chapter 7

Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth

(Rolando V. Sosa and Kwai Ming Wa)

In this chapter, we present a picture of program and comparison youth in the pre-program period as well as (to some extent) in the prior-to-pre-program, program and post-program periods. We focus on single-dimensional characteristics of youth: demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, age), arrest histories, confinement experience and self-report gang-membership status, mainly in the pre-program period and/or at the Time-I interview. The differences across samples are better statistically controlled in our later multivariate analyses in relation to changes in youth behaviors that may or may not have been due to the Project. The nature and scope of Project-worker contacts and services to program youth, and Project effects in respect to some of these characteristics, are described in later chapters.

Our discussion in this chapter covers all youth who participated in the Project, whether or not they were interviewed or have worker (service)-tracking records. We use and integrate data from various sources – the Individual Gang-Member Survey, the Project’s worker-tracking records, and San Antonio Police and Probation Department records. Our samples focus on program youth with worker-tracking records ($N = 104$), program youth with no worker-tracking records ($N = 6$), and all the comparison youth ($N = 120$). The samples include interviewed and non-interviewed youth, and all youth with or without police histories ($N = 230$).

7.1

Demographic Characteristics

Gender. Of the total sample (N = 230), 84.4% were male and 15.7% were female. Males predominated in our samples. The gender distribution is somewhat similar across the samples, although there are more program worker-tracked males (87.5%) than comparison males (80.8%). There were only males in our small, program non-worker-tracked sample. Because there were so few youth in our program non-worker-tracked sample, we eliminated this sample in the later multivariate analyses (Table 7.1).

Race/Ethnicity. Almost all youth in our samples were Latino (Mexican-American): comparison (100.0%), program worker-tracked (94.2%), and program non-worker-tracked (100.0%). African-Americans comprised only 5 youth (4.8%) in the program worker-tracked sample, and were not present in the other samples. There was also one non-Latino white youth in the program worker-tracked sample. Since 97.4% of the total samples was Latino, we excluded race/ethnicity from our later multivariate analyses (Table 7.2).

Age. The ages of youth were categorized into three groups: two juvenile groups – 12 to 14 and 15 to 17 years, and an adult or young adult group – 18 to 24 years. The 15- to 17-year-old group was the largest (50.4%) of the total sample, and was larger in the program worker-tracked (57.7%) and the program non-worker-tracked (50.0%) samples than in the comparison sample (44.2%). The 18-years-and-older group was relatively larger in the comparison (36.7%) than in the program worker-tracked (24.0%) or program non-worker-tracked (16.7%) samples. The youngest age group, 14 and under, had the smallest proportion of youth in the program worker-tracked (18.2%) and the comparison (19.2%) samples (Table 7.3).

Arrest Histories

Arrest histories were obtained from the San Antonio Police Department for all program and comparison youth who were arrested in San Antonio. The histories covered all recorded arrests prior to July 1, 1999, when the program ended. Youth generally were arrested in the city, usually in the police district where they lived or their gang hung out. Our Evaluation focus is on arrest-pattern changes at the individual-youth or area levels between the matched pre-program and program periods, depending on how long each program youth was in the program (and the equivalent periods for each comparison youth, matched on age at the time of the program youth's entry into the program). However, since the program period was relatively short in the San Antonio Project, and substantial numbers of youth had arrests prior even to the pre-program period, we include a prior-to-pre-program-period category and also a post-program category. To create a complete pre-program picture, especially of early arrest history, we present arrest data in this chapter on youth in the three samples in their prior-to-pre-program, pre-program and post-program periods. The data in Table 7.4 indicate that relatively and absolutely more of the program worker-tracked youth (64.4%) than comparison youth (40.8%) had arrest histories and had somewhat different types of pre-program arrests (Table 7.5).

Arrests in the Pre-Program and Other Periods. Of the total youth in the three samples (N = 230), only 50.9% (n = 52) had arrest records and were included in our analysis of youth arrested in the pre-program period, program period, or both. The remainder either had no arrests, or arrests in other periods (prior-to-pre-program or post-program), but not in the pre-program or program periods. Included in the matched samples of youth arrested either in the pre-program or program period, or in both periods, were: comparison youth (n = 49), program worker-tracked

youth (n = 67), and program non-worker-tracked youth (n = 1). (Not all of these were necessarily arrested in all of the three arrest periods.)

In other words, because of the short period of program operations and the nature of the program, pre-program and other periods, as full a scope of arrest histories is not accounted for in the San Antonio program analysis as it was in the analyses of the other sites.

The profiles of youth with records of arrests in the pre-program period were as follows: considerably more program worker-tracked youth (64.4%) than comparison (40.8%) had arrests in the pre-program (as well as other) periods. However, although an equivalent number and similar proportion of program worker-tracked (n = 24, 23.1%) and comparison youth (n = 24, 20.0%) only had arrests in the prior-to-pre-program or post-program periods, there were a great many more comparison (n = 45, 37.5%) than program worker-tracked (n = 13, 12.5%) youth who had no arrest histories. In other words, not only did more program worker-tracked youth than comparison youth have arrest histories, but probably more program worker-tracked youth had arrest histories in the pre-program period, as well as in other periods (Table 7.4).

When we focus on the overall pattern of frequency of arrests in the pre-program period, we find that the average number of arrests for program worker-tracked and non-worker-tracked youth together (mean = 1.03) is about equivalent to that of the comparison youth (mean = 1.0). However, the nature of the arrests of youth in the pre-program period is quite different for program youth (worker-tracked and non-worker tracked) and comparison youth. There was a higher percent of arrests of program youth for serious violence (11.4%) and less-serious violence (18.6%) than for comparison youth, (4.1%) and (6.1%) respectively. On the other hand, in the pre-program period there was a higher percent of arrests for drug offenses for comparison youth

(28.6%) than for program youth (10.0%) (Table 7.5).

In other words, Table 7.4 and 7.5 indicate not only that more program youth than comparison youth had arrest records, but that the pattern of their arrests was different, at least within the pre-program period. The program youth (particularly the program worker-tracked youth) were relatively more involved in – or at least arrested for – violence offenses, and the comparison youth for drug offenses; not that each sample of youth was specialized completely to certain patterns of offenses, especially in the pre-program period, but that the program worker-tracked youth with violence backgrounds were more likely to be selected for the program than the comparison youth, perhaps because of their violence orientation.

These differences in types of offenses by the two samples may also have represented more enduring patterns of offenses and arrests. This is evident from the data in Table 7.6, covering arrest histories across all periods – prior-to-pre-program, pre-program, program and post-program. These differences persist between program and comparison youth when we aggregate all periods together. Program worker-tracked youth are relatively more highly oriented to acts of violence, and comparison youth relatively more oriented to illicit drug activity. To what extent the Project (despite its short-lived period of operation) may have influenced arrest rates, as well as patterns of offenses for which arrests were made, we examine in our later multivariate models.

Confinement Experience

We were not able to collect and analyze data on total probation and parole experiences of youth prior to their entry into the program, but we were able to collect data on confinement (i.e.,

detention and incarceration), including the amount of time program and comparison youth were confined in the matched pre-program period. A higher percent of program worker-tracked youth (57.3%) than comparison youth (41.9%) had confinement experience. No program non-worker-tracked youth had pre-program confinement experience. In other words, not only were more program youth arrested, but more of those arrested had detention and/or incarceration experience in the pre-program period. Furthermore, more of the program worker-tracked youth (22.4%) than equivalent comparison youth (3.7%) experienced longer periods of confinement (Table 7.7). Program youth (those who were served in the program) were more serious offenders than comparison youth (who were not served in the program), and we controlled for these differences in the later analyses.

Probation/Parole Status

At the Time I interview, more program than comparison youth reported that they had been on probation and/or parole. Eighty-one percent (81.0%) of program youth (N = 100) and 46.7% of comparison youth (N = 120) reported they had been on probation. There was little difference, in the percentage of those who said they had probation experience, between program youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II (80.1%) and those interviewed only at Time I (81.3%). However, at the Time I interview more of the comparison youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II reported they had probation experience (51.2%) than those interviewed at Time I only (35.3%).

At Time I, while 23 (23.0%) program youth reported they had been or were on parole, only 4 (3.3%) comparison youth reported parole experience. Again, probation and parole data,

based on youth self-reports, indicate that program youth were clearly more serious offenders than were comparison youth.

Gang-Membership Status

Despite the fact that more program worker-tracked youth than comparison youth had arrests for violence and extensive confinement experience in the pre-program period, at the Time I interview more comparison youth (n = 119, 99.2%) than program youth (n = 88, 88.0%) declared they had a history of associating with gang members. The remaining youth in each sample, regardless of gender or age, said they did not associate with gang members (Table 7.8). In other words, association with gang members or identification of self as a gang member was not necessarily associated with arrest, or levels-of-arrest, background.

There was a high level of congruence between what program youth self-reported and what Project workers said was the youth's gang status during his program experience. In 87.8% of the cases (n = 105), both Project workers and the youth himself agreed as to whether he was a gang member, gang associate, or non-gang youth. Further, there was greater agreement on whether the youth was a gang member (89.6%, n = 77) rather than a gang associate (40.0%, n = 15), or a non-gang youth (7.7%, n = 13). Despite the high degree of congruence in overall estimates, there was a tendency for the Project worker to underestimate the youth's being a gang member when the youth himself declared he was a gang member; they also overestimated him as a wannabe or gang associate, and underestimated him as a non-gang youth. The greatest discrepancy occurred when the youth declared he was not a gang member, and the worker said he was a gang member or associate.

It should be noted that the estimates of gang-membership status – by youth themselves and Project workers – covered slightly overlapping periods. The Project-worker estimates covered a period forward from the time the youth entered the program; the youth self-reports covered a period six months prior to the time of the first interview, after the youth had entered the program (Table 7.9).

Also, it should be noted that there was a good deal of change in the program youth's level of gang activity, and identification with the gang, over time. It was difficult to determine whether comparison or program youth were more or less identified with a particular status of gang membership. Although more program than comparison youth said they were not gang members, more program youth said they had always been gang members, but more comparison youth said they had been active gang members in the previous six-month period. About a third of each sample said they were former gang members (Table 7.10). In other words, if a youth said he associated with gang members, this did not, in his eyes, necessarily make him an active gang member. The meaning of gang-membership was therefore changeable and somewhat elusive.

Finally, outreach youth workers reported that program youth were members of a large range of gangs or street groups (Table 7.11). Based on their field observations, many youth readily switched membership from one group to another. Although the great majority of youth (program or comparison) were gang members and/or associated with gangs at one time or another, in our later analyses we did not find gang-membership status to be a useful predictor over a short period of time of program effects on arrest-change patterns. We observe that the program had little effect in changing the gang status per se of program youth, i.e., his identification or association with a gang, over a relatively short period of time.

Summary

In sum, program and comparison youth were reasonably similar in regard to the distribution of gender, race/ethnicity, age, and gang-membership characteristics. Youth in both samples were predominantly male, Mexican-American, 15 to 17 years of age, and were gang members at program entry (or at the Time-I interview). The key differences between the samples were whether the youth were previously arrested, for what types of offenses, and to what extent they had a confinement background (i.e., prior detention or incarceration experience). More program youth than comparison youth had arrest records, were relatively more-often arrested for violence but less-often for illicit drug activity, and had more extensive confinement histories. These initial gang-membership-status differences would be controlled in the multivariate models to determine the effect of Project-worker contacts and services on youth in the program. The nature of the youth samples and our analysis did not permit us to determine whether gang membership and delinquency were distinctively correlated, since most program and comparison youth were gang members with arrest records. We were not be able to determine whether the program had any special effects on youth who were or were not gang members.

Table 7.1
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 230)
Gender

Youth Sample	Male	Female	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	97 (80.8)	23 (19.2)	120 (52.2)
Program Worker-Tracked	91 (87.5)	13 (12.5)	104 (45.2)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked	6 (100.0)	0 (0)	6 (2.6)
Total	194 (84.4)	36 (15.7)	230 (100.0)

Table 7.2
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 230)
Race/Ethnicity

Youth Sample	African-American	Latino (Mexican-American)	Other (non-Latino white)	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	0 (0.0)	120 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	120 (52.2)
Program Worker-Tracked	5 (4.8)	98 (94.2)	1 (0.1)	104 (45.2)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked	0 (0.0)	6 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	52 (2.6)
Total	5 (2.2)	224 (97.4)	1 (0.4)	230 (100.0)

Table 7.3
Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 230)
Age Categories

Youth Sample	12-14	15 to 17	18-24	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Comparison	23 (19.2)	53 (44.2)	44 (36.7)	120 (52.2)
Program Worker-Tracked	19 (18.2)	60 (57.7)	25 (24.0)	104 (45.2)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked	2 (33.3)	3 (50.0)	1 (16.7)	6 (2.7)
Total	44 (19.1)	116 (50.4)	70 (30.4)	230 (100.0)

Table 7.4
Arrest Histories
Prior-to-Pre-Program, Pre-Program and Other Periods^a Only (N = 230)

Youth Sample	Arrest Period				Total
	Prior-to-Pre-Program and Post-Program Only	Pre-Program and Other Periods ^b	Post-Program Only	No Arrest History	
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	
Comparison	24 (20.0)	49 (40.8)	2 (1.7)	45 (37.5)	120 (100.0)
Program Worker-Tracked	24 (23.1)	67 (64.4)	0 (0.0)	13 (12.5)	104 (100.0)
Program Non-Worker-Tracked	4 (66.7)	1 (16.7)	0 (0.0)	1 (16.7)	6 (100.0)
Total	52 (22.6)	117 (50.9)	2 (0.9)	59 (28.7)	230 (100.0)

^a For purposes of program evaluation, youth in the three samples were matched based on the length of time the program worker-tracked youth was in the program. Focus of the outcome analysis is on the pre-program and program periods. However, several youth in the three samples also had arrests prior to the (matched) pre-program period.

^b Youth arrested in the pre-program period could also have been arrested in other periods, including the program, prior-to-pre-program as well as the post-program periods.

Table 7.5
Types of Arrests in the Pre-Program Period (N = 119)
Comparison Youth (N = 49) and Program Youth (N = 61)^a

Arrest Category	Comparison Youth Arrests		Program Youth Arrests	
	n	%	n	%
Serious Violence	2	(4.1)	8	(11.4)
Less-Serious Violence	3	(6.1)	13	(18.6)
Drugs	14	(28.6)	7	(10.0)
Property	24	(49.0)	31	(44.3)
Weapons	2	(4.1)	1	(1.4)
Public Disturbance	2	(4.1)	1	(1.4)
Alcohol	1	(2.0)	2	(2.9)
Other	1	(2.0)	7	(10.0)
Total	49	(100.0)	70	(100.0)

^a Includes program worker-tracked and non-worker-tracked youth.

Table 7.6
Arrest Patterns
All Youth (N = 230) – All Periods^a

Sample	Types of Arrest										Total	
	Total Violence ^b Including Drugs		Total Violence ^b Excluding Drugs		Drugs/No Violence		No Drugs/No Violence ^c		No Arrests			
	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	N	(%)
Comparison	5	(4.2)	11	(9.2)	36	(30.0)	23	(19.2)	45	(37.5)	120	(52.2)
Program Worker- Tracked	17	(16.5)	33	(31.7)	15	(14.4)	26	(25.0)	13	(12.5)	104	(45.2)
Program Non- Worker- Tracked	1	(16.7)	1	(16.7)	2	(33.3)	1	(16.7)	1	(16.7)	6	(2.6)
Total	23	(10.0)	45	(19.6)	53	(23.0)	50	(21.7)	59	(25.7)	230	(100.0)

^a Youth are classified by type by all arrests, regardless of whether arrests occurred in prior-to-pre-program, pre-program, program, or post-program period.

^b Includes serious and less-serious violence arrests.

^c Includes arrests for all types of offenses, excluding violence and/or drugs.

Table 7.7
Percent of Confinement Experience
for Youth With Arrests in the Pre-Program Period (N = 117)

Sample	None		< 0.1		0.1 – 0.24		> = 0.25		Total	
	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	N	(%)
Comparison	27	(55.1)	19	(38.8)	1	(2.0)	2	(1.7)	49	(41.9)
Program Worker-Tracked	28	(41.8)	24	(35.8)	5	(7.5)	10	(14.9)	67	(57.3)
Program Non-Workers-Tracked	1	(100.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	1	(0.9)
Total	56	(47.9)	43	(36.8)	6	(5.1)	12	(10.3)	117	(100.0)

Table 7.8
 Association with Gang Members and Non-Gang Youth
 Time I Interview

Sample	Ever Associated With....				Total	
	Gang Member		Non-Gang Youth			
	n	(%)	n	(%)	N	(%)
Comparison	119	(99.2)	1	(0.8)	120	(54.6)
Program	88	(88.0)	12	(12.0)	100	(45.5)
Total	207	(94.1)	13	(5.9)	220	(100.0)

Table 7.9
 Youth Gang-Membership Status
 Congruence of Self-Reported and Worker Estimates
 Time I Interview^a (N = 105)

Program Youth Self-Reported Gang-Membership Status ^b	Project-Worker-Reported Gang-Membership Status ^b							
	Gang Member		Wannabe (Gang Associate)		Non-Gang Youth		Total	
	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	N	(%)
Gang Member	69	(89.6)	5	(6.5)	3	(3.9)	77	(73.3)
Gang Associate	9	(60.0)	6	(40.0)	0	(0.0)	15	(14.3)
Non-Gang Youth	6	(46.2)	6	(46.2)	1	(7.7)	13	(12.4)
Total	84	(80.0)	17	(16.2)	4	(3.8)	105	(100.0)

^a Youth reported their gang-membership status at the Time I interview, within a six-month period of program entry, usually covering a four- to six-months prior period. Project workers made their estimates of the youth's gang-membership status several times in the course of his/her total program period. The estimates of the majority of workers were used to determine the youth's gang-membership status.

^b Row figures are program youth self-descriptions. Column total figures are worker estimates of program youth gang-membership status.

Table 7.10
 Self-Reported Gang-Membership Status
 Sample Youth – Time I Interview (N = 220)

Sample	Non-Gang Youth		Former Gang Member		Active in Previous Six Months		Always Active		Total	
	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	N	(%)
Comparison	1	(0.8)	47	(39.2)	25	(40.0)	47	(39.2)	120	(54.6)
Program	12	(12.0)	33	(33.3)	5	(5.0)	50	(50.0)	100	(45.5)
Total	13	(5.9)	80	(36.4)	30	(13.6)	97	(44.1)	220	(100.0)

Table 7.11
 Project-Worker-Reported Gang Affiliation (N = 107)
 by Gang or Street Group (N = 37)

Gang or Street Group	Number of Youth (%)
Bad Company/Mexican Posse	18 (19.1)
Original Crip Gangsta X3	14 (14.9)
ABC/Southwest Crips	8 (8.5)
Illusion Posse (party crew)	4 (4.3)
Puro Brown Chicanos	3 (3.2)
Valley High Mob	3 (3.2)
Suicidal Loscos	3 (3.2)
Insane Chicanos	2 (2.1)
Sureno 13	2 (2.1)
Carnales Por Vida	2 (2.1)
Puro Fearless Gangster	2 (2.1)
Ladies Player Crew	2 (2.1)
Getting Fucked Up	2 (2.1)
Westside Possee	2 (2.1)
Las Minas	2 (2.1)
LA Boys	2 (2.1)
Los Cycoz	2 (2.1)
Ambrose/Northside Ambrose	2 (2.1)
Almighty Latin Kings	1 (1.1)
Underground Eruption	1 (1.1)
Killing is Necessary (KIN)	1 (1.1)
Skills That Kill	1 (1.1)
Always Violent Boys	1 (1.1)
Southside Crips	1 (1.1)
Brown Leaf Posse	1 (1.1)
Hispanics Doin It	1 (1.1)

Table 7.11 cont
 Project-Worker-Reported Gang Affiliation (N = 107)
 by Gang or Street Group (N = 37)

Gang or Street Group	Number of Youth (%)
Party Crew	1 (1.1)
Latin Syndicate	1 (1.1)
Indian Creek Posse	1 (1.1)
Barrio La Blanca (LBL)	1 (1.1)
Up From Above (UFA)	1 (1.1)
Locked Out Crips	1 (1.1)
Krazy Latino Boyz (party crew)	1 (1.1)
Rigsby Court Gangsters	1 (1.1)
Doin Straight Kaos	1 (1.1)
Legion of Doom (LOD)	1 (1.1)
R/Q Rock Quarry Gang	1 (1.1)
Subtotal	94 (11.4)
None	13
Total	107

Chapter 8

Program Services and Worker Contacts

(Rolando V. Sosa)

Introduction

The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual gang youth (and the gang itself), but the community and its organizations and programs were involved in both the creation and the reduction of the youth gang problem. The Comprehensive Gang Program Model assumed that key organizations in the community were not adequately coordinated in developing an appropriate program approach of worker contacts and services, and that sufficient resources might not have been available to target gang-involved or highly gang-at-risk youth. The Model required that agencies and grassroots groups develop and rearrange their programs to better target gang youth, particularly through a combination of coordinated school, job, counseling, and suppression activities. A truly comprehensive approach was necessary, one which included different types of agencies and local groups concerned with and/or closely related to the interests and needs of gang youth, their families, and those at highest risk of gang delinquency.

The Projects at the five Model sites were expected not only to mobilize both agency and grassroots elements, but to establish outreach contacts with targeted gang youth who were only partially (or not at all) served and not adequately socially controlled. From a structure-and-process perspective, the Model required not only a Steering Committee of community leaders and representatives of key organizations, but also a street team consisting of workers from the

key organizations and community groups concerned with the youth-gang problem. The community direct-service or contact team was to include police officers, probation officers, outreach youth workers and case managers, and, closely related to them, teachers, manpower-development workers and specialized treatment workers. Probation and police officers would be interested in providing social support, as well as suppression measures. Outreach youth workers would preferably come from the same gang neighborhoods as the targeted youth, and would be able to assist youth with social support and access to appropriate social services (e.g., drug treatment and family counseling), as well as to exercise appropriate social control. The various types of workers were to collaborate in their efforts to target appropriate youth. Worker services and contacts might extend over a period of months or years, as necessary, with especially-frequent contacts with hardcore gang-delinquent youth, their families and other agency and neighborhood workers.

Model elements, strategies and operating principles in San Antonio were slowly and incompletely developed during the life of the Project. Probation officers were the primary source of referral of youth to the program. Along with the police, they embodied the authoritative character of the program, but were not substantially involved on a collaborative team basis in the social-development components of the Project. Outreach youth workers (and the contact agency [EXCEL treatment workers) became the major source of social support for program youth, and (increasingly) the initiators of contacts with other agencies on their behalf. A traditional outreach youth service began to evolve. Criminal-justice, social, and community-based agencies, and particularly the Project's lead agency, did not take adequate initiative for implementing the key, interrelated services-and-controls approach specified in the OJJDP Model.

The Worker Tracking Form

The major instrument for obtaining data regarding services to and contacts with individual program youth by the different Project workers was the 12-page Worker Tracking Form, containing mainly closed-ended, check-off items and several open-ended questions. Each worker was expected to summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth and the services provided (including referral services) during each three-month calendar quarter.

The form requested the following types of information from each worker: identification of the worker and his organization; identification of the program youth; the youth's demographics (age, gender, race/ethnicity) and gang affiliation (along with rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact with the youth (first contact after program entry, first and last contact in the reporting period); number and types of contacts with the youth; types of services provided; referrals made on behalf of the youth; a rating of the youth's progress; identification of services or referrals felt by the worker to be most helpful to the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the youth's degree of involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the reporting period. Also very important was an accounting of the nature and level of Project-worker-initiated coordinated contacts with other workers (both other Project workers and workers from outside agencies) in regard to the youth.

Fifty-five (55) possible services or activities of workers were identified, and then further combined into eight major service/activity categories: case planning, group-oriented services, individual counseling, family counseling, school-related services, job-related services, suppression, and material support. Project-related probation officers, outreach youth workers and

other workers (e.g., schools, parole, job development, neighborhood groups) were ideally expected to provide services to and/or contacts with youth. In the San Antonio program, 878 Worker Tracking Forms were completed. The percent of forms completed by each of the different types of workers was: 5 Project outreach youth workers, 2 outreach supervisors, and 1 employment counselor = 72.3%; 6 probation officers = 4.4%; 1 juvenile parole officer = 4.5%; 2 police officers and 1 police gang detective = 10.5%; 1 director of a community-based youth treatment agency = 7.3%; and 1 assistant school principal = 0.9%. No other types of workers completed Worker Tracking Forms.

Model strategies were specifically indicated by the following categories of services and contacts: *social intervention* – individual counseling, group discussion and family counseling (including crisis intervention); *social opportunities provision* – vocational or job-related and education-related services such as school placement, GED program and continuing education; *suppression* – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, monitoring, surveillance. The strategy of *community mobilization* at the direct-worker contact and service level, specified by the concept of coordination of workers across agencies, was indicated by the number of worker-contacts by workers with each other in relation to a particular youth, and by which worker initiated the contact. The strategy of *organizational change and development* was indicated by possible changes in types and combinations of services and contacts as the program developed. Little of the strategy of organizational change and development, as conceived in the OJJDP Model, occurred in San Antonio.

Our analyses of the worker-tracking data focus on services to and contacts with all program youth (N = 110) for whom worker-tracking data exists (n = 107; 97.3%), regardless of

length of time the youth was in the program. A total of 6,713 services were provided and 5,535 worker contacts made during the approximately 2 years of program operations – May 1, 1997 through June 30, 1999. An average of 8.2 forms were gathered for each program youth. We believe that an adequate basis exists to analyze the nature of patterns of different worker services and contacts using various characteristics of youth in the program. Program-youth entry and exit records were independent data sources for verifying the length of time youth were in the program. Length of time in the program was an important variable in later multivariate analyses of the effects of the program (see Chapter 9).

Youth Characteristics and Sources of Referral to the Program

All youth who participated in the program and who had worker-tracking records (N = 107) were included in this analysis, whether they were interviewed or not. Thirty-eight (38) were referred by Juvenile Probation, 1 by Adult Probation, 24 by Juvenile Parole, 14 by outreach youth workers, and 13 by the local school officials. The remaining 15 youth were referred to the program by family (5), police (3), another program youth (3), and a youth himself (3) (the source of referral for 2 youth was unknown). Probation and Parole officers referred the majority of youth (58.9%) to the program (Table 8.1).

Of the 107 youth, 94 were male (87.9%) and 13 were female (12.1%); 101 were Latino (mainly of Mexican ancestry) (94.4%); 5 were African American (4.7%); 1 was non-Latino white (0.9%). Most of the youth (46.7%) were 17 to 21 years old at program entry, followed by 15- to 16-year-olds (33.6%), and 13- to 14-year-olds (18.9%). (Note that the age breakdowns are a little different from those in Chapter 7, and also slightly different from those in Chapter 9.)

Most youth (97) came to the program after July, 1997 and therefore could not have received more than two years of program services and contacts. About a quarter of the program youth, with various characteristics, entered in a steady stream in each succeeding six-month period of the two-year program (Table 8.2).

Dosage of Services and Worker Contacts

Youth, on average, were in the program a relatively short period of time (mean = 12.6 months; median = 12.7 months) and were provided with an average of 4.8 services through 3.4 worker contacts per month. A little less than one third of the contacts were coordinated contacts with other workers (Table 8.3).

Types of Services Provided, and Change Patterns Over Time

The main direct services or activities provided over the entire program period (regardless of length of time the youth was in the program) were group counseling (20.4%), individual counseling (18.1%) and, to a lesser extent, school-related services (14.9%). Other services provided were: material support, including transportation (10.5%), job-related services (9.0%), suppression services (7.9%), and family counseling (7.4%). Noteworthy was the relatively low percentage of services or activities of a suppression nature provided and/or recorded by Project workers. Changes in service patterns included some increase in school and job services in the last year of the program, and a decline in suppression activities from the first six months (11.9%) to the last six months (6.6%) of the program (Table 8.4).

Patterns of Service

Patterns of services varied somewhat for program youth based on particular characteristics of gender, age, race/ethnicity, pre-program arrests and gang-membership status (Tables 8.5. a-f).

Gender. Although males comprised the large majority (87.9%) of youth in the program, females (12.1%) were provided with a higher number of services on average over the program period: 87.2 services per female, 59.4 services per male. The patterns of types of services also varied somewhat by gender. As a proportion of total services, females were provided with relatively more material support (15.0%) than males (9.6%); relatively more family counseling (9.5%) than males (7.0%); but less job services (3.6%) than males (10.1%), and less suppression services (6.4%) than males (8.1%). However, the largest difference based on gender was the number of services per youth, rather than the types of services provided (Table 8.5a).

Age. There was hardly any difference in numbers of services provided: 15- and 16-year-olds were provided slightly more services (66.7) per youth than 17- to 21-year-olds (61.5) and 13- to 14-year-olds (60.8). Also, there was little difference in the pattern of services to youth based on age. Younger youth, 13 and 14 years (8.4%) and 15 and 16 years (9.1%), were provided with slightly more family counseling than older youth, 17 to 21 years (7.5%), but the pattern was more sharply reversed in respect to job-related services: 17- to 21-year-olds (9.1%); 15- to 16-year-olds (8.6%); 13- to 14-year-olds (2.1%) (Table 8.5.b).

Race/Ethnicity. We could not adequately compare patterns of services to program youth or make reliable estimates of differences in service patterns based on race/ethnicity, since 101 youth (94.4%) were Latino; only 5 (4.7%) were African American, and 1 was non-Latino white

(0.9%). Latino youth were in the program for longer periods of time. While Latino youth were provided with more services per youth (64.7) than African-American youth (35.0), there were some differences in the types of services provided. African-American youth were provided with somewhat fewer material-support, family-counseling and school services, but with more job and suppression services (Table 8.5.c).

Gang-Membership Status. The large majority of youth (96.2%) were reported by Project workers to be gang members or gang associates. Gang members were provided with somewhat more services per youth (65.9) than gang associates (59.5) or non-gang youth (47.5). There appeared to be an appropriate concentration of services directed to gang members. However, there was little difference in the patterns of services provided based on gang-membership status, except that gang members were provided with more job services (9.9) than gang associates (4.9) or non-gang youth (7.5). Surprisingly, non-gang youth were provided with slightly more suppression services (9.4) than gang associates (8.4) or gang members (7.6) (Table 8.5.d).

Pre-Program Arrests. In the analysis of services to youth based on number of arrests, we classified youth mainly by numbers of arrests in the pre-program period. However, since 37 (34.6%) youth had no arrests in either the pre-program or program period, or were arrested in the prior-to-pre-program period (because the program period was so short), we placed these 37 youth (plus 3 for whom no search of arrest records was made) in a special *excluded* category.

In general, we found that the program provided the most services-per-youth (95.4) to those who were not particularly delinquent, i.e., those with less than 1 pre-program arrest, compared to youth with more, or no, arrests. The *excluded* youth – the least delinquent – were provided with less services-per-youth, although hardly less than the most delinquent youth.

The pattern of services varied somewhat. The youth with the most arrests were provided with relatively more group counseling, individual counseling, family counseling, and suppression services than other categories of youth, although fewer job and school services. None of the differences in types of services provided to the different categories of youth appeared to be significant (Table 8.5.e).

Types of Arrests. We were especially interested in the dosage and pattern of services provided to program youth based on their arrests-offense patterns. Were youth who committed the most serious types of offenses provided with more services, and also with the appropriate services? This may not have been the case. Only a minority of youth (21.5%; n = 23) were violence-and-drug offenders, at least based on arrest records in the program- and/or pre-program periods. The highest percent of youth provided with services (37.4%; n = 40) had no arrests in these periods. Most youth provided with services were non-violence/drug offenders (78.5%; n = 84) (Table 8.5.f).

Furthermore, the most serious offenders were provided with lower percentages of certain services (e.g., group counseling, individual counseling, school services, and even suppression services). However, they were provided with relatively more job services. It was likely that the program targeted the less-serious offenders, and provided them with more appropriate types and dosages of services than they did the more-serious offenders.

In general, not only were less-serious offenders provided a disproportionate amount of program services, but there was little differentiation in patterns of services based on characteristics and/or social needs of youth or the needs of the community for protection from

more serious crime.

Patterns of Worker Contacts

While there were relatively few differences in the types of services provided to youth with different characteristics, there were greater differences in numbers and types of contacts made with youth based on the different categories of workers. Project workers (i.e., case managers, outreach youth workers, and the job-development worker) had contacts with a greater proportion of youth in the program (45.0%) than did probation/parole (16.5%), police (21.6%) or the treatment and school-agency workers (16.9%). Outreach youth workers and case managers (and to some extent job-development workers) provided a great deal more services per youth (51.6) than did probation/parole workers (8.2), police (5.9), or youth-agency treatment and school personnel (19.0)

The workers provided different distributions of services. Outreach youth workers, case managers, and the job-development worker most often emphasized job-related services (17.8%), school-related (17.8) services, and material support (11.6%). The treatment-agency workers provided relatively most of the case-planning (14.6%), individual-counseling (24.0) and family-counseling (9.8%) services. Suppression services were least often provided by the Project outreach workers (6.0%) and the treatment-agency workers (2.8%).

The highest concentration of suppression services was provided by probation/parole (38.7%) and police (21.8%), and they provided the lowest amount of material support (0.3% and 1.7%, respectively). Probation/parole officers provided the second-highest proportion of individual counseling (23.6%) of all types of services. Police reported a very high level of group

counseling (40.1%), although we probably should translate the term group counseling to mean group contacts with youth on the streets in the program area. The lowest proportions of family-counseling services were supplied by probation/parole (3.5%) and police (2.4%) (Table 8.6).

In sum, we find that Project outreach youth workers and case managers had the greatest amount of contact with youth compared to other types of workers. They provided far more services to more youth than any of the other types of Project workers. Outreach youth workers and case managers were the dominant service providers in the program.

The patterns of contacts by the different workers also varied by the characteristics of the youth served:

Gender. Outreach youth workers and case managers had a relatively higher rate of contacts per youth with females (63.2) than with males (50.1) during the program period, as was the case with youth-agency treatment personnel – 7.3 with females and 2.3 with males. Contact rates of by probation, police, and school personnel were low, but also varied on a youth-gender basis, particularly for police, who had relatively more contact with males, and for school personnel, who had relatively more contact with females (Table 8.7.a).

Age. Outreach youth workers and case managers had a higher rate of contact with youth across all age groups – somewhat more with older youth, 17 to 21 years old (44.9), than with the other age groups. Treatment and school workers had far more contact with the youngest age group (13- to 14-year-olds) than with the older age groups. Probation and police tended to have slightly more contacts with the two older age groups (15-16 and 17- to 21-year-olds) than with the youngest age group (13- to 14-year-olds) (Table 8.7.b).

Race/Ethnicity. Outreach youth workers and case managers had the most contact with

Latino youth (41.7) and African-American youth (36.0). Probation workers had slightly more contact with African-American youth (6.2) than Latino youth (4.5). Other types of workers had slightly more contact per youth with Latino than African-American youth (Table 8.7.c).

Gang-Membership Status. Only outreach youth workers and case managers focused more on contacts with gang members (44.4) than with other types of program youth. Probation officers apparently paid more attention to gang associates (7.2). Surprisingly, priority contacts for police were with non-gang youth (2.1). Treatment personnel appeared to focus their contacts more on gang associates (4.5) (Table 8.7.d).

Pre-Program Types of Arrests. Finally, we note that the number of contacts by the different types of workers varied by program-youth arrests for different types of crime in the pre-program and/or program periods. Non-criminal-justice personnel (i.e., outreach youth workers, case managers, and treatment workers) had almost 8 times as much contact with program youth as did criminal-justice personnel (i.e., probation/parole and police officers). In general, most contacts per youth by all types of workers were with the less-serious offender types. However, non-criminal-justice workers had more contact with the violence-and-drug offenders than did the criminal-justice workers, who had relatively more contacts per youth with the less-serious offender types. Both types of workers had the least number of contacts with youth who had no arrest histories in the pre-program and program periods (Table 8.8).

It would have been more appropriate for all types of workers to target the most-serious offenders, and certainly for the probation/parole and police officers to have either absolutely or relatively more contacts with violence-and-drug offenders than with other types of offenders, which they did not.

Coordinated Contacts

A key concept of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model was team work, as indicated by the coordination of services and contacts among the different types of workers around particular youth. Coordination, or the interrelationship, of contacts by representatives of key organizations concerned with the gang problem was the principal indicator of the strategy of community mobilization at the inter-agency, street-worker level. The purpose of the Project at the program-service and worker-contact levels was to implement a set of interrelated and balanced control and social-support or social-development functions, depending on the kind of problem the youth represented to himself, and to the community, as a gang member or someone highly at risk for gang involvement.

A balance of different types of workers initiating coordinated contacts would be an indicator of a team approach, based on the Model, associated with reduced levels of certain types of arrests in the program period. Data from the worker-tracking records permitted analysis of the contacts each Project worker initiated with other workers (from both within and outside the Project) related to the sharing of information and the provision of services to youth. Outreach youth workers and case managers were the principal initiators of coordinated contacts, with only limited initiation of contacts by other types of Project workers (Table 8.9).

The ratio of coordinated contacts to total direct contacts by Project workers was 1 to 3 over the two-year program period. In other words, a little more than one of approximately every 4 contacts by a Project worker with program youth was a coordinated contact undertaken with another worker (see Table 8.3). It is not clear whether this pattern of contacts with other workers represents a high, moderate, or low level of coordination related to efforts to reduce the youth's

delinquent behavior. Further, it is not simply the number of coordinated contacts but the nature or structure of the contacts which may be especially important, i.e., which worker initiates contact and for what purposes.

Almost three quarters (72.5%) of all coordinated contacts among all types of workers were initiated by outreach youth workers and case managers. Furthermore, most of their coordinated contacts – more than a third (37.7%) – were initiated with workers in their own agencies. Outreach youth workers and case managers initiated a good deal of contact with probation and/or parole workers (24.8%) and some with school personnel (14.8%) and other agencies (13.7%) (mainly treatment agencies). Less contact was initiated with police (8.8%). The purpose of coordinated contact initiated by outreach-youth-workers and case managers was mainly to report on what they all were doing, but also to refer youth for services, and advocate on behalf of the youth.

Fewer coordinated contacts with other Project-related staff were initiated by probation/parole officers (10.3%); more were with outreach youth workers and case managers (38.8%), school personnel (21.8%) and police (18.0%), and fewer with staff of other agencies (13.3%), or with other staff in their own agencies (6.9%). The largest proportion of coordinated contacts initiated by other Project-related workers was with outreach youth workers and case managers. In other words, Project outreach youth workers and case managers were less active in contacting other types of staff, but other Project staff were relatively more active in contacting Project outreach workers and case managers.

The outreach workers and case managers seemed to contact other Project workers mainly for providing social-service and social-development services, rather than for social control of

youth. The San Antonio program was clearly built around the social-intervention efforts of outreach youth workers and case managers. No other kinds of workers came close to the importance of the outreach youth workers and case managers in making contacts and delivering services. GRAASP was a social-service-dominated program with limited interest or involvement in social control. The results of the analysis of the worker-tracking records are consistent with those of field observations. The program was strong in terms of the involvement of outreach youth workers and case managers, but weak not only in terms of leadership by SAPD administration, but in the pro-active involvement of other types of workers, particularly suppression workers. The appropriate balance of strategies and services by the different types of workers in some interrelated way, as required by the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model, was not achieved in San Antonio.

Summary

The description of the services and worker contacts provided in the San Antonio program was based on data derived from 878 worker-tracking records documenting the Project workers' contacts with and services to 107 program youth during the program period – January 1, 1997 through June 30, 1999. The forms were completed every three months for each youth, providing an average of 8.2 forms per youth.

A total of 6,713 services, 5,535 direct worker contacts and 1,828 coordinated worker contacts were provided to program youth. The sources of referral of these youth (94 males and 13 females) to the program were mainly the County Juvenile Probation Department and the Texas Youth Commission (Juvenile Parole) (n = 63). On average, youth were in the program for

only about a year and a half, and were provided with an average of 3.4 worker contacts and 4.8 services per month.

The majority of services provided were social-intervention, i.e., group counseling (20.4%); individual counseling (18.1%); and family counseling (7.4%), as well as job services (9.4%) and school services (14.9%). Suppression was the smallest percentage of services provided (7.9%). The primary source of worker contacts was outreach youth workers and case managers, who provided 79.5% of all contacts. Probation and parole officers, the next significant providers, contributed 8.8% of all contacts. Police provided 3.3%, school personnel 2.5% and treatment personnel 6.0% of total contacts per youth. The program was oriented predominantly toward social services, with limited suppression contacts (based on worker-tracking data, and consistent with field observations).

Although there were relatively few females in the program, they received more worker contacts (63.2) than males (50.1), as well as more services (87.2) than males (59.4). There was little variation in types of contacts and services provided on the basis of age. Younger youth tended to be provided with somewhat more counseling services, and older youth with more job services. Gang members were provided with somewhat more services than non-gang youth or associate gang members, but non-gang youth were provided with slightly more suppression services. Relatively more services were supplied to the less-delinquent than the more-delinquent or non-delinquent youth (based on numbers of prior-to-pre-program or pre-program arrests). However, the less serious the youth's delinquent activity, the more services were provided.

Finally, we note that outreach youth workers and case managers were heavily, if not predominantly, involved in initiating contacts with other types of workers on behalf of program

youth; they were responsible for 72.5% of all coordinated contacts. Probation/parole officers (10.3%) and police (7.8%) were far less involved in initiating contacts with other workers. The balance of interrelated social-intervention and suppression contacts and services by the different types of workers, as indicated by the OJJDP Model, was not achieved over the relatively short program lifespan.

Table 8.1
Source of Youth Referral to Program
By Year and 6-Month Period

Source of Referral	Year and 6-Month Period percent and (n)					Total % (N)
	1997		1998		1999	
	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	
Probation/Parole	9.3 (10)	9.3 (10)	12.1 (13)	15.9 (17)	12.1 (13)	58.9 (63)
Outreach Youth Workers	0	6.5 (7)	2.8 (3)	3.7 (4)	0	13.1 (14)
Schools	0	5.6 (6)	4.7 (5)	0	1.8 (2)	12.1 (13)
Family	0	0.9 (1)	0.9 (1)	1.8 (2)	0.9 (1)	4.7 (5)
Self	0	0	1.8 (2)	0	0.9 (1)	2.8 (3)
Police	0	0.9 (1)	0	0	2.8 (2)	2.8 (3)
Other Project Participant	0	1.8 (2)	0	0	0.9 (1)	2.8 (3)
Other Youth Services Agency	0	0	0	0.9 (1)	0	0.9 (1)
Don't Know	0	0	0	0	1.8 (2)	1.8 (2)
Total^a	9.3 (10)	25.2 (27)	22.4 (24)	22.4 (24)	20.6 (22)	99.9 (107)

^aRow and column percentage totals do not sum due to rounding.

Table 8.2
Selected Demographic Characteristics of Program Youth at Program Entry
By Year and 6-Month Period

Selected Demographic Characteristics	Year and 6-Month Period percent and (n)					Total % (N)
	1997		1998		1999	
	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	7-1 to 12-31	1-1 to 6-30	
Male	7.5 (8)	23.4 (25)	19.6 (21)	19.6 (21)	17.8 (19)	87.9 (94)
Female	1.9 (2)	1.9 (2)	2.8 (3)	2.8 (3)	2.8 (3)	12.1 (13)
Latino ^a	9.3 (10)	24.3 (26)	20.6 (22)	20.6 (22)	19.6 (21)	94.4 (101)
African-American	0	0.9 (1)	1.9 (2)	0.9 (1)	0.9 (1)	4.7 (5)
Non-Latino White	0	0	0	0.9 (1)	0	0.9 (1)
13 to 14 years-old ^b	1.9 (2)	5.6 (6)	2.8 (3)	1.9 (2)	6.5 (7)	18.9 (20)
15 to 16 years old	5.6 (6)	5.6 (6)	8.4 (9)	6.5 (7)	7.5 (8)	33.6 (36)
17 to 21 years-old	1.9 (2)	14.0 (15)	11.2 (12)	14.0 (15)	5.6 (6)	46.7 (50)
Total^c	9.3 (10)	25.2 (27)	22.4 (24)	22.4 (24)	20.6 (22)	99.9 (107)

^aPrimarily of Mexican ancestry.

^bExcludes one youth with missing birth date; age at program entry could not be calculated.

^c Row and column percentage totals do not sum due to rounding.

Table 8.3
Dosage of Services and Contacts
Program Youth (N=104)^a

Months in Program		Total Services	Services per Youth per Month	Total Direct Contacts	Direct Contacts per Youth per Month	Total Coordinated Contacts	Coordinated Contacts per Youth per Month
Mean	Median						
12.6	12.7	6,713	4.8	5,535	3.4	1,828	1.3

^aThis table includes data only for youth who were in the program for 1 month or more.

Table 8.4
Number of Types of Services^a by 6-month Period for All Youth (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Year & 6-month Period^c</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth^d</u>	<u>Average Services per Youth</u>
1997 1	36	31	52	46	10	11	22	28	236	11	21.5
1997 2	141	130	232	198	92	75	102	76	1,046	37	28.3
1998 1	196	198	321	331	162	129	119	129	1,585	55	28.8
1998 2	219	180	321	326	121	140	235	151	1,693	74	22.9
1999 1	200	164	446	312	114	251	523	143	2,153	86	25.0
Totals	792	703	1,372	1,213	499	606	1,001	527	6,713	263	25.5

Percentage of Types of Services by 6-month Period for All Youth (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Year & 6-month Period^c</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
1997 1	15.3%	13.1%	22.0%	19.5%	4.2%	4.7%	9.3%	11.9%	100.0%
1997 2	13.5%	12.4%	22.2%	18.9%	8.8%	7.2%	9.8%	7.3%	100.0%
1998 1	12.4%	12.5%	20.3%	20.9%	10.2%	8.1%	7.5%	8.1%	100.0%
1998 2	12.9%	10.6%	19.0%	19.3%	7.1%	8.3%	13.9%	8.9%	100.0%
1999 1	9.3%	7.6%	20.7%	14.5%	5.3%	11.7%	24.3%	6.6%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%

^a Overall there were 6,713 services provided to 107 youth or approximately 63 (62.7) services per youth on average.

^b Five Project outreach workers, one job developer, and two outreach supervisors together completed 634 forms (72.3%); six probation officers completed 39 forms (4.4%); one juvenile parole officer completed 40 forms (4.5%); two police officers and one police gang detective completed 93 forms (10.5%); one director of a community-based youth organization completed 64 forms (7.3%); and one assistant school principal completed 7 forms (0.9%) from May 1, 1997 through June 30, 1999 (878 forms).

^c Period 1 = 1/1-6/30; Period 2 = 7/1 - 12/31.

^d The number of youth with particular services/contacts is not exclusive of the number of youth also provided with other types of services/contacts.

Table 8.5a
Number of Types of Services by Gender (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Average Services per Youth</u>
Male	655	533	1141	1000	391	565	841	454	5580	94	59.4
Female	137	170	231	213	108	41	160	73	1133	13	87.2
Totals	792	703	1372	1213	499	606	1001	527	6713	107	62.7

Percentage of Types of Services by Gender (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
Male	11.7%	9.6%	20.4%	17.9%	7.0%	10.1%	15.1%	8.1%	100.0%
Female	12.1%	15.0%	20.4%	18.8%	9.5%	3.6%	14.1%	6.4%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%

Table 8.5b
Number of Types of Services by Age Category (N=106)
(876[▲] Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth[▲]</u>	<u>Average Services per Youth</u>
13-14 years	143	127	316	254	102	26	157	91	1216	20	60.8
15-16 years	266	224	495	439	219	207	362	190	2402	36	66.7
17-21 years	381	350	553	514	178	373	482	246	3077	50	61.5
Totals	790	701	1364	1207	499	606	1001	527	6695	106	63.2

Percentage of Types of Services by Age Category (N=106)
(876[▲] Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
13-14 years	11.8%	10.4%	26.0%	20.9%	8.4%	2.1%	12.9%	7.5%	100.0%
15-16 years	11.1%	9.3%	20.6%	18.3%	9.1%	8.6%	15.1%	7.9%	100.0%
17-21 years	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.0%	7.5%	9.1%	15.0%	7.9%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.0%	7.5%	9.1%	15.0%	7.9%	100.0%

[▲] Excludes 1 youth with 2 worker-tracking records whose age at program entry could not be determined.

Table 8.5c
Number of Types of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Average Services per Youth</u>
Latino♦	768	690	1332	1180	490	583	985	503	6531	101	64.7
African-American	22	12	38	31	9	23	16	24	175	5	35.0
Non-Latino White	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	7	1	7.0
Totals	792	703	1372	1213	499	606	1001	527	6713	107	62.74

Percentage of Types of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
Latino♦	11.8%	10.6%	20.4%	18.1%	7.5%	8.9%	15.1%	7.7%	100.0%
African-American	12.6%	6.9%	21.7%	17.7%	5.1%	13.1%	9.1%	13.7%	100.0%
Non-Latino White	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%

♦Primarily of Mexican ancestry.

Table 8.5d
Number of Types Services by Gang-Membership Status^a (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Gang-Membership Status</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Average Services per Youth</u>
Gang Member	604	537	1048	925	390	516	790	394	5204	79	65.9
Gang Associate	122	101	186	171	67	44	126	75	892	15	59.5
Non-Gang Youth	66	65	138	117	42	46	85	58	617	13	47.5
Totals	792	703	1372	1213	499	606	1001	527	6713	107	62.7

Percentage of Types of Services Provided by Gang Membership Status^a (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Gang-Membership Status</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
Gang Member	11.6%	10.3%	20.1%	17.8%	7.5%	9.9%	15.2%	7.6%	100.0%
Gang Associate	13.7%	11.3%	20.9%	19.2%	7.5%	4.9%	14.1%	8.4%	100.0%
Non-Gang Youth	10.7%	10.5%	22.4%	19.0%	6.8%	7.5%	13.8%	9.4%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%

^a Gang-membership status was based mainly on self-reports of youth (n = 100), and by Project workers (n = 7). Where there were differences between youth self-reports and worker estimates, self-reports were always preferred.

Table 8.5e
Number of Types of Services by Prior-to-Pre-Program and Pre-Program Level of Arrests (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of <u>Prior-to-Pre-Program</u> & <u>Pre-Program Arrest</u>	<u>Case</u> <u>Planning</u>	<u>Material</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Group</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Individual</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Family</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Job</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>School</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Suppression</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>of Youth</u>	<u>Average</u> <u>Services</u> <u>per Youth</u>
Excluded ^a	203	184	396	324	135	168	316	114	1840	40	46
None ^b	169	136	270	225	84	124	295	108	1411	21	67.2
Less than 1 ^c	241	201	400	353	147	166	235	165	1908	20	95.4
1 to < 2 ^c	102	124	171	172	70	98	112	83	932	13	71.7
2 or More ^c	77	58	135	139	63	50	43	57	622	13	47.8
Totals	792	703	1372	1213	499	606	1001	527	6713	107	62.7

Percentage of Types of Services by Prior-to-Pre-Program and Pre-program Level of Arrests (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

Level of <u>Prior-to-Pre-Program</u> & <u>Pre-Program Arrests</u>	<u>Case</u> <u>Planning</u>	<u>Material</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Group</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Individual</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Family</u> <u>Counseling</u>	<u>Job</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>School</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Suppression</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
Excluded ^a	11.0%	10.0%	21.5%	17.6%	7.3%	9.1%	17.2%	6.2%	100.0%
None ^b	12.0%	9.6%	19.1%	15.9%	6.0%	8.8%	20.9%	7.7%	100.0%
Less than 1 ^c	12.6%	10.5%	21.0%	18.5%	7.7%	8.7%	12.3%	8.6%	100.0%
1 to < 2 ^c	10.9%	13.3%	18.3%	18.5%	7.5%	10.5%	12.0%	8.9%	100.0%
2 or More ^c	12.4%	9.3%	21.7%	22.3%	10.1%	8.0%	6.9%	9.2%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%

^a Thirteen (13) program youth with no arrest histories, 24 with only prior-to-pre-program or post-program arrests, and 3 whose arrest records were missing.

^b Twenty-one (21) program youth who had no arrests in the pre-program period, but had arrests in the program period.

^c Youth who may have had arrests in the prior-to-pre-program period as well as in the pre-program period.

Table 8.5f
Number of Types of Services by Types of Pre-Program-Period and Program-Period Arrests (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Type of Arrest</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>	<u>Average Services per Youth</u>
Property Only ^a	136	91	230	189	67	108	223	102	1,146	22	52.1
Violence/Drugs Only ^b	231	236	364	332	142	200	214	137	1,856	23	80.7
Other ^c	222	192	382	368	155	130	248	174	1,871	22	85.0
None	203	184	396	324	135	168	316	114	1,840	40	46.0
Totals	792	703	1,372	1,213	499	606	1,001	527	6,713	107	62.7

Percentage of Types of Services by Types of Pre-Program-Period and Program-Period Arrests (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Type of Arrest</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
Property Only ^a	11.9%	7.9%	20.1%	16.5%	5.8%	9.4%	19.5%	8.9%	100.0%
Violence/Drugs Only ^b	12.4%	12.7%	19.6%	17.9%	7.7%	10.8%	11.5%	7.4%	100.0%
Other ^c	11.9%	10.3%	20.4%	19.7%	8.3%	6.9%	13.3%	9.3%	100.0%
None	11.0%	10.0%	21.5%	17.6%	7.3%	9.1%	17.2%	6.2%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%

^a Includes youth who only had property arrests in the pre-program and/or program period.

^b Includes youth who only had arrests for violence and drug offenses in the pre-program and/or program period.

^c Includes youth who were arrested for other offenses which do not include violence, drugs or property in the pre-program and/or program period.

Table 8.6
Number of Types of Services by Type of Worker (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Type of Worker</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Number of Youth^a</u>	<u>Average Services per Youth</u>
Outreach Workers ^b	615	622	980	911	408	552	955	321	5364	104	51.6
Probation/Parole	38	1	27	74	11	20	21	121	313	38	8.2
Police	31	5	118	50	7	13	6	64	294	50	5.9
Treatment Agency	108	75	247	178	73	21	19	21	742	39	19.0
Totals	792	703	1372	1213	499	606	1001	527	6713	231	29.1

Percentage of Types of Services by Type of Worker (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Type of Worker</u>	<u>Case Planning</u>	<u>Material Support</u>	<u>Group Counseling</u>	<u>Individual Counseling</u>	<u>Family Counseling</u>	<u>Job Services</u>	<u>School Services</u>	<u>Suppression Services</u>	<u>Total %</u>
Outreach Worker ^b	11.5%	11.6%	18.3%	17.0%	7.6%	10.3%	17.8%	6.0%	100.0%
Probation/Parole	12.1%	0.3%	8.6%	23.6%	3.5%	6.4%	6.7%	38.7%	100.0%
Police	10.5%	1.7%	40.1%	17.0%	2.4%	4.4%	2.0%	21.8%	100.0%
Treatment Agency	14.6%	10.1%	33.3%	24.0%	9.8%	2.8%	2.6%	2.8%	100.0%
Totals	11.8%	10.5%	20.4%	18.1%	7.4%	9.0%	14.9%	7.9%	100.0%

^a The number of youth with particular services/contacts is not exclusive of the number of youth also provided with other types of services/contacts.

^b Includes youth outreach workers, case managers, and job-development workers.

Table 8.7a
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Gender and Type of Project Worker (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Type of Project Worker</u>					<u>Total</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>
	<u>Outreach*</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>School</u>	<u>Treatment</u>		
Male	40.1	4.5	1.8	1.2	2.6	50.1	94
Female	48.2	4.6	1.2	1.9	7.3	63.2	13
Totals	41.1	4.5	1.7	1.3	3.1	51.7	107.0

Table 8.7b
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Age Category and Type of Project Worker (N=106)[^]
(876[^] Worker Tracking Forms)

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Type of Project Worker</u>					<u>Total</u>	<u>Number of Youth</u>
	<u>Outreach*</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>School</u>	<u>Treatment</u>		
13-14 years	39.1	3.4	1.4	5.1	6.1	55.0	20
15-16 years	38.0	5.3	1.6	1.0	3.1	48.9	36
17-21 years	44.9	4.6	1.9	0.0	1.8	53.2	50
Totals	41.5	4.6	1.7	1.3	3.1	52.1	106

[^]Excludes 1 youth with 2 worker-tracking records whose age at program entry could not be determined.

*Includes outreach workers, case managers and job developers.

Table 8.7c
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Race/Ethnicity and Type of Project Worker (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

Race/Ethnicity	Type of Project Worker					Total	Number of Youth
	Outreach*	Probation	Police	School	Treatment		
Latino❖	41.7	4.5	1.7	1.4	3.3	52.6	101
African-American	36.0	6.2	1.0	0.0	0.4	43.6	5
Non-Latino White	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1
Totals	41.1	4.5	1.7	1.3	3.1	51.7	107

❖ Primarily of Mexican ancestry.

Table 8.7d
Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Gang Membership Status
And Type of Project Worker (N=107)
(878 Worker Tracking Forms)

Gang-Membership Status	Type of Project Worker					Total	Number of Youth
	Outreach*	Probation	Police	School	Treatment		
Gang Member	44.4	4.0	1.7	1.3	2.8	54.2	79
Gang Associate	35.1	7.2	1.3	1.3	4.5	49.4	15
Non-Gang Youth	27.8	4.6	2.1	1.2	3.6	39.3	13
Totals	41.1	4.5	1.7	1.3	3.1	51.7	107

*Includes outreach workers, case managers and job developers.

Table 8.8
 Number of Direct Contacts per Youth (N = 107)
 by Type of Arrest and Type of Project Worker
 Pre-Program and Program Periods

Type of Arrest	Type of Project Worker		Total	
	Outreach Non-Criminal Justice ^a	Criminal Justice ^b	Direct Contacts	Number of Youth
Property Only	31.0	7.8	38.8	22
Violence/Drugs Only	70.3	7.7	78.0	23
Other ^c	62.4	8.5	71.0	22
None ^d	29.9	3.2	33.1	40
Totals	45.5	6.2	51.7	107

^aOutreach workers, case managers, job developers and treatment workers.

^bProbation/parole and police officers.

^cIncludes youth who were arrested for other offenses which do not include violence, drugs or property in the pre-program and /or program periods.

^dYouth who did not have any arrests during the pre-program period and program periods, but may have had arrests during the prior-to-pre-program and/or post-program periods.

Table 8.9
Coordinated Contacts By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted
May 1997 through June 1999

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n)						Total ^a (N)
	Police	Probation/Parole	School	Outreach	Other ^b	Within Worker Organization	
Outreach ^c	8.6 (114)	24.8 (329)	14.8 (196)	0.3 (4)	13.7 (182)	37.7 (500)	72.5 (1,325)
Probation/Parole	18.0 (34)	1.1 (2)	21.8 (41)	38.8 (73)	13.3 (25)	6.9 (13)	10.3 (188)
Police	---	21.1 (30)	0.7 (1)	56.3 (80)	1.4 (2)	20.4 (29)	7.8 (142)
School	10.5 (2)	10.5 (2)	---	36.8 (7)	10.5 (2)	31.6 (6)	1.0 (19)
Treatment Agency	---	17.5 (27)	3.9 (6)	40.9 (63)	1.3 (2)	36.4 (56)	8.4 (154)
Total ^d (N)	8.2 (150)	21.3 (390)	13.3 (244)	12.4 (227)	11.7 (213)	33.0 (604)	100.0 (1,828)

^aPercentages are based on the marginal totals for each row from a total of 1,828 coordinated contacts for 107 program youth. An average of 17.1 coordinated contacts per youth were provided.

^bThe highest percentage (26.8%) of contacts with personnel from "other" organizations were with the director of the community-based youth agency EXCEL. The other 73.2 % of contacts were with individuals from a myriad assortment of agencies and institutions (i.e. San Antonio Housing Authority, private law offices and public defender's office, Dominguez State Jail, Texas Department of Human Services, district and juvenile courts, Catholic Charities, Huantes Learning Center, Bexar County Correctional Facility).

^c Outreach youth workers, case managers and job developers.

^d Percentages do not always sum due to rounding.

Chapter 9

Arrest Outcomes

(Kwai Ming Wa)

Introduction

In this chapter, we examine key effects of the program using arrest variables. We are interested in the program's effectiveness in reducing arrests for youth in the program relative to the comparison youth (youth not provided with services and worker contacts). We use statistical models to control for differences between program-youth and comparison-youth characteristics, and tell us to what extent youth characteristics, and especially program effects, account for changes in arrest patterns during the program period compared to the pre-program period.

In the General Linear (GLM) models, we use five dependent (outcome) variables: *yearly total arrest changes*, which includes arrests for each of the categories of offenses; *yearly total violence arrest changes*, which combines arrests for serious violence (such as homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery) and less-serious violence (such as simple assault, simple battery, attempted robbery, street fighting, and intimidation); *yearly total drug arrest changes*; *yearly property arrest changes*, and *yearly "other" arrest changes*.¹ The GLM models estimate differences or changes in the mean number of arrests for program-worker-tracked youth and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods, controlling for demographic characteristics of the youth. The GLM models provide us with information to answer the question: Did the mean level of change in arrests decrease, increase or

¹ Refer to Appendix A for a description of charge categories for the different types of arrests.

stay the same – not only for the program and comparison-youth samples, but for subsamples based on age, gang-membership status, length of time in the program (or its equivalent for comparison youth) and pre-program arrest histories? We did not include the 6 non-worker-tracked program youth in our multivariate models; 1 had only one arrest in the program or pre-program period, and 5 were in the program for less than 1 month. We also did not include gender and race/ethnicity variables in our analyses, since there were only 8 females in the comparison sample and 5 females in the program sample, and no non-Latinos in the comparison sample. Also, since very few youth in the comparison sample were arrested for serious violence, we combined the serious and less-serious arrest variables into a single total-violence variable.

The dependent (outcome) variables measure the mean yearly differences in the number of arrests for youth between the pre-program and program periods. For each of the five dependent variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was annualized, in order to control for varying numbers of arrests during varying youth program-period lengths, which were matched with pre-program periods for each youth.²

Five independent variables are included in the GLM equations to explain variance in each of the five dependent (outcome) variables. The independent variables are: *project* – program youth with worker-tracking records and comparison youth, both interviewed at Time I; *level* (or category) of *pre-program yearly total arrests* for the particular arrest/offense; *age group* at program entry (generally 15 years and under, 16 to 17 years, 18 years and over); *gang-*

² First, the mean number of yearly arrests was calculated using the total number of each youth's arrests during the program and matched pre-program period, divided by the length in years for each period. Second, the mean yearly change was calculated by subtracting the mean number of yearly arrests in the program period from the mean number of yearly arrests in the pre-program period.

membership status – mainly whether youth classified themselves as gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth; and *program length* (i.e., length of time in the program: less/more than one year).³ Three (sometimes 4) interaction terms are added to the models: *project* × *age group*; *project* × *gang-membership status*; *project* × *program length*; and *project* × *pre-program yearly arrests*. (Youth who had zero pre-program and zero program arrests [“zero-zero”] were excluded from the GLM models.) The following sections present the findings of the “best” GLM models to determine whether the Project had an effect, particularly in reducing arrests for program youth compared to similar comparison youth, under similar demographic and time conditions.

GLM Models

Yearly Total Arrests

In the GLM model for yearly total arrest changes – consisting of 49 comparison youth and 66 program-worker-tracked youth (N = 115),⁴ the model explained 42.5% of the variance in the dependent variable, and was significant (p<0.001). *Pre-program yearly total arrests*⁵ (p<0.001) was the only significant variable, in this and in all models using different arrest variables. The findings using the *pre-program arrest* variable signified a regression effect; i.e., the greater the number of pre-program arrests, the fewer the number of program-period arrests, and the fewer

³ Note that program length for comparison youth is equivalent to the program length of their matched program youth.

⁴ One of the program youth was excluded from the analysis because the arrest data were incomplete.

⁵ The level or category of pre-program yearly total arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high ≥ 2.00 arrests.

the number of pre-program arrests, the greater the number of program-period arrests. None of the other independent variables or any of the interaction terms were significant as main effects. In other words, the program had no statistically significant or close-to-significant effect in accounting for a change in yearly total arrest patterns of youth. Such changes would have occurred anyway, without the program.

Both program and comparison youth increased their average total number of yearly arrests over time, although the increase was somewhat less for program youth (LS mean = 0.029) than for comparison youth (LS mean = 0.428). The LS mean difference was not significant ($p = 0.39$). Age group, gang-membership status, and program length made no difference, across or even within the two samples. The one interesting, almost statistically significant finding was that program youth with medium and high levels of arrests in the pre-program period did substantially better than matched comparison youth in reducing their levels of yearly total arrests (LS mean $p = 0.07$) (Table 9.1).

In sum, there appeared to be no significant difference in change in yearly total arrests for program youth compared to comparison youth. Both program and comparison youth did slightly worse during the program period. The Project also had no significant effect in reducing yearly total arrests for any subgroup of program youth.

Yearly Total Violence Arrests

Thirty-six (36) youth had histories of violence arrests (both serious and less serious):⁶ 29

⁶ The level of pre-program yearly total violence arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no violence arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.049 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1.00 arrests; and high = 1.00 or more violence arrests.

program youth (80.6%)⁷, and 7 comparison youth (19.4%). The results of the GLM model with *change in yearly total violence arrests* as the dependent variable were significant (R-square = 0.687, $p < 0.001$). Pre-program yearly total violence arrests ($p < 0.001$) was the only significant variable in this equation, although *program length* ($p < 0.062$) was marginally significant. Youth who were in the program less than one year had a reduction in total violence arrests, while youth in the program one year or more had an increase in total violence arrests. This was not an appropriate effect to be associated with the program. Nevertheless, the overall level of reduction of total violence arrests was greater for program youth (LS mean = -0.229) than for comparison youth (LS mean = -0.074), but the difference was not statistically significant. (This possibly was due to the inclusion of program youth who were in the program for short periods of time.)

There was no difference in program-youth and comparison-youth subsamples based on age and gang-membership characteristics. Of some interest was that program youth who had low, medium and high levels of pre-program yearly total violence arrests did slightly worse than comparison youth with similar pre-program yearly total violence arrest levels in reducing their total violence arrests in the program period. The difference was not statistically significant, however. Also, the longer the youth was in the program, the worse he did (Table 9.2). In sum, the Project was not effective in lowering yearly levels of total violence arrests.

Yearly Total Drug Arrests

Over the course of the program and pre-program periods, a total of 41 youth (20 program

⁷ Two program youth were removed from this analysis because they were considered outliers, i.e., their patterns of violence arrests did not conform with those of the remainder of the program youth.

and 21 comparison) were arrested on drug charges.⁸ However, the pattern was different for drug arrests compared to violence arrests. Slightly more comparison youth (51.2%, n = 21) were arrested on drug charges than program youth (48.8%, n = 20) during the pre-program and/or the program periods. The GLM model was significant (R-square = 0.698, p<0.001).

The only significant variable in the equation was *pre-program yearly total drug arrest change* (p<0.001), i.e., the regression effect. Youth who had drug arrests in the pre-program period tended to lower their drug arrests in the program period; and youth with no or low numbers of drug arrests in the pre-program period tended to have more drug arrests in the program period (Table 9.3). While comparison-youth drug arrests increased slightly (LS mean = +0.02), program-youth drug arrests increased substantially more (LS mean = +0.23). The difference was not statistically significant, however. Age factors within or across the samples made no difference. All age groups, except the comparison 17-and-over youth, increased their arrests for drugs. Gang members, particularly those in the comparison sample, did better than associate gang members or non-gang youth in having increases in drug arrests. Of special interest was that while there was little difference over time, youth who were in the program for more than a year (LS mean = -0.16) did better than youth who were in the program for less than a year (LS mean = +0.63). The longer the youth was in the program, the more he reduced his arrests for drugs, although the difference was only marginally significant (p = 0.10). Overall, the program sample did slightly worse than the comparison sample. Fourteen (14) program youth increased their drug arrests, but only 6 reduced their drug arrests; 12 comparison youth increased

⁸ The level or category of pre-program yearly total drug arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no drug arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.49 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1.0 arrests; and 4) high = 1 or more drug arrests.

but 9 decreased their arrests for drugs (controlling for other variables).

The findings were generally consistent whether we used changes in drug arrests or changes in self-reported drug-use/selling patterns (without demographic controls), looking at the 68 program youth and 86 comparison youth who were interviewed at Time I and Time II. Fewer comparison youth than program youth were using or selling drugs at Time II than at Time I. Furthermore, while fewer program and comparison youth self-reported selling drugs at Time II (29.4%) than at Time I (33.8%), even fewer comparison youth were selling drugs at Time II (14.0%) than at Time I (47.7%).

Yearly Total Property Arrests

In our preliminary GLM model (N = 64), using change in yearly total property-crime arrests⁹ between the pre-program and program periods, the equation was significant (R-square = 0.747). Arrests for property crime decreased in the program sample (LS mean = -0.31) while they increased in the comparison sample (LS mean = +0.19). This was a marginally statistically significant difference (p = 0.068). It appeared that the Project may have had an important positive effect on program youth in reducing arrests for this most-prevalent of crimes in the area.

However, a check of 9 youth (7 program and 2 comparison) who reduced their property arrests revealed that these youth in fact increased their arrests for (mainly) drugs and/or violence. We could not view this pattern of change as positive. Therefore, when we removed these 9 youth from the analysis, the modified model (N = 55) was still statistically significant (R-square =

⁹ The level or category of yearly pre-program yearly total property arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no property arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high ≥ 2.00 property arrests.

0.744), but the difference between the program and comparison samples was no longer marginally significant ($p = 0.38$) (Table 9.4). Still, the program sample showed a reduction in yearly property arrests (LS mean = -0.28), while the comparison sample showed an increase (LS mean = 0.017).

In this modified model, gang members generally did better than gang associates or non-gang youth in reducing their levels of property arrests, but the difference within or across subsamples did not come close to statistical significance. Older program youth, 17 years and over, had a reduction in property arrests (LS Mean = -0.43), while equivalent-age comparison youth had an increase (LS mean = +0.21) ($p = 0.13$). Differences were not significant or near significance when comparing age subgroups across the two samples. In sum, it is difficult to conclude that the Project had a positive effect in reducing arrests, since the same program youth who had reductions in these arrests had increases in drug and/or violence arrests.

Yearly Total “Other” Arrests

Relatively fewer youth ($N = 29$) were arrested for a range of “other” or minor offenses (such as curfew violation, drinking [minors], gang loitering, resisting an officer, and unlawful possession of a firearm), than were arrested for violence, drugs, or property offenses. Eighteen (18) program and 11 comparison youth were involved in such “other” arrests during the program and/or pre-program periods. The GLM model for yearly total “other” arrests was significant (R-square = 0.730, $p < 0.001$). The pattern of change was slightly better for program than comparison youth. Nine (9) program youth increased and 9 decreased their “other” arrests; 6 comparison youth increased and 4 decreased their “other” arrests (Table 9.5).

The only significant variable in the equation, however, was *pre-program yearly total “other” arrest change*¹⁰ ($p < 0.001$). No other variable came close to indicating a statistically significant difference for program and comparison youth in “other” arrests between the program and pre-program periods. The only marginally significant difference, under controlled statistical conditions, was that the 14-and-under program subgroup (LS mean = -3.05) had a lower level of “other” arrests than the same-age comparison subgroup (LS mean = -0.31) ($p = 0.08$). But the two subsamples of younger youth were extremely small (Table 9.5). Again, we find little (if any) Project effect, positive or negative, on changes in “other” arrest patterns on program youth.

Summary

The San Antonio Project was not effective in contributing to the reduction of arrests of the program youth, in respect to almost all categories or subcategories of offenses, relative to the comparison youth, who were not provided with worker contacts and services in the program period. However, program youth did consistently but non-significantly better in reducing (or having less of an increase in) arrests than did comparison youth, for all types of crime except drug crime. We also could not detect any significant or marginally significant differences between program and comparison subgroups based on age, gang-membership status, length of time in the program, or even considering many of the subcategories of variables alone within the program sample itself. The program appeared simply to have had no effect on arrest behavior, whether the youth was older or younger, a gang member, gang associate or non-gang youth, or

¹⁰ The level of pre-program yearly total “other” arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no “other” arrests; 2) low = 0.09 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high = 2 or more “other” arrests.

whether he was in the program a longer or shorter period of time.

It is possible that the lack of significant Project effect on program youth was due to GRAASP's failure to really adopt and/or adequately implement the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Again, as indicated in earlier chapters, this may have been due to: 1) inadequate understanding and/or acceptance of the Model; 2) inadequate motivation by the lead agency to integrate suppression and social-service strategies through an interdisciplinary team approach; 3) lack of lead-agency administrative attention to or interest in directing and developing the program; and ultimately 4) inadequate community mobilization or joint planning across agencies in the city and county to address the youth gang problem.

Table 9.1

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.1(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.425)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	2.383	0.74	0.391
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, 17 & over	2	3.391	1.06	0.352
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth	1	0.114	0.04	0.851
Program Length: <1 Yr vs >=1 Yr	1	4.533	1.41	0.238
Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	2	101.703	31.64	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.263	0.08	0.922
Project XGang-Membership Status	1	0.720	0.22	0.637
Project XProgram Length	1	2.422	0.70	0.406
Project XPre-Program Yearly Total Arrests	2	3.837	1.19	0.307
Within error	101	3.214	—	—
Total	114	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

9.1(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests Interaction

Project	Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Comparison	None	1.805	0.535	15	1	—	*	‡		*	‡
Comparison	Low	0.290	0.639	12	2	*	—		*		†
Comparison	Med/High	-0.812	0.455	22	3	‡		—	‡		<i>f</i>
Program	None	1.929	0.431	21	4		*	‡	—	†	‡
Program	Low	0.065	0.487	20	5	*			†	—	†
Program	Med/High	-1.906	0.382	25	6	‡	†	<i>f</i>	‡	†	—

For differences between groups: *f* *p* = .07; * *p* < .05; † *p* < .01; and ‡ *p* < .001 .

Table 9.2

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.2(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.687)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.068	0.16	0.694
Age Group at Program Entry: 16 & under, 17 & over	1	0.538	1.25	0.273
Program Length: <1 Yr vs >=1 Yr	1	1.632	3.79	0.062
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	1	10.458	24.31	0.000***
Project XAge Group	1	0.082	0.19	0.666
Project XProgram Length	1	0.261	0.61	0.442
Project XPre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	1	0.525	1.22	0.279
Within error	28	0.430	—	—
Total	35	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

9.2(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project X Program Length Interaction

Project	Program Length	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
					i/j	1	2	3
Comparison	<1 Yr	-0.289	0.554	2	1	—		
Comparison	>=1 Yr	0.142	0.302	5	2		—	
Program	<1 Yr	-0.732	0.403	3	3			— *
Program	>=1 Yr	0.273	0.129	26	4			* —

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; † $p < .01$; and ‡ $p < .001$.

Table 9.3

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Drug Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.3(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.698)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.224	0.30	0.586
Age Group at Program Entry: 16 & under, 17 & over	1	0.002	0.00	0.959
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth	1	0.123	0.17	0.686
Program Length: <1 Yr vs >=1 Yr	1	1.252	1.70	0.202
Pre-Program Yearly Total Drug Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	1	43.348	58.78	0.000***
Project XAge Group	1	0.179	0.24	0.626
Project XGang-Membership Status	1	0.020	0.03	0.869
Project XProgram Length	1	0.573	0.78	0.385
Project XPre-Program Yearly Total Drug Arrests	1	0.451	0.61	0.440
Within error	31	0.737	—	—
Total	40	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

9.3(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project X Program Length Interaction

Project	Program Length	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
					i/j	1	2	3
Comparison	<1 Yr	0.093	0.511	3	1	—		
Comparison	>=1 Yr	-0.059	0.223	18	2		—	
Program	<1 Yr	0.628	0.414	6	3			— <i>f</i>
Program	>=1 Yr	-0.162	0.296	14	4			<i>f</i> —

For differences between groups: *f* *p* = .10; * *p* < .05; † *p* < .01; and ‡ *p* < .001 .

Table 9.4

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Property Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total Property Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.4(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.744)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.567	0.80	0.377
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, 17 & over	2	0.254	0.36	0.702
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth	1	0.324	0.46	0.503
Program Length: <1 Yr vs >=1 Yr	1	0.952	1.34	0.254
Pre-Program Yearly Total Property Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	2	33.007	46.38	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	0.327	0.46	0.634
Project XGang-Membership Status	1	0.145	0.20	0.654
Project XProgram Length	1	0.136	0.19	0.665
Project XPre-Program Yearly Total Property Arrests	2	0.509	0.72	0.495
Within error	42	0.712	—	—
Total	55	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

9.4(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project X Age Group Interaction

Project	Age Group	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Comparison	14 & under	-0.366	0.613	2	1	—					
Comparison	15 to 16	0.210	0.448	9	2		—				
Comparison	17 & over	0.206	0.280	9	3			—			<i>f</i>
Program	14 & under	-0.283	0.321	7	4				—		
Program	15 to 16	-0.129	0.245	15	5					—	
Program	17 & over	-0.426	0.298	14	6			<i>f</i>			—

For differences between groups: *f* $p = .13$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .01$; and ‡ $p < .001$.

Table 9.5

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total “Other” Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total “Other” Arrests in the Pre-Program Period).

9.5(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.730)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked	1	0.005	0.00	0.961
Age Group at Program Entry: 14 & under, 15 to 16, 17 & over	2	2.930	1.47	0.258
Gang Membership: Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang Youth	1	0.683	0.34	0.566
Program Length: <1 Yr vs >=1 Yr	1	0.175	0.09	0.771
Pre-Program Yearly Total “Other” Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	1	42.913	21.50	0.000***
Project XAge Group	2	3.104	1.56	0.240
Project XGang-Membership Status	1	1.153	0.58	0.458
Project XProgram Length	1	0.082	0.04	0.841
Project XPre-Program Yearly Total “Other” Arrests	1	0.180	0.09	0.767
Within error	17	1.996	—	—
Total	28	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

9.5(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project X Age Group Interaction

Project	Age Group	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Comparison	14 & under	-0.272	0.886	4	1	—			<i>f</i>		
Comparison	15 to 16	0.131	2.447	5	2		—				
Comparison	17 & over	-0.313	1.667	2	3			—			
Program	14 & under	-3.050	1.229	2	4	<i>f</i>			—	*	*
Program	15 to 16	0.938	0.592	10	5				*	—	
Program	17 & over	1.453	0.813	6	6				*		—

For differences between groups: *f* $p = .08$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .01$; and ‡ $p < .001$.

Chapter 10

Gang and Area Effects

The San Antonio Police Department's Project (GRAASP) was expected to focus on the coordinated and enhanced provision of community-based services and controls to youth-gang members or youth at high risk of gang membership, who were referred to the program mainly from juvenile probation or parole. The Project did not focus on changes in activities of gangs on the street. The key Project workers who provided services to the youth were the outreach youth workers and case managers. Outreach youth workers were not assigned to the program youths' specific gangs or gang sections on the street. Efforts of the gang police to suppress and control gang activity on the streets were ongoing, but not necessarily related to particular program youth. The Steering Committees and the agencies providing services and controls to program youth also did not directly address the interrelationship of youth in the program and particular gangs on the street, or the community problems that program youth could have contributed to.

Limited data were available to indicate whether changes at the individual program-youth levels might be parallel or related to changes possibly taking place at the youth's particular gang- and aggregate-gang levels during the same time periods. Because of the lack of adequate or sufficient data at the gang-as-a-unit and community-gang-incident levels, we speculated that our samples of program and comparison youth, in the aggregate, could be used also as proxies to reflect changes that might have occurred at the gang-as-a-unit and community-gang-incident levels. We could not see direct or reliable connections between changes at the individual, gang and aggregate-community-crime levels; our data were too incomplete.

We obtained and aggregated data from interviews of individual program and comparison youth about possible changes in their gang-membership status between the Time I and Time II interviews; data from police records about changes in arrests for program and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods (without controls for age, gender, or other factors), as well as the SAPD area-level gang-incident changes; and the perceptions of SAPD Gang-Unit officers about changes in gang size and the scope of crime committed by gangs in the program and comparison areas over a four-year period. We thought we might be able to learn something about a possible relationship of the findings to program effects.

Gang Membership-Status Change. Eighty-six (86) comparison youth and 68 program youth responded to a series of questions about their gang-membership status at both Time I and Time II (approximately 1¼ years apart). A key question asked: “Have you ever been in a gang or associated with a gang?” Almost all youth, comparison and program, said they were presently or had earlier been involved in a gang. There was little change in the response pattern for comparison or program youth about their gang-membership status between the Time I and Time II interviews (Table 10.1).

At Time I, 86 comparison youth said they were or had been gang members; at Time II, 85 said they were gang members, and one youth said he was now a non-gang youth. At Time I, 58 of the 68 program youth said they were gang members; at Time II, 60 said they were gang members. In other words, at the Time II interview, one less comparison youth was a gang member but two more program youth were gang members. There was little change in gang-membership status for the comparison and the program youth. It is difficult to detect any

significant program effect from these findings, or that the program would have directly or indirectly influenced changes at the gang-as-unit or area levels.

Gang-Unit Police Interviews (Lorita Purnell-James)

Three San Antonio Police Department officers who had knowledge of gangs in both the program and comparison areas were asked to identify the number and size of gangs at the end of the first year of program operations (1998), and again two years later (2000). (The final estimates were made approximately one year after OJJDP funding ceased.) A total of twenty-nine youth gangs were identified in the program and comparison areas; however, only ten gangs with the same name were identified across the two areas. These gangs ranged in size from 5 to 50 members each. Between 2 to 6 program and comparison youth were identified as being from six of these gangs in both the program and comparison areas.

The SAPD police officers reported a decline in the size of gangs in San Antonio, including the six gangs in the program and comparison areas, over the three-year police-interview period. The decline in membership was estimated to be greater for the gangs in the program-area community, including the gangs of which program youth were members. Between 1998 and 2000 – about a 2½-year period – membership of the six gangs in the program area declined from 137 to 87 (36.5%), but the decline in membership for the presumably-comparable six gangs in the comparison area was from 145 to 107 (26.2%).

The San Antonio police officers were also asked to estimate the degree to which each of the gangs was involved in drug, violence, or property crime, using a scale of 1-10, with 10 indicating the most involvement and 1 the least involvement of its members in the particular type

of crime. Estimates were made in November, 1998, and again in August, 1999. At each time, gangs in both areas were viewed as being involved more in property and drug crime than in violence crime, and the severity of each type of crime was perceived generally at a modest level, in the range of 4 or 5.

Gang violence, drugs, and property crimes were viewed as having dropped almost to zero in the six gangs in the program area, and to have dropped only slightly (to a 3) in the six gangs in the comparison area. Again, the perceptions of the officers were that there was a considerably greater reduction in number of gang members and in the severity of crime in the program area than in the comparison area. However, assuming that the views of the Gang-Unit officers were accurate and reliable, it is difficult to precisely match (or relate) them to changes (or non-changes) that occurred in gang-membership and arrest patterns of individual program and comparison youth, over a somewhat similar period of time. Program youth were obviously not leaving the gangs.

Aggregated Arrest Changes

It is possible that changes in the pattern of aggregated offenses of the program and comparison youth were similar to those of all the other youth in the gangs from which the program and comparison youth came. We note, in fact, that when we aggregated arrests for program and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods, there was a slightly greater drop in arrests for program youth – from a total of 70 to 67 (4.3%) – than for comparison youth – from a total of 49 to 48 (2.0%) (Table 10.2). There is some consistency in this with police reports of a greater reduction in crime among the gangs in the program area than

in the comparison area. Both are very small decreases in total arrests over an almost 1- or 1¼-year period, hardly enough to indicate superior progress by program youth.

However, at the aggregate arrest-change level (without controls for age, gender or pre-program arrests) we found that program youth had an increase in their levels of serious-violence arrests – from 11.4% to 19.4% – and a slight decrease in less-serious violence arrests – from 18.6% to 17.9%. On the other hand, comparison youth had a decrease in serious-violence arrest – from 4.1% to 0.0% – and a decrease in less-serious violence arrests – from 6.1% to 4.2%. The levels of arrests for violence were also much higher for program youth, at both time periods. This hardly reflects the perceived sharp drop in levels of violence of gangs in the program community, or slight drop in the comparison community.

We also found that program-youth drug arrests increased sharply – from 10.0% to 20.9% – but comparison-youth drug arrests decreased only slightly – from 28.6% to 25.0%. Again, this pattern appears to be opposite to that indicated for gang-level change in the community by the Gang-Unit officers.

The one area in which there may be some congruence between program-sample arrest change and police-report arrest change may be in respect to property crime. There was consistency in the arrest patterns in both samples of youth and the police reports of gang crime, that the dominant gang member offense was property crime, at least during the program period. Property-crime arrests did decrease for program youth, and were reported by police to have declined for program-youth gangs in the program area. The decline in property-crime arrests was from 44.3% to 25.4% for program youth, with a slight increase – from 49.0% to 52.1% – for comparison youth. It is possible that the Project was successful in contributing to the reduction

of property-crime arrests for program youth, although we know that the program youth who were no longer committing property offenses were engaged in violence and drug crime instead, or at least were being arrested for these crimes.

Aggregate Gang-Incident Statistics

The San Antonio Police Department provided gang-incident data on a police-district basis. The program area included three police districts – 5160, 5170, and 5180 – but data were available for only two of the districts – 5160 and 5170. Three police districts were included in the comparison area – 6130, 6220, and 6240, and data were available for all three. We were able to compare official changes in total gang incidents reported for the program and comparison areas between the pre-program period, 1995-1996 – a two-year period – and the program period, 1997-1999 – approximately a two-and-a-half year period in which the program was active.

We focused on changes in total gang incidents in the program- and comparison-area districts generally between the pre-program and program periods. The trends in reported gang incidents were downward in both areas, as they were for the city as a whole. The trend downward, however, was not as sharp in the program area as in the comparison area. The decrease in the program area was from 131 to 87 gang incidents, a decline of 33.6%; the decrease in the comparison area was from 197 to 83 gang incidents, a decline of 57.9%.

The implication of the findings of changes in aggregate gang incidents (despite the incompleteness of available data and the lack of precise matching of time periods) was that the gang problem generally was being reduced at a somewhat greater rate in the comparison area than in the program area. Furthermore, since program-youth arrest-change patterns did not differ

significantly from those of comparison youth (under statistically-controlled conditions), it was hardly likely they could have been responsible for changes in either direction – up or down – at the gang-as-a-unit or community gang-incident levels.

Summary.

Based on data from various sources, there was no consistent, reliable evidence that there were significant changes in program- or comparison-youth gang-membership status, gang size, or gang-crime severity, in program- and comparison-youth arrests, or in area gang incidents, that would indicate a decrease in the gang problem in the program area relative to the comparison area between the pre-program and program periods. The exception was in the data based on the views of the SAPD police, who estimated a greater decline in gang membership and the severity of gang crime in the program area than in the comparison area.

Nevertheless, when considering all data sources, we do not find that there is sufficient evidence that the gang problem at the aggregate level was reduced at a greater rate in the program area than in the comparison area. Perhaps more importantly, we do not find significant evidence for a program-youth arrest-level change that could account for any changes at the gang-as-a-unit or community gang-crime levels in the program area.

Table 10.1
Gang-Membership-Status Change
Time I – Time II

10.1A Time I

Sample	Gang Member N (%)	Non-Gang Youth N (%)	Total N (%)
Comparison	86 (100.0)	0 (0)	86 (55.8)
Program	58 (85.3)	10 (14.7)	68 (44.2)
Total	144 (93.5)	10 (6.5)	154 (100.0)

10.1B Time II

Sample	Gang Member N (%)	Non-Gang Youth N (%)	Total N (%)
Comparison	85 (98.8)	1 (1.2)	86 (55.8%)
Program	60 (88.2)	8 (11.8)	68 (44.2)
Total	145 (94.2)	9 (5.8)	154 (100.0)

Table 10.2
Change in Types of Arrests (N = 234)
Comparison Youth (N = 49) and Program Youth (N = 68)
Pre-Program and Program Periods

Type of Arrest	Comparison-Youth Arrests (N = 97)				Program-Youth Arrests (N = 137)			
	Pre-Program Period		Program Period		Pre-Program Period		Program Period	
	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)	n	(%)
Serious Violence	2	(4.1)	0	(0.0)	8	(11.4)	13	(19.4)
Less-Serious Violence	3	(6.1)	2	(4.2)	13	(18.6)	12	(17.9)
Drugs	14	(28.6)	12	(25.0)	7	(10.0)	14	(20.8)
Property	24	(49.0)	25	(52.1)	31	(44.3)	17	(25.4)
Weapons	2	(4.1)	1	(2.1)	1	(1.4)	1	(1.5)
Public Disturbance	2	(4.1)	3	(6.3)	1	(1.4)	2	(3.0)
Alcohol	1	(2.0)	2	(4.2)	2	(2.9)	1	(1.5)
Other	1	(2.0)	3	(6.3)	7	(10.0)	7	(10.4)
Total	49	(100.0)	48	(100.0)	70	(100.0)	67	(100.0)

Chapter 11

Executive Summary

The San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) received funding for a project called the Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment and Service Program (GRAASP) from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice in September, 1994. It was one of five demonstration programs to test the model of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. The SAPD aimed to address a combination of emerging and chronic gang problems in a large area on the south side of San Antonio.

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model was characterized by the interrelated strategies of community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, and suppression that required organizational changes and development in a cluster of criminal-justice, social-service, grassroots, and other organizations working together to target gang-involved youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. A Steering Committee of local-community and citywide agencies and organizations was to advise on policy, and an interagency team of outreach youth workers, case managers, police, and probation officers was to provide program services and controls for program youth.

A comprehensive evaluation was conducted by the University of Chicago and by a local evaluation team. A technical assistance team and officials of OJJDP assisted in the development and monitoring of Project implementation, and outcome in terms of reducing gang-related offenses of youth in the program, as well as program-area rates of crime. A comparison area and

a sample of comparison-area youth were also selected and assessed for changes (although they received no Project-related services). The local evaluation team and a National Advisory Board were to assist in the development of the evaluation.

The program and comparison areas each contained about 25,000 persons. The areas had experienced economic hardships between 1988 and the early 1990s, as measured by declines in family and household income. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, 26.7% of families in the program area and 32.4% in the comparison area were below the poverty line. Between 1980 and 1990 a large section of the non-Hispanic white population had moved out of the program area, replaced by a low-income Hispanic (mainly Mexican-American) population, in part because local military installations were downsized, jobs lost and mortgages on homes foreclosed. The comparison area contained an even lower-income, Hispanic (mainly Mexican-American) population, with little change in population composition and a higher level of residential home ownership in 1990.

San Antonio had come to be known as the “gang drive-by capital of Texas in 1993.” The SAPD had identified 5,485 known gang members and associate gang members in 137 gangs and gang subunits in the city, but little information was available on the specific number and types of gangs and gang members in the program and comparison areas. Both program and comparison areas were said to have an emerging gang problem. There was a tendency to include tagger and street-delinquent groups along with gangs as part of the youth-gang problem. The groups identified were often small and ephemeral, with gangs and street groups periodically changing names and youth switching from one gang or street group to another. There was evidence that gangs were in some conflict with each other and defended their own territories.

The local evaluation team from the University of Texas-San Antonio (UTSA) raised questions about the consistency and validity of the criminal-justice agencies' definitions of a gang and a gang member. The San Antonio Police Department, the Bexar County Sheriff's Office, the Country Probation and Parole Department, the District Attorney's Office and the School districts all had Gang Units, and appeared to independently determine the nature and scope of the gang problem. A key initial objective of the SAPD had been to establish a task force to develop comprehensive and consistent collaboration among these units, and reduce the fragmentation of gang-control planning and suppression.

In the second-year funding application to OJJDP, the size of the program area was reduced in order to better focus on the development of a comprehensive control and service program for gang-involved youth and those highly at-risk for gang involvement. A key objective was improving the level of cooperation between local citizens and the police department. The SAPD had already tried to assist local neighborhood groups with access to services. The program area (like the comparison area) was a long distance from central city services; there were few cultural, business, and other resources accessible to program-area residents. Much of the SAPD's concern was with improving relationships with local community leaders and organizations, particularly through its community-policing (SAFFE) officer.

The SAPD, after its initial planning application, did not appear to invest a great deal of staff resources in the development of the GRAASP program. The commander of the Youth Crimes Unit, a SAPD lieutenant, was assigned as Project Director only 20% of time, but was given more responsibility for other, non-Project tasks in the third and fourth years of the Project. Project funds were not allocated for other police or criminal-justice staffing units or agencies

(e.g., probation or parole units) which referred youth to the program. Funds were largely expended on the development of a service program staffed mainly by outreach youth workers, case managers, and by local social-service agencies.

A Steering-Committee structure was developed with initial focus on mobilizing local neighborhood organizations, but there was less local interest in the gang problem than in clean-up activities and recreation opportunities for the general youth population. Conflict between the SAPD and the local neighborhood organizations increased over the issue of whether the SAPD could provide more resources or access to community health and social services. Representatives of justice-system agencies initially did not meet regularly with the Steering Committee, and local agencies and grassroots organizations did not become sufficiently involved in supporting or developing the Project.

The program itself got off to a slow start. GRAASP did not become operational until almost two years after the SAPD received OJJDP funding. Also, the first full time Project Coordinator resigned after only a few months. Delays in staff hiring resulted in part from a cumbersome process which required all police-agency hiring to be approved through ordinances passed by the City Council. Substantial services and worker contacts with program youth were provided during only about two of the four years the Project was in operation.

GRAASP essentially became an outreach, social-service support program to gang-involved youth who were referred mainly by juvenile probation and parole officers. Outreach youth workers and case managers took the lead in the planning and delivery of services. While there was referral of program youth to social agencies, and contacts with probation and police, there was no integrated or coordinated planning and delivery of services involving outreach

youth workers, case managers, police, probation and school personnel together. A team structure or approach incorporating practitioners representing various organizations or agencies as key members of an effective Steering Committee was not developed.

It was not clear how fully invested the SAPD was in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Despite the limitations of the GRAASP Steering Committee, poor program structure and lack of integrated control and service development, effective collaboration between the SAPD program operators and national and local evaluation personnel was achieved. Program-service forms, interviews with program and comparison youth, criminal histories of individual youth, and statistics on gang crime incidents in the program and comparison communities were adequately completed.

The National Evaluation was interested not only in Project development, but also in effects of the Project on program youth. The sample of 110 program youth with worker-tracking records was matched with a sample of 120 comparison youth, who received no Project services. The gender distribution of both program and comparison youth was similar: males comprised 82.5% of the program sample and 80.8% of the comparison sample. Almost all youth were Latino (Mexican-American) (program youth = 94.2%; comparison youth = 100.0%). The ages of youth at program entry were classified into three categories: 12 to 14 years, 15 to 17 years, and 18 to 24 years. The 15- to 17-year-old group was the largest in both samples. The great majority of youth were self-declared gang members at program entry: program youth = 88.0%; comparison youth = 99.2%.

The key differences in the youth samples were patterns of arrests and confinement histories in the pre-program period. More program youth than comparison youth had arrest and

confinement histories, and their histories were longer. The distribution of the types of offenses for which the youth were arrested was also different. Program youth were arrested relatively more often for violent offenses; comparison youth relatively more often for drug offenses. Delinquency background did not seem to be simply correlated with gang-membership status.

Evaluation records indicated that 878 worker-tracking forms were completed during the program period – January 1, 1997 through June 30, 1999. Project workers (primarily outreach youth workers and case managers, as well as some probation/parole, police, and manpower workers) provided contacts and services to 107 program youth. The 12-page form was completed by workers for each youth every three months – an average of 8.2 forms per youth. Youth were in the program for an average of a little more than a year, and were provided with an average of 3.4 worker contacts and 4.8 services per youth per month.

The main services provided to youth included: group counseling (20.4%), individual counseling (18.1%), family counseling (7.4%), job-related (9.4%), school-related (14.9%) and suppression/social control (7.9%). Other services included transportation, case planning, and material support. Youth workers and case managers supplied 79.5% of these services; parole and probation officers 8.8%. Almost 75% of coordinated contacts with other workers were initiated by youth workers and case managers; 10.3% by probation and parole officers. The outreach-youth-worker services did not include contacts with gang youth on the streets.

There were some differences in the patterns of services provided to the different kinds of youth in the program. Although there were fewer females in the program, they were provided on average with more services (63.2) than males (50.1) during the course of the program. Younger youth were supplied with relatively more counseling services, and older youth with relatively

more job-related services. Gang members were given more services than non-gang youth or associate gang members, but, surprisingly, non-gang youth were provided with slightly more suppression contacts or services than gang members or associate gang members. More services were supplied to less-delinquent than more-delinquent or non-delinquent youth. However, the types of offenses the youth were arrested for made a difference.

A key Evaluation question was whether the program contributed to a relatively greater reduction in arrests for program youth than for matched comparison youth who were not provided with program services. Age, gang-membership status, length of time in the program and pre-program arrest histories were control variables used in GLM models to determine whether there were differences in arrest patterns for program and comparison youth, i.e., increases, decreases, or no change in arrests for specific kinds of offenses, comparing changes between matched pre-program and program periods. Since there were very few females in either youth sample, and almost all youth in both samples were Hispanic (Mexican-American), the gender and race/ethnicity variables were eliminated in our GLM analyses.

Separate analyses were conducted for each of the dependent or outcome variables – change on an annualized basis in total arrests, violence arrests, drug arrests, property arrests, and “other” (minor) arrests. Although program youth generally did better than comparison youth in lowering or not increasing arrest levels as much (except for drug arrests), none of the differences in levels was statistically different. The variable *pre-program arrests* was highly significant in all of the models. For both samples, the same regression phenomena occurred. The more arrests in the pre-program period, the fewer in the program period; and the fewer in the pre-program period, the more in the program period. There were, however, some interesting sub-sample

differences.

Both program and comparison youth increased their number of total arrests. Program youth increased their total arrests (L.S. mean +0.03) less than comparison youth (LS mean +0.43). Age category, gang-membership status and length of time in the program made no difference across, or even within, samples. One difference, which was almost statistically significant, was that program youth with medium and high levels of arrests in the pre-program period did substantially better than their comparison-youth subsample counterparts (LS mean difference $p = 0.07$). In the model with *total violence arrests* (serious and less serious) as the dependent variable, there was a greater non-significant reduction in arrests for program youth (LS mean -0.23) than for comparison youth (LS mean -0.07). Surprisingly, youth who were in the program less than one year had a greater reduction in total violence arrests than youth who were in the program more than one year. But program youth with high and medium levels of total violence arrests in the pre-program period did marginally better than their comparison-youth counterparts.

The pattern was different for drug arrests, where the comparison youth did better than the program youth. Program youth were arrested substantially more often (LS mean +0.23) than comparison youth (LS mean +0.02) between the pre-program and program periods. Length of time in the program was associated with number of drug arrests: youth who were in the program longer (i.e., a year or more) had more drug arrests than youth who were in the program less than a year. This difference was marginally significant ($p = 0.10$).

In a preliminary GLM analysis, the program sample appeared to do significantly better than the comparison sample in reducing their arrests for property crime. However, a careful

check of 7 program and 2 comparison youth who reduced their property arrests revealed that these youth increased their arrests for violence and/or drug crime instead. Therefore, we could not regard this change pattern as evidence of Project success. When the 9 youth were removed from the analysis (55 youth remained) the model was still statistically significant, but the difference between the program and comparison samples was no longer statistically significant. Nevertheless, the reduction in property-crime arrests for the program-sample youth (LS mean - 0.28) was considerably greater, since the comparison-sample youth had an increase in property crime arrests (LS mean +0.02).

Relatively fewer youth were arrested for “other” (minor) offenses (such as curfew violation, drinking, gang-loitering, resisting an officer, unlawful possession of a firearm) than were arrested for violence, drugs, or property offenses. Changes in arrest patterns showed that program youth did better (LS mean -0.22) than comparison youth (LS mean -0.15) in reducing “other” arrests.

In sum, program youth did better in reducing their level of arrests for different types of crime (except for drug crime) than did comparison youth, but none of the differences were statistically different as main effects. We have no evidence to indicate that the Project was substantially effective in reducing arrests for youth, other than what would have occurred without the program.

Based on interview findings, there was also no evidence that program youth reduced their involvement with the gangs of which they were members. Slightly more program youth, in fact, became gang members, while slightly fewer comparison youth remained affiliated with gangs, during the program period. On the other hand, the SAPD Gang Unit detectives and other police

officers assigned to both the program and comparison areas (but not necessarily to the GRAASP program) estimated there was a somewhat greater reduction in the size of gangs in the program area than in the comparison area. They also felt that the severity of gang property, drug, and violent crime in the program area declined more than in the comparison area. However, the analysis of official SAPD gang-incident statistics revealed that while gang incidents decreased 33.6% in the program area, they decreased by 57.9% in the comparison area.

The youth-gang problem was abating in San Antonio generally, and in the program and comparison areas specifically. There is no substantial evidence to indicate that the GRAASP Project had a differential effect in reducing the level of gang crime at the individual, gang, or community levels. It is likely that the absence of a significant GRAASP Project effect was due to the fact that the SAPD, local agencies and grassroots groups did not adequately support the OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Program Model.

Appendix A

Police Arrest Charges

Crime	Charges	
Serious Violence	Murder Attempted Murder Manslaughter Aggravated Battery Aggravated Assault	Armed Robbery Armed Violence Drive-By Shooting Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse
Violence	Battery Robbery Kidnapping Arson Assault Home Invasion Attempted Aggravated Battery Attempted Robbery Hijacking/Motor Vehicle Domestic Assault Domestic Battery Sex Crime	Child Abuse Street Fighting Mob Action Educational Intimidation Hate Crime Stalking Telephone Harassment Intimidation Ethnic Intimidation Racial Incident Unlawful Restraint Protection Order
Property	Burglary Auto Theft Theft Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle Sale of Stolen Motor Vehicle Theft of Lost Property Attempted Burglary Attempted Theft Shoplifting Possession of Stolen Property Receipt of Stolen Property	Possession of Mislaid Property Criminal Damage to Property Criminal Damage to Land Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle Graffiti Vandalism Trespass Criminal Trespass to Residence Criminal Trespass to Land Criminal Trespass to Property Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle Possession of Burglary Tools

Crime	Charges	
Drugs	Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of Controlled Substance Possession of Controlled Substance Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance	Under the Influence of Cocaine Under the Influence of Meth Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana Driving under the Influence of Drugs
Weapon	Unlawful Use of Weapons Aggravated Discharge of Firearm Unlawful Sale of Weapons Unlawful Possession of Firearms	Unlawful Possession of Weapons Possession of Firearm and Ammo Unregistered Gun Carriage No FOID
Public Disturbance	Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer Disorderly Conduct Reckless Conduct Curfew Violation Loitering	Gang Loitering Gang Assembly Unlawful Assembly Contempt of Court Obstruction of Justice
Alcohol	Driving under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs Sale of Alcohol/Minor Minor Drinking Intoxication of Minor	Possession of Alcohol/Minor Possession of Alcoholic Beverage Drinking Transportation of Open Alcohol
Other	Other Status Offense Attempted Suicide Motor Vehicle Act Fraudulent/Unlawful ID Contributing to Delinquency of Minor Exhibitionism Public Indecency Maintaining a Public Nuisance	Child Neglect Child Care Referral Forgery Bank Fraud

Appendix A - Page 2

References

- Battin-Pearson, Sara R., Terrence P. Thornberry, J. David Hawkins, and Marvin D. Krohn. 1998 (October). "Gang Membership, Delinquent Peers, and Delinquent Behavior." *OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin*. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Bursik, Robert J., Jr., and Harold G. Grasmick. 1993. *Neighborhoods and Crime*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Cheatwood, Derral, Milo Colton, Stephen Blanchard, Richard Diaz. 1996 (August 30). *Preliminary Report: Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment and Service Program (GRAASP) in San Antonio*. San Antonio: The University of Texas at San Antonio.
- Cloward, Richard A. and Lloyd F. Ohlin. 1960. *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Cohen, Stanley. 1980. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of Mods and Rockers*. 2nd GEd. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Curry, G. David, Cheryl L. Maxson, and James C. Howell. 2001 (March). Youth Gang Homicides in the 1990s. *OJJDP FACT Sheet*. U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Curry, G. David. 1995 (July). *Responding to Gang-Related Crime and Delinquency. A Review of the Literature*. Prepared for Abt Associates, and the National Institute of Justice. Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Missouri– St. Louis.
- Curry, G. David, Robert L. Fox, Richard A. Ball, and Darryl Stone. 1992. *National Assessment of Law Enforcement Anti-Gang Information*. Resources (Draft Final Report) Criminology Department, University of West Virginia.
- Curry, G. David and Irving Spergel. 1988. Gang Homicide, Delinquency, and Community. *Criminology* 26: 381-407.
- Decker, Scott H. 2003. Policing Gangs and Youth Violence: Where Do We Stand, Where Do We Go From Here? In *Policing Gangs and Youth Violence*, Scott H. Decker (ed.) Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth, Pp. 287-293.
- Fagan, Jeffrey E. 1989. The Social Organization of Drug Use and Drug Dealing Among Urban Gangs. *Criminology* 27(4) 663-669.

References - 1

- Gold, Martin and Hans W. Mattick. 1974. *Experiment in the Streets: The Chicago Youth Development Project*. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
- Haynie, Dana L. 2001. Delinquent Peers Revisited: Does Network Structure Matter. *American Journal of Sociology* 106(4): 1013-57.
- Howell, James C. 2000 (August). *Youth Gang Programs and Strategies, Summary*. National Youth Gang Center. Institute for Intergovernmental Research. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Howell, James C., Arlen Egley, Jr., and Debra Gleason. 2002 (June). Modern-Day Youth Gangs. *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Hirschi, Travis. 1969. *Causes of Delinquency*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Klein, Malcolm W. 1995. *The American Street Gang*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Klein, Malcolm W. 1971. *Street Gangs and Street Workers*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Klein, Malcolm W. 1968. *From Association to Guilt: The Gangs Guidance Project in Juvenile Gang Intervention*. Los Angeles, CA: Youth Studies Center, University of Southern California and the Los Angeles County Probation Department.
- Kobrin, Solomon. 1951. The Conflict of Values in Delinquency Areas. *American Sociological Review* 16 (1); 653-661.
- Kornhauser, Ruth. 1978. *Social Sources of Delinquency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Markowitz, Fred E., Paul E. Bellair, Allen E. Liska, and Jianhong Liu. 2001. Extending Social Disorganization Theory: Modeling the Relationships Between Cohesion, Disorder, and Fear. *Criminology* 39 (2): 293-319.
- Maxson, Cheryl, and Malcolm W. Klein. 1990. Street Gang Violence: Twice As Great or Half as Great? Pp. 71-100 in *Gangs in America*, edited by C. Ronald Huff. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Merton, Robert K. 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Mihalic, Sharon, Katherine Irwin, Delbert Elloitt, Abigail Fagan, and Diane Hansen. 2001 (July).

References - 2

- Blueprints for Violence Prevention. *OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin*. U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Miller, Walter B. 2001 (April). *The Growth of Youth Gang Problems in the United States: 1970-1998*. U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Miller, Walter B. 1962. The Impact of a 'Total-Community' Delinquency Control Project. *Social Problems* 19 (2): 168-191.
- Miller, Walter B. 1957. The Impact of a Community Group Work Program on Delinquent Crime Gangs. *Social Service Review*, 21 (4): 390-406.
- Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2001. Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence. *Criminology* 39 (3): 517-560.
- National Youth Gang Center. 2000 (November). *1998 National Youth Gang Survey*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Neighborhood News*. Issue I. Winter 1999. Hidden Cove/Indian Creek, San Antonio, Texas.
- Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. 1994. A Comprehensive Response to America's Gang Problem. *FY 1994 Discretionary Competitive Program Announcements*. Washington, D.C. Pp. 38-51.
- Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. 2000. *Gang-Free Schools and Community Initiatives*. Washington, D.C.
- Reed, Winifred L. and Scott H. Decker. 2002 (July). *Responding to Gangs: Evaluation and Research*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
- Sampson, Robert J. 1991. Linking the Micro-and Macrolevel Dimensions of Community Social Organization. *Social Forces* 70 (1): 43-64.
- Sampson, Robert J. and W. Byron Groves. 1989. Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganization Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 94: 774-802.
- Sampson, Robert J., and John H. Laub. 1993. *Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points Through Life*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

References - 3

- Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry D. McKay. 1972. *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, revised edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Short, James F., Jr., and Fred L. Strodbeck. 1965. *Group Process and Gang Delinquency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sivilli, June S., Robert K. Yin, M. Elaine Nugent. 1995 (March). *Evaluation of Gang Interventions: Final Report*. Prepared for the National Institute of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. U.S. Department of Justice.
- Spergel, Irving A. 1995. *The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Spergel, Irving A., Kwai Ming Wa, et al. 2003 (February). *Follow-Up Report, Evaluation of the Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP) in Little Village, Chicago – The Role of the Youth Worker with Various Types of Gang Youth*. Chicago: School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago.
- Spergel, Irving A., Editor and Ron Chance, Co-Editor. 1992. *Technical Assistance Manuals*. School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, in cooperation with the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
- Community Based Youth Agency: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Candice M. Kane with the assistance of Irving A. Spergel.
- Community Mobilization: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Irving A. Spergel.
- Corrections: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Thomas Regulus.
- Employment: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Robert L. Laseter.
- General Community Design: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Irving A. Spergel.
- Grassroots Organization: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Irving Spergel.
- Judges: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Ron Chance.
- Parole: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Thomas A. Regulus.
- Police: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Irving A. Spergel and Kenneth Ehrensaft.

References - 4

- Probation: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Ron Chance.
 - Prosecutor: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Candice M. Kane.
 - School: Technical Assistance Manual. 1992 (January). Robert L. Laseter.
- Sullivan, Mercer L., and Barbara Miller. 1999. Adolescent Violence, State Processes, and the Local Context of Moral Panic. Pp. 261-283 in J. Mc C. Heyman (ed.). *States and Illegal Practices*. New York: Berg.
- Sutherland, Edwin and Donald R. Cressey. 1978. *Principles of Criminology*. 10th ed. New York: J.B. Lippincott.
- Suttles, Gerald D. 1968. *The Social Order of the Slum*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thrasher, Frederick. 1927. *The Gang*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Venkatesh, Sudhir Alladi. 1999. Community-Based Interventions into Street Gang Activity. *Journal of Community Psychology* 27(5): 1-17.
- Veysey, Bonita M. and Steven F. Messner. 1999. Further Testing of Social Disorganization Theory: An Elaboration of Sampson's and Groves's 'Community Structure and Crime.' *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 36 (2): 156-174.
- Zatz, Marjorie S. 1987. Chicano Youth Gangs and Crime: The Creation of Moral Panic. *Contemporary Crisis* 11: 129-158.

References - 5