


# NEWSLETTER

NO. 07-04

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## Media is the Battlefield



*Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*


Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

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## Foreword

Media operations are vital components of the information operations fight. This newsletter explores the role media operations play on the modern battlefield, enumerating battle-tested and proven public affairs training guidance tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). These TTP help units and Soldiers gain a better perspective and situational understanding of the battlefield environment. Media operations provide units and Soldiers with an enhanced capability to view the adversary and themselves through someone else's viewpoint – via television, Internet, or print media.

Steven Mains  
Colonel, Armor  
Director  
Center for Army Lessons Learned

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The intent of this CALL publication is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by Soldiers for Soldiers. Please send relevant TTP to Mr. George J. Mordica II, Managing Editor (COM: 913-684-9503/ DSN: 552-9503, FAX: DSN 552-9583, email: [mordicag@leavenworth.army.mil](mailto:mordicag@leavenworth.army.mil).) Articles must be submitted in Microsoft Word format. Graphs, slides, and photos must be submitted separately in their original form in either TFF, PSD (Adobe Photoshop), or high-resolution JPEG format.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications referenced in this newsletter (other than the CALL newsletters), such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

## **Media is the Battlefield 2006: An Introduction**

In 1992, a select group of officers, led by then BG Robert Scales as the Desert Storm Study Group, was charged by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff to write the Army's story on Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort. The result was the book, *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War*. One of the greatest challenges in writing the book was finding photographs from any source on U.S. Army ground operations in the conflict. It was the day of the tightly controlled media pool, a method that virtually excluded media access to the battlefield once the war, particularly ground operations, commenced.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 92-7, *In the Spotlight Media and the Tactical Commander*, captured many of the insights and lessons learned relating to media and media relations in that war. For the most part, media relations and public affairs (PA) were viewed as an adjunct to operations. Developing and sustaining a positive media atmosphere were viewed as a combat multiplier for existing battlefield operating systems (currently referred to as warfighting functions).

As the end of the 1990s approached, U.S. Army involvement in operations in the Balkans grew. Interest in media operations as part of information operations (IO) and as a stand-alone subject grew accordingly. Media relations and PA came to be seen as a warfighting tool to support decisive operations. CALL published Newsletters 99-2, *Information Operations: IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment*; 99-15, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Information Operations*; and 03-18, *Task Force Eagle Information Operations* (a follow-up to CALL Newsletter 99-15). The media approach taken in 1990 and 1992 proved to be inadequate for PA operations in the new millennium.

MAJ James E. Hutton, as Chief of Media for U.S. Transportation Command, wrote a thought-provoking article for CALL titled, "Producing Change in Army Public Affairs: Ideas for Refocusing Operations" (*News from the Front*, September-October 2001). MAJ Hutton's article serves as Chapter 1 of this 2006 newsletter. Much of what MAJ Hutton called for was soon to happen, accelerated by the events of 9/11.

With the collapse of the World Trade Center towers and the simultaneous strike on the Pentagon, both seen virtually live around the globe, media relations and PA became the fourth dimension of modern warfare as practiced in the 21st century. Rather than a combat multiplier for lethal warfighting functions, PA, especially as a component of IO, became integral to decisive operations. It was no longer a question of considering the media's role on the battlefield. More properly stated, the media had become part of the battlefield. MAJ Hutton's 2001 article heralded that change.

Certainly the JRTC was well aware of the changes MAJ Hutton wrote about; the JRTC was a key training center for Balkans mission rehearsal exercises. In 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense issued guidance emphasizing the need for timely and accurate media and command information coverage of U.S. military operations (see Appendix A). Media-on-the-battlefield training was something JRTC rotational units and leaders could expect ("dread" was a word sometimes heard). Some of the changes MAJ Hutton called for are evidenced in "Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level" (Chapter 2), written by MAJ Darryl Wright, the JRTC PA officer (PAO) observer/controller (OC). Writing in 2002, MAJ Wright drew heavily on the methodology put forward in CALL Newsletter 02-3: *Targeting the Rakkasan Way: A Complete Guide on the Brigade-Level Targeting Process*, battle-tested that same year in Operation Enduring Freedom.

The JRTC Operations Group has continued that focus on media operations. In 2005, MAJ Randy Martin, the current PAO OC, published two articles on media-related issues. They serve as Chapters 3 and 4 of this newsletter. As a new PAO in Kosovo, MAJ Martin benefitted from a visit by MAJ Hutton during an intensive IO effort. In Chapter 5, now LTC Martin addresses media relations training for units, Soldiers, and leaders. Chapter 6, by CPT David Connolly, examines the impact of media operations in contemporary operational environments. Chapters 7 and 8 look to actual operations in Iraq and hurricane-relief operations in 2005 for related lessons on media relations and PA.

In 2006, the media is indeed part of the battlefield, and commanders must look at it that way. War in the 21st century is certainly fought in the fourth dimension. All commanders, leaders, and Soldiers must understand that and train for that fight.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Producing Change in Army Public Affairs: Ideas for Refocusing Operations**

**Analyst's Note:** In this article, the author suggests a refocusing of Army public affairs (PA). The ideas expressed in this article represent only the views of the author and are not to be construed as representing either current or emerging doctrine or policy. The purpose for publication here is to provoke thought, engender discussion, and explore possibilities for improving methods for practicing PA. View any tactics, techniques, or procedures presented in this article as points of discussion and not as approved replacements for current operational methods.

#### **Prologue**

The article below was written in 2001, prior to the events of 9/11. But more importantly, it was written before the numerous operations that have come since.

Although the need to adapt to the exponentially expanding marketplace of ideas and media outlets was clear before 9/11, such adaptation has proven critical in the last five years. Our Soldiers, the American public, the publics of our allies, and publics of our enemies have changed the way they receive and deliver information. Gone are the days when a local news release stays local. A word uttered at Fort Sill, Iraq, or Afghanistan can rocket across the planet instantly. On the other hand, the overwhelming flow of available information makes getting heard and understood a daunting task.

When I wrote "Producing Change in Army Public Affairs: Ideas for Refocusing Operations" for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in 2001, telling the Army story often meant pushing stories to reporters. Today, media encounters are nearly constant, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, we must go beyond quantity of contacts as a measure of effectiveness; maintaining pressure on reporters to cover operations comprehensively is the key to the success of PA operations in 2006. One factor that skews coverage in Iraq is that reporters are not as able to move about as they may wish. Consequently, many organizations are satisfied to collect daily casualty statistics and other items that are easily packaged. In fact, some organizations rely heavily on "stringers," that is non-professional local nationals who are sent to the streets to capture quotes, photos, and video, which are then brought to news bureaus. The actual reporters then use the material. Obviously, the materials gained through this method are of questionable validity; this is something news organizations are not eager to talk about publicly.

One constant remains: telling the truth is the only acceptable mode of conduct for PAOs. Although we need to be innovative in getting information out, we cannot dilute the product by allowing the use of false or misleading items.

One way to get information out is the continued use of "super-reporting," as described below. In addition to the many possibilities listed, we need to include the use of Web logs—otherwise known simply as "blogs." "Bloggers" are becoming more prominent; some of them are our very own Soldiers. Instead of cowering from the possible ill effects of blogging (such as operations security violations), it is important that we embrace this new use of technology to tell our story.

Commanders at all levels are making tremendous strides in working with reporters for stories. Operation Iraqi Freedom I and subsequent rotations have all included embedded reporters. From the several hundred reporters that followed troop units as they moved from Kuwait into Iraq, to the several dozen that remain throughout the country today, long- and short-term embedding has

provided some of the best, most comprehensive reporting of the war. Commanders now fully understand that one substantial duty of command is to meet the press.

The Army News Service's growth has been dramatic. The Army homepage and its multiple functions in support of viewers make it the most impressive Web page in the U.S. government's inventory. As installation and forward-based Web pages continue to follow suit, we can expect more strides in functionality.

Finally, the most impressive development from the combat theater is the use of the Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System. The system, first used from Iraq by the 1st Cavalry Division in 2004, allows units from virtually anywhere in the battlespace to link with a satellite for live and taped interviews with any commercial media outlet worldwide. The system provides for a direct news feed, for example, to local television affiliates in a way that simply was not possible with any prior technology.

It is important that PA practitioners make use of all means at their disposal to tell the Army story. It is clear that if left to chance, the story that is told will not offer a true and full depiction of what is occurring on the ground.

### **Introduction**

Army PA is facing a stern challenge. As the Army enters a new century, PA must adapt to major advancements in technology, growing expectations for development of information, and a heightened need to communicate ideas. Army PA must adopt a public relations model to maximize the potential strengths of current force structures in both installation offices and operational PA units, using new practices that effectively present the Army message and are consistent with Army values. This effort will require a focus on public relations techniques and a reduction of journalistic practices.

This article provides a set of ideas aimed at altering the approach of PA practitioners and commanders in PA operations. The new approach will require a use of PA personnel that does not necessarily represent current doctrine and practice. It does not, however, contradict legally mandated edicts for honesty, timeliness, and accuracy.

Despite years of downsizing, the Army remains a large and enduring institution. However, although we would like to believe that the Army is an organization whose relevance is self-evident, such is not the case. What remains for commanders and PA practitioners is the need to remain connected to the American people in a highly visible and ongoing way. A thorough refocusing of PA efforts and skills will ensure such a connection is achieved.

### **Why Does the Force Need to Change?**

Many members of the media, a growing segment of Congress, and a large majority of the American public have never served in the military. Many states have no military installations. In short, the lives of our military members and the American public are intersecting less and less.

It is incumbent on our military leaders to engender understanding of, and support for, the actions we take in preparing and executing our national military strategy.



“In the end, internationally, if adversaries are sure we can (defeat) them, they are more likely to stay in their box. If Americans know how good we are, they will support our needs. If our base/post neighbors know how important our mission is, they will put up with noise and traffic. If each Soldier knows the story, he will be a better Soldier.”<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, Americans, through the media, are far more inclined to listen to senior officers than junior Soldiers on large, substantive issues such as readiness, efficacy of operations, and future development. Both types of interviews, with both junior Soldiers and senior officers, are necessary and are necessary often. Senior leaders must step out of the shadows, take the prudent risks, and talk to the American people.

### **Why Must Army PA Change?**

PA, like any operation, is a commander’s program. Although PAOs execute PA missions, without direct commander involvement, only mediocre results are possible. Commanders must establish clear PA objectives. PAOs, adopting some of the ideas below, can develop the commanders’ plans and maximize use of all means available to effect results.

The U.S. armed forces are populated by the finest military professionals in the world. Soldiers, at all levels, must understand that they are part of the team that will achieve PA results. A concerted effort to tell the military story is necessary as an ongoing way of military life. The world of instant media and the reality that the public quickly shifts its attention to other events demands great effort to maintain a public relations edge.

“It doesn’t make any difference how good you are if nobody knows it. Take the Marine example. When you hear that word [Marine], it evokes a variety of images, mostly positive. But you are certainly not left without an emotional response. That’s partly because they have 160,000 PR people—their total force.”<sup>2</sup>

### **A World of Ideas**

Commercial organizations compete in a world of ideas through advertising and public relations. In this vast marketplace lies numerous media outlets and venues: radio, television, every form of print publication, the Internet, music, billboards, handbills, and phone banks. Of course, there is a commensurate ongoing competition among the various media outlets to capture information and deliver it to a widely diverse set of audiences.

Although the Army and other military organizations are not in direct competition with national commercial institutions for market share, commanders and PAOs can harness the competition between the information publishers and brokers to forward the Army’s ideas and positions. The media intensely seek out new information to sell their product. Innovative commanders and PAOs can leverage regularly scheduled and special events for greater media impact by employing a deliberate program of continuous interaction with key members of the media and other influential community leaders.

### **Exploiting the Use of Personalities**

Perhaps the most controversial of changes in an Army culture that stresses team accomplishment is exploiting the abilities of certain individuals by repeatedly putting them in the media spotlight. Senior leaders with charisma and media savvy can become media personalities and, therefore, respected spokesmen for the Army.

While this ostensibly runs counter to the institutional desire to avoid a cult of personality, it can provide benefits to the organization for many years. GEN Colin L. Powell, until becoming Secretary of State, was a popular circuit speaker. He related his military experiences to rapt audiences, despite having retired in 1993. GEN Powell may indeed be a rarity; however, many bold personalities are within our ranks.

The Army must make a concerted effort to identify such personalities and use their media talents for organizational advantage. Although this individual focus undoubtedly will cause some discomfort, the advantages are clear:

1. The Army gains a credible, consistent outlet for its message;
2. In time of crisis, that same credible figure can make an instant connection with the American public; and
3. Interviews with high-profile figures will transcend past individual publications or broadcasts and often will be used in multiple outlets.

### **Reorganization**

Effective future Army PA will blend the current triad of community relations (COMREL), internal information (also known as command information), and media relations into a single-minded effort, based on a commander's stated intent for PA. This intent, created with the assistance of the PAO, is to describe the commander's goals for providing information to key public groups and the general public, to meet the recurring information needs of key public groups, and to conform to higher-level PA guidance.

Restructuring PA offices with the new focus on conducting public relations will require little, if any, changes in numbers of personnel. Indeed, current PA manning for COMREL, command information, and media relations is sufficient to create a new public relations team.

PA offices cannot and should not compete with commercial newspapers. Small-town newspapers, with little or no responsibilities for COMREL or media relations, publish newspapers with staffs that dwarf most PA offices. Installation newspapers usually have one editor and a small number of reporters. The reporters and, to some degree, the editors may have only a few years of experience. Reporters on commercial newspaper staffs may have many years of experience and much greater educational backgrounds than Soldier-journalists. Additionally, commercial newspapers may employ sectional editors (i.e., sports, news, community).

It is apparent that despite the best efforts of installation staffs to prepare newspapers, their current focus on "news" items, irrespective of any commander's intent for PA, cannot yield the quantity or depth of a commercial newspaper.

More importantly, PA staff members in a public relations model are part of the team, not roving reporters looking for a scoop.

The current focus on collecting "news" should be abandoned. By employing methods that are focused on the needs of the commander and key public groups, installation and operational PA staffs can refocus post newspapers using a model that provides necessary information, supports the commander's intent for PA, and maximizes the strengths of current PA manning policies.

## **Internal Notes and Publications**

Post newspapers have become marginalized in importance with the emergence of computer communication for providing command information. In seconds, commanders can distribute command information to each key subordinate and quickly gain meaningful feedback. Other relatively new developments, such as the commander's cable channel on continental United States installations, Internet bulletin boards, and public folders on intranets, further limit the usefulness of the post newspaper as a tool of command information.

However, that does not mean that post newspapers should be eliminated. Indeed, new developments in technology can assist in the new approach suggested in this article. Other than the bulletin-board type of information that appears in every newspaper, many future articles should be designed for internal **and** external audiences. Some articles will, of course, lend themselves to only the internal audience.

Each Army journalist must demonstrate knowledge of the commander's intent for PA. Every article must withstand the scrutiny of the PAO in meeting the requirement to support the mission of the command. The post newspaper is not a venue for attempting to win a Pulitzer Prize for examining society's latest problem, unless such an examination supports the needs of the commander.

Training of Army journalists will require adjustments in focus. Soldier-journalists will not approach subjects for articles in the same manner as a commercial reporter. As a member of the organization, Army journalists will work from the commander's intent in developing information articles.

### **“Grip-and-Grins”**

Using “grip-and-grin” photo opportunities (which include Soldiers receiving awards and ribbon-cutting ceremonies) represents a change in the mindset of today's PA practitioners. Many commanders and command sergeants major ask for such efforts from their PAOs, often meeting at least some resistance. Indeed, past regulations suggest such events yield little in the way of newsworthiness.<sup>3</sup> However, concerns about newsworthiness simply miss the point. Such opportunities provide the commander with a tool for achieving his information needs.

PAOs should re-examine the reasons for their reluctance. “Grip-and-grin” photos, while not always useful for newspapers, can have a positive internal or external public relations effect. Further, with the emergence of digital photography, production of photos is much easier. Sharing the photos is also quick through e-mail and posting on Web sites.

PAOs can consider creating systems that incorporate “grip-and-grins” in support of the commander's intent for PA:

- Create a short, biweekly newsletter that uses “grip-and-grin” photos. Publish the newsletter only as an e-mail item and send it to an established distribution list. Expand the list to key external recipients when appropriate. Although some PAOs may consider this time-consuming, once a template is built, it will require little maintenance. The installation COMREL chief can be the newsletter editor. Although this represents a departure from the current responsibilities of the internal information chief, it will further tie COMREL to the overall PA plan and foster solid relationships to key internal and external audiences.

- Furnish copies of photos via e-mail for persons involved as part of the commander's PA plan, within reasonable constraints. Future technological advancements, such as e-mail accounts that are permanently tied to individuals, will increase the ability to make this program grow.
- Use the opportunities to discover useful stories. Ensure the articles can serve internal and external purposes. Stories must support the overall PA plan. Judge each article against that standard.

### Market Outlets

Create an electronic file that includes e-mail addresses, Web sites, fax numbers, and points of contact for local, regional, and national media outlets. This data is important in forming the structure of the database, but that is only part of the process. Such lists, while useful, require constant updating, not unlike the improvement of a defensive position.

Working the lists is essential to successful implementation of ongoing and future projects. By working the lists, the PA practitioner routinely calls or contacts the primary outlets and, just as importantly, constantly seeks out new media outlets.

Send cover letters and prepackaged material (such as video products, special edition newspapers, and visitor's guides) to a broad range of targeted local, regional, and national media outlets. Often, periodicals with seemingly no apparent interest in military matters (city and county newsletters and newspapers, scientific journals, documentary writers and producers of various types [consult with the Chief of Army PA, Los Angeles Branch], special-interest publications, and business magazines) will see something in your packet that they can use.<sup>4</sup> In addition, there may be daily newspapers and television affiliates outside the local installation's normal circulation area (which may not have been considered before) that are interested in various projects.

This effort is endless. There are thousands of media sources that have a constant need for story ideas. It is important to note that many print, broadcast, and Internet reporters have limited knowledge of military matters. Coach them along and develop interest where there may have been none before. Make a strong effort toward providing opportunities for reporters to participate in events to the fullest extent allowable by law and good sense. You may think your three-day Multiple Launch Rocket System live-fire exercise is business as usual. However, it may be the first time the reporters (and the general public) sees the sky ignited by streaking rockets.

### Staying Current

Remaining current is the hard work of the PA business. Develop plans that ensure recurring events or key Army strengths are presented forcefully and often. For example, CBS News followed the progress of a student through the Ranger Course one summer. The series of stories that resulted from that coverage demonstrated the commitment, hard work, and sense of duty required to complete the course. It was a great series; however, those stories aired more than 10 years ago. Virtually no potential recruit, ROTC student, or West Point prospect has any recollection of the reports. Key Army stories cannot be told "once and for all" through an article, radio broadcast, or television episode. (See "super-reporting," below).

Using the example above, other logical stories could have been (or could be) coverage of the Army's Best Ranger Competition, a documentary on Ranger missions or training, or a series of print human-interest stories. Such stories offer a poignant portrayal of the meaningful and rigorous work of the force and, more importantly, provide a solid, human-face connection between the force and the American public.



### Keys to program vitality:

- **Constant pressure.** Regular, deliberate contact with media outlet points of contact bears fruit.
- **Absolute adherence to truth.** No fakery can improve the Army's relationship with the public.
- **Consistent exploration of new venues.** Scour the Internet, go to conferences, subscribe to free news on the Internet, and meet with television producers and newspaper editors. Investigate at least 10 new venue possibilities per week.
- **Standing operating procedures that detail recurring opportunities.** Provide plan outlines based on what has worked in the past, geared toward maintaining a solid continuity file for future PAOs. Also see the CALL Web site, *Training Techniques*, 2QFY99, "Building a Useful Continuity Book," by Leonel Nascimento. Maintain and pass on a journal that includes lessons learned, planning factors, and important media tips.

### No Manipulation of the Public

In the bygone era of limited media outlets and few key media representatives (reporters), public relations specialists sometimes sought to manipulate the public through clever (occasionally deceptive) methods. This could explain the development of an Army PA apparatus that was to be seen as distinct from public relations.

Two factors have largely moved the public relations profession away from such practices. The first factor has been the explosion of media outlets, print and electronic, through such means as improved distribution, the Internet, and 24-hour cable television. These factors alone have made it impossible to easily manipulate views over a sustained period (of course, there are exceptions).

The second factor has been the general professionalization of the public relations community. Public relations specialists understand the sustained power of the truth. More importantly, they see themselves as professional advisors to their clients on business practices. Their advice can sometimes result in a business changing its behavior in a way that maintains its goals and may mitigate potential crises. It also can enhance the public's perception of the company by demonstrating a responsible approach to dealing with potentially explosive issues.

### Use of Conferences

Major corporations employ convention organizers to schedule conventions, conferences, and seminars. Army-related organizations, such as the Association of the United States Army and others, plan and execute similar events.

The Army and its major subordinate commands can develop highly focused, message-intensive events. The goals and purpose of such events cannot be limited to photo sessions and general presentations, although elements of both will occur. Plan the events with definite themes. Establish key media centers.

Follow the event with a media-impact analysis:

- Are command messages coming through?
- What products are receiving the most attention?

- Is the reporting based on the facts as the command knows them?
- Are there differences in print versus electronic media? If so, why?
- How timely are reports?
- Do stateside media outlets respond to submissions from the PAO? What methods are employed to check this? Internet? Phone calls? Other?
- Have there been policy implications? Enemy or friendly (in theaters of operations)?

### **“Super-Reporting”**

“Super-reporting” involves the constant surveillance of electronic broadcasts and printed materials and the anticipation of internal and external information needs and planning factors to maximize opportunities. PAOs must “super-report” to gain and maintain an information edge over the internal and external audiences. PAOs must understand trends and creatively find ways to take advantage of media information needs.

Electronic databases are an essential element of “super-reporting.” PAO databases must contain the following elements:

- Publication/Broadcast outlet name.
- Key point(s) of contact.
- Phone/fax/e-mail, business mail addresses and street addresses (for overnight delivery).
- Publication focus and format(s):
  - Print publications.
  - Frequency (such as daily, weekly, monthly).
  - General theme (general news, or specific topics, such as military, aviation).
  - Circulation.
  - Geographical area of concern (if applicable).
  - Publication policies (i.e., acceptance of outside material, ombudsman, deadlines).
  - All mentions of the military (or installation/unit) in the past six months.
- Electronic outlets:
  - Broadcast schedule.
  - News programming format.
  - Span of broadcast (i.e., in the case of radio stations, watt emission).

All of the items above can be maintained on an off-the-shelf spreadsheet program. At higher levels, database programs may be more desirable. Major commands must share their databases and constantly provide other PAOs with new and promising venues for telling their stories.

PAOs can gain important leading-edge information by joining civic groups, attending town council meetings, organizing and participating in COMREL events, and maintaining personal contacts in the community and the media. PAOs should develop information-collection plans and routinely scour notes for internal and external dissemination. Such a system will allow PAOs to properly target media outlets, prepare useful press releases, and schedule well-timed interviews to support commanders' programs.

When deployed, PAOs usually have the added task of producing an internal information publication, a newsletter perhaps, but are not tasked with providing COMREL. The COMREL task is much broader in a theater of operations and is conducted as part of information operations by civil affairs personnel. PAOs also have the task of continuing to provide the home installation with internal information. In garrison or in a theater of operations, PAOs must continue to research and provide for key media opportunities.

### Commanders Lead the PA Effort

Commanders greatly influence the flow of information, as well as the tenor and content of their subordinates' media input, by being conspicuously prepared to encounter the media. The following suggestions provide the basis for commanders and command sergeants major to be more innovative when interacting with the media:

- **“Story-in-a-pocket.”** Develop a program that ensures key leaders have a “story-in-a-pocket.” Leaders in each unit can identify significant actions of the unit that have news value. Most battalions have a Soldier-of-the-Month program, weapons-skills competition, and a multitude of other activities. Units, of course, will answer honestly when meeting the media, but reporters “don't know what they don't know” about Army units at all levels. Help the media find a subject.
- **Integrity is paramount.** While ensuring reporters learn about the great things units are doing, it is important not to create false impressions about a unit's record.

“... promotion of the Army in any form that is deceptive (in fact or source) or ‘puffery’ (gratuitous self-praise) is outlawed as ‘propaganda’... .”<sup>5</sup>

Gratuitous self-praise, however, is easily avoidable by being honest when engaging the media. It is not gratuitous self-praise to introduce the winner of the yearly installation rifle competition to the media or to highlight achievements by the local retention Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) of the Year. Moreover, accomplishments of units in the field are worth knowing by the general public; such knowledge can even be seen as necessary.

- **Meet the press.** Where possible, develop relationships at home station with individuals in the media. Invite them to meet and talk to battalion commanders and sergeants major and “right-seat” annually (or more often) on a local exercises. Provide reporters with opportunities to see Soldiers at work.
- **Remain forthright in the face of bad news.** The Army has proven its mettle in providing timely and accurate information about situations that have undoubtedly caused great discomfort. Almost no private company can boast of such honesty; PAOs should point that out.

- **Power the Hometown News Release (HTNR) Program.** PAOs and commanders must work closely to ensure items are sent to the Army/Air Force HTNR. The adage “all news is local news” takes on added significance for Soldier stories. Local newspapers (and occasionally television stations), are constantly searching for local stories. These local stories include news about Soldiers who are stationed around the world.
- **Use the Internet to make the HTNR grow.** With minor article adjustments, Army journalists can provide hometown newspapers with “local boy/girl-made-good” stories that may not fall under the purview of the HTNR program. Army journalists should capture the hometowns of Soldiers mentioned in local stories. The gathered article can be e-mailed quickly to the Soldier’s hometown newspaper (with digital photos when possible). Newspapers, especially small outlets with little resources for travel, are appreciative of such efforts. This effort, which is extremely low-cost, gives existing stories greater impact.
- **Provide photographs and articles to the Army News Service (ARNEWS).** When applicable, PAOs should send photos (preferably digital files) and articles from their units or installation to the ARNEWS (arnews@hqda.army.mil) and, space permitting, create a photo library on their installation server. Articles should support the commander’s PA intent.
- **Develop and invigorate installation speaker bureaus.** Military thinkers use initiative in all operations. By actively pushing speaker bureau activities, PAOs can seize the initiative and control the high ground. Speaking at local functions provides a chance for unfiltered communications. It also is useful in connecting with the American public at the grass-roots level because one-on-one interaction often has a deeper impact than media coverage. Speakers can include an assortment of officers and NCOs. Working closely with the PAO, each speaker can deliver key command messages to a variety of audiences. The more this program is sold, the more it is used. Local organizations often need outside speakers. Ensure that your own journalists cover the event(s) and write stories.

### Know the Organization

All PAOs must ensure that they are “thoroughly familiar with all facets of (the) command.”<sup>6</sup> The PAO should be able to give a full command briefing that relates a unit’s missions, capabilities, training methods, major weapons systems, equipment platforms, ongoing projects, historical summary, and command philosophy.

A PAO who does not understand the mission of the organization is not a useful member of the staff. Beyond possessing the simple “just the facts” knowledge listed above, it is essential that the PAO understands and can articulate the values of the organization. It is of little worth to a PA program if a PAO has a bundle of media contacts but is unable to deliver key values-based messages. Commanders and PAOs should work to craft solid messages that accurately reflect the organization’s goals and aspirations.

### Find Populations of Knowledgeable Parties

With a thorough knowledge of the key public audiences, the organization, and the organization’s values, the commander and PAO continually seek out populations of knowledgeable parties and try to communicate with them. PAOs must ensure key public audiences understand the organization’s values and that the command understands the audiences’ thinking.



## **The Emperor Has No Clothes**

PAOs assist commanders in developing a list of the key public audiences. As mentioned earlier, one of the PAO's major functions is to consistently inform commanders of what these audiences are thinking. How does the public perceive the command? This feedback is gained through media analysis, COMREL event after-action reviews, and a myriad of other sources, including internal and external town hall meeting minutes and civilian town or county council minutes.

While some PAOs will insist that this service is already provided, this new approach to PA will make such efforts much more vital.

## **Advising the Commander**

The following example is fictitious. Its purpose is to provide PAOs with an understanding the necessity of advising the commander. It illustrates how the PAO, who is not necessarily an expert on the underlying issue, can provide sound, practical information to a commander to limit or eliminate potential PA crises.

**Background.** Fort Columbia had a problem. During World War II, it was a central transportation point for processing troops en route to the Pacific theater. A consequence of this activity was that hundreds of railcars were left in a large holding area after the war. The railcars sat unused for decades with little notice. Meanwhile, advances in environmental knowledge led to the creation of an environmental office on the installation, complete with inspectors and a large set of federal regulations. Inspectors made their way through the installation's training areas, offices, housing areas, and, ultimately, to the rail yard. Upon examination, inspectors discovered numerous major environmental hazards that required significant cleanup. Local reporters, long suspicious of the environmental state of the railcars, did not know of the actual depth of the problem.

Some advised the garrison commander to leave the railcars in place and suppress the results of the report. Obviously, the commander could not do that. He was obligated to start a cleanup effort. The commander then was advised to conduct the cleanup, but not to make the matter public. He faced the dilemma of whether to publicly acknowledge the cleanup effort or to conduct the cleanup without advising the public through a media release.

**Advice from the PAO.** Acknowledging the cleanup effort was only one of the things the commander could do to limit the effects of this situation. While he could not possibly placate every faction of the public, a detailed media campaign could satisfy the public that his installation was doing what was required to address this problem. The campaign could start with an announcement of the cleanup effort from the commander, include a tour of the area, have a detailed plan for press packets, and provide background briefings by installation environmental officers in charge of the cleanup. Do this both for internal and external purposes. The commander' initial statement should point out that his installation discovered the problem, took steps to alleviate the problem, and will continue to announce progress of the cleanup.

The commander could activate the speakers bureau and arrange (through the COMREL program) for senior officers to talk to important civic groups. He could also dispatch briefing teams to speak to key audiences. The installation newspaper, of course, should provide key information about the project.

In the above example, neither the PAO nor the commander are environmental experts. However, both have applied good sense and integrity to a potentially explosive situation. Had the commander chosen to ignore the problem, the situation details could have leaked to the media, leading to a “scandal” angle in the media coverage. Had the commander chosen to start the cleanup and not informed the media, a similar scenario could have played out. By addressing the issue up front, the commander and PAO were able to set the conditions for a message that showed that the installation was conscientiously attacking the problem and dealing with it systematically. Again, this will not satisfy everyone in the public or the media. Such a state is probably not possible with any course of action. However, the key audiences and the general public will not view this issue as a “scandal.”

Ensure that feedback given to the commander provides accurate data. This is no time to hold back needed information for fear of upsetting sensibilities. Too often, commanders are told that the military is held in high esteem, and it is left at that. In fact, such general respect is easily displaced by specific negative information. Handled poorly, bad information festers and transcends an otherwise high opinion of the military.

### **Role of the PAO**

As information continues to grow in importance, the role of the PAO must change to support the commander’s critical need to know what key audiences think. The PAO can no longer simply function as a funnel through which news clippings pass. The PAO must provide the commander with advice on how to mitigate or eliminate the effects of potentially damaging information, without resorting to deception. This advice should contain definitive behavioral steps to determine the best course of action. PAOs must be willing to encourage commanders to change behaviors that can lead to negative media. Such changes must always be positive and affirm the Army values system, even to the short-term detriment of the organization. The PAO will consult with key staff agencies, develop a PA plan, and proactively approach pre-crisis management.

### **PAO interaction**

PAOs can improve their understanding of public relations through professional memberships and advanced schooling. Consider the following to further professional expertise:

- Join the Public Relations Society of America or International Association of Business Communicators.<sup>7</sup> These organizations hold chapter meetings, provide instructional material (for a fee), and provide a mechanism for professional accreditation.
- Complete an advanced degree in public relations. Programs that lead to an advanced degree in public relations have value in producing media and information campaigns.
- Attend public relations conferences and workshops. Civilian PA/public relations practitioners can teach valuable PA lessons.
- Contribute what you learn to the force. Several publications, including *PA Update*; the Forces Command *I-Opener*; and CALL’s *News From the Front* and *Training Techniques*, provide outlets for sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures. Contact CALL at [call@leavenworth.army.mil](mailto:call@leavenworth.army.mil).

## **Conclusion**

In the world of ideas, deliberate and repetitive voices are heard. To meet challenges in this world of ideas, Army PA must adapt through refocusing, using current manning levels. The Army can exploit the advantages of using media savvy senior leaders to effectively communicate the Army's message. PAOs must learn to provide commanders with public relations products and advice, with the goal of supporting a stated intent for PA. PAOs will provide products and conduct operations that have not been part of the formal conduct of PA in the past.

Old paradigms must change. PAOs will seek out markets, just as public relations specialists do for commercial enterprises. PAOs will "super-report," that is, beat reporters to the punch on issues affecting the command. PAOs will provide solid advice during the planning and decision cycles for commanders. Commanders will expand their focus for PA by staying prepared for inquiries and standing ready to spread their message. All of this will occur within the parameters of honesty and integrity. The public expects nothing less. Presenting the Army message is now harder only because of the endless number of potential venues. Plan well and maximize the benefits to the Army's great Soldiers.

## **Notes**

1 Dooley, Alan, Captain (Ret.), U.S. Navy, e-mail to the author, October 27, 2000.

2 Ibid.

3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 360-81, *Command Information Program*, Washington, D.C., 20 October 1989, p. 8. This regulation, along with other PA-related regulations, is being consolidated and revised.

4 One example includes an article that appeared in a business periodical concerned with management styles and methods: Pascale, Richard, "Fight, Learn, Lead," *Fast Company*, August-September 1996, pp. 65-72. The article, written about the Army's combat training center's method for experiential learning, was crafted by Dr. Pascale to fit the magazine's focus.

5 "Statutory Prohibitions on Public Affairs Activities," *I-Opener*, March 1998, p. 6.

6 Wilcox, Howard S., Brigadier General, U.S. Army, "Press Relations and the Commander," *Military Review*, August 1961, p. 6.

7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, Washington, D.C., 1 October 1998, paragraph 42.3.B.





## Chapter 2

### Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level

You (as a brigade task force [TF] commander) sit pensively, surveying your map. The graphics depict your command, arrayed across the battlefield. Your mind races through the hundreds of pre-battle preparations your unit has accomplished. Within minutes, you know the enemy will enter your sector and attack your Soldiers. Have you considered every contingency, every possible situation? Before you can answer, the executive officer approaches and says, "Sir, CNN is here."

"Media Facilitation for the Infantry Company, Battalion and Brigade," *Infantry*, by MAJ Christopher C. Garver, former public affairs (PA) observer/controller, JRTC

This vignette should sound familiar. What also should become familiar are the actions taken to facilitate, handle, and use media at the brigade TF level and below. Additionally, and more importantly, PA as an entire commodity must be used at the brigade TF level and below.

**Note:** Although this article concentrates on a brigade TF-level staff, the same considerations and processes discussed can be applied to other combat support (separate), combat service support (separate), and special operation forces units that do not have organic PA assets.

#### PA Assets

With the exception of joint, combined, unified brigade TF headquarters; separate or enhanced brigades; and armored cavalry regiments; there are no organic PA assets available below division-level units. However, this fact does not relieve the brigade TF commander of PA responsibilities. Brigade TF-size and smaller elements often work in an autonomous environment that is devoid of its habitual divisional relationship. There are instances when higher headquarters PA staff is unable to provide timely support and/or PA guidance. Perhaps the limited numbers of PA assets deployed are unable to provide support to battalion- and company-level units.

Doctrinally, the two sources for tactical PA support are PA sections organic to warfighting headquarters and PA units. The four basic PA units are: PA detachments, mobile PA detachments, PA operations center, and the broadcast operations detachment (**Note:** FM 3-61, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*). Unfortunately, most brigade TF elements will not be provided **any** of these assets to assist in planning and synchronizing the brigades' PA operations.

#### Synchronization of PA

CALL Newsletter 02-3, *Targeting the Rakkasan Way: A Complete Guide on the Brigade-Level Targeting Process*, contains a very informative article outlining the targeting process and explaining the integration of targeting into the military decision-making process. In fact, boldly stated in the article is the proposal to rename the targeting meeting or targeting process to the combat power synchronization meeting. The same process must be applied (simultaneously) when planning, executing, and assessing PA operations at the brigade TF level. Please refer to Chapter 2, Appendix A, "Targeting Process Matrix," to understand the four-step targeting process (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) and see where PA operations fit.

### Decide, detect, deliver, and assess

**Decide:** The basis for a PA plan is created during this phase. Remember, the end state is to issue a clear PA annex to the brigade TF operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO). Avoid providing a Xerox copy of the division or higher headquarters' PA annex and PA guidance (PAG). There are four products (appendices listed below are located at the end of this chapter) that will assist the brigade staff in creating a PA operations plan (PAOPLAN) and PA annex to the brigade TF order(s):

- Targeting process matrix (Chapter 2, Appendix A)
- PAOPLAN (Chapter 2, Appendix B) (**Note:** This product can be developed into the brigade TF PA annex for the brigade TF order.)
- PA planning worksheet (Chapter 2, Appendix C).
- Division (higher headquarters) PA annex to a current division (higher headquarters) OPORD or FRAGO. Higher headquarters PAG also should be available.

Focus on what is important to the brigade TF for PA operations. Consider the key talking points, themes, or messages for the brigade TF. Will these change from phase to phase of the operation? How long has the media been operating in sector? Who is the media's audience? What is the media angle or slant on key events? Could PA tactical assets become operationally controlled by the brigade TF during certain periods of the operation?

**Detect:** Allocation of resources should occur during this phase. Do not fixate on organic PA resources or assets. Information may be the most valuable resource that must be allocated within the TF. For example:

- Is the key talking point during the defense portion of the operation focused on the fact that the brigade civil affairs teams' primary focus is the safety of all civilians and civilian infrastructure?
- Are units within the brigade able to support embedded media?
- Is the local radio station a viable asset for use as a PA medium?

**Deliver:** Once again, CALL Newsletter 02-3 serves as the best reminder that attack assets can be both lethal and nonlethal. The intent of civil-military operations (CMO) is to obtain cooperation from the local populace. Integrating PA operations during the deliver phase serves as the marketing outlet to inform the populace (and peripheral audiences) of this cooperation, thus providing a wider basis of support. In this particular example, the PA asset or method that can best support CMO must be decided during the decide and detect phases.

**Assess:** This is probably the hardest phase, as you try to quantify or measure the success of PA operations, especially when it involves media facilitation. Arguably, this phase requires the most assistance from higher headquarters PA organic assets. Assessment has the biggest effect on future PA operations. Additionally, this is the phase where the military can exercise the least amount of control on what product the media finally "puts out." By exercising careful, detailed planning during the previous three phases, even at the brigade TF level, you can control the results of PA operations. The focus during the assess phase must be based on the 50-percent rule – during any given media event, you control half and "they" control the other half. Appendix D of Chapter 2, below, is a sample format for a media analysis report, which is the most effective

way of assessing PA operations. Do not forget to assess peripheral methods of sustaining PA operations. For example, everyone seems to have digital cameras. Did an industrious platoon sergeant provide the only photo taken of two Soldiers sharing a smile during joint training with a coalition force? Did the local press use it? Did the product in this example support the talking point identified in the detect phase of the targeting process?

### **Trends Suggest Key Issues**

#### **Who on the brigade TF staff gets assigned to deal with PA operations?**

There is no doctrinal answer for who handles the PA portion of targeting and synchronization on a brigade TF staff. Frequently, the judge advocate general and/or the brigade TF adjutant serve as the unit PA representative (UPAR). However, the trend during rotations at the JRTC has been to assign either the brigade staff judge advocate or the brigade adjutant. In some instances, both have been assigned the task. Some additional points to consider include:

- The staff officer or staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) assigned the additional task or duty of being the UPAR should be present during the planning, targeting, or synchronization process.
- The staff officer or staff NCO assigned as the UPAR does not by default have to be the person responsible for physically escorting or facilitating the media; this is the role of the unit media facilitator (UMF). View the UPAR as the planner and the UMF as the executor of the PAOPLAN.

#### **What products should be developed in targeting PA?**

In the decide phase of targeting, the brigade TF UPAR is responsible for developing the brigade TF PA annex to the brigade TF order. As with any portion of the higher headquarters' OPORD or FRAGO, it should serve as a base to create a brigade product. The same principle applies to PA operations. Too often at the JRTC, the substitute for a solid brigade PA annex is to Xerox the division or higher headquarters' portion of the PA annex for distribution. The result is an unrefined product that brigade subordinate elements do not read. The example in Appendix B, Chapter 2 (PAOPLAN), is short and concise, ensuring that subordinate staff and commanders can easily use it to plan and execute of PA operations.

#### **How can a brigade sustain effective PA training?**

Often PA training is the last thing on the brigade's agenda. Units that have the most success with PA operations have sustained frequent training within their units by doing the following:

- Ensuring Soldiers (at all levels) gain confidence in talking with the media and telling their unit's story. Incorporate this skill into the unit's lanes training, in a media-on-the-battlefield environment, with assistance from local or home-station organic PA assets.
- Training UPARs and UMFs with local or home-station organic PA assets to gain a better understanding of what installation or divisional PA assets do for a living. Some brigade TF staffs have successfully implemented processes or products in their unit smart books, devoting an entire section to PA operations.
- Conducting proactive planning with local or home-station organic PA assets to invite the media to their unit in a training environment.

- Conducting concurrent staff planning with the JRTC and other combat training centers during planning conferences and leader's training programs prior to rotation (see Chapter 2, Appendix E, which offers a sample of the media guides the JRTC PA team offers).

### **Conclusion**

The intent of this article is not to template a brigade TF-level PA office. Rather, it provides a systematic approach to synchronize PA within the planning process and mesh it with what the rest of the brigade TF is doing. Too often, PA is not part of the synchronization process. It becomes an afterthought or an isolated decision that does not meet expectations. Include PA in the targeting process; rely on organic higher headquarters' PA assets to answer the hard subject-matter-expert questions.

This article also should drive home that synchronization is the key to a proactive PAOPLAN. For example, a proactive PAOPLAN takes the guesswork out of determining when and if higher headquarters is going to "make" the brigade TF embed media. Seeing where PA fits into the brigade TF plan at least 24 to 48 hours out provides the brigade staff options on how to best meet higher headquarters' intent for PA.

Incorporating media-on-the-battlefield training is important. Get all Soldiers comfortable with the fact that working with the media is a critical factor in mission accomplishment. UPARs and UMFs need additional training from organic PA assets.

Plan to see more PA operations and media events at the brigade TF level and below. PA can be a primary nonlethal delivery asset. The key rule to remember is that PA is a process, not a decision.



Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level

Appendix A

Targeting Process Matrix




Figure 2A-1

**Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level**

**Appendix B**

**Public Affairs Operations Plan (PAOPLAN)**

<b>REF:</b>	<b>Time Zone:</b>	<b>DTG:</b>	<b>Copy:</b> of
<b>Annex V: Public Affairs (PA)</b>	<b>Brigade (BDE) Mission:</b>	<b>Commander's (CDR's) Intent:</b>	
<b>PA assets in area of operations (AO):</b> 1. (Media relations, support) 45th National Guard PA Bureau (White cell/Joint Information Bureau) 2. (Media relations) Rob Martindale, reporter, <i>Tulsa World</i> , Tulsa, OK		<b>Enemy situation:</b>	
		<b>Friendly situation:</b>	
<b>Theme:</b>			
<b>PA mission (higher headquarters):</b>			
<b>BDE CDR's intent for PA operations:</b>			
<b>Concept of operations:</b>			
<b>PA posture:</b>	<b>Primary audience:</b>	<b>External:</b> American public, international	<b>Internal: Soldiers, families, civilian employees</b>
<b>Key talking points:</b>			
<b>Supporting staff functions:</b>	<b>CMO</b> <b>S2</b> <b>JAG</b>		
<b>Coordinating instructions:</b>			
<b>Reporting:</b>	Report all crisis action events, serious incidents to the BDE UPAR for appropriate response and action.	Report any and all media events to the BDE UPAR if any of these criteria apply: 1. Unescorted media 2. Uncredentialed media 3. Unscheduled media	No one at any given time retains the right to confiscate any media film, notes, or videotapes. Do not touch or threaten any media at any time. Call the BDE UPAR for assistance if this type of activity is to ensue.  Report any operations security violations involving media to the BDE UPAR immediately.
<b>Uncredentialed media:</b>	<b>Service support:</b>	<b>Command and signal:</b>	
		<b>Force protection:</b>	
<b>Acknowledge Official:</b>		<b>Brigade TF CDR:</b>	
<b>Brigade Task Force (TF) UPAR:</b>			

Consider using this form or template for creating a brief and concise PA plan (annex) and product to execute brigade PA operations. This form is only a sample. Tailoring it to meet the needs of the brigade TF staff is highly encouraged.

As this form covers most generic operations order annex information, only the PA-specific portions will be explained below:

- **PA resources in the AO:** Explains what higher headquarters' PA assets are working in the brigade's AO. Also lists which media outlets are operating within the AO. Pertinent information should be available in the higher headquarters' (division) PA annex.
- **Enemy situation:** Does the enemy's use of PA operations or media pose a threat to the brigade? If so, how is it a threat?
- **Friendly situation:** Explains higher headquarters' PA assets within the AO and what bearing they may have on brigade TF PA operations.
- **Theme, talking point:** What is the brigade's main theme, talking point, or command message during this operation? Pertinent information should be available in the higher headquarters' (division) PA annex.
- **PA mission (higher headquarters); BDE CDR's intent for PA operations:** Always know higher headquarters' mission, found in higher headquarters' (division) PA annex. All Soldiers must know BDE CDR's intent for PA operations.
- **Concept of the operation:** Could be as simple as informing all Soldiers of the pertinent talking points or themes. May involve facilitating media.
- **PA posture; primary audiences (in priority), external, internal:** Pertinent information should be available in the higher headquarters' (division) PA annex.
- **Key media themes:** This allows focus or a selection of other themes that may be pertinent during the operation.
- **Supporting staff functions:** As the target synchronization meeting progresses, the roles that other members of the brigade TF staff play in PA operations will become evident.
- **Coordinating instructions, reporting, uncredentialed media, service support:** These areas of the PAOPLAN or annex allow further explanation of the contents of the higher headquarters' PA guidance, reporting procedures for PA operations, and other requirements as needed (for example, service support requirements for embedded media).

**Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level**

**Appendix C**

**Public Affairs (PA) Planning Worksheet**

This is a sample copy of a PA planning worksheet. It is a good tool to use when higher headquarters is giving direct control to the brigade task force (TF) over organic PA assets or the brigade TF is responsible for facilitating media.

This is a tool for both the unit PA representative and the unit media facilitator.

PA PLANNING WORKSHEET							
Commander's intent for interview (themes to stress)				Date-Time Group: Higher HQ PA Rep: Higher HQ PA Rep:			
Reporters Expected							
Name	News Agency	Storyline	Notes	Name	News Agency	Storyline	Notes
Proposed Itinerary							
Time	Event/Interview		Responsible Person		Notes		
Proposed Interviews				Proposed Video/Photography Opportunities			
Interviewees	Themes to stress	Events to discuss	Time/Location	Event	Themes to stress	Time/Location	Point of Contact



**Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level**

**Appendix D**

**Media Analysis Report (Sample)**

The following is a sample format for a media analysis report. If available, the news article can be attached to the report. The intent is to provide the brigade task force (TF) with a means of assessing public affairs (PA) operations. Higher headquarters' organic PA assets may not be present during key PA operations or media events within the brigade TF.

Notice the "Summary" section of this report. The length of this will vary, depending upon the expectations or criteria established during the decide, detect, and deliver phases of the targeting process.

If civilian facilitation is part of the assessment and media analysis, remember to remain objective with the analysis.

**Media analysis – Media in Cortina, 11 May 2002**

**Reporter:** Julie Rose

**Medium:** Newspaper reporter, town population more than 1,000,000

**Job title:** Staff reporter

**Focus:** Crime in the city, Irish-American community in Philadelphia and the surrounding suburbs.

**Focus of article:**

A. Interview w/Charlie Company/1-82d Aviation Regiment – Pilots in Cortina. Article focused on the effect air missions in Cortina had on the local populace.

B. Interview w/Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Alpha Company, 307th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) – Article focuses on some of the duties that a FSB has in the daily operations of the division.

**Summary:** Military friendly, fair, and objective

**Number of articles composed in country:** Two (with these stories)

\*\*\*

**Reporter:** Joshua Book

**Medium:** Newspaper reporter, town population less than 75,000

**Job Title:** Journalist

**Focus:** World affairs

**Photo essay focused on:** Interview w/307th FSB – Article features some of the duties and responsibilities that the FSB has here in Cortina.

**Summary:** Military friendly, fair, and objective

**Number of articles composed in country:** Six (with this one)

Five – written stories

One – photo essay

**File Name:**

**Media Analysis 11May.doc**

**Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level**

**Appendix E**

**Media Facilitation Guide**

Below is a sample Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) reference guide for conducting media facilitation and escort operations. Remember that media facilitation is a small part of public affairs (PA) operations, but often the most important.

This card is a suitable tool for unit media facilitators and for issue to all Soldiers within the unit for quick reference. This is one of the products that should be provided to units training PA operations at home station.


<p><b>MEDIA ESCORT OPERATIONS (PLANNING AND CONDUCTING)</b></p> <p>I. Receive the mission from Public Affairs: name and news organization of reporter; purpose and length of visit; draft itinerary; logistical support plan; ground rules.</p> <p>II. Assist the media in preparation to move: conduct TLP with media before movement; instructions in event of enemy contact.</p> <p>III. Move media to the unit: expedite movement; listen to reporters to pick up possible storylines or questions they may ask.</p> <p>IV. Brief the interviewee: away from the media initially; review ground rules; set time limit; all things are "on the record;" OPSEC concerns; don't speculate; stay in your lane; attempt to bridge to your message; anything the media talked about on the way.</p> <p>V. Monitor the interview: timekeeper; listen for OPSEC violations or inaccuracies; help reporter understand anything confusing; record any follow-on commitments of support by the interviewee.</p> <p>VI. Assist media in filing products as necessary.</p> <p>VII. After-Action Review with Public Affairs upon return: impression of interview; lines of questions; ground rules violations; attitudes of reporters; additional requests for information; logistical issues.</p>	<p><b>MEDIA ESCORT OPERATIONS (RESPONSIBILITIES)</b></p> <p>-- As a media escort, you are the liaison between your command and the media.</p> <p>-- You are a guide to, and interpreter of, the events your unit is conducting. Assist the media in obtaining their story and understanding what they see.</p> <p>-- You are not responsible for the physical safety of the media. You should assist them as you would any other United States civilian in a combat environment. Instruct them and assist them in making combat-smart decisions.</p> <p>-- You are to ensure the media do not violate standing force protection measures, such as noise and light discipline.</p> <p>-- You are to assist the media with arranging logistical support as outlined to you by Public Affairs and your command.</p> <p>-- You are to ensure the media abide by the ground rules (provided by Public Affairs) that they agreed to. Refer violations to Public Affairs.</p>	<div style="text-align: center;">  <p><b>JRTC REFERENCE GUIDE</b></p> </div> <p><b>MEDIA FACILITATION AND MEDIA ESCORT OPERATIONS</b></p> <p><b>PROVIDED BY THE JRTC AND FORT POLK PAO</b> 9 DECEMBER 97</p> <p><b>PURPOSE:</b> This training aid assists units with no dedicated public affairs assets in planning and conducting media facilitation and media escort operations. This training aid will also assist personnel with no public affairs experience who are assigned as media escorts in planning and conducting media escort operations.</p> <p><b>REFERENCES:</b> FM 100-6; FM 46-1</p>
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Figure 2E-1




Figure 2E-2

## **Chapter 3**

### **A Successful Brigade Public Affairs Officer**

It seems like my unit is surrounded by all types of media: unilateral television, print, and radio reporters. There are public radio stations, major-market newspapers, and television stations. I can see that there is a propaganda campaign against us or, at the very least, a serious problem with misinformation in my area of operations.

My brigade's mission is to bring stability to the chaos while fighting a determined enemy on the streets. The public is hungry for information. They will devour lies or, in the absence of information, fill the void with rumors unless I provide the truth as I know it.

For the past six months brigades have entered the JRTC with a resource never before available. The JRTC allows brigades to conduct public and command information in support of combat operations at the tactical level, with the media as a condition of the battlefield, rather than a separate training event. Some PAOs do very well and others struggle.

#### **The Role of the PAO**

Brigade-level PAOs are now a part of the norm, and an Army at war will require PAOs to succeed. Clearly, there are lessons learned that should be shared. There are four common themes of successful brigade PAOs at the JRTC:

- PAOs organize for and conduct future and current operations on the staff.
- The PAO team develops stringers and unit public affairs (PA) representatives (UPARs) to support command information and public information.
- PAOs are resourced with communications and electronic news-gathering equipment to accomplish their tasks.
- PAOs understand and know how the local information environment works.

Doctrine already describes the role of the brigade PAO. Chapter 8 of FM 3-61.1, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)*, says that "Working as both a special staff officer and as a member of the brigade's planning team, the brigade PAO acts as the spokesperson for the unit, advisor to the commander, and provides PA guidance and planning to commanders at all levels." Today, brigade PAOs sit side by side with psychological operations officers, a civil affairs (CA) team, intelligence officers, and information officers as members of the U.S. Army's new modular brigades and brigades who have organized for success in an information environment.

The brigade's staff battle rhythm includes lethal and nonlethal targeting meetings under the emerging doctrine of effects-based operations. Arguably, nearly every operation becomes "a brigade fight with a brigade plan." There are three or more daily briefings to the commander or his designated representative. There are rehearsals of all types: combined-arms rehearsals, logistics rehearsals, communications rehearsals, and rehearsals for rehearsals. Given all the meetings, some PAOs might start to consider public and command information as a distraction. The PAO decides where he should be and, given the gravity of future operations and the need to



The PAO decides where he should be and, given the gravity of future operations and the need to set the conditions for his battalions' success tomorrow, successful PAOs are serving primarily as planners.

### **Getting the Job Done**

The first dilemma facing the brigade PAO is how to divide and accomplish the tasks at hand. Soldiers are responsible for any perceived success. A successful brigade PAO organizes to conduct future and current operations. He takes the responsibility of planning future operations and allows his Soldiers to conduct current operations. He looks 24, 48, 72, and 96 hours out. In conjunction with other staff officers, he develops plans that direct battalions to perform PA tasks. This planning is accomplished through the effects-based operations process. He continually refines his plans based on feedback and analysis and shares his analysis with other staff officers. In turn, the PAO contributes to or writes fragmentary orders, separate plans, and annexes.

The PAO anticipates challenges and makes recommendations that allow the brigade to fight and win in an environment that is dominated by real-time news and information. He helps shape the environment by conducting embedded media opportunities, hosting media events, and developing public information products – engaging the media personally or through designated members of the unit.

PAOs are only successful because of the superb noncommissioned officers and young Soldiers working alongside them. Often these Soldiers come directly from advanced individual training. They are skilled at broadcast operations and print journalism, but they are new to the process of being on a staff. The PAO trains his staff, and on-the-job experience refines how they function. The PAO continues planning for the future and relies on his Soldiers to conduct PA current operations (i.e., anything that happens in less than 24 hours). PA Soldiers track the battle in the brigade tactical operations center. They play a major role in producing public and command information. They focus on the close fight by monitoring the local media, receiving media contact reports, analyzing trends, and making assessments. They help staff PA products and keep the PAO informed while the PAO attends meetings, briefings, and planning sessions.

Brigade PA Soldiers create products such as press releases, video news releases, and radio spots in support of the PAO's plan. They read, understand, and enforce PA policies and procedures from the tactical to strategic level. They prepare for and execute media opportunities such as interviews and media events. Likewise, they train others to perform PA tasks.

Recently, one PA Soldier determined that there was a pattern for misinformation on the local radio station through careful tracking using a staff duty log. The Soldier gave the information to her PAO who, in turn, was able to use other brigade resources and minimize the effects of misinformation and propaganda. Some might argue that it was someone else's job. The PA Soldier, however, was the only one besides the public who was paying attention.

The brigade is very large in terms of number of troops and expanse across the battlefield. How do they increase their range and effectiveness?

### **Stringers and UPARs**

PA Soldiers are well-trained in developing news for the commander and enabling a better understanding of lessons learned, tasks, and purpose throughout the Army. Evidence from brigades recently deployed from JRTC directly into theater shows that command information remains crucial. However, the brigade PAO team's time and range are limited. To accomplish the commander's goal, brigade PAOs use stringers and, in some cases, UPARs to support

command information and public information. UPARs are trained at home station by PA Soldiers. They learn how to prepare subject-matter experts for interviews. UPARs learn and apply communications skills with media embeds or during select media opportunities.

UPARs submit media contact reports during and after scheduled and chance encounters with the media. As part of its current operations function, the PA office refines reports and keeps the chain of command informed of the local media environment. At JRTC, one PA Soldier identified uncredentialed media through a contact report and, with the help of other staff members, was able to prevent imposters from gaining access to a forward operating base.

UPARs serve closely with battalion commanders as lower-level subject-matter experts on PA plans and policy on embedding the media, engaging the local media, and conducting media opportunities at the battalion level. This added expertise gives the commander more time and flexibility to engage the media at the time and place of his choosing, often resulting in better preparation.

The “additional duty” of UPAR is often assigned to the battalion S1. Experience at the JRTC has shown that the best UPARs are not necessarily members of any one designated staff section; rather, they are volunteers who are motivated for the task and are reliable. One battalion commander selected his fire support officer to serve as the UPAR. Another chose a CA Soldier assigned to the battalion. In both cases, the UPAR had skills and expertise the commander preferred over his S1. The results were better interviews because both UPARs were better prepared and more comfortable in the media setting.

UPARs and stringers are the brigade PAO’s direct link, a liaison of sorts, to battalions. UPARs function best when they are equipped with digital cameras and reliable communications equipment. Although UPARs broaden the PAO’s effective range, without the necessary equipment, neither the PAO nor the UPAR will effectively aid their commander. A successful brigade PAO is resourced with communications and electronic news-gathering equipment to accomplish his tasks.

Brigade PAOs are constrained by time, terrain, and the enemy. At the JRTC, the PAO operates in an area where battalions are dispersed over 2,700 square kilometers, with a determined foe who uses all tactics available to kill U.S. Soldiers. The PAO often lacks language skills to communicate with the local media, but he still must accomplish a mission.

### **Tools of the Media Trade**

The brigade PAO uses his own Soldiers, stringers, and UPARs to gather images and stories with digital cameras to support urgent information requirements. Images are passed electronically from the point of action to the release authority rapidly through secure and non-secure mediums.

Digital cameras are supplied to the brigade and battalions for the specific purpose of gathering and developing news products. The brigade PAO uses the Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System and a dedicated video editing system to produce and distribute video products to local television and the higher headquarters.

One brigade commander chose to announce the arrival of his brigade on local television and radio in an area of operations (AO). His message clearly had public information value and did not violate the PAO's integrity. The PAO cleared the release through his staff and the release authority. The public met the brigade commander early by virtue of his PAO.

Dedicated voice communication is a must. The PAO relies on his higher headquarters for senior PA guidance. One PAO was denied a dedicated phone, causing the local media to be frustrated when they called the tactical operations center, where either no one spoke Arabic or Soldiers did not want to speak to them. A better-resourced PAO used his phone to contact the media following a deadly attack on a newspaper office. He was able to build rapport with the journalist through an act of compassion.

One brigade commander who saw his PAO as a key asset resourced the PAO with an interpreter. With proper training, time, and trust, the interpreter helped the staff gain cultural understanding, served as an assistant for media analysis, and communicated directly with the media when the PAO could not.

### **The Information Environment**

All the resources in the world are insufficient if a PAO does not understand the capabilities he brings and the dynamics of his information environment. As the staff's expert, the PAO must understand the local information environment in detail. Successful brigade PAOs build estimates for their AO. They consider and use all available resources for gathering news and disseminating information. They know and understand the news cycle in their area so they can make an impact on news products at the right place and time.

One brigade PAO knew the time and place for an upcoming combat operation and prepared preapproved press releases to coincide with the production of the daily newspaper. He anticipated consequences, and when the time was right tactically, he released information to the public and filled the void.

The brigade PAO understands the dominant news mediums and their constraints. He makes recommendations to the command on how and where to engage the media. He builds information folders on the media in his AO. With the help of his PA Soldiers, he continuously assesses the local media and refines the overall plan.

### **Conclusion**

Doctrine is in place. Brigade PAOs are a powerful addition to the brigade combat team and its staff. Successful PAOs are practicing planning as a primary function with a well-organized staff. They are developing their organization through training at home station and gaining effective stringers and UPARs. They are resourced with personnel and technology to communicate with their command and the media. Successful brigade PAOs are experts in their craft and prepared to operate at the tactical level of the military information environment.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Arab Media Interviews and the American Commander**

COL Smith, the commander of 3rd Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, entered the studio. It was a foreign place in every way. Although his personal security detachment had swept through just moments earlier, emerging satisfied there were no hidden threats, the colonel wasn't so sanguine. In fact, he was paralyzed by fear at what he saw.

A confident looking man sat at a desk across from the brigade commander; the local disc jockey (DJ) appeared to have an equal amount of experience in his craft as the colonel. The DJ moved fluidly and issued instructions to his staff as the commander entered the room. They were late for the scheduled "show."

The DJ looked up at COL Smith and spoke in Arabic, leaving the American clueless. A hand gesture seemed to suggest both haste and a desire for COL Smith to sit down. There between them were headsets and two microphones. Decks of equipment lined the walls. There were flashing lights and music was playing. COL Smith was clearly out of his comfort zone; everything seemed foreign to COL Smith's senses. "We didn't prepare for this," COL Smith said to himself.

The PAO, who had the foresight to bring a video camera, and COL Smith's interpreter took their flanking positions. They still had on their body armor and the room seemed like an oven to all three. Their misery was only beginning.

The interview seemed like it would never end, but of course it did. COL Smith felt defeated and drained. He knew he had not prepared for the engagement. He also knew and believed such "stuff" was important. After all, he knew success here depended on his ability to engage the public. "Warrior ethos," he said to himself. "Engage." Then, with a calm and firm voice, he gave the PAO directions to prepare for subsequent opportunities.

The PAO, a smart young officer, gathered a team of cultural experts on the staff, as well as a team of locally-hired interpreters. They reviewed the taped interview, picking it apart carefully for ways to improve. The staff then designed a guide for future media engagements in Arabic culture. There were six key points:

- Build and maintain rapport with the interviewer and audience before, during, and after the engagement.
- Be polite and professional.
- Demonstrate your knowledge and respect for Arabic culture.
- Be confident with your response and the Army's purpose.
- Provide facts that support your purpose.
- Plan and conduct the engagement like a combat operation.

When the staff presented COL Smith with their final product, he read it carefully. With a couple of minor changes, he adapted it for use with all media. He planned a regular program for engagements with local TV, radio, and print reporters. Each time he used the six points.

### **Build and Maintain Rapport With the Interviewer and Audience Before, During, and After the Engagement.**

- It is always best to greet the audience and host with an appropriate cultural and verbal greeting (hand over heart, Arabic “hello,” first and last names, firm handshakes, calm demeanor).
- Create a connection with the audience. For example, “I’m a family man and my kids names are . . . . They want to live in a safe world just like your children.” Or, “I graduated from college with a degree in science and I know that your nation gave the world its first scientists.”

### **Be polite and professional.**

- Thank each person who asks you a question.
- Take notes and answer each question asked.
- Be willing to say, “I don’t know, but your question is important and I’ll get you an answer.”
- Have a good interpreter that can express emotions.
- Sit or stand straight and look at the interviewer, not the interpreter.
- Use hand and arm gestures that are natural and friendly.
- Think about your answer before you speak; a pregnant pause might be necessary in order to compose your thoughts.

### **Show an understanding and appreciation for Arabic culture.**

- Compliment their culture, country, and traditions continuously.
- Use as much Arabic as you can.
- Don’t talk about your pets.
- Don’t talk about your girlfriends.
- Don’t joke.
- Don’t talk about women.
- Don’t argue about religion.
- Use metaphors that will work in the culture to describe enemies.
- Mention people, places, and organizations that are helping you because it builds their esteem and your alliance with them.
- Demonstrate knowledge of their history and religion.



**Be confident with your response and the Army's purpose.**

- Don't say "if," say "when." It's more powerful and positive.
- Immediately counter false accusations with denials: "We aren't what you said we are, we are \_\_\_\_\_ ; you are wrong."
- Too much empathy shows weakness.
- Speak from a position of authority and power.
- Don't use "uhhhh," or "ummm;" it sounds like you are grieving.
- Sound enthusiastic and passionate.
- Introduce the Army values.
- Talk about the great ideals of freedom and a democratic system.
- Look for creative ways to describe your purpose: "a safe and secure environment."

**Provide facts that support your purpose.**

- React to each question with a fact; bridge to and close with a command message.
- Be nested with your higher headquarters and what they are communicating.
- Short but complete answers are best, allowing for translation.
- Remind people about our nation's commitments and successes in history.
- Have and use facts: dollars spent, patients treated, etc.
- Tell about fighting capabilities in general terms.
- In the absence of facts, talk about the process for (among other things) treatment of detainees, investigations, civil affairs assessments, decision making, etc.
- Our acronyms, technical terms, slang, and some adages won't work.

**Plan and conduct the engagement like a combat operation.**

- Conduct rehearsals.
- Gather information about your audience, the medium you are using, and the interviewer.
- Use a team approach to answering questions.
- Share lessons learned laterally and vertically.
- Reinforce the command's messages.
- Know that your audience will cross over multiple demographic boundaries.

One week later, COL Smith returned to the radio station. This time he'd taken a few extra measures to make the event a better engagement. His staff had planned for it and rehearsed him thoroughly. His messages were nested in those of the higher command. He understood and used the six major points his staff had outlined for the engagement.

The PAO and interpreter entered the radio station. They greeted the DJ with an Arabic phrase and a hand over heart as a sign of respect. After an introduction, COL Smith smiled widely. He was clearly more comfortable.

When the time was right, they all entered the studio together. The commander spoke to the interviewer. He took time to build rapport. He answered each question. He realized that his message would be heard by hundreds of thousands in multiple audiences. Satisfied with his engagement, the team left.

They had planned and conducted the engagement like a combat operation. They provided facts to support their purpose. They'd demonstrated open confidence in their purpose. They had shown a keen understanding and respect for Arabic culture. They had been professional and had built rapport throughout the engagement. ***And, most importantly, they had succeeded!***

## **Chapter 5**

### **Media-on-the-Battlefield Training: How-To**

#### **Does this resemble your unit's media training?**

In Omnistan, Second Platoon, Bravo Company, Second Battalion patrols a route leading to a village. Suddenly, machine-gun fire from an ambush rakes the platoon. Practiced battle drills save lives: Each man finds cover and concealment as rehearsed. The lieutenant directs fires and maneuver to overwhelm the enemy. Then the platoon consolidates and reorganizes on its objective.

Three rosy-cheeked, well-groomed, young men in civilian clothes approach the battle-weary team. They want to interview the Soldiers gathered under a shade tree. The visitors have no media credentials, even though they are playing media for training. Their digital camera's battery is dead. Why charge it? No one had real intentions of writing a story or taking real pictures at the training area anyway. The camera was a prop for "media-on-the-battlefield" training.

A skeptical Soldier, seeing the approaching crew, draws a bead on the guy with the camera. A staff sergeant shouts a warning to halt or be shot. The reporters beg for an opportunity to interview someone, anyone. One sergeant remembers that his manual requires him to ask for media credentials, but he wonders what those credentials were supposed to look like.

A PAO observer/controller, there to oversee media training, adjudicates and says that the event should continue with an interview and everyone could accomplish their training objectives.

One specialist is thrust forward from the platoon's ranks to give comments to the supposed media. The first question is, "Do you think the U.S. policy in Omnistan is authorized according to the principle of just war?" The reporter asking it has no clue as to what constitutes a credible answer. He accepts whatever is tossed his way and the interview continues for four or five minutes. Then the reporters and their PAO observer express gratitude and depart to find other Soldiers and repeat their drill.

No report is sent by the platoon to higher headquarters. No story appears in a newspaper from the interview. The event just ends. And so goes media-on-the-battlefield training.

An opportunity was lost here; this was superficial media training and it's dangerous.

#### **Superficial Media Training is Dangerous**

Media has been thrown in to train Soldiers on how to react to media on the battlefield. Although it was an impressive idea, it had been merely an afterthought when the scenario-based training exercise was developed.

The media-on-the-battlefield training was poorly conceived and planned. The unit in training had little or no previous training for media on the battlefield prior to the encounter, and no one knew the unit's standing operating procedures (SOP) for dealing with media. The role-player journalists were not sufficiently trained for the task they were to perform, and they were not resourced properly.

The media role players, public affairs (PA) Soldiers with the fresh enthusiasm of post-Defense Information School training, were injected at an illogical point in the scenario. They wore civilian clothes and carried equipment that made them look like journalists, but they did not know the scenario and asked unrealistic questions. There was no report in the news of the incident later because the scenario did not include an information environment complete with newspapers, television, and radio for the training.

The commander who had asked for media-on-the-battlefield training understood the importance of training and wanted his PAO to play a role. He knew from his own experience that the public has a need, indeed a right, to know about U.S. military operations within certain operational constraints. Likewise, he understood that there is a competitive strategy among our adversaries to misinform or exploit media for the purposes of propaganda. He wanted his Soldiers to know how to react to media on the battlefield, and he wanted to see if he could communicate certain messages to the public.

Unfortunately, unrealistic portrayals of media on the battlefield reinforce bad habits and perceptions of journalists on the battlefield. When the platoon finally deploys, it encounters embedded local and international media on the battlefield. And the world reads, watches, and listens as opportunities to tell the Soldiers' stories are lost.

With a little preparation, creativity, planning, and resources, training centers can create an information environment that promotes effective media-on-the-battlefield training.

### **Fixing Media Training**

Start with internal procedures. The battalion should have a SOP for incidental contact with media, deliberate media engagements, and embedded journalists. The SOP may require the company- or battalion-level organization to assign certain responsibilities to a unit PA representative or a stringer. SOPs also should address procedures for reporting media contact. SOPs should give guidelines for preparing for media interviews and procedures for hosting embedded media and media opportunities. Fragmentary orders or the operations order for the scenario also may include media-specific tasks or coordinating instructions.

Next, develop an information environment that makes sense and is supportable with available resources. A PA planner should be included for scenario development. He should understand the scenario and the environment in which the unit is operating. He can create replicated news mediums, such as a newspaper, television newscast, or radio broadcast, which can be evaluated for content by unit leaders later.

Then build a PA architecture with higher headquarters involvement. Media engagements require the participation of multiple military and civilian echelons that are easily portrayed by actual or role-playing staffs. There should be a higher headquarters that directs media procedures in the scenario. Realistic training aids, such as credentials for role-playing media, ground rules for media, and PA guidance, should be produced and disseminated.

### **Select, assemble, train, and resource media role players.**

Soldiers can be used, but there are great benefits to using civilians. Civilians are less enamored by rank. Also, by using civilian media role players, the training audience will recognize that the media are not fellow Soldiers in disguise. The dynamic of unfamiliarity favors realism in training for media on the battlefield.

You must train role players for media-on-the-battlefield scenarios. Role players should be given a character description so they can act the part. They should understand the media credential

system, ground rules, and the scenario in general. They should be capable of engaging in dialogue to determine the essential elements of a news story. They should be able to operate assigned news-gathering equipment, such as cameras and personal computers. They also should be able to independently compose a news story for print or broadcast.

Resource media role players to act like journalists. First, the role player needs an identity badge to serve as credentials. The design of the badge should be clearly marked "FOR TRAINING ONLY," and should show the individual's photograph and identification number in accordance with the unit SOP or scenario PA guidance.

Next, the role player needs a communications device of some type (e.g., cell phone) so he can, if necessary, dictate a news piece and expedite production of a news story for radio or print. A cell phone also helps with command and control by the exercise controller. The role player will need a digital camera, laptop computer with word-processing and photo-editing software, and a removable drive.

If the information environment includes television replication, media role players may require a hand-held video camera and a digital editing system. All media role players should have the ability to maneuver independently by automobile in the training area and be afforded a base of operation where media products are edited, reproduced, and distributed.

Certify media role players with a rehearsal. Assign stories, make precombat inspections of equipment, and practice interviews. Role-player certification ends with the production of a "replicated newspaper" or clipsheet, television news broadcast, or radio news broadcast.

Next, conduct classroom training with Soldiers. Training Circular (TC) 7-98-1, *Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package*, provides a good model for briefing Soldiers on media. A qualified PA representative should give the doctrinally accepted standards for engaging media, conducting interviews, etc. The PA representative should explain actions required by the unit SOP.

During this phase the trainer should explain the imperatives of communicating with media, including the following topics:

- Preventing disclosure of classified information.
- Ensuring accuracy to preserve credibility.
- Avoiding comments on policy decisions.
- Maintaining propriety.

The trainer should also discuss constitutional obligations, Department of Defense (DOD) directives, and the command's own stated philosophy. Finally, the class should address theater or scenario restrictions derived from DOD PA guidance and unclassified tactics, techniques, and procedures.

You are now ready to conduct media-on-the-battlefield training. The commander determines how and where he wants to introduce media on the battlefield. He may choose to embed media, assign media with other civilians on the battlefield, or assign visiting media to conduct a media opportunity for a specific event. An observer may accompany the media role-playing team. The commander can assess the unit's ability to react to or engage media by the performance of individual tasks, the resulting media product, or a combination of both. But how does the commander decide where to inject media on the battlefield?



### Execution

One option is to embed media with the platoon. In essence the platoon is carrying an added member into the fight. The platoon will need to be aware of the media, safeguard information, build rapport, and communicate. Embedded media provide another set of eyes on the inner workings of the platoon, which helps the command to see itself. An embedded media role player in the earlier example might have written a headline that read “U.S. patrol thwarts attack near Omniville.”

The story would include firsthand accounts of the platoon’s actions, rendered by a sympathetic member of the patrol. The platoon leader would have time to articulate his purpose and give credible information to the embedded journalist so that the public understands the unit’s intentions and mission.

Another option is to place media among the local population. In training this means that media role players see the unit as outsiders and report on their actions as perceived by the local populace. Placing media in built-up areas or among the population adds a realistic dimension to training. Placing media among the local population might generate the following headline: “Insurgents ambush patrol near Omniville; 10 killed.”

The story might call to question the presence of the U.S. patrol and drive other elements in the training environment to action. Or it might account for the unit’s follow-on actions in the town and the leader’s efforts to set conditions for humanitarian support. The platoon leader may have, of his own accord or by specified task in his operations order, granted an interview to the reporter in the village.

One other option is to have the patrol perform a task that relates to or serves a media objective. One such task might be for the platoon to establish security at a site and prepare to receive media.

In this case the resulting story in the newspaper might describe a school-opening ceremony. The platoon sergeant might render a quote to hosted media that supports a headline like this: “Army Sergeant: We’re helping restore hope for kids.”

In all cases, a media product results from the scenario and is produced after the actual mission ends. There may be tasks that occur throughout the training event that are associated with individual skills. FM 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*; TC 7-98-1; FM 3-61.1, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*; and various common task manuals address tasks that should be conducted when media are encountered. But dissecting each properly performed task and rendering the Army’s standard of “GO” or “NO GO” may be shortchanging our command’s true intention, which is to communicate with the public through the media.

Throughout this exercise a higher headquarters supports training by analyzing media products and advising the commander on media task performance. The trainer in the examples above is able to assess media perceptions and advise the command on how to improve training for media on the battlefield. Successfully executed training allows the unit to revise its SOPs, retrain, improve knowledge, and build confidence for engaging media at every grade of rank.

### Conclusion

Properly conducted media-on-the-battlefield training requires planning, resources, preparatory training, and follow-through. If executed well, it can be a tremendous learning experience that exercises the command from the lowest level to the highest training headquarters. Media-on-the-battlefield training exponentially improves the command’s ability to communicate

with audiences at home and abroad, now and in the future. It can also allow the command to see itself through another's eyes, something that often happens too late for remedy. With realistic training, Second Platoon would have been equipped with knowledge before it deployed.

With realistic training, our leaders have trained a generation of Soldiers who understand the importance of engaging media on the battlefield.



## **Chapter 6**

### **Media on the Battlefield: “A Nonlethal Fire”**

Public affairs (PA) and the media play a key role in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This operation proves that now, more than ever, the U.S. military must be prepared to engage the media and provide timely, factual information. This article shares some experiences with the media during Operation Enduring Freedom and the early stages of OIF. The intent is to explain, from a company/field grade point of view, how media played a part in the operations and how tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for engaging the media relate to current doctrine. This article also shares thoughts on how field-grade officers can prepare themselves to conduct media interviews in today’s environment.

#### **Introduction**

GEN Eric Shinseki, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, once said, “If we do not speak for the Army, others will.” The media should be considered as a component of nonlethal fires and/or nonkinetic targeting, another tool to help accomplish the mission. The media will write their story, with or without input from the field. It only makes sense to engage the media to ensure the entire story is told. The media is a venue where Soldiers can pass along command messages that contain truthful and factual information. Soldiers have nothing to hide. However, when attempting to carry out orders within the laws of land warfare, bad things can happen. During these times, it is best to confront the media and present the military side of the story.

When integrated and synchronized with information operations (IO) efforts, PA, and the media, in particular, can be force multipliers. However, it is important to understand the difference between IO and PA operations. Both belong to the IO career field. IO uses deception and, unlike PA operations, specifically targets the enemy. PA operations must be aware of the themes and messages IO is pushing during each phase of the operation. The intent is to leverage IO. During the initial phases of OIF, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) always ensured PA planners were involved in the IO working groups, especially the effects targeting board process. This involvement ensured that the PA officer (PAO) would bring information to the media director. The media director then would have a clear picture of the commander’s intent and what the staff was attempting to accomplish.

Armed with this knowledge, the media director could prioritize which of the thousands of media queries to work on, while still maintaining a level of fairness and equity to all reporters. (As an example, prior to crossing the line of departure [LD], IO was pushing themes to the enemy concerning capitulation. Knowing this, the media director pushed reporters out to units responsible for dealing with large numbers of enemy prisoners of war to show the enemy how they would be fed, clothed, and provided shelter.)

There is always a tendency to overclassify information to avoid speaking to the media. There are essentially two things you always want to protect: timing and intentions. You must ask yourself if the information you are providing to the media will give an adversary something they can use against you. If operations security (OPSEC) or safety concerns make it impossible to support a media request, then simply say so. Reporters must understand when they can write or speak about what they see. Units were very successful during the decisive combat phase of OIF in allowing reporters access to command centers. (The practice of allowing reporters in command centers will be discussed later.)

“Go ugly early” is a phrase sometimes used in PA. Bad things happen in war. There were nearly 700 embedded reporters with units prior to crossing the LD. They saw and heard everything. There were many times when something bad happened, and Soldiers were unsure how to respond when a reporter was on the scene. There was an incident near the Umm Qasr area where several civilians were injured by coalition fire. An embedded reporter captured the scene as British and U.S. troops attended to the injured. Initially, the troops shouted at the reporter to get back, but eventually allowed him to continue to film as long as he remained out of the way. The images of the Soldiers’ faces told the story. They were concerned that they had injured innocent civilians on the battlefield, but the film showed that the primary concern at that point was to provide medical attention. The embedded reporter had a right to be there to do his job, which was to report the activity. The unit could have gained even more leverage by engaging the reporter (by way of a short stand-up interview) with a leader on the scene who could have released known information and delivered a command message. The message could have included sympathy for the injured and how the coalition makes every attempt to avoid civilian casualties, followed by basic, releasable facts. This situation proves that Soldiers must be able to articulate their story on the spot without violating OPSEC. In order to do this, PA must be incorporated into home-station training.

The best-case scenario is when Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are the spokespersons, not the PAO. All Soldiers must be prepared to answer questions pertaining to their area of responsibility (AOR). Third Infantry Division had the benefit of a great deal of training prior to crossing the LD. They were on rotation for Operation Desert Spring in the fall of 2002. The division began “training embeds,” where reporters were embedded with units for a three-to-four-day period. This training gave the Soldiers an opportunity to become comfortable having reporters present 24/7 as they carried out their duties. The reporters saw it all – the good, the bad, and the ugly. The reporters also learned how to do their job in the harsh desert conditions. They began to learn how their equipment would work, how to move with a unit, and so on. The benefit from this experience was evident when the division crossed the LD with the embeds because there were very few problems associated with this new relationship.

Training and experience dealing with the media were not the only issues. Initially, a Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) was not established in Baghdad. There were problems with reporters using press badges issued in Kuwait to attempt to get through checkpoints in Baghdad. There were two types of badges issued in Kuwait: one for embeds and one for non-embeds. The badges issued to non-embeds in Kuwait were not intended for use in Iraq and were only to be used during coordinated opportunities through the Kuwait CPIC. The CFLCC made a conscious decision not to use badges in Baghdad at the beginning of the war. Reporters knew their way around the city and did not need PAO escort. At that time, they only needed information on where to go to cover certain activities. As time went on and a CPIC was established, badges were issued and controlled.

### **Preparing for Interviews**

Today’s military members must be skilled at preparing for media interviews. There are generally two types of interviews to prepare for: the taped, stand-up interview and the print interview. During these interviews, no one hears the question, only the response. Press conferences are usually reserved for those higher in the chain of command. Even at the CFLCC level, a decision was made initially not to conduct press conferences because Department of Defense (DOD) would be conducting press conferences in Washington, D.C., and Central Command would conduct a daily press conference in Qatar.

Preparing for an interview is basically a negotiation. Stress to the reporter your need for information before you begin. Ask yourself what the story can do for your unit and the mission. Think about what phase of the operation you are in. What themes and messages is IO pushing?



How does this story help leverage them? Is this the right time to do the story? For example, prior to crossing the LD in Kuwait, you may not want to do a story about how you are going to fight oil well fires. Do not give the enemy that information yet. After you cross the LD and have passed that phase, then proceed with the story.

Many reporters will want “fluff” stories. These are fine, but given the choice, prioritize stories depending on what phase of the operation you are in. If you have not crossed the LD yet, a story about Soldiers training in the desert should be given emphasis over a story about women in the Army. Remember, you need to send a message to the world and the enemy that you are trained and ready. You can do a story about women in the Army later. Be polite, honest, helpful, and friendly to journalists, but remember the mission and Soldiers on the ground. How can you help them?

When preparing for an interview, do what you do in other military operations: gather intelligence. Ask questions such as, “What is the story about?” What angle is the reporter after? What aspects of a subject is the reporter interested in? Is the reporter talking to anyone else? Will you have to augment information he has already gotten? Will you have to refute information? How knowledgeable is the reporter on the subject? What does he know about the military? What type of stories does this reporter typically write? Are they pro- or anti-military? Pro- or anti-war?

Gather background information on reporters; get their biographies. Consider asking the journalists to send questions to you. You may have to gather facts from other subject-matter experts on the staff to help you articulate your side or the rest of the story. Asking for questions also helps you prepare for what might be asked during the interview. Brainstorm every question you think might be asked, especially the difficult ones. Have a response for all questions.

If you cannot do the interview, tell the reporters why. More times than not, they will understand. For example, in Baghdad a news crew had gotten information on an effort to find a pilot downed in the 1991 Gulf War. CFLCC would often get off-the-wall requests such as this. However, after some investigation, it was learned that a team was, in fact, investigating the whereabouts of missing Navy Commander Michael Scott Speicher. For obvious reasons (timing and intentions), doing the story at that time would jeopardize the investigation. After a meeting between the news crew and the investigating team, it was agreed to wait until a time when the information could be released without risking the investigation.

Know what senior leaders are saying about your operation. This helps you anticipate questions. If you have access to the Internet, review recent DOD transcripts. Chances are the same questions will be asked at your level. You do not have to regurgitate the Secretary of Defense’s responses, but you can ensure that your messages are in line and focused on how things are from your foxhole. Military leaders must be aware of what is being said to avoid their comments being taken out of context. For example, if the President said yesterday, “There are indications that foreign fighters are involved in conducting these attacks,” and you say, “We have no indications of foreign fighter involvement,” it would appear that you are not on the same sheet of music. If you knew what the President’s statement was, you could have rephrased your response to more accurately articulate your message. The President is speaking for the entire country. Perhaps in your specific AOR there are no indications of foreign fighters. You could have said, “In our area, there are no indications ... .” This way, you can avoid being taken out of context. Just being aware is the start point.

Know current events. If you are doing an interview tomorrow, what happened in the news today that may relate to that interview? How does that event impact what you are going to talk about? Remember, you are the military to some journalists, no matter what the topic. Stay in your lane and speak to what you know.

## Conducting the Interview

(For the purpose of this topic, the focus will be on stand-up, taped interviews where the question is never heard, the most common situation for most Soldiers.)

The interview itself is all about control. You want it; the reporter wants it. You have to learn how to structure effective answers and control the interview. Do not be question-driven; be message-driven. The trick is to use your messages as guideposts and not repeated phrases. This is where skill, preparation, and experience come in. You should be trying to articulate command messages that will positively influence the outcome of your mission. Use the media as a “nonlethal fire.” Help raise the morale of that young E-4 on the checkpoint. If you have the information and it is releasable, by all means give it, but consider what other information to deliver to tell the remainder of the story.

Structure effective answers. You are engaging the media not only to respond to their questions, but also to deliver a message about your mission that is important for the world to understand. Again, you must ask yourself how you can help Soldiers on the ground by providing information to the media. To do this, you need to structure effective answers or responses. You should come to the interview with about three or four messages that you want to deliver. Think of each message as a pyramid.




Figure 6-1

The top of the pyramid shows that you should **state your message**. This is your response to the first question. For a taped stand-up interview, it does not matter what the question is. You should deliver your most important message first. That way, if you are interrupted later, the message is already out. No one will hear the question on a taped interview. Many times, even if a journalist comes to you with a specific question in mind, if you deliver a clearly articulated message, they will use it. You may tell them something that they did not know. It may look and sound so good on tape that the affiliate's editors decide to use it as their sound bite.

After delivering your message, you then need to **support your message**. Provide an explanation, evidence that supports your initial statement (middle of the pyramid). At this point provide facts, key statistics, description of a certain program, or a supporting argument or rationale. For example, to support a statement made about what you are doing in western Iraq, you can talk about how many patrols you have conducted, number of arrests made, and food and water delivered. If your position statement is that you are doing great things, winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, back the statement up with facts the media may have overlooked.

The bottom of the pyramid is where you further **expand and illustrate your message**. Give a prepared example or analogy. Using the example above, you might want to talk about a specific raid in one of the towns.

During this entire process your goal is to be in control of the interview. Have the reporters follow you. **Hook** the reporters' interest. Be passionate about what you are talking about. Usually the reporter will follow you through one message (or pyramid). The skill comes in bridging to a second or third message. The goal is to smoothly transition to your messages so you are not repeating things. This takes practice and experience and sometimes a bit of charm. One key leader who uses this method effectively is Colin Powell. He uses textbook communication skills both during speeches and while talking with reporters. He transitions so fluidly, the untrained eye may not notice. By not sounding like a robot, he effectively communicates his messages and avoids losing credibility.

You have to continually bridge back to your messages. Always be aware which questions are out of your lane. The tendency is to attempt to answer all questions. The key is to first think about what is being asked. If it is not for you to answer, transition back on track and state, "I don't know about that, but what I can tell you is ... ." or "DOD might have more information on that, but the important thing to remember is ... ." Flag or spotlight your message with phrases such as, "First, let's clarify the facts ... ." or "Let's look at what is really important ... ."

The hook is a tool you can effectively use to control the interview. You want the reporter to follow you. The pyramid shows where you can briefly stop between your initial answer and elaboration by offering a statement such as, "You should have seen what happened yesterday..." or "We have this new approach ...," then pause long enough so the reporter can ask, "Well, what's that?" This may not work easily every time, especially with savvy reporters, but you get the idea. Remember, you want to control the interview.

### **Embeds**

During the decisive combat phase of OIF, CFLCC embedded an unprecedented number of reporters. The reporters did not seem to mind the structure and limited freedom of movement between units. They enjoyed a certain sense of security, especially when facing many unknown circumstances. Once decisive combat was declared over, many journalists and their affiliates decided it was time to leave the unit and return to traditional reporting.

Embeds became a part of the unit. They saw military members who went out of their way to do the right thing, many times at risk to their own safety. Embeds saw that Soldiers care about limiting collateral damage. They saw hundreds of Soldiers in command posts struggling all night over target lists and the effects of striking specific targets. They saw the amount of work involved in deciding on each and every target. They saw Soldiers put their own lives in danger to save the lives of civilians on the battlefield.

The rate of information drastically increased by embedding reporters. Units did not fully appreciate how much information would be out before it went through the official reporting chain; however, units still had to be responsible with information and not officially “release” it until it was confirmed and on the significant activities report. There was a lot of pressure to confirm things, which simply could not be done on the spot. Reporters were out there and units had to let them report. Units continued to handle information in the same manner. Once the information was confirmed, Soldiers would acknowledge it; if unconfirmed, they would either refute it or state that to their knowledge it did not happen.

It is important to understand how embeds were deployed. For OIF, DOD asked CFLCC how many reporters they could handle, given the task organization. CFLCC worked with subordinate PAOs to work out specific numbers. CFLCC then provided DOD with a number. DOD took the number and allocated slots to specific affiliates and media organizations. Those affiliates and organizations assigned personnel to fill the slots. Not all the reporters assigned as embeds wanted the slot. Some had been in the AOR for months and benefitted from the training embeds. Some had never been there at all. Between DOD and CFLCC, the attempt was made to ensure the right reporters and media types were in the right places. There was a mix of different categories of media spread throughout the task force (print, TV, weekly magazines, regional/Arab media). Subordinate commands had input if they desired a specific anchor or reporter to embed with their headquarters. Some already had built a good rapport with individuals through training. The DOD embed list assigned reporters down to division level. Divisions then pushed them down, at times, to company level.

There was some disagreement with allowing reporters in command centers without a security clearance. Units were able to do this without violating OPSEC by establishing strict ground rules while still being responsible with information. Some have said, “We give away too much about our capabilities by letting in civilians without clearances.” One example given is that reporters learn too much about how far and fast we can go; however, this information is easily confirmed by events on the ground. After a unit crosses the LD and executes the mission, everybody knows their capability. What Soldiers must protect are TTP and information they will use again in the future. Just because reporters are allowed into a command center does not mean they are shown every secret in the book. You must still be responsible with information. It is challenging, but doable.

Units need to move away from the tendency to overclassify information, while still protecting sensitive information that should remain classified. That should be the trend even after the current fight is over. It is a balancing act that requires thought. Tomorrow, today’s graphics and basic plan or concept of the operation may no longer be sensitive, but some of the TTP required to build them still need to be protected. Security at the source requires that each individual understands the difference. Be conscious of the information you are providing and the situation at the time you are providing it. Protect timing, intentions, and anything that an adversary can use against you.

## **Ground Rules**

All reporters who desire access to forces are required to sign ground rules whether they are embedded or not. Most will abide by them because they want that access. Enforcing the ground rules, however, is sometimes difficult. Security at the source was the rule. It became impossible to watch a reporter 24/7 and was especially dangerous when reporters had satellite phones and the capability to “go live” at any moment. Geraldo Rivera is a prime example. He went live on air and basically violated all the ground rules. He was embedded with the 101st Airborne Division while they were on the move toward Baghdad. He scratched out a sketch in the sand that showed their formation, where they were, how far and fast they had traveled, and when they would be at their next location. Luckily, it does not appear that his actions ever got anyone killed.

Units always can add to the higher headquarters’ ground rules. One good rule would be to instruct the reporter never to go live unless there is a Soldier or “handler” present. This would have worked well in the situation with Geraldo Rivera. Depending on the reporter, they may have good intentions and just not realize that a certain piece of information may be sensitive at the time. Remember, reporters are just like Soldiers; you have to train them and set the standard of conduct at your level.

No ground rule is foolproof. One of the CFLCC ground rules stated that no image or photograph would be taken of a deceased coalition Soldier. The commanding general (CG) felt strongly about this. He did not want family members to learn of their loved one’s fate in the media. There was much debate with DOD on whether it should be a ground rule. An incident involving the use of a photograph of a dying 101st Airborne Soldier by a military newspaper resulted in a major debate between the CG and the newspaper. Even when you think a ground rule is self-explanatory or simply in good taste, make sure your intentions are articulated in detail.

## **Conclusion**

Dealing with media effectively requires training and experience. You will not personally like every reporter you encounter. However, you must be able to put your personal feelings aside, get on with your mission, and allow the reporters get on with theirs. When encountering the media, you should always ask yourself how you can use this nonlethal fire to help accomplish the mission and, most importantly, how it will assist the Soldier at the checkpoint or on patrol.





## **Chapter 7**

### **Integration of Information Operations into Planning and Operating, Public Affairs and the Media**

#### **Extract from Center for Army Lessons Learned Initial Impressions Report 05-3, *Information Operations***

#### **Brigade-Level Integration**

In most brigade areas of operations (AOs) in theater, the public affairs (PA) officer (PAO), information operations (IO) coordinator, and psychological operations (PSYOP) representatives are integrating and employing sound communications strategies. This integration may be attributed to smaller staff size and heightened command interest and control at brigade-sized units. The smaller staff size at brigade level contributes to successful integration of specialty elements because each specialty usually has only one representative at the brigade headquarters. The three brigade specialty staff officers most directly involved in communications operations – PA, IO, and PSYOP – tend to drift together and begin integrating their efforts.

Command interest and influence is also a contributing factor to increased integration of PA, IO, civil affairs, and PSYOP at brigade level. The commander of a brigade-sized unit insisted on a proactive information campaign for every civil-military operation (CMO) in his brigade AO. Coverage of each CMO project was an ongoing effort, beginning with announcements at the start of a project, progress updates during work, and a media event or ceremony at completion. The commander placed heavy emphasis on the distribution of photographs and dissemination of updated information. PA and PSYOP became the primary tools to disseminate information and plan and execute media events.

At higher levels of command, IO components are not as well coordinated. At these levels, the lack of a CMO project roll-up limits the ability to determine if a project has received media coverage. The opportunity to leverage local, national, and international media coverage of more than one billion dollars' worth of CMO "good news" projects in theater has not been fully realized.

#### **Lessons learned**

- The small staff size at brigade level seems to contribute to successful integration of the specialty elements of PA, IO, and PSYOP.
- CMO projects must have visibility to receive media attention. After spending more than a billion dollars on CMO in Iraq, a very small percentage was leveraged as positive media coverage.

#### **Media Analysis**

Some forms of media collection and evaluation are being accomplished at various levels throughout the theater. However, an analysis process has not been formalized, and information is not shared across staffs and levels of command. Nearly every IO staff interviewed had established some form of a media collection cell or was using media data collected by other staff sections to assist them in developing themes, messages, and measures of effectiveness (MOE). In two units, IO Soldiers and native Iraqi speakers staffed the cell. In another, the PSYOP and open-source intelligence staff performed media analysis tasks and would give the product to the IO staff upon request.

Various PA desk officers throughout the corps conduct informal media monitoring of Web-based news each morning and periodically throughout the day. However, this process is not formalized, no formal analysis is being conducted, nor is trend data being captured. Unit PA sections were not robust enough to perform this function, and unit G2 sections were not involved in media analysis. Although almost every unit believed their IO section was undermanned, most dedicated assets to media analysis because of the importance they placed on it as a gauge to assist them in developing IO products and evaluating MOE.

Multinational Forces-Iraq and Multinational Coalition-Iraq recognize the benefit and utility of having Arab media analysis. However, staff members are not aware of the media analysis products already available. One unit PAO wanted to contract for media analysis solely because he was not aware of media products readily available to him from Central Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Deputy Director for Information Operations.

Above major subordinate command (MSC) level, PAO analysis efforts of Iraqi/Arab media are limited to one contract Iraqi translator physically reviewing daily stories that appear in the top five Iraqi newspapers. The translator's primary focus is to look for statements made by key people and the type of media coverage major events received. This PA section needs resources to conduct more in-depth, quantitative, qualitative, and trend media analysis.

### **Lessons learned**

Media analysis is a critical component of PA in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Timely, in-depth, quantitative, qualitative, and trend media analysis is required to support PAO activities and overall IO efforts.

- MSC PA modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) do not adequately support wartime activities. Current IO and PA organization structure does not support the conduct of formal, in-depth media analysis at the MSCs or higher levels. MSCs and higher PA organizations are not resourced to support basic wartime theater requirements without significant augmentation. Formal, in-depth media analysis is an additional requirement that requires additional resources.
- Unit IO staffs received inadequate training in media analysis prior to their deployment in theater.
- The PAO school does not currently teach in-depth, formal media analysis processes.
- Few IO or PA personnel are aware of available Arab media analysis products.

### **Audience Analysis**

One MSC audience analysis resulted in identifying a diverse mix of audiences. Various messages, channels, and techniques were required to reach each audience. During day-to-day activities, the MSCs have primary contact with a variety of media outlets working in their AO. These media include a mix of international wire services, reporters, and correspondents, as well as local Iraqi/Arab media.

The PAO selects the target media, to which story ideas are provided, based on the type of event and IO planning considerations. For some events, the MSC holds combined press conferences that are open to all media operating in the AO. For other events, the MSC holds Arab-only press conferences.

### **Lessons learned**

- Units identified the value of beginning key audience analysis and planning before deploying from home station.
- Close analysis of target audiences is needed to address cultural differences that may create a need for special communications channels.

### **Media Environment**

The media cycle in Iraq and the Middle East tends to be faster than in the West. Local customs dictate that the remains of the dead be buried as soon as possible, often the day of death. Products supporting IO, such as flyers, television spots, or statements that highlight IO messages surrounding a fatal event, are far less effective if not “on the street” within 24 to 36 hours, if not sooner. Terrorist groups often produce somewhat crude (but effective) flyers very quickly after one of their members is killed. They flood the streets with these flyers to stir emotions among the populace. Following an incident in which Arab noncombatants are killed or wounded by non-Arab forces, Arab media will often play and replay the images on television. This endless loop video technique is extremely effective in stirring strong emotions among people who otherwise would be indifferent. If coalition forces take 48 to 96 hours to investigate, vet messages, engage media, and disseminate, the impressions of the event as portrayed by Arab media are already fixed in the minds of the target audiences.

One corps-sized unit PAO reports that the PA staff is limited to rebutting incorrect information appearing in the media, rather than taking more direct counter-propaganda efforts. The corps PA planning officer stated that it is hard to coordinate counter-propaganda directly with the IO staff without strategic communications direction from higher headquarters. Currently, the corps PA planner and IO staff are trying to work out a system to proactively counter propaganda without specific guidance from above.

In addition to a lack of higher-level guidance, the corps is further restrained by the lack of internal assets for countering propaganda or rebutting incorrect information. Most PA resources in theater that can be applied to the effort reside at the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC), an asset of the senior military headquarters in theater. The CPIC is located at the convention center in downtown Baghdad, in close proximity to the hotel complex where the majority of western and international media have established bureau offices. The CPIC maintains the most up-to-date contacts for all Arab/Iraqi media operating in theater. The location, organization, and systems of the CPIC make it the most appropriate tool to rebut incorrect information and reactively counter propaganda. In this process, the corps PAO becomes an intermediary, passing incidents of incorrect media reporting to the CPIC for resolution.

Operational-level PA enable lower headquarters to counter propaganda by pushing PA down as required for particular events, such as brigade or battalion media days, press conferences, or other operations. These efforts could be considered proactive tactical counter-propaganda; however, there is little planning and coordination with IO and no counter-propaganda guidance or strategic communication direction from higher headquarters.

Two MSC PAOs hired Iraqis with media experience to be their commands’ Arab/Iraqi media coordinators. When the commands schedule events that are open to the media, the PAOs notify the coordinators, who in turn notify the Iraqi media of the media opportunity. The MSCs frequently provide transportation for journalists desiring to cover events to facilitate the coverage from Iraqi and Arab media. Reporters attending the event are free to write what they want and receive no pressure to provide positive coverage from the coordinator or the command. One MSC began a loosely organized group of media operating in the MSC area, the Baghdad

Press Club, to identify media opportunities and facilitate media notification. The Iraqi media coordinator used the group's membership list to identify, choose, and contact agencies to attend media events. The coordinator does not limit invitations to agencies that provide positive media coverage of the coalition. Attempts are made to engage top Iraqi/Arab and western agencies, even though some are habitually pro-coalition, neutral, and anti-coalition.

### **Lessons learned**

- Coalition commanders and staffs need to formulate, approve, produce, and disseminate products supporting IO within hours after an event. Coalition IO planners should be prepared to sacrifice polish for rapid production.
- Strategic communications guidance is required to achieve a proactive, integrated counter-propaganda effort from PA.
- PA assets for a counter-propaganda effort or major media operations are available at the CPIC level.
- The CPIC usually maintains the most up-to-date information for media operating in theater.

### **Media Engagement**

One of the greatest challenges for brigade PAOs is getting subordinate battalions to engage news media representatives. One brigade PAO says this is usually a function of the battalion commander's personality. Some battalion commanders openly welcome media, while others only accept media when directly ordered to do so by the brigade commander.

Brigade PAOs are instrumental in planning, coordinating, and executing the media embed program. In the current Iraq theater, brigades operate AOs that are geographically and culturally different from each other. The differences in each brigade AO present unique opportunities for news media.

Brigades receive few requests for embedding from Arab/Iraqi news media representatives. One brigade PAO reported that he understood there was reluctance on the part of the Arab/Iraqi journalists to embed because they were concerned for their safety. Arab/Iraqi journalists said they do not like to be seen traveling with U.S. forces, and they do not like to be out at night. They are afraid that they may be perceived as working with U.S. and coalition forces.

In one MSC, the PAO realized that one of the key IO objectives, to put an Iraqi face on the reconstruction efforts, was not being accomplished because the responses to media queries were being answered predominantly by coalition members and not by Iraqi officials. This MSC PAO staff had earned a reputation of being very responsive to news media queries. News media operating in the area grew accustomed to dealing with the PAO and developed the habit of simply querying the coalition as the primary source for all information. The PAO staff consistently provided the news media with what they needed, a quick response from a credible source in a position of authority in control of the situation. However, this responsiveness did not help to accomplish prescribed IO objectives.

The PAO began to refer news media representatives to the appropriate Iraqi agency, official, or office for responses. Although this process took longer to get information to the media, it enabled the command to better realize its IO objectives while still meeting the information requirements of the news media organizations. Coordinating responses from appropriate Iraqi



officials or organizations provided the command the opportunity to build support for Iraqi authorities. At the same time, the command's PAO remained very engaged in the process.

Iraqi officials and organizations require additional support and tutelage from coalition PA to effectively plan; organize; and, at times, resource media events or press conferences. Although coalition forces removed themselves as lead spokespersons on events, they remained very involved behind the scenes.

### **Lessons learned**

- Brigade and battalion PAOs who established good working relationships with news media representatives in their AO were critical contributors to the media management mission.
- Brigades and battalions are filling PAO slots with untrained personnel. Personnel assigned to these key positions must quickly acquire an understanding of media engagement and begin building relationships with news media representatives.
- Brigade-level PAOs are vital to successful planning, coordination, and execution of the media engagement mission at the tactical level.
- Brigade PAOs spend the majority of their time planning, coordinating, and executing the media engagement mission.
- Arab/Iraqi journalists are reluctant to embed because they are concerned for their safety. Different approaches are required to engage Arab/Iraqi media.
- A locally contracted Iraqi media coordinator is vital to providing understanding and insight into the local culture and media practices. Having this person onboard leads to successful engagement with Iraqi/Arab media.
- The Press Club organization provides a structure to facilitate media contact and coverage of key media events.
- Providing transportation facilitates Arab/Iraqi media coverage of events. Arab/Iraqi media are frequently restrained from covering stories by transportation and expense factors.
- Iraqi officials and official organizations require coalition PA support and training to effectively plan, organize, and resource media events or press conferences.

### **Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications**

#### **Doctrine**

- PA doctrine should commit to taking a more active role in leading news media communications activities of IO and participating in the selection and integration of themes and messages to mass information effects.
- IO doctrine should include the concept of audience analysis.
- CMO projects must be tracked as a nonlethal effect.

- PA and IO should ensure that communications contingency plans are well-coordinated with operational planners (G3 and C5 planners). Operational planners should be involved in communications contingency planning.
- Incorporate an understanding of the integration of PA activities with IO into Army doctrine so the concept, role, and relevance of PA activities as they relate to IO objectives are understood.

### Organization

- PA MTOE at all levels should be changed to support requirements of wartime battle rhythm (night shift, MSC meetings, plans and operations, media escort, and other headquarters requirements).
- The PAO at all levels should remain a separate special staff position in the command, but have a direct requirement to provide expert news media communications input, coordination, and advice to IO mission planning and execution.
- A clear staff organizational structure for a brigade combat team is needed to define the relationship between special staff officers (PAOs), slice elements (tactical PSYOP detachment), and IO coordinators within the brigade.
- A trained PAO organic to the brigade is vital to successful media engagement and integrated employment of PA with IO at the tactical level.
- Organize units and staffs to support the rapid formulation, approval, production, and dissemination of products in support of IO.
- PA staffs should be organized to conduct continuous audience analysis and provide continuous support to IO.
- Few PA assets exist at the lower tactical levels, brigade and battalion, to plan and run a large, proactive counter-propaganda campaign. Ensure the CPIC organizational structure maintains the ability to provide PA assets to corps, MSCs, brigades, and battalion-sized units to meet specific IO needs.
- MSCs and/or corps-level staff organizations should designate a staff element with the responsibility and resources to conduct formal media analysis for the staff.

### Training

- Current PA doctrine (FM 3-61.1, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*) clearly outlines the need for and type of support PA should provide to IO. PAO training should prepare PAOs to provide expert advice to IO, fully integrate PA activities with IO, and take a leading role in the command's news media communications efforts.
- The PA school should develop a media analysis course and export the training. IO Soldiers need training on media analysis prior to deploying into theater.
- PA integration training is necessary to ensure plans, branches, and sequels for PA and IO have the same rigor and discipline as lethal operations.

- School-train PAOs to operate independently and without immediate divisional support. Training should prepare PAOs to conduct all aspects of PA in a large and varied brigade AO.
- Provide focused training for IO and PA staff planners on crisis communications planning. Incorporate IO operations and communications contingency planning into the School for Advanced Military Studies curriculum.
- MSC- and/or corps-level IO and PA staffs should be made aware of and trained to use the analysis tools currently available.
- PAOs must be able to facilitate and train others to facilitate media engagement, including responding to queries and conducting press conferences.

### **Leadership**

- Leaders must understand the missions and organizations of PA and how to effectively integrate PA into the overall IO plan. Commanders must drive the process and force diverse staff elements to integrate and coordinate.
- Leaders need to have sufficient Iraqi cultural environment preparation training to feel comfortable and confident using messages and techniques that resonate with Iraqi cultures. Ensure that commanders understand the importance of identifying and providing resources to engage key audiences.

### **Materiel**

- Units with IO core capabilities need to have equipment (video production and transmission equipment) to provide for the rapid production of products in support of IO.

### **Personnel**

- Units need to be staffed to formulate, approve, produce, and disseminate products supporting IO within hours after an event.
- Units should have a local contract media coordinator who provides understanding and insight into the local culture and media practices. Deploying units should anticipate the need to interview and establish a contract with qualified local nationals upon deployment.



## Chapter 8

### Support Operations, Public Affairs Office

Extract from Center for Army Lessons Learned  
Initial Impressions Report 06-11, *Disaster Response Hurricanes Katrina and Rita*



**Figure 8-1: Public affairs interview in Mississippi**

This article addresses the need for public affairs (PA) support during disaster relief operations. Public interest in how the U.S. government and the Army supports relief operations was significantly increased after Hurricane Katrina because this domestic disaster hit home in a monumental way. PA officers (PAOs) on the Gulf coast had to work closely with civilian media to ensure command messages and military information was disseminated in an accurate and timely manner. PAOs leveraged the power of U.S. media organizations to assist in information gathering and dissemination.

One National Guard (NG) division PAO in Louisiana conducted a vigorous media information program to get the command message out, despite staff shortages. The NG division, operating under the modular force structure, deployed with no organic staff. The modular force structure authorizes three officers and seven enlisted personnel in the PA section. The NG division possessed only one qualified PAO, who acted as the single point of contact for media operations within the division.

Through rigorous networking with military and civilian media agencies, the PAO was able to coordinate media coverage when opportunities surfaced. Most of this coordination was conducted while attending civilian news media meetings at the state emergency operations center. Command messages were disseminated via these meetings and with the military PA



detachment (MPAD) located at Belle Chase, Louisiana, south of New Orleans. However, the MPAD was not part of the division. The division PA office had no tasking authority over the MPAD. Priority of media coverage was determined by the Louisiana NG chain of command, instead of the division-assigned command and control authority. If the MPAD was not available, the division PAO would cover stories on his own. These stories would be included in a newsletter that was distributed by the MPAD. The PAO also would arrange press meetings for the division commander. The PAO possessed 15 years of prior enlisted PA experience. This experience was critical in filling the void in staff structure.

In Mississippi, all intelligence/information was channeled through the joint task force (JTF) G2, who was also acting as the G5 and G7. As tactical-level units reported information about civil infrastructure and the status of services to the G2, this information was also passed to civilian media outlets by the JTF PAO. Initial military response priorities were communicated via press conferences and field media contacts at the local and higher headquarters levels. These priorities became part of the overall information operations (IO) plan and the media support plan. Sample talking points in the initial phase of the relief operation are listed below.

### **NG Support to Hurricane Katrina**

As of 2 September 2005

#### **Key Messages**

- This is what we do. We are trained and ready to help others, whether they're overseas or in the United States. These are our neighbors we're helping now. We're looking forward to getting there and doing our part to help.
- We've been deployed before, so we're used to being away from home for months at a time. No one likes to be away from his or her loved ones for too long, but we feel fortunate that it is for a good cause. The sooner we can get there the better for everyone. I'm ready.
- These National Guardsmen are trained professionals who bring great expertise and sensitivity to their mission in support of local law enforcement.
- NG helicopters have evacuated hundreds of sick and injured persons out of the devastated greater New Orleans area.
- Over the next few days, that number will rise to nearly 30,000 as we continue to deploy personnel and critical equipment to the hardest hit areas.
- These are National Guardsmen saving, protecting, and serving the American people. They are committed citizen-Soldiers and Airmen, gathered from communities across this country.
- The NG has a tradition of responding during natural disasters.
- More than 320,000 NG Soldiers and Airmen and their equipment from all states are ready to mobilize into the disaster-struck area.
- We understand the mission that lies ahead of us. This is why we serve – to help the nation in times of national crisis.

**Insights/Lessons learned**

- PA coverage while supporting domestic disaster assistance is vital in disseminating the command message and telling the Army story.
- The division PAO must be resourced with the authorized level of section personnel to properly conduct media support operations. Working one-deep has the potential to cause gaps in media coverage and may cause media opportunities to be lost.
- It is important for the PAO to be present in any disaster relief to act as a conduit for military and civil leadership.

**Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications**

- **Training:** PA cells need to know and understand IO tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to take the lead when no IO personnel are present.
- **Personnel.** Commanders should place more emphasis on resourcing the PA office with the staff needed to conduct media operations during domestic disaster support operations. Deploying staffs should plan for the appropriate level of media support during domestic disaster support operations or identify civilian-acquired skills sets that will support the PA section.

<b>Table of Supporting Observations</b>	
<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Public Affairs Operations During a Natural Disaster	44841-43727
Intelligence Support to Effects	77501-71346



## **Appendix A**

### **Public Affairs Guidance for Training Purposes**

Although first presented in a Secretary of Defense message in 2001, the information presented in this appendix still provides useful and valid public affairs (PA) guidance (PAG) to units for training.

#### **PAG for Training Purposes**

**Subject:** PAG on military operations in the host nation and the conflict in the area.

**1. Purpose:** The Department of Defense's (DOD) principal goal for battlefield coverage of the U.S. military in combat is to provide for timely and accurate news media and command information coverage of coalition military operations in the host nation.

#### **2. Policy.**

2.A. DOD policy is to provide accurate and timely information ("maximum disclosure with minimum delay") consistent with the requirement to maintain operations security (OPSEC), protect intelligence information and sources, and protect the welfare and privacy rights of Soldiers, patients, next of kin, and family members. All PA offices will practice security at the source. The DOD policy on media coverage of military operations in the host nation is that media will have long-term, minimally restrictive access to U.S. air, ground, and naval forces through embedding, direct engagement with military personnel, and approved methods of public information release. Media coverage of operations will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; and the public in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace and security to this region will come in our long-term commitment to supporting our democratic ideals. We need to tell the factual story, good or bad, before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell our story; only commanders can ensure the media get to the story alongside the troops. We must organize for and facilitate access of national and international media to our forces, including those forces engaged in ground operations, with the goal of doing so right from the start. To accomplish this we will embed media with units, conduct active PA engagements, and release public information in a prudent manner, considering OPSEC first and foremost. Commanders and PA officers (PAOs) must work together to balance the need for media access with the need for OPSEC.

2.B. Since the fall of the former regime, an intensive effort has been made to accredit bona fide media. Multinational Corps (MNC) has issued credentials to bona fide local and international media. Their credentials neither afford unrestricted access to U.S. forces nor attest to a preferred editorial bias. Rather, credentialed media have demonstrated an acceptance of MNC ground rules for coverage of U.S. military operations and are not known to be affiliated with non-compliant forces in the host nation. Perceived violations of ground rules will be addressed to the MNC PAO before termination of an embed or revocation of credentials.

2.C. MNC directs all embeds in the host nation. Media may be embedded with unit personnel at air and ground forces bases and with forces afloat to ensure a full understanding of all operations. Embedded media will be given access to operational combat missions, including mission preparation and debriefing, whenever possible.

- 2.C.1. A media embed is defined as any media representative who remains with a unit on an extended basis, perhaps a period of hours, days, or weeks. Commanders will provide billeting, rations, and medical attention, if needed, to the embedded media commensurate with that provided to members of the unit. Access to military transportation and assistance with communications for filing/transmitting media products will be provided if required.
- 2.C.2. Embedded media are authorized to use their own vehicles while traveling in an embedded status. Commanders will use their discretion and may prohibit the use of media vehicles if the tactical situation prohibits such use or if media vehicles would in any way encumber the tactical commander's mission.
- 2.C.3. To the extent possible, space on military transportation will be made available for embedded media equipment necessary to cover a particular operation. Media embeds are responsible for loading and carrying their own equipment at all times. Use of priority inter-theater airlift for media to cover stories, as well as to file stories, is highly encouraged. Seats aboard vehicles, aircraft, and naval ships will be made available to allow maximum coverage of U.S. troops in the field.
- 2.C.4. Units should plan lift and logistical support to assist in moving embedded media products to and from the battlefield to help tell our story in a timely manner. In the event of commercial communication difficulties, embedded media are authorized to file stories via expeditious military signal/communications capabilities.
- 2.C.5. No communications equipment for use by embedded media in the conduct of their duties will be specifically prohibited. However, unit commanders may impose temporary restrictions on electronic transmissions for OPSEC reasons. Embedded media will seek approval to use electronic devices in a combat/hostile environment, unless otherwise directed by the commander or his/her designated representative. The use of communications equipment will be discussed in full when the media arrive at their assigned unit.
- 2.C.6. Embedded media provide their own personal protective equipment. Media agencies are required to provide all immunizations required for the area of operations (AO).
- 2.C.7. Embedded media are, under no circumstances, allowed to carry or possess a firearm or weapon.

2.D. Direct engagement with media is defined as all interaction with unilateral media in the host nation AO. Commanders are encouraged to interact with credentialed media by conducting interviews with media and affording access to unit personnel. Direct engagement with uncredentialed media may be done at the discretion of the unit commander.

2.E. Release authority is delegated to the MNC.

2.F. The following categories of information are releasable:

- 2.F.1. Approximate friendly-force strength figures.
- 2.F.2. Approximate friendly casualty figures by service. Embedded media may, within OPSEC limits, confirm unit casualties they have witnessed.
- 2.F.3. Confirmed figures of enemy personnel detained or captured.

- 2.F.4. Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation can be disclosed using approximate terms. Specific force or unit identification may be released when it no longer warrants security protection.
- 2.F.5. Information and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack.
- 2.F.6. Generic description of origin of air operations, such as “land-based.”
- 2.F.7. Date, time, or location of previous conventional military missions and actions, as well as mission results, are releasable only if described in general terms.
- 2.F.8. Type of ordnance expended in general terms.
- 2.F.9. Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in the AO.
- 2.F.10. Type of forces involved (air defense, infantry, armor, Marines).
- 2.F.11. Allied participation by type of operation (ships, aircraft, ground units, etc.) after approval of the allied unit commander.
- 2.F.12. Operation code names.
- 2.F.13. Names and hometowns of U.S. military units.
- 2.F.14. Service member’s name and hometown with the individual’s consent.

2.G. The following categories of information are not releasable because their publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

- 2.G.1. Specific number of troops in units below corps/Marine expeditionary force level.
- 2.G.2. Specific number of aircraft in units at or below the air expeditionary wing level.
- 2.G.3. Specific numbers regarding other equipment or critical supplies (artillery, tanks, landing craft, radars, trucks, water, etc.).
- 2.G.4. Specific number of ships in units below the carrier battle group level.
- 2.G.5. Names of military installations or specific geographic locations of military units in the area of responsibility, unless specifically released by DOD or authorized by the MNC commander. News and imagery products that identify or include identifiable features of these locations are not authorized for release.
- 2.G.6. Information regarding future operations.
- 2.G.7. Information regarding force-protection measures at military installations or encampments (except those which are visible or readily apparent).
- 2.G.8. Photography showing the level of security at military installations or encampments.
- 2.G.9. Rules of engagement (ROE).



- 2.G.10. Information on intelligence-collection activities that would compromise friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- 2.G.11. Extra precautions in reporting will be required at the commencement of hostilities to maximize operational surprise. Live broadcasts by embedded media from airfields, on the ground or afloat, are prohibited until the safe return of the initial strike package or until authorized by the unit commander.
- 2.G.12. During an operation, specific information on friendly-force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize OPSEC or lives. Information on ongoing engagements will not be released unless authorized for release by the on-scene commander.
- 2.G.13. Information on special operations units, unique operations methodology, or tactics. (For example: air operations, angles of attack, and speeds; naval tactical or evasive maneuvers, etc.) General terms, such as “low” or “fast,” may be used.
- 2.G.14. Information on the effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare.
- 2.G.15. Information identifying postponed or canceled operations.
- 2.G.16. Information on missing or downed aircraft or missing vessels while search-and-rescue and recovery operations are being planned or underway.
- 2.G.17. Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
- 2.G.18. No photographs or other visual media showing an enemy prisoner of war or detainee’s recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item may be taken.
- 2.G.19. Still or video imagery of custody operations or interviews with persons under custody.

2.H. The following procedures and policies apply to coverage of wounded, injured, and ill personnel:

- 2.H.1. Media representatives will be reminded of the sensitivity of using names of individual casualties or photographs they may have taken which clearly identify casualties until after notification of the next of kin (NOK) and release by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA).
- 2.H.2. Battlefield casualties may be covered by embedded media as long as the service member’s identity is protected from disclosure for 72 hours or upon verification of NOK notification, whichever is first.
- 2.H.3. Media visits to medical facilities will be in accordance with applicable regulations, standing operating procedures, operations orders, and instructions by attending physicians. If approved, service or medical facility personnel must escort media at all times.
- 2.H.4. Patient welfare, patient privacy, and NOK/family considerations are the governing concerns surrounding news media coverage of wounded, injured, and ill

personnel in medical treatment facilities or other casualty collection and treatment locations.

- 2.H.5. Media visits are authorized to medical care facilities, but must be approved by the medical facility commander and attending physician. These visits must not interfere with medical treatment. Requests to visit medical care facilities outside the continental United States will be coordinated by the unified PA command.
- 2.F.6. Reporters may visit those areas designated by the facility commander, but will not be allowed in operating rooms during operating procedures.
- 2.H.7. Permission to interview or photograph a patient will be granted only with the consent of the attending physician or facility commander and with the patient's informed consent, witnessed by the escort.
- 2.H.8. "Informed consent" means the patient understands his or her picture and comments are being collected for news media purposes and that they may appear nationwide in news media reports.
- 2.H.9. The attending physician or escort should advise the service member if NOK have been notified.

### **3. PA posture.**

3.A. DOD PAG specifies active posture for media coverage of deployed/deploying units and unit training activities, within constraints established in the PAG. For public inquiries, the Army PA posture is active. PA offices are encouraged to maintain outreach activities (e.g., contact with veterans service organizations, military service organizations, speakers bureaus, etc.) to keep the public informed.

3.B. During combat operations, DOD will conduct daily news briefings. Major subordinate commands may direct commanders to conduct press conferences in order to convey public information to defined audiences.

3.C. PA offices at all levels should address, within their purview and to the greatest extent possible, media and public queries about nonoperational matters, referring only those queries they cannot answer to higher-echelon PA offices. It is anticipated that the majority of media queries about nonoperational matters will focus on: casualties; status of Soldiers; family assistance; capabilities of weapons systems; and general structure, size, capabilities, and mission of Army units.

3.D. Be prepared to furnish transportation and required logistical support. Provide a guide with the transportation and an escort for the media. For embedded media, commanders on the ground will make the call if media escorts are required.

### **4. Security.**

4.A. Open and independent reporting is the principle means for news coverage of coalition military operations. Open reporting means the military will give credentialed journalists access to military operations and will facilitate reporters. Open reporting does not mean we will compromise security or the safety of our Soldiers. We will be open and honest. We will not cover up mistakes or embarrassing situations by burying them under a cloak of secrecy, and we will not lie to the media. Independent reporting means we will allow journalists to get their own stories. We will avoid using media pools, where only a few journalists are given access and must

share their reports with other news agencies. There is no security review or censorship of news media products. U.S. military personnel shall protect classified information from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. Do not confiscate news media products or the property of a news agency or reporter. Always maintain security at the source.

4.B. Expect contact with all types of media (local, national, U.S., and international) while in country. Some journalists may be unescorted and uncredentialed while covering U.S. operations in the host nation or may be credentialed, but not escorted.

4.C. Expect scheduled and unannounced media visits. The MNC PAO will verify the accreditation of all willing members of the media and issue credentials before allowing access for scheduled media visits to any subordinate unit. As part of the credentialing process, media have agreed to abide by a set of ground rules. Any violation of these rules could result in media being denied access to cover coalition forces operations in the host nation.

4.D. The MNC PAO may provide a military or DOD civilian escort for the media when conducting scheduled visits. When a bona fide escort (civilian or military) with media arrives at your unit, allow immediate access to the person or event the reporter will visit.

4.E. If uncredentialed and unescorted media arrive in your area, assume that the individual is not a member of the media, follow PAG, report the contact, and refer them to the MNC PAO for credentialing.

4.F. If credentialed, but unescorted, media arrive in your area, allow access to your area within the PAG outlined in Annex R (PAG). Do not jeopardize current or ongoing operations to allow access.

4.G. Do not detain any members of the media unless absolutely necessary in accordance with ROE. In all cases, report detention, injury, death, or equipment confiscation to the MNC PAO. Serious incidents involving media are reported through command channels to DOD and Department of State.

4.H. Do not detain or interfere with media members who have official escort. Safety of the media beyond your own local security is not a concern.

### **5. Point of contact is MNC PAO.**

### **6. The following statement is approved for use by all military personnel concerning the current U.S. military deployment to the host nation.**

6.A. "U.S. military forces have deployed to the host nation to enforce multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. Our role here is to help the people establish a democratically elected government and, as necessary, destroy forces that attempt to deny the right to live in a free and democratic country."

6.B. Themes and messages:

- Gain public support for coalition military forces and the interim government.
- Create an environment that facilitates the restoration of public services, health services, and utilities.

- Support coalition operations to remove or apprehend threat elements and neutralize resistance to coalition operations.
- Promote a safe and secure environment.

6.C. Talking points:

- We are committed to using all assets assigned to our unit to support coalition activities to restore peace and basic services to the host nation.
- We are trained and ready to accomplish all missions assigned to our unit.
- We will take any measure to protect our Soldiers while conducting operations.
- We will provide a safe and secure environment to ensure a legitimate government is established.
- Our units are committed to supporting the local communities in order to promote public support while building a better country.

6.D. The following questions and answers are for your use in responding to media queries:

- Question 1: Why are U.S. forces here?  
Response 1: U.S. forces are in the host nation as part of a coalition to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions and establish a safe and secure environment.
- Question 2: How long do you plan to stay?  
Response 2: We have not determined how long we will stay; however, we are committed to assisting the government and plan to stay as long as it takes to complete the mission.
- Question 3: What is your mission?  
Response 3: Our mission here is to help the people establish a democratically elected local government and a safe and secure environment for its people.
- Question 4: What are your plans to conduct combat operations?  
Response 4: For operations security reasons I cannot talk about future operations or plans. I can tell you that we are prepared for any situation or contingency.
- Question 5: In the event your forces come under attack, what action can you take?  
Response 5: I cannot discuss rules of engagement; however, we will take whatever action necessary to protect coalition Soldiers, civilian lives, and property.



Appendix B

Task Force Iron Horse Guidelines for Working with News Media in Iraq

Provided by the 4th Infantry Division Public Affairs Office




Figure B-1

**Working With Media on the Battlefield:**

- You do not have to talk to the media. However, Soldiers who refuse to speak with the media present the impression that they are withholding information.
- Your comments matter.
- You're the best spokesperson we have.
- We need you to tell the Army story, but we also need you to do it right.



**“Engage ... it’s a duty. We have to reach out in a broad spectrum and in a credible manner.”**

**GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, U.S. Army Chief of Staff**

### **Discuss**

Only those matters over which you have direct responsibility or personal knowledge. If you do not know, say so.

### **Pan-Arab/Iraqi Media and Respect for Arab Culture**

- Compliment their culture, country, and traditions continuously.
- Use as much Arabic as you can.
- Don’t joke.
- Don’t talk about women.
- Don’t argue about religion.
- Use metaphors that will work in the culture to describe enemies.
- Mention people, places, and organizations that are helping you.
- Demonstrate knowledge of their history and religion.

### **Before the Interview:**

- Who is the reporter? Agency?
- Are they credentialed by higher headquarters?
- What is the topic? Ensure you are the right spokesperson.
- Know what you want to say (messages).
- Choose the location (operations security [OPSEC], backdrop).
- Prepare an opening statement (20 to 30 seconds).
- Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse.
- Prepare for four easy and four difficult questions.

### **During the Interview:**

- Reporters are not your buddies. They will report what you say. If you don’t want to see your name by a quote, don’t say it.
- Stay in your lane.
- Stay on the record.

- Discuss only firsthand knowledge.
- Stay brief and concise. Use simple words, avoid jargon and acronyms.
- Listen, pause, think, and then answer.
- Answer only one question at a time.
- Speak directly to the reporter.
- All contact with media is “On The Record.”
- Be honest and forthright, never lie.
- Talk facts, don’t speculate.
- It is okay to say “I don’t know” or “I can’t answer.”
- Do not discuss politics, per Army Regulation 360-1.
- Do not discuss rules of engagement.
- Protect OPSEC.
- If you realize you made a mistake, tell the reporter immediately.

**Enduring Messages:**

- Our #1 priority in Iraq is training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) so they can assume responsibility for their own security.
- Much like the U.S. Army supports and defends our Constitution, the Iraqi Army will support and defend theirs too.
- The security, stability, and future of Iraq is dependent upon a well-trained, well-led, motivated, and competent Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Force.
- Our exit strategy is tied to the future of the Iraqi Army and its success in becoming increasingly self-reliant in order to assume the battlespace.
- The Anti-Iraqi Forces have nothing positive to offer the Iraqi people. They indiscriminately target innocent men, women, and children.
- Ultimately the security of Iraq will be up to the Iraqi people.

**Note:** Success equals ISF gaining capability and assumption of the battlespace.

Remain positive. Talk about how the Iraqi forces get better every day or how they are increasing in capability each day. Talk about their courage in the face of direct threats against their lives and the lives of their loved ones. Talk about your mission, but do not talk negatively about the ISF.

**When in doubt, contact the closest public affairs officer.**




## **Appendix C**

### **Role Play Media Training Guidance**

The following information provides an example for training guidance regarding the role of media on the battlefield.

#### **Role Play Media Credentials**

1. Media representatives are accredited by the Multinational Corps (MNC) public affairs (PA) officer (PAO). PAOs will have the identification below, see Figure C-1. Units should expedite access of credentialed journalists and escorts into unclassified unit areas.
2. When unscheduled, but properly credentialed, media visit a unit, the unit's designated PA representative should contact the higher headquarters PAO.
3. If uncredentialed journalists arrive at your unit, courteously refer them to the higher headquarters PAO for accreditation and coordination of their coverage of coalition forces.
4. Absence of an official MNC PAO badge does not prevent media from accessing information for their news service. The MNC badge only verifies the bearer's acceptance of the published MNC media ground rules. Security at the source is essential.
5. The media badge is a serial-numbered item and corresponds to a master list maintained by the MNC PAO. If an individual's credentials are in question, the unit should request verification of the badge through the higher headquarters PAO.



**Figure C-1: Sample of accredited media credentials**

**Role Play Media Contact Report (MEDIAREP) from Unit Standing Operating Procedures**

1. The following MNC MEDIAREP format will be used for reporting media contact within the area of responsibility.
2. Brigade level (or equivalent) units will submit a MEDIAREP to their higher headquarters PAO no later than 1300 daily. MEDIAREPs will include reports from subordinate battalions.

<b>Media Contact Report (MEDIAREP)</b>	
<b>Line #</b>	<b>Line Subject/Content</b>
Line 1:	Unit submitting report (Down to the lowest level).
Line 2:	Date-time group of contact with media.
Line 3:	Location of contact with media (Grid or vicinity).
Line 4:	Names and news organizations of all media representatives (Include agency, name, and country).
Line 5:	General categories of lines of questions.
Line 6:	Outcome of interviews (positive, neutral, or negative, and why).
Line 7:	Concerns about which the division commander needs to be alerted.

3. Include any command information interviews/stories conducted to provide the MNC PAO possible feedback from these products (attach photos).

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Example of a Reporter Profile</b></p> <p>Name: Lars Magnusson Occupation: Reporter/Photographer Organization: Western European capital newspaper</p> <p><b>MNC Identification # 022005-032</b></p> <p>This is an experienced, influential reporter who was born and raised in western Europe. The readership of the newspaper he works for (tens of millions) tends to be pro-U.S., but skeptical of U.S. policies in the Middle East and its continued presence there. Magnusson’s articles have been analyzed and tend to be neutral. He reports the facts as they are known with no editorial bias, and he is likely to include coalition comments in his products to give both sides of an issue. He has expressed interest in embedding temporarily. He wants to talk to leadership and staff officers. He typically lives and works in the local area. He currently is based in Talatha and must file stories from offices there by 2 p.m. local time. Magnusson has spent the last six months covering the Talatha conflict. He has left the country only for brief periods of vacation and has developed a keen appreciation of how the war has affected all involved.</p>
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## **Appendix D**

### **Plan a Media Visit**

#### **Extract from Field Manual 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations***

#### **Conditions:**

The element is given orders to plan for civilian media coverage of a news event in its area of operations.

#### **Task Standards:**

1. Element is prepared for visit not later than the time specified in the order.
2. Staff assesses the nature and impact of the event.
3. All aspects of the news media event are considered in the planning process.
4. Key personnel are briefed before the event.
5. News event is executed not later than the time specified in the order.
6. After-action requirements are completed.
7. Unit adheres to rules of engagement.

#### **Subtasks and Standards:**

1. Staff assesses the nature and impact of the event in four areas:
  - a. How will it affect the public: internal, external, regional, national, special? Pinpoint the public(s) most affected by or interested in the event.
  - b. What are the objectives of the event? Clarify the objectives.
  - c. How must the element plan and prepare for the media coverage?
  - d. How will the element execute the plan?
2. Commander and staff plan the news media event.
  - a. Media coverage. How will the media be able to cover the news event? If it is an equipment demonstration, will the media be required to be stationary, perhaps shooting photographs from a cordoned-off media area? Or will they be allowed to move about freely, but with individual escorts?
  - b. Clearance from higher headquarters is not always required, but when it is, make sure approval is given.
  - c. Day/date/time factors. Watch for conflicts or conditions not conducive to media coverage. Use common sense, a calendar, and a schedule of events when setting a date.



d. Location.

- \* Is the location suitable or practical?
- \* Can the site be secured?
- \* Is the site accessible to the media, buses, and other commercial vehicles?
- \* Does the site allow for the transmission of microwave signals to area radio and television stations?
- \* If it rains, will mud present a major obstacle?
- \* Is there shelter for the media?
- \* Is there an inclement weather plan?
- \* Inclement weather preparations, outdoors versus indoors: A lack of light is usually the big difference between indoors and outdoors. Parts of the event may have to be altered or canceled if conducted indoors. Additional power generation may be required if conducted indoors.

e. Time lines and tie-ins with other events. Consider host-country sensitivities.

f. Advance releases and personal invitations to the media. Carefully scrutinize for errors in spelling, grammar, and format.

g. Press kit preparation, if needed. Carefully check each piece of information. Make sure only essential information is contained in the press kits. Make sure a point of contact is on each item in the press kit.

h. Transportation requirements for the media.

- \* Make sure the transportation meets the terrain and environmental challenges.
- \* Ensure there are suitable parking facilities for the media.

i. Advance clearance of media. Provide the gate guards or military police a list of media attending the event and instructions on how to refer other unconfirmed media to the public affairs (PA) office or registration site. Another option is to place a PA representative at the gate to verify credentials and issue press badges.

j. Press center facilities, if required. Consider power, typewriters, commercial telephones, and restrooms.

k. Advance arrangements for interviews or photography shooting sessions, if required.

l. Advance briefing for photographers. Discuss photographic considerations (how close they can get to the action and the ground rules).

m. Escorts, if required.

- \* Brief escorts on the event and terrain and media considerations.
- \* Use senior noncommissioned officers close to the subject matter or event as escorts.

n. Copies of speeches or remarks. Do not give the media advance copies of speeches or remarks, since many commanders change them or ad-lib. Give the media a hard copy of a speech or remarks only after it is given and a PA office staffer has verified the contents.

o. Keep the PA officer (PAO) oriented and prepared to brief on the event. He should know who from the media is attending.

p. Establish a checklist and milestones.

- \* Closely supervise all facets of the media event's preparation. Troubleshoot the preparation.
- \* Keep in touch with all of the key people involved with the media event.

3. Brief the key people before the event. Go over the itinerary of events, who is coming, what to expect, whom to contact if problems arise, what to do if someone arrives late, and so forth.

4. Execute the news event.

- a. Register all media representatives. Give them press badges (if required) and press kits, and introduce them to their escorts (if required).
- b. Ensure S1 constantly checks all facets of the news event and works closely with the PAO to solve problems quickly and quietly.

5. After the news media event, the commander and staff:

- a. Debrief the key personnel involved.
- b. Monitor print media, radio, and television for coverage.
- c. Write an after-action report.



## **Appendix E**

### **React to a Media Interview**

#### **Extract from Field Manual 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations***

#### **Conditions:**

A Soldier of the command is approached for an interview by media representatives who appear to be legitimate. The Soldier is participating as part of stability operations and support operations. The interview will not materially affect his ability to conduct his assigned tasks.

**Situation A:** Press is unescorted and not accredited by the force headquarters.

**Situation B:** Press is escorted by a unit public affairs representative (UPAR).

#### **Task Standards:**

1. Interviews are not conducted with non-accredited media representatives.
2. UPAR provides guidance to both interviewer and Soldier to be interviewed.
3. Soldier interviewed does not speculate, nor does he express opinions beyond the scope of his experience or duties.
4. Operational information is not discussed.
5. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

#### **Subtasks and Standards:**

1. Soldier asks to see accreditation certification.
2. Soldier asks where the escort is if the reporter appears to be unescorted.
3. If all details are in accordance with instructions received from briefings, Soldier participates in the interview. (See subtask 6 below if reporter is not escorted.)
4. UPAR remains nearby during the interview.
5. Soldier responds to interviewer's questions.
  - a. Soldier listens to the question, asks for clarification if needed.
  - b. Soldier thinks about answer before responding.
  - c. Soldier is honest in his answers. Says "I don't know" if answer is beyond scope.
  - d. Soldier explains if he cannot answer a question due to operations security.
  - e. Soldier does not respond to hypothetical situations used by correspondent to elicit a response.

- f. Soldier terminates interview if he becomes uncomfortable with the questions being asked, or if questioning becomes provocative.
  - g. Soldier does not allow himself to be “baited” into a response by a controversial or so-called “investigative reporter.”
  - h. Soldier avoids saying “No comment.”
6. If press representative is unescorted, Soldier:
- a. Determines if escort is in the area. Asks for a specific name and unit rather than accepting a general wave “over there.”
  - b. Requests person or team to accompany the reporter to headquarters element location or calls for superiors to come to the location.
  - c. Uses tact in dealing with media team.
7. Leader attempts to verify identity of media team.
- a. Notifies higher headquarters UPAR or public affairs officer (PAO).
  - b. Advises media team to depart area of operations to make contact with higher headquarters UPAR or PAO. Provides location and recommends route.
8. Guidelines for media team operations in a controlled area. If media team is in an area under direct U.S. force control (e.g., secure compound, protected area, buffer zone), Soldier detains the media team to maintain positive control.
- a. Soldier informs media team that they are in a controlled area.
  - b. Soldier informs media team that detention is for security reasons and will continue until released by higher headquarters.
  - c. Soldier uses restraint consistent with authorized methods.
  - d. Soldier/Leader considers that a ploy may be engineered to portray U.S. force unfavorably.
  - e. Soldier/Leader keeps higher headquarters informed of all actions taken.

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