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SUMMARY OF M-DAY MAJOR COMBAT UNITS, LAND FORCES, CENTRAL REGION (a)

	Actual Status as of 1 Apr 61		SACEUR's Requirements for 1 Jan 62 (SMPR 167/61, Aug 61)		Actual Status as of 1 Jan 62	
	Divisions	Brigades	Divisions	Brigades	Divisions	Brigades
Belgium	2 (87%)	-	2 (90%)	-	2 (89%)	-
Canada	-	1 (100%)	-	1 (100%)	-	1 (100%)
France	2 (63%)	1 (87%)	4 (90)	-	2 (87%)(b)	1 (94%)
Germany	7 (69%)	-	8 (90%)	-	8 (88%)	-
Netherlands	2(-1/3)(84%)	-	2 (90%)	-	2(-1/3)(103%)	-
U.K.	-	7 (75%)	-	7 (90%)	-	7 (68%)
U.S.	5 (103%)	3 (100%)	5 (100%)	3 (100%)	5 (105%)	4 (100%)
Totals	18(-1/3)(83%)	12 (81%)	21 (92%)	11 (94%)	19(-1/3)(93%)	13 (79%)
	<u>21+2/3 (80%)</u>		<u>24+2/3 (93%)</u>		<u>23 (90%)(c)</u>	
Fully combat ready division equivalents	16				20	

- NOTES: a. The percentages in parentheses in the table represent the average percentage of war authorized strength.
- b. In addition to these units, France has moved two (2) divisions (the 7th Lt Arm Div and the 11th Lt Inf Div) from Algeria to locations in Eastern France where they are being reorganized and re-equipped. SIAPE now carries these divisions as 1st Echelon units; however, the French authorities state that these divisions will be ready to be placed at SACEUR's disposal if necessary.
- c. Total strength of above M-Day major units in Central Region:

1 April 1961	:	267,000
1 January 1962	:	323,000
Increase	:	56,000 or 21%

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By MMK NLDDE Date 8/20/10

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CATEGORIES OF ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

The ratings shown in the column titled "SACEUR's Assessment of Combat Effectiveness as of 1 January 1962" in Inclosure 2 are those given by the Major Subordinate Commander's based on personnel, training and equipment status and the reaction capability of the unit. The four (4) possible ratings are defined as follows:

FULLY EFFECTIVE

- Units which are for all practical purposes fully combat ready.

HIGHLY EFFECTIVE

- Units which have minor deficiencies but which nevertheless possess a high combat potential capability.

MODERATELY EFFECTIVE

- Units which have major deficiencies but which nevertheless possess moderate combat potential capability.

MARGINALLY EFFECTIVE

- Units which have serious deficiencies that cause them to have little combat potential capability.

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I. UNITS

BELGIAN ARMY

UNITS	SCHEDELON	STRENGTH-1 APR 61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH-1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACMUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
<u>Major Headquarters</u>						
1st Corps Hdq	M	32%	29%	23 days CPX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 543. 1st Corps is located approximately 100-150 kilometers from its assigned Emergency Defense Plan position.
<u>Major Combat Units</u>						
1st Div (Mech)	M	86%	90%	22 days CPX 4 days FX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 14,700. One (1) brigade anti-tank company and one (1) brigade reconnaissance company have not been activated. They are planned to be activated by 1 Apr 62 and 1 May 62, respectively.
15th Div (Mech)	M	87%	87%	18 days CPX 4 days FX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 14,825. One (1) brigade anti-tank company and one (1) brigade reconnaissance company have not been activated. They are planned to be activated by 1 Mar 62 and 1 May 62, respectively.

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BELGIAN ARMY

II. In response to SACFOR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SIAPP 167/61, August 1961), the Belgian authorities took the following action:

a. Training:

(1) The two (2) second echelon divisions conducted reserve and mobilization training for 15 days for 98% of their personnel.

(2) A NATO technician school has been established.

b. Logistics:

(1) Operational reserves have been brought to 48 days of supply for Class III and 85 days for Class V.

(2) The following equipment has been purchased and is due in: nine (9) 8-inch howitzers, 51 M-41 tanks, 243 M-75 APCs and 524 AMXs. from France. from the US.

(3) Additional 76mm, 81mm, 90mm and 8-inch ammunition has been purchased.

III. Principal deficiencies still existing as of 1 January 1962:

a. Personnel: V-Day non-organic support units are at 81% of their war authorized strength and 1st echelon non-organic support units at 51% of their war authorized strength.

b. Organization: Non-organic support units are insufficient in number to enable the Belgian land forces to conduct sustained operations.

c. Logistics:

(1) Shortages still exist for some items of TO&E equipment such as armored personnel carriers and helicopters.

(2) Operational reserves for the following items of equipment are below the required level: 105mm howitzers, 155mm howitzers, 155mm guns and 8-inch howitzers.

(3) Operational reserves of ammunition are below the required level for the following calibers: 76mm tank, 90mm tank, 105mm how, 155mm how, 8-inch how and 762mm rocket.

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## I. UNITS

CANADIAN ARMY

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UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH-1 APR 61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH -1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
<u>Major Combat Units in Europe</u>						
4th Brigade Group	M	100%	100%	19 days CPX 35 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 6051. The motorized infantry brigade was strengthened by one (1) organic Honest John unit (4 launchers) and an additional 843 men in December 1961. The war authorized strength of the Bde Gp was adjusted accordingly. The brigade is capable of conducting sustained ground operations. Its combat effectiveness is, however, limited by its partial dependence on UK non-organic service support units.

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II. In response to SACEUR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61 August 1961), the Canadian authorities took the following actions:

a. Personnel

(1) The war authorized and the actual strength of the 4th Canadian Brigade Group in Germany was increased by 1,078 personnel.

(2) The war authorized and actual strength of the 1st Canadian Division (-4th Bde Gp) in Canada was increased by 311. The total strength of this unit is 12,772.

(3) Canada plans to make readily available in Canada 1,519 personnel to be used as reinforcements for their forces in Europe.

b. Organization

(1) The normal rotation of one (1) infantry battalion of the 4th Bde Gp was deferred until 1962.

c. Logistics (4th Canadian Brigade Group in Germany)

(1) Generally, the TO&E equipment is available but mechanization will not be completed before 1965.

(2) The modernization of small arms, communications equipment, electronic equipment and tanks will be accomplished by the end of 1962.

III. Principal deficiencies still existing as of 1 Jan 1962:

a. Logistics

(1) Delay in mechanization of the 4th Bde Gp until 1964/1965.

(2) Partial dependence on the UK non-organic support units.

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I. UNITS

FRENCH ARMY

UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH-1 APR 61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH-1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
<u>Major Headquarters</u>						
1st Army HQ	M	70%	81%	6 days CPX 10 days FTX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 1,440.
2d Corps HQ	M	100%	57%	9 days CPX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 387.
<u>Major Combat Units</u>						
1st Div (59, Type, Armd-Hvy)M		58%	80%	10 days CPX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 18,451. The one (1) bde stationed in France did not participate in CPX and FTX during 1961. The 3rd Div, the 1st Div (minus 1 Bde), and the 13th Mech Bde stationed in Germany are immediately available. One (1) brigade of the 1st Div is located in Eastern France. Provided the 11th Light Inf Div and the 7th Light Armd Div are not assigned national tasks, they could be made available by M plus 2. The 15th Div (minus 1 Bde) and the 15th Mech Bde could be available within 6 to 10 days. The lack of non-organic support units downgrades significantly the sustain combat capability of the French land forces.
3rd Div (59, Type, Inf-Hvy)M		68%	94%	9 days CPX 24 days FTX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 19,177.

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I. UNITS

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FRENCH ARMY

UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH-1 APR 61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH-1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACJUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
13th Mech Bde, 15th Div	M	87%	94%		Highly effective	War authorized strength 4,906.
15th Div(minus 1 bde)	1st	56%	52%		Highly effective (See Note)	War authorized strength 14,207.
7th Light Armd Div	1st	Div was located in Algeria; strength information was not reported.	100%		Information not available to assess this unit.	War authorized strength 7,446. To be assigned to ACE if necessary.
11th Light Inf Div (Abn)	1st	Division was located in Algeria; strength information was not reported.	100%		Fully effective (See Note)	War authorized strength 9,206. To be assigned to ACE if necessary. Training information was not reported.
15th Mech Bde	1st	50%	59%	6 days CPK	Moderately effective (See Note)	War authorized strength 5,446.

NOTE:

This rating was arrived at using first echelon criteria.

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FRENCH ARMY

II. In response to SACEUR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61 August 1961), the French authorities took the following measures:

- a. Personnel: Raised the average manning levels of M-Day major combat units from 60% to 87% of their war authorized strengths.
- b. Organization: Deployed the 7th Light Armored Division and the 11th Light Infantry Division to Europe from Algeria. These units may be placed at SACEUR's disposal if necessary.
- c. Logistics:
  - (1) Raised ammunition stocks, except for anti-tank and SS-11, to a 60-day level (SHAPE rates).
  - (2) Issued the following major items of TO&E equipment to major combat units in Germany:
    - (a) 87 tracked armored personnel carriers, bringing the overall number to 45% of the TO&E.
    - (b) 43 AMX-SS-11 tanks, bringing the overall number to 50% of the TO&E.
    - (c) Eleven (11) light aircraft, bringing the overall number to 100% of the TO&E; and
    - (d) 22 helicopters, bringing the overall number to 95% of the TO&E.
  - (3) New transport vehicles and radiological equipment is being issued to units.

III. Principal deficiencies still existing as of 1 January 1962:

- a. Personnel:
  - (1) The manning levels of the M-Day Divisions are still below the required level of 90% of war authorized strength.
  - (2) The manning levels of the M-Day and 1st echelon non-organic support units are below the required levels.
  - (3) The M-Day and 1st echelon major units have shortages of communications, ss-11 and radar technicians.
- b. Organization: France only provides one (1) M-Day type 50 division (Inf-Hvy) instead of the 2-2/3 required in SACEUR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe. The number of M-Day and 1st echelon non-organic support units is insufficient to enable the French forces to conduct sustained operations.
- c. Logistics: Although TO&E equipment is generally adequate, deficiencies exist in armored personnel carriers, transport vehicles and communications equipment.

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I. UNITS

GERMAN ARMY

UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH-1 APR 61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH- 1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
<u>Major Headquarters</u>						
1st Corps Hq	M	80%	93%	8 days CPX 5 days FTX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 366.
2nd Corps Hq	M	71%	83%	8 days CPX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 366.
3rd Corps Hq	M	77%	99%	10 days CPX 5 days FTX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 366.
<u>Major Combat Units</u>						
1st Abn Div	M	61%	90%	11 days CPX 3 days FTX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 11,243. Consists of two (2) brigades. Not capable of executing divisional parachute jump operations Two (2) parachute infantry battalions, one (1) HOWEST JOHN battery and two (2) brigade air defense batteries not activated.
3rd Armd Div	M	76%	99%	5 days CPX 32 days FTX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 16,423. One (1) brigade air defense battery not activated.
5th Armd Div	M	73%	83%	16 days CPX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 16,423. One (1) brigade not operational. One (1) armor battalion, one (1) mechanized battalion, one (1) brigade reconnaissance company, one (1) brigade engineer company and one (1) brigade air defense battery not activated.
1st Armd Inf Div	M	78%	97%	5 days CPX 17 days FTX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 17,604. One (1) self-propelled artillery battalion and one (1) brigade reconnaissance company not activated.

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## I. UNITS

## GERMAN ARMY

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UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH-1 APR 61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH-1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
2nd Armd Inf Div	M	69%	83%	14 days CPX 6 days FTX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 17,604. One (1) armor battalion, one (1) mechanized battalion, one (1) brigade reconnaissance company and one (1) brigade air defense battery not activated.
4th Armd Inf Div	M	61%	75%	12 days CPX 17 days FTX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 17,604. One (1) armor battalion, two (2) mechanized battalions, one (1) self-propelled artillery battalion, one (1) HONEST JOHN battery, one (1) brigade engineer company and one (1) brigade air defense battery not activated.
11th Armd Inf Div	M		87%		Moderately effective	Assigned 1 Jan 62. War authorized strength 17,604. One (1) armor battalion, one (1) mechanized battalion, one (1) air defense battalion and one (1) brigade air defense battery not activated.
1st Mtn Div	M	61%	92%	3 days CPX 5 days FTX	Moderately effective	Assigned 1 Jan 61. War authorized strength 15,947. Two (2) infantry battalions and one (1) artillery battalion not activated.

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GERMAN ARMY

II. In response to SACEUR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61 August 1961), the FRG authorities took the following actions:

a. Personnel:

- (1) Raised the manning level of M-Day divisions to 88% of war authorized strength.
- (2) Retained conscripts and certain categories of regulars for an additional three (3) months service.
- (3) Conscript service is being increased from 12 to 18 months.
- (4) By mobilization of the "Alarm Reserve", the M-Day divisions can attain their war authorized strength within one (1) day after Simple Alert.
- (5) Retained 6,000 regulars and critical technicians.

b. Organization: Nine (9) divisions consisting of 26 brigades (24 operational and 2 training brigades) are assigned to ACE. Additionally, the 25th Brigade, 12th Armd Div, is not assigned to ACE, but available to perform an assigned emergency defensive mission. One (1) division with two operational and one (1) training brigade in Schleswig-Holstein is assigned to APNORTH.

c. Training: Conducted limited number of brigade level exercises and divisional command post exercises.

d. Logistics:

- (1) Took certain measures to equip units with full TO&E. Sixty (60) M-113 APCs have been received, and the following items have been purchased and are due in: 2150 APCs, 267 155mm SP Howitzers, 136 175mm SP guns, 38 8-inch SP Howitzers, 63 bridge launcher tanks, 125 tank recovery vehicles and 87 H-34A helicopters, all from the U.S.
- (2) Ordered 315,000 rounds of 90mm HEAT ammunition from the U.S.

III. Principal deficiencies still existing as of 1 January 1962:

a. Organization:

(1) The total war authorized strength of non-organic combat support units is only 17,602. The shortfall of these units reduces the combat capability of the German land force contribution.

b. Training:

- (1) Lack of division level exercises.
- (2) Lack of adequate training areas.

c. Logistics:

(1) Deficiencies still exist in TO&E equipment, particularly for anti-tank and air defense weapons, combat vehicles, helicopters, communications and bridging equipment.

(2) Operational reserves of equipment and ammunition have not reached a balanced level of 30 days (SHAPE rates). There are critical deficiencies in armored personnel carriers, combat vehicles, transport and communications equipment and mortar ammunition.

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## I. UNITS

## NETHERLANDS ARMY

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UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH -1 APR 61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH- 1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
<u>Major Headquarters</u>						
1st Corps HQs	M	81%	73%	23 days CPX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 592. The Corp except for 121st Light Brigade, is located approximately 100-150 kilometers from its assigned Emergency Defense Positions.
<u>Major Combat Units</u>						
1st Inf Div	M	85%	104%	38 days CPX 32 days FTX	Highly effective	War authorized strength 14,469. When compared with the NATO Standard Division (mechanized, infantry-heavy), this division is short three (3) armor battalions.
4th Div (Mech)	M	84%	101%	29 days CPX 10 days FTX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength, 11,290. Consists of two brigades. When compared with the NATO Standard Division (mechanized, infantry-heavy), this division is short one (1) brigade headquarters, organic support elements, three (3) infantry battalions, two (2) armor battalions and one (1) artillery battalion.
121st Light Brigade	M		100%			Moved to Germany in response to SACEUR's Plan of Action-NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61, Aug 1961). Principal combat elements are two (2) reconnaissance battalions.

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NETHERLANDS ARMY

II. In response to SACEUR's Plan of Action-NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61) August 1961), the Netherlands authorities took the following actions:

a. Personnel

(1) Raised the manning levels of the two M-Day divisions to 104% and 101% of their war authorized strength of 14,469 and 11,290, respectively.

(2) Extended conscript service from 21 months to 22 months for officers, NCOs and specialists, and 18 months service to 20 months for other personnel.

b. Training

(1) The 2nd Ech 32nd RCT was recalled for 25 days of training during September 1961, and it can be recalled before Simple Alert if necessary.

(2) Measures have been taken to increase the combat capability of three (3) tank companies and certain non-organic support units. The total strength of these units is 2500 men.

(3) La Courtine Training Area was leased from the French authorities for divisional level exercises and brigade exercises were conducted at the Bergen-Hohne Training Area.

(4) As an emergency measure a plan was developed to use privately owned areas in the Netherlands for battalion and company exercises.

c. Logistics

(1) Purchased from UK 10,000 rounds of Centurion tank ammunition.

(2) Started negotiation with MAAG to obtain the loan of equipment and stocks that are urgently required.

(3) Planned to replace the Garand rifle by the Belgian FN 7.62 rifle during 1962.

(4) Planned to replace the Sten sub-machine gun by Israel-made U21 submachine gun as soon as possible.

(5) Planned to replace the light tanks of two reconnaissance battalions with AMX vehicles by end 1962 from France.

(6) Planned to provide AMX tracked APC's for two infantry battalions by end 1962.

(7) Planned to introduce 105mm SP AMX guns for two field artillery battalions during 1963.

(8) Planned to introduce wheeled Netherlands-produced DAF APCs into four infantry battalions during 1963-1964.

(9) Made funds available to order equipment for the mechanization of one (1) more infantry battalion and one (1) field artillery battalion and for the motorization of the remaining infantry battalions.

(10) Planned to complete the area grid communications system during 1963.

(11) Improved the balanced logistical support by obtaining three (3) storage depot sites in Germany to provide a forward support capability.

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III. Principal deficiencies still existing as of 1 January 1962:

a. Training

(1) Lack of divisional-level exercises.

b. Logistics

All planned materiel improvements will probably not be completed before end-1964.

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I. UNITS

UNITED KINGDOM ARMY

UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH-LAPR61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH-1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
<u>Major Headquarters</u>						
1st Corps HQ	M	112%	100%	21 days CPX 5 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 338. The major combat units of the UK Forces on the continent consist of seven (7) brigades. The lack of non-organic support units on the continent downgrades the sustained combat capability of the UK land forces. The brigades, if assessed separately, would be considered highly effective.
<u>Major Combat Units</u>						
1st Division 7th Armd Bde Gp 20th Armd Bde Gp	M	77%	69%	17 days CPX 5 days FTX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 11,001.
2nd Division 6th Inf Bde Gp 11th Inf Bde Gp 12th Inf Bde Gp	M	75%	68%	23 days CPX 14 days FTX	Highly effective (See Note)	War authorized strength 1,124. FTX conducted at Brigade level only.
4 Division 4th Inf Bde Gp 5th Inf Bde Gp	M	75%	67%	10 days CPX 21 days FTX	Moderately effective	War authorized strength 11,775.
					<u>NOTE:</u>	
					The 2nd Division is more effective than the other two (2) UK divisions and, primarily for this reason, the Major Subordinate Commander (MSC) rated this unit as "highly effective". Aside from this consideration, however, a rating of "moderately effective" is more appropriate.	

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BRITISH ARMY

II. In response to SACEUR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61, August 1961), the United Kingdom authorities took the following actions:

a. Organization:

(1) The 3rd Division, stationed in the UK, was earmarked for SACEUR's Strategic Reserve.

(2) One (1) Surface-to-Air Guided Weapons Regt and two (2) light AA regts were deployed to Germany. (British Regiment equivalent to US battalion).

(3) The UK is planning to move additional non-organic combat support units (total strength 775) to Germany in April 1962.

b. Logistics: Certain major types of equipment have been scheduled for replacement, namely: missiles, artillery weapons, combat vehicles, long-range radio equipment. This modernization program was to have been completed by the end of 1961, but the deliveries of most items will be delayed until 1963-1964.

III. Principal deficiencies still existing as of 1 January 1962:

a. Personnel:

(1) The manning levels of the major combat units have decreased from approximately 75% (1 April 1961) to 60% (1 January 1962) of their war authorized strength.

(2) The manning level of the M-Day non-organic support units is 70% of their war authorized strength.

b. Organization:

(1) The BAOR consists of one (1) corps Hq, three (3) divisional Hqs and seven (7) brigade groups. This force does not meet the requirement for three (3) M-Day divisions in Germany.

(2) The number of non-organic support units on the continent is still insufficient to enable the UK forces to conduct sustained combat operations.

c. Logistics:

(1) Although TO&E equipment is generally available, there are shortages of combat vehicles and modern long-range radio sets.

(2) The UK maintains 30 days (UK rates) of supply on the continent. The other 60 days of supply are reported to be in UK depots, but a seven (7) day warning period would be required to start movement of these supplies to the continent.

(3) Since only 30 days of supply are positioned on the continent, many shortages exist in ammunition, signal equipment, 155mm howitzers, 6-inch howitzers, 5.5" guns and cargo trucks.

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I. UNITS

UNITED STATES ARMY

UNITS	ECHELON	STRENGTH-1APR61 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	STRENGTH-1 JAN 62 % WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	TRAINING DURING 1961	SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVE- NESS AS OF 1 JAN 62	REMARKS
<u>Major Headquarters</u>						
HQ 7th Army	M	106%	115%	7 days CPX 7 days FTX	Fully effective	War Authorized strength 982.
HQ V Corps	M	125%	123%	18 days CPX 16 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 262.
HQ VII Corps	M	114%	115%	10 days CPX 13 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 259.
<u>Major Combat Units</u>						
3rd Inf Div	M	104%	104%	21 days CPX 9 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 14,596.
8th Inf Div	M	106%	105%	25 days CPX 12 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 14,401.
24th Inf Div	M	104%	102%	11 days CPX 40 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 14,663.
3rd Armd Div	M	102%	102%	17 days CPX 8 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 14,548.
4th Armd Div	M	104%	102%	16 days CPX 30 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 14,578.
2nd Armd Cav Regt	M		100%	22 days CPX 28 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 2,799.
11th Armd Cav Regt	M		97%	8 days CPX 40 days FTX	Fully effective	War authorized strength 2,799.
14th Armd Cav Regt	M		98%	11 days CPX 17 days FTX	Highly effective (See Note)	War authorized strength 2,799.
3rd Armd Cav Regt	M	Located in the United States	Estimated at approx 100%			Arrived in Germany late in 1961; not assessed. War authorized strength 2,799.

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NOTE:

The reason given for this rating is a 30% deficit in radio operators. Corrective action has been initiated.

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UNITED STATES ARMY

II. In response to SACEUR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61 August 1961), the United States authorities took the following action:

a. Personnel

(1) Deployed approximately forty thousand (40,000) additional personnel to Europe. As a result, manning levels of major headquarters, major combat units and the majority of non-organic support units are at 100% or above of their war authorized strengths.

(2) Brought three (3) Army STRAC divisions to M-Day status in the US.

(3) Brought two (2) Marine Divisions/Air Wings (Strategic Reserve) to M-Day status in the US.

b. Organization

(1) Improved the mechanization of infantry divisions in Europe.

(2) Deployed the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment to Europe in the last quarter of CY 1961.

(3) Deployed to Europe additional non-organic combat and service support units from the US.

c. Logistics:

(1) Continued the re-equipment of combat units with M-60 tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers and M-14 rifles.

(2) Positioned equipment in Europe for two (2) Strategic Reserve divisions.

(3) Achieved a level of 90 days operational reserves for all classes of Supply in Europe.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT  
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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LUXEMBOURG

In response to SACEUR's Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61, August 1961), the Luxembourg authorities agreed to expedite the conversion of the existing 2nd echelon infantry battalion into a M-Day 105mm (towed) field artillery battalion.

On 9 February 1962 Luxembourg proposed measures to SHAPE to expedite the conversion. The proposal which was completely acceptable will result in the following when implemented:

- a. By June 1962 - 2nd echelon 105mm towed field artillery battalion.
- b. By 1 January 1963 - Unit will be raised to 1st Echelon status.
- c. By 1 July 1963 (or 1 November 1963 at the latest) - Unit will be raised to M-Day status, manned at 100% of war authorized strength.

PORTUGAL

In response to SACEUR Plan of Action - NATO Europe (SHAPE 167/61, August 1961), Portugal replied that no additional contributions could be made at this time.

SACEUR recognizes that Portugal has heavy national requirements for its armed forces at this time. It is hoped that Portugal will find it possible to proceed with the conversion of the 3rd Infantry Division (2nd Echelon) into a Brigade Group (M-Day).

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