

SCAP Event Standards Support to Computer Network Defense


SCAP Conference – October 2009

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An adversary's ability to impact






Adversary's ability to impact results from success in all three areas – shrinking any of the circles results in a reduced level of impact



An adversary's ability to impact






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Looking Ahead ... Looking Back


Waves of IT Industry Growth in the Information Age





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Toward a Resilient Cyber Ecosystem



Reactive & **Manual**

Security administrators follow rules and do their best to "put out fires"

Tools-Based

Tools and technologies are applied piecemeal to assist people in reacting faster

Interoperable

Loosely integrated tools exchange data to assist people with cyber situational awareness

Policy-Based

The enterprise instantiates security policy, illuminates events and helps the operators find, fix, and target for response

Enterprise optimizes service to user by to dynamically isolating and containing effects including in supply chain and underlying infrastructure



SCAP - Enabling NetOps through

- Strong and Flexible Configurations
 - FDCC
 - Best Practices
- IA Command and Control
 - Strong Situational Awareness
 - Rapid Reporting (machine-to-machine communication)
 - Automated Remediation
- GIG Measurements
 - Network Sensors, Log and node data
 - Enabling Situational Awareness
 - Compliance validations
 - Detection Signatures
 - Node integrity





Systems support Missions

Measurements need to result in data that feeds that support net management, CND, and mission execution.

GTI8175

LTU400

- Multiple levels of SA to support missions





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Drive strategies that give us the advantage!

A trusted environment "Reducing the living-space/time" **Dectection** monitoring and analysis Stay in **Impact** Act Get in **Reduce Attack Surface Control of Root Privileges**




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We don't know what we don't know

- Protection is preferred, Detection is a must!










Strategies to increase detection?

Needs development!

Data Strategy – enabling policy and strong configurations

Heavy focus on network Sensors – currently driving for improvement

- Communication
- Data Standards



Measurements and "triggers" for host and log/audit based detection will require much more emphasis


Enabling use of logs!

- Log and Audit data standards
- Secure log servers
- Triggers and indicators?
- Reporting and response





Resources - People vs. technology







System and Network Hygiene must be improved!

- An issue from the beginning of networked systems...
 - Policies, Directives, Security Guidelines if implemented would take care of 80% of the problem.









What clues exist within Event Data?

- Red Teams and audit logs?
- Logging is a requirement who is looking at them?
- How do we do log and audit records right? How long does it take right now?
- A Huge untapped source of CND Data!
 - We need common Taxonomy, Syntax,
 Transport and Recommendations and we need to start doing it right!





Shift in Strategic Focus

We need to get to the next level – standards and interoperability are key!

FROM	ТО
Protect Information	• Ensure Operational Success
Static Pre-Placed Defenses	Dynamic Network and Information Operations
Proprietary Point Solutions	Policy-Based Enterprise
People Intensive	• Integrated Services
 Fragile Information Technology 	• Resilient Cyber Ecosystem



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Questions?

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