Mission Based Analysis for Cyber Measurement and Mission Assurance

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Agenda

- NIAEC: Past and Present
- IA Best Practices Demonstration
- Beyond NIAEC: Cyber Measurement and Mission Assurance



History: What Is NIAEC?


NIAEC Mission: Provide a forum for engagement among those who develop and operationally deploy IA solutions to enhance national security by moving IA technologies into the hands of warfighters

- Insert IA technologies into operational scenarios and realistic system configurations
- Demonstrate the effects and impacts in a realistic OPSIT
- Educate operational users on the abilities and benefits of emerging IA solutions
- Educate IA researchers on operational needs and likely employment scenarios
- Facilitate technology transition from researchers to programs of record





NIAEC 1.0




FOCUS: Awareness

- Threat you are at risk
- Technology
 — there are ways to mitigate
- Operations how real-world employment should drive IA research



Mission Based Cyber Analysis









NIAEC 2.0: Expanding Focus to Meet the Challenge



FOCUS: Awareness

- Threat you are at risk
- Technology
 — there are ways to mitigate
- Operations how real-world employment should drive IA research

FOCUS: Survivability

- Fight through the battle
- What IA mitigations make a difference?
- What system changes could affect cyber survivability?




The Challenge

- How do we measure the effects of IA investment, system security, cyber activity to allow:
 - Investment decisions and trade offs
 - Assessment of performance
 - Operational soundness
 - Readiness/preparedness
- What makes any of these measurements meaningful?
 - MISSION MISSION-MISSION




Attacking That Challenge



Our Hypothesis:
Mission outcome can be affected,
determined, or measured via
operations on the information plane

- Develop the combination of methodologies and approaches that:
 - Represents mission success drivers in terms of information flows
 - That represents system operations in terms of information flows
 - That can be operated on so that changes in system state (via cyber activity) can drive mission outcome
 - That can be operated on so that changes in mission can be correlated to system vulnerabilities





MISSION ANALYSIS QUESTIONS

- How do we express mission consistently to open MRACT ANALYSIS QUESTIONS on it?
- How do we assign value to decomposition of mission MOEs?
- How do we account for mission variability and non-operate on information plane?
 cyber drivers?

SYSTEM ANALYSIS QUESTIONS


- How do we characterize system performance for the information plane?

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 How do we characterize system performance for opperational systems? As-spec'd systems? Projected system capabilities?
- How do we characterize attackers/attack vectors thow do we incorporate disparate cyber and nonnon-operate on information plane? cyber (network, physics-based) models for cyber
- What variations of IA controls or attacks must be permitted for different mission types?



The REAL Hard Problems



INTEGRATION SCALABILITY OPERABILITY



Looking Forward

- NIAEC continues to operate in its role of Education, Awareness, and Technology Understanding
- Tackling the cyber measurement and mission assurance challenges requires cooperative effort across community
 - Best of breed needs to be brought together
 - Expansion of model types and approaches
- NIAEC looking to connect with COIs and researchers to bring the mission capabilities to bear
 - Opportunities to 'mash up' our solutions on common scenarios
 - Align with NIAEC visitors and obtain feedback on operational needs

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