



Automating Attack Analysis Using Audit Data

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Introduction




- Audit logs are cumbersome and traditionally used after the fact for forensics analysis.
- Computer Network Defense (CND) situational awareness would be greatly improved if there was a way to automate audit log analysis in near real time.
- This presentation describes a task currently underway at NSA to address this perceived situational awareness gap through efficient analysis of audit log data.



Nonstandard Audit Log Formats are a Problem












- The overall objective of this task is to architect and execute a reference implementation system that will allow the analyst to *extract*, *aggregate*, *normalize*, and *pre-screen* audit data for attack signatures.
 - A Proof-of-Concept showed that we can deploy a generic tap on network platforms and that specific log data elements can be extracted, normalized to a draft Common Event Expression (CEE) format, and then be matched against pre-determined attack patterns in near real time.
 - Future signatures will enable further audit policy enhancements through focusing on collecting and analyzing only those data elements relevant for specific uses.



Proposed Module Multi-Platform Architecture








Program Phases









• Phase 1 (Proof of Concept)

- Research, collect and generate attack use cases.
 - Define the necessary data elements required, their location, and the sequence to validate the use case (the signature).
 - Initial research addressed attacks against Windows and Linux workstations, IIS and Apache Webservers, and CISCO Routers.
- Develop a means to automatically extract log and log-like data elements.





Use Case Template 1

USE CASE NAME - (Insert Uniquely Identifiable Meta-data)					
SCOPE					
Summary:	1-3 SENTENCES				
Importance:	Critical Essential Expected Desired Optional				
Priority:	Critical Essential Expected Desired Optional				
Use Frequency:	Always Often Sometimes Rarely Once				
Threat Actor					
Threat Activity					
Stakeholder	LE/CI/CNDSP/OTHER "achievable outcome"				
Alt Stakeholder	LE/CI/CNDSP/OTHER				
Responder Actors:	Enablers supporting stakeholder				
PRECONDITION (Prereq)	State what special and interesting standards or configurations must be true for this particular case to work				
Success - end condition	Primary stakeholder's goal is satisfied				
Event Trigger	1.				
Main Success Scenario:	 STEP principal actor does something STEP system response 				
Alternative "index" Scenario Extensions:	BRANCH CONDITION 1. ALTERNATIVE STEP 2. ALTERNATIVE STEP				
Special Requirements	2. desired quality or technological limitation				
Assumptions:	1.				
Variations	2. possible change in technology or data format				
Post-conditions	List the interesting things that are true after a scenario is completed.				
Notes and Questions	 NOTE: Open issues to research NOTE: QUESTION: QUESTION 				
Mitigation					



Detailed Use Case



eference Use Case #		#11724		
Audit Data Sequence	Audit Data I	ements	Operating System or Application Source	Platform
#1	2005-08-26 18:33:30 W3SVC68783193 SBS2003 192.168.2.2 GET /images/ - 80 - 192.168.2.1 HTTP/1.1 403 14 5 412 433		8783193 SBS2003 2.2 GET /images/ - 80 -	Web Server
#2	2005-08-26 18:33:30 W3SVC68783193 SBS2003 192.168.2.2 GET /images/a_secured_file.doc -80 - 192.168.2.1 HTTP/1.1 403 02 5 412 433		IIS	Web Server
#3	2005-08-26 18:33:30 W3SVC68783193 SBS2003 192.168.2.2 GET /images/a_secured_file.doc - 80 - 192.168.2.1 HTTP/1.1 401 03 5 412 433		IIS	Web Server
#4	Security ID: SBS2003\A_User_Account Account Name: A_User_Account Account Domain: W3SVC68783193 Logon ID: 0x1fd23 Object:		Windows 2008	Web Server





- 1. Can extract from a wide range of data sources and log like file types using a single deployed generic agent.
 - Arbitrarily-formatted logs/files.
 - File system entities
 - SQL databases.
 - Operating system utilities, APIs and external programs, including Windows event logs.
- 2. Flexible and readily configurable regular expression parsing of arbitrarily-formatted text extracted from files, processes, OS utilities, etc.
- 3. Configurable SQL extraction from SQL databases.
- 4. Configurable normalization of captured data through mapping to user-defined data elements.






- 5. Plug-in interface for data transformations and generation of derived data elements from one or more extracted elements.
 - e.g. white/black lists.
- 6. Plug-in interface for key-value lookup of related data from a cache, which can be maintained dynamically (i.e. not just a static lookup table).
- 7. Modular, integrated rule-based aggregator/correlator.
- 8. User-defined rules implemented by SQL database back-end.
 - Point-and-click rule builder.



Module Architecture









- Measures already implemented in Tap module
 - Deliberate audit settings.
 - Aggregating like events within limited time interval.
 - Address limited number of high priority scenarios.
 - Filter out events of low interest by signature, category.
 - Filter on event content.





- Measures to be implemented in Tap module
 - Screen single events based on combinations of attribute values (e.g. user <> acted-on user).
 - Stateful capability to detect event sequences within limited time window.
 - Apply thresholds e.g. report after accesses to > 3 different files of other user.
 - Plug-in interface for analysis modules.



Next Development Steps




- Phase II (Multi-Platform Proof of Concept)
 - Refine use cases for other platforms and for multiplatform use cases.
 - Deploy module on multiple network platforms and extract additional log data elements.
 - Investigate legacy or new Tier-3 data repository capabilities to accumulate extracted, parsed, and normalized audit log data.



Initial Proof-of-Concept Data Flow











- Phase III (System Integration)
 - Develop network operational use cases.
 - Develop and deploy extraction modules on additional platform types.
 - Develop an integrated storage architecture:
 - Develop data reduction and compression techniques.
 - Incorporate data provenance
 - Incorporate privilege management
 - Integrate into various architectures
 - Ensure CEE and EMAP acceptance by industry



Common Event Expression



- Common Event Expression (CEE): A Standard Log Language for Event Interoperability in IT Systems
 - Standardizes how computer/device events are described, logged, and exchanged.
 - Led by MITRE, numerous Government and vendor organizations are supporting the CEE working group to mature the CEE standard.
 - NSA is engaged with NIST to mature and validate the standard.



CEE Basic Components



CEE differs from other log standards in that it breaks the recording and exchanging of logs into four (4) components:

Event Taxonomy

• Specifies the type of event. A reduced language set or event listing can be used to ensure that all events of the same type are recorded in the same way.

Log Syntax


 How the event and its details are recorded. The syntax could be a binary encoded, XML, or other text-based specification, and allows the data to be unambiguously parsed from the logs. To maintain consistency and compatibility among the different syntaxes, CEE provides a data dictionary. The dictionary contains the unique syntax identifiers along with their meaning, format, and usage suggestions.

Log Transport

• The transport simply defines how the logs are transmitted.

Logging Recommendations

• A collection of logging best practices and log-related information. While not a standard itself, it is a complementary portion of CEE to ensure maximum utility.





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Sample CEE Data Dictionary




field name	*data typ	e* *Explanation*
actedon_user	string l	User name that is being acted upon.
action	string 7	The action as reported by the logging device.
app	string a	application layer protocole.g. HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, IMAP.
bytes_in	number H	How many bytes this device/interface took in.
bytes_out	number H	How many bytes this device/interface sent out.
category	string A	A category that a device may have assigned an event to.
channel	string 8	802.11 channel number of a wireless transmission
count	number 7	The number of times the event has been seen.
cve	string (CVE vulnerability reference.
database_name	string N	Name of a database.
database_table	string N	Name of a database table.
database_query	string (Query issued against a database.
delay	integer [Delay in seconds.



EMAP/OEEL








Enhanced AM Environment








Physical Components






Note: Multi-platform pattern matching performed at Security Information Manager (SIM/SIEM)



Approximate Schedule









Questions?

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Definitions



- Logs This includes audit logs, event logs, system logs, etc. that can be retrieved from routers, servers, web servers, firewalls, and workstations. Logs contain a history of events that have occurred on a device.
- **Normalization** The process where each log data field is converted to a particular data representation and categorized consistently. In our context, this is where event log data from dissimilar systems are converted into a common event exchange language.
- Aggregation The act of collecting data or logs. An aggregator can be on a specific host or device in order to collect logs or logs can be sent from multiple hosts and the aggregation can be done on a centralized location or SIM.
- **Data Reduction** Process where unneeded data elements/fields are removed from logs in order to reduce storage as well as minimize analytical overhead.
- **Compression** Storing a log file in a way that reduces the amount of storage space needed for the file without altering the meaning of its contents.
- **SIM** A Security Information Manager (also sometimes called a SEIM or SEM) is a centralized collection point where data is aggregated, normalized, compressed and stored.