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NSABB Statements and Recommendations |
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Full Recommendations of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Regarding its March 29-30, 2012 Meeting to Review Revised Manuscripts on Transmissibility of A/H5N1 Influenza Virus
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March 29-30, 2012 Meeting of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to Review Revised Manuscripts on Transmissibility of A/H5N1 Influenza Virus
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NSABB Reports |
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Enhancing Responsible Science - Considerations for the Development and Dissemination of Codes of Conduct for Dual Use Research
(February 2012)
This report was undertaken in response to the United States Government's request for advice on the development, utilization and promotion of codes of conduct for dual use research to interdisciplinary life scientists, and relevant professional groups. The Board's recommendations address strategies to develop a code of conduct, the importance of strong institutional support for such endeavor, considerations for the dissemination of a code of conduct, and the need to assess the effectiveness of a code of conduct overtime. The report also provides two tools for developing a code of conduct: a toolkit that includes concrete steps in developing and disseminating a code of conduct for dual use research and an educational module on dual use research that may be used either alone or in conjunction with the toolkit.
The tools are available in PDF format below, they are also available upon request in PPT format so that institutions can modify them to tailor them to their own educational purposes.
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A Code of Conduct Toolkit |
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Dual Use Research Educational Module |
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Guidance for Enhancing Personnel Reliability and Strengthening the Culture of Responsibility
(September 2011)
This report, which is a follow-up to the Board's May 2009 report on personnel reliability, was undertaken in response to the U.S. government's request for specific strategies and guidance on practices that promote a culture of responsibility with respect to biosecurity. The Board's recommendations address good management practices, the role of strong institutional and laboratory leadership and oversight, responsible hiring and employee management practices, and the need to assess that the effectiveness, potential impact, and unintended consequences of any measures being implemented. The report also discusses two potentially useful practices for enhancing personnel reliability and a culture of responsibility at the local level - video monitoring and the "two person rule" - that, while not recommended for broad implementation, should be considered by local institutions only after conducting an assessment of these practices' risks and impacts. The report also notes practices that the NSABB does not recommend for widespread implementation by institutions, particularly academic institutions.
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Strategies to Educate Amateur Biologists and Scientists in Non-life Science Disciplines About Dual Use Research in the
Life Sciences
(June 2011)
In addition to its standing charge to advise on strategies and tools to promote awareness of the dual use issue in the life sciences community generally, the U.S.
government charged the Board with developing recommendations for promoting awareness of the dual use issue among two non-traditional audiences for these efforts:
(1) scientists trained in non-life science fields who collaborate in the life sciences on such endeavors and synthetic biology, and (2) amateur biologists who
pursue life science research as an avocation and whose activities are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Toward that end, the NSABB has developed a report
that presents a series of observations about the special characteristics of these communities and pairs them with recommendations for specially tailored strategies
for awareness building.
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Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology
(April 2010)
The incredible promise of synthetic biology notwithstanding, the rapid pace with which the field is evolving and the diversity of its practitioners present some uncertainties and potential biosecurity risks. The Board recommends that synthetic biology research be subject to institutional review and oversight and notes that NSABB's proposed oversight framework for dual use life sciences research, which focuses on local level oversight, should adequately address much of this type of research.
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Enhancing Personnel Reliability Among Individuals with Access to Select Agents.
(May 2009) This report contains the recommendations of the NSABB regard strategies for enhancing personnel reliability among individuals with access to biological select agents and toxins.
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Strategic Plan for Outreach and Education on Dual Use Research Issues
(December 10, 2008) This report contains the recommendations of the NSABB regarding the development of a comprehensive program of outreach and education on issues related to dual use life sciences research.
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Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information.
(June 2007) This document contains the recommendations of the NSABB regarding the proposed framework for the oversight of dual use life sciences research.(Double-Sided Version)
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Responsible Communication of Life Sciences Research with Dual Use Potential
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Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to the Synthesis of Select Agents
(December 2006) This document contains the recommendations of the NSABB regarding the use of synthetic genomics to synthesize select agent nucleotides.
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Reports of the International Roundtables on Dual Use Life Sciences Research |
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November 2008 International Roundtable Report
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November 2008 International Roundtable Brief Summary
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October 2007 International Roundtable Summary
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October 2007 International Roundtable Executive Summary
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February 2007 International Roundtable Summary
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