


Ivan Kirillov March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2011

## Why Do We Need to Develop Standards for Malware?

#### Lots of products

#### **Multiple layers of protection**












#### There's an arms race



#### **Rise of New Threats** Background Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report, Volume XIII, 4/2008 500,000 450.000 400,000 150 000 300.000 160.004 100.000 150.00 100.000 Jul-Dec 2005 G 14 jar hjar jakart jak ja G 1 ⊂ X ⊕ ⊙ ∐ 1 1.1.1.1 1.5 . 1. 1 dament - 2 · 10 Nimda or (GME MÆC (CME UII DING SECURITY I-Worm or **Readme?** Feb 2005 **Oct 2005** Jan 2007 Feb 2007 **Dec 2009** Jun 2010 **Oct 2004 CME** Submission **CME** public **39 CME IDs DHS SwA Forum MAEC** public **Initial MAEC Initial CME** Server assigned **Malware WG** website Schema announcement and discussions at VB website Conference MÆC ME


## Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC)



- Language for sharing structured information about malware
  - Grammar (Schema)
  - Vocabulary (Enumerations)
  - Collection Format (Bundle)
- Focus on attributes and behaviors
- Enable correlation, integration, and automation


## **MAEC Use Cases**

Operational




#### Analysis


- Help Guide Analysis Process
- Standardized Tool Output
- Malware Repositories



#### **MAEC** Overview




### **MAEC Schema v 1.1 Overview**




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### **MAEC Schema v 1.1 Objects**



## **Common Cyber Observables Schema**



## **Community Engagement**




- IEEE ICSG Malware Working Group
  - Developed Malware Metadata exchange schema to facilitate the sharing of sample data between AV product vendors
    - Attributes for AV classifications, source (URIs), object properties (file hashes, registry keys), boolean properties (isKernel, isPolymorphic)
  - MAEC currently imports the IEEE ICSG Malware Metadata exchange schema
  - The MAEC team has been invited to join the WG and develop the next version of the schema
- Industry Collaborations
  - Working with Mandiant on MAEC <-> openIOC
  - Tool vendors supported our development of MAEC translators:
    - CWSandbox : GFI Software
    - ThreatExpert : Symantec
    - Anubis : International Secure Systems (Isec) Lab

## **MAEC Schema Roadmap**


#### **MAEC v 1.0**

- Analysis: Dynamic
- Operational: Detection (Host-based through OVAL)
- Schema Level: Host-based observables
- MAEC v 1.1 (current release)
  - Analysis: Static
  - Schema Level: Malware metadata
- Future Schemas
  - Additional attributes (Netflow, Layer 7 protocols)
  - In-Depth Analysis
    - Mid-level behaviors
  - Operational
    - Signature and Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) management
    - Mitigation and response support
  - Expressiveness (operators, constraints, relationships)

#### **Use Case: Host Based Detection**



#### **Real World Example: MAEC & Zeus**



\*http://anubis.iseclab.org/?action=result&task\_id=1167a57d1aa905e949df5d5478ab23bf9



## MAEC & OVAL today

Using OVAL in combination with MAEC can augment existing anti-malware capabilities

- Particularly useful for 0-day malware detection

- MAEC to OVAL script
  - Generates OVAL XML from MAEC XML documents
  - Allows for malware detection based on files & registry keys
  - Future support will add detection based on ports/IP addresses, processes, DNS cache, and services
  - Available on MAEC's Handshake group
    - Email the MAEC team at <u>maec@mitre.org</u> for access

## **MAEC Requested OVAL Capabilities I**

- Expand capability for malware detection by adding new tests
- Windows:mutex test
  - Object: <mutex\_object>
    - name (required) : The name of the mutex.
  - State: <mutex\_state>
    - name : The name of the mutex.
    - owner\_pid : The ID of the process which owns the mutex.

## **MAEC Requested OVAL Capabilities II**

#### Windows:file\_signature test

- Object: <file\_signature\_object>
  - filepath
  - path
  - filename
- State: <file\_signature\_state>
  - filepath
  - path
  - filename
  - signature\_exists: Whether a signature exists for the file or not.
  - signature\_verified: Whether the authenticode signature is verified or not.
  - certificate\_issuer: The issuer of the certificate used to sign the file.
  - certificate\_subject: To whom the certificate used to sign the file was issued to.

### **Requested Future OVAL Capabilities III**

Add test(s) for memory scanning (heaps, etc.) ?

- Use OVAL for malware forensics

# **Questions?**



#### References

- MAEC website: <u>http://maec.mitre.org</u>
- MAEC discussion list: <u>http://maec.mitre.org/community/discussionlist.html</u>
- Handshake Access: email <u>maec@mitre.org</u>