General Duane H. Cassidy

Commander in Chief
United States Transportation Command
and
Commander in Chief
Military Airlift Command

An Oral History

Air Force
Joint
and
Business Careers

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Preface

In September 1997, United States Transportation Command celebrated its 10th anniversary at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. The keynote speaker at the anniversary dinner for some 300 guests was retired Air Force General Duane H. Cassidy, the first "CINCTRANS," Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command. The most honored guests that evening were two dozen command plank owners,[*] including retired Navy Vice Admiral Al Herberger, retired Air Force Major General Jack Griffith, Air Force Major Generals Bobbie Floyd and Andy Pelak, Air Force Colonel John Wigginton, and retired Air Force Colonels Davie Hinton, Roy Baker, Bob Eason, Bob LaRue, Larry Culley, and myself. Surrounded by this august group, I could not help but feel fortunate to have been part of USTRANSCOM since its inception and to have served under such a remarkable leader, the one and only "Cecil B. DeCassidy." Like the famous director of *The Ten Commandments* and *The Greatest Show on Earth*, General Cassidy over the years showed us how to "think big."

Moved by the occasion, I decided to honor my former teammates and our leader by publishing this oral history which combines extensive interviews conducted by Roger Launius, General Cassidy's Military Airlift Command Historian, and by me, his USTRANSCOM Historian. The former interview, which covers General Cassidy's entire Air Force career, has not been distributed widely, while the latter has been out of print for several years. My assistant, Peg Nigra, and I have done extensive editing on both manuscripts, reorganized the narratives, and combined them as if the interviews were conducted simultaneously with the two command historians and their commander in chief sitting around a table, tape recorders running. Peg and I have maintained in this new publication the historical integrity of the two original oral histories. Part II is this combined Matthews/Launius interview with General Cassidy.

Throughout the year following the command's anniversary celebration, General Cassidy and I worked closely together in editing the manuscript. In the process, we decided to expand the project in two ways. First, General Cassidy wanted to place the entire interview in historical perspective, emphasizing why oral histories should be conducted, contemplated, and used. The result is the interview found in "Part I: Past is Prologue." Second, I wanted to update the document, stressing how General Cassidy's military career helped him succeed at CSX, and what he learned in the business world that should perhaps be applied to military operations and planning. In general, I sought to compare and contrast General Cassidy's military and business careers. That interview became "Part III: Epilogue."

[*]A plank owner is a member of the first crew to serve on a newly-commissioned ship; from the French tradition that such a crew member becomes part owner of the ship. (Source: *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*.)

Several themes tie the three parts together. First, General Cassidy believes that military life--training, education, planning, operations, and other experiences--prepare people for a successful career in business. The two careers, military and business, are, in his words, "a near perfect match." Second, General Cassidy is convinced that transportation, in the military and in the private sector, plays, and will continue to play, a central role in our nation's defense. Third, and perhaps most importantly, transportation is, and will remain, a crucial component of national security through its support and stimulation of US commerce, which, in turn, underpins American values and promotes democratic ideals.

The overarching theme of the oral history is, however, leadership. General Cassidy believes that the study of history is fundamental to leadership development. He also believes that leaders must focus their organizations on customers and strategic planning. Above all else, leaders must focus on their people. The higher that leaders progress in their organizations, the more time they must invest in hiring, placing, developing, compensating, and promoting employees. Leaders must not only understand their people, they must empathize with them. They must make their people feel good about their jobs and contributions to the organization. Leaders must never let their employees be satisfied with the status quo. Instead, they must motivate their people to excel by continually "raising the bar" on personal and professional standards, and by setting increasingly higher goals. Finally, senior people, in the military and in business, who do not put their people first, are managers not leaders, and military and business organizations that don't put their people first, fail.

Peg and I believe General Cassidy's oral history will be of great interest and use to government and business decision makers in general, and to defense transportation specialists in particular. It will also be an important primary source for academic and government historians. We hope it will inspire others as General Cassidy inspires us.

James K. Matthews
Director, Research Center
USTRANSCOM

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Part I: Past is Prologue[*]

An Historical Perspective

Introduction

Dr. Matthews: General Cassidy, just prior to your retirement from the Air Force in 1989, you told your command historians that you considered the study of history to be a crucial component to leadership and command [see pages 26-28]. It was also, you said, a motivator for achieving success and influencing the future. Do you still feel this way?

Gen Cassidy: I believe it more all the time. Leaders' accomplishments and influence on events are not really apparent until much later. For example, the true measure of my effectiveness as Commander in Chief of [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS)] wasn't a daily report card. That report card is a work in progress. A leader's true measure of merit is shown in history, not on a day-to-day ledger. By the way, two of my associates and friends--Ron Fogleman [Air Force General Ronald R., USCINCTRANS, and Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC), August 1992-October 1994] and Duncan McNabb [Air Force Brigadier General Duncan J., Commander, AMC/Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)]--are students of history and exceptional leaders.

Dr. Matthews: The Air Force and the Joint History programs are very big on oral histories, like the one we are doing now. I've done one with each of our CINCs [Commanders in Chief] at TRANSCOM. Why is it

[*]Interview conducted by Dr. James K. Matthews in June 1998.

important that command historians conduct oral histories with their commanders?

Gen Cassidy: You military historians are experts at making thoughts and deeds something fun, easy to read, and useful. More importantly, you are integrators, evaluators, and analyzers of past events. In many respects, you are both your commander's messenger and biographer. Frankly, I'm intimidated by the thought of sitting down and writing or editing a historical manuscript, but talking to you, my historian, is very natural and enjoyable. In a sense, you historians are like modern day pollsters. Pollsters today don't ask questions that require quick, one word or one-sentence responses. They take you to the second, third, and fourth level of questioning. That's what you historians do. You question what we say, and pull out of us thoughts and ideas that didn't seem to us to be particularly important at the moment. Then you complete the historical process by putting it all in perspective and in proper prose.

Dr. Matthews: Sometimes oral histories are the only summary of a commander's tour. Is that why you think incoming commanders should read their predecessors' histories, because they serve as their end-of-tour reports?

Gen Cassidy: Many turn out to be end-of-tour reports, but the term "end-of-tour report" does not do justice to an oral history. Oral histories are much more than that. They get at the interviewee's feelings and personal beliefs. It's an opportunity--in a very structured profession--for the one being interviewed to be accountable, not only to himself, but also to the people he has led and to the organization he has helped to build. He can now say, without

impunity, things that may not be said any other way. End-of-tour reports emphasize the literal; oral histories stress the cognitive.

Dr. Matthews: Why should young troops read these oral histories?

Gen Cassidy: It makes them think "in time," that is, reading history will give them perspective and balance to their lives and careers. History in general, and oral histories in particular, teach our young troops to be patient and how not to worry about who gets credit in the short-term. The study of history teaches them that organizational development is continual and results are often not known, understood, or recognized until long after the fact. Simply stated, "the past is prologue." And at risk of stating the obvious, by studying history, and reading these oral histories--provided they are candid, and that is in part the historian's job, to get candid responses--future leaders will learn from their commanders' mistakes.

I firmly believe you can learn from other people's mistakes as you can from their accomplishments. Likewise, you can learn as much from people you dislike as from those you like and admire. I remember many times thinking, "If I'm ever there, I'm sure not going to do it that way."

Dr. Matthews: In your CINCTRANS oral history, you stated that transportation was perhaps the most important element of national security. Has anything happened to change your opinion on that matter?

Gen Cassidy: No. However, we all recognize my bias on the subject. To say one thing is more important than another will create debate, but I will say it again just to create the debate. It's clear to me, more clear every day, that the greatness of our country is underpinned by its enormous mobility capacity: air, land, and sea in both our

private and government sectors. We are a trading nation; our commerce makes us great. Our unique, robust transportation system makes possible our commerce. Thus, without our transportation infrastructure, we would be nothing.

USTRANSCOM as a "Corporate Headquarters"

Dr. Matthews: In your oral history with me when you were CINCTRANS, you emphasized the need for TRANSCOM to remain a small, war planning, corporate headquarters-like organization, one that stayed out of the component commands' peacetime business [see pages 70, 76, and 85]. As you know, the command now has a peacetime mission and is the DOD [Department of Defense] single manager for transportation: air, land, and sea. We number 800 people, plus contractors. We are deeply involved in our component commands' peacetime business. Have you changed your mind on the issue?

Gen Cassidy: I really have not changed my mind on the issue. Let me clarify what I mean by "staying out of the components peacetime business." We should not be operating ships, planes, trucks, and trains from TRANSCOM. We will be in the peacetime business to some extent because we must act in peacetime as we will operate in wartime. And it was always envisioned that the role of TRANSCOM would expand and encompass more in the peacetime role. In fact, in my congressional testimony I emphasized that likelihood, especially as the command proved its worth. And that is exactly what has happened. The command's move into the peacetime mission started with H. T. Johnson [Air Force General Hansford T., USCINCTRANS, September 1989-August 1992]. He was the right guy at a unique time--following Desert Shield and

Desert Storm--to push the command forward. TRANSCOM must be intimately involved in peacetime as well as wartime operations. But that involvement must be as a corporate headquarters, not at the operating level of transportation systems. The command must always guard against becoming too centralized. Any new CINC coming into a corporate headquarters that numbers 800 ought to consider that that is too many people. Remember, Al Herberger [Navy Vice Admiral Albert J., USTRANSCOM's first Deputy Commander in Chief (DCINC), September 1987-February 1990] and I held the number at 350.

Dr. Matthews: Headquarters historically seem to get bloated.

Gen Cassidy: With a series of two-year CINCs, which is the case at TRANSCOM, CINCs don't have to be held accountable for permitting their headquarters to grow too large. They need to remember that every time they add a person to the headquarters, they deprive some field commander of one really good young transportation specialist, officer or enlisted. The command needs to have a process of auditing and scrubbing its manpower every two years. If you don't, then Congress will come after you someday, and you'll also lose your credibility.

Dr. Matthews: Over the last several years, the GAO [General Accounting Office] has been a major player in that process. At any given moment there are a dozen or more audits underway relating to TRANSCOM, the component commands, and the DTS [Defense Transportation System].

Gen Cassidy: Some of those are legitimate, others are not. You owe it to the men and women in the field to make sure you're not top heavy.

Fundamentally, everything you do at a headquarters should be in support of field activities.

Dr. Matthews: You talk frequently to General Kross [Air Force General Walter, USCINCTRANS, July 1996-August 1998], you come in here to TRANSCOM regularly, and you work with us in the NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association]. Is there anything you see us doing that maybe we shouldn't be doing?

Gen Cassidy: I'm worried about TRANSCOM working issues that are down in the weeds, like household goods movements. I'm not so sure that's what we created TRANSCOM to do. Certainly that's a transportation issue. Certainly that's a people issue. Certainly it's embroiled in politics. But every ounce of energy that the CINC and his staff uses reengineering the movement of household goods would perhaps be better used on…

Dr. Matthews: Something more obviously tied to readiness?

Gen Cassidy: Now, I don't mean to say he's wasting his time. He's not. In solving this problem, he's showing the leadership of TRANSCOM. And if he doesn't do it, who will?

Dr. Matthews: And that's how we got into it. I remember when Military Traffic Management Command [MTMC] briefed us on MTMC attempts to reengineer the movement of household goods and POVs [Privately Owned Vehicles] at a component commanders conference when General Fogleman was CINC. Basically, the briefer said, "This is what we've been trying to do. We've been trying to do this for years. The troops need this. They've been screwed around with much too much. We have to change the way we do it. But honestly, we can't do it. We don't have the clout to do it. If it's going to get done, we need a four-star to do it." When

TRANSCOM got its charter as single manager for defense transportation in peace, as well as war, it inherited the problem from MTMC.

Gen Cassidy: If TRANSCOM is doing more of what traditionally has been the component commands' work--and it must be if it has 800 people--than maybe there are jobs in the components that should no longer be done there. At some point in time, as TRANSCOM grows in manpower, TRANSCOM needs to ask "Is it still necessary to have three component commands? Have the components become an unnecessary layer?" There are far too many layers in the Department of Defense now. To really become efficient, DOD is going to have to do away with entire levels of activity. TRANSCOM must ask, "Is MTMC, MSC [Military Sealift Command], and AMC performing work that is now being performed at TRANSCOM?" And if the answer is yes, you ought to cut out one or more of them. If you don't, Congress will do it for you. You must maintain your credibility with Congress.

Dr. Matthews: Every new regime that comes through, every new CINC and DCINC, looks at consolidating in some way the TCCs [Transportation Component Commands]. It started on your watch with a guy named Derek [J.] Vander Schaaf [former DOD Deputy Inspector General]. The GAO regularly quotes his report* because

*Published in February 1988, the Vander Schaaf review recommended the elimination of the TCCs and the creation in their place of a massive joint operational transportation command.

it recommended merging the TCCs into TRANSCOM to form one huge UTC [unified transportation command].

Gen Cassidy: I remember Derek's report very well. And some of what it said made sense. But the timing was terrible. Why, we hardly had the command set up and he was trying to do away with the components. And we weren't going to let that happen. But that was eleven years ago. Times have changed. The world has changed, the threat has changed and, for the case in point, the budget has changed. Congress and the US taxpayers expect TRANSCOM to lead the DTS into the next century.

GTN and VISA: Origins and Evolution

Dr. Matthews: Do you also remember a day ten years ago when you assembled your senior staff in Building 1961's auditorium to see a computer demonstration by a contractor who employed some bright young kids from Harvard and MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]?

Gen Cassidy: Most certainly.

Dr. Matthews: That was the first time I heard the term "Global Transportation Network [GTN]." You put GTN at the top of your "to-do" list, second only to our dual priority of National Sealift Policy/C-17. Why?

Gen Cassidy: The need for such a system was obvious. We would never be able to make the DTS work in war--or peace--if we didn't have a well-developed GTN and some of its indispensable components, such as ITV [intransit visibility], which is only one part of GTN, albeit an indispensable part. We needed that network, and that

demonstration convinced us it was within our reach. Those bright young students were already doing what we were only dreaming of doing.

Dr. Matthews: How did you come up with the name?

Gen Cassidy: I recall some discussion about the name. We didn't want it to sound like some old Air Force or Navy term. We were looking for something neat, and simple, and easy to remember.

Dr. Matthews: You didn't want JDS [Joint Deployment System] II.

Gen Cassidy: [Laughter] No, nor "Son of JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System]," or anything like that. We felt "global" was more accurate than "international," and "transportation network" just kind of fit our need. The name caught on quickly, and it certainly wasn't disputed. GTN will transform the transportation business, but only history will prove me right or wrong.

Dr. Matthews: Does anyone in particular deserve special credit for instituting GTN?

Gen Cassidy: Rick Poff [Air Force Colonel Richard G.]. Rick was working for the MAC/DO [Military Airlift Command/Operations Directorate] on the GDSS [Global Decision Support System] project. After he got GDSS underway, we brought him over to TRANSCOM to lead the team that wrote the GTN architecture. And the term "GTN" came out of Rick's team.

Dr. Matthews: Does the system differ in any significant way today from what you envisioned it would become?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. We were taken in by those whiz kids, who said that we could very quickly build a whole new system and throw away current

systems that weren't working well or didn't do what we wanted them to do, systems that just gave us a bunch of data and no real information. We soon found out that was a pipe dream, and we probably couldn't afford it. Instead of throwing the old systems away, we just used them smartly. We brought them together with an extremely capable database management system that's able to reach in and discretely pull out data from those legacy systems, and that is the substance of GTN. So we haven't had to rebuild the world, we've just had to find out how to use what was already there, in many cases, and then that gives us a platform on which to build.

Dr. Matthews: Why do you think it's taken so long to get GTN operational?

Gen Cassidy: Leadership. There hasn't been enough push on it, enough belief in its need. That's not a knock against any CINCTRANS or anyone else. There are reasons for the neglect. The environment may not have been right for it. And of course, fighting a war in the Persian Gulf and, in its aftermath, expanding the command's mission to peacetime operations were the CINCTRANS' primary activities. But General Kross has taken a giant leap forward with GTN. The circumstances were perhaps the best ever for him and he for it. And he is certainly an authoritative spokesman for the need for the system because of his position as the TRANSCOM J3/J4 [Director of Operations and Logistics] during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. He also has a strong partner in DOD, Dr. Hamre [Deputy Secretary of Defense John J.]. GTN is certainly funded well. So the stars happen to be aligned right now. Also, by GTN being a little slow to develop, it gave us a chance in the private sector to better prepare for it. At first we in the business world really stumbled with it, and then fiddled with it for eight years. Finally, we have something working.

Dr. Matthews: Yes, we've used it for redeployment from Bosnia, in Exercise Bright Star,[*] and then again for Phoenix Scorpion[**] and Desert Thunder.[***] In each succeeding deployment, our ITV improves. Some in NDTA have been critical of TRANSCOM for taking so long to get on with ITV. Some of that criticism seems unfair because it compares us to businesses like Fed Ex [Federal Express Corporation]. There are some major differences between what a Fed Ex-like company does and what TRANSCOM does. Would you elaborate on that please?

Gen Cassidy: There are differences. Fed Ex has a closed-loop system that the company completely controls. It's a marvelous system and serves them superbly. GTN was envisioned to be much grander, to encompass a series of closed-loop systems. It is a system of systems, a network of networks. Technologically, GTN is much more complex than what is found in the business world. In Federal Express, Fred Smith [Frederick W., Chairman of the Board, President, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Fed Ex] could decide what he wanted, and do it. When you're talking about a network of networks, you have to somehow write the protocols that

[*]Initiated in 1981, Bright Star became a series of field training exercises held in Egypt during odd numbered years.

[**]Phoenix Scorpion was AMC's name for the augmentation of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in the fall of 1997. U.S. troops in the region were enforcing United Nations resolutions against Iraq..

[***]Desert Thunder was the Joint Staff name for the augmentation of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in early 1998. U.S. troops in the region were enforcing United Nations resolutions against Iraq.

make everyone behave together and that's why it goes back to leadership. It takes somebody pushing this thing hard, *somebody* with the status of a CINCTRANS.

Dr. Matthews: And until TRANSCOM had that peacetime single manager charter, to go along with that four-star clout, we couldn't keep the Services in line, get them to standardize systems they were using and developing, and make everyone in DOD speak the same language, so to speak.

Gen Cassidy: It's not so much a matter of keeping things in line as it is of setting priorities. When the CINC sets priorities, he is, in effect, keeping the players in line.

Dr. Matthews: There is another aspect to this, too, that I would like you to comment on. Fed Ex's mission is comparatively narrow to TRANSCOM's mission. They don't carry near the variety of stuff that we carry--tanks, hazardous material--nor do they carry it to the ends of the earth.

Gen Cassidy: True, their operations are different, but they are equally complex. When Fed Ex guarantees that it will have an item in your hands at ten o'clock tomorrow, by God it will. TRANSCOM will never attempt to meet that service-level commitment. Fed Ex also has to make a profit, to show a return on invested capital. It has Wall Street and the shareholders breathing down its neck, which forces it sometimes to make decisions that it would probably not otherwise make because they are short-term and shortsighted. Each side, DOD and business, has its own handicaps, problems, and needs. On the one hand, Fed Ex controls about 50 percent of its potential customer base, so it builds an ITV system to satisfy that need. On the other hand, TRANSCOM owns 100 percent of

DTS business by law, so it has to build a system that works for everybody. It's unfair to compare, but fun to compare. [Laughter]

Dr. Matthews: What are your concerns about TAV [Total Asset Visibility]?

Gen Cassidy: The big push for TAV in Washington coincided with the early successes of GTN, as Ron Fogleman handed it off to Skip Rutherford [Air Force General Robert L., USCINCTRANS, October 1994-July 1996], and Skip to Walt Kross. The notion of a total asset visibility is absolutely dead right on. But what tends to happen in Washington, and all bureaucracies, is that before the worker bees finish one task, the planners prematurely decide the initial task--in this case, GTN--is complete and then they take a huge jump forward to, in this case, TAV. My admonition to the CINCs and to their staffs is before you declare victory on GTN, you'd better field GTN, make it work right, make it robust, and make it serve the customers it is supposed to serve, inside and outside the government. GTN deals with transportation. That's our expertise and it is something we control. Total Asset Visibility gets into a plethora of areas we don't control, like production schedules…

Dr. Matthews: Depot to the fort in CONUS and forward movement intheater.

Gen Cassidy: Yes, TAV goes way out of the realm of transportation. We can get there eventually, but our entry, our ticket, and our invitation into TAV has to be a strong GTN. Then we can branch out. My point is, let's not declare victory on GTN and go to TAV too quickly.

Dr. Matthews: General Smith [Army Lieutenant General Hubert G., USTRANSCOM DCINC, September 1995-August 1997] expressed a similar concern in his oral history. He feared that the Services were going to march off and do their own thing without

regard to the centerpiece, the GTN piece, and then even develop a TAV system based on a European scenario without regard to what is needed in the other CINCs' AORs [areas of responsibility]. Eventually we would end up with TAV distribution processes and systems that differed by CINCdom instead of a joint system for all.

Gen Cassidy: Hugh's right on. He came at it from a different point of view, but I think that he would agree with me that before you go to step five, you'd better have completed steps 2, 3, and 4. Those steps will give us a full up and running GTN. We're a long way from doing GTN correctly. A long way.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think TAV is competing with GTN?

Gen Cassidy: I'm afraid TAV will suck off human resources as well as money. It's one of those big dreams like JOPES, WWMCCS [Worldwide Military Command and Control System], and other massive endeavors that we have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into, and the guys in the ALCE [Airlift Control Element], or the guys out in the remote airfield, the guys at the remote port, the civilian with a container, don't benefit from it. ITV will probably be a wondrous thing to have for the Pentagon staffs. My question is, "How will it help the air crew, the ship's captain, and others in the field?" And that's who we should be helping first.

Dr. Matthews: With the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, VISA, we will finally "make SRP [Sealift Readiness Program] more CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet]-like," a phrase coined by you and Admiral Herberger [see page 87]. Why has VISA been so long in coming?

Gen Cassidy: It's a major change for the industry, one that we expected to be a long game. The relationship between the shipping industry and the military was established by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.

That relationship was based primarily upon statute and law. The CRAF relationship was based upon contracts--some even unsigned--trust, commitment, and patriotism. So we had to shift an industry with relationships based in law and statute to one with relationships based on contracts. It's just such a huge change. And while we worked to facilitate this change, the industry itself continued to change. The second largest US flag carrier, APL [American Presidents Line], has been sold to a foreign firm that is controlled by a foreign government [Singapore]. The maritime business, particularly the container shipping business, is at a new low of profitability, and so there have been enormous machinations within the industry at the same time the industry was trying to change the way it related to the military. It was and is extremely difficult to keep focused on both of those spinning plates. We--TRANSCOM, DOT [Department of Transportation], labor, and industry--got together to duke it out, using the National Defense Transportation Association, the NDTA, as the ring. I'm very proud of having played a role in VISA as CINCTRANS and as a member of the NDTA. VISA is a great program. It will serve the country well.

Dr. Matthews: Admiral Herberger's experience seemed to compliment yours perfectly in making SRP more CRAF-like.

Gen Cassidy: Like hand in glove, but Al gets credit for setting the groundwork for VISA when he was DCINC, and then after he left the Navy he continued to help move it forward while working for Jim Allen's [Air Force General James R., Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC), June 1981-June 1983] IPAC.[*] As you know, Al met with his successors at TRANSCOM, Generals

[*]Admiral Herberger joined International Planning and Analysis Center (IPAC) and served as its Vice President for Maritime Affairs from 1990 to 1993.

Starling [Army Lieutenant General James D. "Dane," USTRANSCOM DCINC, June 1991-August 1993] and Wykle [Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R., USTRANSCOM DCINC, August 1993-August 1995] to advise them on VISA. Later, as Maritime Administrator, he was a central figure in VISA negotiations. There are many who have contributed, but none like Al Herberger. He should get the credit for VISA. It just simply wouldn't have happened without Al.

Dr. Matthews: The command's CINCs and DCINCs in the past have commented on the "strained," even "adversarial," relationship between DOD and the US flag shipping industry. In the last few years, since we started getting into VISA negotiations and discussions, have you seen an improvement in the way they feel towards each other?

Gen Cassidy: Absolutely and dramatically. TRANSCOM's changed it. Certainly MSC and the Navy would not have changed it. MSC even seemed to enjoy the adversarial relationship between the two parties. Although there was certainly some good healthy tension between the Air Force/AMC and the air industry--about rates and about who's getting what business--the relationship could not be categorized as adversarial.

Place in History

Dr. Matthews: With the passing of General Huyser [Air Force General Robert "Dutch" E., CINCMAC, July 1979-June 1981][*] last year, you became the senior statesman for air mobility. What responsibilities come with that mantle?

Gen Cassidy: I hadn't thought about that. [Laughter] Am I the senior statesman for air mobility? I don't know how you get voted into that role, but I guess I've been in the transportation business as long or longer than most anybody else.

Dr. Matthews: Think about how Huyser was the spokesman for the Airlift/Tanker Association and for air mobility. And with him gone, who are the young troops going to look up to? I mean, I can't think of anyone more qualified than you. You don't have to be modest about it. Because you're a former CINCMAC and CINCTRANS, and the fact that you're a former four-star, and you've been in the business most of your adult life, the role seems to fall to you.

Gen Cassidy: I have a responsibility to remain active in the business. I just can't retire and go off into Never Never Land. I know I must be responsive and willing to share my experiences and opinions on what's going on in transportation. And the eight years that I've had in the private sector have helped me formulate new opinions and strengthen some of the opinions I already had. But I don't think that this business of ours can necessarily rely on one spokesman. Dutch Huyser became a spokesman much because of his personality. He enjoyed that role, probably more than I would. It kept him involved and he was good at it. We all loved Dutch for what he did for us in that role. With Dutch's passing on, the role

of the spokesman goes to a lot of us, like Al Hansen [Air Force General Alfred G., Retired], Bob Patterson [Air Force Major General Robert B., Retired], Walt Kross. I'd like to see Ron Fogleman more involved in our business. Certainly I'm going to play a role. If it has to coalesce around me sometimes, that's fine. I'll be glad to be center stage when it is appropriate.

Dr. Matthews: In your CINCTRANS oral history, you emphasized the importance of several individuals to advancing your career and helping you formulate your leadership style and philosophy [see pages 23-24, 40, and 42]. Who would you consider to be your mentors?

Gen Cassidy: Mentorship is a term that slipped somewhere, somehow, sometime into the lexicon. It's kind of like the "sexual revolution"; I feel like it passed me by. While I was doing my business, the world was having a sexual revolution and, in hindsight, I would like to have been involved in it. But, somehow, I wasn't. Similarly, mentorship suddenly was here and accepted as a part of life. And again, I missed out, at least in the formal sense, as I think you mean it. There were no mentors for me. No one took me aside and taught me the ten commandments of airlift or leadership. I just watched people. Everyone I worked for and with I learned from.

Dr. Matthews: What is the relationship between mentorship and leadership?

Gen Cassidy: Mentorship is an inherent and fundamental part of leadership. I always felt that as a leader it was my role, maybe my most important role, to make sure that certain people with certain talents were given a chance to display their talents. And that the worst thing I could do was to try to find little Duane Cassidys to mentor or nurture. If you surround yourself with cronies and "yes men,"

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[*]General Huyser died on 22 September 1997.

you can't make objective decisions, which means you can't lead. I wanted to find the people who had something special to offer but for some reason were being rejected, under appreciated, or misunderstood. So, the role of the mentor is much the same as for the leader: to seek out people with potential and make sure they are in the jobs that can maximize that potential. Too many times we put the square peg in the round hole. Instead, we need to be building the Dutch Huysers, the P. K. Carltons [Air Force General Paul K. Carlton, CINCMAC, September 1972-March 1977], and the Walt Kross' of tomorrow, people who come into our lives with the right kind of background to do the job as presented to them at the moment. Is that mentoring? I think so. I know so.

Dr. Matthews: Did you mentor in the private sector?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, for awhile. I was assigned three people to mentor. I found that difficult because I didn't pick them, and they didn't pick me. And I didn't know what the hell I was supposed to do with them. Worse yet, when the company designates a mentor, it lets everyone else off the hook. They don't have to nurture. They can just say, "Well, that's Duane's job. He's Charles' mentor." The terms "mentor" and "mentorship" were coined by managers, not leaders. I think I was much better at mentoring at CSX* as I had done it in the Air Force, informally and naturally, as part and parcel of my leadership role.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think the Air Force is doing that today?

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*In November 1980, two of the nation's regional railroads--Chessie Systems, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio, and Seaboard Coast Line Industries, Inc., Jacksonville, Florida--merged to form CSX. They chose the letters "C" and "S" to represent their companies' lineages in the new union, and included the letter "X" to represent their various non-rail holdings. General Cassidy worked for CSX from October 1989 to January 1998. See his biography, pp. 147-149.

Gen Cassidy: I don't think they're doing enough of it. I don't think anybody is. The private sector and the Air Force--and the military, in general--I am sorry to say, are spending too much time on just trying to get through today. But the people I really admired--those who nurtured me or just set a good example for me--are the ones who conscientiously and tirelessly sought to build their organization around the right people. That's different than saying "helping people out." It's being able to grasp the true capabilities of lots of people to see how you can get them to work together. So, is the Air Force doing it right today? Record poor retention rates today lead me to conclude no.

Dr. Matthews: What more do you want to accomplish to ensure your place in history?

Gen Cassidy: [Laughter]

Dr. Matthews: That question comes from your oral history with me nine years ago. You mentioned then that you'd like to look back on your career and say "I've been a Bill Tunner-like* individual," or words to that effect.

Gen Cassidy: I just want to look back and feel proud that I've made a difference. I was very lucky. I had a supportive family and good health. I was given opportunities that a lot of people will never get. I feel an enormous amount of responsibility to make sure I don't throw it all away, that I have done something constructive with it. I especially want to feel I was part of "The Team," one in the historical succession of air mobility leaders, like Tunner, who helped build our air mobility profession and contributed to the greatness of our nation.

When we did that oral history--when I retired from the service--I felt good about what I had accomplished, but I thought maybe "that's all there is," as the old Peggy Lee song[*] goes. Fortunately, I found that in the private sector I could also make a difference using some of the same skills I learned in the military and also working in the same business, the transportation field. I'm also proud of what we've been able to do between the private sector and TRANSCOM, how I've been accepted by leaders on both sides of the fence as someone with ideas worth listening to. But, no, I'm not trying to be a Bill Tunner or a Dutch Huyser or a P. K. Carlton. What I want is to make sure that someday somebody will remember that I was fairly important to a business that is vitally important to our nation.

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[*]Lieutenant General William H. Tunner served as Commander, MATS, July 1958-May 1960. See footnote on page 27 for more information.

[*]"Is That All There Is," words and music by Jerry Leiber and Mike Stoller. It was a hit record for Peggy Lee in 1969.

Part II: Air Force and Joint Careers[*]

Introduction: On Leadership

Dr. Launius: You made your stars very quickly.

Gen Cassidy: I was promoted to brigadier general in 1980, major general in 1982, lieutenant general in 1983, and four-star in 1985. I received four stars in five years, but up until that time I had been right on time, an average guy. I had a relatively slow start because I was behind in education when I came into the Air Force, and because I was a navigator who went back to pilot training. So I'd been on a crew a long time, probably 15 years, and almost no one stays in the cockpit that long. In fact, I've been crew-qualified for almost my entire career. I've had a very different kind of a career path.

When I entered the senior ranks, I had a great wealth of background that I could draw upon to succeed. If you promote people real early to the senior ranks, you do them a disservice. You get them all the way up to colonel, where they're expected to make critical policy and operational decisions, but they have few life experiences to base decisions on. Decisions are not based necessarily on data. Most of the good decisions in life are based upon instinct and judgment. You can't get that out of a book. You have to experience life to do that. You must have been there. Clausewitz[**] said there is no substitute for fighting a war. He called military exercises poor and feeble substitutes for the real

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[*]Interviews conducted by Dr. James K. Matthews (USTRANSCOM) and Dr. Roger D. Launius (MAC) in September 1989.

[**]Karl Phillip Gottlieb von Clausewitz, 1780-1831, Prussian general. His *On War* is considered a classic study of military theory.

thing, fighting a war. It's the same for leadership development. There's no substitute for having been there at a variety of levels.

Dr. Launius: In addition to experience, what makes a leader?

Gen Cassidy: Leadership does not depend upon whether you can operate the equipment. You can be taught how to fly airplanes, operate tanks, or drive ships; you can't be taught how to be a leader. You have to get that for yourself. You have to want to be a leader. You have to want to have the responsibility of leadership. You have to be willing to give of your time and share your family. You have to be willing to make a commitment to somebody other than yourself.

As an aide, I watched the senior members of the Air Force from the anteroom. I used to peek through the keyhole, so to speak, and I used to sneak into projection rooms. I would listen to them and watch them, and I really made a study of it. Not a study like you historians would make, but a study in my head about what to do and also what not to do. I sat down and tried to figure out what was common to those guys, a P. K. Carlton, a Jack Catton, a Curt LeMay. I asked myself what made Jack Ryan, William McBride, and George Brown[*] such terrific leaders? Being in the presence of all that brass as a junior officer offered me an incredible opportunity for character study.

Dr. Launius: What did you discover?

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[*]Air Force General Paul K. Carlton, Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC), September 1972-March 1977; Air Force General Jack A. Catton, CINCMAC, August 1969-September 1972; Air Force General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, June 1961-February 1965; Air Force General John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, August 1969-July 1973; Air Force General William V. McBride, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, September 1975-March 1978; Air Force General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1974-June 1978.

Gen Cassidy: I identified two common traits. First, all of the guys, no matter how mean or cantankerous, were selfless. Second, they all had an incredible amount of energy. So, to be a great leader, you have to put your men, unit, organization, service, and nation above yourself; you have to take care of yourself; you have to prepare yourself for the long haul. You have to pace yourself so you will be able to call upon a reserve of energy when you need it. Those are two characteristics--selflessness and high energy--those leaders had in common.

In regard to leadership, there are a couple more important lessons I've learned: don't try to be something you are not. If you're an intellectual, don't try to be a good old farm boy from Louisiana. It's not going to work. If you're a good old farm boy from Louisiana and you've been successful, then don't try to be an intellectual. If you manage to get a degree in geography like me, don't try to be an historian or an electrical engineer. You're going to come off poorly. People you lead will see through you [snap of fingers] "just like that." Which is the long way of saying, "Don't be a phoney." You have to be who you are.

Then you have to make sure you put excitement in whatever you're doing. Leaders need to excite people or people won't follow. A leader can't be boring and dull. Therefore, you have to use everything in your kit to motivate your people: use your influence, your organization and command, your job assignments, your people's talents. And you have to be out front in every activity.

Dr. Launius: But a leader must build consensus.

Gen Cassidy: That's why we reformed the MAC [Military Airlift Command] Council when I became CINCMAC [Commander in Chief, MAC]. The Council had tended to wane during the years before I arrived. We had had one-man rule from on top for too long. I wanted the Council to function as a corporate policy board. I made the Vice Commander and the Directors a part of it. If I saw in the minutes that an assistant DCS [Deputy Chief of Staff] was in attendance, I'd send the minutes back to his director and say "I want to know what you, the principal, think about this." I'd force each one of the senior members of my staff to take a part in every decision process of major importance. Therefore, it's not a Duane Cassidy decision process. It's a MAC decision process.

Dr. Matthews: Why the Round Table at [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command]?

Gen Cassidy: It represented the joint decision-making process and it stimulated open discussion among our various service flags. [US]CINCTRANS [Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM] wasn't sitting at the head of the table with his three-star deputy necessarily on his immediate right and his two-star Operations and Logistics deputy necessarily on his left. We--TRANSCOM's general officers, the corporate headquarters' senior leadership--sat in a circle as equals in the decision-making process. Together, we set the command on a joint course.

Dr. Launius: Why did you pick a non-airlifter as your Vice at MAC?

Gen Cassidy: Because I was afraid that I might go off in some directions that were parochial and personal. I thought, maybe, because I knew everybody on the MAC staff, they'd all do what I asked just because it was me. I didn't want that to happen. I wanted

somebody to say, "Why are you doing this? Does this make sense? Is it legitimate? Is it using the forces correctly? Is it the right direction to go?" Lieutenant General Sam Armstrong [Air Force Lieutenant General Spence "Sam" M., Vice Commander, MAC, September 1985-July 1987] did that very, very well.

Dr. Launius: Are the lessons of history in your leadership kit bag?

Gen Cassidy: A commander can't command without having a knowledge of history because history provides the foundation for the future. Our history programs at TRANSCOM and MAC are not "history for history's sake." They are for the commander to do his job better. Our history programs are the commander's tools.

Dr. Matthews: Over your career you have been a great supporter of historians in the Air Force, and now in the unified command structure. You have also been personal friends with a number of them, like Dick Kohn [Dr. Richard H., former Chief of Air Force History] and Clay Snedeker [Clayton H., former 21st Air Force Historian]. How have historians and the study of history helped you in your career?

Gen Cassidy: I have no more original thought than the next guy. I am not terribly cerebral. There are a lot of people who have a lot more intelligence than I do. I am not putting myself down. I'm just trying to assess myself. So my successes have come from having good instincts and a keen eye for knowing where to get good information and good advice to make up for my own weaknesses. Go to the history books. It is there.

There is very little we do that hasn't been done before in some sense, as Dick Kohn showed me through his comparison of the American Revolution with the Vietnam War. He showed me how

the thought patterns and processes, the utterances were almost identical in those two wars. The two greatest powers in the world in those moments in time, Britain and the United States, didn't really lose, they just went home. They lost the will to finish what they had started. Leaders need to study history and seek out historians who are as excited about history as you two are, to learn how history lessons can be applied. So I've drawn extensively upon the lessons of history and my historians.

History is very exciting and a great motivator. History is a motivator personally because, in an arrogant way, I want to go down in history like the Bill Tunners[*] of the world, those kind of people. I want to be known as somebody who did something really important like them.

Also, history provides people with a reason for being. It provides legitimacy. It provides a powerful pride and positiveness deep inside you. History provides that because in our business we create history. Perhaps most importantly, studying history can help a leader prepare for the future. The past provides you an atmosphere of clear thought so you can then attempt to influence the future. That is all we are trying to do as leaders, influence events.

Dr. Matthews: A leader must also be a visionary, then?

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[*]In 1944 Brigadier General William H. Tunner commanded the India-China Division of the Air Transport Command, which supplied China by air across the Himalayas. After World War II he commanded the Berlin Airlift, the massive relief operation that, from June 1948 to September 1949, airlifted over 2.3 million tons of coal, food, and miscellaneous supplies into the beleaguered city of West Berlin, to break the Soviet blockade of the city. During the Korean War, as commander of the Combat Cargo Command, Far East Air Forces, Major General Tunner directed the airlift for the initial Inchon invasion, subsequent paratroop operations, and the advance of the 8th Army to the Yalu River. He served as Commander, Military Air Transport Service (MATS) from July 1958 to May 1960, when he retired from the Air Force as a three-star.

Gen Cassidy: Most certainly, and history should be the basis of a leader's vision of the future.

Dr. Matthews: What I want you to do now is look off into the future. Thinking really big, what is TRANSCOM's greatest potential? What are the greatest contributions the command can make to the nation?

Gen Cassidy: TRANSCOM can help the nation maintain its preeminence by being a catalyst to the transportation industry, which has more to do with our being the world's largest trading nation than any other industry. It does this in two ways. First of all, it provides transportation--it has to do that. But it also provides the capitalization for expanding business. It does so by reducing inventories. Therefore, TRANSCOM, by reducing government inventories and costs, can serve as an example for doing the same thing nation-wide.

Dr. Matthews: What role will ITV [intransit visibility] play?

Gen Cassidy: Let's take, for an example, General Motors' [GM's] nine billion-dollar inventory. If, through perfect transportation--"just on time" delivery, origin-to-destination tracking--we could do away with two-thirds of that inventory, GM can take all that inventory capital, which is tied up, and invest it in other industries. Now we--TRANSCOM, the military--can set an example for industry.

Dr. Matthews: No more huge new car lots?

Gen Cassidy: When you go to buy your new Cadillac, there won't be a lot with 100 cars. There won't be huge inventories. Instead you will go into your study and turn on some soothing music. You will have a set of audiovisual systems to construct in computer graphics the car the way you want it. You will dicker on the price via your

home computer, and then you will punch a button and your order will go by satellite to the factory. It will be placed in queue and then transmitted to the robotics that build the car and squirt it out the next day. It will then be put on the most efficient and effective transportation mode while you arrange financing. The next day, you can pick up your custom-made car.

Dr. Matthews: That's a wild idea, but can you apply these principles to all of industry?

Gen Cassidy: Buying wine in Italy, diamonds in Israel. You can ship bubble gum to the right places. You can move cattle around. You control an inventory in motion thus doing away with the enormous standing inventories that eat up capital. It works out because of ITV and "just in time" technology. The infrastructure for this is beginning to show: Federal Express, Consolidated Freightways, and Japanese building cars in Tennessee. It's out there. Now somebody, like TRANSCOM, must get all of that together and give it a shove. It will be the new industrial revolution by some other name. TRANSCOM can play an enormous part in the nation's future if the command's people care and think big.

Dr. Matthews: What advice do you have for TRANSCOM's future leaders?

Gen Cassidy: Continue to set a solid foundation for the command. I predict the command will, in the years to come, be asked to do more for the nation than anyone at the time of its creation imagined. TRANSCOM will perform its mission so superbly that the nation will ask it to take on increasingly greater responsibilities, including many of which its component commands and the Services now perform in peacetime. For example, the TRANSCOM will be asked to increase its control over transportation funding for both

modernization and operations to guarantee that limited monies are spent efficiently. Perhaps my greatest fear for the command is that those who follow me, under intense pressure from above, will take on too much, too fast.

Early Air Force Career

Enlistment and Training

Dr. Launius: Sir, let's begin this section of the interview by discussing how you first became interested in aviation and the Air Force.

Gen Cassidy: Unlike some kids who grew up wanting to fly airplanes, I never considered that even a remote possibility. I didn't have those dreams. I lived in a little steel mill town, Coraopolis [Pennsylvania], along the Ohio River. My parents, who had a farming background, didn't have much money because they were hit hard by the Depression.

In high school I was an average student--that may be stretching the statement a little bit--with no real desire to go to college and no wherewithal to go even if I had wanted to. But in my senior year I began working in the steel mill, and the experience taught me I could do anything I set my mind to. It also taught me that I didn't want to work in a steel mill the rest of my life.

One day, a friend of mine told me he was going to take the test for the Air Force Aviation Cadet Program. Seeing this as an opportunity to leave the mill, I went along with him, took the test, and passed. That didn't mean I wasn't excited and curious about the Air Force. It just indicates that I didn't have a real early commitment to it.

At the time--during the early 1950s, after the Korean War--the Air Force wanted what it called "aerial observers." So I took the test for the career field and passed it. I thought at the time I was probably going to pilot training, but I didn't know for sure and I didn't really care. Many kids today will not join up unless they get a specific assignment, a specific place, a specific time. I just wanted out of the mill.

The Air Force sent me to Harlingen, Texas, for Basic Observer Navigator Training, an Aviation Cadet Program that lasted through the early 1960s, and then was scrapped in lieu of taking only college graduates as rated officers. It was rigorous: parades, walking tours, demerits, making beds, polishing floors. I never became homesick and I enjoyed the discipline. I came from a family that was fairly well disciplined; they had to be to survive.

Air Weather Service and Air Rescue Service

My first assignment was to the Air Weather Service in 1954, which turned out to be a mismatched assignment, because they needed pilots not navigators, and at that time I was a navigator. So I soon went on to the Air Rescue Service* [ARS]. My point is that in the first year out of training, I had assignments to two Military Air Transport Service [MATS, precursor to MAC] organizations. I was promoted to first lieutenant in Air Rescue. In those days, that was a big promotion. It usually took a lot longer than it does now.

Air Rescue Service was exciting. It set the scene of adventure in the Air Force for me. Those units were very small--four crews, four fixed-wing airplanes, two helicopters--and we did our training

with amphibious airplanes in the lakes of Michigan and Vermont, in some really beautiful areas. We also took part in resupply missions for the DEW [Distant Early Warning] Line, because we had the capability to land on ice and snow. So, at a very young age, I was flying into remote areas in some relatively unsophisticated airplanes: we virtually had no communications equipment more advanced than a radio, a compass, and a sextant. We were up in the northern latitudes where the variations in magnetic fields were much different from what we were used to in the United States, so I really had to learn to navigate. I'm not sure that I was terribly good at navigating. As a matter of fact, I probably would evaluate myself as being mediocre. I guess I always felt if I got pretty close, it was good enough. If an individual is a top-notch navigator, he will always be striving to get right on the money every time, and that's the way our MAC navigators operate today.

One of the high points of my early career, in MATS' ARS, came in 1956 when, as a second lieutenant,[*] I began supporting Operation Redwing, the hydrogen weapons test program. That experience offered me a whole new horizon, so to speak. I flew across the [Pacific] ocean in a little twin-engine prop airplane[**] that wasn't built to go overseas. My first flight to Hawaii was almost 13 hours

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[*]Air Rescue Service was established on 13 March 1946, redesignated Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service on 8 January 1966, and then again redesignated Air Rescue Service on 1 August 1989.

[*]2d Lieutenant Cassidy was assigned to the 49th Air Rescue Squadron (ARSq), Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan. Designated and organized on 12 October 1955, the Search and Rescue Element (Provisional) was composed mainly of personnel and aircraft of the 49th and 76th ARSqs and put under the operational control of Air Task Group 7.4, Test Service Unit. Assigned to provide search and rescue coverage for the atomic weapons test and logistic support for four weather stations, the unit became partially operational at Eniwetok Island on 6 March 1956, and flew its first intercept mission three days later.

[**]Grumman's SA-16, the *Albatross*.

long, very noisy, very tiring. The two engines just droned on for hours, and the noise made everyone irritable. From there, we went to Wake Island, to Midway, island-hopping out to Eniwetok in the central Pacific, where we spent eight months. We flew virtually every day, providing rescue for an array of test airplanes that flew out of Eniwetok. We also did air sampling through the clouds.

There were really two types of airplanes out there, sampling airplanes and test effects airplanes. The sampling airplanes literally did sampling of the clouds. Tests required an array of airplanes to fly around the clouds to see what effect the clouds would have on them. For the first time I got to see lots of different kinds of airplanes--B-47, B-52, B-36, F-84, B-57, B-66, B-29, B-50--all of which were part of the effects testing. We didn't have the modeling capability or the understanding of electronics that we have today. Nobody really knew what would happen when a hydrogen weapon was detonated. So I participated in the first test of air-dropped hydrogen weapons. We actually did a couple of rescues, too. Saving lives was very self-satisfying.

We also did some island and atoll resupply in the South Pacific. We took out fresh vegetables and fish, and rotated people in and out of weather stations and radar detection sites, often landing on lagoons. I can remember the island names to this day: Pohnpei, Tarawa, and Truk. Kapingamarangi was the most southern one, just below the equator. There were no navigation aids. Sometimes we would just go to a point and set up an expanding square search until we found the island. If we ran out of gas, we would land on the water and call home for more fuel. Anyhow, I did that for eight months and came back to the states when they deactivated the unit.

Hungarian Crisis

I went then into flying MATS C-121s, "Connies," out of Charleston, Air Force Base [(AFB), South Carolina]. That was in the late l950s, when we had a series of crises--Suez Canal[*] and Berlin[**] were the two most notable ones. But the Hungarian crisis[***] is the one I remember the most vividly. Once again, we were helping people. I flew over 250 hours in a month, for two months. Now, if a crew member has 330 hours over a three-month period, we make him quit flying. I put in 500 hours in a couple of months. I just lived in an airplane.

The standard route was to fly from Charleston to Frankfurt [Germany], then crew rest. Then we would go to Munich [Germany] to pick up Hungarian refugees, fly to McGuire [AFB, New Jersey], then back to Munich, back to McGuire, back to Frankfurt. We had augmented crews, but we'd often fly continuously for 24, 26, 30 hours. Then we'd get 12 to 18 hours on the ground and start the cycle over.

We really worked hard, but it was fascinating because we saw whole families come in--three and four generations--who had left their homeland to come to the United States. They couldn't speak

[*] In July 1956, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in retaliation for the withdrawal of US funding for the Aswan Dam project. British, French, and Israeli forces invaded Egypt in an effort to retake the canal.

[**] In November 1958, the Soviets again threatened to restrict access into West Berlin.

[***] In November 1956, Soviet tanks crushed the briefly successful Hungarian Revolt in Budapest. Between December 1956 and June 1957, MATS transported over 10,000 Hungarian refugees. Commercial carriers under government contract transported an additional 4,170 refugees.

the language. They left virtually all their worldly possessions behind. I thought, "Why would anybody want to leave their homeland and come to the United States?" Now that I'm older, of course, I understand why. To this day, when I fly back to the US and see our coastline appear on the radar, I have this terrific feeling of joy and peace. The Hungarian operation had a great effect on me, as hokey as that sounds. It made me realize what an important role even a kid from western Pennsylvania could play in world events.

Air Crew Command and Service in Vietnam

Dr. Launius: How did you move from navigator to pilot?

Gen Cassidy: I did not like being a navigator. I guess I was coming out of my shell and I began to realize that there was nothing I couldn't do if I set my mind to it. I also realized that I would never be satisfied with being the number two guy. Our DP [Director of Personnel] at Charleston at that time was Les Kearney [Air Force Major Lester T., Jr.]. He retired as a two-star. I was the assistant to the wing adjutant. Les came into our office one day and said, "Here, sign this piece of paper." I said, "What is it?" He told me it was an application for a regular commission. Most of the Air Force at that time was made up of reserve officers, unlike today where most are regulars. I said, "I don't think I'm going to stay in. I want to do something else." He said, "I don't care what you want to do, just sign the paper. I have a quota to meet and I need your name on that thing, so sign the paper." So I signed the paper, and I was selected for a regular commission and accepted for pilot training. After a year in pilot training, I volunteered for SAC [Strategic Air Command]. Everybody thought I'd lost my mind, because nobody

wanted to go to SAC in those days. All they did was pull alert. But SAC was the toughest, most demanding part of the Air Force.

Dr. Launius: Those were the LeMay years, weren't they?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, General LeMay [Air Force General Curtis E., Commander in Chief, SAC, October 1948-June 1957] ran SAC and built it into the premier Air Force command. As a matter of fact, in those days when we came out of pilot training, class ranking order determined who got preferences. Typically, the top 50 percent of the class went anywhere but SAC, and the lower 50 percent of the class always had to take SAC. So SAC didn't necessarily get the best students, the best performers.

But I selected SAC. At the time I was out at a pilot training base, a single-engine base. The wing commander called me in and had a little session with me. He told me I was nuts. But I had made up my mind by then, and I wanted to go to McCoy [AFB, Florida], near Orlando. Geography played a role in my decision, but mostly I thought I could really do better career-wise if I was in an airplane that needed a navigator/bombardier.

I wound up with the same crew for almost four years, the same two guys. One of them was an old-time pilot; he could fly anything, upside down, right side up. He was not enthused with SAC and hated paperwork. He'd let me do it all. He was very satisfied to just steer the airplane around the sky and do what we told him. The navigator and I became pretty good friends and made a pretty good team. We divided up the labor. I would do almost all of the navigating for the crew, and he'd do the bombing. Then he could focus all his attention on doing the bombing, and I'd do the

navigating from the back seat of the B-47. And the aircraft commander, the old aviator, did what he was told.

Eventually--after two tours at McCoy and two at Little Rock [AFB, Arkansas]--I got to the point where I was stuck in the back seat. By this time B-52s were coming into the inventory and B-47s were going out. As a result, B-47 guys were a dime a dozen. A guy who wanted to upgrade had to compete with all of these old aircraft commanders. Finally, I went to the wing commander and said, "You're doing serious harm to my career if you don't let me have a crew." He said, "That's fair enough, I'll give you a check ride." A check ride on a B-47 was three rides in a row, one four-hour mission and two eight-hour missions with a check pilot. If I passed, I could have a crew, and if I didn't pass, he told me I'd never get a crew as long as I was in the Air Force. The pressure was really on. His name was Lee Hogan [Air Force Colonel Henry L. III]. I got a crew.

Dr. Launius: This was at Little Rock?

Gen Cassidy: The first time I was an aircraft commander and signed the form 175 flight plan was at Little Rock. I'll never forget the day. I was finally the boss. I still have that form.

Dr. Launius: You had been in the Air Force for about ten years by then, right?

Gen Cassidy: That's exactly right. I remember my copilot was a guy by the name of Bobby Demkovitch. I picked him because he was a good golfer. My navigator was a real character. His name was Leon Napoleon Hamilton III. He was a good bombardier, but not a very good navigator. I didn't worry about that because I could do all the navigating. Bobby Demkovitch, in the back seat, would fly while I used a hand-held sextant and took sightings in the front.

I'd do all the computations. I'd do all the navigating, and let Leon find the target. And he was good at bombing. We did very well.

Tours at Lincoln, Nebraska, and Minot, North Dakota, followed. My family and I arrived at Minot [AFB] on Thanksgiving Day 1965 and stayed for two years. While we were there I was the aide and executive officer to the former wing commander who checked me out in the B-47: Lee Hogan, now a brigadier general. He was a very fine gentleman, a good guy. He had been an aide to General Maxwell Taylor* in his younger years, a West Pointer, Class of '44. We stayed there for two years, and I learned how to fly the B-52 and some of the fighters; there was a fighter outfit there. I got in a lot of good flying.

Dr. Launius: The war was heating up then in Southeast Asia.

Gen Cassidy: In 1967 I volunteered for Vietnam, which took a waiver because they weren't sending any SAC crew members to Vietnam. General Hogan was willing to give me three months of leave en route to Vietnam. While on leave I finished up my bachelor's degree at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. I could do that because I had enough leave stored up, and because I already had credits from the University of Nebraska when I was at Lincoln.

I got my degree just before I went to Vietnam in 1968. I was a forward air controller for a short while, and then went into

*As a major general in the Army, Maxwell D. Taylor parachuted with his men into Normandy on 6 June 1944, becoming the first American general to fight in France in World War II. He received his fourth star in 1954 and was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955. General Taylor retired from the Army the first time in 1959; however, President John F. Kennedy recalled him to active duty in April 1961. General Taylor was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1962 to June 1964, when he resigned that post to become ambassador to South Vietnam until mid-1965. General Taylor was the chief architect of the "flexible response" doctrine that still dominates American strategy. He died in 1987 at the age of 85.

headquarters. After that I became the air briefer to the press corps in Saigon working for MACV [Military Assistance Command Vietnam]. That was really interesting. We briefed General Abrams [Army General Creighton W., Jr.] every day and I got to meet a lot of other senior people like Generals Brown and Momyer [Air Force General William W.]. I went out in the field with senior news people including Dan Rather and Wayne Sergent.

Dr. Launius: That must have been a tough assignment.

Gen Cassidy: It was very difficult; we'd brief every day, the "five o'clock follies" they called it. We briefed in three languages. We really had to know what was going on. We learned a lot about the press corps and came to respect the media--that doesn't mean that I liked them--but I understood what their jobs were, and I got to appreciate the differences between the various media. The wire services, the periodicals, and TV all had different goals and deadlines. If you knew what they were after, you could fulfill their needs, which was our responsibility. At the same time, you could protect classified information. When I got home a year later, I was assigned to MAC headquarters.

Return to MAC

Dr. Launius: Had you missed MAC?

Gen Cassidy: Very much so. I looked on MAC as a very favorable assignment compared to SAC. SAC guys spent so much time sitting alert, and SAC always trained to do something that they hoped they'd never do. MAC guys were doing what they were trained to do all the time. I wanted to be a part of that, and so I worked very hard through some friends to get an assignment back here.

It's like MATS gave me a lobotomy. I was hooked since my hydrogen weapons test days. I felt in MATS like I was always part of what was important to the nation and world.

At Headquarters MAC I was hired by General Faught [Air Force Major General Courtney L.], whom I had met when I was a navigator at Charleston. I was his executive officer [XO]. I was also XO for Generals McBride and Jim Hill [Air Force Brigadier General James A.]. Then I went to work for General Catton, the MAC commander, as his executive aide. I didn't want to be an aide again, but I couldn't pass up a chance to work with this incredible man. He was a great general, a great speaker, a great communicator, a great leader, a great aviator. To me, he was Steve Canyon.* He taught me a lot about the Air Force general officer corps, about rubbing shoulders with the gentry, and how to act in their presence. He took me everywhere with him. We flew a lot, just he and I. We'd jump into an airplane, fly to Washington [D.C.], park the airplane, and race all over the city. I spent a couple of years with him.

Then the MAC Director of Personnel, Ollie Lewis [Air Force Brigadier General Oliver W.], told General Catton that I needed to get the heck out of the headquarters and go be a squadron commander somewhere. So General Catton put me in as a squadron commander of C-141s, and that move was objected to by most of the MAC staff because I had never flown a C-141. In fact, as a pilot, I had never flown a MAC airplane other than the T-39. But it was just airplanes and people, regardless of the command and the type of airplane. That's why you don't necessarily require

*Famed aviator and adventurer from the comics. Created in 1947 and drawn by Milton A. Caniff.

a certain number of hours in an airplane to be able to command an outfit.

Anyway, I went up to McChord [AFB, Washington] and took over a squadron. And I took to it well. I loved it and learned a lot. I learned more in two years than I ever learned doing anything else in such a short time.

Dr. Launius: Is squadron commander one of the great jobs as far as you're concerned?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, because you're still one of the flyers. You have your foot in both camps. You are on the senior staff of the wing commander, yet you're still an aircraft commander, one of "the guys." If you can learn to straddle that fence well and still lead, then your career blossoms. The good ones grow up as a squadron commander.

Dr. Launius: Compare command of the 63d Military Airlift Wing [Norton AFB, California] with your time as a squadron commander?

Gen Cassidy: I liked being a squadron commander more, even though I could do more as a wing commander. I enjoyed the greater challenge and the bigger arena that I found myself in as a wing commander. I also liked attending the commanders' conferences, but for pure enjoyment, command of a squadron can't be beat. I had to do things as a wing commander that did not always make people happy. The higher you get in the ranks, the tougher the decisions because they affect the lives of a greater number of people. It's not that I shied away or backed away from them. There's a toll, a down side. In the senior jobs, wing commanders and upward, you are forced to do some things you would just as soon not do. There's no baggage with being a squadron commander. It's just a

great job. Every day was fun. I hated to go to sleep because I was afraid I'd miss something.

MAC Director of Operations and Numbered Air Force Commander

Special Operations

Dr. Launius: What do you feel were your major accomplishments as the Director of Operations for MAC [MAC/DO]?

Gen Cassidy: I enjoyed being the DO. I was the DO for a couple of great guys--Dutch Huyser [Air Force General Robert E., CINCMAC, July 1979-June 1981] and Jim Allen [Air Force General James R., CINCMAC, June 1981-June 1983]. They let me do anything I wanted to do, and I was willing to do lots of things. We really changed the course of MAC at that time. For example, we took over Air Force Special Ops [Operations].

An FMI [functional management inspection] of special ops initiated the move. The FMI was damaging. It showed that both the equipment and the people were in bad shape. But more importantly, the people were being treated very poorly by the Air Force. We made the case that the biggest problem was the people problem. Air Force Special Ops folks mostly came out of MAC rescue--C-130s and helicopters--yet they were being aligned with fighter forces. We were the only ones who really could take care of them and really make sure they had a good career. We had the biggest pool of people to put into that field, so it made sense that we should run the SOF [Special Operations Forces]. I was a brigadier at the time facing off with a bunch of two-stars: the TAC/DO [Tactical Air Command, Director of Operations] John

Piotrowski [Air Force Major General John L.]; the PACAF/DO [Pacific Air Forces, Director of Operations] Ernie Bedke [Air Force Major General Earnest A.]; the USAFE/DO [United States Air Forces in Europe, Director of Operations] Bill Kirk [Air Force Major General William L.]; and Perry Smith [Air Force Major General Perry M.], another fighter guy on the Air Staff who chaired this committee looking at how best to align SOF. It was me against all of them.

General Allen, CINCMAC, coached me, though. He had me present the case for Air Force SOF consolidation under MAC. The case was compelling; the case sold itself. It never came to a big vote. We finally got the SOF when General Creech [Air Force General Wilbur L.], CINCTAC [Commander in Chief, TAC], said, "I agree with the MAC position. I take away my objections. I'll give you the special ops forces."*

It was pretty hard to swallow for some of the people in TAC. The Ninth Air Force commander, which had all the SOF forces in TAC, was then Larry Welch [Air Force Lieutenant General Larry D.], and he felt it was a really big loss. That was my first brush with him. He was a three-star, and I was a one-star. The problem was that some of the old SOF guys never really joined in. They became a fifth column.

Dr. Launius: Was it a similar situation to the one MAC faced in 1974 with the consolidation of tactical airlift assets?

*The Air Force activated Headquarters Twenty-Third Air Force on 1 March 1983, and assigned to it the 2d Air Division to manage Air Force special operations. In addition, on that date the Air Force assigned to the 2d Air Division the 1st Special Operations Wing from TAC, 1st Special Operations Squadron from PACAF, and 7th Special Operations Squadron from USAFE.

Gen Cassidy: Similar, but much, much worse because there was more fever, more emotion about consolidating the SOF force. SOF people tend to be loyal only to the people in their immediate sight because they work with them, they train with them, they're hyperactive with them. They share life-threatening experiences with one another and become so close-knit that they won't let anybody else in. I'm not knocking it. That's part of their strength. They didn't want anybody else, didn't need anybody else, and that's the way we trained them to be. We recognized the problem and pretty much had it solved, and then in 1987 the USSOCOM [United States Special Operations Command] initiative got underway, rekindling a lot of those old fires.[*]

Aerial Refueling

Dr. Launius: Was it tough selling MAC crews on the need to be air refueling qualified?

Gen Cassidy: Frankly, MAC came in kicking and screaming. MAC people had always just landed when they needed gas, refueled, and then went on. The notion that they should air refuel and keep qualified for that was not very easy to sell. It represented a large departure from past practices. As a result, I had my work cut out for me. You have no idea how many times I had to explain the need for air refueling to old airlifters who thought it was not worth the trouble. They did some M-14 model excursions; we had just brought up the M-14 model on the Cray computer. It showed that air refueling really wouldn't do anything for us if the Soviets invaded Western Europe, so "why should we bother?" the naysayers argued. Of

[*]DOD established USSOCOM on 16 April 1987, and assigned to it three service components: the Army's 1st Special Operations Command, the Navy's Naval Special Warfare Command, and MAC's Twenty-Third Air Force.

course, when you look at it only from that perspective, air refueling doesn't help us process a big flow to Europe. There is not much you gain in ton-mile capability for what you spend for air refueling, but that logic ignores the enormous flexibility gained in planning.

Dr. Launius: That's the same period when the C-141 stretch* was taking place, and the Air Force was fitting the Starlifters [C-141s] with air refueling receptacles. Was there opposition to that modification?

Gen Cassidy: That problem had already been solved. That issue had been decided on General Carlton's watch, and he had fully justified the air refueling receptacle for the C-141. Although if you go back in the history of the Air Force, not many people were in favor of it; there was great resistance to it. Frankly, it was done because of General Carlton's very close personal relationship with the Chief of Staff, David Jones [Air Force General David C., Chief of Staff of the Air Force, July 1974-June 1978]. Both of them grew up in SAC and recognized the need for air refueling. Surprisingly, many of us at MAC felt the potential of air refueling was not being realized, in spite of the acquisition of the new tanker/airlifter then

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*In 1977, Lockheed Georgia Company began "stretching" the fuselages of 270 C-141As by 23 feet, 4 inches. The modification increased the interior by approximately 30 percent and added inflight refueling receptacles. The modified aircraft, now known as the C-141B, had an additional 237 square feet of floor space and aerial refueling capability.

coming into the inventory, the KC-10.

Consequently, there was a big debate about who would own and operate the KC-10s, SAC or MAC, and good cases could be made either way. As the single manager of air refueling assets, SAC certainly could make the case for SAC. But the airplane had been bought with money under major force program 4, which is Mobility Programs, a fund that MAC has a lot of say about. As a result, the airplane was justified for mobility reasons, to support more C-5s and the C-17. In addition, the KC-10 had a cargo capability, and as the single operating agency for airlift, MAC had another good justification for owning the airplanes.

So that debate went on, and I was very much a part of it, supporting General Allen against the arguments of CINCSAC [Commander in Chief, SAC], then General Bennie Davis [Air Force General Bennie L.]. I presented MAC's case showing how important air refueling was to the strategic mobility of the nation. We did an awful lot of work on this issue, and at the heart of it all was this premise that MAC crews had to be air refueling-capable.

We devised all sorts of training methods to convince our people of the need to get proficient in air refueling. There was one called "tanker anchor." We would put a KC-10 out over the coast of Nova Scotia. The KC-10 would be up there every day at the same time orbiting in the refueling area. Every MAC airplane that went to Europe would punch on, get some air refueling training, and then fly across the Atlantic. It would, we anticipated, build crew proficiency and create airlift flexibility to meet our mission requirements.

It didn't work very well. We couldn't rely on getting the tankers from SAC, and we succeeded in getting only enough funding to qualify half of our crews in air refueling. We did, however, set the stage for some very important developments in air refueling in MAC.

I was also pushing for air refueling MAC's nuclear weapons missions. Initially, I was pretty much out there by myself on that issue. The MAC staff didn't want to do it, nor did the nuclear surety people at the Department of Energy. They were afraid.

Dr. Launius: Were their concerns based on safety?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. Their argument was driven by safety concerns but based on ignorance. Finally, we convinced them that to not air refuel was subjecting the weapon to another landing or to a variety of threats ranging from hijacking to terrorist attacks.

Dr. Launius: Or the plane breaking down when it lands.

Gen Cassidy: Exactly, and then you have to move the weapon again to another aircraft. With the custody process and procedures for nuclear weapons, it made eminent sense to air refuel the missions. We got a couple of people from the Department of Energy up in the airplanes with us and showed them how we did the refueling. Finally, as you know, you see it every day, we air refuel the missions. So I was very proud to have been able to push that though.

Combat Training: CATS

Dr. Launius: As the MAC/DO you worked hard to ready the command for war.

Gen Cassidy: MAC needed to be recognized as a combat force by all in the Air Force. MAC's mission was not to be the Department of Defense's [DOD's] private airline. Certainly we could do the airline mission, but you can train a monkey to do that. We had to find ways to let our young pilots feel capable of handling an airplane that may fly into harm's way. We had to help them know the airplane well enough that they would be prepared technically and psychologically to use it in modes in which most people never expected them to use it.

That's why we started the CATS program, the Combat Aircrew Training School, at Nellis [AFB, Nevada] in 1983. We put a detachment there to train airlifters to become tacticians with the Red Flag[*] fighter pilot mentality, the Red Flag psychology. Our pilots could fly Red Flag to learn tactics with the fighter pilots that they would have to interface with in a combat environment. At Nellis they could also see the Soviet weaponry that they would come up against in combat. That doesn't mean that we planned to throw a six-ship formation of C-141s into the Fulda Gap.[**] Knowing the enemy and knowing what his capabilities are, knowing the proper tactics, understanding what your airplane can do and what airplanes supporting you can do, and most of all knowing yourself--your own personal limitations and strengths and how they interface with the limitations and strengths of the

[*]The Air Force's premier fighter training program conducted at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

[**]Northeast of Frankfurt, Germany, Fulda Gap is a narrow divide between two clusters of wooded hills and, in American war plans, served as a strategic chokepoint in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

airplane--would allow our crews to survive and execute their mission.

In pilots' jargon, there's an "envelope" in which the airplane is built to fly. That envelope is depicted on performance charts. These charts, the envelope if you will, of the airplane are color-coded. The green is the performance area in which the airplane is designed to fly all the time. Then there is a little yellow area outside the green envelope that indicates that the pilot should exercise caution, because the aircraft was not designed to exceed those flight characteristics. Then there is a red area into which you should never go because you can predict failure of the airplane. What you have to do is teach crews to recognize that envelope and how to use the outer limits of the envelope to the advantage of the mission. You have to know the mission, the envelope, and yourself. That's what we're teaching them in the CATS program. It got off to a slow start. Like anything new, and particularly something that is fairly radical, people didn't come running to the trough. When I came back as the CINC in 1985, after the program had gained legitimacy in the MAC staff and Air Force-wide, I was able to give it a good push forward.

Combat Training: Simulators

Dr. Launius: Were you an early convert to simulation?

Gen Cassidy: No. I thought, as an old pilot would, that if a guy's life isn't being threatened, then he probably isn't being stressed enough to receive worthwhile training. I said that in one of our meetings and a guy by the name of Paul Cairo, who has a Ph.D. in some training discipline, responded, "Hey, you're wrong, general, and I'm going to prove you're wrong." It took him a while, but over the next

several years I began to look at simulation differently. He showed me how all our technology could be harnessed to train our people more efficiently, more effectively, and more safely. In the past, we in the command had tended to use simulation only to teach people how to respond to emergencies. Typically, we'd put a guy in a simulator and while he's taxiing out, we'd give him every emergency that you could imagine in the taxi phase. Then he'd take off, and he'd get all the emergencies that he might face in the inflight phase. On landing, we'd give him all the emergencies that he could possibly encounter in that phase. It was just a series of "rote problems." It made no sense and had no cohesion. It bore no relationship to reality. What we did then was build a mission.

Dr. Launius: Just like a normal channel mission?

Gen Cassidy: Exactly, like a normal mission. A "normal" mission that had a series of things go wrong, most of which were exterior to the airplane and the crew. The pilot would take off and everything would be normal and everything would be good, which is mostly the case. Then, with his arrival eight hours away, he'd get a call that the weather was deteriorating at his arrival station, that it would be a little different than what he had been led to believe. That was the old way of simulation training.

In the new method, starting at this point eight hours out, we built in a series of possible, logical occurrences that frequently happen on missions with likely consequences for each action, until the guy was under extreme stress. We built in stress levels close to reality. When we had it orchestrated correctly, he didn't know if he was in an airplane or a simulator. We set that all up not just by the activities in the simulator, but by selection of the people in the simulator as well. We used peer pressure. We put people in

together who were natural competitors. The realism came as a revelation to us, to me personally, and to most of the command.

But the premise remains the same. If you have good training programs and good standardization programs, then young people can fly airplanes as good as old folks. Most Americans are a lot more comfortable with a gray-haired pilot in the seat. Not me. The difference between pilots is in their training, standardization, and commitment to their job. As a matter of fact, I'll take a lot of young pilots over the old pilots. Their reactions are better. They're quicker. They have stamina. They're just like young surgeons. Who do you want working on you? The old surgeon who's been doing it the same way for 20 years, or the young guy who just came out of school with knowledge of the latest procedures and high tech proficiency? But there's a balance. You want somebody probably in the middle.

In MAC we now have excellent training and standardization/evaluation programs. And they're getting better all the time. I am proud to have initiated some of this when I was the DO, and then to have come back as CINC after two years, see what had happened in my absence, and then help them keep moving. I was able to pick it up, and, I hope, give it a shove in the right direction.

Combat Training: Exercise Employment

Dr. Launius: I remember sitting in a meeting with you when you were the DO and hearing you complain about MAC not being involved in exercise employment, like flying airdrop missions. It was just "take them over and bring them back."

Gen Cassidy: MAC's first high profile involvement in exercises was with Gallant Eagle and Bright Star.[*] In Bright Star 82 we launched our airplanes out of Charleston and Pope [AFB, North Carolina], flew to Egypt and dropped only 20 seconds off TOT [time over target]. I have some pictures that are just amazing. One is of a Chinese general in the audience. You should have seen the look on his face.

We did another Bright Star in 1983, and, if you remember, the Libya operation was heating up then.[**] As a result, we were dragging the whole formation within Moammar Gadhafi's range. We started developing processes to coordinate our activities with the Navy so they could give us protection and some cover as MAC's airplanes went across the Gulf of Sidra. It was the best possible kind of training because we were working with another Service's forces. We formalized those procedures for getting the right frequencies to coordinate with the Navy task force for their support as we were going into harm's way.

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[*]During Bright Star 82, MAC used 24 C-141s to airdrop 859 troops and 172 tons of cargo over a 13-hour period on a desert drop zone. This drop, the largest nonstop parachute assault mission to that date (14 Nov 81), was only 20 seconds off the time over target.

[**]In the early 1980s Libya's ties to international terrorism and its claim that its territorial waters extended over the Gulf of Sidra, heightened tensions between Libya and the United States, and culminated in the US air strike against Libya in April 1986.

Later we expanded our profile. We set up to drop and come home without landing, and soon we were doing everything that we had been working for all those years: air refueling, combat tactics, exercise employment, the works. We didn't have to land anywhere and, most importantly, we didn't need anybody's approval to land anywhere. As you know, overflight and landing rights are two of the touchiest issues we work.

Dr. Launius: And Gallant Eagle?[*]

Gen Cassidy: Yes, when four people were killed, the "death drop" they called it. We dropped on five drop zones at one time, the first time we had tried anything like that. MAC saved a lot of people's lives that day because air evac[uation] was there at MAC's insistence. We rarely have an exercise now without air evac.

We had two Numbered Air Force commanders who did not really want to try this type of activity, simultaneous multi-zone airdrops. But there was so much those units could be doing that was not getting done. We had to force things through, like all the long-range airdrops and the new concepts to keep us moving forward, to exploit MAC capabilities and potential. MAC had just been there doing its daily routine. Somebody who really knew the airlift system could tweak it up to make people say, "Wow." That's what we did for a couple of years, 1982 and 1983. I must add that now with TRANSCOM speaking for MAC, MAC has no problems getting high visibility exercise participation.

Dr. Launius: Tell us about the Magellan Project.

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[*]Gallant Eagle 82, conducted at Fort Irwin, California, from 28 February to 31 March 1982, had tragic consequences. In the largest airdrop in 20 years, 4 died and 100 were injured, mainly due to high wind gusts at ground level.

Gen Cassidy: We wanted to fly two C-141s non-stop around the world. We dubbed it Project Magellan. As planned, they would leave the States, go down to Diego Garcia, make an airdrop, and come back home. We would show that MAC could resupply our troops by air anywhere in the world from the United States and return home without landing. The Air Force turned us down because they just didn't have enough courage to do it, and they thought it was too much like grandstanding.

Urgent Fury

Dr. Launius: You were the commander of the Twenty-First [Air Force, McGuire AFB, New Jersey] during Urgent Fury, the operation in Grenada [1983]. The MAC History Office wrote a book on Urgent Fury, so I know you were not at McGuire when it kicked off.

Gen Cassidy: I was at the MAC Commanders' Conference here at Scott [AFB, Illinois] that Friday night. I went down to the MAC command center with General Ryan [Air Force General Thomas M., Jr., CINCMAC, June 1983-September 1985], and I said to him, "Jesus, I think we're going to do this. I'd better get home." I called Bob Patterson [Air Force Brigadier General Robert B.], my Vice at the time, and told him to be prepared to deploy. Bob put together some of the staff out of the Twenty-First and went through Pope and picked up some more guys he needed. He knew by then that he was going to Barbados to serve as Commander, Airlift Forces.

I went to Grenada about three days into the operation. It went well, not because it was planned well. It wasn't. MAC would never have done it the way it was done, putting the JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] forces in and then taking them out, then putting in the 82d [Airborne Division], and then taking them

out. We ran over 800 missions. Nonetheless, it worked well because there were some very, very competent people out there making it work: aircraft commanders, combat controllers, and Bob Patterson.

In spite of poor planning, we did some great deeds. We launched the airplanes at an incredible rate with over 98 percent reliability. Even the airplanes seemed to know the importance of the missions. The crews certainly knew it was important. They were so fired up for it. Things that didn't work perfectly they adjusted for--the fact that the first airplane pulled off and didn't do the airdrop, and the fact that we re-rigged the guys twice--didn't matter. It was really tough rigging in the back of an airplane at night while waiting to jump into the abyss from a C-130 at 500 feet. The weather was also bad. The airplanes were bouncing all around. I don't know how the hell they did it, but it was the only way we were ever going to get them onto that strip of land.

Dr. Launius: Or else they'd end up in the ocean?

Gen Cassidy: That's right. Only two guys got wet out of the whole crowd, and that wasn't in the ocean. It was in a little pond. Our people were superb. They were very high-quality people and very well trained. The crews were very confident. They believed they could do anything, and they could. We just told them what we needed done, and they got it all sorted out and did it.

Dual-Hatted Commander in Chief

Formation of USTRANSCOM

Dr. Matthews: Was the TRANSCOM Implementation Plan, our "Charter," on the mark?

Gen Cassidy: For the most part, yes. And the glory of it was it left a lot of things to us. It was specific enough to get us going, specific enough to give us legitimacy. At the same time, it was general enough to let us go in most any direction we seemed to find correct. That's what we've done. You've seen that. They gave us the ball, and we ran with it.

Dr. Matthews: Over the last ten years or so there have been several attempts to unify transportation in the DOD. The emphasis before TRANSCOM was on the two surface TOAs [Transportation Operating Agencies], Military Traffic Management Command [MTMC], and Military Sealift Command [MSC]. There were also a couple of moves to put MAC into a transportation consolidation of some sort. Your predecessors, General Huyser for instance, fought it forcefully, as far as MAC being part of a UTC [unified transportation command]. During 1986 and early 1987 you also fought it, or at least, you resisted it. Would you give me your rationale and the basis for your resistance to enter into a UTC?

Gen Cassidy: The concept had been fraught with so many problems before. It was so political, I frankly didn't think anybody was serious about it. And I was afraid it would come out as some kind of hybrid that wouldn't work. I didn't want to be part of any of that. And I didn't want MAC to be any part of it. It might hurt MAC, which was very competent and capable. And if it didn't come out as a

truly unified command, I didn't want anything to do with it. We already had a Joint Deployment Agency [JDA]. That's what we would have had if we put MSC and MTMC together. We would have created more problems than we solved. So I didn't want to be part of it until I was sure that there would be somebody who had the authority to make it work the way it was going to have to work. And that somebody was MAC. MAC had to be the lead command because of its size, and that would get the unified command out of Washington. I didn't want it put off in a corner somewhere in Washington. It needed to be part of the entire unified command team. Be one of the "Big Boys."

I hoped that somebody would ask MAC to do this, or force MAC to do it. And then we could reluctantly say, "Okay, we'll do it." So I wanted to hold out until the last minute until we, in fact, could do it the way it should be done. That strategy worked.

Dr. Matthews: You met with the Packard Commission [President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management] in June 1986 and talked to Rhett Dawson [Mr. Rhett B., McNair Law Firm], and some other members of the Commission. What transpired at that meeting?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, I met with Rhett Dawson, the Executive Director of the Commission. Jim Holloway [Navy Admiral James L., III, Retired, and President, Council of American-Flag Ship Operators] was there, as were Frank Carlucci [Mr. Frank C.,] and Brent Scowcroft [Air Force Lieutenant General Brent, Retired]. A couple other members, too.

Dr. Matthews: Gorman?

Gen Cassidy: Gorman [Army General Paul F., Retired, and Vice President, Burdeshaw Associates Limited] and Barrow [Marine Corps

General Robert H., Retired] were there, too. I said to them, "I'm going to have to take a position on this one way or the other, so I'd like you to tell me what you're thinking, what you want. What do you have in mind?" I'd talked to the Secretary of the Navy [John F. Lehman, Jr.] by then. What he had in mind was just putting some little staff out somewhere with a three-star or maybe a four-star in charge just to satisfy the Packard Commission. I said "Is that what you want? Or is this a commitment? If we get this thing going, wherever you are, I'll get your support?" I said, "I don't want to get into something half-baked, something stuck off in a corner." There are already too many of those organizations. That wouldn't serve the best interests of the DOD or our nation. So I asked, "Are you seriously interested in a full-blown unified command?" And that's where the discussion led us. I was asking them for guidance and I was also laying down a marker. If I was going to get into this thing and put my full weight into it, I didn't want the commissioners running for the hills when I needed their support. I wasn't prophetic enough to know where they'd end up. Think about it. Frank Carlucci became National Security Advisor [to President Ronald W. Reagan] and later Secretary of Defense [under President Reagan]. And Brent Scowcroft is the current National Security Advisor to the President [George Bush]. So these were the types of guys I was asking advice from. My question to them was legitimate: "Are you going to just write this in a report and then leave town, or are you going to support me when the going gets tough and somebody tries to do it wrong? Can I then come to you for help?" And I got the nod from everybody and everybody seemed pleased that somebody had come to talk to them because nobody else had. They encouraged me to get into it and to work hard to set it up correctly. And they

all, including Admiral Holloway, encouraged me to have MAC take it on, all of it.

Dr. Matthews: Implicitly, that meant it would be at Scott?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. It jelled out later on. But that was part of the plan. Get it out of Washington.

USTRANSCOM's Maturation

Dr. Matthews: How does the command today compare with what you thought it would be back when you met with the Packard Commission?

Gen Cassidy: I thought we would be very much embroiled in detailed planning, repairing the damage done over the years by people's unwillingness to use the Joint Deployment System for planning. I personally don't enjoy that kind of work, but I knew the new command was responsible for it, so we took it on. And I also thought we'd be deep into the command, control, and communications [C3] process, linking things together, and we are. I thought we'd be doing that to support the planning process, principally. But I never dreamed we'd be doing all the other things we're doing in addition to the planning and C3 duties. Nor did I envision the degree of cooperation and teamwork we've enjoyed. I didn't think we could get that team spirit among so many heterogeneous groups: [US]EUCOM [United States European Command], [US]CENTCOM [United States Central Command], [US]PACOM [United States Pacific Command], and the other unified commands. We can't, of course, take full credit, but we deserve a lot of the credit.

Dr. Matthews: Who else deserves credit?

Gen Cassidy: Members of the Joint Staff who were pushing to use the Joint Deployment System. General Kelly [Army Lieutenant General Thomas. W.], the J3 [Joint Staff, Director for Operations], was very supportive. The Chairman [Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.] and the Service Chiefs also.

Perhaps most importantly, we were blessed to have two superb J-4s [Director for Logistics] on the Joint Staff [JS]. First Al Hansen [Air Force Lieutenant General Alfred G, Director of Logistics, Joint Staff, 1985-1987], a logistician extraordinaire, shepherded the command's implementation plan through all the wickets all the way to the Chairman, SECDEF [Secretary of Defense], and President. And then following Al in the JS/J4 was Ed Honor [Army Lieutenant General Edward, Director of Logistics, Joint Staff, 1987-1989]--former MTMC commander and expert in transportation doctrine and history--who used his transportation expertise, credibility, and personal relationship with the Army Chief of Staff to move TRANSCOM forward. The importance of those two individuals, and the position of the JS-J4, to TRANSCOM's success can't be overstated.

So I knew we'd be in the planning business and the command, control, and computer business, and I knew we would have moved them along in some way. But I had no idea that we'd be so far along in those other areas. I had no idea we'd be looking at information flow and general architecture for a global transportation network. I had no idea we'd be looking at emerging technologies that can do things that none of us dreamed could be done two or three years ago. I had no notion we'd be that far along in the electronic world. I had no notion that when we "directed" as the supported CINC for planning, that indeed we'd be responded to so favorably.

Dr. Matthews: In addition to support in high places, what else accounts for that favorable response?

Gen Cassidy: We stood up the command the right way. Early on we established good relationships with the other commands. We were proactive. We showed them we could help, that we were a positive force. We got their acceptance early on, much sooner than I expected. Maybe I'm just a bit cynical about that. I'd watched other unified commands stand up and they were treated like a bastard at the family reunion. But we seemed to get status quickly. We seemed to be brought into the fold quickly. A lot of that is because we had a Chairman who was committed to seeing us succeed. A lot of it is because we had a Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Taft [William H., IV], who was committed to the transportation business. So we had good friends in high places. And the times we needed support, we got it. Also, the simple fact was TRANSCOM was needed. Few have denied that. It is a command born out of need.

Dr. Matthews: The Navy did not concur with our establishment. How would you assess Navy support to date?

Gen Cassidy: I was pleasantly surprised that the Navy did as much as they did. The principal reason for that was Admiral Herberger [Navy Vice Admiral Albert J., Deputy Commander in Chief (DCINC), USTRANSCOM, September 1987-February 1990]. He was the right man, at the right place, at the right time. He has absolute credibility with the Navy and everybody else he works with. He is a unified person in thought, he can deal in the abstract, he has integrity, and he's dedicated to the mission of the command. And because of his personal efforts and status, the Navy has come along a lot further than it would have without him. That's been aided and abetted by Paul Butcher [Navy Vice Admiral Paul D.,

Commander, MSC, December 1988-February 1990, and USTRANSCOM DCINC, February 1990-March 1991], too, but Al set the ground work before Butcher ever got into the transportation business.

Dr. Matthews: What else has surprised you?

Gen Cassidy: In my advocacy role, I never would have predicted I'd be having meetings with labor unions and giving speeches at the New York Traffic Club or the Propeller Club of Washington, D.C. I never dreamed I'd be quoted in the *Journal of Commerce* as often as I have, or received personal mail from people in industry and government encouraging us to keep doing what we're doing. It's incredible!

Dr. Matthews: Where has your role as the single point of contact and advocate for the Defense Transportation System [DTS] been most evident and successful?

Gen Cassidy: The Defense Resources Board [DRB], without question. That's where CINCTRANS can be most effective because that's where the final decisions are made, that's where the money is allocated, that's where you talk to "the man," the Secretary of Defense.

Dr. Matthews: How has our customers' perception and knowledge of TRANSCOM changed over the last two and a half years?

Gen Cassidy: Well, they know we're here. For example, on my last trip to Europe, I talked to General Galvin [Army General John R., Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander in Chief, USEUCOM] and his staff. He emphasized the need to improve transportation capability, and he said to me, "We'll work with your every step of the way to make the required changes." That's a

commitment and recognition of our role in the game. In the past, unified commands tended to be parochial about doing their own transportation thing. Now they clearly understand our mission and role in the business and they want to use us.

Dr. Matthews: What is the importance of Exercise Proud Eagle?[*]

Gen Cassidy: It's probably the most important single event in the command's brief history. It's right up there on a par with--maybe even more important than--standing up the command because, first of all, it tells us where we are. What will it do? It's a test. It's not going to test everything, but it will show if we've made any progress in the ten years since Nifty Nugget.[**] It will set the baseline for the command. And then we ought to have a similar exercise in three or four years to show the command how far it's moved forward. It's very important to set the baseline, where we are, and then set some goals against that to know what we need to fix and where we should go. The command needs to pull itself back after Proud Eagle, and say "time out." And using the data from Proud Eagle,

[*]A JCS-sponsored worldwide command post exercise held 12 October-3 November 1989. Proud Eagle tested the nation's civilian and military crisis management procedures for the mobilization and deployment of US forces.

[**]Nifty Nugget was a command post exercise conducted in the fall of 1978. The first government-wide mobilization effort since World War II, the exercise simulated a fast-breaking attack by Warsaw Pact forces on North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe. In particular, Nifty Nugget evaluated cooperation between DOD and other federal agencies during mobilization and deployment of US forces. The exercise exposed great gaps in understanding between military and civilian participants and, as a result, mobilization and deployment plans fell apart.

look ahead to form a vision for the command. Where should we be focusing our attention? Where is the most money to be made? Where can we get the biggest return on our investment? And we may have to get out of some of our advocacy role, and turn that over to somebody else. We may have to focus more on plan refinement, on ADP [automated data processing], on relationships with the Services. We may have to focus more on our relationship with the Chairman or the SECDEF. We don't know that for sure. But Proud Eagle will give us the data we will need to build a strategic plan to determine where the command should go. Besides that, it will get TRANSCOM into the limelight more than ever. It will make the senior decision-makers in the country knowledgeable about TRANSCOM, how we can make a difference and, hopefully, it will make them realize the importance of early, well thought out plans for mobilizing our country for war. That's Proud Eagle's potential.

Dr. Matthews: Will we have the proper participation all the way up the chain?

Gen Cassidy: No, we will not, but we hope we will have significant participation. The proper participation in my mind is the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], and the Secretary of Commerce, all sitting down at a table playing Proud Eagle, but I'm not naive enough to believe that we are going to have that. We'll get something less than that.

Dr. Matthews: What's your assessment of the team evaluating Proud Eagle? Do we have the right people in those positions?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, we have some very experienced folks, like Colonel Al Brewer [Air Force Colonel Alton P. H., Jr., Retired, Modern Technologies Corporation]. He worked with the Joint Deployment Agency at its inception. He used the JDS [Joint Deployment System] in MAC. He's dealt with all the Services. He's as good a guy as you can get to do it.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything in the way the Proud Eagle plan sits now that we might have been able to improve upon?

Gen Cassidy: I can't give you a good answer on that now. I would have to say to you "not that we know of." If we did know about it, we would be on the phone giving directions to somebody to fix it. But is it adequate? Hell, no! No plan ever is. But strength comes from knowing how to use an inadequate plan.

Manpower and Personnel

Dr. Matthews: Would you assess the weaknesses and strengths of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,* especially in regard to personnel management? Is it going to be better for the nation?

Gen Cassidy: Giving the Chairman increased authority has been for the better. Increasing the authority of the CINCs is correct. The down side of it is micro management of the JMP [Joint Manpower Program] and how many people get joint credit. Congress doesn't understand the problems inherent in personnel management in the military. They ought to tell us, in general parameters, what to do, and let us do it.

The micro management is partly our fault. As you recall, the Joint Chiefs' initial reaction to the idea espoused by Senator Goldwater

[Senator Barry M., Republican-Arizona] and Congressman Nichols [Representative William F., Democrat-Alabama] were quite negative: "Hey, we don't need that. We're doing fine. There is nothing wrong over here." So the military established an adversarial relationship. One of our strongest supporters, Barry Goldwater, had to cram it down our throats. The Joint Chiefs lost credibility by responding negatively.

Dr. Matthews: One thing that sticks in my mind is our senior staff's consensus that TRANSCOM has the best and brightest people they have ever worked with. Why do we have such high quality people?

Gen Cassidy: There are generally two types of people at large headquarters. On the one hand, take MAC. You can't have all the best people in the Military Airlift Command headquarters. You have to have some exceptional people, but you also need some--I don't want to use the term mediocre, because none of the MAC people are mediocre--ordinary people who just do an honest day's work, and then go home. So not everybody in MAC headquarters is exceptional; it's too large.

On the other hand, a unified command is much smaller. We're talking about 350 versus 2,400 people in a headquarters, an enormous difference. A unified command is like a corporate headquarters. Almost all corporate headquarters are small. When we put TRANSCOM together, we searched for the best people in all of the TOAs and Services. And then the highest quality senior officers--like Admiral Herberger, and Generals Griffith [Air Force Major General John E., Director, Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM], Piatak [Army Major General John

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*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 ordered the Secretary of Defense to consider creation of a unified transportation

R., Director, Plans and Programs Directorate, USTRANSCOM], and Beasley [Air Force Brigadier General Dennis C., Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, USTRANSCOM]--attract the highest quality people. They know where the best people are. And the best people like to work with them because they know they'll be rewarded, not only with promotions, but with challenges--a psychic income--and they'll be rewarded with fun. In sum, talent begets talent. I've joked that we could have stopped recruiting after we brought on board our first 50 troops, the command's plank owners, because they were the best troops in all of the DOD.

Dr. Matthews: Davie Hinton [Air Force Colonel David S., Chief of Staff, USTRANSCOM] was your first of the first 50. Why?

Gen Cassidy: Davie Hinton has great instincts. Making Davie Hinton my chief of staff was my most brilliant stroke. Davie Hinton, I knew, would never quit.

Dr. Matthews: Why else did you pick Davie Hinton?

Gen Cassidy: He makes things happen. The way he goes about business, he doesn't make people mad. He's not overly impressed with his position and he's willing to do "three-level work." He'll scrub the floors. He'll draw the plans for the floors. He'll build the building. Whatever you need done, he'll do it. And we had to have somebody who knew MAC. MAC would be required to give TRANSCOM a tremendous amount of support the first few years. We needed somebody who knew how and where to get that support. And TRANSCOM needed a chief of staff who was not timid, and Davie certainly isn't timid. I needed somebody I knew

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command and revoked the law preventing creation of such a command.

well and trusted. And I needed someone who knew me and trusted me. You've noticed the relationship between Davie and myself. Our relationship is very, very strong and close, and it's gotten even closer the last couple of years. So Davie worked the personnel issue early on and superbly. He set the scene, establishing momentum for our flag and general officers.

Dr. Matthews; Do we lack any expertise today? Do we have any personnel problems?

Gen Cassidy: We have too many colonels and Navy captains. We have the right number of generals, but I think we should do away with some of those O-6 [colonel and Navy captain] billets. Turn them into lieutenant colonel or Navy commander[O-5] and major and Navy lieutenant commander [O-4] action officers.

Dr. Matthews: Any billets in particular?

Gen Cassidy: None in particular. We need more bright young guys and gals to sit down and work. Recognizing that the jump from O-6 to O-7 [brigadier general] is so competitive, so enormous a jump, people at the O-6 level tend to stagnate in one job. We can't permit that. We need more O-4s and O-5s, a group of people who flow in and flow out and go other places. Then there would be more drive, push, and original thought. There would be a lot more pizzazz!

Dr. Matthews: Is that something our J1 [Director, Manpower and Personnel] can handle or is it a bigger problem, Air Force-or DOD-wide?

Gen Cassidy: It's something General Johnson [Lieutenant General Hansford T., Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and selected to replace General Cassidy as CINCTRANS] is going to have to take on. We've not been able to attack the problem yet because we're

still fighting for the remaining billets. It should have been 106, but it looks like we're going to get only 38. Once we know exactly what our final number will be, then we can start rearranging by rank and directorate. That will be a major job for General Johnson. And that must be done before Al Herberger leaves, because Al has the corporate knowledge to get it done.

Dr. Matthews: As for the service mix in all ranks, are we where we should be or do you recommend changes?

Gen Cassidy: We might put in more Marines. And I'll recommend to General Johnson that in six months to a year from now, he consider bringing a Marine Corps brigadier general in to do either the J3 [Director for Operations] or J4 [Director for Logistics] job. We should consider splitting those up sometime.

Dr. Matthews: Are there other organizational changes you'd recommend or consider?

Gen Cassidy: That would be the only one I'd consider down the road.

Dr. Matthews: How would you assess TRANSCOM's esprit de corps?

Gen Cassidy: Morale is high. Nobody is vying for position or status. There are corporate approaches to everything, team approaches to everything.

CINC's Philosophy on Dual-Hat Command

Dr. Matthews: For a time you had the unique position of being both a unified commander and a specified commander. Did that situation have inherent problems?

Gen Cassidy: There was no problem at all. You can only be one. I was and am a unified commander. My status as a unified commander has been much higher and stronger than it was as a specified commander. That's not because I've changed any. And it's not because people don't love specified commands. The fact is when you are a unified commander, you represent a true unified view. You carry considerably more weight. You are much more accepted into "the club." You are looked upon differently. The specified command is set up for communication with the Joint Staff. The specified command [pause] I haven't thought this through before [pause] when you create a specified command, you don't give it any more authority to do its job. It's still in its Service, the Air Force in the case of MAC and SAC. The Air Force was still supporting them. You create a unified command to get it out from underneath the Services to work directly for the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, so the tasking and communication lines can be more clear, direct, and faster.

But I did have to be careful when I went from a specified commander to a unified commander, careful not to put a layer between the Chairman and the Military Airlift Command that would hinder the Chairman's ability to task and direct MAC. The glory of MAC is its flexibility and speed. It's a reactive command. It can move faster than any other command. For MAC to be utilized by the National Command Authorities, it needs a direct line to those authorities. I wanted to make sure we didn't disrupt that line and I believe we've structured TRANSCOM so that won't happen. We have to be careful. We get the wrong kind of J3 [pause], we don't want any one tinkering around with MAC. That's why you need to have CINCTRANS dual-hatted with CINCMAC. If CINCMAC doesn't like the way the J3 in

TRANSCOM is dealing with MAC, he'll tell him to knock it off. And he can do it [snap of fingers] just like that, because he's also CINCTRANS. That's why it must remain dual-hatted.

Dr. Matthews: So the CINC should remain Air Force. How about rotating the Services in the other general/flag officer positions?

Gen Cassidy: All the other flag and general officer positions should remain nominative. Although we should consider, if the CINCTRANS/CINCMAC position is always blue suit, rotating the DCINC job. But the fact is you tend to get good guys in nominative positions. If the Services want it bad enough, they send you their best people. Of course, a unified commander can reject nominations.

Dr. Matthews: What do you think about the dual-hat arrangements below the CINC?

Gen Cassidy: We're trying to get rid of some of those now. Fifty-five of them we don't like. We just made a mistake. You can't dual-hat a computer operator, for instance. Those types of dual-hat arrangements don't work. You can't be in two buildings at the same time.

Dr. Matthews: Some of those dual-hats were delegated to us in our Implementation Plan, the "IP."

Gen Cassidy: You're exactly right. And it was just a mistake.

Dr. Matthews: There has been one question I have wanted to ask you for a couple of years. Why did you decide to reside in MAC headquarters, Building 1600, rather than P-4, the TRANSCOM building?

Gen Cassidy: Most of the things that go on in a unified command can be delegated. That's why we designated the number two guy a DCINC instead of a Vice CINC, so he would have the authority to run the day-to-day business of the unified command while the CINC acted as chairman of the board. MAC's an operational command where the commander has responsibilities by law and statute. He must approve the budgets, take care of the disciplinary actions, make the life and death decisions. He has the entire safety responsibility. The commander must be seen with the people. He must set the standard for the people. He must set the pace for the people. He must do all that. Nobody else can do it, because there is only one commander in MAC.

Much of what a unified CINC does, once he sets policy, he can delegate. He can delegate day-to-day activities to his DCINC and still control events by sitting in a forum with the senior officers, getting their agreement, and letting them run with it. The unified CINC can rely principally on his component commanders to deal with problems of morale, performance, safety, and esprit de corps. And, of course, the unified staff is 350 versus 2,400 at MAC. But my decision was based not so much on the size of the staffs as on the inappropriateness of delegating my MAC responsibilities.

Also, if the CINC had moved over there to P-4--the first CINCTRANS--and out of MAC Headquarters, what signal would that have sent to everybody? "General Cassidy is giving away MAC." Now that TRANSCOM is up and running, the new CINC may want to do it differently, maybe switch when the new building is completed or sooner. Clearly the bigger role, or the biggest job, is managing the ninety-some thousand people at MAC. Leading people, which is the direct responsibility of the commander, MAC, requires more time than sitting down and making policy decisions.

The unified CINC tends to make policy decisions. You can do that quickly, if you have a good unified command staff like mine who prepares you well. As the major command commander, you are the only guy who should be giving the Outstanding Unit Award to one of the members of the MAC team. You are the only guy who can preside at the change of command at the Numbered Air Force. You are the only guy who can do the opening ceremony at the Airlift Rodeo.* You are the only guy who can be at the airlift convention. You can't delegate any of that stuff. You are the man. So anybody who doesn't do that will lose the heart and soul of what MAC is really all about.

Dr. Matthews: Have you made these thoughts known to General Johnson?

Gen Cassidy: Not yet, but I will. He will probably try to do it a bit differently, for a couple of reasons. I really have a leg up on everybody. I know more about MAC than anybody else, and I know probably more people in MAC than anybody else. Nobody can pull the wool over my eyes regarding MAC. Also, we have been fairly successful in setting up TRANSCOM, and that's not an easy act to follow either. So the next CINC can't come in and try to be like me. His background is not like mine, so he's got to do something different, and he will. He'll be good at it, too.

*MAC's annual international airdrop competition.

USTRANSCOM's Relationships with Component Commands

Dr. Matthews: How would you assess our relationship with the component commands today?

Gen Cassidy: With MTMC it's pleasant, based on tolerance. MTMC tolerating us. They tolerate us because, being under us, they have more status than they had before. MSC is much stronger than I ever anticipated it would be under us. Our relationship is coming on very, very well. It's developed well, and it's strong and I see few, if any, animosities between us. That doesn't mean we are going to agree on everything. There are some initiatives coming up where we are bound to disagree. MAC's cozying up to TRANSCOM. MAC kind of got its comeuppance a bit. MAC thinks they do things very well, near perfect, and they are [near perfect], but they are not perfect. Therefore, MAC is slowly realizing that TRANSCOM is good for MAC and that MAC needs to take advantage of TRANSCOM's unified powers more than it has. There is no arrogance, no standoffishness. The relationship is becoming warmer as time goes on. All three relationships are different.

Dr. Launius: So you see a bright future for MAC under TRANSCOM?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, because there will be an increased dependence on transportation: air, land, and sea. We will bring troops home from Europe and Korea. Some of those troops will remain in garrison in the United States, but a big percentage of them will go away, which will put a greater demand on mobility, flexibility, and speed, especially on airlift. If we're able to capitalize on the moment, it'll be good for us. I'll put it another way: US strategy will depend

increasingly upon strategic mobility. The overarching strategy of our nation is forward defense, which implies that you need transportation to get to the battle. If you're doing some retrenching or regressing from forward deployed forces, then you need transportation all the more. The issue then becomes, if our strategy is forward defense--and it must be, we don't want to fight on our soil--and our enemies are forward deployed already, then we're going to have to make sure that we can get there with the right-sized force in time and resupply it. You can build masses of F-15s, F-16s, and B-2s, but you're not going to take any land with them. You take territory with ground troops. Thus the key to our strategy must be transportation.

Dr. Launius: That's Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest's comment, "get there firstest with the mostest."[*]

Gen Cassidy: It's an old axiom that if you get into a defensive position, you can defend with a force one-third the size of the attacking force and prevail. It's the three-to-one equation. What that tells me is we had better get there in a hurry before the bad guys dig in. More to the point, we'd better get there and dig in before the bad guys come because we're going to be outnumbered and, at least initially, outgunned. We have to depend on something else, and that's speed and technology. We need to look at our strategic mobility force--air, land, and sea--as a national asset, as a national treasure, as a national capability to influence the world. The business we're in is not only one of defending the shores of the United States. We're in the business of supporting the notion of freedom and free

[*]Confederate Army Lieutenant General Forrest said, "I always make it a rule to get there first with the most men." The phrase has been misquoted as "I git thar fustest with the mostest men."

men. Nobody knows this better than you historians.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything more TRANSCOM can do to improve relationships with and among the component commands?

Gen Cassidy: We can improve them by doing the same thing we are doing. TRANSCOM has never hurt anybody. It has always been sensitive and receptive. It's worked the problems of the components very well. Whenever the components needed help, it has always worked with them. TRANSCOM doesn't tinker with their day-to-day business. It provides something to them, for them. It is a corporate headquarters. So, they have upped their star by being a part of this corporation. If TRANSCOM continues to let them operate autonomously and not muck around with them, it will work well. But mark my word, the minute TRANSCOM starts tinkering around with the components, two things will happen. First, the component will get mad and be our adversary. Then the job won't get done. Second, if TRANSCOM starts mucking around with the components, then TRANSCOM will not be doing the work it's supposed to be doing, its corporate work. And nobody will do it for them. TRANSCOM doesn't have time to fiddle with the components and still do its corporate work. So something won't be getting done and the unified command/component command relationship will be destroyed.

C-17 Program

Dr. Launius: One of the biggest projects on your plate while CINCMAC and CINCTRANS was the C-17 program. MAC lost the AMST [Advanced Medium STOL (Short Take-Off and Landing) Transport] in the late 1970s. The C-X came aboard, which ultimately became the C-17. The propriety of building the C-17

has been a constant issue in Congress, with commercial carriers, and in a variety of other places. How do you see that developing over a period of time? Where's it going to go from here?

Gen Cassidy: It's a $36 billion program. With that kind of price tag, it will be a political lightning rod. It is a very demanding technological program, making it fertile ground for screw-ups. Furthermore, the Air Force does not speak as one on the C-17 issue. Therefore, the C-17 program exhibits many of the problems that brought down the AMST program. We shouldn't have lost the AMST. MAC didn't have the stature--which it now has under TRANSCOM--to get the support it needed to bring it to fruition. That's water over the dam. Hopefully we've learned from the AMST debacle.

From the beginning, we felt we had to make sure that the C-17 had Air Force support, particularly the [Air Force] Chief of Staff's, and at least two or three of my colleagues in the four-star arena. That was a fairly easy task for me. General Bob Russ [Air Force General Robert D.], the commander at TAC, was the USAF [United States Air Force] Deputy Chief of Staff for R&D [Research and Development] when I was the DCS Personnel, so we had worked together closely. He knew the C-17 program well because his people, when he was in the Pentagon, were working it. MAC capitalized on our relationship and on his knowledge of the program to gain his support.

The Chief of Staff [General Larry D. Welch] had understood the program since his days as Vice Chief of Staff. And CINCSAC [Air Force General John T. Chain, Jr.] understood the program having been the XO [Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations] of the Air Force during the C-17 formulation period. Thus there were at least four of us four-stars right up front leading

the charge. We lined up three other four-stars who had enough knowledge of the program that we could get them together on it. So, rather than MAC carrying the ball, we tried to get Air Force to carry the ball, recognizing that MAC could only go so far with it. As soon as it would bump up against another program--B-1, B-2, F-15, F-16, Midgetman, whatever--we'd still have to carry the ball on our own, but we needed broad support up front.

Dr. Launius: How about support from the other Services?

Gen Cassidy: The other Services lined up behind us, especially the Army, the C-17's primary user. When General Carl Vuono [Army General Carl E.] was the Ops Dep [Operations Deputy] of the Army, I used to pick him up and we'd go over and testify together before Congress. We did that on several occasions. So he was already committed to the C-17 when he became Chief of Staff of the Army. We got great support from the Army Secretary John Marsh [John O., Jr., Secretary of the Army, January 1981-August 1989]. Secretary Marsh was an old airborne guy, so he understood airlift. He had also been a member of Congress, so he understood the acquisition and budget processes. He was very helpful.

As CINCTRANS I made sure that when I went into the Defense Resources Board--and, as I said earlier, that's really where the final decisions are made--the Army representative, the Air Force MAJCOMs [major commands], and the CINCs knew the issues. We made sure we had all the support the C-17 needed before we went in, and we let them play our tune for us. When they were done, I chimed in, "You bet, I agree with them."

We're again in the process of justifying the C-17. There has been $500 million taken out of the new FYDP [Five-Year Defense

Program] budget by the House Armed Services Committee. We have a new Secretary of the Air Force, a new Secretary of Defense, and they're asking the same questions that we answered three, four, five, and six years ago, so we have to go through it all again. We should not be timid, because these questions are valid, and our answers are still correct and legitimate. It's a lot of work on our part, but we'll prevail.

Dr. Launius: It looks like the C-17 will be a reality then?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, it will. The airplane has some problems, of course, but it's an excellent design, an excellent concept, and it's the right airplane for the job. It just comes about in a time of declining defense budgets and an enormous, booming economy, particularly in the airplane business. The ability to produce big airplanes in this country is stressed. The McDonnell Douglas Corporation, which is building the C-17, is behind in their production of the MD-80 and the MD-11. Both of those are fairly mature. The MD-11 is a brand new airplane, but it's a derivative of the DC-10. The MD-80 is a derivative of the DC-9, which is a mature program that they've been building for nearly 20 years, and they're having trouble producing those two airplanes. Now they're starting up a new airplane, so it should come as no surprise they are having trouble producing it.

Dr. Launius: We've never designed an airplane to do airlift like this.

Gen Cassidy: Of the three current airlift aircraft--C-141, C-130, and C-5--the C-5 is the closest to the C-17, but the C-5 was built for different reasons. In the case of the C-5, we wanted to build the biggest aircraft possible. We went to the engine manufacturers knowing that the power plants were going to determine how big the airplane

could be. We said, "How big an engine can you build?" Gerhard Neuman, "Herman the German," a guy working for GE [General Electric] at the time, said, "We can design you an 8:1 bypass ratio engine." Everybody rolled their eyes because that was twice as big as any engine to date. But he designed it and he built it. It was the TF-39 engine. We figured out how much four 8:1 bypass ratio engines could lift and built an airplane around them. It's called the C-5. We didn't look at what it would do when it got there. We didn't look at the fact that it would take six acres to park it. We didn't consider that when you turned it around, it would blow everything over in sight with those great big engines. We talked about driving it around in the dirt and the mud, not recognizing when you do that there's a lot of dirt and mud kicked up on airplanes. Certainly the footprint of the C-5 can handle it, but when you get it out in the dirt and the mud, none of the other vehicles that have to load and unload it can get to it. They get bogged down. The whole concept was kind of out ahead of itself. As an aside, the TF-39 engine became a core for GE derivatives that are flying in every aircraft in the world today. Quite frankly, the C-5 program was a great contribution to commercial aviation. We'll never get credit for it, but we energized the commercial aviation industry by developing that engine.

Dr. Launius: The C-17 is much different. It's being built to maximize throughput.

Gen Cassidy: The major issue for the Military Airlift Command, we who operate the airplanes, is throughput. That's not a very sexy thing to talk about, but throughput is the key to running an airlift operation: how much can you get through a station in a specific period of time? How many airplanes can you get through? How many cycles can you make? Can you keep the flow going? If a C-5

takes six acres to park, you can have only one of them in a place at a time, and it takes three or four hours to offload it and pump gas into it. That's not very good throughput. We've built the C-17, first and foremost, to meet the customers' needs. With the C-17, we will be able to spend 30 minutes on the ground, and do it with a reliability factor of about 98 percent versus about 70 percent for the C-5. Now you're talking about real throughput. So we built throughput into the airplane, along with reliability, maintainability, and other efficiencies. That's a first.

Strategic Sealift: USTRANSCOM's Role

Dr. Matthews: Where does TRANSCOM need to focus its efforts to improve sealift capability and reliability?

Gen Cassidy: We must be much more definitive of the overall needs; what the requirement is for shipping, how many ships do we need. We are not even close to offering that now. The notion that we should have the RRF [Ready Reserve Force] on a five-, ten-, twenty-day breakout is arbitrary. How many ships do we have on a five-day breakout? We have 55 ships on a five-day breakout. If we broke them all out in five days, the equipment wouldn't be ready to load on them. So we need to be more definitive. Say, for example, we break out the *Cape Girardeau* and the *Cape Horn* in two days. The next ship would be broken out at 2.5 days, two more in 3 days, four more in 6, and so on. Phase them into the active force as units require them. Why break our backs to do break out half the RRF in five days when all the units can't hope to move their equipment to the seaports that fast? The troop reduction will require us to be much more definitive in our planning, and if we are, we can greatly increase mobility effectiveness and efficiency.

Dr. Matthews: I want to get at your intellectual maturation on the sealift issue. I can remember in late 1987, sitting around the table at staff meetings, putting quarters in the jar every time someone used an unfamiliar acronym like FSS [Fast Sealift Ship] and RO/RO [Roll-On/Roll-Off ship] without defining it. And last week, two years later, you were not only giving congressional testimony as DOD advocate for transportation, I think it is safe to argue you were serving as a spokesman, perhaps *the* spokesman, for the revitalization of the maritime industry in this country. Think back on those early days and tell me what the major turning points were for you and TRANSCOM in this maturation, our "getting smart" on sealift issues.

Gen Cassidy: You're a product of your own environment, all of us are. I used my experience as an airlifter as my guide. Airlift and sealift both require machines, they both require trained people, and they both are fighting the elements of size and time. They are both transportation and they are both military transportation. So we compared them. We looked at how airlift got to where it is, its strengths, its infrastructure, and how we, the military, have affected the air carrier, the air cargo industry. We also searched for analogies between airlift and sealift relations with industry.

Dr. Matthews: Did you find any analogies?

Gen Cassidy: We found little to compare. The military had not interacted with the shipping industry like it had with the air transport industry, and therefore we felt that one of the reasons the maritime industry had gone to hell-in-a-hand basket was because those relationships didn't exist. Then TRANSCOM had to get smart on why that was important. If it has gone to hell-in-a-hand basket, so what? Well, the "so what" is our ability to respond to national emergencies.

The maritime industry is vital not only to our national defense, but also to our national security.

Dr. Matthews: What is the difference?

Gen Cassidy: There is a distinction between the two. I'm not sure I can tell you exactly what it is, but I will give you my opinion. National defense deals with the physical defense of the country. National security deals with greater issues. Defense is a component of security, which also includes economic, political, and social issues. Our military is not just the fighting force. It is also a large part of the social fabric, the infrastructure, of our country. The military--and especially a command like TRANSCOM, which is doing its wartime job every day in peacetime--must support the industry it needs in wartime. So what if the maritime industry is in trouble? The "so what" is in direct relation to national security, the economic and defense elements of national security, for sure. Maybe it goes beyond that, too. Remember, defending our country means defending a way of life and an ideology called freedom, liberty, and democracy. That is what the military is really all about. Our military transcends defense, so to do our job and fulfill our role, it is essential that the military in general, and TRANSCOM in particular, to support by word and deed essential industries such as the maritime industry. We can no longer take the maritime industry for granted just because it's always been there.

Dr. Matthews: What was our plan of attack?

Gen Cassidy: We saw very quickly that there was a lot of infighting in the industry and that the military was aiding and abetting the industry's self-destruction by the way it set rates, the way it used

the bureaucracy against the industry instead of to help the industry. We, the military, had not accepted our rightful role as facilitator for and supporter of the maritime industry. We were just sucking everything we could out of the industry to save money in peacetime instead of looking at the industry as a chance for us to invest a relatively small amount of money to guarantee wartime readiness. When TRANSCOM began to speak up on the issue, people in Congress, the Administration, the military said to me, "Why are you taking that on, you're nuts. It's needed, but if there's any issue in this country that you are going to catch a lot of flak on and run into deep frustration, it's going to be that one, so why take it on?" Such comments and attitudes only reinforced my belief that TRANSCOM had to take on the problem. An industry so vital to our national security had to be saved, and there was nobody else doing what needed to be done. It wasn't necessarily our rightful role, but we were positioned to do it. We have the stature to do it. The angels are on our side because it is right. Therefore, we decided we needed to get into it and see how much difference we could make, so we began probing. It looked like we could be productive. We also found that the key people would be willing partners. They were looking for leadership. They believed Defense had not played its rightful role, that the Navy had abdicated its rightful role in supporting the maritime industry. The time was right for TRANSCOM to fill the leadership vacuum.

Strategic Sealift: National Sealift Policy

Dr. Matthews: When you met with Secretary Cheney [Richard "Dick," B., Secretary of Defense 1989-1993] back in May [1989], what did you discuss? What kind of guidance did he give you on sealift?

Gen Cassidy: I told him what the problem was. He accepted what I said and he grasped the issues very quickly. I had a short four-chart briefing that told him how TRANSCOM was involved in sealift issues and why sealift was important to national defense. Admiral Crowe went with me because he felt strongly about it, too. He shook his head in the affirmative, and embellished some of the points I'd made. Mr. Cheney looked at me and said, "What do you want to do?" I said, "The first thing we have to do is get the President to sign our National Sealift Policy and that's what I'm here to do, to get your support any way I can. And I'm really also here to let you give TRANSCOM the green light to go to other agencies within the government to tell our story on sealift and the National Sealift Policy. So I'm asking you to unfetter us some and let us go." He said, "Well, have at it. I think you have an uphill battle; you have some terrible problems to deal with. I think your timeline for the sealift policy is overly ambitious, but I wish you well and give you the authority to do what you want to do."

That was a very substantive and meaningful conversation. It served two purposes. First, it let me go out and talk to people like Secretary Skinner [Samuel K., Secretary of Transportation], and I have now done that on three separate occasions. Second, it gave him a very quick thumbnail sketch of the problem and how our command was working it. We're not tinkering around with scheduling airplanes, looking after household goods, or worrying about the departure times of ships and airplanes. Those are our components' jobs. He believes TRANSCOM is dealing with the level of activity that a unified command should be dealing with, and I think he believes we can make an impact.

I also got our points across to Mr. Atwood [Donald J., Deputy Secretary of Defense] at two DRB meetings, one of which Mr.

Atwood chaired, the other chaired by Secretary Cheney. Mr. Atwood became very curious about the condition of sealift and airlift, and asked probably more questions during my briefing than any other attendee. I took the first ten minutes to say just a little bit about the command and a lot about the maritime world. And I took the last ten minutes to talk about airlift, so I was able to use the two sessions to tell him everything we wanted to tell him and get it on record with him. They were very congenial sessions, with give-and-take conversation, lots of input from [US]CINCEUR [Commander in Chief, USEUCOM], from the Chief of Staff of the Army, Secretary of the Army, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Several of the CINCs were very supportive. Mr. Atwood was quick to grasp the issues. As the Vice Chairman of General Motors, he understood transportation's contributions to bringing down inventory costs and saving capital investment, making productivity the ultimate goal. So we have the right people listening. TRANSCOM has opened up some doors that we've never been able to open before.

Dr. Matthews: Who would TRANSCOM like to see as members of that governing board, the Senior Elders for the National Sealift Policy?

Gen Cassidy: We would like to see a triumvirate of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, and the National Security Council. It should be driven by those three. A lot of this is personality-dependent. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation are so extremely strong and both of them have a very good relationship with the Secretary of State. My point is that if we can get Transportation and Defense to push the transportation issues and then include State at the right time, it would probably be the best of all possible worlds.

Dr. Matthews: At the Component Commanders' Conference [1989], you told Admiral Butcher [Commander, MSC, December 1988-February 1990] to move out on using the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] as a guide to help assure adequate sealift during war. Where is he going with that and what would you like to see come out of your guidance?

Gen Cassidy: He has already moved out. He has always been very positive. He has looked at the peacetime business as an incentive for wartime capability. He believes that for every defense dollar spent in peacetime on transportation, there is a dollar invested in wartime readiness. That's a new approach for the Military Sealift Command. Admiral Butcher can make that happen, but it is not going to be an overnight success story. It is going to be a long, slow process. He's also looking at using CRAF-type modifications as models for ship modifications. That's a program over and above sea sheds and flat racks. So he is already moving right along.

Dr. Matthews: Can we do what we need to do for sealift without giving anything up?

Gen Cassidy: We may have to give something up, but our solution to the Merchant Marine problem is to, in theory, capture more market share for US business and therefore increase the business base and, with that, the tax base. That is the right methodology, economically and militarily. But in the meantime we may have to give up something. We may have to give up some programs dedicated to one of the other transportation modes to infuse several hundred million dollars into sealift research and development. We shouldn't hesitate to advocate it, and we could make a case for it. You'd get an awful lot for your money in ability to fight, and the

CINCs will see that, too. We can't meet the price tag the Commission [Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense] set at $13 billion in the FYDP. We can't possibly afford that. But I'd emphasize that the air transportation industry--airplane manufacturing and air transport of people and cargo--contributes more to the tax base and balance of payments than any other industry in the country, and I'd argue the same potential is there for sea transportation. As the largest trading nation in the world, we need both air and sea transport primacy. Those industries will become even more important as the global economy becomes stronger. I can't help but believe that those two industries could bring down the national debt. TRANSCOM can play a major role in the process.

Dr. Matthews: Can we guarantee a pool of skilled merchant mariners without revitalizing the Merchant Marine? Is it possible?

Gen Cassidy: I don't see how. Reservists can't do the job. The demographics won't permit it. You aren't going to get old timers to be reservists. You have to go for the younger kids, and there aren't enough of them. We need a viable Merchant Marine; we've proved it over a half dozen wars. The Merchant Marine is needed for national security. Also, revitalization wouldn't cost the DOD any money, if it's done right, and it should be stated as a national objective.

Dr. Matthews: How can TRANSCOM stimulate revitalization of the Merchant Marine for national security?

Gen Cassidy: Simply, clearly, and accurately state the need at the right forums. Build a coalition of people who believe they can turn it around. We're doing that today. We will have CINCEUR, [US]CINCCENT [Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM],

[US]CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific Command], and CINCTRANS saying to the Chairman and the Chief of Naval Operations that there must be changes. There must be some funding to turn the situation around. There must be a greater effort on all our parts. That's the way we'll get it done.

Rapport with Congress and Representation in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think we have adequate representation in Washington?

Gen Cassidy: No.

Dr. Matthews: What happened to our recommendation to establish a TRANSCOM Washington Office?

Gen Cassidy: Well, it just kind of fell out because Admiral Crowe believed that the changes under the Goldwater-Nichols Act would negate the need for it. Under the Act, supposedly the Joint Staff would become a different kind of Joint Staff. In addition to supporting the Chairman, the Joint Staff would be expected to support all of the CINCs, and therefore there is no need for a TRANSCOM Washington Office because our Joint Staff is up there to do everything that we wanted done in D.C. But it's a fact that the Joint Staff doesn't work for me. They have their own agenda. So we believe that we need some more representation in Washington. But we don't think that will ever come about.

Dr. Matthews: Give me some examples why we think we don't have proper representation?

Gen Cassidy: All the work on our National Sealift Policy could have been done by a Washington Office. We have Captain Holland [Navy Captain Donald L., Chief, Logistics Policy and Systems Division] in D.C.

He's done a superb job, but he has had to live up there. With a larger office we could send representatives to more of those important meetings. We are missing opportunities to infuse transportation taskings into plans, procedures, and programs.

Dr. Matthews: Such as?

Gen Cassidy: With FEMA, with Commerce, with State, with trade organizations, with shipbuilders associations, and the unions. Those kinds of things.

Dr. Matthews: We have made significant progress it seems with the Department of Transportation.

Gen Cassidy: Oh, yes.

Dr. Matthews: Where might that lead us?

Gen Cassidy: I think it will lead us to having a closer relationship between two cabinet members who have not necessarily been very close in the past. TRANSCOM will be the catalyst for them to conduct business together. God, that has to be good. Personalities enter into it a lot, too. Right now we have Skinner and Cheney. That's luck.

Dr. Matthews: Colonel Scooler [Air Force Colonel Donald, Chief, Programs Division, Plans and Resources Directorate] allowed me to look over the written testimony you thought you were going to submit to Congress and the one you actually submitted after OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] chopped on it. I highlighted what they had taken out and discovered they had really deemphasized any urgency over sealift, and downplayed the link between industry and national security. They also took out most of your

adjectives. During your oral testimony, did you get your points across? What was the reaction of the committee?

Gen Cassidy: The PA&E [Program Analysis and Evaluation] people in OSD were the ones who made those changes. They believed, and I agree with them, that their rightful job is to make sure an issue is studied properly before DOD takes a course of action. And PA&E didn't believe that that requirement has been fulfilled. They didn't believe it has been studied enough as to what our role in it should be. They didn't fully accept my rationale, as I just described to you, for the DOD's involvement in the maritime industry. PA&E held a much narrower view: you spend a defense dollar, you get defense capability that's usable in combat to defeat the enemy and that issue, as you would imagine, is an analyst's point of view of the world. And of course, that is why we have analysts doing analytical work and commanders doing command work because we are supposed to look at things from a different point of view. Have you seen the movie, *Dead Poets Society*?

Dr. Matthews: No, I haven't.

Gen Cassidy: You should see it. Robin Williams is an instructor in a boys' school. He is a poetry professor, using poetry to teach students to think. During one lesson he tries to teach them to view an issue from an entirely different perspective than their own. To emphasize the point, he has all the students stand on their desks and he says to them, "Now, doesn't the world look different from up there compared to where you were sitting down here?" The point is compelling. PA&E must do their part and we have to do ours. They did take out a lot of the adjectives. They wanted to take out anything that would make the state of the maritime industry look like a crisis. They were afraid somebody might

overreact, which is a tendency in Washington, and lead us to a solution that we could not afford or that the Department of Defense had not agreed on. They believed that TRANSCOM was getting out ahead of them. And that is understandable. As I have said before, we see our role as a leadership role, and a leadership role is getting out ahead and that sometimes means dragging some people with us. Leaders face resistance. But this time we were up against it, 6:30 at night, before the next day's 9:30 A.M. hearing. So, we took out what we were told to take out, those parts that were not agreed to. If we had had more time, we would have debated that issue more, but we didn't have the time.

Dr. Matthews: How did the oral testimony go?

Gen Cassidy: Senator Breaux [John B., D-Louisiana], the Chairman of the Committee [Merchant Marine Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee], and I had talked a lot of times about the issues at hand. I had told him I felt we ought to quit talking about and studying the problem and get on with solutions to the problem. I felt that whatever credibility I had on the need to revitalize the maritime industry would start to wane if all I did was get up and make dinner speeches or luncheon speeches about how bad things were, how we should get together and hold hands and fix it. Sometime somebody's going to have to propose solutions and that's what I wanted to do, offer solutions, and Senator Breaux knew that. So he'd read my statement, and it was very clear and obvious to him that there wasn't much meat on the bone. And he said that as he opened up the hearing: "General Cassidy, I've read your statement, and it appears to me that there is an awful lot of platitudes in here." He said for instance, "Your one statement here says it is time for some drastic action, some bold action." He asked, "What would that be?"

Dr. Matthews: So the ground rules changed?

Gen Cassidy: I characterized my response as personal and not an opinion of the Department [of Defense]. You are required by law and by DOD regulations to give straight, direct personal answers during congressional testimony. So I opened up by saying, "If I were king for a day, this is what I would do," which established what followed as Duane Cassidy's opinion. But it really established more because everyone knows I have the whole unified transportation command behind me and I had become somewhat of a spokesman for fixing the problem. So I outlined several controversial solutions. I told him somebody is going to be against all of these, but we ought to deal with them up front.

First of all, I dealt with the shipbuilders and ship operators, the relationship between the two, and how the two are linked by the 1936 Merchant Marine Act. "But," I said, "let's eat this elephant piece by piece. You can't fix both of those industries at once. You have to fix them separately. They have separate solutions, they have separate problems, they have separate cultures, and they should not be dealt with in the same solution set." That is absolutely basic to the problem and it is so apparent. He seemed to accept it. I told him we have to look critically at government regulations and do away with as many of them as possible, because over-regulation is costing liner companies billions of dollars in shipping a year and they can't survive in that atmosphere. Some of the rules and regulations for operating US flag ships are more restrictive than the international rules that we, the United States, helped establish. We have to look at what the tax reform acts have done to this industry. If you accept my premise that this is not just another industry, if you accept my premise that the health of this industry has a direct bearing on national security, then you have to

accept the fact that if some tax reform has been detrimental to the maritime industry, then you may want to make an exception for it. That will be controversial. As soon as you make an exception for one industry, then somebody is going to want exceptions for the steel, tourism, and automobile industries, etc. But there should be tax incentives for an ailing industry. Maybe we could have sundown clauses.

Dr. Matthews: For instance?

Gen Cassidy: You could take the relative tax flow into the treasury from this industry now and say, "We are going to give you some tax breaks until the industry is revitalized and it can start producing more tax dollars to be put back in. And at a certain time, the knee of the curve, the crossover point, then let's do away with those tax incentives and let the industry live on its own." But you have to start somewhere to help them. And if you can't give them a big infusion of capital, if you don't think you can afford that, then you have to find some other ways to stimulate the industry, and tax breaks are one way. I suggested we do that.

Dr. Matthews: You discussed operating differential subsidies [ODS]?

Gen Cassidy: I also discussed ODS. I said, "Let's take the $235 million that we have in subsidies today and reform it so it gets us the most for the dollar. It is not getting us $235 million of productivity out of that industry and therefore, if we are going to put that much money into the industry, then we ought to get our money's worth, and we are not. We have to have ODS reform and we ought to get on with it."

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything you wish you would have done or said differently during the testimony?

Gen Cassidy: Ironically, it worked out better than I expected. As I said to Admiral Herberger today, I got more attention because it had been so difficult to get the statement through. We were able to hit all the issues we thought important to the industry. So I can't think of anything I would have done differently.

Command and Control Systems for Transportation

Dr. Matthews: What is TRANSCOM's role in containerization and intransit tracking [intransit visibility] of cargo?

Gen Cassidy: They are inherent TRANSCOM responsibilities. Containerization maximizes the use of what is available. There is a certain amount of dead weight tonnage available for containerized cargo, and we must use that to our best advantage and efficiency. Containerization solves a part of a problem, which is a total lift problem, and tracking solves the problem of our ability to adjust the flow, divert the flow, return the flow, and support the national strategy, which may be start, stop, start, stop, start, stop, turn around and come home. You can't do that without intransit visibility.

Dr. Matthews: TRANSCOM's Implementation Plan makes it CINCTRANS' responsibility to integrate transportation, mobility, and deployment ADP systems into a single deployment system.

Gen Cassidy: We are merging JDS and JOPS [Joint Operation Planning System] into JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System] to create a single system for deliberate and execution planning. We have also launched a program to tie together DOD and commercial transportation systems. We've dubbed it GTN, the Global

Transportation Network. Bringing GTN to fruition must remain one of TRANSCOM's highest priorities in the years to come.

Dr. Launius: Why has it taken so long to get JOPES up and running?

Gen Cassidy: Ever since I've been a flag officer, I've been wrestling with MAC's relationship with the Joint Deployment System. If you remember, the Joint Deployment Agency was established in 1979, and that's when I was Assistant DO. My boss, the DO at that time, was General Baginski [Air Force Major General James I.]. He left the MAC/DO position to become the director of the Joint Deployment Agency. With all his knowledge of MAC, he tended to use MAC as a sounding board. He knew what information was available at MAC, so he would lean on MAC to give him all the information we had in our systems. We said, "No, we're not going to give it to you; you don't need it." It became an adversarial relationship between the Joint Deployment Agency and MAC. We kind of led the other two TOAs--MTMC and MSC--and created adversarial relationships in the whole deployment community. There was no cooperation, and there was nobody who had directive authority to change the situation, no unified, four-star transportation command. MAC was particularly at fault. We were shortsighted.

Dr. Launius: MAC had its own tool then and now, the FLOGEN, the flow generator, for deliberate planning.

Gen Cassidy: The FLOGEN was never designed for anything else, but we began to use it in execution planning, too. It really didn't serve execution planning well, but it was the only thing on the table at the time, and so FLOGEN became a household word in the mobility community. The Joint Deployment Agency was filled with a lot of

very bright people from the Air Force and other Services who tried to adapt FLOGEN to their execution planning needs, but it was an incredibly unwieldy system for that purpose.

The Joint Deployment Agency then began complaining because FLOGEN wouldn't do the job that JDA wanted done. The whole mobility system was in trouble as a result. Joint Deployment Agency people said, "You MAC guys can't produce what we need." Well, no wonder we couldn't do it, the flow generator was never designed for that. As a result, we started to build the second generation flow generator, which we called ADANS [Airlift Deployment Analysis System]. It does much more than generate an airlift flow. It gives us the ability to intervene. It gives us the ability to stop, to start, and to change in midstream. The point is, TRANSCOM now has the ball. It must make sure that all of the Services' transportation systems talk to one another. It is a daunting task.

Conclusion

Dr. Launius: At the beginning of our interview, you said that, compared to your peer group early on in your career, you were "behind" in your education. Was it tough getting your degree?

Gen Cassidy: I went to night school for years. I started night school at Selfridge [AFB, Michigan] when I worked for the Air Rescue Service and continued it in Charleston, even when I was in pilot training, and the whole time I was at McCoy. The way I did that was a little unique. Night schools in those days were just at colleges, not on the bases like now. They didn't have courses tailored to the military lifestyle. I wound up taking a lot of the courses twice, because often I was not in one place long enough to complete the

work. We were going TDY all the time. Rosalie, my wife, would attend classes in my place when I was TDY to Europe or Africa on what we called Reflex,* sitting nuclear alert. She would tape the courses on one of those old reel-to-reel tape recorders. She'd send the tape over to me on the next airplane. I'd listen to the lectures and relisten to them, but I didn't quite get all I needed because I missed the classroom discussions, the give and take. So I had a hell of a time. I wound up having credits from 12 different colleges when I finally received my bachelor's degree from Omaha while on leave just before I went to Vietnam.

Dr. Launius: And your master's degree?

Gen Cassidy: In 1974, as a lieutenant colonel, I went to the Air War College. I really had a great time and I did well. I was a Distinguished Graduate, got a master's degree, won some golf tournaments, and the championship in racquetball. I decided while at Maxwell [AFB, Alabama] that I would only do the things I liked to do, which for me was a recipe for success.

Dr. Matthews: What do you consider to be your biggest success at TRANSCOM?

Gen Cassidy: I'd have to say the stature of the command itself. I am really very proud that we've brought TRANSCOM so far, so fast. TRANSCOM is a real success story already. I am professionally and personally proud to have had a part in it.

Dr. Matthews: What else do you hope to accomplish for TRANSCOM in the next month?

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*Reflex Action began in July 1957 and was based on the premise that placing a few crews and aircraft on ground alert at overseas bases was more effective than maintaining entire wings at these bases on a rotational basis.

Gen Cassidy: First of all, I hope that the NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association] Forum will be very, very successful because we have moved into NDTA in a big way. The NDTA can be the conduit between us and industry. If this Forum, the second one we've been in, is a success, our relationship will become institutionalized. Second, my biggest responsibility before I leave is to the people who have been so loyal to me, who have worked so hard for me, and who have gone 12 extra miles for me, guys like you, Jim. I have a responsibility to you all to make the transition to the new CINC, General Johnson, one of class, and stature, and smoothness. A transition that will be worthy of all the work that you have done. A transition that will permit you and the rest of that exceptional team of people we put together to slip right into the next phase of TRANSCOM, on a higher level than you started on.

Dr. Matthews: Specifically, what will you do to smooth the transition?

Gen Cassidy: First of all, I will take General Johnson around and introduce him to the right kinds of people and say, "This is my friend, General Johnson. He's my choice to replace me. I want you to give him the same kind of support that you have given me." I'll say that to a dozen congressmen and senators. I'll say that to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation. I'll say that to the National Security Council. I want General Johnson to know all the people I've known, those who helped us get to where we are today. I intend to tell him why I've done things as I've done them, recognizing he will do things differently. He ought to know why we did them the way we did them. Then I'm just not going to say "Okay, over to you." I'm going to sit down and rather laboriously take him through the process. He is a quick study and absorbs information very quickly. Then I want to use my close personal

relationship with him to make sure that he doesn't do anything drastic. He won't. But I owe that to the command to help absorb the shock. There are likely people who are worried about this transition, probably more so this time because there are two commands involved and he is a non-transportation guy. I have to make the transition as smooth and palatable as possible, and I have to get him up to speed as soon as possible, make sure there are no hiccups, no pauses.

Dr. Matthews: You say he was your choice. You can actually choose your successor?

Gen Cassidy: You have a choice and he is a choice that I am delighted with. There are some I wouldn't have been happy with and I would have struggled with. I have seen a lot of changes of commands in which senior commanders didn't even speak to each other because they didn't like each other. That's dumb. It serves no purpose.

Dr. Matthews: What would you have done differently as CINCTRANS?

Gen Cassidy: I can't think of anything, and I guess that is kind of arrogant.

Dr. Launius: As you look back on your experiences as CINCMAC, is there any special highlight that you can recall?

Gen Cassidy: MAC does big things all the time, and we tend to take them for granted. But the accomplishments that stand out in my mind are some of our little, less recognized ones, like when we took down the 50-foot flag pole and put up an 80-foot flag pole with a great big flag on it out in front of our headquarters building. I remember very fondly the Airlift Rodeo [1987] with Bob Hope and Lucille Ball and the President [President Reagan].

And then there was the Air Tattoo here. I attended the first night of festivities in my old grubby clothes to mingle with the crowd. I overheard two young kids, probably 10 or 12 years old. One said to the other, "Is this impressive or what?" I thought, "That's all the payback I need for putting on the show."

All those little events and exercises combine to build an esprit de corps that I see present everywhere I go in MAC. People are, and should be, very proud of our command, our Armed Forces, and our nation. That's what I remember the most.

Dr. Matthews: How about your heart-felt assessment of this last assignment as CINCTRANS? What does it really mean to you?

Gen Cassidy: Serving as CINCTRANS has been fun and it has been a personal and professional triumph, one to be shared by all airlifters. I never planned to do it, and I never asked to do it. I got here for a variety of reasons, but lots of people probably could have done the job. But it was me. I am also proud that an airlifter has been brought into the key Department of Defense decision-making processes. I am extremely proud that TRANSCOM has already set new standards for joint cooperation and established itself as an advocate for the health of the commercial transportation industry. It is a privilege beyond belief to have been a part of the United States Transportation Command at its inception.

Part III: Epilogue

A General Officer in the Business World[*]

Introduction

Dr. Matthews: At your change of command and retirement ceremony, a train went by and gave us a toot. What was that all about?

Gen Cassidy: [Laughter] Some of the Air Force guys who planned the parade were kidding me about going with a company that's principally a railroad. You have to agree, it was a nice touch.

Dr. Matthews: [Laughter] I'm just trying to figure out how they orchestrated it. In the airlift business you have the "time over target"; you have to be really punctual. Was the train sitting down the track watching the clock?

Gen Cassidy: [Laughter] Yes, waiting for "time over target." That's probably the only time in the history of railroads that they've been precise. Railroading is not a precision business.

Dr. Matthews: Why do you think CSX hired you?

Gen Cassidy: Primarily it was personality driven. John Snow,[**] the chairman of CSX, and I knew each other well. He knew I was looking to do something different. I told him I didn't want to be a consultant,

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[*]Interview conducted by Dr. James K. Matthews in July 1998.

[**]In 1988, John W. Snow was President and Chief Executive Officer, CSX, Richmond, Virginia. Currently, he is Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, CSX Corporation.

and I didn't want to just sit on a board of directors somewhere passing judgement on things I knew little about. Also, I told him I wanted to see if my success in the military was legitimate or just a big fluke, and I thought I had something to offer the business world. He said, "Well, good. Come to CSX." I said, "Fine. What do you want me to do?" He said, "I don't know." So that's the way it started. Wasn't very formal, was it? [Laughter]

Dr. Matthews: [Laughter] Like wearing a polo shirt to your new job at CSX where your co-workers call you "Duane." How did you get to know John Snow?

Gen Cassidy: NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association]. In 1987, the Airlift Committee [of the NDTA] was made up of people from the airline industry and two members representing at least one other mode. Larry [R.] Scott, Chairman and CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of Consolidated Freightways Corporation, and John Snow, President of CSX Railroad were the "other mode" members of the Airlift Committee back then. There was one particularly difficult problem we were working on, so John suggested, "Why don't we go down to the CSX retreat in Boca Grande [Florida]--it's kind of a fish camp--and we'll thrash this out over the weekend." So we solved that problem and we called the result "The Snow Solution," because John was our host. The more I got to know John, the more I liked him. He is a unique individual. He is an academic--he has a Ph.D. in economics--a lawyer, and a businessman all rolled into one. He was also in government as Under Secretary of Transportation during the Ford Administration. John and I are now very close friends.

Dr. Matthews: What Air Force and joint experiences, education, and training did you find most useful in your civilian career with CSX?

Gen Cassidy: First and foremost, leadership skills, especially the ability to match people with jobs. Now, I never took a course that specifically taught me that skill, although many courses in college helped me develop it. Secondly, the ability to focus on processes. Large businesses, like the military, must change processes to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. The similarities between the military and business are perhaps greater in the transportation arena than in any other field. Processes are much like transportation networks. Organizations like [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command], AMC [Air Mobility Command], MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command], MSC [Military Sealift Command], CSX, APL [American President Lines], Fed Ex [Federal Express], and Landstar all oversee processes called transportation networks. When they think processes, they are really thinking about operating huge transportation networks: air, land or sea, trucks, trains, or planes, it makes little difference. And I would argue that an orientation to processes facilitates people skills. To successfully reengineer processes, leaders must also understand their people. Consequently, the skills I learned in the military were readily transferable to the business world.

Dr. Matthews: The article in *Traffic World*,[*] the one I gave you earlier, listed several military characteristics that have been sought after by transportation and logistics companies. I'm going to throw some of these terms out and see what your reaction is, see if, when you look back on your career with CSX, these characteristics helped you get the job done. First, "mental and physical discipline."

[*]Ann Saccoman, "Transport Wants You," *Traffic World*, 4 May 1998.

Gen Cassidy: Absolutely. Discipline gives you energy. You have to know how to manage your energy. Military officers, and particularly pilots, must learn discipline to manage energy. Discipline has to do with being efficient, working on the right things at the right times. It doesn't mean just doing things right or wrong. Department of Defense employees, military and civilian, succeed in the private sector because discipline and energy are the keys to success there, too.

Dr. Matthews: "Civic-minded."

Gen Cassidy: The military is inherently civic-minded. We are all one big family with our own local-governmental structure. Take the Air Force for example. The base commander is the mayor who oversees all public services for his "family": housing, fire and police protection, health and medical care, shopping, and recreation. Thus we service folks are trained early on to be civic-minded and, better than most any other profession, we focus on our people. So if we go into business, we bring to the corporation a natural inclination to provide services and support to our employees. And our contribution to civic thinking in the private sector is perhaps even more valuable in the transportation business than in other businesses because transportation is so people-intensive. It requires large numbers of people. You can't put a business like ours on autopilot because it is always moving, both in space and time. It is like "trying to paint a moving train" or like "milking cows." Cows never stay milked. You get them milked today and you have to milk them again tomorrow. Therefore, the transportation business places tremendous demands on its large numbers of people. So transportation companies had better support their people's support networks or they will lose their people. CSX's care for and support of its people really turned me

on to the business world. I suspect my military service, in regards to civic-mindedness, helped make me a good fit with CSX. In conclusion, companies that ignore their people's needs just don't last.

Dr. Matthews: "Teamwork."

Gen Cassidy: The military conception of teamwork differs from the one I found in business. I don't like the way the private sector "builds" teams. They just try to buy people. People can only be bought for a little while. In the private sector the notion of teamwork is like "the flavor of the day." "Today we are going to create teamwork" or this year is "The Year of Teamwork." In the military, everything is fundamentally based on teamwork. Leadership in business, like leadership in the military, should demand teamwork day in and day out. Leaders who don't demand it as a way of life, and employees who are not team players--those who don't understand the value of teams and the value of each team member--have to be removed from the organization.

Dr. Matthews: "Safety."

Gen Cassidy: Safety is a way of life in the military, and our ability to "think safety" is definitely a desired trait in the private sector. Your safety record and your efficiency measures must be linked hand-in-hand. Safety has to be inbred into everybody. It's a teamwork issue. Troops have to look out for each other. If you do your job efficiently and the way you set out to accomplish it, then you will most likely avoid accident and injury. Safety has to be everyone's issue all the time, and it has to be built into every process. It must be seen as important to every person in the organization and it is leadership's responsibility to make it so. If safety is not central to

all activity of the organization, the organization will be in chaos. Thus safety is inextricably linked to teamwork, leadership, process improvement, and TQM [Total Quality Management], all of which the military offers to the private sector.

Dr. Matthews: Does CSX have a culture of quality?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. CSX attempts to put a cost on quality. The term "cost of quality" is really better said "the cost of no quality." If you don't do a quality job, what has it cost you? And they put a number against that, reducing it to dollars and cents. And it has a huge influence on safety, which is also reduced to dollars and cents. Those programs are inherent in the day-to-day business of the company.

Dr. Matthews: Is there actually a quality office?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, in all the companies. CSX has many quality programs.

Dr. Matthews: Senior military officers are selfless. Did you draw upon that character trait in the private sector?

Gen Cassidy: Oh, yes. The people I most enjoyed being with in the business world were like my military friends: selfless. As in the military, I found my business colleagues to be wonderful, marvelous people to work with. The military personality and the business personality are a near perfect match.

Dr. Matthews: Were there other characteristics that as a senior military officer you brought to the business world that we haven't discussed?

Gen Cassidy: It's amazing how similar the organizations are. Because, once again, they are both people-intensive.

Dr. Matthews: You do have some motivational tools in the private sector that you don't have in the military!

Gen Cassidy: Yes, monetary compensation, for one. And you can also make sure people feel like they are part of the organization by giving them part of the organization in stock options. But you're still faced with the same types of problems. There's still only one CEO and there's only one CINC [Commander in Chief], but there are a dozen or more people in the organization capable and qualified to fill the top position. People have their private lives. There's only so much of their time that they can give to the company. And, as in the military, the ones you want the most are always the busiest ones. So you have to offer your best and brightest employees things that will turn them on to spending more than 40 hours a week with the company. Private industry takes the easy way out, for the most part. It gives a guy or gal a gob of money to buy his or her allegiance and dedication. That works in the short-term, but not the long run.

Dr. Matthews: Landstar, and undoubtedly other transportation companies, has an educational program they call Training with Industry, where they bring junior military officers into their organization for a year to teach them business practices. Does CSX have anything like that?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, it does. The military has been putting young officers, captains generally, into the private sector for a long time. The military has to give up a slot and a body for the year. The private sector pays the military for that slot.

Dr. Matthews: It seems like TRANSCOM should get involved in such a program. Maybe we already are, but I have not heard about it.

Gen Cassidy: Somebody in your GTN [Global Transportation Network] shop who is interested in policy would be a good candidate for a year tour with CSX. From what I know about such training programs, they are a benefit for all concerned: trainees, the military, and especially business. And there's the rub: if those captains do a bang-up job, the private sector will offer them triple their military salary to come work for the company as soon as their service commitment is up.

Dr. Matthews: Does CSX have a policy to hire former military?

Gen Cassidy: Nothing written down. When I came to work for CSX, there were some former military in the organization. They came in through the training with industry arrangement, and the corporation found them with headhunters and through personal connections. I personally brought in about two dozen, including H. T. Johnson's son, Rich, who is former Marine Corps. He first worked for us in military procurement with the railroad and has since moved up in the railroad's sales and marketing structure. Rich is currently National Account Manager for Integrated Steel Raw Materials. I also brought [retired Army Major General and former USTRANSCOM Director of Plans and Programs] Jack [John R.] Piatak's son, Tom, into the organization. He is former Army, and serves CSX now as Director of Marketing for CSX TransFlo, which manages rail-to-truck and truck-to-rail transfer operations. Both Rich and Tom have done very well with the corporation, as have the other former military. I hired them because I trusted them and knew they would excel. I suspect their success will result in many more former military coming to work for CSX.

Dr. Matthews: And you hired General Piatak. I remember that after he retired from the Army as MTMC Commanding General, he went to the

former Soviet Union to look at their rail system. What was that about?

Gen Cassidy: First he came to work for me in Alexandria [Virginia]. He and I shut down the Sea-Land/CSX Logistics group, after which he led a twelve-person team--comprised of representatives from CSX's sea, rail, and intermodal companies--to the former Soviet Union. Serving as consultants to the Russian Ministry of Transportation, they assessed transportation--seaports, railroad, and intermodal--and other infrastructure capabilities in an effort to improve trans-Siberian operations. Jack then used his wealth of logistical experience with the Army to help Sea-Land form a joint venture company with the Russian government to move containers by rail from the Far East to Europe. That operation is ongoing. General Piatak is now Assistant Vice President, Customer Service at CSX.

Crisis Management versus Strategic Planning

Dr. Matthews: I have thought of another military skill you might have used in your business career: crisis management.

Gen Cassidy: I would like to put a spin on my response to this one. Sure, military experiences include crisis management, and we bring them to bear upon private sector activities. We are valued for our ability to manage crises. But more importantly, we bring to the table experiences in strategic planning, which I found sadly lacking in the business world. There are many people in business who don't do anything well unless there is a crisis. They find their fun in rolling up their sleeves to attack the crisis *de jour*, and then when they get through the day's turmoil, they say, "Wow, that was great!" But what does that do to make tomorrow better than

today? If the corporation had planned strategically, thought strategically, it could have probably avoided the crisis in the first place, thus saving cash and time that they could have used to create profit in the future.

Dr. Matthews: Did you encounter such people at CSX?

Gen Cassidy: I recall one individual in a management position at CSX who told me, "Hey, I really don't care much about all this strategic stuff. I'm a good tactical guy, so that's what I want to do." When this guy didn't have a crisis to manage, he'd create one to perpetuate the company's need for him. He wasn't missed all that much after he retired. The company might want a few of these "tactical types" or crisis management experts, but it certainly doesn't want them at high levels. Former military personnel bring to business good strategic planning to put processes in place that increase profit and time for investment in the future. We offer them crisis management skills, certainly, but more importantly, we give them crisis avoidance through strategic thinking.

Dr. Matthews: You had the TOs, Tactical Officers, in the Air Force, too.

Gen Cassidy: We called them "Old Goats." They actually had a patch that said "The Old Goats," and they were proud of it. They knew how to run a fort. They would gladly go out every day to fly an airplane and do tactical drops, but if you asked them to sit down and plan a strategic drop or write a training syllabus, their eyes would glass over. They wanted no part of it. Occasionally, and usually inadvertently, we would promote them because they were good at what they did--they helped us get through the day--and we all loved them. But you should really promote people for their potential.

Dr. Matthews: Why do you think business does not give strategic planning its due?

Gen Cassidy: They never get around to it because Wall Street is constantly pushing them to get stock prices up, and stock prices can be pushed up dramatically by some short-term, one quarter gain. It's quite amazing how fast dividends accumulate. As an example, let's hypothesize about one good year at CSX, in which we bump up the stock three dollars a share. On the surface, that may not seem like much. But there are 240 million shares of CSX stock out there. So, three dollars a share is $720 million of wealth created. A businessman tends to concentrate on realizing that sort of quick profit rather than working on building his organization for the future so a guy who replaces him ten years up the road pockets his share of that 720 million bucks.

Dr. Matthews: Too bad we couldn't have bought stock in TRANSCOM eleven years ago.

Gen Cassidy: [Laughter] We plank owners should have figured out a way in 1987 to "buy" virtual shares, with virtual stock credit each year, so, just for fun, we could see what we are worth today. I am sure we would all be virtually wealthy.

Dr. Matthews: Why did you retire from CSX?

Gen Cassidy: At age 62 I felt that within a year it would be right for me to retire from the railroad, and also it would be the right thing to do for the company. Three of the five senior vice presidents, including me, were scheduled to retire within a month of each other on their 65th birthdays. We needed, I felt, a succession plan that staggered those retirements. I said, "Okay, I'm the oldest guy by a year or

two, I'll retire now." So I did a year later, staying long enough to work the succession issue and a few others.

Dr. Matthews: Why had the organization not "grown" a successor for you?

Gen Cassidy: Building succession plans go hand in glove with moving an organization from the tactical, crisis planning mode to the strategic, long-term planning mode. Part of a strategic plan is building a succession plan, which necessitates identifying people's strengths and weaknesses. You must then capitalize on their strengths, but more importantly, you must help them grow out of their weaknesses, which means assigning them tasks and putting them into jobs where they are forced to confront and, hopefully, overcome their weaknesses. Part of this maturation process should include development of strategic thinkers. Succession plan building needs to start at the top with the CEO or it won't play out down the chain. At any given time, the company should have three or four successors apparent--two or three from inside the company and one somewhere else--for the corporate staff, which at CSX includes the CEO, the chief financial officer, the lawyer, and the head of public affairs. None of those positions have successors groomed. Strategic thinking and succession planning are not inherently part of most business cultures. Business tends to relegate strategic planning to the CEO and succession planning to the human resources department when such matters should really be everyone's concern and responsibility.

People: An Organization's Most Important Asset

Dr Matthews: As Senior Vice President for Sales and Marketing, you met executives from most of your company's customers, which

included some of the nation's largest corporations. Did you find any that were dedicated to succession planning?

Gen Cassidy: I dealt with over 400 companies, virtually every company in the country uses railroads, and many of the largest--like Chrysler, General Motors [GM], Ford, Allied Signal, and Proctor and Gamble--allowed me to study their operations in detail and close-up. I can count on one hand the number I came across that are serious about succession planning. Let me compare and contrast two, GE [General Electric], which is, and GM, which isn't. I got to know one of the top five people at GM very well. Whenever we met, he talked about cars, organizational structures, and North American versus European markets. He was fascinating. Then I would play golf with GE's CEO, Jack Welch [John F. Welch, Jr., Chairman of the Board and CEO]. He would talk two minutes about such things, and then the rest of the time he would want to discuss people issues: how to find candidates, how to select the right person for the right job, and training programs. GE is focused on people. GE has the best employee-development program in the world. GE is the largest company in the world. GM is focused on products, and consequently, it is in dire straits, and will be in trouble for years to come.

Dr Matthews: Does GE seek out former military?

Gen Cassidy: In a big way. Jack Welch has a program designed to recruit and hire 250 ex-military people per year. He may not be sure where he will put them, but he hires them anyway. He uses professional headhunters who specialize in recruitment of former military for industry.

Dr: Matthews: In summary, then, GE is an excellent example of a company that is people-oriented, which includes a program that grooms successors, and consequently, it is strategically set for continued success.

Gen Cassidy: You bet! And, for all the reasons we discussed earlier, GE wants ex-military in their organization. The keys to success, in the military and in business, are thinking strategically, truly caring for people, knowing how to motivate them, and grooming them for success. I call that leadership.

Dr. Matthews: It seems that our former CINCs, beginning with yourself, have been conscientious in succession planning for ten years out and longer. There is a long list of names for that CEO job well into the next century.

Gen Cassidy: After me, there was a series of non-strategic mobility types in the position: H. T. Johnson, Ron Fogleman, and Skip Rutherford.* But we all recognized that our role as TRANSCOM CEO required us to prepare airlifters and other transportation experts to fill the top jobs in the command and throughout the DOD [Department of Defense].

Dr. Matthews: So, like in industry, we should have some CEO/CINC candidates inside and some outside the business?

Gen Cassidy: I want to make myself clear here. I am not saying that a non-airlifter can't be a great CINCTRANS. Take Fogleman, for sake of discussion. Even though he was not an airlifter, he was really great for the command because he put people above all else. He

*Air Force General Hansford T. Johnson, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM [USCINCTRANS], September 1989-August 1992; Air Force General Ronald R. Fogleman, USCINCTRANS, August 1992-October 1994; and Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, USCINCTRANS, October 1994-July 1996.

identified with his people and they with him. He went out in the field and played Crud.* He made his job and his people's jobs fun. He added excitement to everything. He sparred intellectually. He believes that if his ideas can't stand scrutiny and debate by the young guys and gals, then his ideas aren't worth a damn. But an airlifter has a huge leg up in the job because he doesn't have to focus all of his attention on learning the transportation business. Look at Walt Kross [Air Force General Walter, USCINCTRANS, July 1996-August 1998]. He came in on day one as CINCTRANS and by day two he knew most everything a guy could know about the business because he grew up in MAC [Military Airlift Command, predecessor to AMC] and served previously as the TRANSCOM J3/J4 [Director, Operations and Logistics Directorate]. Almost immediately he could focus his attention on his people. We have come back now to just about where we started with this interview: transportation is a people intensive business, so people must come first.

Dr. Matthews: I understand the trucking industry last year was about 80,000 truck drivers short.

Gen Cassidy: Why is that?

Dr. Matthews: I read recently a comment from someone at Schneider [National, Inc.] stating that, in today's job market, people can find work other than trucking that pays just as well, but doesn't keep them away from home and family.

Gen Cassidy: How do you solve that? Most of the trucking companies have a turnover of drivers of over one hundred percent. One that doesn't is Landstar. It's owner-operated. So is "owner-operated" the

*A full-contact team sport using a billiards table, one billiard ball, and one cue

answer? Probably not. Perhaps the rail industry could solve some of the trucking industry's problems. Perhaps truckers should carry the goods for three hundred miles, about a day's driving distance. They then could transfer the goods to rail for the long haul. At the end of the line, the goods go back to the trucks for a three hundred-mile or less distribution. How do we do that? We must focus on the people, not on trucks, or trains, or aircraft.

Dr. Matthews: The Air Force's retention problems?

Gen Cassidy: The trucking industry's retention problems are not dissimilar from the Air Force's retention problems, nor are their solutions that much different.

Dr. Matthews: I also read that Schneider has gone to buying up companies just to get their drivers.

Gen Cassidy: Buy it. That's a typical industry solution. "What's the problem? We'll fix it by buying our way out of it." Buying your way out of it is the short-term solution. If Schneider buys up those companies for the drivers and they don't fundamentally change their operation, they'll be right back where they started, only this time with a huge debt.

Dr. Matthews: What do you think about the trucking industry increasing the driver pool by targeting women and retired couples?

Gen Cassidy: Potentially, they could at least double the pool, but the point is they are after the best people, not just people. The only way you're going to get the best people and keep the best people is by making their job the kind of job that they can live with. That doesn't mean driving a truck 12 hours a day and then sleeping in

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ball.

the cab 12 hours a day. If you're going to make them do that, you had better compensate them accordingly--benefits, job satisfaction, and job security--not just pay. Then you need a leadership that makes them feel good about what they are doing. Leadership must understand the job of driving a truck, or driving a train, or driving an airplane. It likely cannot be solved by a chief financial officer. It has to be solved by people who have empathy for the people, the employees, who are doing the fundamental work of the business. The fundamental work of the business isn't financial. General Motors is being run by people who are completely out of touch with the workers. Does that mean you should acquiesce to the workers? No. That means you should know your workers, get out there and prove to them you understand what they're doing. Make them part of the solution. That's how we created TRANSCOM. We made everyone a part of the solution.

Know Your Customers: Service Demand and Demand for Services

Dr. Matthews: When you went to work at CSX in October 1989, you filled a new position, Vice President for Logistics Technology. As I understand it, you were charged with doing a macro level analysis of the entire CSX corporate customer base. For what purpose?

Gen Cassidy: I wasn't charged with doing an analysis, per se. I was charged with seeing how CSX could embrace technology. I, and my staff of two, looked for opportunities and then went to our components for final solutions. When I was in the military, I believed solutions were in the field staffs. I believed that when I worked for CSX. I believe that today. Remember, this company is made up of very old, very mature industries. The ocean shipping industry has been around since before Christ and America grew up on railroads. Businessmen are always looking for ways to rejuvenate their mature businesses. The question was: is technology a rejuvenator? Ergo my title, Vice President for Logistics Technology; we embraced the notion of logistics, rather than just transportation, and looked at how technology could give our old, mature companies a real bump.

Dr. Matthews: What did you find, especially in regard to commonality among your customers?

Gen Cassidy: The main conclusion we reached was that our customers' demands for quality transportation services were rising much faster than the old mature transportation companies realized or were prepared to meet. The rise in our customer expectations was tied to the increasingly global economy: the American consumer, that is, our customers' customers, had come to expect the highest quality

product without regard to where it came from. The classic example: Japanese automobiles, which forced American automakers to dramatically improve their products and become more efficient. That meant they needed to look closely at their inventory costs, and at the heart of inventory costs is transportation. The transformation from the lowest level demand to the highest level demand for transportation services took place in a relatively short time, about 15 to 20 years. And that level of demand was foreign to the transportation industry. We were used to the customer accepting whatever service we provided.

Dr Matthews: In what ways did you and your auto customer change behaviors?

Gen Cassidy: Business makes strange bedfellows. For instance, the automobile business not too long ago would never dream about transporting a Ford and a Chevy on the same vehicle to their respective dealerships. Yet it is inherently sensible to do so to lower transportation costs. If the two types of vehicles are made in Michigan, and they are both going to be sold in California, there is no good business reason why they could not be on the same train or truck. But the industry mind set was “competitors don’t mix.” But we, the transporters, applied our expertise and technology to fill up the trains and trucks to give our automaker customers cheaper transportation rates. New economic realities, new customer imperatives and demands, created a new mind set and stronger partnerships between us and our customers for both our benefits.

Dr. Matthews: How about the type of customer? Did you find changes there?

Gen Cassidy: They have remained much the same. There is the bulk industry of manufacturing and merchandising. And then there is the

automobile industry. Again, the change was in our customers' expectations for service. Think about the aircraft manufacturing industry. We used to be comfortable and happy if we had a dispatch, or reliability, rate on an airplane of 75 percent. That was darn good for something as complicated as an airplane. Today, [The] Boeing [Company] guarantees a dispatch rate on its commercial airplanes of 98 percent. A dramatic, almost unbelievable change. That 23 percent improvement required huge investments for manufacturing. In fact, Boeing changed their production philosophy. It began to build reliability into the production process.

Dr. Matthews: And that built-in reliability translates also into improved departure times?

Gen Cassidy: Passenger airlines departure times used to be in the low 80 percentile. I was on a series of trips over the last four months requiring sixteen departures. Fifteen were on time. The airlines have built reliability into the system. They put quality processes into place. Perhaps most importantly, they've used technology for root cause analysis. We, the transportation industry, have looked at our systems and processes and made them inherently reliable. That wasn't one of the mainstays of transportation twenty years ago. It wasn't necessary. It's now demanded by customers.

Dr. Matthews: It's "service demand" and it's "demand for more services."

Gen Cassidy: Yes. Our customers want us to guarantee reliability and predictability. That takes care of the "service demand." Then they are also demanding more services, specifically they want us to satisfy their total transportation need. They don't come to us anymore just for rail movement. Now they come to us for point-

to-point movement. And that may be truck-rail-truck, truck-rail-barge, rail-truck-truck, or rail-ocean-truck. We have a ways to go before we can meet all our customers' "service demand" for meeting their "demand for more services," but we have had some great successes.

Know Your Customers: The Kuwaiti Example

Dr. Matthews: An example, please.

Gen Cassidy: When the Iraqis occupied Kuwait in August 1990, the Kuwaitis formed a government in exile in Saudi Arabia, which bought emergency relief supplies, predominantly in the United States and the United Kingdom [UK]. The Kuwaitis knew they would go back home some day to rebuild their country, so they began stockpiling everything from blood, beds, and blankets to ambulances, trucks, and cars. They spent nearly a billion dollars buying emergency relief supplies. And then they said "My goodness, we're going to have to get it all home." They came to CSX for help. We used a slick technology program to locate all their various stockpiles in the US and UK and to sequence their movement into Kuwait.

Dr. Matthews: You developed a TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data] for them.

Gen Cassidy: It wasn't that big, but we did it in much the same way we would have done it at TRANSCOM. We created three major APOEs [aerial ports of embarkation]: Chicago [Illinois], Baltimore [Maryland], and Seattle [Washington]. We also moved their stuff by sea. We had two SPODs [seaports of debarkation] in Kuwait.

We used foreign flag feeder vessels and our own ships. We put everything we could into containers. They needed the generators first; the Iraqis had destroyed Kuwait's power production capacity. So the generators, which were built in the United Kingdom, were an air requirement. There was no commercial aircraft large enough. Even the C-5 was not big enough. It missed the height requirement by two inches. So CSX chartered two Russian AN-124s and we paid cash for them. We took the generators down to Kuwait City and the headlines read "Lights are back on in Kuwait City." It was a major turning point for the Kuwaitis.

Dr. Matthews: The Kuwaitis came to you and said "This is what we need done, you figure out how best to do it?"

Gen Cassidy: It's kind of like that. We knew what the Kuwaitis were up to and that they were searching for a solution. We took them a solution. The Kuwaitis didn't really know what they wanted. Customers want lots of things, but it is the transportation guy's job to figure out what they really need. It is a play on words, but it's a very important distinction. If a logistics and transportation company can convert a customer's vision into specific needs, then the customer's needs can be met and their transportation problems solved. It's simply impossible to "solve" a vision. It's too big. It's too complicated. It can't be put into processes. The military does these "conversions" all the time. They take a vision or idea and turn it into a "needs statement." Once again we fell back on military training. In this case, CSX took the Kuwaiti vision of "I want to turn the lights back on in Kuwait City"--because it's key to economic recovery, it's socially correct, and it's politically symbolic--and turned it into a "needs statement." So we determined their need: three big generators from England to Saudi Arabia by such and such a date. We identified the item, the time

frame, the closure schedule, and other parameters, all the stuff we do in the military.

Dr. Matthews: What part of the operation caused you the most difficulty?

Gen Cassidy: How the hell to lease a Russian airplane! Russia was in chaos and we couldn't get US business or diplomatic channels to work for us. We finally made connection with the Russians via some RAF [Royal Air Force] officer friends of mine. Then the Russians didn't know how to charge for the aircraft, so we had to help the Russians through that, too. Next, the Russians' poor credit rating wouldn't allow them to buy gas. We had to send one of our guys along on the mission with a suitcase full of cash. Everywhere they landed, they paid cash for gas in cash, in US dollars. And when we landed with the generators in Kuwait, guess what? The MAC ALCE [Airlift Control Element] was controlling the airfield.

Dr. Matthews: You were there, too?

Gen Cassidy: Oh yes. I was in a Gulfstream II. We were the first civilian airplane to land in Kuwait City. And the ALCE gave us clearance to land. I walked into the ALCE tent and there sat a bunch of old MAC guys. They looked up at me and said "Where the hell did you come from?" Then I hitchhiked into town and found our principle contact to the Kuwait government, Captain Al-Nabari. He was the port director, appointed by the prince. And we went to work.

Dr. Matthews: Were you operating outside the DTS [Defense Transportation System]?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. TRANSCOM was not involved. The operation was private, with private money.

Dr. Matthews: With a foot in the door, did you continue to support the Kuwaitis?

Gen Cassidy: We supported the US oil companies that put out the oil well fires and we helped the allies clean up the mines. There were mines in all of the ports and on the beaches. That cleanup operation was led by the Marines. We also helped open up the Kuwaiti seaports. There were vessels sunk in the ports. The devastation of the city was incredible, sickening. CSX was in there almost immediately, two or three days, after the war was over.

Know Your Customer's Customers: Leverage Strength and Measure Performance

Dr. Matthews: So you were looking for the total logistical solutions to your customer's problems. You needed to turn their vision into a needs statement and you looked for ways to apply technology to find solutions. What other pieces are there to the puzzle?

Gen Cassidy: Leveraging strengths, knowing your customers, and measuring results. Railroads have a strength. They can move a whole lot of stuff cheap. Trucks have a strength. They can sequence into a shipper's dock in two-minute intervals or less. Ocean shipping can carry 4,000 containers on one ship. But that's all understood. Of first and foremost importance is getting inside your customer's head. Knowing what he needs. Is time important to him? Is inventory important to him? Is cost important to him? If all three are important, then you have to create a yield-management system to catch the best yield out of the dollar that's being spent. It's called return on invested capital, something we in the military aren't taught and don't practice. If you, a company, are investing your capital assets--vehicles, machinery, parts--and the return

you're getting on all the money you've invested is six percent, you might as well have put it in a savings account at a bank. Why run a business? You're working for nothing.

Dr. Matthews: You have to look at the return on invested capital.

Gen Cassidy: There are some businesses that invest no capital at all, a freight forwarder, for example. All he needs is a desk and a phone, and he can start providing a service. His return on invested capital is good because he doesn't have much invested. However, his margins are small, so his profits are small. In contrast, the transportation business has a lot of capital invested, so it is continually concerned about the return on invested capital and, because of its willingness to invest capital, it is poised to make huge profits.

Dr. Matthews: You look at all your customer's records and study what they do, but it seems to me you'll still eventually need to sit down, like we are doing right now, and get to know them on a personal basis, to give them the whole logistical package.

Gen Cassidy: Absolutely. Not only do we need to know the customer, let's say General Motors, we need to understand General Motors' customers. What do they want? General Motors customers are generally a dealer network, because dealers sell the product. So what does the dealer need? And then the dealers' customers are, of course, people like you and me who buy cars. So the transportation guy has to be sophisticated enough to know the customer, the customer's customer, and the customer's customer's customer.

Dr. Matthews: A TRANSCOM analogy: for us to maximize our support to the functional CINCs, like [US]SOCOM [United States Special

Operations Command], we need to look closely at how they support their customers, the theater CINCs.

Gen Cassidy: Or, the greater TRANSCOM's understanding of AAFES' [Army and Air Force Exchange Service's] relationships and interactions with base and fort commanders, their BXs [Base Exchanges] and PXs [Post Exchanges], and AAFES' ultimate customers, the local base and fort populations, the greater the possibility that TRANSCOM will discover ways to increase DTS peacetime operational efficiency. And that's why it's so important to have a command like TRANSCOM working those issues.

Dr. Matthews: TRANSCOM is establishing a CIO [Chief Information Officer] to better leverage technology in the flow of information. Does CSX have one?

Gen Cassidy: CSX has one. Originally, he was with the railroad. But we brought him up to the corporate level to tell our company and our customers we were committed to leveraging technology throughout the corporation. He works directly for the Chairman and closely with the Chief Financial Officer. He has a senior vote on allocation of capital and a senior vote on people. But the CIO's position has to be well-defined. That's difficult to do in a corporation that is fundamentally a holding company of several other large companies. I think it would be extremely difficult to leverage technology from a corporate technology position. My reasoning goes back to what technology is for, particularly in older, mature companies. Is technology there as another product or is technology there to make the present products more robust? For transportation, the CIO has to be there for the latter to help leverage present services and products. You have to use technology to do what heretofore could not be done: yield

management, utilization of vehicles, equipment inspections, return on invested capital studies, and servicing your customers. It's pretty hard for technologists to do those sorts of things in isolation of the core industry. You must have all your technology people closely linked with your core competency, which is running trains, running trucks, running ships, running planes. A corporate CIO sitting off somewhere, independent of the operators, could be a huge mistake. TRANSCOM has it right with GTN, for example. The most important person in GTN is the J3/J4, TRANSCOM's Chief Operating Officer, not the J6 [Director, Command, Control, Computer, and Communication Systems Directorate]. The operator sets the requirements.

Dr. Matthews: If you create the function just to support the function, then you forget why you came to the table?

Gen Cassidy: TRANSCOM needs its C4S [command, control, communications, and computer systems] to link directly and continuously to the people in the field who are running and using the legacy systems. If you can get that linkage with the component commands' operators--and it's the operators in the field and all the way up the chain to the J3/J4 who are setting the requirements--then TRANSCOM's CIO can perform his principal role: to help the Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and the rest of the corporate staff set priorities. You're not going to have enough money to do everything you want to do, so you have to prioritize. What's the priority by component? What do the components need to be working on? What needs to be done first? What do they need? Remember, their needs are the justification for TRANSCOM.

Dr. Matthews: And you feel like this CIO philosophy and organization will be a benefit to the military, TRANSCOM in particular?

Gen Cassidy: I think so, as long as you don't create a whole bureaucracy of CIOs. If you create a CIO at TRANSCOM, and then you need one at AMC and all the numbered air forces, that's crazy. If you create a CIO that indeed supports the needs of the fundamental competency of the units, which is operations, then it will work fine.

Dr. Matthews: We have discussed the importance of knowing your customer and leveraging your strengths. Let's now discuss that other piece of the puzzle: measuring performance. General Kross is extremely pleased with our GTN metrics. Have you had a chance to see these agile metrics?

Gen Cassidy: I have not, but I believe strongly in developing agile metrics. They have to be simple and adaptable to graphic portrayal. Everyone must be able to look at the same chart and reach the same conclusions. To me "agile metrics" also denotes measurements that allow decision makers to identify problems and take corrective action before they find themselves in a crisis mode. Additionally, agile metrics should be few in number. Mature businesses have metrics for everything. The problem then is you can prove almost any side of an issue. What you have is data but not information. Agile metrics must get at the gut issues and inform the right people, the decision-makers.

Dr. Matthews: What does CSX actually measure with agile metrics?

Gen Cassidy: Let's take the railroad. Data flows in daily from all of the legacy systems of the railroad. It deals with car utilization, locomotive utilization, crew utilization, and on time performance of all of

those. It covers your accounts receivable and your accounts payable, and how and where money is changing hands. Those are very specific and very sophisticated.

Dr. Matthews: And who sees them?

Gen Cassidy: They're seen by hundreds of people in the company on computer screens and printouts. As a matter of fact, I still get the railroad loading report on my computer. It is a hundred pages long. It's an excruciating amount of detail.

Dr. Matthews: But you're getting information that can be used and applied, not just data for data's sake.

Gen Cassidy: That's up for debate. It's just a value judgement. Personally, I think there's too much information.

Dr. Matthews: At TRANSCOM, you liked to raise the bar on us.

Gen Cassidy: My original notion, when I was a very young guy at MAC, was "Well, let's just set the bar, get our people to clear it, and then quit beating them over the head about it." I soon learned that was wrong. I learned to be much more sophisticated and aggressive about setting and meeting standards. You should develop a standard, demand that your people reach it, and then when they perform as you have demanded, when they've reached the standard, then you increase the standard. Of course, the leader's role is to give their people the tools they need to excel and to focus the organization's attention on the bar.

Dr. Matthews: Continual process improvement.

Gen Cassidy: You may have to change your organization. You may have to change some people. You may have to change some processes.

You may have to invest more money, but you should be willing to do all those things. If you get better, then everything else gets better. Your costs go down, your performance goes up, your people get better, you do more. Everything about the system gets better because you are getting better as a whole. So once you get to 100 percent reliability, you can't get any better, right? Not so. Let's say you're 100 percent reliable within two hours. Next you set the standard at 100 percent reliable within one hour and forty-five minutes. You can always get better. You just can't tolerate the status quo.

Serve Your Customers: Move into the "White Spaces"

Dr Matthews: You actually took a step out of the CSX door a couple of years ago, didn't you?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. My last eighteen months or so at CSX I worked part-time, which brings up an interesting point for our discussion comparing business and the military. Private industry is willing to take people who are retirement age and continue to use their individual, unique capabilities and experience in innovative ways. Rather than see me walk out the door, the CEO moved me out of the senior level staff job in the railroad--replacing me there with a younger guy on his way up--and assigned me to the Commercial Board, where I became its Chairman. In that way the company could continue to benefit from a senior manager's knowledge of the company and industry and his personal contacts. The military doesn't do that. They retire you on Tuesday morning, and on Tuesday afternoon, it's all over.

Dr. Matthews: Who makes up the Commercial Board?

Gen Cassidy: The Commercial Board is made up of the senior commercial people--those in charge of sales and marketing--of all of our companies. We had lots in common. We had the same customer base, in many cases. We worked with the same people, we had entrée into companies each other needed, and so it was natural to try to coordinate and integrate our actions.

Dr. Matthews: What does the Commercial Board do?

Gen Cassidy: The board has everything to do with an overworked term called "synergy," the notion that five people together working a problem can solve it better than one person dictating the answer to the problem. And it has everything to do with taking transportation from a single mode to a multi-mode focus. It has everything to do with finding ways for our corporation to harness all of its energy to solve our customers' problems. We believed that if we could direct our total power, we would have no competition. Working together we could break down the barriers that are naturally created by strong, proud companies that make up huge corporations like CSX. In other words, we had to stop competing with ourselves. CSX is a company that has rail, intermodal, sea, and barge. We're all working the same customer for a finite amount of business. So if we could ever get to the point where we were collegial enough and smart enough, and know the customer well enough to just simply solve the customer's problem to the best advantage of the customer, if we could always act in the customer's best interest, then we would all be better off for it. All of CSX would be the winner. But selling that belief was difficult because the businesses were parochial and the people were short-term focused.

Dr. Matthews: You actually found, then, that you were competing against yourselves?

Gen Cassidy: Certainly. Our relationship with General Motors is a good example. We had sales people from the barge line, from Sea-Land, and from the railroad all calling on the same people in General Motors. Our people were passing each other in the night. At the very least they should be sharing intelligence on the customer. What does the customer need? What does he want? Where can we--the whole corporation--make the most money?

Dr. Matthews: Putting myself in the customer's shoes, I would ask "What is with this CSX? They sure are disorganized. I'm not so sure I want them moving my goods."

Gen Cassidy: Even worse! If you're a smart customer, and most of ours are, they can leverage one guy against another.

Dr. Matthews: Did the Commercial Board build teamwork at CSX?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, and with our customers also. We proved that if we gave our customers better service and worked on their behalf, both their businesses and our businesses would improve. Costs would go down on both sides. Profits would go up on both sides. That is a very difficult thing to grasp and some people will dispute it, but we've proved it's true. We brought a lot of money into our company by working customer problems. Our customers believe in us. We were able to show them that many of the problems they had been blaming on transportation were in reality production problems inside their companies. We became very useful to them. We saved them enormous amounts of money. We added value in ways untold. But you must be willing to step outside of your traditional transportation role to realize such savings for your

customer. You have to be willing to get into what Dr Prahalad* calls the "white spaces," the areas where no one is, thus creating new tracks in space.

Dr Matthews: Please give me another example of a "white space" you charted for your customers.

Gen Cassidy: Helping them select transportation modes. Our work with Dupont, Nissan, and Allied Signal come to mind. Such large companies have portions of their staffs dedicated to barges, aircraft, ships, containers, and so on, who tend to work in their own little niches. They don't tend to think intermodally. So we gave them our intermodal perspective and, consequently, picked for them the most efficient mode rather than the most convenient mode. Again, we saved them big bucks by moving into the "white spaces."

Dr Matthews: Sounds like a role played by TRANSCOM's Joint Mobility Control Group.

Gen Cassidy: It *is* the same. In fact, we in the military airlift business were providing our customers similar services for years before the establishment of TRANSCOM. Let me give an example from my past. Back in March 1980, when the DOD established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force [RDJTF] and I was the MAC/DO [Director of Operations, MAC], my office served as the new organization's airlift advisor. Initially, the RDJTF would request from us, for discussion's sake, two C-130s, four C-141s and two C-5s. We educated them instead to give us their total requirement, and then to allow us to put the airlift package together for them. In this way we applied yield management to the transportation

*Dr. Gary Hamel and Dr. C. K. Prahalad used the term "white spaces" in their 1994 book *Competing for the Future*, published by Harvard Business School Press, Boston Massachusetts.

selection process. Sometimes we might determine that, for instance, it was more efficient to use a C-5 to move a small item--because it was headed in the right direction anyway and it was empty and could do it--than it was to pull a C-141 out of the air flow or fly a C-130 across state or from another state to do the job. The point is that if you can look at the total movement, you can do a yield analysis, which then allows you to maximize capacity. And remember the old saying, "an ounce of airlift wasted is an ounce of airlift never regained."

Dr. Matthews: The meeting TRANSCOM held with the Secretary of Defense recently was a landmark. After listening to TRANSCOM's briefings, I understand SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] looked at Walt Kross and said, "TRANSCOM can do so much more for DOD and the nation than just provide transportation."

Gen Cassidy: TRANSCOM's greatest contributions lie in those "white areas." Only TRANSCOM has the expertise and wherewithal to chart that space. That is why I go back to my earlier advice to you: "better be careful, TRANSCOM staff. You guys and gals need to stay out of the day-to-day running of transportation so you can concentrate on your real work in the white spaces."

The USTRANSCOM and Commercial Industry Relationship

Dr. Matthews: How is the military relationship with the private sector different today than it was eleven years ago when you were CINCTRANS?

Gen Cassidy: It's greatly improved, thanks to TRANSCOM. Clearly the private sector sees TRANSCOM as being the command that gets things done. Business no longer has to deal with a multitude of staffs:

Services, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], Joint [Staff]. They need now only deal with TRANSCOM, which can make a decision so the rest of us can get on with it. That's good for business.

Dr. Matthews: That's very interesting, because two of the main reasons TRANSCOM was established was to serve as an advocate and single point of contact for the DTS. But those who wrote the command's implementation plan, its original charter, I believe, were thinking military DTS customers and military partners in the DTS, not the private sector.

Gen Cassidy: You're right. That's a bonus. Early on at TRANSCOM, sitting at our Round Table, we, the senior staff, agreed to seize the opportunity, to begin using the new unified command's powers to increase lift capacity and readiness through our commercial partners. We considered it our responsibility, even though it wasn't stated so in writing, to evaluate their capabilities and preparedness, and find ways to strengthen the marriage of organic and civil assets.

Dr Matthews: Back in our original interview, when you left the command, you praised our implementation plan [IP] as being specific enough to get us moving, but general enough to allow us to use our initiative [see page 56].

Gen Cassidy: Exactly. The IP was open-ended. It had a beginning but no end. We created the path forward believing TRANSCOM to be the natural and rightful leader of the DTS, both the military and civilian sides.

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel industry is sufficiently plugged into DOD contingency planning?

Gen Cassidy: I don't think they will ever be plugged in enough, but industry's tie to military planning is certainly better than it's ever been. The current CINC, Walt Kross, gets credit for taking it to a new level. Of course, it started way before Walt became CINC. It started with CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] really. That's where it grew from, where we began briefing our industry partners on classified projects and classified planning. Are we moving in the right direction? You bet. Is it better than it was? Absolutely.

Dr. Matthews: Do you have any suggestions as to how TRANSCOM could better let its industry partners know what's required of them?

Gen Cassidy: TRANSCOM needs to use its clout. It has a lot of clout. And the clout is not only because of your big four-star. The clout is because you have two or three billion dollars worth of transportation business to dole out. So you dole out that transportation business to the companies who bring the most to the game. That's buying transportation value, not just low cost capacity. For TRANSCOM to get that transportation value, it must partner with companies that have the ability and willingness to sit down and assist TRANSCOM in planning. Then you're not just getting a movement. You are also getting the commercial sector's unique perspective and expertise to manage the movement and analyze capability.

Dr. Matthews: It's just been in the last couple of years that we've actually invited industry in to be a part of our exercises at TRANSCOM. Do you think we should do even more of that?

Gen Cassidy: Absolutely, as MAC used to do that with CRAF. In the late 1960s we built Building 1600 with a section in the upper story of the command center specifically for the CRAF carriers. CRAF

carriers would come in during a contingency or an exercise and set up office. United [Airlines] and TWA [Trans World Airlines] schedulers, among others, would be there at their desks. They would get to see the classified briefings. We have believed in this sharing of information for a long time.

Dr Matthews: TRANSCOM and its component commands already rely on the commercial sector for approximately 85 percent of DTS lift capability. One could argue we are the DOD archetype for outsourcing. Should we increase our dependence on the private sector?

Gen Cassidy: Yes, TRANSCOM should continue as a DOD catalyst for increasing private sector capacity and good health. The command must be smart enough to use the private sector to its maximum and hold down the organic to the minimum. This is particularly true in the air cargo business. TRANSCOM should take advantage of its current growth. In general, you must continue to find ways to apply government's great strength: leveraging capital to promote the private sector. In that way the private sector can increase its great strength: serving commerce in peacetime and the military in times of crisis and war. However, that balance between the military capability and the private sector capability is ever changing. If you are to error, you need to error on the side of military capability. But my main point should be evident: TRANSCOM, through leverage of capital, can fine-tune that balance. By fine-tuning that balance, the command can create and maintain excess capacity, private and organic, in the DTS for emergencies.

Dr. Matthews: I'm curious to know if CSX employees appreciate their role in national defense.

Gen Cassidy: Railroaders and sailors understand their vital role in the nation's defense. They know they are part of the nation's history and will continue to be a part of its future. Nobody by now should doubt their patriotism. Do we make the most of it? No. We should wave the flag more to motivate our employees.

Dr. Matthews: How would you describe CSX's relationships with TRANSCOM and its component commands?

Gen Cassidy: I think they are stronger than they have ever been, and I think they are the strongest of any in the transportation industry. The CINC can always depend on three companies above all others: Landstar for trucking, Federal Express for air, and CSX for rail and sea.

Dr. Matthews: As I recall, those were the organizations that the CINC invited to meet with the SECDEF.

Gen Cassidy: The CEOs of those companies were asked to participate by the CINC and they all adjusted their schedules very quickly and said "yes" immediately. It wasn't to see the SECDEF. It was because the CINC asked them.

Conclusion

Dr. Matthews: We began this interview session discussing how your military experiences dovetailed with your new career in business. Did you find your military experiences a hindrance in any way?

Gen Cassidy: In one way I felt somewhat handicapped when I first arrived on the business scene; I lacked appreciation for what really makes our country tick: capitalism. The military culture is socialistic. As we discussed earlier, most of our social and civic needs are tended to by our Service, and our budgets--from the various directorates and

wings on up to the major commands and Air Staff--are given to us. We have to manage the money, but we don't have to make money or show a profit at the end of the year.

Dr. Matthews: Such a capitalistic way of thinking is alien to most people in the military.

Gen Cassidy: Jumping headlong into the capitalistic culture from the socialistic one was certainly tough for me. Quite honestly, I don't care much about that kind of stuff. When I look at large charts and spreadsheets with numbers on them, I get bored in a nanosecond. A lot of my colleagues in the private sector salivate over numbers. They can pick out trends as they watch the numbers move, and they can quickly figure out in their head the net present value of a certain investment in a certain piece of rolling stock. If I had been turned on by budget number crunching and profit making, and been more literate with them, I would have been better prepared for my work at CSX. And I think government, including the military, has much to learn from business and its capitalistic ways. General Kross is on the right track with the new Business Center at TRANSCOM. But, personally, I don't give a damn about the numbers as long as there is money at the end of the month for groceries.

Dr. Matthews: If you were to come back to TRANSCOM today as CINCTRANS, with nine years of business experience under your belt, what would you do differently? Would you, for example, inculcate capitalistic thinking at the command?

Gen Cassidy: It's not just thinking costs and rates and profits. It's broader, like how to leverage your money and your assets to get what you really want. When the government talks "costs," it really means

"procurement at lowest price." But the government shouldn't necessarily want the lowest price. It should be looking for "best value." But that really isn't it either. What we all should be looking for is "best long-term value." We started talking about the C-17 in 1980 and it flew in 1990. A ten-year gestation period for an airplane! But that airplane will be flying long after we are all dead and buried. If I came back as CINCTRANS, I would use "best long-term value" as my credo.

Dr. Matthews: What else?

Gen Cassidy: I would also deemphasize "single mode" in strategic planning, operations, and thought. That would mean TRANSCOM would be a different organization than it is today, because today the DTS is organized by mode. The command, like industry, would have to quit worrying about "mode of transportation" and start thinking about "total transportation," and how transportation affects production rates of product and consumption rates of product. Most importantly, I would make sure TRANSCOM was not bogged down in the day-to-day transportation business to a point where it could no longer concentrate on how to solve the transportation problems of the future.

Dr. Matthews: In general, what do you feel were your greatest accomplishments at CSX?

Gen Cassidy: Hopefully, increasing the focus on people. I tried to set an example by the way I related to and worked with the corporate executive group and my own group of people. The higher you get in the organization, the more time you should spend thinking about people. As the CINC, I did that. As the Senior Vice-President for Sales and Marketing at CSXT [the railroad company of CSX], I

did that. I spent more of my time on people issues than I did on any other issues. If I helped move the company from a "management of business" to a "leadership of people" philosophy, that would be a great accomplishment. Only history can tell us whether or not that was so.

Dr. Matthews: Specifically, what do you consider your most important accomplishment at CSXT?

Gen Cassidy: Without question, I believe my most important contribution to our railroad was to create a new method of hiring people and evaluating people. We completely changed that process, and I think today the talent, brainpower, and quality of people in the sales and marketing organization of the railroad is second to none.

Dr. Matthews: How did you find people and evaluate them?

Gen Cassidy: We found people in a variety of ways. We used headhunters, we went to colleges, we used intern programs. This transportation business is tough and requires a unique kind of person. We created a list of parameters of what kind of person that is. We defined roles. If a guy is going to be a marketeer or salesman or both, what is his role? Once we defined the role, then we could define the kind of person to put in that role. We brought them in and tested them. We created a battery of psychological tests to serve as the discriminator. About 3 out of 20 who took the test passed. The tests helped us determine a person's propensity to do things. Will that person be a good salesman or good marketeer? Then we took the people who passed the tests and put them into an interview process. Rather than an interview with one person, we conducted what we called a "Gang Interview." It was an interview with at least five people of equal level within the company, and then they

evaluated the person. It's much like our Round Table at TRANSCOM. We put some of our senior people around a table and said "Okay, now we're all equal and equally responsible. Is this the kind of person we want to hire or not?" And it created some good debate and we found some high quality people. No, I mean we *really* found some *great* people. And they are there today doing exceptional work.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything you feel you could have done better?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. I am disappointed that I did not improve the railroad's service performance. If I would have worked that harder, I could have, maybe, put processes into place that would have eventually improved service. But I wound up in sales and marketing. Maybe I could have contributed more if I had worked on the operating side. Also, I left without having established a formal succession planning process. The issue of succession planning was a bone of contention between the CEO and me.

Dr. Matthews: Do you have any business ventures in the works?

Gen Cassidy: I have a couple of ideas. I haven't messed around in the trucking business yet.

Dr. Matthews: As an advisor to the Commercial Board, what have you done lately for CSX?

Gen Cassidy: Not much. I'm becoming increasingly inactive every day, by intention. It's Rosalie's turn.

Dr. Matthews: What does she want to do?

Gen Cassidy: She would like us to be able to do what we want to do, when we want to do it. If we want to go to an NDTA or A/TA [Airlift/Tanker Association] conference, then we'll do it.

Dr. Matthews: You'll be staying active in NDTA and A/TA?

Gen Cassidy: Yes. I still feel like I have much to give them and I have invested so much of myself in them already. I want to help make sure their courses are correct.

Dr. Matthews: What are the two organizations' strongest points?

Gen Cassidy: No organization connects private industry with government like NDTA. No organization connects the young people in the mobility business with the senior people in the mobility business like A/TA.

Dr. Matthews: Since our plan is to distribute your oral history--covering for the first time your military and business careers--at the A/TA and NDTA 1998 national conferences, perhaps we should end the interview here, unless you have something else to add.

Gen Cassidy: No, I think we have covered it.

Biography

General Duane H. Cassidy was Commander in Chief of United States Transportation Command (1 July 1987-22 September 1989) and Commander in Chief of Military Airlift Command (20 September 1985-22 September 1989), at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. As Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, he was responsible for global land, air, and sea transportation for all US fighting forces. As Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command, he was responsible for military airlift in support of unified and specified commands during war, periods of crises, and contingencies. The general also commanded special operations, rescue, weather, aeromedical evacuation, audiovisual, and operational support airlift forces for Department of Defense agencies throughout the world. He was executive director of the Single Manager Operating Agency for the Department of Defense Airlift Service.

General Cassidy was born 24 November 1933, in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania. He earned a bachelor of science degree from the University of Nebraska in 1968 and a master of science degree from Troy State University in 1975. He completed Squadron Officer School in 1961, Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1973, Air War College in 1975, the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University in 1979, and the program for senior executives in national and international security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in 1983.

Upon completion of aviation cadet training, the general was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1954. He then attended navigator training at Harlingen and James Connally Air Force Bases, Texas. His initial operational assignments in the Air Force were to the Military Air Transport Service, first to the Air Weather Service's 6th Weather Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, flying B-25s, and then to Air Rescue Service's 49th Air Rescue Squadron, Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan. During these assignments he participated in numerous rescue and weather reconnaissance missions, including the hydrogen weapons test in 1956 at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. His navigator assignments ended after two years as a Military Air Transport Service C-121 crewmember at Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina. He entered pilot training in December 1958.

After graduating from pilot training, General Cassidy was assigned to Strategic Air Command and flew B-47s at McCoy Air Force Base, Florida; Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas; and Lincoln Air Force Base, Nebraska. In November 1965, he transferred to Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and served with the 810th Strategic Aerospace Division, whose mission included B-52 bomber and Minuteman missile operations. In September 1968, he was assigned to the Republic of Vietnam, serving first with 7th Air Force's Tactical Air Control Center and then with the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Directorate of Public Affairs as an air briefer to the Saigon press corps.

The general returned to the Air Force airlift mission in October 1969. He was assigned to Military Airlift Command headquarters as executive to the deputy chief of staff for operations, and later as executive aide and pilot for the Military Airlift Command commander. In August 1972, he assumed command of the 8th Military Airlift Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, Washington. He entered Air War College in August 1974 and, upon graduation, again served at Military Airlift Command headquarters, this time as assistant chief of staff.

In August 1976, General Cassidy was assigned as vice commander of the 63rd Military Airlift Wing at Norton Air Force Base, California. In February 1978, he became commander of the wing. He returned to Military Airlift Command headquarters in July 1980 and served initially as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations. In August 1981, he became the command's deputy chief of staff for operations.

From October 1983 to August 1984, he served as commander of Military Airlift Command's 21st Air Force at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. During this period, Military Airlift Command was heavily involved in support of United States' operations in Lebanon and Grenada. General Cassidy then transferred to Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, D. C., where he served as deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel. The general assumed command of Military Airlift Command on 20 September 1985 and was promoted to general 8 November 1985, with the same date of rank. He assumed command of United States Transportation Command on 1 July 1987, when the Senate confirmed him as the first USCINCTRANS.

On 22 September 1989, General Cassidy relinquished command of USTRANSCOM and MAC to General Hansford T. Johnson. At the ceremony, Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented to General Cassidy the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for USTRANSCOM, 17 April 1987-1 October 1989. During the ceremony, General Cassidy also received the Defense Distinguished Service Medal from General Larry D. Welch, Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Army's Distinguished Service Medal from General Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff. His other military decorations and awards include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, and the Air Medal. General Cassidy also wears the Parachutist Badge. He is a command pilot and senior navigator with more than 8,000 flying hours.

Retiring 1 October 1989, in the rank of general, he spent the next eight years and three months with CSX Corporation, first as Vice President of Logistics Technology from October 1989 to January 1992. During this period he also held the position of President CSX/Sea-Land Logistics. He then became Senior Vice President for Sales and Marketing, CSX Transportation, the railroad arm of CSX Corporation, from January 1992 to June 1996. In June 1996, he took the position of Corporate Senior Vice President and Chairman, the Commercial Board, which he held until he retired from CSX in January 1998.

General Cassidy is married to the former Rosalie Mosley of Glenwillard, Pennsylvania. They have two daughters, Diane and Susan, and two sons, Michael and Patrick, and six grandchildren.

Glossary

AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
ADANS	Airlift Deployment Analysis System
ADO	Assistant Director of Operations
ADP	automated data processing
AFB	Air Force Base
ALCE	Airlift Control Element
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMST	Advanced Medium STOL (short take-off and landing) Transport
AOR	area of responsibility
APL	American President Lines
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
ARS	Air Rescue Service
ARSq	Air Rescue Service Squadron
A/TA	Airlift/Tanker Association
AWS	Air Weather Service
BX	Base Exchange
C3	command, control, and communications
C4S	command, control, communications, and computer systems
CATS	Combat Aircrew Training School
CENTCOM	See USCENTCOM
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCCENT	See USCINCCENT
CINCEUR	See USCINCEUR
CINCPAC	See USCINCPAC
CINCMAC	Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCTAC	Commander in Chief, Tactical Air Command
CINCTRANS	See USCINCTRANS
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DO	Director of Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Department of Transportation
DP	Director of Personnel
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DTS	Defense Transportation System
EUCOM	See USEUCOM

Fed Ex	Federal Express
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLOGEN	flow generator
FMI	functional management inspection
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
FYDP	Five-Year Defense Plan
GAO	General Accounting Office
GDSS	Global Decision Support System
GE	General Electric
GM	General Motors
GTN	Global Transportation Network
IP	Implementation Plan
IPAC	International Planning and Analysis Center
ITV	intransit visibility
J1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate, USTRANSCOM
J3/J4	Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM
J6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, USTRANSCOM
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Joint Deployment Agency
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JS/J4	Joint Staff, Logistics Directorate
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAC/DO	Military Airlift Command/Director of Operations
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
O-4	major or Navy lieutenant commander
O-5	lieutenant colonel or Navy commander
O-6	colonel or Navy captain
O-7	brigadier general or Navy rear admiral (lower half)
ODS	operating differential subsidy
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACAF/DO	Pacific Air Forces/Director of Operations
PACOM	See USPACOM
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, OSD
POV	privately owned vehicle
PX	Post Exchange
RAF	Royal Air Force
R&D	research and development
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RO/RO	Roll-On/Roll-Off ship
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAC/DO	Tactical Air Command/Director of Operations
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TAV	Total Asset Visibility
TCC	Transportation Component Command
TDY	temporary duty
TO	Tactical Officer
TOA	Transportation Operating Agency
TOT	time over target
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TQM	Total Quality Management
UK	United Kingdom
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAF/XO	Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, USEUCOM
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, USPACOM
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unified transportation command

VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
XO	executive officer
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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