

General Walter Kross
Commander in Chief
United States Transportation Command
and
Commander
Air Mobility Command:
An Oral History

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Preface

Like previous USCINCTRANS oral histories, General Kross' interview, conducted in five sessions between June and October 1998, covers a wide range of issues including readiness, recent operations, force modernization, reserve forces, and the integration of the three transportation modes: air, land, and sea. Unlike the others, he discusses in depth USTRANSCOM's process improvement initiatives and the command's efforts to adopt and apply best business practices. General Kross' answers to our questions are candid, illuminating, and provocative. We believe his oral history will be of great interest and use to government and business decision makers, in general, and to defense transportation operators and planners, in particular. It will also be an important primary source document for academic and government historians.

Our associate, Margaret J. Nigra, a historian assigned to the USTRANSCOM Research Center, deserves special thanks for her assistance with this project. She transcribed and edited the manuscript, compiled the glossary, and prepared the final copy for printing.

We will distribute additional copies of this oral history upon request.

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Introduction

Dr. Matthews: You're the only CINC [Commander in Chief] who's served previously at [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command]. About two months after you arrived here on your second tour, you told the TRANSCOM staff that you felt like someone who had been working in a family business, then went away to serve in the armed forces. You said, "I then came back to run the family business, but everything had changed." What are the biggest differences between TRANSCOM today and when you were here as our J3/J4 [Director of Operations and Logistics]?

Gen Kross: When I was here as the J3/J4 during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we were in our first manifestation. There was a lot of groping on the part of the TRANSCOM staff. We and our components were not pulling together. We had not been stressed as an organization yet, so we did not know what we really had to be. No organization knows about itself until it's stressed. Then when I came back as CINC, we had had that defining moment, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We had learned our war lessons well. And our great supporters, our leaders in the Pentagon, had thrust us into our second manifestation, which was as the single manager of the Defense Transportation System [DTS] in peace and war. It was now clear, even to our components, that we needed to operate as a single entity. We've gone from being a threat to being a haven and a home. We have become the center of excellence for defense transportation.

Dr. Matthews: A threat to our component commands?

Gen Kross: Yes, they considered us to be a threat to the way they had been doing business. They did not have the same vision that the people

who voted for TRANSCOM did. The components and their Services were all very suspicious of the US Transportation Command at the beginning, particularly at the highest levels of leadership. It wasn't that they perceived us as communists. They simply did not see a need to embrace us because they didn't see us as a value added. And slowly over time, through process reengineering, just plain hard work, and building relationships based on fairness and honesty, we have added value to the Defense Transportation System.

Dr. Matthews: Compare and contrast the relationship between TRANSCOM and MARAD [Maritime Administration] pre-Desert Shield/Desert Storm and today.

Gen Kross: MARAD had a relationship with the Military Sealift Command [MSC] but virtually no relationship with TRANSCOM at the beginning. That was a condition fostered, aided, and abetted by the Military Sealift Command. They didn't want MARAD to have a relationship with TRANSCOM. [Laughter] You would expect that the day-to-day relationship to be between the component and MARAD, but on strategic matters there has to be a MARAD/TRANSCOM relationship. Also, MARAD felt at first that it didn't need any help in military readiness. They were quite embarrassed by their performance over their RRF [Ready Reserve Force] breakout times in Desert Shield. They came to see that by partnering with TRANSCOM and the Department of Defense [DOD], they could get the funds needed to improve readiness and meet their advertised breakout schedules. Then once that readiness was created--through a combination of funding, lessons learned, and process reengineering--they became very proud of what they brought to the table and of the teamwork they helped to build between the two departments, DOD and DOT [Department of

Transportation]. It's as good as it's ever been, but it still has room for improvement.

Dr. Matthews: One more "compare and contrast": our partnership, when you were the J3/J4 and now, with commercial industry, and in particular, the NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association]? How has it changed?

Gen Kross: It is a major change. When I was here as the J3/J4, the relationship was immature, just beginning to grow. Today the National Defense Transportation Association is like an expanded body of TRANSCOM. It is very focused on TRANSCOM and making TRANSCOM's vision a reality for the Defense Transportation System and all of its members. They are a power beyond the command for the command. They are a reflection of our priorities, organizational structure, strategic game plans, and they have the leverage to carry it through, whether it's in establishing our wartime capability or in daily execution. Much of the good will heaped on TRANSCOM today for what the command is achieving is in large measure due to this unique, one-of-a-kind relationship between the United States Armed Forces and the NDTA. There is *nothing* else like this relationship: other professional organizations working with DOD don't concern themselves with process reengineering and best business practices.

Dr. Matthews: Is there more we can do to partner with NDTA?

Gen Kross: There is a committee or two that we could pump up, but the main committees have full plates. We just need to keep following through, keep it at the present high level of activity. The Business Processes Committee is in its germination stage and will continue to grow. We set it up right, and the Transportation Advisory Board really hit its stride over the last year. Having Ed Honor [Army

Lieutenant General Edward, Retired, President, NDTA] run the NDTA--no one runs an organization better than Ed Honor--boy, that has been paying off for TRANSCOM in a very big way. Jeff Crowe [Jeffrey C., Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Landstar System, Inc., and Chairman and CEO, NDTA] serves as a visionary for the DTS, and Ron Drucker [Ronald W., Business Practices Chairman, Business Practices Committee, NDTA] is tremendously proactive. Ron says, "What do you want me to do?" I say, "Do this, this, and this." "Roger, I've got it," and off he goes. If we can keep the same energy and momentum going, the TRANSCOM/NDTA relationship will continue to pay off big time for us.

Dr. Matthews: You've been concentrating on the differences, the changes in TRANSCOM when you were the J3/J4 and when you came back as CINC. Is there anything that stands out as staying the same, other than the fact you had the same historian at TRANSCOM then as today?

Gen Kross: [Laughter] Actually that did change. I don't know if you've noticed but he altered his job title. He became the Director of the Research Center. [Laughter]

One of the reasons why I stayed in the military--to try to be the last man standing--was to come back to work with the phenomenal talent resident at TRANSCOM. What has remained the same? The TRANSCOM staff's total dedication to the TRANSCOM mission. Folks like you, Dr. Matthews, and the other command plank owners,* can take pride in where TRANSCOM has gone.

*A plank owner is a member of the first crew to serve on a newly-commissioned ship; from the French tradition that such a crew member becomes part owner of the ship. (SOURCE: *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*.)

Dr. Matthews: How do you feel about the progress we've made in the last two years?

Gen Kross: It's like I said this morning at the CINC's Call, "We have achieved together far more than I ever thought we were going to achieve when I started my tenure as [US]CINCTRANS [Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM]." When I was driving to the change of command and putting together my "three themes"* speech, I had no idea where those three themes were going to take us. I had no end vision. When you're only in the job for two years, you just kind of move it and then after that, you step aside and others take over. But what was most exciting for me was to see, when I got here, that the command had come so far while I was away. I became very excited to think of where we then could take it. After being here for about two weeks, I said, "We need to raise the bar," and everyone responded: getting to the fight initiatives; best business practices; process, process, process; driving down costs; customer focus; and modernization programs. Our people exceeded my highest expectations. We have come a long way in a short time.

Mr. Cossaboom: Would you give us your thoughts on where you wanted to take AMC [Air Mobility Command] when you became Commander, AMC?

Gen Kross: I tried to keep things pretty simple: same three main themes. I knew when I came into the command its readiness would be very, very high. This is the third time I have followed General Rutherford [Air Force General Robert L., Retired,

*Theme One: Readiness--to support the warfighting CINCs. Theme Two: Modernization--preparing now to operate efficiently in the 21st Century. Theme Three: Process Improvement--continuous improvements to the key processes in the DTS.

USCINCTRANS and Commander, AMC, 1994-1996] into a job, so I knew that air mobility readiness was going to be as good as it could be. But I knew our readiness was threatened by the lack of engines and spare parts. I also knew, from where I was sitting as Director of the Joint Staff, that we were not preparing ourselves very well to operate in the 21st Century. I used the word “modernization” to express Theme Two, but my intent was broader: preparedness to effectively operate in the next century. Theme Three is process, process, process. Continuous improvement. It includes strategic metrics, agile metrics, and best business practices connected to our goals and objectives all the way to our vision. No, we didn’t draw big “Qs” for “Quality” around the US Transportation Command or Air Mobility Command emblems and profess “this is the new thing.” We didn’t reorganize either command the entire two years I commanded them. I’m very proud of that. Instead, we worked processes.

Mr. Cossaboom: How would you grade your themes?

Gen Kross: “A” and getting better, because people in the organization are buying it. I live in an ivory tower. But even so, I can still tell when my staff considers something to be baloney. I fly with Reserve crews. I talk to my captains. I send my wife out to talk to our enlisted men and women and their spouses. We talk to the senior enlisted advisors. So I get lots of feedback. Most of our folks feel like the organization has the right kind of values and is headed in the right direction. AMC is an organization that listens, where everybody is a stake holder. Everybody in AMC is pulling together, just like TRANSCOM. On the TRANSCOM side, when I came on board I established a business rule: I will not make an important decision unless all of the component commanders agree with it. I tried to deal with the NAF [Numbered Air Force]

commanders in the same way, although I did so less consistently on the AMC side.

Dr. Matthews: How did your experience as the J3/J4 help prepare you to be CINCTRANS?

Gen Kross: To have played such a critical role in the organization during the point of its greatest stress was excellent preparation for me. I saw the organization when it was maxed out, and as a result I had first hand knowledge of what needed to be accomplished: establishment of operating and business rules, procedures, and policies necessary for TRANSCOM to provide what it was tasked to provide. That's why it was so pleasing for me when I returned to find much of that work had already been done.

Dr. Matthews: Like H. T. Johnson [Air Force General Hansford T., "H. T.," Retired, USCINCTRANS, 1989-1992], you were Director of the Joint Staff prior to becoming CINCTRANS. How did that position help prepare you to be CINCTRANS?

Gen Kross: Serving as Director of the Joint Staff is perfect preparation for any one of the CINCs. As the Director you see how it all is supposed to come together. You also work with all the CINCs and those who are slated to be a CINC. You become friends. You're bonded because you work problems as a team. You have solved problems for our country. And by succeeding at it, you've got a shot at being a CINC. Working with General Wes Clark [Army General Wesley K.] as SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] and General Howell Estes [Air Force General Howell III] as [US]CINCSpace [Commander in Chief, United States Space Command], Hal Gehman [Navy Admiral Harold W., Jr., Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic] and Jim Perkins [Navy Vice Admiral James B. III, Commander, Military Sealift Command] who was a

DCINC* [Deputy Commander in Chief], is easy and fun. We are all very tight. Our trust and confidence in one another is built on past mutual experience. We'll ask each other to do things as matters of faith.

Dr. Matthews: Most people don't understand how important these past relationships are to daily operations.

Gen Kross: As Director of the Joint Staff you must deal with the Service Chiefs every day, both as members of the Joint Chiefs and also in their service hats. I had built personal relationships with Generals Krulak [Marine Corps General Charles C., Commandant of the Marine Corps], Reimer [Army General Dennis J., Army Chief of Staff], Fogleman [Air Force General Ronald R., Retired, former Air Force Chief of Staff, 1994-1997, and USCINCTRANS, 1992-1994], and Admiral Boorda [Navy Admiral Jeremy M., former Chief of Naval Operations, 1994-1996], and then later with Admiral Johnson [Admiral Jay L., Chief of Naval Operations, 1996-present]. And the same goes with working with the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. General Shali [Army General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993-1997] had the confidence in me to make me a CINC so I had the confidence in him to know I could tell him or ask him anything. We speak candidly. You don't get to be a Director of the Joint Staff or a CINC unless you have had many candid conversations with the Chairman. So service as the Director is clearly the best preparation for being a CINC. By the way, we're very pleased that one of our former J5s [Director of Plans and Policy] has been nominated to that position, Vern Clark [Navy Vice Admiral Vernon E.].

*Admiral Perkins was DCINC and Chief of Staff, United States Southern Command, 1994-1996.

Dr. Matthews: Will he be our first Navy CINCTRANS?

Gen Kross: Or perhaps one of the other CINCs. It's for sure he'll be ready for it.

Mr. Cossaboom: Sir, you identified five types of potatoes: small potatoes, medium potatoes, big potatoes, serious potatoes, and bad potatoes.

Gen Kross: Yep, those are the ones.

Mr. Cossaboom: You classified Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda as bad potatoes; quality and family are big potatoes. Could you tell us why? What do you use for a classification system?

Gen Kross: Things that are hopeless are bad potatoes. [Laughter] Things that require everyone's attention because they will pay dividends for years to come are big potatoes. Things that can bite you in the butt unless you pay attention to them are serious potatoes. Then the scale from big down to small is obvious.

Mr. Cossaboom: Could you give us some examples of what you would consider serious potatoes?

Gen Kross: GATM [Global Air Traffic Management] is serious potatoes. It will save lives and get us to the fight. C-5 modernization is serious potatoes. Year of the Enlisted Force is big potatoes. There's a difference. Not doing Year of the Enlisted Force won't bite you in the butt, but doing it will bring much goodness.

Readiness: Theme One

Overview

Dr. Matthews: I got to sit in on your briefing to the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] the other day. You showed him the slide depicting the balance between wartime effectiveness and peacetime efficiencies. You made it very clear that wartime effectiveness is Job One for TRANSCOM. How can we make sure we keep our priorities straight?

Gen Kross: Being a Theme One organization, we are always going to keep the focus on readiness. But while there will be fewer and fewer contingencies, there'll be increasing emphasis on efficiency, efficiency, efficiency. When that phone rings, and the Chairman says, "Walt, I need you to lean forward. Set up your air bridge and tell me how much it's going to cost," then we'll set up the bridge and take the hits in efficiencies during the contingency. I think that the balance is set right. We should just keep doing what we're doing.

Dr. Matthews: As CINCTRANS, what were your most important readiness indicators?

Gen Kross: Ninety-five percent of the daily game is in air mobility. Therefore, nearly all of my key indicators were over on the air side, and mission capable rates were far and away the most important indicator. If you aren't mission capable, you can't do your wartime mission. You would also begin to stumble a lot in peacetime. I didn't worry about the departure reliability. As a matter of fact, I tried to move us away from departure reliability to arrival times, which is where the customer measures you. He

doesn't care if your airplane departed one hundred times in a row on time. He only cares that it arrived on time. I only had one key surface readiness indicator: the RRF's ability to breakout.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything more that either of your staffs could do to help CINCTRANS assess readiness?

Gen Kross: If anything, I would rather look at last night's data than last month's data. But in comparison to the other modes and the other CINCs, air mobility readiness metrics are agile. At a CINC's conference, I could look the Secretary of Defense in the eye, and say, "Sir, our mission capable rate as of midnight last night was 'bing.' As of midnight, I have 'this' many wartime spare engines, 'and so on.' 'This' is what it means if..." I was the only CINC in the room who could talk in those terms because we have agile metrics. And he liked it.

Dr. Matthews: How would you assess the military's overall ability to assess readiness?

Gen Kross: My view is that people worry too much about assessing readiness. Congressional committees scrutinize it because they aren't convinced that the military brass is giving them the real story. Every time they go out in the field, they find a sergeant or a lieutenant on the ramp somewhere who doesn't have everything he or she thinks he or she needs. I never had everything for 33 years and some of those were really good years. What some in Congress really want is more information so they can run the entire government from Capitol Hill. And if you feed that bear, that's what you'll get. The Joint Staff and the Service staffs are on to them, so they don't want to give them a lot of information. To do so would create a death spiral of distrust, "Byzantium inside the Beltway."

Dr. Matthews: You've already done some comparison between TRANSCOM during Desert Shield/Desert Storm and TRANSCOM today. What do you think are the biggest changes in the Defense Transportation System's readiness, then and now?

Gen Kross: We are more ready now to do a major theater war than we were at the beginning of Desert Shield and Desert Storm because we have been stressed. As I mentioned earlier, you can form an organization, have it up for three or four years, but if you don't ever stress it, you don't know anything about it. We didn't have readiness assessment processes in place. We do now. We didn't have validated TPFDDs [Time Phased Force Deployment Data]. We do now. Perhaps most importantly, we hadn't planned to execute. We do now. Additionally, we exercise TRANSCOM and component readiness better in our JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] exercises than we ever have before. We have more reliable equipment. The C-17 is more reliable than the C-141. We now have the tankers. God, I think the most KC-10s I ever got my hands on when I was the J3/J4 was five on any given day. Five! The others sat in the desert and baked. Now, as CINCTRANS, I have combatant command of the tankers. The "em-PHAH-sis" is now on the right "syl-LAH-ble." So, we are much more ready today because we're unified, we're integrated, we're lubricated, we're processed out.

Dr. Matthews: I think you'd agree that one of the biggest changes then and now is our sealift capability and readiness...

Gen Kross: Yes, I must cover the sea side. Another major improvement is, of course, the Ready Reserve Force. It is actually ready! Its readiness is rated between 90 and 95 percent. Back then, they didn't rate it. They didn't exercise it. Breaking out the RRF was

pretty painful for us. After the war, we bought a bunch of RO/ROs [Roll-On/Roll-Off ships]--17 then and 31 now--and we've kept the readiness up on our FSSs [Fast Sealift Ships]. And here come the queens of the fleet, the LMSRs [Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships]. Seven of the nineteen are already in hand.

Dr. Matthews: And land?

Gen Kross: A little different story. We operate fewer ports than we did back then, but we can expand into contingency mode fairly quickly. We have replumbed our TTBs [Transportation Terminal Brigades] and TTUs [Transportation Terminal Units] so that they are better focused on their wartime mission. And we've built our fleet of special use rail cars from around 700 to about 1,100, and we are on our way to 1,400. The Army is modernizing its watercraft program. And we're putting money into JLOTS [Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore]. So, all across the board--air, land, and sea--readiness ratings today, compared to 1990-1991, are much improved.

*Phoenix Scorpion**

Mr. Cossaboom: We deployed to the Persian Gulf on your watch as CINCTRANS. How did we do?

Gen Kross: Phoenix Scorpion, as you know, came in two flavors: Thanksgiving and St. Valentine's Day. Each one was quite something. Phoenix Scorpion I put the world on notice that TRANSCOM had truly improved its processes. We had velocity, we had ITV [intransit visibility], we had integrated teamwork. And then it turned out not to be all that large a movement. Kind of a burst move. We then took our lessons learned from Phoenix Scorpion I and applied them to our processes. You historians could write a book just on the logistical process improvements we made from Scorpion I to Scorpion II. You remember, in Scorpion I it was "Well, we have 15 aircraft broken today, and then there were 20, 25, 38. Whoa. Wait a minute. Unsatisfactory." We vigorously attacked the problem, so the second time around, the numbers didn't get up that high: 10, 15, 18. One day it was over 20 and then it came right back down.

Dr. Matthews: Those readiness fixes carried over into peacetime.

Gen Kross: We used to have on average 15 aircraft broken around the world on any given day. Now most days we have 3 to 5 broken down. That is phenomenal improvement! People ought to be running around

*In November 1997 (Phoenix Scorpion I), February 1998 (Phoenix Scorpion II), November 1998 (Phoenix Scorpion III), and December 1998 (Phoenix Scorpion IV), the United States ordered the deployment of additional forces from the United States to Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean in response to Iraq's intransigence over the United Nations inspection of Iraqi sites that might contain or support weapons of mass destruction. Phoenix Scorpion II and III were also known as Desert Thunder. Phoenix Scorpion IV was also named Desert Fox. (SOURCE: AMC History Office.) AMC used "Phoenix Scorpion" to indicate its participation while the joint world used "Desert Thunder" or "Desert Fox" to encompass the whole operation.

here declaring holidays. Why? More revenue generation, better customer support. [Laughter] In fact, we had critical help from our customers including Dennis Reimer and the United States Army, and our receiving CINC and the CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] customer, General Franks [Army Lieutenant General Tommy R.]. They set the bar right for us. And then they honored us when we cleared it.

Mr. Cossaboom: What could we have done better?

Gen Kross: We could have done better in diplomatic clearance process improvement. We could have put the Tunners [60k loaders] into the theater faster and in more places. We could have improved velocity on C-17 ground times. We need to refine our data input team process. The business of keeping the teams together and putting the teams in the right places at the right times is a science in itself.

AEF and EAF

Mr. Cossaboom: What do you see as AMC's role in the AEF [Air Expeditionary Force] concept?

Gen Kross: It is *the* central role. The emphasis in AEF is not on employment. In actuality, it is on deployment. It was partnering between Air Combat Command [ACC] and Air Mobility Command--in developing the play books, in doing the walk-throughs and rock drills*--that put AEF into operational status early and has continued to refine it to the point where our customers are

*A term used by Army leaders to describe the step by step process from organization, movement, and execution of a plan. Originally used out in the field when Army personnel would use rocks to denote positions of units and equipment in planning for battle.

motivated to decrease the size of their force packages and maintain TPFDD discipline. This is top-down, from the MAJCOM [major command] headquarters to the wing level. I used to not give the Air Force very high marks for getting out of Dodge, but now the Air Force, through the AEF, gets out of Dodge better than anyone else. That's a grand benefit for our country. Getting to the fight gives the AEF its strength. You've heard me say this before: "When the miscreants see that we are coming, we being America, that is when they pay up their insurance. That is when they go live underground." It is the *coming* that modifies the behavior. It is not the sitting and the swatting of flies in place.

Dr. Matthews: I have a similar question but it is kind of a drilling down just a bit. You asked General Coolidge [Air Force Major General Charles H., Jr., USTRANSCOM Director of Operations and Logistics] to look hard at the AEF deployments to find out why their deployment requirements were, in general, increasing and why deployments of some units, say F-16s, were considerably larger than other units with the same type of aircraft. What did you find?

Gen Kross: A mixed bag. Our partner, General Hawley [Air Force General Richard E., Commander, ACC], looked at it for us. He drove things out of the package, and he's keeping them out of the package. He's altered the processes within his command, and it's paying tremendous dividends. Partnership and teamwork are always the keys to success.

Mr. Cossaboom: Would you tell us how the EAF [Expeditionary Air Force] concept differs from AEF, and what is AMC's role in EAF?

Gen Kross: It differs a lot. Despite all the good things I just said about AEF, AEF is EAF done badly. It is the thrusting forward of forces without the best and smartest application of American airpower.

AEF puts forces forward like chess pieces in the desert. They are underutilized, cause opstempo problems, and reduce the efficiency of TRANSCOM and the Air Mobility Command. To rapidly deploy forces forward in a package is nothing new. We've been doing that since the Korean War. So we should never declare success based on that suboptimized capability, but rather on the smart application of air forces. We have reached a point today where American airpower can reach out and touch anybody in 36 to 48 hours, and modify their behavior in a very significant way. We can have bad people walking around on the other side of the planet and something will come out of the night without warning and vaporize them. That is a phenomenal capability. No one else has that. So why do we need to go sit at Al Dhafra [Saudi Arabia] and Al Kharj [Saudi Arabia] and Thumrait [Oman] and wear goggles. The EAF recognizes this strategic difference. It says, "Let's take the Air Force, divide it up into ten operational modules, and keep two of those modules in the window at home." It requires the CINCs to modify their behavior so that they will call the modules forward when they need them and return them home when they do not need them. The Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] is behind it. The CINCs are behind it.

Mr. Cossaboom: Do you consider General Ryan [Air Force General Michael E., Chief of Staff of the Air Force] a visionary?

Gen Kross: Yes, and in this case, he has found the keys to the kingdom: the EAF. It is the EAF accepted by the customer that will reduce the opstempo. Little else will. And so we'll have the Hap Arnold [Air Force General Henry H. "Hap"] package. We'll have the Ira

Eaker* [Air Force Lieutenant General Ira C.] package. And air mobility forces--Active, Guard, and Reserve--are integral parts of this package. Does that mean you are going to sit around, cocked, if you're one of these packages? The answer is no. Does that mean you are going to fly short missions instead of long missions? No. Instead it means that you'll be in the window for ninety days, and the TACC [Tanker Airlift Control Center] will manage the application of mobility air forces on strategic warning to be part of those packages. And we'll do it well.

Mr. Cossaboom: During Desert Strike** you said [US]CENTCOM [United States Central Command] was sucking us dry, using strategic air mobility for theater operations. We were canceling flights for the other CINCs because of CENTCOM inefficiencies. How did we work through this problem?

Gen Kross: First thing was for CINCCENT [Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM] to agree with us, and he did. Early. And as it turned out, it was requirements within the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility] that were sucking us dry, not CINCCENT and not the CENTCOM staff. They actually preferred to be in the EAF construct. It was really the leadership of our government that wanted us forward for reasons that go beyond pure military efficiency. We serve our civilian leaders and they have requirements for military forces without regard to efficiency and

*Both Generals Arnold (1886-1950) and Eaker (1896-1987) were aviation pioneers. As Chief of the Army Air Forces during World War II, Arnold directed the dramatic expansion of the Army Air Force to meet wartime needs. General Arnold retired in 1946 as a four-star. In 1949, Congress awarded him a fifth star, the only Air Force officer to hold the five-star rank. During World War II, Eaker commanded the 8th Bomber Command and the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. He directed the daylight bombing campaigns that reduced much of the German military and industrial base to rubble.

**Responding to Iraqi military actions in the UN-established no-fly zone in Northern Iraq, US B-52s bombed Iraqi military sites in early September 1996.

opstempo. The trick now is to show our civilian leaders that EAF will serve their purposes.

Mr. Cossaboom: Are we likely to face the problem again?

Gen Kross: We will likely revisit this because someone will try to use forces that are currently recharging their batteries for the next contingency. We have a government that has not met a contingency it didn't like. Make no bones about it. It's in the White House and in the NSC [National Security Council] staffs where the problem originates.

GTN

Dr. Matthews: If we had had GTN [Global Transportation Network] operational in 1990-1991, how would it have facilitated the deployment to the Persian Gulf?

Gen Kross: With intransit visibility, our customers wouldn't be ordering two or three times. If we could have seen what was actually in the containers, we could have been far more efficient. We would have had to carry far less and we would have gotten it there faster. Therefore, we would have saved the taxpayers a lot of money. We would not have had to retire our C-141s as early, because we wouldn't have had to fly them so much. We would have lost fewer containers and pallets. We're still in litigation over lost goods and containers. We still don't know where the heck some of the goods ended up. I could go on and on.*

* See *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm* by James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt for: ITV/GTN, see "Intransit Visibility" in Chapter II; for containers, see Chapter VI-Containerization; for pallets, see "463L Pallets" in Chapter III; and for airlift in general, see Chapter III-Airlift.

Dr. Matthews: Think back about some of those conversations you had with your compatriots during the war. Are there any specific problems you can recall where GTN could have helped you right on the spot?

Gen Kross: Yes. There were times when we'd lost track of complete shipments of precision-guided munitions. There were times when we had the plastic spoons but we couldn't find the forks. But the biggest ITV-related problem of all was the loss of containers, thousands of them lost. Our industry partners needed them returned so they could go back and pick up their commercial work. And actually, if you remember, we came real close to running out of pallets.

Dr. Matthews: In the last two years, what do you consider to be the most important indicators of GTN success?

Gen Kross: The receiving customers use it. General Franks and the CJTF staff probably did more for GTN than all of us here at TRANSCOM by simply using it. They were calling wanting to know where the data was if they didn't see it in GTN. And to have customers in [US]PACOM [United States Pacific Command] calling and saying, "I can't find it in GTN," that is music to our ears. So if the customers are using the system, then we can concentrate on working GTN processes.

Dr. Matthews: What is the greatest potential of GTN?

Gen Kross: Here's my vision of GTN. The customer places an order and we accept it, price it, arrange for pick-up and delivery, and then bill, all at once, electronically. The customer can then track movement and give us feedback. The whole process is conducted through customized suites and supported by AIT [automated identification technology] feeder systems.

Dr. Matthews: What are the biggest hurdles to realizing that vision?

Gen Kross: Actually, the biggest hurdle right now is funding. We have the technology to do it. We have the intent to do it. It's all very do-able right now with existing assets. We don't have to build anything new.

Dr. Matthews: Would you consider our GTN metrics the archetype of agile metrics?

Gen Kross: Yes.

Dr. Matthews: Where else can we apply that archetype in the DTS?

Gen Kross: I would like to see it applied in air mobility, from tasking through execution. I'd like to see it on the sealift side as well, from tasking through execution. And I'd like to have more real time financial data, so we don't have to extrapolate.

Agile metrics can be used in any part of the operation where you can get real data on what actually happened just a few minutes ago. Agile metrics are valuable for their predictive nature. That's what is nice about the business model. The business model is one big warehouse of fairly agile metrics. There are really no limits on where to use agile metrics.

Total Force: Active Duty and Reserves

Mr. Cossaboom: AMC has developed a great partnership with the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. We've come to depend on them to meet many day-to-day requirements. How much more help can we expect from them?

Gen Kross: We should be continuously grateful and amazed by the tremendous support we get from our Guard and Reserve partners. The Guard and Reserve opstempo is at an historical high. We have to get it down a notch. What's a notch? Ten to fifteen percent. And then we need to keep it at that level, and I believe we can. We're all operating with the same information systems and under the same business rules. The key rule: the single air mobility system. We now have more control over filling priorities for all our customers. We are very proud of our Guard and Reserve. They are our "not so secret weapon." No other nation has what we have in them.

Dr. Matthews: Following Desert Shield/Desert Storm, one of our top five lessons learned was "we need access to the Reserves right away to grease the mobility system, prime the pump." Our initiative was the Ready Mobility Force, a way to get our hands on about 25,000 folks. That has languished. In the meantime, we've been working an initiative called "PSRC [Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up] in a Can." Will it give us what we need?

Gen Kross: Absolutely. "PSRC in a Can" lubricates the process and moves the runner from home plate all the way around to third base, so all you have to do is bunt them home.

Dr. Matthews: What have TRANSCOM and AMC done to reintegrate C-130 aircraft crews and infrastructure into AMC? How did you make them feel like they were a part of us?

Gen Kross: I didn't check under their AMC patch to see if they had hidden a little ACC [Air Combat Command] patch. I knew they had one there and that is fine. *Vive la différence*. We tried to downplay the fact that they had been away. We tried to play up all the good things they had done in Air Combat Command, like defensive system testing, combat capability refinement, and infusion of monies into Pope [Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina]. It is great to have them back in AMC because mobility air forces ought to be together. Certainly in CONUS [Continental United States] they all ought to be under one command, and now they are. We gave them noise cancellation headsets. We came up with the C-130 modernization program, which would never have happened if they had remained in Air Combat Command.

Dr. Matthews: A couple of years back we were integrating the aerial refueling and airlift cultures, making them one strategic mobility culture. I noticed we started bringing in air refueling folks, with a SAC [Strategic Air Command] background, into the MCC [Mobility Control Center]. Are we following that same process with the C-130 expertise?

Gen Kross: This is a very complex area, one where we don't want to move too fast. We definitely don't want to do it badly. When I left the staff here in 1993 to go to the 15th Air Force, it had started to go badly. We got into this "one-shoe-fits-all" kind of Air Force under General McPeak [Air Force General Merrill A., Retired, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 1990-1994]. We also had started to do a "one-shoe-fits-all" in Air Mobility Command. That is the wrong approach. The tanker force did things its way because it was safe and effective. The airlift force did things its way because it was safe and effective. Then someone said, "No, we should have one way." That's like Macintosh and IBM. It's like

Protestant and Catholic. It's like airlift and tanker. Somebody on the DO [Director of Operations, AMC] staff sold it all the way up the chain of leadership, including the person I replaced. As soon as I came back, I broke Humpty Dumpty apart again. Integration shouldn't necessarily mean homogenization. C-130, tanker, and strategic airlift all have their own personalities, their own methodologies, and their own subcultures, things that are near and dear to them. Allowing each of them to retain their subcultures facilitated teamwork. Their attitude was "Throw me in that briar patch. Give me that tasking. I'll do it." Same for the Reserve and the Guard. There are certain parts of their culture you just leave alone, as long as they meet the standards. You show people where the standard is, and they will hit and then exceed it. Morale plummeted when we tried to homogenize. Now, we recognize and applaud the subcultural differences. I'm not at all emotional about that. [Laughter]

Total Force: Civil Crews in a Bio/Chem Environment

Dr. Matthews: What is your confidence level that our civilian partners, the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] and merchant mariner crews, will not balk at entering an area that is contaminated or threatened with contamination by biological or chemical weapons?

Gen Kross: The first thing we have to do is to make the ogre three feet tall, not ten feet tall.

Dr. Matthews: Like we did to "Ivan" [the Soviet Union] during the Cold War?

Gen Kross: Exactly. The trick is, first, orientation and education. Then it's training, then it's exercise, and after that it's God's will. We can

take care of one through three. For four, we're going to need a little help. And there is more to the equation. As we run more tests on these weapons' effects, we're finding it's difficult to create situations and environments conducive to extensive damage. Can such situations and environments be created? You bet. Fire enough SCUDS [surface-to-surface missiles] and you can make a port pretty filthy. If you churn it up in the mud and the dust, you have a lot of problems. But remember, few germs can live in the sun, nature's antiseptic. That's why they live under the skin.

Dr. Matthews: In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, US civilian air carriers and US civilian mariners had chemical ensembles with them. They trained to use them.

Gen Kross: God bless them. Ninety-nine percent of them went into the AOR. Yeah, we had a few toads holed up in the London Hilton who called their union bosses and said, "I'm not going down range." We can't order civilians to go in harm's way. General Johnson knew how to handle that situation. At the right time, he did the right thing. He kept the flow. But when the chips are down, a lot of our civilians will surprise us with their heroism, their intrepidity, and their risking of their own lives for our country. The CRAF and VISA* [Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement] may be contractually based, but in the end we're going to find a lot of them going in when the going gets rough. They know it is their brothers and sisters who are over there in the trenches. They're going to do whatever they can for us as long as they feel they are protected

*Developed in 1991 and approved by the Secretary of Defense on 30 January 1997, VISA is the United States' primary sealift mobilization program. A unique partnership between DOD, DOT, and the US flag commercial sealift industry, it represents a major improvement over its predecessor, the Sealift Readiness Program or SRP. (SOURCE: USTRANSCOM Pamphlet 10-1, *VISA and the Sealift Mobilization Programs*, 21 September 1998.)

enough. And that's the key word. What we need to do is achieve *enough* protection to keep the flow going.

Total Force: Civil Air

Mr. Cossaboom: Have we fixed the war risk insurance problem or do you still have concerns about our CRAF carriers meeting their wartime commitments due to the lack of coverage?

Gen Kross: We always have concerns in areas that are contractually based. The worst of all scenarios would be to have an insurance problem pop up right at execution time. I have great confidence in Gil Regan [Air Force Brigadier General Gilbert J., USTRANSCOM Chief Counsel and AMC Staff Judge Advocate] and his staff in staying on top of it. We also have watchdogs on the commercial side like Mr. Ed Driscoll [Edward J., Chairman of the Board, President, and CEO, National Air Carriers Association, Inc. (NACA)] in NACA. He's going to make sure our commercial partners are protected and understand their responsibilities.

Dr. Matthews: During the UPS [United Parcel Service] strike [in the fall of 1997], Fed Ex [Federal Express Corporation] was unable to meet the increased demand for its services. They asked to be excused from the "not on time" fine and they put a ten percent increased cap on each of their customers. Does that make you suspicious about the air cargo industry's capability to meet its CRAF wartime commitments?

Gen Kross: No, it doesn't. Fed Ex's motivation was financially based, an opportunity to gain market share. We didn't let them out of their commitment. We were morally supportive, because they actually lost market share during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They saw

the strike as an opportunity to get it back. They hit a wall, they tried to go through the wall, and we asked them not to.

Dr. Matthews: They backed off.

Gen Kross: Yes. Fred Smith [Frederick W., Chairman of the Board, President, and CEO] of FDX Corporation, the parent company of Fed Ex, is a pioneer and a patriot. Contractually, he is only required to give us 33 percent of his long range international cargo capability. In fact, he gives 100 percent. That equates to nearly 40 percent of the entire CRAF III* cargo capability. His chief financial officers and chief lawyers whisper, “Hey, don’t be a chump. Only do what you gotta do.” He tells them to sit down and color. I have had an invisible sign behind my desk since I was the Vice Commander of Air Mobility Command that reads, “What have we done for Fred Smith today?” Sure, we are limited in what we can do for any particular company, but what we can do, we should do. Our commercial partners are on their own competing with Chinese and Japanese and other government-controlled airlines. It is in the best interest of CRAF and our country for us to help Fred Smith and Mr. Kelly [James P., Chairman and CEO] of UPS to expand their networks around the world. We, TRANSCOM, should lead the US government and all its departments in finding ways to help US commercial transportation companies compete on the world market. My view is that people like Fred Smith are as important to national security and our nation’s economic vitality as is Bill Gates [William H., CEO, Microsoft Corporation].

*CRAF is divided into three increasingly larger “stages” designed to meet the requirements from contingencies to major theater wars.

Total Force: Civil Sea and Land

Dr. Matthews: Following Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we concluded that in the future we should not have to rely so heavily on foreign flag shipping for surge sealift. Since then you have been asked the question more than once as to your feelings about relying on foreign flag shipping. At times it seems as if your detractors wish to deny you your personal experiences. I would like you to, one more time for the record, tell us how you really feel about the use of foreign flag shipping vis-à-vis US flag shipping for surge sealift and for sustainment during war.

Gen Kross: Let me make this perfectly clear on this leading question. When I was the J3/J4, we had to get our troops to the fight. To do so we had to rely on foreign flags for force closure, because we simply ran out of our own ships. We don't want to go there ever again. We found that foreign flag ships were not reliable. They weren't there when they said they were going to be there for loading. After we loaded them, we lost all visibility on what they carried. Then they took their sweet time getting to the fight. A lot of them balked. The foreign companies would be off trying to get the market share from our American flag ships. It's better that we buy surge capability and subsidize our American sealift industry to provide the rest. We should play to the strength of America's industry, which is in container ships.

Dr. Matthews: In that regard, if we had had VISA in 1990, how would it have facilitated the deployment to the Persian Gulf?

Gen Kross: It would have facilitated it a whole heck of a lot. We would have had a single unified program. We would have had arrangements in place to provide intermodal capacity in stages that matched our

requirements! That, by itself, would have made it much simpler. We also would have known where the end was in various phases, so we then could go out and procure additional shipping if needed for a crisis or a spike.

Dr. Matthews: How has the VISA process improved DOD and industry relations?

Gen Kross: When you plan together at the classified level, and when you solve war planning problems together, you form the basis for strategic trust. You also help tie the vision to the contract rather than “it’s just another contract.” We have a mutual commitment to the whole enterprise, the whole endeavor. The process has convinced me that our VISA partners are people who have a sense of ownership over sealift readiness for our country. Yes, you’ll find folks in those companies who don’t know VISA from “Schmeesa,” but in fact the leadership of the companies, the planners in the companies, the operators in the companies, they know what it is and they are very proud of it. They speak with just as much pride of being in on this planning as we do. The agreement, going back to your previous question, gives us common information systems to track flows, common development of AITE [automated information technology equipment], and access to infrastructure in the international marketplace, because these companies have global alliances, all of which improves deployment capability and readiness.

Dr. Matthews: What were the biggest hurdles to overcome to get VISA to where it is today?

Gen Kross: Past relationships, primarily those between our component, Military Sealift Command, and industry. MSC was always trying to squeeze the last ounce of sweat out of these companies. There were decades of mutual adversarial distrust. The vehicle taking us

forward is the EWG, the Executive Working Group. It will pound out VISA in its final form. It's a group that lives on the cusp. It will be over here working the contract issue and up here tying it to legal. In that body, when there's too much blood on the floor, General Thompson [Army Lieutenant General Roger G., Jr., Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM] will say, "Okay, this doesn't sound like we're working with strategic trust." And the entire atmosphere in the room will change. The trust between us and our VISA partners is magic.

Dr. Matthews: What are the biggest hurdles yet to clear in the VISA process?

Gen Kross: Avoiding the busting of too many chops over money. Never forget that VISA is a strategic need. We must have it. We have a government policy that subsidizes the sealift industry so that they can stay competitive. We are now at a point in the negotiations where we're going to settle on the rates, called contingency rates, and how companies will be compensated for loss of market share. To try to figure out how valuable sealift is in a major theater war and to set a rate on it in an air conditioned room at Scott [AFB, Illinois], requires us to see the "Big Picture." We can't have tunnel vision when it comes to sealift. We must take the perspective that we should and will pay a premium for it, and it's a righteous and worthy premium. We don't ever want to get ourselves in a position where, if we ever use VISA once, it's over. We want to be able to have an agreement that we can use again and again and again. It's not a strategic one-shot deal; it's a strategic multi-shot deal.

Dr. Matthews: And it could be a one-shot deal if our VISA partners, after we call up their ships, say, "Hey, it isn't worth it."

Gen Kross: “I lost the market share. You didn’t compensate me enough.” Or worse yet, “You’re not going to compensate me enough and I’m going to have to back out. I’m even going to have to walk away from the subsidy.” Then we will have failed. From the very beginning, when I came into this job, I’ve been saying, “Pay the man, and pay him well. No other nation has what these people are offering to do. Don’t let them rob us, so to speak, but pay the price. It’s going to be worth it.”

Dr. Matthews: What are your concerns about munitions carriers’ capabilities and readiness to support us in wartime?

Gen Kross: They have not been stressed in a decade, so I have some concerns. We need to exercise them hard to get our level of confidence up.

Dr. Matthews: The trucking industry had an 80,000-driver shortfall last year. Are there implications for DOD?

Gen Kross: I suspect it just means it gets delivered a little later. We are their largest customer, but we’re only four percent of their total business. What I fear a lot more are labor actions that are timed to hold hostage certain capabilities at certain times.

Force Protection, Information Warfare, and Y2K

Mr. Cossaboom: Force protection initiatives in DOD accelerated greatly while you were CINCTRANS and Commander of AMC. How did you determine what needed to be done to improve your troops' security? And how did you go about fixing the problems you found?

Gen Kross: We set up a mini-task force to plan and implement force protection's future. We moved out and forward faster than the other CINCs, and that enabled us to get first crack at the new pot of force protection money. Colonel Rocky Lane [Air Force Colonel Lawrence R., Director, Security Forces, AMC] knew how to work the Washington [D.C.] scene to tap the money early. So while others are just now being issued funds on a salami-slice basis, TRANSCOM men and women--and troops from across the Armed Forces who are given over to us as they travel through our system--are benefiting from increased security.

Mr. Cossaboom: Please delineate for us CINCTRANS and supported CINC force protection responsibilities for strategic mobility assets as they transit and operate in the supported CINC's AOR.

Gen Kross: We can write a book on that. Most importantly, theater CINCs are simply not agile, robust, or spread out enough to provide security for rapidly moving transportation forces. When, during a contingency, they put forces forward at intermediate staging bases, they can provide security, and they do it very well. And we should, at those points, subordinate ourselves to their security measures since it is their theater and the Secretary of Defense has given them responsibility for it. But that's about one percent of the

game. The other ninety-nine percent of the game is when we are out there alone on a scheduled or unscheduled basis within someone else's AOR. The only security would be a security officer from the embassy or contract local security. We do all security coordination directly with those agencies. We use our methods, processes, practices, and business rules, so to speak, to determine what level security we need. We have a force protection committee in Air Mobility Command that looks at each mission and runs a 34-point checklist on it. There's nothing like it anywhere in any other CINCdom. When we determine it is necessary, we add Phoenix Raven security to our missions. Phoenix Raven is another program set up by Air Mobility Command Security Forces under Colonel Rocky Lane. He and his group have done a great service to our country. God knows how many incidents we have averted or controlled by having Phoenix Ravens onboard our flights.

Mr. Cossaboom: What yet needs to be done?

Gen Kross: Improving security at passenger terminals and cargo facilities should be a priority. Most of those upgrades we have made so far are patchwork and interim in nature. In most cases, we are tenants. Someone else gives us a location on a facility and then we work quickly to make it as secure as possible. It's definitely not a "one-shoe-fits-all" kind of a process. We also have an awful lot of work to do in making sure each of our aircraft and each of our ships are properly equipped with defensive systems. Right now, we have too many planes with no defense. We really need to get on with those modifications, knowing full well that technological improvements will make the process continual.

Mr. Cossaboom: Did the bombings of our two embassies in East Africa* change any of your precepts on security?

Gen Kross: No. Not at all. It was a classic attack. They just chose a place where the security wasn't all that tight. It didn't change anything in the way we operate our transportation forces or provide security for them.

Dr. Matthews: How did you conclude that we should put walls around Buildings 1900 [the USTRANSCOM building] and 1600 [the AMC headquarters building]?

Gen Kross: I do not believe there is any real threat to either one of our buildings. We don't even have a fence around the base for that matter. But I support the wall for three primary reasons. First, it will be a visible, tangible, daily reminder of the importance of security. It will promote security awareness. Second, it will provide increased security to the many very important people who visit us. And third, I am concerned that during some future major regional contingency our facilities will be showcased in some way, greatly increasing their likelihood of becoming a target. But during normal day-to-day operations, I don't see a threat.

Dr. Matthews: Like force protection and bio/chem warfare, information warfare in operations has been placed on the front burner. What have we done to protect DTS systems and what more should we do?

Gen Kross: The second part of your question is easy to answer: there's a lot more to do. But we have done, in my view, an admirable job of providing day-to-day protection of our defense transportation

*On 7 August 1998, truck bombs exploded at the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In Nairobi, over 200 people were killed including 12 American citizens. The explosion in Tanzania killed 10 (no Americans). Thousands were reported injured in the two blasts.

information systems. We are probed. And we are surviving those probes. This indicates that the procedures and systems we have in place are relatively effective, but the threat is relentless. Consequently, we must be relentless in our quest to counter the threat. We must stay on the leading edge of information warfare because we are an information organization first and foremost.

Dr. Matthews: And we're measuring the probes. We actually have metrics on it now so we can bring it to the four-star's attention.

Gen Kross: Indeed. There's an old saying, "You can't fix anything unless you can measure it." It allows us to know where we are.

Dr. Matthews: If you were the enemy, where would you attack the DTS?

Gen Kross: I know of no area right now that is any more vulnerable than another or so vulnerable that we could be stopped from operating. Every day we assess the threat around the world. When we see that the threat is going to the next level, we transform ourselves to counter the threat. For example, for the redeployment from Desert Thunder,* when we saw a threat in Kuwait and other places due to Osama bin Laden,** we operated in a very different way. I won't go into that here, but we operated differently in order to protect our transportation forces and those we move. Two areas where I feel we are vulnerable are our information systems and our aircraft on regularly scheduled routes. Somewhere, someone has been watching us for a very long time. There is a strong likelihood that they have found us and put us on their list. We generally use plain vanilla airplanes, but eventually I fear the enemy will just take a

* Also known as Phoenix Scorpion II and III. See footnote on page 14.

** Accused by the United States of masterminding the embassy bombings in East Africa.

whack at one of them. It would be almost like picking a car off the interstate from a bridge.

Dr. Matthews: In a related issue, Y2K [Year 2000], TRANSCOM and its component commands appear to be in pretty good shape, at least compared to the rest of the DOD and other federal agencies. Are you confident we have been getting the real story on DTS preparedness for the turn of the century?

Gen Kross: No, I'm not confident. We have some green on our charts, some yellow, and some red. But we are very much out in front in preparing for operational testing next year [1999]. That will be the real period of truth.

Dr. Matthews: What worries you most about Y2K in regard to the DTS?

Gen Kross: Surprises, and things that will be revealed to us during testing and certification that we might not have time to fix. Also, the fact that we can't go this alone. We are part of an information continuum. We only control from second base around to shortstop. We're fed a lot of information from home plate, first base, and third base, and even the outfield. I have no confidence that systems feeding us are going to be as effective in working Y2K as we are. I am particularly nervous about our commercial feeds. I know that our commercial partners need to make a buck on New Year's Day, but I am also highly suspicious that they are not totally honest and forthcoming with their current progress in solving Y2K. It would be bad for their business today to let on to their customers that they are concerned about making it to the next century. I can only hope they'll eventually throw enough money at it to fix it.

Dr. Matthews: What are your broader concerns in regard to Y2K?

Gen Kross: I worry like everybody else. I worry about the future of the rain forest. So I also worry about whether I ought to be in an airliner or heavy traffic that day. [Laughter] You know, all of these things that we all worry about. I certainly want to know my money isn't in transit at any time on that date; it's all going to be in the passbook account. Or in bonds, or under the bed. [Laughter]

Dr. Matthews: When Colonel Shackelford [Air Force Colonel John C., Retired, former Deputy Director, Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center (JTCC), currently a contractor for Data Systems Technology] briefed you on Y2K a few months back, you shared with us an anecdote about being in a C-17 crossing the equator. Would you put the story on the record?

Gen Kross: We all know the C-17 went through the Air Force's world class RDT&E [Research, Development, Operational Test and Evaluation], IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and Evaluation], and the follow-on OT&E [Operational Test and Evaluation], and then we operated it for six months. And then one day we decided to fly it to Rwanda across the equator. When we did, a fistful of systems on the airplane shut down because the computers didn't know how to cope with the equator. If the Air Force missed that, God knows what Y2K is going to find.

Deliberate and Execution Planning

Dr. Matthews: Considering the type of operations we've been involved in since the war in the Persian Gulf, i.e. "other than war," with no plan or TPFDD on the shelf, it seems like "TPFDD in an Hour" could be a major contribution to readiness.

Gen Kross: Now we can develop TPFDDs from the dead start in a fortnight. By Halloween, we will have "TPFDD in a Day." Next step is "TPFDD in an Afternoon" and then "TPFDD in an Hour." "TPFDD in an Hour" will give us agility, fidelity, and a rapid list of potential courses of actions for any type of contingency. But "TPFDD in an Hour" will take considerable process reengineering on our part and that of the CINCs.

Dr. Matthews: A problem we recognized prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the CINCs were sending their plans and policy people to our TPFDD refinement conferences. And then when the war broke out their J3 folks hadn't been trained on JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System]. Have we made any progress in getting the J3s from the unified commands more involved in training to operate the system during wartime?

Gen Kross: I think we've made some progress, but there is still much more to be made. It's a continuous education, one of those things you never stop working. Remember these folks are turning over every two to three years.

Dr. Matthews: Over the last few years, it seems like CINCUNC [Commander in Chief, United Nations Command-Korea] has been more consistently supportive of and involved in deployment planning with us than [US]CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, USPACOM] has. However, if war breaks out in the Korean Peninsula,

CINCUNC will be preoccupied with survival so much so that he won't be able to think about strategic deployment. Will PACOM be prepared to get to the fight?

Gen Kross: A very good question and it was a very big concern of mine when I came into the job. My view was the same as what is embedded in your question. But PACOM has come a long way in the last two years. They have really stepped up to this deployment issue. They've seen a very proactive TRANSCOM working with UNC, which prompted them to step up to the bar. They are asking all the right kinds of questions now. They are challenging us, in a positive not an adversarial way, to stand right there with them. But, as I have stated before, you never know about an organization until it's stressed. PACOM has not been stressed.

Dr. Matthews: I have a General Kross quote: "First line, one MRC [major regional contingency; also known as a major theater war (MTW)] strategic mobility force. Second line, stay the course." Do our customers understand what you mean?

Gen Kross: Yes, they do. The warfighting CINCs and the Services back our Theme Two modernization to the hilt, one hundred percent. They put it very high on their integrated priority lists so, consequently, the Service POMs [Program Objective Memorandums] have paid attention to it, as did the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] staff. It's everything for "get to the fight," from en route infrastructure modernization to aircraft and sealift modernization.

Dr. Matthews: We have modeled force closures for two MRCs using several time periods to define "nearly simultaneous." Fifteen days, I believe, was the tightest. Is that transportation-feasible?

Gen Kross: No. It's fantasy. Not achievable. Not transportation-feasible. We would just be a true one MRC force then, the rest would go red like a thermometer out the top.

Dr. Matthews: What is the biggest "if" in our swing strategy?

Gen Kross: The behavior of the first engaged CINC including his components and their ability to swallow hard and release the resources: first the air and then the sea. The theater CINCs must behave in a global way despite the fact that their missions are to guarantee regional successes.

Dr. Matthews: Are we really prepared to swing from Korea to the Persian Gulf?

Gen Kross: We are prepared to swing both ways. We conceptualize the swing from the desert to Asia in our minds, but it does work both ways.

Dr. Matthews: Are there problems inherent in one that are not inherent in the other?

Gen Kross: Yes. In a desert war we will stabilize and then stop the dying. In the Korean theater, we will only reduce the dying. And that will change the swing dramatically. CINCUNC and CINCPAC will be very much more resistant to releasing the forces to swing.

DIRMOBFOR and Joint Doctrine

Dr. Matthews: You said at staff meeting that if the Joint Staff called a meeting of the Joint Transportation Board to solve problems during a war, TRANSCOM had failed. Please elaborate.

Gen Kross: I have been at the only meeting of the Joint Transportation Board and that was during the war in the Persian Gulf. I found it to be stillborn, inappropriate, lagging in its time, and unable to reach a

decision on the matter for which it was convened. Most importantly, the wrong people were on the board. Anyone who can spell transportation is a member while those actually accountable for success of the operation are not members. Therefore, the whole idea of the Joint Transportation Board is goofy. If problems cannot be solved between CINCs--the supported CINC and the supporting CINC, USCINCTRANS--then they should take it to the "Tank."^{*} As it has turned out, we have assurances that the Joint Transportation Board will never again be convened.

Dr. Matthews: Why don't we get rid of it?

Gen Kross: In the next printing of that joint doctrine, it will be gone.

Dr. Matthews: Going on two years ago at the Airlift/Tanker Association Conference in Dallas [Texas], I stood up and asked you whether you intended to change the definition of DIRMOBFOR, Director of Mobility Forces, to include the surface and the sea components. You said you didn't at that time have that intention. I'm wondering now, after two years, and the fact that MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command] is doing seaport management in theater, if you've reconsidered expanding DIRMOBFOR responsibilities.

Gen Kross: That's a very good question. It would seem a natural extension, but I think the decision to expand DIRMOBFOR roles to seaport operations and surface transportation is still a ways off. Here is why. The air role of the DIRMOBFOR is just now beginning to crystallize. We have yet to clarify and finalize single port management or RSO&I [Reception, Staging, Onward Movement

^{*}The Tank is a nickname for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference Room where the Service Chiefs meet to debate and make policy decisions.

and Integration]^{*} and, quite honestly, the theater CINCs and their logisticians are not yet willing to share that much of their power. Finally, and quite frankly, TRANSCOM is not ready to ask for it. It is not something we should be excited about. We know that it is a worthy cause, but we just don't have the energy to devote to it now. It will not help us inculcate best business practices or bring down rates. It's not going to be cheaper or more efficient. In a really big war, it would probably make us more effective. But when it comes about, I bet it will be externally imposed from upon high as part and parcel of logistics reform, end-to-end supply chain management, and DOD-wide efforts to move the TRANSCOM AOR closer to the tactical assembly area.

Mr. Cossaboom: Back in October 1996, you stated, "Before I leave here I'd like to get at least one or two documents that actually have DIRMOBFOR directing, not just coordinating." Were you successful?

Gen Kross: Yes. Absolutely. Phoenix Scorpion II was the first. And we also did it in Ulchi Focus Lens.^{**} The secret is stability in the DIRMOBFOR.

Our logic is to keep the wing commander/DIRMOBFOR in place for two cycles so they and the theater command they are designated to support become joined at the hip. That's what we

^{*}RSO&I is the reassembling of personnel, equipment, and accompanying supplies deploying to a theater of operations into mission capable forces and their movement forward in theater for battle.

^{**} US-Republic of Korea defensive exercise.

did with Williams, Boots, and Roser.* I don't worry about what they do with the wing. They know that business. It is second nature to them. They are far more important in their other role as a general officer, the DIRMOBFOR role. And in Air Mobility Command, general officers can compete for their next promotion in any job. It won't hurt them to stick around in that dual-hatted job. In fact, it is better for all concerned that they do.

Mr. Cossaboom: Assess DIRMOBFOR training, structure, and selection process.

Gen Kross: They have all gotten much better in the last couple of years. Buck Marr [Air Force Major General Richard C., Commander, Air Mobility Warfare Center (AMWC), 1995-1997] and Bill Welser [Air Force Major General William III, Commander, AMWC, 1997-present] have continued to refine and improve DIRMOBFOR training. It's taught as a platform course largely, but they now actually exercise the curriculum at Blue Flag.** Once you're a DIRMOBFOR course graduate, we have to use you, and use you soon. If we don't, you will atrophy. If I train you to be a ballplayer and then you don't play baseball, you won't be very good at it. We have also fine tuned the selection process including our overseas teammates, the theater CINCs. Now our customers have a sense of the game. We are building trust. Real trust will come when we choose someone from a theater who has strat[egic] experience to be a DIRMOBFOR during a large contingency.

*Brigadier General George N. Williams was Commander, 60th Air Mobility Wing, Travis AFB, California, December 1995-July 1998. He was promoted to major general 4 March 1999. Brigadier General Robert J. Boots was Commander, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover AFB, Delaware, July 1994-June 1996. He was promoted to major general 20 March 1998. Brigadier General Steven A. Roser was Commander, 437th Airlift Wing, Charleston AFB, South Carolina, July 1996-June 1998.

**A joint-service, component-level command and control battlestaff training exercise.

That's going to be the next step in the process. We've all agreed to do it. It just hasn't happened yet.

Dr. Matthews: You've said several times that "iron majors"* don't do joint doctrine, the CINC does joint doctrine. You've also stated that the joint doctrine development process, from the Joint Staff on down, could use some improvement. What recommendations would you give us?

Gen Kross: First, if I could clarify the quotes. What I've said is if you leave doctrine development, joint or Service, to the "iron majors," you get what you deserve, which is an equivocating, milquetoast product that allows pretty much anybody to do whatever the heck they want, because everybody has put so many qualifiers into it that it can be read any which way.

Now, on improving the process. When it takes longer to produce a doctrine document than to fight World War II, obviously the process can be improved. The Joint Staff has actually accelerated the coordination process through Doctrine Working Parties, where everybody gets in a room and they bang it out. The process originally took nearly four years. The Joint Staff has reduced it to about a year. This is lightning speed for doctrine coordination. There is an inherent problem: you have to coordinate it with the Services who don't want you to do joint doctrine because joint doctrine is directive, and therefore, they want to water it down to the maximum extent. CINCs, however, are very happy to do joint doctrine and that's where the Working Party kind of carries the day.

*A term for a hard-nosed action officer. An "iron major" can be any rank and any Service.

Dr. Matthews: You held a Working Party with the commander of USAFE [United States Air Forces in Europe] and produced a “Little Red Book.”*

Gen Kross: The issue was how to organize mobility forces for a contingency. Efforts to date had not gone well, in the European theater in particular. The AMC and USAFE staffs were not getting along. So I told my good friend General Ryan [then Commander, USAFE], “Look, at my end, I’m just going to do it myself. The staff is no longer part of the process. I know enough about this business that I can knock this thing out with just me writing it.” He said, “Okay.” So he and I knocked it out, and we put together a pretty good product. What am I talking about? I’m talking about TACON [tactical control] of the TALCE [Tactical Airlift Control Element], an agent of the TACC, to the DIRMOBFOR, which is fine. It’s in the theater. It’s forward. The DIRMOBFOR is our guy anyway. He’s bonded and designated. I can name him by theater. We really didn’t give anything away. In fact, in giving TACON of the TALCE to the DIRMOBFOR, we codified DIRMOBFOR influence in that theater. Before, he was simply a coordinator; now he is a true director of mobility forces.

**Presentation of Forces: The Little Red Book*, 1 April 1997. Printed by the Air Force, this document provides a structured approach for commanding and organizing Air Force forces assigned to a joint force commander. The name “Little Red Book” came from General Hawley and is taken from a golfer’s instruction guide of the same name written by Harvey Penick.

RSO&I and The Seam

Mr. Cossaboom: The deployment of IFOR [Implementation Force] for Joint Endeavor* under General Rutherford's watch highlighted a seam in the air transportation system between strategic and theater airlift. Has that seam been eliminated?

Gen Kross: No, it has not been eliminated. There will always be seams between strategic and theater, and it is not particular to the case you made. When you alter a process, you probably break another process. When you change an organization, you probably break many processes. When you attack one seam, you will create other seams. It's in the dealing with the seam that's the trick. We believe that we have dealt with the seam very well over the last couple of years. We have altered doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. And we have exercised it. We have also gotten buy-ins from all the players. There is a tendency within a theater to have a theater focus. It's what we pay people for. And role theory is really a physical law, not a theory. Organizational behavior is a physical law.

Dr. Matthews: That hasn't changed since we put one of our own** in USAFE's Number Two spot?

Gen Kross: No, it has not. Role theory is operative. When you put folks who are global in their focus into the theater, they will be theater in their focus. That's just the way it is, especially in [US]EUCOM [United States European Command], and specifically in USAFE, the air component of EUCOM. USAFE believes it can do the

*Operation Joint Endeavor was the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in December 1995.

**Lieutenant General William J. Begert, Vice Commander, USAFE, was the USTRANSCOM J3/J4 from March 1995 to July 1997.

TRANSCOM mission just as well as TRANSCOM because it owns a squadron of C-130s and a squadron of tankers. That is simply not the case.

Dr. Matthews: There is a cultural difference between TRANSCOM and USAFE.

Gen Kross: USAFE represents the cutting edge of the Air Force culture: “I have a problem. Let’s reorganize.” We are not of that religion. They’re “Protestants”: Martin Luther came from over there in Germany. We tend to be “Catholic.” By the way, the definition of “catholic” is pretty close to global and universal. Or you could put it like this: we are IBM and they are Macintosh. We are culturally opposite in our approach to problems. Their culture is not wrong, it’s just different. Now that we recognize and acknowledge the differences, we can work together to solve problems, to keep the trust up, and the distrust down. Knowing it is the key to success. Knowing it and not dealing with it is a recipe to fail at the strategic seam next time around in that theater.

Mr. Cossaboom: USAFE wants to stand up its own TALCE.

Gen Kross: That’s alright. I have, as a matter of fact, directed that we give them a MARC* [Mobile Air Reporting Communications van]. They ought to have a squadron’s worth of capability. A squadron’s worth of capability is not just planes. It’s a TALCE, too. And we shouldn’t be worried or threatened by that. We have 34 of our own TALCEs and we get along quite well with 34. We have a few extra MARCs here and there. We ought to be able to give them one.

* A MARC is a transportable command center for use at ALCE (Airlift Control Element) deployed locations.

Dr. Matthews: Based on your experiences during the war in the Persian Gulf and now as CINCTRANS, what should TRANSCOM's role be in RSO&I?

Gen Kross: Very little. I am not compulsive about going across the seam. It follows a natural pattern we have: whenever you move into someone else's AOR, you become at best their antagonist and opponent, at worst their enemy. You are certainly not going to be their friend and partner. Whenever you transfer power between CINCs, you get problems. You've heard me say this many times: I seek to solve problems like those inherent in RSO&I through process improvement. If you get people to work it through process improvement, you build a partnership while finding solutions.

Theme Two: Modernization

Overview

Mr. Cossaboom: Theme Two. How well is AMC prepared to operate in the 21st Century?

Gen Kross: Pretty well if the Air Force leadership funds us. And that's a "big if."

Mr. Cossaboom: In particular?

Gen Kross: Stay the course on C-17s, C-5 modernization, 60K loader buy-out, GATM, C-130 modernization, en route infrastructure. Air Force Materiel Command gets funded for their spare parts. We make the changes that are necessary to our acquisition systems so I have a vote in picking the right kind of logistics support contracts. There's no committee issuing me a camel. I then have to pass through with rates and we don't have the tails [airlift aircraft], the spare parts, or the engines needed to get the job done. So we need a lot of help from the Air Force. The Air Force is very interested in the Expeditionary Air Force. We're right in the middle of that. But we can't take our eyes off the ball for readiness and follow-through on Theme Two procurements. That's very important.

Dr. Matthews: Who are our best friends on the Hill, and whom do you think we need to spend some more time educating?

Gen Kross: Our best friends on the Hill, in Congress, are Jim Saxton [Representative H. James, Republican-New Jersey], who carries the Air Mobility Command banner, and Tillie Fowler [Representative Tillie, Republican-Florida], who understands global transportation in ways that even I don't. We have strong

support among staffers on the HNSC [House National Security Committee] and HAC [House Appropriations Committee]. On the Senate side, we have strong support from Senator Cleland [Senator Max, Democrat-Georgia] for air mobility. Senator Lott [Senator Trent, Republican-Mississippi] is also a tremendous supporter of global air mobility and TRANSCOM, as is his staffer, Mr. Eric Womble. I have not met any elected official or staffer who, once they know the TRANSCOM story, have not gotten behind us. What we have sells because it benefits all. Telling our story is a continuous quest because our intended audience is extremely busy with numerous priorities.

Dr. Matthews: Several months back you had a conversation in staff meeting with Cam Crawford [Air Force Colonel Cameron M., Chief, CINC's Action Group]. He was lining up meetings for you with members of Congress and you mentioned you weren't looking forward to your hour with Senator Lott. Your comment was an aside. I sure am curious as to what you meant.

Gen Kross: Turns out I was wrong. Whenever you're dealing with folks who are busy, you can get wrong information. We've received nothing but the finest support from Senator Lott and from his staff, not only for C-17s but also for C-5 and C-130 modernization programs, global air traffic management, mobility enhancement funds, and funding the overseas en route structure. Senator Lott was quickly a grand supporter of the full range of TRANSCOM priorities. He sees TRANSCOM as the key to national defense. We need to strengthen our ties to Senator Lott.

Dr. Matthews: We had a component commanders conference last week [11-12 June 1998] and the first briefing was by Dan McMillin [Daniel F., Deputy Director, USTRANSCOM Plans and Policy Directorate]

on how we're linking our strategic plan with the POM process. What a stroke of genius it was, putting your deputy chief financial officer in the Deputy J5 position.

Gen Kross: He absolutely loves the job. It showed in his briefing and the discussion that followed.

Dr. Matthews: Is the TRANSCOM strategic plan on track?

Gen Kross: I didn't pay much attention to the strategic plan. I tend to live out the strategic plan while focusing on three main themes. I'm like most people. I can't remember more than three things at a time. A strategic plan has 25 things in it. If you get three themes and you hang little ornaments under each of them, then you can remember what needs to be remembered. That's why I was pleased to see that General Robertson [Air Force General Charles T. "Tony" Robertson, Jr., General Kross' successor as USCINTRANS] has similar themes. Basically they are the same three themes with a greater emphasis on people, kind of drawing them up into the three themes. I applaud him for that.

Dr. Matthews: You stated that CINCTRANS was third to speak at the CINCs' conference, following CINCCENT and CINCPAC, and that was an indicator of TRANSCOM's increased stature in the hierarchy. Are there other indicators?

Gen Kross: As a former CINC, the Chairman, General Shelton [Army General Henry H., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997 to present, and former Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 1996-1997], has rock solid faith in our ability to perform our mission. Like him, Dr. Hamre [Dr. John J. Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1997 to present] continually reaffirms his confidence in us. He sees TRANSCOM as central to

his vision of the DOD of the future. He has not only been our partner but one of our prime capital investors. He has been a venture capitalist with us. His support for GTN is paying off big time for everyone. And then there is my boss, the Secretary of Defense [William S. "Bill" Cohen]. Bill Cohen has taken great notice of TRANSCOM. He knows that we'll continue to work for the warfighting CINCs and for all of our customers. He is now using us as a reinvention CINC, as a Secretary of Defense benchmark for where he wants to take reform in the Department of Defense. What grander set of three supporters can a CINC have? And when I say a CINC, I mean this CINCDom, this organization, this command.

Dr. Matthews: And the JROC's [Joint Requirements Oversight Council's] support of our modernization programs?

Gen Kross: I can also tell you that everything we ever asked for from the Chairman through the JROC process has come our way. I must add that the Service Chiefs, because they wear their JCS hats with pride, have built their modernization programs with us in mind. We have done very well by them the last two years. All this support is recognition of what TRANSCOM brings to the table for our country.

MRS BURU and MRS 05

Dr. Matthews: We are about ready to go in for a follow-on to MRS [Mobility Requirements Study] and MRS BURU [Bottom-Up Review Update] with MRS 05 [Fiscal Year 2005]. Do you expect to see any major changes in that new study?

Gen Kross: No. We expect to see reaffirmation of most things that we already know. We expect to see a chem/bio [chemical/biological] overlay awareness, which is appropriate. We expect to see justification for C-5 modernization by the increasing visibility and criticality of the halting phase. And we expect to see an excursion validating more C-17s for SOF [Special Operations Forces]. If the C-5 modernization and C-17 for SOF are not in MRS 05, then we at TRANSCOM have not done our job.

Dr. Matthews: This is a rather long-winded question. In your posture statement of March 1997, you stated that even with all eleven LMSRs we would still face a 550,000 square foot RO/RO shortage for surge. You hoped to minimize the operational risks through expanding square footage of the existing RO/ROs, NDF [National Defense Features], VISA, and then “a resolution of prepositioning issues related to the surge requirement, which may have a mitigating effect on the final amount of our RO/RO capacity that we must acquire.” I have never been able to figure out what you meant by that.

Gen Kross: You have to remember that the staff writes the posture statement and that I only scan it. [Laughter] Let me make it clear. We have 95 percent of the requirement, so you have to look at it as a glass 95 percent full and we’re worrying about the last five percent. We have very good plans to mitigate the five percent. If we did nothing, we would in a contingency contract a few foreign flag

RO/ROs off the open market. So it is not much to worry about. The other initiatives are going to probably soak up the last five percent pretty well. And as we speak, two to three percent are funded and then MRS 05 will change the level in the POM anyway.

Mr. Cossaboom: You also said that you were “always looking for ways to use fewer C-141s.” What did you find?

Gen Kross: That I was wrong. We will always use as many C-141s as we can get our hands on. In the end, we have developed business processes and process improvement to get at the remaining C-141s that were in the Guard and Reserve. It’s called the single air mobility system.

GATM

Mr. Cossaboom: You’ve identified GATM as critical to DTS readiness. Are all the systems funded?

Gen Kross: All of the systems for our air mobility aircraft are funded, with one exception: C-130s. However, we’re going to be able to recover because we have a foothold in the Air Force POM to fund the C-130 beyond the out years, so the C-130 modernization program will eventually result in GATM-compliant C-130s.

Mr. Cossaboom: Will all AMC aircraft be modified in time to meet ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] standards?

Gen Kross: No, but we are not overly concerned about it at the moment because solidification of ICAO standards will put tremendous pressure on the budgeting process to make them compliant. The standards, the restrictions I would call them, are still murky.

Consequently, at this time we can't accelerate funding. Also, we're not obsessed with meeting a standard now that likely will change. Finally, we can't afford to have all of our fleets down nearly simultaneously. So the plan as we have it right now, the schedule as we have it now, is probably as good as any.

Mr. Cossaboom: Who was most helpful in getting us funds to comply?

Gen Kross: In OSD it was Dr. Hamre. On the Joint Staff, General Joe Ralston [Air Force General Joseph W., Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] literally strapped the JROC on his back and brought them across the goal line for us. When the budget was tight, in the bottom of the ninth inning, a couple of the Services did not want to fund it. General Ralston was able to separate air mobility airplanes from Navy and Army planes where GATM compliance is less critical. And we received excellent help from Congressman Jim Saxton who carried our banner on the House side. He really stepped up to the global issue of GATM. Early on in my term as CINC, we set out to find a standard bearer in the House, and to a lesser extent in the Senate, to take up the challenge. Congressman Saxton didn't even blink. He has been out studying the issues and, as a result, he has become extremely knowledgeable about them. He understands our vision and our position. It's just a tremendously positive relationship. General Robertson and Congressman Saxton really hit it off, too. So the relationship will get even closer. His staff has become literally an extension of our own staff. I mean I can cite their birthdays and I send them cases of Budweiser. I never miss an opportunity. [Laughter] It's time and effort very well spent.

Dr. Matthews: And on the Senate side?

Gen Kross: We went to Senator Inhofe [James M., Republican-Oklahoma] because he was a pilot. He didn't want to do it. So we went to Senator Cleland, who is a great American, a big-hearted, tremendous patriot. And he has well-meaning members on his staff who are very helpful. Our only difficulty is there are fewer senators than congressmen so they are spread thinner. Senator Cleland has many issues on his plate, including the needs of disabled veterans. But he's always there for us when we need him. I must also credit our good friend Congressman [Duncan] Hunter [Republican-California] who heads the procurement subcommittee of the HASC [House Armed Services Committee]. In essence he has delegated air mobility procurement matters to Congressman Saxton. So, he has really transferred his influence and power to Congressman Saxton. Knock on wood, we will continue to do well the last couple of years in this Congress. Funds are being *added* for air mobility and other transportation programs. That's a positive benefit for us and, therefore, for the country.

En Route Infrastructure

Mr. Cossaboom: You declared 1997 the Year of the En Route Structure to highlight the needs and weakness of AMC's en route structure. What were the results?

Gen Kross: First I want to talk a little bit about the "Year Of." The "Year Of" is really a process. We have one under our belt [Year of the Container], another almost under our belt [Year of the En Route Structure], and a third one coming out of the ground [Year of the Enlisted Force]. With the "Year Of" we establish a process theme for a year that pays dividends long after the year is over. We put a lot of capital investment in the physical plant of our en route

system. We set new and higher standards for cleanliness, signage, and information systems. And I think the best offices in the command are now in the en route system. The ultimate compliment for Year of the En Route Structure was the fact we came within a hair of doing it for a second year. We voted five times to break the tie between “Year of the En Route Structure II” and “Year of the Enlisted Force.”

Mr. Cossaboom: Is the en route structure now able to support national policy objectives?

Gen Kross: No, not at the most stressed level, the major theater war. Problems remain in the DOD en route structure that are overlaid on our structure. Hydrants under ramps, pipelines to the hydrants, fuel storage, and pipelines from the ship to the air base are major concerns. Over the last couple of years, we have fully funded all of the known requirements in the FYDP [Five Year Defense Plan]. About \$1.5 billion was added to the DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] POM to cover our concerns. We were able to do that because of our strong partnership with DLA. We also have great support from Dr. Hamre and Secretary Cohen.

Mr. Cossaboom: This is for places like Rota [Air Base (AB), Spain], and Andersen [AFB, Guam]?

Gen Kross: Rota, Andersen, Yokota [Japan], Elmendorf [AFB, Alaska], Moron [AB, Spain], Eilison [AFB, Alaska], the list goes on and on. Some of them are in the CONUS, like Fairchild AFB [Washington].

Super Fast Sealift

Mr. Cossaboom: What technological innovations have caught your attention for the possible adaptation to the DTS?

Gen Kross: Information. We need to continue to transform ourselves into that “information first” command.

Dr. Matthews: Back when you were our J3/J4, we had pretty much decided that there would be no major technological advances in sealift in the foreseeable future. Do you still feel that way?

Gen Kross: No. I’m hopeful that we will get super fast sealift. My good friend, Admiral Perkins, disagrees. He says there are three variables: speed, capacity, and range. You can get two, but you can’t ever have three. I’m actually hopeful for breakthroughs in the next five to ten years. That’s why I encourage organizations like CCDoTT [Center for Commercial Deployment of Transportation Technology]. Computers will help us improve hull and power plant design. I believe there will be marked improvements in composite materials.

Interestingly, I have found that the shipbuilding industry is not excited about future technology. They fear it will mean fewer jobs. And as long as they can get the “govement” to pay for research and development in heavy steel, they aren’t going to be stressed to come up with something better. Shipbuilding companies do not behave like airplane building companies, which have R&D [Research and Development] labs and factories. Shipbuilders are off welding. They take big heavy things and weld them together. And then they wire them and then they put them in the water. That’s pretty much what they do. So they make only

marginal process improvement. Like they learn to put the wire in before they start welding.

TRAC²ES

Dr. Matthews: You stated in the summer of 1996, “I would not be surprised if TRAC²ES [TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System] collapsed under its own weight.” Can I get a statement from you on the state of TRAC²ES today?

Gen Kross: It appears to have turned around. When it was transferred over to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, it languished for a period. Then through the efforts of General Randolph [Air Force Major General Leonard M., Jr., USTRANSCOM Command Surgeon and AMC Command Surgeon] and General Thompson, with a lot of interest on the part of auditors, we got the program moving forward again.

Dr. Matthews: The cost of TRAC²ES has raised eyebrows since its inception.

Gen Kross: TRAC²ES to me still costs way too much for what we’re expecting to get. If I had had a say in it, back at the beginning of TRAC²ES, I would not have put together a program costing 212 million dollars that doesn’t guarantee tracking patients during contingencies. I’m not sure how important it is to have such a system for peacetime activities. I have a heck of a lot more use for that kind of money, and the price tag may eventually be much higher than that. We could, for instance, operate the entire C-9 force for ten years on the TRAC²ES budget. Which one is more important? There are attempts right now to cashier the C-9 force, but there isn’t anyone trying to cashier TRAC²ES. I think we have the “em-PHA-sis” on the wrong “syl-LAH-ble” again.

Commercial Aerial Refueling and Commercial C-17

Dr. Matthews: The TRANSCOM staff recommended to you that TRANSCOM not support contract aerial refueling. You decided to give the contractor, Omega Air, at least a modicum of support. Why?

Gen Kross: If we didn't, they would have been off lobbying Congress to write language that would have been lame and unexecutable. It would have caused us phenomenally bigger problems in the long run to have locked the door to Omega. So we hugged them close, which gave us time to do an assessment of their proposal. As it turns out, they can't execute. They don't have a strategic application system. They're only basket refuelers. So it has only modest applicability in the standard, stabilized peacetime mode, primarily Navy training because they are the only ones who have the baskets.

Dr. Matthews: So we aren't committed to them in any kind of way.

Gen Kross: No. We recommended they base their first phase effort on about 500 hours per year of DOD business, and then they should develop a boom capability. That's where it is today.

Mr. Cossaboom: What are the pros and cons of a MD-17?

Gen Kross: It is in the national interest to sell C-17s commercially and to other countries. Why? Because *our* C-17s will be cheaper. We can then take those dollars saved and invest them elsewhere. We will also have more C-17s that, through the CRAF "apparatchkee," we can use in a contingency. Of course, the big question is "is the MD-17 commercially viable?" So far, I don't think so. Anyway, as of yet, we haven't found a way to use it commercially nor has

Fred Smith or anyone else. But we fully support this concept.
[Laughter]

C-17: Challenges

Mr. Cossaboom: Have you identified any problems with the C-17, and if so, what are they?

Gen Kross: The airplane itself is basically a compromise of everything that everybody ever wanted. That's its first big drawback. They said, "Build me an outsized airplane that can fit into the footprint of a C-141." Well, we did that. But by doing so we sacrificed range. So we put in an air refueling module and now the C-17 is tanker intense. Everybody thought it was going to be a big modern C-130. It was going to land on dirt. It can land on dirt but only a few times and only on certain kinds of dirt.

Dr. Matthews: It sure is reliable.

Gen Kross: It's much more reliable than anything we have, but it's not anywhere near as reliable as we would like it to be. It carries a lot, but it doesn't carry as much as we wish it would carry. Only 18 pallets. A C-141 carries 13 pallets. But when you put cargo on pallets, it's no longer outsized, it's oversized.

Dr. Matthews: And the engines?

Gen Kross: We touted the engines because they were so much more reliable than 757 engines. Yeah, but they aren't as reliable as I'd like them to be because they put a lot a stuff on them, including some parts that are unique to us. And those are the high failure parts.

Dr. Matthews: And crew ratio?

Gen Kross: We built a briefing: “Wouldn’t you like to have a three-man crew?” Great idea. Lowers your manpower. The manpower people then took the manpower and gave us a 3.0 crew ratio active but only one loadmaster per crew. One loadmaster is not enough to do the daily work on that plane. You have the sick, the lame, the lazy, the ones on PME [Professional Military Education], the ones on leave. Boom. Pretty soon we don’t have a full crew. We have the pipeline, “the schmipeline,” but only 91 percent manning. We need 1.5 loadmasters per crew. Minimum. We learned that. So we are under capitalized in terms of our crew ratio.

Dr. Matthews: It has velocity.

Gen Kross: They gave us an airplane that has the *capability* for velocity. It’s reliable enough that we can be operating ten, twelve hours a day, easy. But we don’t have enough crews to do it. We’ve hit a wall in crews. The airplane is not the kind of airplane that you’re supposed to be moving peacetime cargo on. Yeah, but I’ve got a lot of peacetime military customers. It’s one of these things where I’m pushing and pulling. It’s the push-pull winner of all time. We’re getting 120 but remember we wanted 210. So it’s tails, tails, tails.

Dr. Matthews: Then if we get more, they aren’t going to be in the active force.

Gen Kross: They’ll be in the Guard and Reserve, and I won’t be able to get at them.

Mr. Cossaboom: Tell us about the computer.

Gen Kross: They gave us an airplane with an Apple IIc computer in a world of 400 megahertz Pentiums. It requires the pilot to start the APU [Auxiliary Power Unit] and do 45 minutes worth of preflight while the co-pilot goes into the flight plan. A pilot must go to the

cockpit because there's no flight engineer to do these preflight duties. So pilots are up there doing flight engineer duties.

Mr. Cossaboom: We'll work the bugs out of the engines and the computer.

Gen Kross: But the Air Force won't give us a higher crew ratio. We could use 4.0 crew ratio on the active side and we could use 1.5 loadmasters per crew. Then I might have enough crews to operate as needed. And putting the 2.0 crew ratio in the Reserves and then giving them all these missions--from airdrop to "airschmop" to everything in between--doesn't make much sense. They will never get out of the local patterns, and we in the active force won't really get much use out of them. That all said, the crews and the aircraft are performing brilliantly.

C-17: Direct Delivery

Mr. Cossaboom: What is the importance of direct delivery?

Gen Kross: It is overdone. It sold the C-17 in a very big way. But in the end, it intoxicated our partner, the Army, who believed the C-17 would actually deliver tanks to dirt airfields forward in a continuous flow. This defies the science of dirt. We can deliver equipment to a forward concrete-capped runway in a continuous flow, and we can deliver equipment to a dirt airfield in one or two sorties but that's about it. Then dirt starts to behave like dirt and, consequently, C-17s cannot land there anymore.

Mr. Cossaboom: What have we done to educate the Army on C-17 capabilities and limitations?

Gen Kross: Everything we can; however, there is a gene that goes into the brain of Army personnel at about the major rank that stays with

them to senior officers--not the most senior, maybe one or two stars--that keeps going into relapse saying, "The C-17 is supposed to land on dirt and if it doesn't, we have been betrayed." I tell them to go back and read the mail, the requirement document that they signed off on. The requirement was never in there. We push our Army partners to think "concrete-capped runways." The C-17 can be put into place very quickly, in a matter of days. Concrete-capped runways are very cheap and they'll hold up for years. As a matter of fact, the Army needs to build a bunch of them around the CONUS in training areas. We also send out a status report periodically on C-17 outstanding issues. We received very good feedback from XVIII Airborne Corps and FORSCOM [United States Forces Command], and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army [Army General William W. Crouch]. We need to keep them all reading those status reports. Then they will understand where we are on everything from our airdrop capability to the science of dirt.

C-17 and Boeing-747

Dr. Matthews: What did you mean when you called the DRB [Defense Resource Board] a "kind of giant love-in"?

Gen Kross: That was when I was Director of the Joint Staff. I was referring to the DRB's final meeting to approve the buy of the additional 80 C-17s to reach the 120 total. Except for Bill Lynn [William J. III, Director, OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)], who would not let go of the Boeing 747 option, it was a giant love-in. Bill Lynn was playing out his role in support of the role theory. It is PA&E's job to be the naysayer. If they ever participate in a love-in, we're all in trouble. He played out his role well, but he did it from a position of systems analyst, and we all know where

that got us in the sixties.* He had a poor understanding of how our Defense Transportation System really works because he based it on numbers. For us to have Boeing 747s in the organic fleet would be silly, because we can buy that capability on the market place. It flies in the face of the whole concept of outsourcing: only keeping what you need to keep.

Dr. Matthews: At a component commanders' conference in March 1997, you said, "One of my successors will have to go in for more C-17s for increased flexibility of T-Tails." Is that time now?

Gen Kross: Yes, the time is now, because you have to be putting them in the out years of the POM. I actually rolled forward to establish and validate a requirement for a higher number. It is for my successor to put numbers against it. As it turned out, in the final months of my time as CINCTRANS, we had an opportunity to put C-17s in the POM, a couple each year, as I recall. We will not shut down the C-17 assembly line. It's all we have for the future of strategic airlift.

*As Secretary of Defense (1961-1968) Robert S. McNamara took a systems analysis approach to defense expenditures which came under fire from segments of the military establishment for relying too heavily on quantifiable results and not utilizing the experience and judgement of military leaders. Under McNamara, defense spending was linked to missions, a process that enabled his analysts to evaluate the cost effectiveness of a weapon system, and to make comparisons of the similarity of missions between weapon systems. This methodology for defense spending dismissed many Service requests in McNamara's search for cost effectiveness and commonality. (SOURCES: Allen R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States*, (New York: The Free Press, 1984); Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, *The Department of Defense, 1947-1007: Organization and Leaders*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997)). Also see footnote on p. 102.

Theme Three: Process Improvement

Overview

Mr. Cossaboom: Theme Three: Process Improvement. Was Roseanne Roseannadanna* right?

Gen Kross: Yes, it's always something. And that's why we practice continuous improvement. TRANSCOM and AMC always need to be Theme Three organizations. Likewise they always need to be Theme Two organizations, and they would put us in jail if we weren't Theme One organizations. All three themes, we must continually bang 'em, bang 'em, bang 'em, and we will continually get better and better and better.

Dr. Matthews: What would you identify as the major improvements in AMC's and TRANSCOM's critical processes?

Gen Kross: The major improvement: everybody's involved in decision-making at the top, including the component commanders and my staffs here at Scott. They really like that. That's one of my cardinal rules. The establishment of agile metrics, which is itself a process to create the metrics, is another process success. Ditto for the establishment of the industry benchmarking, cost driver, Customer Day, "Year Of," contingency planning, and execution processes. The single air mobility system, which is a process and not a system, and the reaffirmation of the JTCC's critical role in process reengineering are others. We have learned to be patient enough to allow the JTCC to do their work before moving on to

*Played by Gilda Radner, Roseanne Rosannadanna was a fictitious news personality on NBC-TV's Saturday Night Live and famous for the line "It's always something."

the next step. Our staff meeting process is an excellent process. The way we work legislative matters is a good process. Our daily updates and wrap-ups are excellent processes. All of these are very important to decision-making processes at the top.

Dr. Matthews: Where do we need to work harder?

Gen Kross: A true indication that it is time for me to move on is the great difficulty I am experiencing in finding ways to improve our processes. I've just about shot everything that I can shoot. You need fresh eyes. I would like to see operations in TRANSCOM use less paper. I would like to see a commanders-only VTC [video teleconference] once a week; just the CINC and the component commanders, no staffs, in there brainstorming. I'd like to take the cost driver process to the next level: it should be biweekly. I'd like to get a much better capability for JOSAC [Joint Operational Support Airlift Center] scheduling. Overall, my list is fairly short, very simple, and do-able in about a year.

Benchmarking with Industry

Dr. Matthews: What have we learned from our industry visits?

Gen Kross: So much that you could write a book about it. Everywhere we've gone, we've found a gold mine. First, we've learned from them how to turn strategic planning into bottom line efficiency for our customers. Because of our visits to industry, we have learned to see customer service as an end-to-end process. Second, we have learned that our commercial partners, and even companies who are not our partners, are very willing to share with us out of a sense of duty to the nation. To get these kinds of things done in corporate America ordinarily would cost big bucks, but for us they do it for

free. Third, there are actually organizations forming in the United States, like BENS [Business Executives for National Security], that are facilitating the government/business benchmarking process. Additionally, we have a Secretary of Defense whose vision it is to inculcate best business practices into the whole Department of Defense.

Dr. Matthews: We are fortunate to have a relationship with industry that is not adversarial.

Gen Kross: It is a true partnership. No other part of the Department of Defense has that. Other parts of DOD have interfaces with industry but they are contractually- and service-based. It's really only over the last couple of years that we have realized our good fortune and started to exploit it.

Dr. Matthews: You've made very strong positive comments about several companies, but two in particular come to mind: Crowley [Crowley Maritime Corporation] and Fed Ex. What is so special about them?

Gen Kross: At Crowley we found agile metrics posted all over the darn place. They have a sophisticated, automated customer process based on artificial intelligence, for want of a better term. When the customer calls, their profile comes up on the screen. It shows their most frequently asked questions, including what they asked the last time they called. If they had a complaint, it also shows up on the screen. We also found solutions to our JLOTS problem staring us in the face.

Dr. Matthews: And Fed Ex?

Gen Kross: The CEO, Mr. Fred Smith, is a geoeconomics shaper first and a CEO second. He is the Bill Gates of global transportation. It

might even be proper to say that Bill Gates is the Fred Smith of information technology. He is a true pioneer, as is Bill Gates. At Fed Ex, we saw the TRANSCOM of the future in terms of vision, objectives, goals, metrics, customer focus, use of information technology, reliability, and agility. We have adopted Fed Ex as a model. Why go to an offsite for six months to recast something when the model is already there for us at Fed Ex? It's off-the-shelf, a COTS [Commercial Off-the-Shelf] product. We asked their permission to steal their ideas and they said, "Yeah, we'd be flattered if you used our approach." So, we did. It has formed the basis for our strategic planning. I'd add a third company to your list, American President Lines [APL]. That's where we first discovered agile metrics.

Dr. Matthews: What do those premier companies have in common?

Gen Kross: Their culture is adaptable to change to the point that they are change masters. They can turn change into successes before their competitors can react. Defense organizations tend to not want to change. They tend to want to hang onto past successes. No one wants to hang onto their failures or their mediocrity, but if you ever succeeded in the past and you try to hang onto it, you are doomed. You must always seek future successes. Failure to do so puts you in the trash heap. Adapt, change, reform. But don't reorganize first. You can't solve your problems through reorganization, which is an Air Force cottage industry and cultural bias.

Dr. Matthews: In what ways are we, TRANSCOM, a performance-based organization, and in what ways are we not a performance-based organization?

Gen Kross: We are relying on equipment and weapon systems that are so ancient and inefficient that we have to create artificial business rules in order to pay for them. It's crazy the way we maintain them through the archaic depot process. And it's ridiculous the way we must always pay to have surge capability. We are not commercially competitive in those areas.

Dr. Matthews: We don't control a lot of the processes that performance-based transportation companies would expect to control.

Gen Kross: Our materiel and logistics functions are largely controlled by other "companies" that have their own rules. Can you imagine Fred Smith having to deal on an equal basis with another company that maintains his airplanes and has its own set of measures of success? Nobody in the commercial world is forced to compete with such handicaps. Those are the artificialities. Now that we know the rules and have set the rates, from that point on, we run the liability, we run the cost drivers, we run everything else, and all of that is performance-based. In other words, we have the skills and the competencies to operate day-to-day as a performance-based organization. It's just that the fundamentals have driven us to an artificial level at which we then start as a performance-based organization.

Dr. Matthews: Have you found any organization in DOD that has done more to inculcate best business practices and to reengineer its processes than TRANSCOM?

Gen Kross: DLA gets bad raps, but I am very impressed by their work with e-mail, prime vendor, the virtual prime vendor, vendor direct delivery, and information systems. Over the last couple of years, from the beginning of my tenure to the end of my tenure as CINC, there was a definite change for the better in the DLA/TRANSCOM

relationship. Worldwide Express* is a classic example of how we've learned to work together.

Dr. Matthews: At the other end of the spectrum?

Gen Kross: We have the Service material commands [sniff]: old information systems, batch processing. They don't care about their customer. All they care about is keeping their depots going.

Dr. Matthews: So in the DOD, TRANSCOM is out in front?

Gen Kross: When Secretary Cohen came out here to meet with us, he found we were further along in the process improvement and in adopting best business practices than most other DOD organizations. In fact, we are so out in front in process improvement, and we are becoming so good at working with industry, we have in a sense created for us a sub mission. Everyone from Secretary Cohen to our warfighting CINCs find our business-related activities exciting because they have translated to their bottom line. The true strength of where TRANSCOM will go in its second ten years lies in this dimension. And when I talk about TRANSCOM, it's "TRANSCOM" writ large, which is TRANSCOM and its components.

*Worldwide Express (WWX) is an international delivery service initiated by AMC. A peacetime program providing high-priority delivery of documents and packages weighing up to 150 pounds, it promises door-to-door pickup and delivery, customs clearance, and intransit visibility via GTN and the worldwide web.

Cost Drivers and Customers

Dr. Matthews: The cost driver management process for TRANSCOM is in its infancy. What fruit has been borne already?

Gen Kross: The component staffs have to root out savings. And they feel pressure to do so because they are accountable right in front of their peers at the other components. And they feel really good about themselves when they succeed! In the beginning, MSC was far ahead of everybody else and AMC was lagging. By the time I left, AMC was coming up with lots of good ideas. Worldwide Express was part of the cost driver process. If I ever get connected with a company, I will make sure it has a cost driver process. Surprisingly, I didn't find one in the commercial world. Everybody wants to reduce costs but ideas come in one at a time on their own merit. They don't have any process to reduce costs.

Dr. Matthews: In General Cassidy's oral history,^{*} he talks about how the CSX Commercial Board discovered that their own companies were competing against each other. The customer was playing CSX parts off against each other for lower rates.

Gen Kross: The customer is much smarter than we are, and small companies are the hungriest. I've seen it out in the commercial world where they play big companies for suckers every day. That's how they make money. That's how they make profit.

Dr. Matthews: General Cassidy told me he saw at CSX similarities with the military services. Like the Services, the various companies had their own culture. At times they were not working together.

^{*}*General Duane H. Cassidy, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, and Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command: An Oral History--Joint, Air Force, and Business Careers*, Government Printing Office, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, October 1998.

Gen Kross: When General Ryan talks to the four-stars behind closed doors, he'll often joke, "We've gotten the tribes together here at CORONA."* He's trying to break down barriers, but my view is, "Yeah, we're tribal but we work together better than any set of tribes you've ever seen." In Africa, the tribal chiefs hate each other. In the Air Force, we love each other. I have the highest respect for ACC's Dick Hawley and Materiel Command's George Babbitt [Air Force General George T., Jr., Commander, Air Force Materiel Command]. Our tribal affiliations tend to break down and we become uncooperative when external rules are applied like "You aren't going to get any more money," or "If you don't squirrel away that manpower, it's just going to go to AMC." Every large organization tends to default to one single culture. In CSX, it's the railroad.

Dr. Matthews: And in the Air Force?

Gen Kross: It used to be a fighter Air Force. Before that it was a bomber Air Force. It's now changed. The tribes are almost dead even. Now there's the fighter tribe, the mobility tribe, which is ascending, and the acquisition and logistics tribe. Those are the three big tribes. The fighter tribe stays at the top because we have a fighter chief. He gets the ACC vote and also the overseas commands' votes, because they're fighter guys. But every day we get increasingly balanced.

Dr. Matthews: I have a follow-up question on cost drivers. You said you didn't see it in business. How did we pick up on it?

Gen Kross: We put together pieces we found on our visits to industry but it was our trip to American President Lines that the picture finally

*A conference hosted by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

took form. APL leaders meet the first week of the month, as soon as they have a week's worth of data. Chiefs of the company go over the data and identify areas to massage so that by mid-month they are starting to see a change. They meet again on the 20th and say, "Well, that changed. But this is going the wrong way. Change it again." They don't call it cost drivers and they don't call it agile metrics. They just work off a spreadsheet. My concept for cost drivers was born out of that visit to APL.

Dr. Matthews: What have been the greatest benefits from Customer Day?

Gen Kross: It averted customer revolt. It made them part of our process. They now have a greater voice, and we actually modified our behavior based on customer needs. It's given us greater visibility in what the customer really wants. And it's matured now. It's gone through two cycles.

Dr. Matthews: I sat through the Army Day, our first Army Day. I thought that was tremendously beneficial. Should we have a Navy and an Air Force Day?

Gen Kross: We need them. Customer Day covers general issues, but each of the Services have their own set of issues. It's labor-intense for us, but if we are really passionate about paying attention to our customers, we ought to have a Customer Day process for each of the Services and for DLA.

Dr. Matthews: How important is it that AAFES [Army and Air Force Exchange Service] and DeCA [Defense Commissary Agency] remain in the DTS?

Gen Kross: It's extremely important because it allows everyone to have lower rates. AAFES and DeCA think they can cut a better deal by going outside the DTS and directly to commercial transportation

companies. The policy of the [Defense] Department is if they can prove that they can get a better deal, which they haven't been able to do, and if they can prove that it would not be a detriment to our national defense capability, which they can never prove, then they can go outside the DTS. We really put the onus back on them. Secretary White [Deputy Secretary of Defense John P., 1994-1997] was very kind to sign that directive before he left office.

Dr. Matthews: So you feel satisfied that we have that situation under control?

Gen Kross: Only temporarily. These are institutions unto themselves. They're, in some ways, rogue organizations that have their own congressional constituency. They have high populations of civilian employees who know how to wait people out. They'll be resurgent. We should expect it to be a yearly cycle.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any customers who could better help us help them?

Gen Kross: I'm particularly frustrated with the Marine Corps. Our country needs a Marine Corps. But I just want the Marines to cooperate with the CINCs, to join the joint world for joint success. We have no interest in undermining the Marine Corps. Who does? Everyone likes the Marines. But boy, they've got this defensive thing. And the CINCs suffer.

Dr. Matthews: Why did we create a Business Center?

Gen Kross: Because Bill Begert and his people had the vision. I did not have that vision. When they came to me, my natural response was, "Oh, do I want to create another organization? That's reorganization." But as I look back on it, I know it was the right thing to do. We get so much mileage out of the Business Center for our operations, our customers.

Dr. Matthews: How do you define a business rule?

Gen Kross: A business rule is something you know when you see it. [Laughter] It's a tactics technique. It's an operating procedure. It's a regulation. It's whatever you want it to be. It's just an overall catch term for what I would call good reinvention. Creating a business rule is kind of a current way of changing something for the positive. It has a positive sound to it.

Dr. Matthews: How does a business rule relate to a process?

Gen Kross: It's embedded in a process. It's part of a process or maybe the outcome of a process.

Dr. Matthews: Have we turned the corner with GAO [General Accounting Office]?

Gen Kross: Yes. We've agreed that in the past we have both been right and we have both been wrong. Now we work together. I have always felt that if the GAO had not beat up on us, and then gotten to a congressional staffer who wanted to beat up on us even more, we would not be as far along as we are in cost drivers and other process improvement initiatives. I went to see Mr. Hinton [Henry L., Jr., Assistant Comptroller for National Security and International Affairs, GAO] and said, "We're not agreeing on this, but we're further along because you pushed us. And you know that." He winked. And I said, "If you keep pushing us, but don't betray us, that's good government." It turns out this staffer wasn't all that bad an egg either. I said to him, "Look, we're doing this and we're doing that." The staffer said, "That's good. You are really responding." And I said, "Keep pushing. You can see that because you all pushed us, we are all better for it. This is a great team." If we were all in a political science classroom, our work

would be a classic case of how government should function. We have to give Congress and their watchdogs a sense of ownership. The CINC's role is to create a partnership with Congress.

BENS and Houley

Dr. Matthews: When you first heard about the BENS group, you said, “these folks aren't our friends.” Have you changed your mind since you met with them?

Gen Kross: Yes, I have, but as you point out, my initial opinion was negative. They went to New Zealand, Australia, and the UK [United Kingdom], and when they come back, they said things like, “We need to be like them.” That gave me a lot of concern. I've been to the RAF [Royal Air Force]. We do not want to be like them at the base level, which is what BENS was talking about. There is a cipher lock on the gate and a third country national working in a kitchen bringing the MPs [Military Police] some bread. Base housing is already embedded in the village. And there's nothing moving on the airfield. The morale is absolutely in the toilet. And they are still sliding. The light switches go off next. Then there is nothing left.

The great militaries in the world are not formed in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. We don't want to emulate them. We want to emulate best business practices as found today in America's cutting edge transportation corporations. Hello. That's the answer. It's nice that they took a trip to New Zealand, Australia, and Britain. It's not pertinent. I think that their visit here convinced them that we know where we are going. We developed a great partnership with the leadership of BENS. They are very supportive of us and I am very supportive of BENS. They make

discoveries in their visits to industry that can help us improve our business processes in information technology. So, I have definitely changed my opinion of them.

Dr. Matthews: An article in the *Early Bird* a few weeks back made it sound like the BENS group and Houley [William P. “Bill,” Director of the Defense Reform Initiative] are bad-rapping each other.

Gen Kross: I am quite surprised to hear that. If there are two groups that ought to be in bed with each other, it ought to be Houley and BENS. I’m actually caught in the crossfire here on the CEO panel.* Although I like BENS for their thrust, I don’t like BENS for their specifics. And I like Houley a lot. I think he’s attuned to what is really important. I think it’s a turf battle of sorts. Houley believes that if he embraces BENS too much, it looks like he’s their agent inside the DOD. And he just doesn’t want to be controlled by them. But I haven’t seen the article. I don’t read the *Early Bird* any more. I do, however, correspond regularly by email with Tom McInerney [Air Force General Thomas G. McInerney, Retired, CEO and President of BENS].

*General Kross chairs a panel of fifteen CEOs who advise the Secretary of Defense and Dr. Hamre on how best to infuse commercial practices into the DOD. Mr. Houley was the panel’s point of contact at OSD until he left his position as Director of the Defense Reform Initiative in March 1999.

JMCG and the Requirements Process

Dr. Matthews: Originally we planned to have all DTS constrained requirements come into the MCC, part of the JMCG [Joint Mobility Control Group]. You later decided to let customers enter the DTS where they felt most comfortable. Why?

Gen Kross: So we'd have buy-in from all of our components. Just as long as we have the visibility over it so if need be we can do an override, what's the dif? Why break a process that's working just so we have a "one-shoe-fits-all?" If you have visibility and--by exception--management, that's going to be good enough for TRANSCOM.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think that eventually all constrained requirements should come in through the MCC for mode selection?

Gen Kross: No, because some are obvious. Some things are never going to go by air. And some things that go by air are never going to go by sea. So I really don't think it's necessary.

Dr. Matthews: What do you see as the future relationship between the JMCG and the JTMO [Joint Traffic Management Office]?

Gen Kross: That they should continue to do process engineering, get closer and closer, bond and bond, until pretty soon you can't see the difference between them. When I say that, I mean the MCC and JTMO in the JMCG.

Dr. Matthews: Have you learned to love the term JMCG?

Gen Kross: No. You've heard me say it before: it's an acronym that nobody outside our command knows anything about. And then when we say, "it's the Joint Mobility Control Group," they ask, "Well,

what's that? Is that something between a squadron and a wing?" We need another name for it. I'm big on names. You can achieve strategic buy-in and clarity by getting the name right. We never got this one right. But remember, I tried to get the staff to change it and they came back and said, "No, we'd kind of like to keep it." That's because they thought it up. This is for somebody else to worry about now.

The Deployment Process

Dr. Matthews: Shortly after you arrived as CINCTRANS, you ranked the Services by their preparedness to deploy: Marines, Navy, Army--which you called clunky and getting worse, and then the Air Force. How did you come up with that ranking and has it changed?

Gen Kross: I came up with that ranking through watching their deployments, and it has definitely changed. I would rank it like this: the Air Force in their AEF packages are best at getting out of Dodge, followed by the Marine Corps, which is still very good because it is inculcated into their culture right down to the unit level. The Army, who was a distant third, is now really closing in on the Marines. Why? Our Army Day process and also the commitment on the parts of General Reimer and General Bramlett [Army General David A., Commanding General, US Army Forces Command] to make deployment better for their Service. And to bring the data on the disks.* The Navy is like a movie you don't rate. It's non-ratable, so to speak. But following the Army is the rest of the Air Force, the non-AEF Air Force. So the Air Force

*To help achieve ITV when it deploys, the Army brings the manifest data from TC ACCIS (Transportation Coordinator-Automated Command and Control Information System) on disk to put into Super R-CAPS (Remote Consolidated Aerial Port System).

writ large is third, but the AEF part is first. Overall, it's gotten better, because the Army and part of the Air Force has gotten better.

Dr. Matthews: Hopefully our new Joint Deployment Training Center [JDTC] will bring them all up on the ranking. Why did you support the JDTC?

Gen Kross: In the beginning I did not. It was "I have a problem, let's create an organization." I hate that. I only bought into it because we, at TRANSCOM, agreed to keep it small, non-threatening, and to keep the bill down. We agreed to use mostly contractors. Even so, we barely got it through the Tank. It impinges on the Services' "train, organize, and equip" AOR. They begrudgingly let us stand it up, using the nose-under-the-tent strategy.

Dr. Matthews: What are your expectations for it?

Gen Kross: Limited. It started off with poor leadership. We corrected that. It started off with the wrong sight picture. We corrected that. And third, like TRANSCOM, it was born out of compromise in the Tank. They actually limited what it could do at the beginning, and then they are going to grade it. If you're going to grade something, you want to let it blossom and then grade it. They didn't do that. In other words, they let us stand up a couple of courses for this group and that group, and try to put together curriculum, and push out some distance learning. We're shooting for about the third floor of a ten-story building. The real value in the Joint Deployment Training Center lies in targeted unit end-to-end training.

Dr. Matthews: Which is a big threat to the Services.

Gen Kross: That's because they don't do it well. We want to take a unit that is a common, up front, strategic deployer and we want to train

everyone in the unit from the general down to the private. That's where the vision of JDTC should be, and until we are allowed to do that by our Tank bubbas, we will have something that is rather stillborn. We should not accrue any impact to it because it will strictly be a spring rain. Like putting out a fine spray. Doesn't even take the crease out of your pants. What we want is a hose that puts out a lot of water and reshapes animals to deploy rapidly and smoothly. We chose the Army, through our Army Day process, for our JDTC experiment. We hope to show people why this JDTC is a good thing. If we are successful, the Tank bubbas will relent.

Dr. Matthews: How will AIT help the deployment process?

Gen Kross: Even when we get "automated AIT-schmee IT," we're still going to be using the data input teams, because we'll always have customers who are not competent to deploy. We can automate the "gazoo" out of the deployment process, but in the end we'll have to take personal and hands-on responsibility. We will always be the accumulator that makes it all work. And it is working better because we are no longer just complaining about our customers. We have changed the business rules to say, "Relying on the customer to input the data is a loser's game." That means we have to do it ourselves. "Aircraft does not taxi until the data is in," which gives us a focus. Sadly, some people, our own people, actually took me literally: "General Kross isn't sending that plane unless you put that blasted data in." We went back and assured our trusted friends, like General Krulak, that the plane would be there and his folks would be on time.

OSA Scheduling Process

Mr. Cossaboom: Have we accurately defined an OSA [Operational Support Airlift] wartime mission? Have we exercised OSA for it?

Gen Kross: No. It defies accurate definition for wartime. We have, however, defined it in concept for force-sizing purposes so that reformers would not sweep it away as an efficiency savings. To do so would leave us without the glue holding a lot of other systems together in wartime. We figured out a hub and spoke, rack and tally sheet for OSA, which went to the Tank. With just a veneer-thin science supporting us, we carried the day. Like JOSAC, it kept us from going too far in defense reform. Remember, defense reform of logistics and transportation--in the case of OSA, I am speaking of the CORM [Commission on Roles and Mission]--is most often done badly by those who are not competent logisticians or transporters. The CORM is gone now. And we're all here. CORM just put a parking lot dent into OSA. Everything else survived.

Mr. Cossaboom: What do you see as TRANSCOM's contribution to OSA effectiveness and efficiency?

Gen Kross: We've already added value. The Joint Staff and TRANSCOM fashioned joint scheduling of Service-owned assets. In our test we thought we'd be able to get eight to ten percent more efficient use--access to added capacity--of Service-owned airplanes. Gosh, we're up to twenty-eight to thirty percent, and that's with the old Navy system, JALIS [Joint Air Logistics Information System]. Once we get the new system from SABRE [SABRE Technology and Solutions], up and running, we'll improve even more. What I am shooting for is to use the same system for wartime OSA

planning and scheduling, first in CONUS in support of AMX [Air Mobility Express] Commercial and AMX Military,* and then also in theater. Of course, getting people in theater to use a TRANSCOM information system is kind of like asking them to share your toothbrush, but in the end, it will be the right thing to do.

Mr. Cossaboom: Should TRANSCOM or AMC take on more OSA responsibilities?

Gen Kross: We do not want to own OSA assets. They should be owned by the Services. We should be the schedulers. As we continue to mature the wartime concepts around AMX Military and AMX Commercial, we will bump up against with Service prerogatives of “train, organize, and equip.” But during a contingency we will just go to the Joint Staff and tell them to override the daily scheduling of generals’ bands and inspection teams, and skew it towards the two AMX programs and war. This is a scenario where the TRANSCOM staff is lagging a bit.

Worldwide Express and GSA

Mr. Cossaboom: Have you drafted a Worldwide Express policy letter?

Gen Kross: Worldwide Express is rolling out about now, so General Robertson will be doing that. Over the next few months there is going to be a lot of activity in Worldwide Express as we market it to our customer.

Mr. Cossaboom: What should that policy letter say?

* Air Mobility Express is an express service offered by USTRANSCOM to the CINCs. Designed to move high priority cargo to wartime locations, it uses both military and commercial aircraft. AMX-Commercial (AMX-C) is cargo weighing 150 pounds or less express delivered by a commercial carrier to its hub. AMX-Military (AMX-M) is cargo weighing over 150 pounds, oversized cargo, or hazardous material express delivered to a military hub.

Gen Kross: Most importantly, as our fleet of tails, tails, tails gets smaller, Worldwide Express plays to the strengths of American air transportation and to the needs of our customers, which is time-definite, rapid delivery. Worldwide Express has great potential because commercial airline networks are expanding. It is an investment in the future. It will give more business to our commercial partners who, in turn, will be helping us compensate for fewer tails. We don't need to use our precious tails to fly cargo between our aerial ports. It can be flown by our commercial partners. We only need to fly where they don't fly. We only need to own what commercial airlines don't own and what we need for wartime. We also need to link Worldwide Express to Air Mobility Express, military and commercial, in a peacetime/wartime continuum. I wish I was going to be around to help frame that relationship. It will be exciting.

Mr. Cossaboom: You stated at a Quality meeting in February 1997 that our partnership with GSA [General Services Administration] could pay big dividends. What is that partnership based on and how has it paid off?

Gen Kross: If we sat on our hands, GSA would carve out DTS business and give it away to non-CRAF and non-VISA folks. They liked GSA City Pairs* and they wanted to do their own GSA Worldwide Express. So we threw a net over them by working with them to create Worldwide Express. And we got under control what we didn't like on GSA City Pairs. They aren't a natural partner, but we still have to sleep with that bear.

*GSA City Pairs program is a price-and-service contractual arrangement with US carriers providing inexpensive seats for individual government travelers on over 5,000 domestic and international commercial air routes.

Mr. Cossaboom: Why is GSA and not DOD in charge of the small package contract?

Gen Kross: That's a very good question. My view is it ought to be DOD. I would also like to see DOD in charge of City Pairs. GSA has only proved to be an impediment to DOD initiative and creativity. They tend to side with the airlines rather than with what's good for the customer. GSA is bureaucratic, in the worst sense of the word.

Mr. Cossaboom: Is this one billion dollar business tied to readiness in any way?

Gen Kross: Definitely. It has both a readiness and a CRAF hook. It will always be up to us to make sure that GSA considers readiness and CRAF in their contracts. GSA does not have DOD interests at heart. They want to use and leverage DOD business for, I don't know, cash awards to GSA employees. Whatever their agenda is, it is decidedly not national defense.

Defense Courier Service

Mr. Cossaboom: TRANSCOM is sending the DCS [Defense Courier Service] back to AMC. Why?

Gen Kross: Under TRANSCOM, everyone in DCS counted as unified "headquarters management" personnel, even those at the execution level, the box kicker, field-level people. So we put them in AMC where they belonged and got them off the unified command books, where they didn't belong.

Dr. Matthews: Is DCS in better shape today than when it went under TRANSCOM? And in what ways?

Gen Kross: I think it is. The Defense Courier Service supports the movement of our nation's secrets in paper form. Technology means less

paper to move around. So their business base has been declining. Colonel C. J. Johnson [Air Force Colonel Clarence A. “C. J.,” Commander, DCS] and his staff have done a remarkable job in cutting the DCS force from 400 to below 300. The cuts were controlled but expeditious. DCS was an archaic function. TRANSCOM helped it move onto the information highway. By reducing its staff and services to the customer, we stressed them into an original thought.

Dr. Matthews: Was there some concern that DCS, without TRANSCOM top cover, might get swallowed up by AMC?

Gen Kross: Yes. When the AMC folks saw that DCS was moving across the street, they wanted to use them for manpower subtracts. They then wanted to chop up DCS and put the pieces in the Air Mobility Support Squadrons. We said, “No, don’t do that. DCS must remain an entity unto itself in order to operate. It needs to be kept together because it is a holistic system, a system within a system.”

Household Goods Reengineering

Dr. Matthews: Like your predecessors, Generals Fogleman and Rutherford, you wrestled with household goods reengineering since Day One as CINCTrans. Why has this been such a tough process to change?

Gen Kross: Very simple: politics and lobbying by an industry that hides behind the skirts of goodness to perpetuate bad performance and unprofessional business practices. And then they blame us for their dirty deeds. For a service industry to blame their lousy service on their customer is the ultimate absurdity.

Dr. Matthews: Some in industry have lobbied hard for just giving troops money to make the deals themselves. Would you consider that a big mistake?

Gen Kross: Yes.

Dr. Matthews: Why?

Gen Kross: Look at the industry and then look at the troops. Who knows the ropes and who doesn't? Think of Airman Jones going on an overseas move, which he has never done before, or has done it once with one company, and now he's doing it again with another company. He's got a job. He's busy. He is at the mercy of the beast. So it's not fair to the troops.

Dr. Matthews: And it's not good business policy.

Gen Kross: You aggregate business so you have leverage to get the lowest rates, the best value, the best service. In the business world, this is called consolidators. We at TRANSCOM are mega consolidators.

Dr. Matthews: They want to keep doing business the way they have always done it.

Gen Kross: This is an industry that whines if we tell them they have to do it on the Internet; E-commerce is the way to conduct business in the world today. They give their employees the minimum amount of training, and they pay their employees the minimum amount possible to move your valued items. And, of course, they want to put our stuff in storage to get the storage fees.

Dr. Matthews: What does it mean for the troops?

Gen Kross: Go to Airman Jones' house and watch the cretins crawl off the truck and move into his home. Airman Jones is still at work. His

wife is home alone. She's outnumbered four to one. They wait for her to leave the room so they can stuff the three pillows around the lamp. Their margins are so thin, they get paid by using the minimum amount of boxes and the minimum amount of this and the minimum amount of that. They can't be trusted. They don't care about your stuff. We must never allow Airman Jones or Seaman Jones to do his own move, because the household goods moving industry will take them to the cleaners. Now, Colonel Jones on his fifteenth move? Yeah, we allow people to do DITY [Do It Yourself] moves now. We could possibly do some moves on the margin, but for average folks it's best that we do it within the aggregate to leverage the taxpayer dollar for the best value. And that's what we are really trying to do. We finally have the Pilot Program approved. All the industry has tried to do is slow us down. They slowed General Rutherford down for two years. They slowed me down for two years. They kept their ability to do rotten business for four years.

Dr. Matthews: Are there companies out there that could provide value?

Gen Kross: I haven't found any. The only way they are going to provide value is by us establishing it in the contract and for them to comply with the contract, and by us hitting them hard when they don't. They will still hire Bubba and he's still going to be the cretin getting off the truck. They aren't willing to change anything in their industry. We're trying to drive out some of the bottom-feeders and to allow the industry to finally realize that they have to treat their military customers like they treat their commercial customers. They say they do, but they don't.

Defense Travel Service and the Gray Areas

Dr. Matthews: I have a quote from General Kross: “The Defense Travel System is not in our core competencies. It is in the gray area and TRANSCOM will always step up to the gray areas in the best interests of DOD.” What have we done to improve the Defense Travel System?

Gen Kross: We haven’t done anything to improve it, yet. It has been issued to us. One of our components, the Military Traffic Management Command, is marginally competent in the area. We are the only place to put it in DOD without establishing a new agency to do it. We’re doing contract management of remotely familiar traffic management and accounting functions. It’s truly in the gray area. One of our major benefactors, Dr. Hamre, wanted us to take it on, and for him we did it.

Dr. Matthews: What can we do about changing the acronym?

Gen Kross: Nothing now. We found out about it too late. My mother once told me that if you don’t ask the question, the answer is always no. We asked the question. We said, “Let’s change that acronym. We already have a DTS.” You and I live in a world where DTS is very much used but the average “schmuckola” in DOD--the average marine or soldier--he doesn’t know DTS from “Schmee-TS.” In fact, he’ll personally become much more familiar with the new DTS than with ours. I can also say this: the sun will come up in the east; if you notice we have two AMCs. And by the way, we were the second one. The Army Materiel Command was up and running long before us. But they didn’t ask us to change our name, and it’s a good thing they didn’t. [Laughter] If they did, we might have had to.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything in that gray area we should consider getting into?

Gen Kross: We shouldn't ever consider getting into anything in the gray area. We should only work issues in the gray area if they are issued to us, when we are the only port in a storm. Then it's an indication that people love us. Look at the Defense Science Board [DSB]. They identify a problem and then they say, "Task TRANSCOM to come up with a plan to..." In other words, they have an idea and they'll ask us to do the real thinking on it. [Laughter] When we come up with a plan, the plan will say, "We're actually doing this now to a large extent, so what's your point?" You get to the second level and it says, "Contract out a lot of what TRANSCOM does to DHL [DHL Worldwide Express]." You can't do that. Contract what out to DHL? Fed Ex is going to let you do that? Emery Worldwide is going to let you do that? Which one of these DSB guys was a consultant for DHL? The good news is the Defense Science Board largely creates what doesn't work, and everyone knows it. Better yet, they aren't directive in nature. They start a flurry of activity, most of which doesn't go anywhere.

Third Party Logistics and Outsourcing

Mr. Cossaboom: Speaking of contracting out, what are the limits of privatization and outsourcing?

Gen Kross: We have to guard against giving away the readiness of our country in the name of trying to make the numbers for the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] press conference. We should not take risks in warfighting, strategic aircraft maintenance, strategic aerial port operations, or supply. Supply is logistics and logistics is what wins wars. I think we are pushing the envelope much too far in supply.

Dr. Matthews: What are the pros and cons of third party logistics?

Gen Kross: The main “con” is the perception that they are more competent than we are. They are not. They operate with different business rules. We are limited by a chronic under capitalization unheard of in the commercial world. We work on the theory that airplanes last forever. They work on the theory that when a new airplane comes off the assembly line, be first in line to buy it. And they have different business rules that allow them to do it. They float three million shares or they get a bank to lease it to them. Some accountant runs the numbers and everybody is making a profit. Our business rules lack such agility. So when somebody tells us, “Well, we can outsource you and make you more efficient,” they’d better darn well change the business rules. And then look at the rules we use to outsource to third party logisticians. We’re held to one standard with one set of business rules, and they’re held to a different standard with a different set business rules. It isn’t cheaper. The biggest drawback for us in terms of the Defense Transportation System is a company who has a bias to tell you he can deliver under any circumstances. That’s why he’s in the business. He has to do that. He lives in the niches. He lives in the flotsam and jetsam of inefficiencies to capture those inefficiencies that the big “mammu” wasn’t able to capture with his primary system. He doesn’t have any assets. We like long term stable relationships with asset holders. If a third party logistician has assets, we’ll probably have a good relationship. If he doesn’t, the relationship will always be guarded and frequently reviewed.

Dr. Matthews: In particular, what do you think about commercial JLOTS?

Gen Kross: Right now, I’m a big fan of commercial JLOTS because I can’t get the Department of Defense to buy RO/RO discharge facilities and

other simple Lego[®] pieces. There are clearly certain companies, like Crowley, that have JLOTS capabilities that we are not but should be using. We can use commercial capabilities in the JLOTS arena through process realignment and behavior modification of the surface component commands.

Denton, SOF, and Counternarcotics*

Dr. Matthews: How did we reengineer the Denton cargo process and bring increased efficiencies to it?

Gen Kross: Slowly, with an uncooperative partner. It represents a classic case of narrow-minded bureaucrats who control operators. They used their entrenched positions to stall us for a year or longer in our process reforms. If it wasn't for the fact that I had a very good friend in Dr. Warner [Edward L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements], we would still be bogged down.

Dr. Matthews: What did Admiral Denton tell us? What was his advice?

Gen Kross: God bless him, in the absence of knowing us, he was siding with unraveling our whole reform plan. Then we made contact with him and we told him what we could do. We said, "Trust us and we will make things better, and we will make them cheaper, not just for you, but for everyone. Trust us to do an end run around the bureaucrats." And in the end, he did trust us and we were right. We're off to a good start, and through continuous improvement we can refine the Denton process. We need to involve NDTA. We

*In the early 1980s, then Senator Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr. (Republican-Alabama, 1980-1986) sponsored legislation that allowed DOD to transport humanitarian relief supplies donated by private aid organizations on a space available basis to countries around the world. Senator Denton is a retired Navy Rear Admiral and former Vietnam prisoner of war.

need to involve our trucking partners. And we will continue to rely heavily on the Guard and Reserve.

Dr. Matthews: You have also expressed concern over Special Operations exercises, especially those in Africa, eating up airlift. Is there something TRANSCOM can influence in that area?

Gen Kross: [US]SOCOM [United States Special Operations Command] and the US taxpayers don't get any real payback for those exercises. It's like flushing foreign aid down the toilet. Special operators, left to their own devices, will go TDY [temporary duty] 290 days a year. They'll try to become fluent in Swahili, Zulu, and Arabic. If they get someone to pay for it, the SOF guys will draw off all our airlift. I'm about the only person who has really shined a light on them. When I was Director of the Joint Staff, I saw some of what they were up to, but back there in the Pentagon we didn't have the visibility as to how much lift and how much money they were wasting. We'd get their request for an exercise stating, "To be held in East Elephant Breath. It's going to have 42 of our guys trading sweat with 49 of their guys." And then the Secretary would sign off on it on a Friday night. When I got to TRANSCOM, I saw close up what the costs to mobility really were. SOF takes unreliable airplanes off the beaten path. The airplanes break, and then we're in a rescue operation. In my opinion, we are wasting thousands of sorties a year and tens of millions of dollars a year on these SOF exercises. But we haven't really done anything yet to plug the hole.

Dr. Matthews: Why not?

Gen Kross: Partly because I thought I wouldn't get anywhere since General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a former CINCUSOC [CINC, USSOCOM], but mostly because

counternarcotics operations demanded our immediate and concentrated reengineering attention. In the long run, Denton and SOF will prove easy compared to counternarcotics reform. Counternarcotics has a lot more players, a lot more MOAs [Memorandums of Agreements], and a lot more money changing hands. First thing we did was ask the Guard and Reserves, “Will you be with us on this one? This will be tougher.” They said, “We’ll be with you.” The customer [Army General Barry R. McCaffrey, Retired, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy] is more militant, as is the adversary. So I went to the customer to try to work this one. What I was really doing was fishing to see how much resistance we would get. I got resistance. And so I backed off and said, “We’ll always be there for you. I know you’re nervous but we’ll be there.” They know their priority is low so they are hanging on for survival.

Dr. Matthews: You discussed the issue with your boss?

Gen Kross: Yes. Because my shift was over, I couldn’t resist putting the counternarcotics issue in my last quarterly letter [quarterly letter to the Secretary of Defense]. In other words, I dropped the dime on the customer. Tony [General Robertson] will have to work it now. Once he has the architecture together for the single air mobility system, he’ll go back and put counternarcotics into the system. All requirements should come into TRANSCOM.

So, in summary, at the top of the list for reform should be Denton, counternarcotics, and SOF exercises. After we get the first two under control, we should kill off the third.

JTCC and OSD/TP

Dr. Matthews: What will be the benefits of a CIO [Chief Information Officer] at TRANSCOM?

Gen Kross: It's one of those incremental reinventions. I don't see it as a big thing. For us, the J6 [Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems] was already largely a CIO.

Dr. Matthews: Some in the JTCC feel like their identity as the command's honest broker is being diluted or lost in the CIO structure.

Gen Kross: As the CINC, I told them it wouldn't be. We got the assurances that it wouldn't be. If that is the feeling in the JTCC, they need to elevate the discussion for a reassessment, probably at the DCINC level. It really isn't a CINC issue. The CINC's already said what he thinks. I feel certain General Robertson doesn't have a countervailing view. You see, he didn't know in his previous life what the JTCC really was. But as he comes up to speed, he'll get a feel for what it does. And besides, we made a promise to another great partner, Mary Lou McHugh [Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy (OSD/TP)], that the JTCC would remain the honest broker.

Dr. Matthews: In regard to OSD Transportation Policy, you said shortly after you got to TRANSCOM in 1996 that "We don't need a divorce, we just want to see a marriage counselor." What led you to conclude the relationship was strained, and have we reconciled?

Gen Kross: When I was Director of the Joint Staff, things came to my attention that I didn't like. OSD Transportation was tasking TRANSCOM direct, and as Director of the Joint Staff, my job as Joint Staff

policeman was to make sure nobody tasked a CINC unless it came through the Joint Staff. The major violator was OSD Transportation. I knew Mary Lou was very professional and someone I could work with. So I went to her early on when I became CINCTRANS and said, "You and I are going to get along just great, but I have one major rule that I need you to follow, and that is always treat CINCTRANS like a CINC. We can do this the hard way or we can do this the easy way. The hard way is that you would be doing it the same way as everybody else on the OSD staff, actually the way it's supposed to be done: You go to the Director of the Joint Staff and he sends out the request." Just think how slow that process is. "Or," I told her, "You can do it the easy way. You can call me or the DCINC on the phone and we can talk about it, and then we task the TRANSCOM staff to get it done. But calling us on a Thursday to tell us we need it to be done by close of business Friday won't cut it. We don't work for you, we work with you." And she was pretty good about it, right from the beginning. Mary Lou and I didn't talk much on the phone, but the DCINC and Mary Lou spoke frequently. And whenever I went to the Pentagon, I would schedule a visit with her. In her chain of command and in her offices, when people see the CINC coming in to talk to her behind closed doors, that's a very big deal. It doesn't seem like a big deal, but it is. She would pull out her list and she'd say, "I'm working this one. What do you think about it?" And we would agree in principle to it. She could then use our agreement in principle to begin staffing it at TRANSCOM. She was brilliant in her ability to understand the political nuances and sensibilities. She didn't just say, "I spoke with General Kross and therefore that constitutes coordination on this policy document." She waited for me to go back to my staff and say, "I think this is okay. You can tell me if you don't like it." Most of the time the staff would

coordinate on it. Mary Lou and I had a great relationship. She is so talented and can get things done so quickly. Ours was a great teaming effort.

Reinvention CINC

Dr. Matthews: What does it mean for CINCTrans to be a reinvention CINC?

Gen Kross: The most important phase, Phase Zero, is the bumper sticker: “First Reinvention CINC.” It allows us to write the music, which is what we really wanted. We didn’t want anyone to tell us, “You are the reinvention CINC and this is what it means.” People reinvent themselves, they aren’t reinvented by others. If you are reinvented by others, you are reformed. [Laughter] Reinvention must come from within, which follows TRANSCOM’s credo: “Everybody should have a stake in all we are and in all we will become.”

Dr. Matthews: The CINC’s staff must generate the ideas.

Gen Kross: I call the process the “Frank [P.] Weber [USTRANSCOM Deputy Director for Logistics and Business Operations] factor.” I’d call in Frank and Buzz [Army Colonel H. A. “Buzz” Curry, Assistant Deputy Director of Logistics] and the folks who work for them, and give them some general esoteric guidance. They’d spend a month or two and then come back to me. I’d say, “Nah, that’s not it. Go away and try again.” No smiles. I always felt bad. Eventually they came back and I’d say, “That’s it.” Then they’d smile. [Laughter] What’s most important for us about reinvention is we get to play our own song. What we do with the tune at TRANSCOM is now up to General Robertson and the new team.

Dr. Matthews: We've been a reinvention lab for years. What is the difference between a reinvention CINC and a reinvention lab?

Gen Kross: The reinvention lab was stillborn. It was someone else's concept. It was not what we wanted to be. We were put on a list of reinvention labs. It came out of the White House, which means it came from another part of the galaxy. The reinvention lab had a central business rule: you have to send your initiatives all the way to Al Gore [Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.]. Anything for us that has to go out of the Department [of Defense] in order to make its way towards success is "a bridge too far."* What we want is small cycles with rapid turnarounds requiring SECDEF's thumbs up or his "John Henry." Being a reinvention CINC allows us to press forward quickly on many small initiatives that we know we can get done, and then morph or transform ourselves so that in many areas we are significantly ahead, in other areas we're abreast, and in still others we're in radar contact. Unfortunately, the term "reinvention" is now losing its original meaning. The Air Force diluted the reinvention thing and the Navy reinvented the reinvention process.

Dr. Matthews: How did our fourteen initiatives become DRIDs [Defense Reform Initiative Directives]?

Gen Kross: There was a down side to our meeting with Secretary Cohen: he actually ate the "dog food," then he tried to get everyone to eat it, too. The Department of Defense cannot reform or transform at the corporate world's pace. The Services, because of their "train, organize, and equip" responsibilities under Title X have a lip lock on the pace of reform, reinvention, and transformation in the

*From *A Bridge Too Far: The Classic History of the Greatest Airborne Battle of World War II*, by Cornelius Ryan.

Department. They took our fourteen initiatives and made them DRIDs, which caused our partners to accuse us of breaking faith. If we had kept them as fourteen initiatives, every one of our partners, the military services included, would have probably signed up by saying, “TRANSCOM has the competency in these areas. They are doing great work for us. Let’s trust them.” But instead, the old pattern of distrust emerged in the military service staffs, slowing us down to a grinding halt. SECDEF’s agent, Bill Houley, gave us back our box of fourteen initiatives and said, “I can’t work these. But call this number and that number and they will help you navigate through the woods.” We were able to get maybe three or four or five of them done. It’s a classic case of how the Department is struggling to reform and reinvent itself but can’t because the military services won’t allow it. You talk about being dual-hatted? Over the last year, I should not have been dual-hatted as CINCTRANS and Commander, AMC. I should have been dual-hatted as CINCTRANS and Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. If I had been, we’d be a whole heck of a lot further along as a department [DOD] than we are today. We should have a Goldwater-Nichols II to make it possible for DOD to do timely reform, or meaningful reform at all.

Dr. Matthews: A unified CINC also being the Service Chief? Hyperbole, right?

Gen Kross: Yes, I’m only kidding. But if I had been, I could have driven our fourteen issues into the POM and made them stick. They didn’t stick because of lack of commitment on the part of Air Force leadership. It is their legacy to the future.

Dr. Matthews: Do we need to persevere with all of our DRIDs? Or do we concentrate on the few that we can get through and drop the others?

Gen Kross: Right now it's not for me to say. It's for the current CINC to decide. And he'll do the right thing.

Reinventing DOD: Goldwater-Nichols II*

Dr. Matthews: Since you brought up the issue earlier, Goldwater-Nichols II, what would you like it to address?

Gen Kross: A whole new set of business rules that will allow the Department of Defense to run like an agile, adaptable, global corporation. The reinvention CINC is the tip of the nose. We need a "reinvention Department." We have to put more power in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. It is time to eliminate, not reduce, *eliminate*, the Service Secretaries. They have no purpose. None. We need to de-emphasize the role of the Service Chiefs. They need to be the Joint Chiefs of Staff, period. We need an Air Force Joint Chief of Staff. Then we need to give the functional and CONUS-based CINCs far more, even sweeping control and accountability over training, organizing, and equipping of the forces. [US]ACOM [United States Atlantic Command] should play the central role in "train, organize, and equip" for the warfighter. TRANSCOM should take on that role for the transportation function, as should SOCOM for the Special Operations function. If we did what I just outlined, we would make a major fundamental change for the betterment of the DOD and the nation.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything in that Goldwater-Nichols Act that you think is not working properly, that Congress should fine tune in the Goldwater-Nichols II?

*The "first" Goldwater-Nichols Act was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which, among other initiatives, ordered the Secretary of Defense to consider creation of a unified transportation command and revoked the law preventing creation of such a command.

Gen Kross: Goldwater-Nichols I was a great first step, but when it created the alternative world of jointness, it should also have de-emphasized the extant world of the military services. As a result, the new world and the old world are continuously bumping heads. Going to the Pentagon as a unified CINC to deal with the Service staffs is like Fred Smith being forced to deal with the Russians. The Russians keep saying, "I'm too poor." It's basically what the Services say: "I have no money for you. I'm too poor. I can't do that."

Dr. Matthews: The joint world has "the committee system."

Gen Kross: If we need more money, the CINCs must go to the mobility panel or the bomber panel, whatever. And, of course, there is no money. So the thing is dead from the beginning, but we still run a funding drill. Everybody has to come up with another hundred million dollars worth of cuts. How do they do that? They drive it into the panel, exactly the same way they've done it since the 1960s. The POM and PPBS [Planning-Programming-Budgeting System] process should be killed. We should throw it away. They are holding us back. Remember who gave us the PPBS?*

Dr. Matthews: McNamara and his systems analysts.

Gen Kross: We've flushed them out of the processes, but we're still struggling with his processes. He won. Folks in the real world deal with dollars that are real dollars. In the execution year, they have the

*PPBS was instituted by DOD Comptroller Charles J. Hitch and became the heart of Secretary of Defense McNamara's management program. McNamara's biographer, Deborah Shapley, endorsed PPBS as an "overdue" reform that produced many benefits. However, she also regretted McNamara's elevation of a managerial mindset over military professionalism honed by direct operational experience. (SOURCE: Deborah Shapley, *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 99-104 and pp. 232-246.) Also see footnote on p. 65.

ability to go lease something and the ability to score it anywhere. That's not our way. It's POM dollars soon-to-become appropriated dollars. We are forced to deal beyond the real cycles of life.

Dr. Matthews: Goldwater-Nichols Act also radically changed the personnel system in the Department of Defense. Did it go too far?

Gen Kross: No, it did not go far enough. In the end, we altered the assignment process by putting more emphasis on joint duty and professional school attendance, marginal kinds of stuff. But the Services still maintain control over the *real* thing: manpower function and manpower slots. A CINC can come up with the best idea in the world, and if he needs ten more manpower slots to get it done, he might as well forget it. The Services are not going to give them to him. They don't do that in the commercial world. We do it dumb. What Goldwater-Nichols II has to do is break the DOD manpower paradigm as well as the budgeting process.

Dr. Matthews: And replace it with...?

Gen Kross: It's very easy to say that you don't like something. And then when you say, "Okay, what do you want in its place," that's the hard part. We had a comptroller awhile back who gave the DOD "BOFs," [Business Operating Funds] and us the DBOF-T [Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation], now the TWCF [Transportation Working Capital Fund]. And everybody laughed and hated it, and they are still trying to kill it off. But, in fact, it's actually a pretty good process. We like our BOF. It gives us flexibility unlike those dopey POM dollars. When we play with dopey POM dollars and O&M [Operation and Maintenance] dollars, we generally lose. That's really why we like the TWCF.

Conclusion

- Mr. Cossaboom: Give us your sage advice.
- Gen Kross: [Laughter] Never, ever chop strategic forces. Never, ever chop TALCEs. Do not let “chop freaks” end run you. Always bond with the CINCs. When the chips are down, the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] will always side with TRANSCOM. [Laughter] Don’t let people go direct to the Guard and Reserve. Watch those GTN feeder systems like a hawk because they can turn you into a dope. Don’t trust somebody at a depot when he says everything is going to be all right. These are simple rules. It’s really a pretty short list.
- Dr. Matthews: In early 1997 you were planning on meeting with the President [William J. “Bill” Clinton]. Did you meet with him, and if so, what did you discuss?
- Gen Kross: I met with President Clinton over dinner and we discussed his golf game. [Laughter] I promised him he would never have to worry about the US Transportation Command, so he didn’t have to know hardly anything about it. And he said, “Thank you. I appreciate you putting it to me that way.” And then he said, “Isn’t that C-17 doing a great job in Bosnia?” And I said, “Yes, it is and it’ll keep on going.” He’s a big supporter of the C-17.
- Mr. Cossaboom: Did he promise 240?
- Gen Kross: No. We didn’t talk about that.

Dr. Matthews: He didn't ask you whether Gail Halvorsen* was a guy or gal did he?

Gen Kross: [Laughter] That came later.

Mr. Cossaboom: Few topics spin you up more than Presidential airlift. What would you say to the President if you could discuss this issue with him one on one after you retire?

Gen Kross: [Laughter] I would urge him to travel with a smaller footprint and take an end-to-end look at his operation to see where he could cut back. The requirement continues to increase. I think his trip to Africa was a wake-up call even for his people. We got a lot of questions afterward from the White House Military Office [WHMO] about how much this cost, how much did we carry, how big was it. But they don't control the situation. It's others in the White House who have control over the requirements. With a little willpower, the White House could cut back twenty or thirty percent per trip.

Dr. Matthews: They aren't used to people questioning their decisions.

Gen Kross: Nope. They aren't. That's the nature of the White House. They believe everyone in the executive branch works for them, which is actually the way it is. [Laughter] They are not under transportation stress or cost controls. Somebody else pays for it in the Department. They don't see the bill. Until someone finally

*As a young first lieutenant, retired Air Force Colonel Gail S. Halvorsen participated in the Berlin Airlift delivering supplies to the beleaguered citizens of Berlin between 1948 and 1949. Lieutenant Halvorsen, nicknamed the Candy Bomber, also dropped small parachutes made of handkerchiefs and carrying candy to the children of the city. In 1998, President Clinton, Colonel Halvorsen, and many others participated in the festivities at Templehof Airport in Berlin marking the 50th anniversary of the Berlin Airlift. In introducing Colonel Halvorsen, President Clinton mistakenly referred to him as "her."

says “That’s enough,” they will remain in an abusive state. In my view, enough is enough.

Dr. Matthews: Once again, when CINCTRANS announced his retirement, the rumors were rampant that his replacement would be from another Service. Did one of the other Services really nominate someone?

Gen Kross: Yes, the Army made a run for it this time. My good friend Dennis Reimer had already made the decision to nominate a candidate for CINCTRANS before I could engage with him. He nominated a very experienced four-star, more senior even than me. He’s an expert in supply-chain management. He’s a premier logistician. He’s a great teammate and a great guy. But he was the wrong guy for the job. I argued my case before Dr. Hamre, General Ralston, and General Shelton.

Dr. Matthews: What did you say?

Gen Kross: I didn’t say, “I want an Air Force officer” or “I don’t want an Army officer.” That would be poison. Obviously, we all wanted the best man for the job. In the case of CINCTRANS, he had to be, I argued, the one who could best work the daily float. As I said earlier, 95 percent of the day-to-day activity at TRANSCOM is air mobility. And air issues are complex. Issues in the other modes are critical, but they tend to be cleaner and less complex than those in air. As importantly, the key mobility issues three years out will primarily be air: GATM, wing structure, C-5 modernization, pilot retention, to name a few. They took my arguments to SECDEF. Based on my criteria, and his interview with the Air Force nominee Tony Robertson, SECDEF, God bless him, chose the right man for the job. Three years from now the criteria, and consequently the equation, might change. The biggest issues on CINCTRANS plate then might be surface or sea.

Dr. Matthews: We have not yet broached the issue of one four-star working for another four-star or where another four-star billet would come from.

Gen Kross: Nobody wants to go there in the discussion, especially the Air Force, and that is fine with me. Here's my bottom line: maintaining the dual-hatted CINCTrans/Commander, AMC keeps the Air Force in balance. I can't tell you how many times my clout as CINCTrans has carried the day in the Air Force chain of command. I believe air mobility is so vitally important to the nation that CINCTrans should always be Air Force. But he should also always be the best man for the job, regardless of his Service. [Laughter]

Dr. Matthews: Is it time to look at flip-flopping the DCINC and the J5, Army to Navy and Navy to Army?

Gen Kross: No, it works great like it is.

Dr. Matthews: Would there be any advantage to rotating the Services of our J3/J4 or J6?

Gen Kross: J6 can go pretty much any way, but it is best to leave it Air Force. Most of our information systems draw from the air, because that's where the intransit visibility really lies. There's absolutely no question that the J3/J4 ought to be Air Force all the time. We should not try to experiment with any other Service in that role. If we put an Army general into the job, he would be clumsy. He would not be valued added. It's very easy to paint me as a terminally blue, old hard-line Air Force guy, but I am really talking from experience. I would recommend that we pretty much leave Director-level Service representation alone. Our processes will carry us through with our customers.

Dr. Matthews: Arguably, nobody has a better perspective on the answer to the next question. Should we break apart the J3/J4?

Gen Kross: No. He is the 800-pound gorilla of the staff. He needs to stay that way. In dealing with the other CINCDoms, we have found that most of the crucial problems encountered stem from their separation of the J3 and the J4. They bought the old paradigm while we changed it to recognize a new transportation-dependent world. Actually, whoever thought that up, combining the J3 and the J4 at the new UTC [unified transportation command], she got it right, God bless her. It enables us to be more seamless. We will never be seamless, but we are more seamless than the other unified commands. The classic example of how to do it badly is EUCCOM, which doesn't even have their J3 and J4 in the same building. [Laughter] And it shows.

Dr. Matthews: Is there any part of either of your commands that you would recommend restructuring?

Gen Kross: No. I'm not a changer of organizations. I use the cards that are dealt, everyone from the execs all the way down.

Dr. Matthews: Assess USTRANSCOM and Headquarters AMC's performance on your watch.

Gen Kross: I give both TRANSCOM and AMC a good solid "A." I have tremendous confidence in the staffs all the way down.

Dr. Matthews: As CINCTRANS, what are you most proud of having accomplished?

Gen Kross: That our partners--components, commercial industry, Services, CINCs, the Chairman, and OSD--place very high value on their relationship with TRANSCOM. They know they cannot succeed

without TRANSCOM. They give over to TRANSCOM projects and issues because they know we will make them succeed. We have credibility. We are trusted. I am leaving TRANSCOM confident that the partnership is stronger than it's ever been.

Dr. Matthews: Was there any time over the last two years that you think we could have done the job better if we had been the supported CINC?

Gen Kross: You know I am not big on that. I think it nurtures adversarial behavior on the part of our teammates. I would purge that quest for being the supported CINC from TRANSCOM's bag. There is nothing to be gained from it. I would much rather be a supporting CINC to some other CINC forward. It works. We succeed. Why try to have a label stuck on our butt just for the purpose of the label? We do not need that bumper sticker. Look at our standing in the Department today, and always remember we exist so others can succeed.

Biography

General Walter Kross is Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, and Commander, Air Mobility Command [AMC], Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. As a unified command Commander in Chief, he is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the nation's defense transportation requirements. He exercises command over service transportation components from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As Commander, AMC, he provides operationally trained, equipped, and mission-ready air mobility forces to support U.S. requirements.

The general was commissioned through Officer Training School in December 1964. His early career combined both fighter and airlift experience as he flew 157 F-4 combat missions, 100 over North Vietnam. He later transitioned to airlift, then senior executive and congressional pilot support. He was assigned to Headquarters U.S. Air Force for six years, part of that time in the Chief's Staff Group. He has served as commander of a C-5 wing, as Director of Operations and Logistics for all defense transportation requirements in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and as Director of Operations for Air Force headquarters. Additionally, General Kross was Commander of the provisional force in charge of standing up Air Mobility Command, as well as its first Vice Commander. He was Commander of 15th Air Force, Travis Air Force Base, California, then Director, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. before assuming his current assignment.

General Kross was born in the Bronx, New York, and his wife, Kay, is from Alabama. Their daughter, Karin, is a Rice University graduate.

Education:

1964	Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry, Niagara University, New York
1971	Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
1974	Master's degree in government, Southern Illinois University
1975	Distinguished Graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
1977	Air War College
1982	National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
1985	Executive Development Program, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
1990	Senior Executive Seminar, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Massachusetts

Assignments:

1. December 1964-July 1966, student, pilot training, Laredo Air Force Base, Texas.
2. July 1966-February 1967, F-4 pilot, 25th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

3. February 1967-September 1967, F-4 pilot, 476th Tactical Fighter Squadron, George Air Force Base, California.
4. September 1967-September 1968, F-4C aircraft commander, 390th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam.
5. September 1968-March 1972, C-141 pilot, 76th Military Airlift Squadron, later, flight examiner, 437th Military Airlift Wing, Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina.
6. March 1972-August 1974, VC-135 and VC-137 special missions pilot, 98th Military Airlift Squadron, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
7. August 1974-August 1975, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
8. August 1975-April 1979, Air Operations Officer, Tactical Forces Division, and later, Assistant Deputy Director for Joint and Congressional Matters, directorate of Plans, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
9. April 1979-July 1981, member, chief of staff of the Air Force Staff Group, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
10. July 1981-June 1982, student, National War College, and Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. June 1982-March 1984, Deputy Commander for Operations and later, Vice Commander, 89th Military Airlift Wing, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
12. March 1984-July 1987, Vice Commander, and later Commander, 436th Military Airlift Wing, Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.
13. July 1987-October 1988, Vice Commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, and Deputy Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for Military Personnel, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.
14. October 1988-May 1990, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.
15. May 1990-July 1991, Director of Operations and Logistics (J3/J4) U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
16. July 1991-January 1992, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
17. January 1992-June 1993, Commander, Air Mobility Command (Provisional), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
18. July 1992-June 1993, Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
19. June 1993-July 1994, Commander, 15th Air Force, Travis Air Force Base, California.
20. July 1994-July 1996, Director, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
21. July 1996-present, Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, and Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

Flight Information:

Rating: Command pilot

Flight Hours: More than 5,900

Aircraft Flown: F-4, C-141, VC-135, VC-137, C-5, T-37, T-33, KC-135, C-140, C-9, C-17, and KC-10

Major Awards and Decorations:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit

Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters

Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Air Medal with 12 oak leaf clusters

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

Vietnam Service Medal with four service stars

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm

Other Achievements:

General Kross has published professional articles in the Air University Review and Armed Forces Journal International. He has authored two books, on military reform and a novel about Vietnam air combat. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Effective Dates of Promotion:

Second Lieutenant	21 Dec 64	Colonel	1 Oct 82
First Lieutenant	21 Jun 66	Brigadier General	1 Jul 88
Captain	11 May 68	Major General	1 Feb 91
Major	1 Feb 75	Lieutenant General	2 Jul 92
Lieutenant Colonel	1 Apr 79	General	1 Aug 96

*Narrative Justification for Award of the
Defense Distinguished Service Medal*

Walter Kross

General Walter Kross, United States Air Force, distinguished himself by exceptionally distinguished meritorious service as the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS); and as Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, from 15 July 1996 to 31 August 1998. During his tenure, General Kross exhibited visionary leadership and provided invaluable counsel to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); fellow Combatant Commanders; Service Chiefs; and members of the United States Congress on all matters relating to defense transportation. With the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2010 concept of Focused Logistics caged squarely in his sights, General Kross charted a direct course to success by focusing his attention on three critically important themes: maintaining readiness to execute USTRANSCOM's mission in support of warfighting CINCs; preparing now to operate effectively in the 21st century through comprehensive modernization of transportation assets; and continuous process improvement within the Defense Transportation System (DTS). He never once wavered in his commitment to those themes.

General Kross' relentless dedication and commitment to excellence led the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to unparalleled heights of readiness posture. Today, USTRANSCOM stands ready to support the National Military Strategy across the spectrum of possible employment options from short-notice humanitarian crises up through and including two major theater wars. Tangible evidence lies in the command's continually demonstrated ability to deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces in support of joint operations worldwide. Under General Kross' direction, USTRANSCOM has participated in over 200 CJCS-directed events. Some of the most significant successes under his watch include Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia), JOINT GUARD (Bosnia), and DESERT THUNDER (Southwest Asia); Hurricane Paka Relief (Guam), Flood Relief missions (North Dakota), Snowstorm Relief missions (New England), and Forest Fire Support (Indonesia). USTRANSCOM moved over 250,000 personnel and 150,000 short tons of cargo via airlift, and in excess of 1 million square feet of cargo via sealift in support of these high visibility operations. In addition, Exercise Central Asian Battalion 1997 (CENTRASBAT 97) was the longest distance airborne operation in history. In September 1997, eight C-17 Globemaster III aircraft flew a nonstop, triple air refueling, 19 hour mission from Pope AFB, North Carolina, to a drop zone in Sayram, Kazakhstan. Execution of this tremendously demanding mission was absolutely flawless. The formation accurately airdropped over 500 U.S. troops plus a platoon from the Central Asian Battalion with a zero-second time-over-target. In the exercise arena, the command's exercise program has realized dramatic improvements in individual, team, and unit readiness levels. General Kross was the driving force behind USTRANSCOM's participation in Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSO&I) 97 conducted in conjunction with TURBO CHALLENGE 97, the first-ever USTRANSCOM/United States Pacific Command

(USPACOM)/U.S. Forces Korea exercise partnership. He was also the impetus for Exercise POSITIVE FORCE 98, the first CJCS-sponsored, worldwide mobilization command post exercise conducted in over eight years. In addition, through USTRANSCOM-sponsored exercises such as Turbo Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (TURBOCADS), USPACOM's ammunition modernization program is now five to seven years ahead of schedule.

The command's continuous support to joint operations like these made managing operations and personnel tempo a monumental challenge. Understanding that people are his most important resource, General Kross has kept quality of life issues as his number one, overarching priority. As one of the first USAF leaders to raise serious concerns about declining retention, he initiated several programs to obtain greater officer and enlisted compensation and to effectively control operations tempo to reverse these negative trends. He also established 1998 as the "Year of the Enlisted Force." Through his personal attention and ceaseless efforts, he vastly improved quality of life for enlisted personnel and their families worldwide. Another quality of life success story was his revamping of the household goods process through reengineering of the DOD Personal Property Program. This initiative incorporated the best available commercial business practices, coupled with long-term contracts and improved insurance coverage, to ensure DOD personnel received the highest quality service available.

Protecting his most important resource was another top priority. Acting quickly after the rise of terrorist incidents worldwide, General Kross established a Force Protection staff agency separate from the Operations and Logistics Directorate, and closely linked with the intelligence community. Totally new force protection coordination and reporting procedures were established to provide indication and warning (I&W) analysts the mechanism to quickly disseminate critical, time-sensitive information on potential threats to USTRANSCOM assets. He also drove the development of key performance measures to determine how quickly I&W analysts responded to threats to USTRANSCOM assets and subsequently disseminated critical information to deployed units.

His thorough understanding of the role that sealift plays in the DTS, and his unwavering support for maritime assets, has ensured future high readiness levels for the strategic sealift fleet. His unique brand of leadership resulted in an unprecedented partnership with the sealift industry and superb support for the warfighting CINCs. General Kross has ensured that the sealift requirements identified in the Mobility Requirements Study, Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) will become a reality. Funding for all 19 Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels is assured, and 31 of the 36 Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ships for the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) have been purchased. He also initiated a review of the Ready Reserve Force activation authority policy that resulted in permanent delegation of authority from SECDEF to USCINCTRANS for activation of RRF vessels, training, and readiness. This was a major step forward in streamlining the activation process. General Kross played a pivotal role in gaining Congressional approval for the Maritime Security Program (MSP). This program, coupled with the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), has resulted in bedrock readiness agreements for strategic sealift mobility. These initiatives solidified

an unprecedented strategic partnership between the maritime industry and DOD, which guarantees that adequate sealift capacity, intermodal capacity, and industry leadership will be available to deploy and sustain U.S. military forces anywhere in the world during time of need.

General Kross immediately recognized the impact of deteriorating worldwide en route infrastructure on strategic mobility operations, and declared 1997 “The Year of the En Route.” He championed program solutions at Pacific and European air bases by enlisting SECDEF and CJCS support for project funding to reverse the decline of the en route system. His direct intervention led to \$407M in the Defense Logistics Agency Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for 18 urgent strategic en route projects worldwide. This represented a two-fold increase in infrastructure funding over any previously approved POM. His shaping of DOD program priorities ensured strategic air mobility will continue to be the cornerstone of responsive power projection into the 21st century.

Additionally, he quickly recognized the tremendous impact that the judicious use of Mobility Enhancement Funds (MEF) have on the command’s ability to execute its wartime mission. He personally managed the allocation of \$75M to over 100 service projects for improvement of DOD installations, depots, airfields, seaports, command and control capabilities, and intransit visibility (ITV) of cargo and passengers. His personal touch resulted in deriving maximum return on investment for the DTS as a whole.

Under his leadership, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) readiness program has grown and stabilized. In wartime, USTRANSCOM relies on CRAF for up to 93 percent of passenger capability and 41 percent of air cargo capability. Since 1996, the CRAF program has moved from a shortfall situation in the required number of passenger and cargo aircraft to a surplus in 1998. This program growth has been accomplished through a combination of innovative management steps, including better leveraging of existing peacetime business, non-traditional incentives such as carrier access to military airfields for non-DOD business, and keen attention to carrier concerns such as better insurance coverage, intelligence-sharing, and smoother activation procedures. The result is a CRAF program which has become a DOD model for military-civilian partnering.

In the deliberate plans arena, General Kross orchestrated efforts that will enhance force deployments by providing “on-the-shelf,” executable Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) files requiring little or no changes at execution. Also, teaming with supported CINCs and members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) produced plans with much greater fidelity and levels of detail. In an extraordinary planning effort, the CJCS’s highest priority plan, CONPLAN 1020, was finished in a record three months, a process that normally takes 18-24 months to complete. As a result of his expertise and direction, six major war plans with TPFDDs are now on the shelf, ready for execution upon direction by the National Command Authorities (NCA).

General Kross’ vision and guidance were instrumental in providing Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4S) support to the USTRANSCOM Mobility Control Center and forces deployed in support of warfighting CINCs. He successfully

guided the huge infusion of information technology into the command's Joint Mobility Control Group (JMCG) project. This mission critical program required countless hours of analysis, reengineering, and systems migration efforts. Because of his diligence and oversight, USTRANSCOM will be able to support its current and future mission through state-of-the-art command and control of global transportation assets.

When DOD mandated joint manpower reductions under the Defense Reform Initiative, General Kross' managerial expertise was readily apparent. He expertly guided USTRANSCOM in meeting the manpower reduction target without any associated degradation in mission capability. He accomplished this by making the necessary decisions to take real manpower reductions without placing civilian employees at risk for adverse personnel actions. He astutely transferred automation and information systems support functions to the Defense Mega Center, and shifted manpower, along with their associated functions, to his subordinate Transportation Component Commands (TCCs). Under his stewardship, USTRANSCOM became a streamlined, leaner, and more efficient organization possessing the same capabilities to meet its global mobility mission.

General Kross' emphasis and success in modernizing critical transportation assets in the face of severe budget constraints has paved the way for a DTS capable of meeting customer needs for many years to come.

With the agility that is his trademark, he kept the current C-17 multi-year procurement program squarely on track, while simultaneously orchestrating innovative solutions to future air mobility requirements. A strong advocate of modernizing the C-5 fleet and obtaining additional C-17 airframes to fill the special operations void left by retiring C-141 aircraft, General Kross has positioned the command for the future success of these critical airlift programs

General Kross immediately recognized the need to upgrade the avionics in the AMC fleet in order to preserve future unrestricted access to prime global air routes. His understanding of the intricacies of the DTS, future global air traffic management requirements, and their relationship with both the domestic and international commercial airline industry, was key to baselining the capability necessary for the organic fleet to remain competitive in the future Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) environment. General Kross clearly articulated the merits of this large, complex program, and obtained support for over \$2B in the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP), enabling over 1,700 AMC aircraft to operate efficiently and effectively in the future. Thanks to his efforts, the program is on track and modifications are already underway.

General Kross identified material handling equipment (MHE) as the weakest link in the air mobility system. He immediately came on line in support of new programs to rectify this deficiency. He advocated the acquisition of 318 60K "Tunner" cargo loaders and 264 Next Generation Small Loaders (NGSL). His actions resulted in full funding for both loaders, and both programs are on track toward satisfying this critical operational need. The "Tunner" is already proving its worth. Six "Tunner" loaders recently loaded

over 36,000 tons of cargo during the Operation DESERT THUNDER deployment to Southwest Asia.

His vision, involvement, and dynamic leadership were instrumental in the development, fielding, and integration of the Global Transportation Network (GTN). GTN supports every tenet, and is a key enabler of Joint Vision 2010--Focused Logistics. General Kross propelled GTN to its current status as the premier logistics system for the warfighter and DTS customers as a whole. His determination to make GTN the "customer's system" transformed GTN into a fully customizable system, which will enable DTS customers at all echelons to tailor GTN to best meet their needs.

General Kross' vision of a single customer service center at USTRANSCOM came one step closer to fruition with the establishment of the USTRANSCOM Business Center. The Business Center integrates responsibilities previously diffused throughout the staff to ensure consistent application of prudent business practices in USTRANSCOM's management of the DTS. Establishment of the Business Center has allowed USTRANSCOM to undertake, intensify, and enhance customer focus. Understanding customer needs is vital to improving quality of service and remaining competitive with transportation counterparts. The Business Center serves as the advocate for strategic DTS customers by developing comprehensive customer profiles through its vigorous Customer Outreach Program. Additionally, Customer Day (annual Flag-level forum) enables all strategic customers and key transportation policy makers to meet, discuss, and resolve DTS related issues. Moreover, the Customer Council of Colonels/Captains (CCoC) convenes to ensure resolution of issues raised on Customer Day. Another customer related initiative is the establishment of the National Defense Transportation Association (NDTA) Business Practices Committee. Thanks to General Kross, the NDTA board accepted USTRANSCOM's recommendation for establishment of this committee. This organization will address logistics support problems experienced by our customers and service providers, and work toward commercial industry best business practice solutions.

As the only CINC who has fiduciary responsibility for a working capital fund operation, General Kross personally directed the United States Transportation Command and its component commands' efforts to reduce cost without degradation of support to the warfighter. His efforts to educate DOD leadership, the Services, and customers on the highly complex process of defense transportation resulted in numerous changes to the command's business processes. Known as the Cost Driver Program, commanders of the TCCs review their cost and revenue trends monthly to identify opportunities to reduce cost and increase revenue. These efforts have resulted in USTRANSCOM identifying almost \$1B in efficiencies and cost reductions.

General Kross also spearheaded the initiative to consolidate Military Traffic Management Command's (MTMC) cargo traffic management and Military Sealift Command's (MSC) liner contracting functions through creation of the Joint Traffic Management Office (JTMO) under the purview of MTMC. Certain contracting functions performed by MSC personnel were transferred to MTMC, resulting in the centralization of all contracting

procedures relative to container movements. This reengineering initiative greatly simplified the process for DOD customers, and allowed MSC to focus on its mission as a key arm of defense for strategic sealift, as well as primary afloat logistics support for the Navy and service-unique forces.

Through his distinctive accomplishments, General Kross culminated a long and distinguished career in the service of his country and reflects great credit upon himself, the United States Air Force, and the Department of Defense.

***Citation to Accompany the Award of
the Defense Distinguished Service Medal
to
Walter Kross***

General Walter Kross, United States Air Force, distinguished himself by exceptionally distinguished service as Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, and Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, from July 1996 to August 1998. During this period, he provided superlative leadership and counsel to the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; fellow Combatant Commanders; Service Chiefs; and members of the United States Congress on matters relating to defense transportation. With the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2010 tenet of Focused Logistics caged squarely in his sights, General Kross charted a direct course to success through three critically important themes: maintaining readiness, comprehensive modernization, and continuous process improvement. His relentless dedication and commitment to excellence led the United States Transportation Command to unparalleled heights of readiness. Tangible evidence lies in the command's continually demonstrated ability to deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces in support of over 200 joint operations worldwide including, Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and DESERT THUNDER, as well as flood, snowstorm, and hurricane relief operations in the United States and its territories. Under his leadership and vision, General Kross made significant and enduring contributions in preparing the Defense Transportation System for the challenges of the 21st century. Through his distinctive accomplishments, General Kross culminated a long and distinguished career in the service of his country and reflects great credit upon himself, the United States Air Force, and the Department of Defense.

Glossary

AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
AB	Air Base
ACC	Air Combat Command
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AIT	Automated Information Technology
AITE	Automated Information Technology Equipment
ALCE	Airlift Control Element
AMC	Air Mobility Command
	Army Materiel Command
AMX	Air Mobility Express
AOR	area of responsibility
APL	American President Lines
APU	Auxiliary Power Unit
BENS	Business Executives for National Security
CCDoTT	Center for Commercial Deployment of Transportation Technology
CENTCOM	See USCENTCOM
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCCENT	See USCINCCENT
CINCPAC	See USCINCPAC
CINCSPACE	See USCINCSpace
CINTRANS	See USCINTRANS
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CONUS	Continental United States
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
COTS	Commercial Off-the-Shelf
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DBOF	Defense Business Operating Fund
DBOF-T	Defense Business Operation Fund-Transportation
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DCS	Defense Courier Service
DeCA	Defense Commissary Agency
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces
DITY	Do-It-Yourself
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DO	Director of Operations
DOD	Department of Defense

DOT	Department of Transportation
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DRID	Defense Reform Initiative Directive
DSB	Defense Science Board
DTS	Defense Transportation System Defense Travel System
EAF	Expeditionary Air Force
EUCOM	See USEUCOM
EWG	Executive Working Group
Fed Ex	Federal Express Corporation
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
FYDP	Five Year Defense Plan
GAO	General Accounting Office
GATM	Global Air Traffic Management
GSA	General Services Administration
GTN	Global Transportation Network
HAC	House Appropriations Committee
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HNSC	House National Security Committee
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IFOR	Implementation Force
ITV	intransit visibility
J3/J4	USTRANSCOM Operations and Logistics Directorate
J5	USTRANSCOM Plans and Policy Directorate
J6	USTRANSCOM Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate
JALIS	Joint Air Logistics Information System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDTC	Joint Deployment Training Center
JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
JMCG	Joint Mobility Control Group
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOSAC	Joint Operational Support Airlift Center
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JTCC	Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center
JTMO	Joint Traffic Management Office
LMSR	Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ship

MAJCOM	major command
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MARC	Mobile Air Reporting Communications (van)
MCC	Mobility Control Center
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MP	Military Police
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
MRS BURU	Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update
MRS 05	Mobility Requirements Study 2005
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NACA	National Air Carriers Association
NAF	Numbered Air Force
NDF	National Defense Features
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
NSC	National Security Council
O&M	operations and maintenance
OSA	Operational Support Airlift
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/PA&E	Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation
OSD/TP	Office of the Secretary of Defense, Transportation Policy
PACOM	See USPACOM
PME	Professional Military Education
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAF	Royal Air Force
R&D	Research and Development
RDT&E	Research, Development, Operational Test and Evaluation
RO/RO	Roll-On/Roll-Off ship
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
RSO&I	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SCUD	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SOCOM	See USSOCOM
SOF	Special Operations Forces

SOUTHCOM	See USSOUTHCOM
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TACON	tactical control
TALCE	Tactical Airlift Control Element
TDY	temporary duty
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TRAC ² ES	TRANSCOM Regulating Aeromedical Command and Control Evacuation System
TTB	Transportation Terminal Brigade
TTU	Transportation Terminal Unit
TWCF	Transportation Working Capital Fund
UK	United Kingdom
UPS	United Parcel Service
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, USPACOM
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, USSOCOM
USCINCSpace	Commander in Chief, USSPACECOM
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unified transportation command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
VTC	video teleconference
WHMO	White House Military Office
Y2K	Year 2000

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ITV (See intransit visibility)

JDA (See Joint Deployment Agency)

JDTC (See Joint Deployment Training Center)

JFCOM (See US Joint Forces Command)

JLOTS (See Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore)

JMCG (See Joint Mobility Control Group)

JMRR (See Joint Monthly Readiness Review)

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