INFORMATION PAPER

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SUBJECT: New START Treaty (NST) Impacts on Army Activities

1. **PURPOSE**: Provide a summary of NST's impact on Army activities.

2. **BACKGROUND:** The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expired in December 2009. The new treaty limiting strategic nuclear systems signed on 8 April 2010 ***significantly reduces Army compliance requirements*** as well as constraints on research and development (R&D) activities. While missile defense and Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) Programs are not prohibited, NST does create potential issues.

3. **NEW START TREATY REQUIREMENTS**

a. The START biannual requirement that the Army report holdings of Polaris A3 SLBM first-stage motors used in the Strategic Target System (STARS) has been eliminated. Under NST, there will be a biannual data update report, but ***Army currently has no treaty-accountable systems in its inventory.***

b. The Army's only inspectable site under NST is at Camp Navajo, Arizona (Arizona National Guard), where excess Air Force Minuteman motors are stored. The Army support facility outside Charleston, SC, which was inspectable under START, is not inspectable under NST. Meck Island at the Reagan Test Site can still be designated as a Space Launch Facility when required and will not be inspectable.

c. Army R&D programs that use NST-accountable first-stage motors (Minuteman III, Trident D5, and Peacekeeper) in booster systems, should not have to share telemetry with the Russians and will be allowed to encrypt telemetry from both the ballistic missile motors and the payload.

i. NST-accountable motors still have notification, launch location, and inspection requirements.

ii. Trident I C4 rocket motors are not accountable under NST when utilized in missile defense target launches, for R&D purposes not related to ICBM or SLBM tests, or as space launch vehicles.

4. **NEW START TREATY POTENTIAL ISSUES**

a. While there are no direct NST provisions that limit missile defense systems, the future ability of U.S. tactical missile defense systems to engage targets that have strategic range (greater than 5,500 km), which demonstrates capability against ICBMs, ***could pose a potential policy challenge***. It is this increase in U.S. capability that prompted Russia to declare that NST is "…effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities…"

b. CPGS systems that utilize NST-accountable first-stage motors ***will have to comply with the notification and inspection requirements*** of the Treaty. CPGS systems using newly developed or commercial ballistic missile motors and that fly a traditional ballistic missile trajectory ***could be considered*** subject to the treaty. Of significance, the U.S. has articulated a unilateral position that ***a CPGS system that does not meet any of the definitions in NST,*** such as the Army's Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) concept, ***will not be subject to NST.***

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