The Eastern Mandates Campaign:



A Staff Ride Guide for Operation FLINTLOCK

The Seizure of Kwajalein Atoll

The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Historical Office
2004

The Eastern Mandates Campaign:

A Staff Ride Guide for Operation FLINTLOCK

The Seizure of Kwajalein

by
Dr. James A. Walker
Dr. Lewis Bernstein
Mrs. Sharon Lang

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Historical Office
2004

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations, Tables and Charts

Landing Ships and Landing Craft

Ground and Naval Aircraft

Command Historian's Preface and Acknowledgements

The Eastern Mandates Campaign: A Staff Ride Guide for Operation FLINTLOCK; The Seizure of Kwajalein Atoll is a history and a self-guided tour of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur battlefield that provides an overview of the American seizure of the atoll. Operation FLINTLOCK was mounted 70 days after the invasion of the Gilbert Islands and decisively proved that amphibious assault doctrine worked, and that the Army-Navy team Admiral Nimitz assembled could use new tactics and doctrine to defeat a formidable enemy. His strategic daring and use of his task forces made it possible to proceed directly to the Marianas, increasing the operational tempo of the war against Japan after almost a year of relative inaction.

At Kwajalein, the Navy was the chief coordinating service and showed it mastered the art of successfully striking across the seas. Even though the Marshalls were the last coral atolls seized and the nature of the Pacific War changed, the innovations tested there were important and served the Army and Navy in both the European and Pacific theaters. The reader will quickly discover our belief that the record of Army-Navy collaboration in the campaign was a true success story.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign: A Staff Ride Guide for Operation FLINTLOCK; The Seizure of Kwajalein Atoll is the result of research begun for a monograph on the Army's use of Kwajalein as part of a national missile test range. This brief work is one aspect of a larger project.

The picture and maps are from the National Archives or Department of Defense sources with the exception of Admiral Conolly's picture, which came from Long Island University. The authors especially wish to thank Jay Graybeal of the U.S. Army Military History Institute for the pictures of and biographical information about General Corlett, as well as Jane Dorfman and Janet Marks archivists and reference librarians of Long Island University, Brooklyn Center and LIU, University Center, Brookville, NY respectively, for pictures and biographical information about Admiral Conolly. In addition, we would like to acknowledge the help of the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor at Fort Knox, Dr. Boyd Dastrup, Command Historian at the Field Artillery Center at Fort Bliss and Z. Frank Hanner, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning for the photos of the various types of weapons. We would also like to thank Ms. Susan Gahagan of Sigma Services of America who designed the layout. The authors accept all responsibility for errors and will gratefully accept corrections.



James A. Walker, Ph.D.
Command Historian

About the U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and U. S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site

The USASMDC is a unique worldwide command whose missions include space operations, information operations, global strike, integrated missile defense and C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). SMDC moves warfighting technologies from concept to operations and is the Army Service Component Command to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). To accomplish its missions SMDC oversees the following elements:

The 1st Space Brigade (Provisional) in Colorado Springs conducts continuous, global space support, space control and space force enhancement operations to support of STRATCOM and combatant commanders through its 1st Satellite Control Battalion and its Colorado and Alaska Army National Guard team members.

SMDC-Colorado Springs manages the Army's astronaut detachment at the Johnson Space Center.

The TRADOC System Manager Ground-based Midcourse Defense (TSM-GMD) integrates and manages GMD user activities within the Army and as a single Army user representative and advocate in developing the land-based GMD system.

The Force Development and Integration Center develops the Army's space and missile defense concepts, validates requirements, and ensures Army-wide solution integration.

The Space and Missile Defense Technical Center is the command's research and development element and as the MDA's executive agent it provides cost, schedule, and technical oversight for missile defense technology, and supplies the Program Executive Office, Air, Space, and Missile Defense with technical matrix support.

The Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab's introduces innovations for space, missile defense, C4ISR, and information operations to the warfighter through lab and field experiments, analysis, and simulation, leading to testing in exercises and experiments and in current military operations.

The Office of Technical Integration and Interoperability combines technical and operational requirements with materiel developers, improves interoperability for our Joint and Coalition warfighters, and advances Space and Integrated Air and Missile Defense.

The Space and Missile Defense Test and Evaluation Center centralizes the command's materiel development, targets, and test facility management and includes three facilities and program offices: the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at White Sands Missile Range, a national center for high-energy laser research, development, testing, and evaluation, the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site for ballistic missile testing and space object tracking

  

and Fort Greely, Alaska, developing as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Testbed to support the MDA.

With more than 40 years of experience in successful ballistic missile testing and supporting space operations, the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site (USAKA/RTS) plays a vital role in research, development, test, and evaluation for America's defense and space programs.

Radar, optical and telemetry sensors operated at USAKA/RTS help sustain missile testing, space surveillance operations and science experiments for the Departments of Defense and Energy as well as NASA. Instruments on the atoll collect metric, signature and science data to characterize missile re-entry systems and maintain the STRATCOM catalog of artificial satellites.

Space Operations

USAKA/RTS supports the Army's space mission, the Air Force, NASA space transportation system operations and experiments, and DoD and commercial satellite launches. USAKA/RTS conducts space-object identification and provides orbital information on new foreign launches; the ALTAIR and TRADEX radars monitor deep space and near earth satellite observations for the Space Surveillance Network; both provide data on more than 42,000 tracks annually. Millimeter wave (MMW) and ALCOR radars provide high-resolution, near-real-time images of space objects.

Missile Testing

USAKA/RTS is the only exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense location and supports land impacts besides recovery of re-entry vehicles and test articles from the lagoon. Its isolated location minimizes environmental and safety constraints and allows control of the radio frequency spectrum.

Sensor Complex

The $4 billion complex of sophisticated radar, optical and telemetry sensors provides quantitative and qualitative data acquisition and includes radar, optics and telemetry. High-resolution radars provide precision metric, signature, and imaging for deep-space operations, satellite observations, strategic re-entry missions, and multiple-intercept engagement tracking. Precise optical metric data are collected on objects inside and outside the atmosphere using large-aperture optics equipped with video, infrared, and film sensors. Critical onboard missile information transmitted to the ground is collected with nine geographically dispersed telemetry antennas while ground stations receive, record, and display high data rate links.

USAKA/RTS can launch strategic interceptors that destroy targets in space, smaller multi-stage scientific rockets that take measurements in the atmosphere, and all types of theater-range missiles. The integrated command and control center provides technical range support.

Introduction

The Central Pacific was one of the last places both settled by man and divided among imperial powers. Sixteenth century Spaniards first reached the Marshalls looking for a shorter route to the Spice Islands of Southeast Asia. It was not until the 18th century that English expeditions made the first charts of the islands. Whaling ships' crews were the most frequent visitors to the Marshalls through the 1850s. By the 1860s German trading firms were active and the German government bought the islands from Spain in the 1880s. The Marshalls remained a German colony until October 1914.

Although Japan conquered the islands as Britain's World War I ally, Japanese companies had traded there since the 1890s. While Germany ruled approximately 75 percent of the goods exported to the Marshalls came from Japan. The League of Nations made the Marshalls a Japanese mandate in 1920. In 1922, the Pacific powers mutually pledged not to fortify their island possessions. In 1943 no one knew the extent of Japanese fortifications.

The Pacific War began and was waged because of the irreconcilable differences between Japan and the United States over the shape of the world expressed in their competing China policies. Japan's lightning conquests between December 1941 and May 1942 shattered notions of Western invulnerability. Elated by these initial successes, Japan expanded its goals and moved into Burma and the islands of the Southwest Pacific to isolate Australia and New Zealand from their American ally. The drive toward Australia was halted at the Coral Sea and the move toward Hawaii ended at Midway.

In July and August 1942, the strategically opportunistic allied offensive in New Guinea and the Solomons forestalled a renewed attack against Australia and the sea lanes connecting the United States to the Antipodes. Although Japan was beaten at Midway, it was still powerful and held the strategic initiative. The loss of four aircraft carriers did not affect land-based aviation. The attrition battles waged in the Southwest Pacific between July 1942 and February 1943 resulted in mutual exhaustion. However, the Japanese were bled of men and ships while American strength was increasing.

As American and Australian forces advanced up the Solomons and across the New Guinea coast their landings were unopposed or met with light to medium resistance. The same was true of the Anglo-American landings in North Africa (November 1942), Sicily (July 1943) and Italy (September 1943). Although the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps had worked to solve the problems of amphibious operations since 1908, actual operations had only undergone minor changes since the 18th century. The amphibious assault techniques the Marines had been devising since publishing *The Tentative Landing Manual (Draft)* in 1934 were

untried. The Combined Chiefs of Staff realized that an invasion of Northwest Europe would be an amphibious frontal assault against a fortified position. The last attempted amphibious assault was the 1915 Gallipoli (Dardanelles) debâcle.

Between February and November 1943, neither the Japanese nor the allies could exercise strategic and tactical initiative. Both seizing the initiative and the doctrinal test began on 20 November 1943 as American forces invaded Makin and Tarawa Atolls (Operation Galvanic), opening a series of amphibious assaults in the Central Pacific. At both places, landing forces were beset with supply difficulties and communications failures. Of the two, the landings at Tarawa were made with greater difficulty and with heavier casualties. To use a historical analogy, Tarawa was similar to the Battle of Shiloh in that both were learning experiences for their commanders and both had large numbers of casualties. Additionally, both ushered in new eras in their respective wars.

All three services learned from their Operation Galvanic experiences. Tarawa influenced the invasion of the Marshalls as the commanders closely studied the results and changed training as well as logistical and assault techniques. The 4th Marine Division's landing rehearsals in early January 1944 became a full dress rehearsal for the upcoming invasion. The performance of the landing craft and ships greatly concerned the planners. In the 7th Infantry Division, a veteran of the Attu invasion, combat units faced new problems because of the different geographic conditions in the Central Pacific. Each unit underwent intensive training with special emphasis placed on amphibious techniques to be used on Kwajalein. The entire division spent a week at the jungle training center on Oahu. It was battle conditioned and instructed in jungle fighting, jungle living, booby traps and demolitions, sniping and infiltration and defense against various types of Japanese tactics that might be employed in the coming campaign. The troops practiced attacking fortified positions using chemical mortars, flame throwers, grenades, engineer-infantry teams, tanks, machine guns and rifles.

While the Marines concentrated on amphibious assault coordination, the Army concerned itself with remedying tactical defects uncovered in fighting at Makin and Tarawa, poor coordination between tanks and infantry, by training tank companies and platoons with the infantry battalion with which they were to work. The amphibious training centers also trained the joint assault signal companies to ease ship to shore communications.

The lessons of Tarawa helped refine intelligence gathering, improved training methods and pointed out the need for better vehicles for crossing reefs. The battle pointed up the flaws in amphibious assault doctrine as it had been practiced. The assault on Betio became a textbook example for future landings. The lessons learned were priceless. The public outcry over the relatively high cost of securing the atoll was fearsome. The more than 3,000 casualties were decried as excessive and perhaps even unnecessary. The invasion of the Marshalls would be a test for amphibious assault doctrine revised in light of the lessons learned at Tarawa.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands







Adapted from Thomas A. Gleason's map appearing in *Many Waters, Little Land*, Livermore, California: Pathfinder Publications, 1974


OCEANIA
CHINA
Taiwan
Philippine Sea
PHILIPPINES
Manila
Northern Mariana Islands (U.S.)
Saipan
Hagåtña Guam (U.S.)
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
CAROLINE ISLANDS
Koror
PALAU
Palikir
Wake Island (U.S.)
Midway Islands (U.S.)
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (U.S.)
Hawaii
Johnston Atoll (U.S.)
North Pacific Ocean
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Majuro
Kingman Reef (U.S.)
Palmyra Atoll (U.S.)
Bandar Seri Begawan
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
Borneo
INDONESIA
Tarawa
KIRIBATI (GILBERT ISLANDS)
Howland Island (U.S.)
Baker Island (U.S.)
Jarvis Island (U.S.)
Yaren District
NAURU
KIRIBATI
RAWAKI (PHOENIX ISLANDS)
LINE ISLANDS
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Port Moresby
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Honiara
TUVALU
Funafuti
Tokelau (N.Z.)
Wallis and Futuna (FRANCE)
Mata-Utu
SAMOA
Apia
American Samoa (U.S.)
Pago Pago
Cook Islands (N.Z.)
Aitutaki
Rarotonga
Indian Ocean
Coral Sea Islands (AUSTRALIA)
Coral Sea
VANUATU
Port-Vila
FIJI
Suva
TONGA
Nuku'alofa
Niue (N.Z.)
Papeete
SOCIETY ISLANDS
Tahiti
ARCHIPEL DES TUAMOTU
ILES MARQUISES
AUSTRALIA
Darwin
Alice Springs
Townsville
Mount Isa
Mackay
Rockhampton
Gladstone
Brisbane
Gold Coast
Port Hedland
Broome
Geraldton
Kalgoorlie
Perth
Bunbury
Esperance
Albany
Adelaide
Whyalla
Broken Hill
Newcastle
Sydney
Canberra
Wollongong
Melbourne
Geelong
Bendigo
Great Australian Bight
Tasman Sea
New Caledonia (FRANCE)
Noumea
Kingston
Norfolk Island (AUSTRALIA)
KERMADEC ISLANDS (N.Z.)
Arorua
French Polynesia (FRANCE)
ILES TUBUAI
Rapa
Adamstown
Pitcairn Islands (U.K.)
South Pacific Ocean
NEW ZEALAND
North Island
Auckland
Hamilton
Hastings
Wellington
Christchurch
South Island
Dunedin
Invercargill
Stewart Island
CHATHAM ISLANDS (N.Z.)
Hobart
Tasmania
Indian Ocean
Scale: 1:36,000,000 at 30°S
Mercator Projection
500 Kilometers
500 Miles
802830AI (R02111) 10-01

The Colonial Period: Spanish, German and Japanese, 1550-1943

War in the Central Pacific was three dimensional—waged on land, on the sea and in the air. It ranged over enormous distances and took place on tiny coral atolls as well as larger islands. The Central Pacific, one of the last places to be settled by man and the last area to be divided among imperial powers, was one of the first to experience the full ferocity and devastation of 20th century warfare. The fighting between 1943 and 1945 stretched over the islands of Micronesia, from the Gilbert and Marshall Islands in the south and move west through the Caroline Islands and north to the Mariana Islands.

These island chains lie athwart the major sailing routes from the United States to East and Southeast Asia. In 1494, the Treaty of Tordesillas ceded ownership of all of Micronesia to Spain. The Marshalls, being off the main trade routes, received little attention from early European explorers. The first Europeans to reach the region in the 16th century were Spaniards looking for a shorter route to the Spice Islands of Southeast Asia. Garcia de Loyassa sighted what became the Marshalls in 1526 and Alvaro de Saavedra followed him in 1529. In 1542, Ruy Lopez de Villalobos was the first European to report the existence of Kwajalein Atoll. They were followed by others and Spain annexed the islands, along with the Caroline and Mariana Islands in 1686. The Spanish used the island chains as possible way stations for its portion of trade with China and the Spice Islands. The Manila galleon made semi-annual voyages between the west coast of Mexico and the Philippines.

The Marshall and Gilbert Islands slipped out of the European imagination until the 18th century. In 1765, British Commodore John Byron explored a portion of the Gilberts while the rest of the chain was first charted by Captain Thomas Gilbert in 1788. At the same time, Captain John Marshall charted the island chain to the north. The two published the first maps of the region and named the two island chains after themselves. Other Westerners visited most of the other islands between 1799 and 1824. Much mapping was done on Russian expeditions under Adam Johann von Krusenstern (1803) and Otto von Kotzebue (1815 and 1823). Until the 1850s the most frequent visitors were whaling ships' crews. By 1857, Protestant missionaries, notably the Reverend Hiram Bingham, Jr. of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions created a missionary outpost in the Marshalls on Ebon.

In the 1860s Adolph Capelle built the first large-scale trading company in the Marshalls and several other German trading firms begin operations in the Marshalls soon thereafter. In the 1870s, German commercial interests began to expand in the Central Pacific. In 1878, a German naval captain negotiated a treaty with the local rulers that granted special trade privileges to German traders. In 1885, with the aid of Pope Leo XIII, the German government annexed the Marshalls and compensated Spain with $4.5 million. There was friction between British interests in the Gilberts and the Germans in the Marshalls and the two powers reached an accommodation in 1886 when agreements between Britain and

Germany were signed demarcating their respective spheres of influence in the region. Germany established a protectorate that year and established trading stations on Jaluit and Ebon to carry out the flourishing copra (dried coconut meat) trade. Spain sold the rest of her Pacific possessions to Germany, with the exception of Guam, in 1899.

During the German colonial period, phosphate deposits in the islands were discovered and developed and more than 100 missionaries arrived to convert and civilize the Marshallese. Politically, the German protectorate terminated the incessant warfare between the Iroij (high chiefs) of the various clans. This imposed peace froze the relative social positions of the various clans. German rule concentrated on promoting trade with the home country and developing markets for exports. The Germans encouraged the expansion of copra production by developing the local population's craving for imported manufactured goods and processed foods. Politically, the Marshallese Iroij continued to rule under indirect colonial German administration.

The German colonial period abruptly ended in October 1914 when the Japanese sent a naval squadron to invade the islands after they declared war on Germany under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At the same time they also conquered the Mariana and Caroline Islands extending the Japanese Empire further into the Central Pacific. Australia also took German colonies in the Southwest Pacific (on New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago) while New Zealand seized Western Samoa. The war also provided Japan with the opportunity to move into China by conquering the German concession in Qingdao (Shandong Province). In 1915, the Japanese attempted further expansion in China by presenting the republican government with Twenty One Demands, which, if accepted would have made China into a Japanese protectorate. Vigorous protests from the United States and pressure from Great Britain force the Japanese to withdraw most of the demands.

Undeniably the Japanese used World War I to advance its own interests in the Central Pacific and in China. In December 1914, the Japanese government informed the Allies that Japan had already made a substantial contribution to the war effort against Germany and that the Japanese people expected that effort to be rewarded. The price was, of course, the extension of the Japanese Empire into the Central Pacific. The initial Japanese effort concerning the Central Pacific had two stages. The first concluded with the military seizure of the islands from Germany in October 1914. The second took shape after the fall of Jinan in November 1914 and lasted until the Washington treaties of 1922. Its goal, successfully achieved, was the international recognition of the Japanese presence in the Central Pacific.

Although they conquered the islands only in 1914, there was a strong Japanese commercial presence in the Marshalls that dated from the 1890s. Expansion into the Central and South Pacific islands (the South Seas or the Nanyō) was a dream cherished by Japanese expansionists since the 1870s. Japanese commerce with the islands began in 1890. One of the earliest trading companies, the Hioki South Seas Trading Company was founded in 1893 and merged with another, the Murayama Shokai in 1906. The merged company, known as South Sea Trading Company (Nanyō Boeki), was the largest firm in the region under Japanese rule. Under German rule, Japanese traders exported copra and shells to Japan and

imported general merchandise—about 75 percent of all exports to the German possessions in the Central Pacific came from Japan.

Initially placed under military rule, Japanese control of the islands was formalized by the League of Nations in 1920. Japan was granted a Class C mandate over the islands in the Central Pacific, which dictated that the islands be governed for the benefit of their native inhabitants and were to be unfortified i.e., no naval or military installations would be constructed. (Territories in this class were considered to be the most backward, furthest from having the ability to determine their own future.) The goal of the Japanese mandate was to prepare the Marshallese to make their own way in a complex world and to govern themselves or decide who would govern them. The islands' neutralization was further guaranteed by a series of multilateral treaties signed in Washington in 1922.



Imperial Powers in Asia and the Pacific

As a League of Nations mandate, the islands were administered by the South Seas Bureau (Nanyō Chō), a Japanese government agency. While the bureau's director had theoretically wide ranging powers, in practice he was the prisoner of Tokyo's dictates as no important decisions about the islands were taken there. Initially, the Japanese followed German colonial policy, but after 1922, understanding the islands' political and strategic value, policy gained a distinct Japanese flavor.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

The Japanese used more colonial administrators than the Germans. They created a local administrative system on the Japanese model. Marshallese served as local government functionaries on the atoll level. They were policemen, scribes and assistant magistrates and served as public health nurses and headman in the villages. These measures reduced the Iroij's political power but the Japanese administrators did not significantly alter the basis of land tenure in the Marshalls and it seems that the Japanese colonial administration permitted custom to play a role in selecting Marshallese for administrative jobs.

The core of their colonial policy lay in economic development. Japan was more active in promoting economic development than any other colonial power in the Pacific. Copra production was increased as government subsidies increased. Local Japanese trade stores, operated by the Nanyō Boeki purchased the copra and shipped it to Jaluit. Through their stores, these merchants had contact with the company and the villages, serving as general merchants and money brokers as well as suppliers of black market goods, like alcohol. They were able to garner substantial profits from these local businesses. The Japanese government and local merchants also encouraged the production of handicrafts. Markets were identified, village quotas established and incentive awards given to efficient producers.

Both economic and political measure made it plain that the Japanese intent was to govern the islands and derive the maximum benefits from them. The administrative rules indicated that the Japanese wanted to rule as cheaply as possible while extracting the maximum benefit. However, the policies the Japanese implemented did not result in great changes in local political and social patterns and while the Japanese economic policies did influence the local economy, some say that these policies had neither a profound nor a detrimental effect on the Marshallese. It is evident that the Japanese administration was characterized by careful planning, caution and thoroughness.

Japanese and American Prewar Planning, 1904-1938

It has been suggested that the Pacific War was fought between Japan and the United States over who would dominate China. Ultimately, Japanese-American relations during the first forty years of the 20th century foundered on the rock of their irreconcilable differences over the shape of the world that was expressed in their competing China policies, which were based on both countries' illusions about the nature of the Chinese polity.

In the broadest sense, the war that erupted in December 1941 was the result of the emergence of two non-European powers in Asian diplomacy, Japan and the United States. Both made their entry onto the world stage at about the same time—the 1890s. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 upset the old order of local Chinese supremacy in Northeast Asia. The Chinese loss of Taiwan and its outlying islands as well as the end of its suzerainty over Korea signaled the beginnings of Japanese predominance in the region that was to last until 1945. In fact, Chinese foreign policy since then can be seen as a drive to restore China's status.

Beginning in 1895, Japan and the United States emerged as two extra-European powers with interests in Asia. Japanese expansionists had long desired to add the Philippines to the Japanese Empire but were thwarted by the American victory in the Spanish-American War which made the Philippines and Guam American colonies. In turn American war planners were presented with a strategic dilemma after 1899 when the United States took possession of Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines.

When the United States acquired the Philippines in 1899 as its far western border, this shifted that border 7,000 miles to the west of California. American war planners had two choices, either build up American forces in the Philippines to defend the islands or invest in a navy that could fight its way to the islands after the outbreak of war. Not surprisingly, before the First World War, a sizeable faction of Army planners opted for the former solution while Navy planners preferred the latter option. The American army and navy were at minimal strength and there were no bases that could be used outside the continental United States. The remedy for this dilemma began to take shape with the creation of the Pearl Harbor naval base and the fortification of Manila Bay.

As Japan gained strength from the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance and the victory over Russia in 1905, which expanded Japanese interests in Northeastern China (Manchuria), tensions between the United States and Japan were exacerbated by a series of incidents, the San Francisco school segregation case, ending Japanese immigration to Hawaii and anti-Japanese laws passed by state legislatures west of the Rockies. These tensions played a part in the decision to fortify Pearl Harbor in 1904, reinforce the Hawaiian garrison and construct harbor defenses in Honolulu and Manila Bay. Theodore Roosevelt's decision to send the Great White Fleet on a world cruise was, in part, designed to impress the Japanese with American naval strength.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Through World War I, the imperial rivalries in Eastern Asia, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, France and the United States were united against a possible resurgence of the "Yellow Peril," another anti-foreign rebellion in China like the Boxers in 1900. The First Word War and the Versailles Treaty changed the make-up of power in Asia.

Traditional American foreign policy called for a fair field and no favor in commercial relations with China. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Japanese assumed an imperial role in China, seizing for itself the same privileges as the Western imperial powers. During the First World War Japan tried to extend its influence by imposing "Twenty One Demands" on the Chinese Republican government, but was thwarted by American interests. Japan's role as a British ally in the war enabled it to take over the German territorial concession in Shandong. However, the war and the Fourteen Points changed the rules of international relations and a new power constellation emerged in Eastern Asia.

The end of the old diplomacy of imperialism was a result of war which had led to the disappearance of the German and Russian monarchies as well as the weakening of the British Empire. The Bolsheviks in Russia, the Americans, the Chinese and the Japanese were eager to construct a new Asian order conducive to their own interests. Between 1921 and 1931 a series of diplomatic and military initiatives created a new Asian political order, but not until a second world war was fought.

The post-Versailles rules of international relations centered on self-determination and revolution. The military-diplomatic initiatives of the 1920s and 1930s spurred military planning. The American initiative began with the Washington Conferences of 1921-1922. The treaties that emerged from them dealt with naval arms control and the non-fortification of Pacific islands as well as guarantees of Chinese territorial integrity. The naval treaties ended the Anglo-Japanese alliance but left Japan as the dominant naval power in the western Pacific. This American initiative did not solve the major diplomatic problem, what was to become of China. Its failure and the rise of an independent Chinese nationalist movement led to a Soviet initiative.

This Soviet initiative was part of Lenin's colonial strategy—to attack the capitalist West through its Asian colonies. Beginning in 1922, the Communist International began organizing communist parties among Asian nationalists. Sun Yat-sen, the primary organizer of the 1911 Chinese Revolution sought Soviet aid to help him regain power. In 1923, he signed a treaty with the Russians and began receiving Russian arms and advisors. This Soviet initiative resulted in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the beginning of a Chinese civil war and a Northern Expedition to unite the country. In 1927, there was an anti-communist coup and anti-foreign incidents in Nanjing and Jinan. The former resulted in the deaths of several British, American and Japanese citizens and the naval bombardment of the city. The latter resulted in a pitched battle between the Japanese army and the Chinese National Revolutionary Army.

The anti-Communist coup purified the Chinese Nationalist movement and the Northern Expedition nominally united the country under Kuomintang rule. The Chinese initiative, 1928-1931, was primarily diplomatic and legal, concentrating on changing the terms of the

unequal treaties with the West and on internal administrative governmental reform. It foundered on the shoals of the Great Depression.

The Japanese, alarmed by strident anti-Japanese component of Chinese nationalism and by its imperial partners' eagerness to negotiate with the new Chinese government, became estranged. The Great Depression hit Japan particularly hard and the façade of civilian parliamentary rule, in place since 1890, began to crumble in the face of military action. The Japanese initiative concentrated on conquest and the creation of a yen economic zone and the enforcement of a "Japanese Monroe Doctrine" for Eastern Asia. Through the 1930s, the Japanese were unable to defeat the Chinese government and escalated their war to cut the Chinese off from foreign aid. This gradually brought them to an armed confrontation with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

The crisis unfolded gradually between 1931 and 1937 against the backdrop of the Great Depression, the apparent decline of liberal-democratic institutions and civil-military conflict in Japan. The latter culminated in an attempted coup d'etat in 1936.

Over the course of these years, the Japanese Army engaged in an expansionist policy in China that led to the China Incident of 1937. Apparently deceived by the Chinese Civil War between Communists, Nationalists and local militarists, the Japanese Army and government assumed that the Chinese would be unable to unite and mobilize against them.

After the war began in July 1937, the Japanese seized North China and the Yangzi Delta. Surprisingly bitter and protracted Chinese Nationalist resistance around Nanjing after German and Italian mediation attempts failed, did not change the Japanese policy of non-recognition of the Chinese Nationalist government. The war was expanded into Central and Southern China in 1938 and while the regular government armies were defeated, the Chinese government retreated, formed new alliances with warlords and the Communists and looked for outside aid. The Japanese Army found itself drawn deeper into the Chinese interior without any way to exploit its economic gains or to defeat its enemies.

The only political solution the Japanese could devise involved expanding the war, but this, too, had reached a dead end until 1940. The initial attempt to punish the Russians for supporting the Nationalist Chinese failed in 1938 at Changkufeng-Khasan and in 1939 at Nomohan. After France fell, the Japanese invaded northern Vietnam to halt traffic to China along the Haiphong-Kunming railroad and pressured Great Britain to curtail traffic along the Burma Road.

The mounting hostility of the United States, expressed in the practical terms of economic warfare, led the Japanese government to consider taking arms against its sea of troubles and by opposing it, end them. In other words, judging from the shape of the world in the summer of 1940, the Japanese decided that the Rome-Berlin Axis would win the war—liberal democracy as a political system was finished. Concretely, the Japanese began to move in this direction by negotiating a treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy in September 1940 and a treaty of friendship with the Soviets in April 1941.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Japanese military strategy evolved on two different tracks after the country was united in its pursuit of a "rich nation, strong army" in the 1880s. Great students of history, Japanese soldiers and sailors drew upon historical lessons learned, from their own experiences and from those of others. Her wartime strategies concentrated on operations in the areas around Northeast Asia and relied upon the Navy to transport the Army to the theater of operations.

Japan's wartime experiences in 1894-1895, 1900 and 1904-1905 relegated the navy to a supporting role, even though it had tested and proved the efficacy of modern naval weapons in combat. The results of the First World War gave the Japanese armed services pause. The prolonged carnage and bloodletting on the Western Front led to post war debates in all the world's armies over the new face of war. After the war, the Japanese army and navy took divergent paths in war making. The Japanese army, based on its experiences in Siberia and in China, prepared for a continental war. Its planners assumed the war would pit Japan against the Soviet Union. Soviet activities in China during the 1920s reinforced this view as did the aid the USSR provided to the Kuomintang government at the beginning of the China Incident.

After the war, the army, a service that concentrated on infantry and artillery was faced with the dilemma of applying the war's lessons and modernization. This led to protracted internal factional debates that concentrated on the question of whether it would be prudent to modernize at the expense of infantry strength or to invest in ideological training to ensure that Japanese soldiers could defeat their foes through the application of "Japanese spirit." The victory of the strength through spirit faction made the Japanese woefully unprepared to fight a fully industrial war.

The navy also studied the lessons learned of its wars. Its experience in World War I on convoy escort in the Mediterranean, led it to conclude that its primary lesson was to integrate new forms of technology, i.e. the torpedo, the submarine and the airplane, into its tactics. However, it remained tactically wedded to the notion of the decisive naval battle between dreadnoughts. All the new weapons platforms would act as auxiliaries to the battle line, which would seek out the enemy's fleet in a Jutland-style decisive engagement. Japanese warship design reflected an obsession with big guns and speed.

The Japanese Navy's war plans had identified the United States Navy as its most likely adversary since 1908. Initial Japanese plans called for the navy to transport the army to the Philippines where it would seize the islands. It was assumed that the American fleet would sortie from Pearl Harbor to seek a decisive engagement with the Japanese near the Marianas. The Japanese plans assumed there would be a long battle of attrition that would culminate in a decisive victory in the Central Pacific.

American army and navy planners were at loggerheads on specifics but in general agreement about a general wartime strategy. They, too, had been preparing for a war with Japan since 1908. While China was the cornerstone of American foreign policy in East Asia, the lodestone for army and navy war planning was the Philippines.

Prewar Planning, 1904-1938

In preparing for a possible war in the 1920s and 1930s, U.S, Navy and Marine Corps strategists returned to an idea that was propounded before 1914, setting up advanced fleet bases. While the U.S. Navy forced its presumptive maritime strategy on the Army, it grappled with the problem of seizing and protecting these bases. This problem engaged the Marine Corps before the First World War. The Marine Corps' experience before and during World War I convinced the first postwar Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, that its earlier mission of protecting American lives and property overseas was ending and that the future lay in seizing and protecting its advanced fleet bases. His protégés, among them Earl H. Ellis, began to develop plans for taking and holding naval bases in the Central Pacific in a war against Japan.



American interest in the Marshall Islands was stimulated before the Washington (1922) and London (1930) Naval Conferences. However, reports concluded that the Japanese were not engaged in fortifying any of their League of Nations Pacific mandates and were acting in accordance with the treaties they had signed. However, the planners believed that possession of the islands would be invaluable to the United States in its drive to relieve the garrison in the Philippines. War Plan Orange, as it was revised in the mid-1930s, called for the islands' capture.

By the 1930s, as war became more and more likely, planners predicted a protracted, bloody conflict against Japan in which the Philippines would be an early loss. The navy wanted to concentrate on striking across the Central Pacific to the Philippines, meeting the Japanese fleet in the area around the Mariana Islands to fight a decisive battle. The army wanted to withdraw to stronger bases in Hawaii and Panama while holding the area around Manila Bay in the face of a Japanese invasion. Neither the army nor the navy was able to muster enough support in Congress to mount an adequate defense of the

Philippines. This inability, along with the failure to fortify Guam underlined the dilemma the Army and Navy faced in defending American possessions in the Pacific.

Both public opinion and national policy demanded that these insular possessions be defended even though military planners said they could not be held with existing forces. The nation, speaking through Congress, would neither abandon these islands nor would it appropriate adequate monies to ensure their defense. These policies dictated a separation of national objectives and national means.

The Japanese - American Road to War, 1940-1941

By 1940, Japanese policy had reached a dead end—the non-recognition policy was not working; the outside world had not yet abandoned China to Japan. Public opinion in Western nations had turned against Japan and the Japanese army, as strong as it was, was not physically able to control China. There was an active partisan movement, fostered by a 2nd United Front of the Communists and the Kuomintang. The Soviets supplied aid through a military mission while the United States had made it easier for the Chinese to obtain aid from private sources.

Events in Europe in spring 1940 changed Japan's options. The Nazi conquest of the European colonial powers presented Japan with new possibilities. In summer 1940, Japan successfully forced the French Indochinese government to stop allowing Chinese aid to be transported through Haiphong to Yunnan and pressured the British to temporarily halt aid shipments to China on the Burma Road. However, even when tied to the new alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis, and despite the defection of Wang Jingwei to establish a Japanese-sponsored government in Nanjing, the Chinese still would not surrender and British, American and Dutch hostility was unremitting.

The Japanese reaction was to escalate the conflict by continuing to move south. This reaction epitomized Japanese foreign and military policy in that it was unrealistic, inflexible, not part of a larger coordinated political and military plan and obsessed with destroying Chinese nationalism. Japanese war planning to date had been characterized by separate service plans that usually concentrated on two different enemies, with no effort at coordination. Until summer 1941, no one had considered the possibility of Japan having to fight a coalition.

The inability to end the China Incident led to the formation of a new government in July 1940 under the leadership of Prince Konoe Fumimaro. The new government's over-arching goal was creating Japanese sphere of influence in East Asia. This goal would be served by working to eliminate all foreign aid to the Chinese government and adopting a "firm attitude" toward the United States while negotiating closer relations with the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Soviet Union. Further, the Konoe government would pursue its economic ends in the Netherlands East Indies and continue to mobilize the society and economy to prepare for war. Over the course of the year, the Japanese government followed this plan. American economic efforts to discourage Japanese actions were futile. Indeed, the goal of American policy was to take no action that would provoke war with either Germany or Japan because precipitous conflict would find the United States unprepared to wage war—rearmament was just beginning and was given greater urgency after the fall of France.

The Japanese government moved towards its goal through April 1941. It concluded the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, four days after Japanese troops moved to occupy Tonkin. The Konoe government did not see the pact as committing them to war. Instead it believed that this new alliance would aid them in their quest to conquer China by deterring the United States, Great Britain and Holland. They were also hopeful that the Russo-German

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Nonaggression Pact would be used to tempt the Russians toward Iran, India and the Persian Gulf and that German influence would lessen Soviet aid to China. The Konoe government considered that war with the United States and Great Britain would occur only if Japan's national security was in imminent danger. Throughout the period, the Japanese engaged in negotiations with the Dutch to increase their purchases of oil from the East Indies, but were ultimately unsuccessful. In April 1941 the Foreign Minister had negotiated a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union.



The occupation of northern French Indochina and the creation of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis changed the view of the American government toward Japan and the conflict in China. Before September 1940, it had believed that the problems in Europe and Asia were separate and could be treated individually. After September 1940, the Roosevelt Administration realized that Japan had chosen to ally herself with Hitler and Mussolini and that the United States had to speed up its rearmament.

Part and parcel of this policy was moving the United States Fleet to Pearl Harbor from San Pedro, California. The move, a political one made to deter the Japanese and show American interest in the Pacific, was made over the objections of the fleet commander, Admiral J.O. Richardson. He believed that the move to Pearl Harbor was wrong because it distracted the Navy from its Western Hemisphere defense positions and because Pearl Harbor

was at the end of a long logistics lifeline. The base facilities on the American mainland were better equipped to succor the fleet. He also pointed out that Pearl Harbor was too congested for a fleet anchorage. Admiral Richardson was relieved in February 1941 and the United States Fleet was renamed the Pacific Fleet and it remained at Pearl Harbor.

Although the fleet had been in Hawaii since annexation, the use of Pearl Harbor as a fleet port meant that it could be improved. In the year following the fall of France, the civilian labor force at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard doubled and naval personnel stationed there increased exponentially. Construction of a new dry dock began, foundries were improved and machine and tool shops were established while the Navy purchased more of the surrounding land for further expansion. The year 1940-1941 saw the Navy Yard become almost independent of the mainland in several crucial areas.

Nevertheless, the American government adopted a policy that would avoid an open struggle with Japan in the Pacific, but that the policy in effect since 1931 and 1937 would remain: the United States would maintain its treaty rights in East Asia continue its economic pressure on Japan and continue to aid China.

Despite its isolationist foreign policy, the United States had acted in concert with allies in Asia since the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Informal staff conversations between the United States Navy and the Royal Navy began after the China Incident began and Japan joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1937. It was informally and tentatively decided that an American fleet at Pearl Harbor would cooperate with a British fleet stationed at Singapore.

These conversations were picked up again in May 1939 when war in Europe appeared imminent. The British informed the U.S. Naval War Plans division that given the need to counter the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy would not be able to send a battle fleet to Singapore. In this light, it was asked that the U.S. Navy undertake the defense of the Malay Barrier.

The disagreements continued. In staff conversations held in 1940-1941, the U.S. Navy's war planners resisted the British call for American aid to defend Malaya and Singapore. While the British believed that Singapore was vital to defending the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand, the Americans did not believe the base could be held if the Japanese occupied southern Indochina and established air bases there. The talks broke off in a stalemate, with each side agreeing to disagree—Great Britain believed it was fundamental to hold Singapore while the United States believed it was fundamental to hold the Pacific Fleet intact. These talks further informally committed the United States to hold Europe as the decisive theater of operations. Germany would be defeated first, while operations against Japan would be defensive in nature. The main problem was to define a plan to safeguard Malaya, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies—this was not accomplished.

By July 1941 much had changed but much remained the same. American planners had a strategy to protect American interests in the Western Hemisphere and to concentrate on defeating Germany first if war came. The German invasion of Russia had not changed American policy or options. The Japanese faced a dilemma.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Despite their success in French Indochina, their strategic and tactical dilemma had not altered. China was still implacably hostile, the Dutch, aided by the United States, would not sell them increased amounts of petroleum products and American economic restrictions on exports and influence in South America were making it impossible to stockpile strategic materials. By July 1941, the Japanese government was rapidly approaching a point of decision. The beginning of the Russo-German war caused them to re-evaluate their policy. Despite the rapid German gains, the Japanese decided they would not enter the war on Germany's side and invade Russia through Siberia. Instead they chose to continue their policies toward China, the United States and Southeast Asia.

To further isolate China, Japan presented an ultimatum to the French colonial government of Indochina on 19 July 1941. On July 25, 1941, the Japanese army moved into southern Indochina, occupying air and naval bases. The immediate American response was to freeze Japanese assets in the United States. This effectively ended Japanese purchases of materials, paid for in American dollars, from the United States, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. In effect, the United States began an economic blockade of Japan. This action galvanized the Japanese government and it began to consider the possibility of conflict with the United States, Great Britain and Holland.

The actions of July 1941 also changed American military strategy. Previously, the goal had been to avoid war with the Japanese and remain on the defensive if war occurred. In July, a military aid mission was sent to China to assess the needs of the Chinese army and air force. By August, after freezing Japan's American assets and imposing an oil embargo, the Untied States began to strengthen its forces in the Philippines by calling the Philippine army into American service, sending more troops to the country and making the major reinforcement air power—bombers.

It was still hoped that the Japanese would be deterred by this display of American strength. However, the Japanese believed they were pushed into a corner and their national existence was at stake. The repeated American negotiating position of (1) respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations, (2) noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, (3) equality of commercial opportunity and (4) maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific except as it may be changed through peaceful means, while true to U.S. foreign policy since 1898, seemed to be the height of hypocrisy to the Japanese government. This implicitly meant that all territorial gains and indeed, Japanese policy, since 1931 were null and void. Aside from patriotic and nationalist considerations, the volatile nature of civil-military relations in Japan and the renewed power of the army made it impossible for Japan to satisfy these conditions.

The Japanese army and navy began to plan for war seriously in August 1941. They saw the issue as one of national survival because they believed the economic embargo the United States had placed on Japan would lead to economic strangulation within two years. In the fall, Japan's minimum demands of the United States and Great Britain were formulated within the government. They included recognition of Japan's pre-eminent position in East Asia, the closing of the Burma Road and the cessation of all aid to China, recognizing

Japan's "special position" in Indochina and Thailand as well as resuming trade with Japan. In return, the Japanese were prepared to use Indochinese bases only against the Chinese, withdraw from Indochina after peace had been negotiated with China and guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

As the diplomatic plans were finalized, the military plans were formulated. By October, the army and navy agreed that the immediate objectives were the petroleum products of the Netherlands East Indies and rubber, tin and copper of Malaya. After the navy neutralized the American fleet at Pearl Harbor and these positions occupied it would be very hard for the Japanese to be dislodged. The planners believed they would fight a limited war for limited gains and that after the initial conflict, there would be a negotiated settlement. Their implicit assumption was that the worst possible case involved Japanese defeat in a limited war.

In October, it was obvious in both Washington and Tokyo that a crisis was rapidly approaching. The Japanese felt pressured by American actions and their diplomatic attempts foundered on American intransigence. The Prime Minister, Prince Konoe negotiated with the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries for a renewal of negotiations after the latest American rejection of the Japanese proposals. The War Minister, General Tojo Hideki, refused and the Konoe government fell on 16 October 1941. On the 18th, General Tojo was appointed Prime Minister.

An Imperial Liaison Conference on 1 November 1941 confirmed the decisions taken in September. However, it gave its sanction to two new negotiating positions that would be proposed the Secretary of State Cordell Hull. A second special envoy would be sent to Washington to present them. They were designated Proposal A and Proposal B. The first amended and already rejected negotiating position. It proposed the following: (1) Japanese troops would be withdrawn from French Indochina and China after a peace treaty had been signed by the Chinese, (2) Japanese troops would occupy "certain areas" of China for 25 years, (3) the Japanese government would divorce itself from concerted action with Rome and Berlin and (4) Japan would not discriminate in trade matters as long as she was not the victim of discrimination. If the United States rejected the first proposal the second would be offered. It called for (1) Japan to withdraw its troops from southern Indochina immediately and from northern Indochina after a peace treaty had been signed with China, (2) American non-interference with the Japanese peace negotiations with China, (3) American cooperation with Japan to facilitate its exploitation of the Netherlands East Indies resources and (4) end the American oil embargo.



The Eastern Mandates Campaign

The proposals were presented in November 1941. The American negotiators realized that rejecting both plans could be taken as a casus belli and would precipitate war. However, accepting either one would negate American foreign policy in Asia since 1900 and acquiesce to making the region a Japanese sphere of influence. Instead a *modus vivendi* was prepared in which the U.S. offered to modify its economic restrictions by permitting trade in cotton and medical supplies and a limited amount of oil if the Japanese would withdraw from southern Indochina, reduce the number of troops in the north. In addition, both nations would not use force to advance their interests in Asia and the Pacific. However, after a discussion about its possible effects on Great Britain, China, Holland and Australia, it was decided that the possible gains were outweighed by the impression of appeasement. The subsequent reply did not mention the proposal.

The American rejection of the Japanese proposals meant that the Japanese made a decision for war on 1 December after long and acrimonious discussions. It was reached despite overt warnings and the feeling within parts of the Imperial Japanese Navy that it would be a futile undertaking. However, the consensus among the Japanese leadership was that too much blood and treasure had been invested in the China Incident for Japan to tamely withdraw in the face of American displeasure and hostility. If Japan was to act it had to act decisively before the United States was able to finish mobilizing its social and economic resources. A limited war ending in a stalemate was their most preferred outcome and they believed a loss in a limited war would not be catastrophic. Each side underestimated the others' determination. In conversations with Admiral Nomura, the special envoy sent to negotiate in October, Admiral Harold Stark warned that war would break the Japanese Empire. While the Japanese would grow weaker, unable to make up their losses, the United States "will grow stronger as time goes on. It is inevitable that we shall crush you before we are through with you."

Wartime Actions and Planning, 1941-1943

The speed and the daring of the Japanese onslaught that began in December 1941 took the allies by surprise. By April 1942, the Japanese controlled all the lands and waters stretching from Burma to the Solomon Islands. In fact, the Japanese offensive had gone better than expected. The Japanese planners expected much stiffer resistance—they had thought it would take between four and five months to conquer Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies and an additional six months to repair the oil fields and provide petroleum for wartime purposes. Instead resistance collapsed in relatively short order and the oil field equipment was hardly damaged by scorched earth tactics.

These successes speeded up the Japanese war plan, but did not change its basic goal. The Japanese Army and Navy would (1) move immediately into the lower Solomon Islands and New Guinea to control the Coral Sea and its environs, (2) seize Midway and the Aleutian Islands to precipitate a decisive engagement with the American fleet and (3) capture New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa to sever the lines of supply and communication between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Admiral Yamamoto's goal was to engage the American fleet, defeat it and control the air and sea-lanes in the Central and Eastern Pacific. Japanese naval planners that they would have to annihilate the American fleet in 1942 and end the war then or, based on the naval expansion acts, face an overwhelming U.S. fleet in 1943-1944. Their attempt to satisfy the first goal resulted in the Battle of the Coral Sea, American resistance to the second goal caused the Battle of Midway and the third goal was never reached.



The Eastern Mandates Campaign

The Battle of the Coral Sea resulted in a Japanese tactical victory but a strategic victory for the United States. The Japanese invasion force scheduled to occupy Port Moresby and threaten northern Australia was turned back although the Japanese occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal was unopposed. The Japanese advance was blunted but only turned aside. The victory gave the Australians and Americans breathing room to consider new possibilities (which eventually resulted in the attrition campaign on New Guinea and in the Solomons), but in truth all depended on thwarting the Japanese move to seize Midway and destroy the American fleet in a decisive battle.

The object of the Midway attack was to draw the American fleet into a decisive battle with the Japanese navy. After the victory, the Japanese assumed they would be able to occupy Hawaii and gain control of the Eastern Pacific. The Japanese plan was complicated as it consisted of three mutually supported but separate actions, (1) occupying the Western Aleutians, (2) occupying Midway and (3) a fleet action. If the United States played its part in the Japanese script, as it had been doing for most of the previous six months, a victory was assured. The story of Midway is well known and does not have to be gone into in detail. The American victory at Midway upset the Japanese timetable and was the first irrevocable defeat the Japanese had suffered. The losses in ships would be made up eventually but the loss of trained manpower was a blow from which the Japanese would not recover. Nonetheless, the Midway victory gave the United States an opportunity to go on the offensive in the Pacific in a defensive manner.

The transition to this defensive offensive was hindered by dividing the Pacific Theater into two commands, a political move designed to short circuit domestic political criticism of the conduct of the war in the Pacific and Army-Navy rivalry. It did not materially aid the prosecution of the war in the Pacific as it resulted in two commands creating two plans to get to Japan.

The two commands were the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) commanded by General MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) commanded by Admiral Nimitz. The SWPA consisted of Australia, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and the adjacent waters. The POA consisted of all land and bodies of water south of the Bering Strait, west of the continental United States, north of the South Pole and east of SWPA. Admiral Nimitz further divided his command into three areas, (1) the North Pacific (NORPAC), north of 42° degrees latitude, (2) the South Pacific (SOPAC), south of the Equator and east of the SWPA and (3) the Central Pacific (CENPAC), north of the Equator to 42° north latitude. The major island groups in the Central Pacific area were the Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island, part of the Gilbert Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, the Mariana Islands, the Bonin (Volcano) Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and the Japanese archipelago.

The offensive launched against the Japanese in the Solomons and New Guinea was designed to forestall a renewed offensive against Australia and the sea lanes connecting the United States to Australia and New Zealand. The decision taken to launch an offensive in the Southwest Pacific was done to mollify the Australians and General MacArthur. (The

trigger was the discovery that the Japanese had begun to build an airstrip on Guadalcanal.) The latter's ambitious plan to advance through the Bismarck Sea to Rabaul was rejected as too risky—although Japan had been beaten at Midway, the Japanese Navy and Army were still powerful. While the number of Japanese aircraft carriers had been diminished, the power of their land-based aviation was not affected by Midway. The attrition battles waged in New Guinea and in the Solomons over six months (August 1942 - February 1943) resulted in a bloody stalemate. Allied forces (American and Australian) advanced up the ladder of the Solomons and westward across the New Guinea coast, but the way was slow and hard. While the Japanese were unable to exercise strategic and tactical initiative, neither were the allies. As the Japanese were bled of men and ships, American strength was increasing.

At Casablanca in January 1943, Admiral Ernest King argued that the Allies were engaging the Japanese in four distinct regional Pacific fronts, (1) in the Aleutians, (2) in and around Midway, (3) in the South and Southwest Pacific and (4) in China-Burma-India. King argued that the successes in the Southwest Pacific called for a new strategy.

Several possibilities presented themselves, advance through the Aleutians directly into northern Japan, invade the Netherlands East Indies or attack the Philippines. King stated that attacking the Philippines would cut Japan off from the resources in both Malaya and the Indies. Of these, isolating Japan from the petroleum of the Netherlands East Indies would be decisive. The question of how to get to the Philippines also had three possibilities, a northern route to Luzon through the Aleutians, a southern route easily outflanked by the Japanese or a direct thrust into the Central Pacific. King argued for the latter route going directly to the Philippines through the Gilberts, Marshalls, the Carolines and the Marianas and from there to the Chinese mainland to strike at Japan itself. In essence, he restated the prewar War Plan Orange. General Marshall also agreed that such a plan would keep the Japanese off balance and prevent them from exercising the initiative in the Pacific.

Predictably the British objected claiming that devoting new resources to the Pacific would detract from the primary effort of defeating Germany. King replied that resources already allocated to that theater would handle the offensive in the Pacific. He said it would be possible to mount offensives in Burma, in the Southwest and in the Central Pacific by husbanding and shuttling resources between the different fronts. The British acquiesced to the American proposal. It was decided that the Aleutians would be secured, the advance in the Southwest Pacific would be continued and an offensive would be mounted in the Central Pacific.

At the same time the Navy was preparing plans for an offensive in the Central Pacific, the Army, under General MacArthur was also preparing its plans for the eventual reconquest of the Philippines. The SWPA planners argued for an advance to seize Rabaul based on converging movements from New Guinea and New Britain in the west and the Solomons and New Ireland in the east.

For the Navy the Central Pacific route to the Philippines was the wisest, but for MacArthur, the Central Pacific drive was not prudent. MacArthur concluded, following received opinion, that it would have to be made without land based air support and therefore

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

demand a heavy cost in Naval assets as well as a reorientation of the front. Instead, MacArthur argued that after the capture of Rabaul the SWPA forces should advance west along the north coast of New Guinea and then assault the coast of Mindanao in the Philippines. The Palaus would be neutralized and the Banda and Arafura Seas would protect the flanks of the advance.

Both MacArthur and Nimitz prepared plans for the remainder of 1943 that would use the ships that were beginning to join the fleet. MacArthur's staff was also placing the finishing touches on another, more comprehensive plan for the remainder of the war in the Pacific which was presented at the March 1943 Pacific Military Conference.



MacArthur's plan argued for a two axis advance against Rabaul, one going through New Guinea and New Britain on the west and the other through the Solomons and New Ireland on the east, culminating in a converging assault on Rabaul. MacArthur's plan called for 22⅔ divisions of troops and 45 groups of aircraft. Together, the South and Southwest Pacific could muster only 15⅔ trained divisions and had a shortage of transport and aircraft. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to scale back the plans. Rabaul would not be taken. Instead, MacArthur would proceed up New Guinea, capture western New Britain and drive through the Solomons to southern Bougainville. Cutting back MacArthur's scope of operations made a drive through the Central Pacific the more likely avenue of approach. By March 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were about to decide if the axis of advance was to be in MacArthur's or Nimitz's theater. However, final judgment would be made at the Trident Conference in Washington in May 1943.

The Trident Conference discussed the various courses of action against the Japanese. The over-all objective was to obtain bases in the Western Pacific that could be used to force Japan to surrender either by air and sea blockade or by a combination of blockade and invasion. The northern approach through the Kuriles was discarded because of the persistent bad weather in the Kuriles-Aleutians area and because Siberia could not be used as a base for operations against Japan until the Russians entered the Pacific War. The southern route, with its long supply and communications lines, through the Palaus could be easily outflanked by the Japanese as long as they retained their strength in what they perceived as the major theater in the Pacific—New Guinea.

Since the planners believed that neither the Bonins, Okinawa nor Taiwan offered a suitable base for the invasion of Japan, a base in China must be acquired and Hong Kong appeared to be the most suitable location. Even if the British could retake Singapore and the Straits of Malacca, it would not necessarily shorten the supply routes necessary for a Japanese invasion. If a single line of advance was adopted, the Japanese may be able to concentrate their forces against it—and use their forces to launch flank attacks against Allied forces.

The only plausible solution that suggested itself to the Navy planners was to strike along the central route and seize key positions in the Gilberts, the Marshalls and the Carolines. If it was combined with an Army advance through the Solomons and New Guinea, the Japanese would be kept guessing about Allied intentions. Additionally, the drive through the Central Pacific would at least follow an outline of a plan with which the Army and Navy were familiar and would use the new ships joining the fleet.

Therefore, the JCS directed Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans to seize strategic points in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Based on the experience gained in the SWPA and in North Africa, the JCS believed that the Gilberts must be seized before an invasion of the Marshalls could be contemplated. Air mastery, using bases in the Gilberts for photo reconnaissance and bombing missions, was a prerequisite for invading the Marshalls.

The advance into the Central Pacific was fraught with unknowns and difficulties. In 1943, both strategists and tacticians believed it would be risky to risk amphibious task forces beyond the range of land-based aircraft. They believed that shore-based bombers had sunk the Japanese aircraft carriers at Midway and the experience in the Solomons re-emphasized the necessity of land-based air cover. The island chains in the Central Pacific lay far beyond the range of land planes. However, the aircraft carrier advocates believed that the new *Essex*-class carriers, the *Independence*-class light carriers and escort carriers could provide enough air power to isolate the islands chosen for invasion and repel any attempted Japanese counter-strikes. At the same time, the ships for transporting and landing the troops were beginning to join the fleet. The organizations formed in summer 1943 existed largely as blueprints, waiting to be filled with men and equipment. Nevertheless, planning and training for the invasion of the Gilberts began that summer. Army, Navy and Marine planners and leaders would follow John Paul Jones's dictum of doing the best you can with what you have. They were motivated by a sense of urgency since the invasion would take place in November. Neither aircraft carrier operations nor amphibious assault were proven military

methods at the time. Thus far, escort carriers had not proved very effective in the Pacific and experience with aircraft carrier operations had exposed shortcomings in tactics, protection and their employment.

The Army and Navy also faced unprecedented logistical problems in waging war in the Central Pacific. After the round-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet (1907-1909) the Navy began to build destroyer and submarine tenders, as well as repair and supply ships to ensure a certain amount of independence from navy yards. The trend was accelerated after the success in using tenders in World War I to repair convoy escorting destroyers in the Atlantic. After the war, the Navy established a Service Force to provide mobile logistical support to the fleet. The idea for this kind of force goes back to the beginning of the 20th century when Navy foresaw it would need ships to accompany the fleet to provide it with navy yard services as part of a mobile base force.

By 1943, it was apparent that the movement across the Pacific could not be supported by advance bases because they would take too long to build. In order to fight the Pacific War, the Army and Navy needed mobile logistics bases. The closest advance base to the Gilberts and the Marshalls was Pearl Harbor, 2-3,000 miles to the east. The new service forces must be able to supply an amphibious force unprecedented in size in an area without large land masses, labor, supplies or any other facilities. The mobile service force had to supply food, fuel, medicine, construction material, clothing, ammunition and small luxuries to troops spread out over an enormous area, it would be the logistical equivalent of an aircraft carrier. The extended campaign in the Gilberts and the Marshalls would be the first combat test of amphibious assault; fast carrier doctrine and the strategy of seizing strategically placed atolls in the Central Pacific and the new fleet service force.

The First Test of Amphibious Assault: Tarawa

The test began on 20 November 1943 as American forces invaded Makin and Tarawa Atolls (Operation Galvanic), opening a series of amphibious operations in the Central Pacific. Air and naval gunfire bombardment preceded and closely supported assault teams while local aerial supremacy had already been achieved. At both atolls, landing forces were beset with supply difficulties and communications failures. Of the two, the landings at Tarawa were more difficult. Although it took two weeks for the Marines to secure the atoll and hand it over the Advanced Base Commander, the most difficult fighting ended in 96 hours.



The 2nd Marine Division's main landings took place on Betio Island, located at the southwest tip of Tarawa atoll, where the airfield and the main enemy forces were located. The landings were made with great difficulty and with very heavy casualties. The transports arrived south of the assigned area and came under fire of the previously alerted enemy at 0507. While the transports moved north out of range of enemy guns, the warships attempted to neutralize the enemy positions.

The gunfire support ships, three battleships, four cruisers and accompanying destroyers, fired on the island for two and a half hours. The Navy expected that the 3,000 tons of shells fired would have destroyed the defenses and left the defenders dazed and disoriented. No one realized how effective coconut log bunkers shielded by coral sand were in absorbing shell fire. Although more gunfire supplemented by aerial bombardment should have been used, the shelling destroyed the above ground installations and communications.

Aircraft delivered brief strikes before the troops landed but the troops landed ten minutes after the strikes ceased. As an aside, the ammunition the planes fired at the positions did not

penetrate the coconut log revetments. Given that respite, the Marines landed under direct fire, many wading from the partly exposed reef that fringes the coast because there were not enough amphibious tractors to carry them over the reef. When they reached shore, landing teams became intermingled and disorganized.

Landings were made on three adjacent beaches (Red Beaches 1, 2 and 3, from west to east) on the northwest coast. The assault force landing on Red Beach 1 gained a beachhead on the northwest tip of the island but was isolated there. In the center, assault battalion was pinned down by enemy fire on Red Beach 2. The Marines discovered that their rifles and hand grenades had little effect on the Japanese machine gun positions and pill boxes. They began attacking with flame throwers (of which there were not enough) and blocks of explosive used like hand grenades. The regimental reserve was committed to the assault by 1030. This unit arrived at the beach at approximately noon, having had to wade across the reef and suffered heavy casualties. By late afternoon, half the division's reserve had been committed to the fight. That evening there were approximately 5,000 men ashore and they had suffered 1,500 killed and wounded. Fortunately, the counterattacks that were expected after nightfall failed to materialize and the meager gains were held.



On 21 November, the rest of the division's reserve was landed and the Marines continued to meet grim opposition but strengthened their hold on the island assisted by aircraft, artillery and naval gunfire. The reinforcements that were landed brought the total number of battalions ashore to seven. Artillery and naval gunfire directed against Betio's eastern end prevented the enemy from escaping to the next island.

The next day, the Japanese on Betio underwent heavy air, naval and artillery bombardment as the battle for the island continued. The enemy was brought under cross fire as artillery was emplaced on Bairiki, the neighboring island. One Marine battalion drove east along the south coast, continuing to advance to the eastern end of the airfield. By the end of the day, the enemy was compressed into the eastern part of Betio and retained a pocket between Red Beaches 1 and 2. During the night of 22-23 November, the Marines repelled the Japanese counterattacks.

On 23 November, Marine units reached the end of Betio shortly after 1300 and the end of organized resistance on Betio was reported at 1330. The Marines then proceeded to secure

the rest of the islands in Tarawa Atoll. On 24 November, two of the division's regiments left for Hawaii. On 28 November, the atoll was completely secured. Marine casualties on Tarawa totaled 3,301 while the Japanese losses were estimated to be 4,690 killed, 17 captured and 129 Koreans taken prisoner. On 4 December, the Marines turned the island over to the Advanced Base Commander. During December 1943 and January 1944, air bases were constructed in the Gilberts.

The Navy and Marines made three principal mistakes. First, the naval bombardment that was not long, heavy or accurate enough. Second, the air support immediately before the landings was poorly timed and the naval aviators provided the Marines with inadequate close air support. Finally, there were not enough amphibious tractors to move the entire landing force over the reef and those that were available easily broke down. The errors in timing and the communications difficulties were the result of matériel shortcomings and the training deficiencies that one would expect to occur in so big an amphibious force. The detailed after action reports and post-mortems, pointing out flaws in performance and suggesting remedies, began flowing into the Amphibious force Headquarters in Pearl Harbor before the end of November.

The naval gunfire and air support parts of the assault failed to function properly. Although 3,000 tons of naval shells were fired at Betio, an island less than half a mile square, the bulk of it before the landings on the morning of 20 November, it did not have the desired effect since the wrong mix of explosives was used. After Tarawa, naval gunfire experts made duplicates of Japanese fortifications on Hawaiian gunnery ranges to determine the best types of munitions needed to destroy them.

Naval gunnery officers also determined the differences between destructive fire and neutralizing fire. The former called for pinpoint accuracy, while the latter would be obtained with a large amount of explosives saturating a large area. In addition, destructive fire also called for using large numbers of armor-piercing and base-fused shells. Neutralizing fire would be used to isolate parts of the battlefield after landing to prevent the Japanese from moving reinforcements to areas under attack.

The most obvious need was for pilots who were better trained for close air support. The navy airmen were shocked by the number of Marine casualties into a better understanding of the importance of close air support missions. Pilots were better trained in this mission and studies done to determine the best types of bombs to use against above ground and underground installations. High explosives were used to destroy buildings and rip up camouflage and undergrowth.

Beach defenses were investigated and it was determined that a method to destroy underwater beach obstacles before the invasion began must be found. The task was beyond the capabilities of naval gunfire support and this fact stimulated the creation of underwater demolition teams, first conceived of in the 1920s.

The battle at Tarawa showed it was possible to neutralize and destroy beach defenses and lay down rolling barrages using naval gunfire. Another lesson learned was to keep the

barrage moving just ahead of the landing troops and along their flanks. The Navy and Marines recognized the need for ships to provide close gunfire support. Landing craft armed with rockets assisted destroyers in this work. The Navy also discovered that destroyers were necessary to give barrage and close-in gunfire support. This discovery led to providing destroyers with more high explosive shells as well as antiaircraft ammunition. The small ships were also required to close within 40-mm range of the shore to provide gunfire support.

One of the most important lessons learned was the need for more amphibian tractors to get the assault troops over the fringing reef of the atoll. The Marines found that the assault lost its momentum not because there was insufficient gunfire support but because there were insufficient numbers of amphibian tractors to get the assault troops to the beach quickly.

Besides the more effective application of naval gunfire and air power, logistics lessons were also learned. It became obvious that better communications were a key to better logistics as well as exploiting tactical advantages. Although new types of ships, designed as amphibious landing command ships were joining the fleet, they were not a panacea. Additionally, portable communications equipment had to be improved—it had to be lighter and waterproof and shock resistant. Communications specialists had to be assigned to fire control parties, air liaison groups and beachhead logistical parties were needed to prevent needless missteps and keep the flow of supplies and information constant and timely.

The Marines also learned that infantrymen had to become adept at skills normally associated with combat engineers and that teamwork between infantry, armor, artillery, flamethrowers and demolitions experts was crucial in isolating and destroying Japanese strong points. The infantryman's vulnerability also spurred developing armored amphibian tractors that could serve as moving strong points in the initial phases of the assault.

The experience on Tarawa helped refine intelligence gathering mechanisms, improved training methods and pointed out the need for better vehicles for crossing reefs. The Tarawa battle pointed up the flaws in amphibious assault doctrine as it had been practiced to that time. The assault on Betio became a textbook example for future landings. The lessons learned were priceless. Although the losses were relatively high, the more than 3,000 casualties suffered by the Navy and Marine Corps were comparatively light when compared to later engagements in the Marianas or Iwo Jima or Okinawa. Tarawa set the in place advance air bases for the attack on Kwajalein, and provided a number of tactical lessons that would be applied to future amphibious operations against fortified positions. The Gilberts had to be seized in order to capture the Marshalls.

The Marshalls Decided On

On September 22, 1943 Nimitz handed Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance the preliminary study he had presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Spruance began studying two alternatives to Nimitz's course of action, both calling for a simultaneous assaults on three atolls, Maloelap, Wotje, and either Mille or Kwajalein. By October 12, 1943 Nimitz's planning staff issued an operation plan for the Marshalls invasion code named Flintlock, but had not selected specific objectives. Then within two days he decided to employ the 7th Infantry Division against Wotje and Maloelap and the 4th Marine Division and the 22nd Marines against Kwajalein. He then fixed January 1, 1944 as the target date for storming Wotje and Maloelap and proposed an attack on Kwajalein the following day. General Holland Smith of the V Amphibious Corps then directed his staff to prepare an estimate of the situation based on these preliminary plans. Smith's staff believed that the likeliest course of action was a simultaneous strike at Wotje and Maloelap, holding the Kwajalein assault troops in reserve. Then, as the need for reinforcements passed, the conquest of the third objective would begin. The invasion of Tarawa and the ensuing battle interrupted this planning.

By the beginning of December, the planners began to integrate the lessons learned from Tarawa into the planning of Operation Flintlock. Perhaps the most significant lesson learned was the need to use naval gunfire to destroy specific enemy positions along with neutralizing fire from naval guns. The second conclusion Admiral Turner and General Smith reached was that there were insufficient forces to take Kwajalein immediately after the landings on Wotje and Maloelap.

By 1 December 1943, Nimitz had an idea that took his staff completely by surprise. Instead of the more cautious approach, Nimitz recommended that the invasion of the Marshalls be accomplished by a simultaneous seizure of Kwajalein; Maloelap, and Wotje Atolls. Nimitz argued that since these three atolls contained 65 percent of the enemy aircraft in the Marshalls, the other 35 percent could be neutralized from Kwajalein. Then, in another surprise move Nimitz proposed bypassing Wotje and Maloelap and concentrating all available forces against Kwajalein. This radical revision led all the Central Pacific commanders, with the exception of two members of Nimitz's personal staff, Rear Admirals Forrest P. Sherman and Charles H. McMorris, to oppose the revised plan.

Despite these objections Nimitz informed the Joint Chiefs of his changed plan and on December 14th received their final approval. He then directed Spruance to devise a plan to assault Roi as well. Alternative objectives assigned included Maloelap and Wotje. D-Day was set for 18 January 1944, but four days later Nimitz requested Admiral King to allow him to move his invasion date to January 31st because he was concerned about the lack of training given his assault troops and the need to make repairs to the carriers U.S.S. *Saratoga*, *Princeton*, and *Intrepid*. Admiral Turner was still worried. While additional forces were allocated, including the 106th Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Infantry Division, he was still worried about the readiness of the various units. Turner therefore, requested the D-Day

date moved to February 10, 1944 to complete the additional training. The Joint Chiefs refused, ordering operations to begin no later than 31 January 1944.



On 20 December 1943 Nimitz issued Flintlock II which combined the work of the two staffs. Carrier aircraft, land based bombers and surface ships would shell the Japanese bases on Wotje and Maloelap and if necessary the carriers would also launch air strikes to help the land based aircraft neutralize Mille, Jaluit, Kusaie, and Eniwetok. While the primary land objectives still remained Roi and Kwajalein, the secondary target of Majuro Atoll was also included. Spruance believed that making Majuro an objective would allow the United States to provide land based air cover for shipping moving into the attack on Kwajalein. Additionally, if Kwajalein turned into a protracted operation it would provide a protected anchorage. While the geography of the Gilberts allowed the fleet to refuel at sea without the danger of submarine attack, the more restricted waters around the Marshalls allowed for a greater opportunity for submarine interdiction. Thus, Majuro was made a target that was to be assaulted by Tactical Group I, 22nd Marines and the 106th Infantry.

Organization and Command of Operation Flintlock

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded all the forces assigned to Flintlock and were designated as the Fifth Fleet. Spruance's fleet was divided into following Task Forces (TF): TF 51, Joint Expeditionary Task Force commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, TF 58, Fast Carrier Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher and TF 57, Defense Forces and Land Based Air, commanded by Rear Admiral John H. Hoover.

While Admiral Spruance accompanied the Joint Expeditionary Force to the Marshalls, he would not assume tactical command unless the force came under attack by the Japanese Navy. Admiral Turner's primary mission was to carry the assault force to the objective and get them safely ashore.

Admiral Turner divided his Joint Expeditionary Force into a Southern Attack Force (TF 52), commanded by himself and a Northern Attack Force (TF 53) commanded by Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly. A Majuro Attack Group commanded by Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill accompanied the Reserve Force (which was later redesignated the Eniwetok Expeditionary Group). Captain Harold B. Sallada commanded Headquarters, Supporting Aircraft, the element responsible for providing air support and finally the Army and Marine assault troops were commanded by Major General Holland M. Smith.

Admiral Turner had 297 vessels directly assigned to his command. These consisted of two new amphibious command ships, seven old battleships, 11 aircraft carriers of various classes, 12 cruisers, 75 destroyers and destroyers escorts, 46 transports, 27 cargo vessels, 5 landing ship docks, and 45 landing ship tanks. Operationally, Turner would exercise tactical control until the amphibious phase was complete and the troops were ashore. After the 7th Infantry Division landed on Kwajalein and the 4th Marine Division on Roi-Namur General Smith would assume the role of Corps Commander and retain it until capture and occupation of the objectives were completed.

Smith's authority was limited, he could not make major changes in the tactical plan nor order unscheduled landings without Turner's express permission. Included within the two assault divisions, the 7th Infantry Division and 4th Marine Division were the 106th Infantry, 22nd Marines, 1st and 15th Marine Defense Battalions, Marine Headquarters and Service Squadron 31 and several Army and navy units to help develop and garrison the atolls once they were captured.

The tiny islands of Roi-Namur, connected with a causeway, were the targets of the Northern Attack Force and 4th Marine Division while the Southern Attack Force and the 7th Infantry Division would strike Kwajalein. Admirals Turner and Conolly commanded the assault forces through the respective landing force commander until the latter determined his troops had made lodgment. Once that had been accomplished, the landing force commander assumed command ashore. The only exception was the Majuro landing. Admiral Hill, the

attack group commander, remained in total control of the Majuro operation until Admiral Spruance declared the atoll captured.

Before the invasion efforts were made to gather intelligence. Since the Japanese held the islands for 25 years and had been secretive about all their holdings it was assumed elaborate defenses were in place. Initial assessments of the first intelligence photos received were completed by November 26, 1943. Carrier planes also took extensive photographs during their raids on the Marshalls on December 4th and the results of pilot debriefings disseminated. Aerial photograph reconnaissance continued throughout December and January until two days before the assault. In addition, the submarines U.S.S. *Seal* and *Tarpon* carried out reconnaissance missions to gain information about reefs, beaches, tides and currents in December and January respectively. The invasion marked the first appearance of the Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams. They would make their first combat appearance to finish the work begun by the submarines and scout the beaches of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur Islands the night before the invasion. After obtaining their hydrographic data the swimmers were to return to the beach and destroy mines and anti-boat obstacles.

After analyzing all but the last minute information, intelligence officers concluded that the 6th Base Force and the Headquarters, Fourth Fleet was the cornerstone of the Marshalls defenses. The Japanese, too, learned from Tarawa. Before the Gilberts invasion the weapons emplaced on the larger islands were sited to protect the ocean beaches, but since Tarawa, when the Marines attacked from the lagoon, the garrisons were strengthening and rearranging their defenses. Except for Kwajalein Island, where photographs showed a cross island defense line, the Japanese concentrated their heaviest installations along the beaches. In essence, the planners looked for the same kind of operation they found on Tarawa—a bitter fight on the beach then after beach defense lines were breached the defenders would fight to the death from shell holes and ruined buildings.

Force estimates put the enemy strength at 8,000 to 9,600 troops spread throughout Kwajalein Atoll and it was estimated that there were between 6,150 and 7,100 combat troops. Therefore, it was assumed that the 7th Infantry Division would face between 2,300 to 2,600 combat troops and 1,200 to 1,600 Korean laborers. On Kwajalein the Japanese built a defensive line east of the airfield. This line was built to provide some defense in depth behind the pillboxes, trenches and gun emplacements that ringed the island. The Roi-Namur photographs showed coastal defensive lines that featured strong points at the corners of each island. However, while there were prepared interior strong points, there were also large numbers of buildings and heavy undergrowth which permitted a defense in depth. The troops that landed on Majuro found the Japanese had abandoned the atoll. Enemy forces were believed to be composed of the 6th Base Force, 61st Naval Guard Force, elements of the 122nd Infantry Regiment, and a detachment of the 4th Civil Engineers.

Operation Flintlock

Operation Flintlock, Aerial View of Ships in the Lagoon

Operation Flintlock, D Day

Sunrise Over the Marshall Islands

The Campaign Begins, November 1943

Operations against the Marshalls begin as part of the air campaign against the Gilberts. After Makin and Tarawa were taken strikes against the Marshalls continued. The air campaign was designed to destroy the Japanese air forces and defenses. Its first phase was conducted by land based medium and heavy bombers. Until December all air operations were carried out by B-24s based south and east of the Gilberts. After 23 December flights could be made by planes based in the Gilberts, allowing heavier and deeper bombing raids into the Marshalls. In November and December Mille atoll, nearest the Gilberts received the heaviest attacks. However, Maloelap with its large air facility was not spared; while Jaluit also was attacked although not as often as the others. Beginning in January Kwajalein and Wotje were also targeted.

Air action over the Marshalls was sustained and harsh. A carrier borne strike was launched against Mille on 18 and 19 November to keep the Japanese away from operations in the Gilberts. But, despite the raids the Japanese made every effort to keep the air strip operating and by 20 November the Japanese had fighters in the air and enemy bombers over Tarawa.

Maloelap atoll was considered the greatest potential threat to operations in the Marshalls. Taroa, with the exception of Kwajalein, was the most important airbase between Tarawa and Truk. Between 26 November and 10 January Japanese interceptors met each flight and for thirty to fifty minutes of each raid bomber crews fought their way to and from the targets. During the Taroa portion of the air campaign nine B-24s were shot down and fifty-nine Japanese fighters were destroyed. Despite the intensity and heavy damage caused by the raids, Taroa was never completely put out of operation. During the second period, concentrating on Maloelap, B-25s made more frequent strikes against the islands dropping seventy tons of bombs between 11 and 25 January. Fifteen enemy fighters were destroyed and the lagoon cleared of shipping at a loss of six B-25s. But, despite the intensity of the effort the airfield still remained in operation. The attack's last phase began on 26 January 1944 with fighter escorts to accompany the B-25s. On 29 January, one day before the invasion task force moved into the Marshalls, the B-25s made a low level attack on ammunition dumps and buildings on the neighboring outer islands. No enemy planes met them and Maloelap was declared neutralized.

Between 12 December and 29 January thirteen air strikes were made against Jaluit, which received less attention that Mille or Maloelap. Fighters and attack bombers from Makin and Tarawa concentrated their efforts on low level strafing and bombing runs, destroying oil and ammunition dumps, communications facilities and three ships in the lagoon. By the time the task force arrived in the Marshalls, Jaluit like the other islands had been neutralized.

The island of Wotje was not struck until 13 December. A total of 325 tons of bombs were dropped on the airfields, fuel and ammunition dumps, and shipping on and around Wotje.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

The Seventh Air Force conducted only light strikes against Kwajalein and Roi-Namur because of the distances involved, undertaking nine more missions against Kwajalein and Roi-Namur during December and January, dropping about 200 tons of bombs on the atolls causing some damage to the installations and shipping. While the Japanese did not intercept the land based bombers after 22 January, Roi-Namur, unlike the other island airbases was not neutralized as the Marshall invasion force steamed into the 10,000 square mile lagoon.

What the Army Air Force couldn't reach the Navy did with its carrier based planes. Between 24 and 29 November, Task Groups 58.1 and 58.3 were brought together for the operation against Kwajalein and Wotje. The two task groups consisted of six fast carriers, five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, three anti-aircraft cruisers, and twelve destroyers. The fleet refueled 820 miles northeast of Kwajalein on 1 December then proceeded southeast, arriving unobserved near Kwajalein on the morning of 4 December 1943. The first strike of the 246 plane force left their carriers at 0630 for Roi-Namur. The carrier pilots discovered enemy planes parked on the runways of Roi-Namur and in the air. Additionally, two light cruisers and one large freighter were anchored off the island. The carrier pilots destroyed nineteen Japanese interceptors and one medium bomber. Three more bombers were destroyed on the ground and several hits were scored on the cruisers and freighters. But despite the success of the raid, carefully camouflaged locations protected many of the Japanese aircraft.

The same strike also hit Kwajalein. Since the Kwajalein airfield was still under construction no aircraft were found. However, thirty cargo vessels were anchored in the lagoon off of the island. Seven were sunk and two large multi-engine aircraft flying boats were strafed and set afire. Twenty-nine other carrier planes attacked Wotje at noon while strikes were still hitting Roi-Namur and Kwajalein. On Wotje the carrier pilots destroyed five planes on the ground and fired the machine shops, hangars, and barracks.

The original plans had called for a two day air operation against Kwajalein and Roi-Namur, but while the carrier planes were busy with their strikes, Japanese aircraft operating from Roi-Namur hit the carrier group. One carrier received a torpedo hit but no other damage occurred. Some operational problems were caused as the carriers maneuvered to avoid torpedo hits and recovering aircraft was complicated. That night the carrier task forces withdrew and the second day of strikes were cancelled. While extensive damage had been made on Kwajalein and Roi-Namur the land based attacks continued. The final task of neutralizing Roi-Namur's airfield and Kwajalein was left to the invasion force that would arrive on 29 January 1944.

While the air strikes took place against targets in the Marshalls, the largest wartime contingent of shipping assembled to date began to sortie from ports in the Hawaiian, Fiji, Samoan, and Ellice Islands and San Diego, California on 13 January. On 22 January, the Southern Attack Force left Pearl Harbor and Honolulu while the Northern Attack Force sailed from Lahaina Roadstead in the outer islands, after a thirty hour break in their journey from San Diego. The Southern Force was about thirty-five miles ahead of the Northern Force. Since embarkation had taken most of the previous day the slower amphibians carrying the amphibian tractors and a detachment of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion

departed ahead of the main convoy. The Attack Force Reserve and the Majuro Attack Group departed on 23 January. The reserve force was to arrive in the general vicinity of the three landings, ready to reinforce which ever group ran into difficulty.

American submarines operating in the Marshalls for a month now took up their pre-invasion stations west of the islands. Three boats patrolled near Truk, one near Ponape, one near Kusaie, and another near Eniwetok as the invasion fleet continued its voyage without mishap to an area near the eastern Marshalls. At dawn on 29 January 1944 the four task groups that composed Task Force 58 and the Neutralization Group, Task Group 50.15, moved into their attack positions. Despite the presence of squalls, Rear Admiral John W. Reeves of Task Group 58.1 launched an air strike from the carriers *Enterprise*, *Yorktown*, and *Belleau Wood* against the airfield on Taroa. By nightfall the airfield was considered completely neutralized. Simultaneously, Task Group 58.2 under the command of Rear Admiral A.E. Montgomery launched a strike from the carriers *Essex*, *Intrepid* and *Cabot* against Roi-Namur. Ninety-two enemy planes were based on Roi-Namur when the attack began and within hours air superiority was achieved and numerous hits were made on the supporting structures. Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman's Task Group 58.3 reached its target area and before sunrise aircraft from the carriers *Cowpens*, *Monterey*, and *Bunker Hill* struck the airfield and adjacent buildings on Kwajalein. Successive strikes strafed and bombed the remainder of Kwajalein. That evening Admiral Sherman moved his group to the northwest in order to be able to launch a dawn strike against Eniwetok. The fourth Task Group, under the command of Rear Admiral Samuel P. Ginder, which included the carriers *Saratoga*, *Princeton*, and *Langley* launched a series of strikes against Wotje which encountered little opposition.

Along with the carrier air strikes, U.S. Army Air Force land based bombers operating from the Gi1berts also participated in the general aerial assault. A flight of seven B-24s dropped fifteen tons of bombs on Roi-Namur and three tons of bombs on Kwaja1ein on the morning and afternoon of 29 January. At dusk the same evening as the carrier planes retired seven more heavy bombers deposited another twenty tons of bombs on Kwajalein.

Naval surface ships joined in the pre-invasion softening up exercises as well. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers accompanying the carrier groups moved in and pounded Wotje and Maloelap late on the afternoon of 29 January. That same day Task Forces 52 and 53, approaching from the northeast on converging courses met north of Ailuk Atoll, 200 miles east of Kwajalein. On the morning of 30 January the destroyers and cruisers convoying the invasion force broke from their convoys and pounded Maloelap and Wotje again, rejoined the convoys and made ready for the pre-invasion bombardment of Kwajalein. Carrier based strikes continued on Kwajalein, Wotje, Taroa, Roi-Namur and Eniwetok. Thus, Task Group 58.2 was replaced by Task Group 58.1, formally assigned the neutralization of Taroa, and Task Group 58.4 whose previous mission was Wotje also continued the neutralization of Taroa as well. Task Group 58.2 continued its attack on Roi-Namur. The carrier groups attacking Wotje and Taroa concentrated on airfield installations, runways and buildings. Those attacking Kwajalein and Roi-Namur flew 400 sorties on 30 January 30. By that afternoon, the surface ships arrived off of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur and began a four hour naval bombardment.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Meanwhile Task Group 58.3 launched planes against Eniwetok. Torpedo bombers swept over the island followed by fighters whose combined efforts found and destroyed nineteen planes on the ground. Naval aircraft destroyed virtually every building on the atoll and cratered the runway as naval ships took defensive positions under gunfire. Task Force 58.3 and later Task Group 58.4 would remain south of Eniwetok as a covering force. While the bombardment was going on, the Northern and Southern Attack Forces split halfway between Ailuk and Kwajalein each taking station in their respective transport and fire support areas on the night of 30-31 January. Troops on board the attack transports of the Southern Force could see the fires burning on Kwajalein as they made last minute preparations for the assault.



The Assault Begins, 31 January 1944

Admiral Turner's Southern Task Force approached their first objectives early in the morning of 31 January. The APDs *Overton* and *Manley* moved toward the islands of Gea (Carter) and Ninni (Cecil) carrying 155 men organized into a provisional unit composed of troops from the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and a unit composed of men from Company B of the 111th Infantry. Both were attached to the 17th Regimental Combat Team. Troop A's mission was to take Ninni Island and Troop B's mission to take Gea. Once the two lightly defended islands were seized the troops were to be reunited then taken to Gehh Island (Chauncey) and neutralize any resistance on it. The infantry units attached to the provisional units were to garrison and defend the channel islands.

About 2,600 yards from the beach, the APDs filled rubber boats with the assault units and a motor launch towed the troops within 800 yards of the shore line. The rubber boats would then be paddled closer to the shore line where they awaited a two man team to plant lights on the beach and then move onto the islands—with the balance of troops following in Higgins boats.



Map of Kwajalein Atoll, Inset of Kwajalein Island

The *Manley's* landing force, B Troop, was delayed because of difficulty in finding Carter Island, and then ran into difficulty when the lead assault boat mistook Cecil for Carter.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Once the confusion was sorted out it was too light to put a reconnaissance platoon ashore so the entire unit landed at 0620. A patrol encountered only one Japanese soldier and quickly killed him. However, as the reconnaissance platoon turned to take a second look at the island in light of the skirmish they were taken under fire. Following a brief and furious fight American troops, using hand grenades, small arms, knives, and bayonets, secured Carter Island by 0930. The intelligence materials were gathered up and sent to Admiral Turner. By 1000 control of Carter was passed from the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop to the infantry force detailed to hold the island.

At 0430 A Troop left the *Overton* paddling against a strong current and an off shore wind towards what they thought was Cecil Island. By 0545 the troop made an unopposed landing only to find they were on the wrong island. The A Troop commander left a small party of infantrymen on Chauncey to guard a beached Japanese tugboat and continued to search for Japanese. The majority of the force took to their rubber boats and began to paddle along the reef line to their intended objective, Cecil Island. Cecil was occupied and was reported secure at 1235. With the small island guarding the passage through the reef secure, the ships that would provide fire support for the main landings could safely enter the lagoon. Meanwhile back on Chauncey, the force guarding the beached tugboat came under attack by about 100 Japanese troops. Under orders to withdraw to Cecil, the company broke off the engagement, established a defensive perimeter for the night and waited for transport to Cecil. One squad remained, which was later reinforced by a platoon.

The next two islands were Carlson, to be used as a divisional artillery base, and Carlos, to be used as a supply base. The 17th Regimental Combat Team's plan called for simultaneous battalion size attacks on the northwestern tip of each island. Each battalion making the landing would be supported by a platoon of tanks and a battalion was to be held in reserve to reinforce should that be necessary. The transports carrying the three battalion landing teams arrived at 0544 on 31 January along with five LSTs carrying four amphibian tractor groups. The most complicated part of the assault occurred when the troops disembarked from the transports to Higgins boats, then transferred to amphibians. The LSTs, laden with the amphibians were to proceed to the Line of Departure, open their bow doors and disgorge their cargo. Since the operation had to be carried out in total darkness, the resulting confusion led Admiral Turner to postpone H-Hour from 0830 to 0910.

The preparatory naval bombardment of Kwajalein's southern tip, provided by the battleships *Pennsylvania* and *Mississippi* began at 0618. Three merchant ships in the lagoon received fire from the destroyer *Ringgold* and the cruiser *San Francisco* and carrier planes cut through the heavy overcast sky at 0840 to begin strafing runs. At 0810 the battleships *New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Idaho,* and *Mississippi,* the cruisers *Minneapolis, San Francisco,* and *New Orleans,* and the destroyers *Stevens, McKee, Ringgold,* and

Kwajalein Island Bombardment

Assault Begins

Sigsbee shifted from preparatory fire to plotted bombardment fire. They brought Carlos, Carlson, Kwajalein, Burton, and Beverly Islands under fire simultaneously. By 1040 the first wave hit the beach on Carlos unopposed. After meeting minor resistance the island was reported secure at 1615.

The first wave landed at Carlson at 0912 with one company on the left of a three hundred yard beach and another on the right with one company held in reserve. The second wave bit the beach at 0920 and the third two minutes later. Meanwhile carrier planes strafed and bombed the island. By 1210 the island was secured. All the objectives were secured with minimal casualties.

75mm Pack Howitzer Giving Fire Support

The lack of strong resistance led General Corlett to speed up the landing of the division artillery on Carlson. During the night of 31 January and early hours of 1 February the men of the field artillery battalions were busy setting up gun positions to lay supporting fire on Kwajalein. Gun pits, tree cutting, and ammunition hauling, registration points, and communications networks all had to be finished before the morning assault began. By the morning of 1 February, all was ready on Carlson—12 batteries of 105-mm howitzers were packed together in an area 900 yards long and 150 yards wide. In addition, headquarters elements transferred from the amphibious command ship *Rocky Mount* to Carlson. Activity

was no less furious on Carlos as 7th Division supply units constructed communications networks, built supply dumps, and set up service repair facilities. The army guns on Carlson accompanied by the guns of the *San Francisco, Idaho, New Mexico,* and screening destroyers steadily pounded Kwajalein through the night.

At the same time, the Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams made their first appearance in combat. Composed of Army and Navy personnel a team conducted a close-in reconnaissance of the beaches on the western end of Kwajalein. The team approached the beach twice on the 31 January, once at 1000 at high tide and again at 1600 at low tide, working within 300 yards of the shore under covering fire from the *Pennsylvania* and the *Mississippi*. While there were no underwater obstacles to destroy, the team did determine surf and reef conditions. After the invasion they destroyed wrecks, coral heads and other underwater obstacles along the coral side of the island.

With all going according to schedule Admiral Turner announced H-Hour as 0930 on 1 February according to plan. Hours before sunrise the ships carrying the assault force and those providing fire support moved into position as the guns from the screening vessels and Carlson kept up a study fire against the Japanese on Kwajalein.

Fire Support

The Seizure of Kwajalein, 1-4 February 1944

The First Day, 1 February 1944

At 0900 Lieutenant Colonel William P. Walker's 3rd Battalion, 184th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest H. Bearss crossed the Line of Departure to begin the thirty minute run to the Kwajalein beach. Navy planes began their last minute strafing run of the beach and the Army and Navy artillery barrage began at 0905. At 0928, the Navy and Army firing on the beach stopped as the first assault wave approached the shore line and shifted 200 yards inland. Boats equipped with 20-mm and 40-mm guns also provided harassing fire. Unlike Tarawa, the heavy bombardment worked, only light Japanese small arms and mortar fire greeted the assault boats. A damaged steering mechanism on an LVT coupled with a strong current led the landing boats farther south, but the only result was crowding at the southern end of the landing zone. The 32nd Regimental Combat Team hit the beach right on schedule and met light mortar and automatic weapons fire despite the heavy bombardment. On Red Beach 1, where the sea wall was almost at the waters edge, the LVTs could gain a field of fire inland. On Red Beach 2 the amphibians stopped at the water line with their fire barely sweeping above the men of the 1st Battalion as they moved forward to destroy a pillbox holding up the line of advance. Meanwhile on the left, two companies moved 150 yards inland against light resistance. Despite some problems with amphibians getting bogged down on the beaches and hung up on palm tree stumps, the first four waves were ashore within fifteen minutes of the designated H Hour. By 1800 on 1 February the beach head was secure and the support and reserve units were in place ready to move inland.

Kwajalein Island – Operation Flintlock

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

The line established by the initial assault was 250 yards inland along the western loop of the main island roadway that ran north and south, just about parallel to the two Red Beaches. Resistance to the advance varied as units began to move inland. The advance of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry met little resistance. While they met some obstacles constructed of coconut logs that were not indicated on maps and found well prepared firing positions unoccupied, they met only scattered resistance. Japanese rifleman preferred to wait until the main line passed. The 3rd Battalion, advancing on the northern zone ran into a network of pill boxes. The action faced at each pill box was similar. Upon coming under fire from them, the troops would quickly take cover in a shell hole and assess the situation. A first attempt usually involved attempting to silence the objective with grenades, but many times these were thrown back. A second attempt would use a flame thrower, which proved ineffective if not aimed just right. Finally, a disgruntled private would crawl out of his foxhole to within a few yards of the pillbox where he would throw white phosphorous grenades in, an action that would often flush the Japanese from their cover. Often another solider would crawl on top of the pill box and fire a clip of M-1 rounds into the bunker. Then, if one was available, an amphibian tank would be summoned to fire its flamethrower and 37-mm gun into the aperture. By 1135 of the first day the troops reached Wallace Road and began to reorganize for the next stage of the advance—Wilma Road, a north-south road that ran east of Wart Area and west of the landing strips, connecting Will Road on the north with the ocean shore stretch of Wallace Road.

Aerial View of Battlefield on D Day

Seizure of Kwajalein

Operation Flintlock - D Day, Landing Craft Approaching Kwajalein

While the log covered shelters and prepared pill boxes were taken the same way, as the troops moved up the length of the island resistance got tougher. The fighting was further complicated by thick underbrush and heavy woods. Once the troops reached the area east of Wilma Road they were in position to seize the airfield. The attack against the airfield began at about 1440, generously supported by artillery fire. The 1st Battalion, which advanced along the ocean side of the field, moved quicker than those who took the inland route. Their advance was delayed only because of a major fire caused when an artillery round hit a fuel dump. By 1525 resistance stiffened for Company E, fighting to clear out the Japanese defensive positions along both sides of Wallace Road called Strong Point Canary. The Japanese mounted a strong defense taking advantage of the rubble and underground tunnels. After an hour of tough fighting and the commitment of a reserve company, it became clear the whole movement had been stopped. At 1800 the attack was broken off and defensive positions prepared for the night.

Defensive perimeters were established approximately one fourth of the distance from the invasion beaches. In the northern zone, Companies L and I held the most advanced position supported by two platoons from Company K, which took positions along Wilma Road linking up with supporting companies just east of the road. In the southern zone, Company F, 32d Infantry held the line along the beach to the southern edge of the landing strip. The

remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry took up positions west and northwest of Company F. In addition, three antitank guns were set up at equal intervals, interspersed with machine guns in Company F's easterly line. All personnel were dug in with two or three to a foxhole. Between the southernmost positions of Company F and Company I was the landing strip and about 250 yards of open ground, which could not provide cover for defending or attacking forces. Company C was sent forward to guard the area to check any possibility of infiltration. In the lagoon the destroyer *Sigsbee* was stationed to put a search light over the area every half hour. Harassment and interdiction fire was also scheduled for the entire area. Intelligence estimates placed remaining Japanese strength at 1,500 men who still had some artillery.

Tanks on Kwajalein

Firing at a Pill Box, Kwajalein

A chilling rain fell across the island and under cover of darkness the Japanese came out of their bunkers and air raid shelters to organize counterattacks against the forward positions. Individual Japanese soldiers and machine gun squads attempted to infiltrate along the flanks of the American lines or in the space between the two regiments. As the Japanese soldiers continued their efforts, their remaining dual purpose guns and their mortars continued harassment and interdiction fire against American positions. The Japanese also fired at the *Sigsbee* from Nob pier. Throughout the night the Japanese made uncoordinated but concerted attacks against the American positions.

Seizure of Kwajalein



The Second Day, 2 February 1944

General Corlett ordered the two Regimental Combat Teams to launch a coordinated assault at 0715 on 2 February, preceded by fifteen minutes of preparatory fire delivered by the battleship *Idaho*, the cruiser *Minneapolis*, four destroyers and five field artillery batteries. The artillery fire would be followed by a twenty minute air strike that would start at 0800. The 2nd Battalion led the advance, slowly at first, and began to find scattered unorganized enemy resistance. While they encountered heavy sniper fire it was "more harassing than deadly." By 0900 advance units of the leading companies passed the H Docks with the 1st Battalion following closely, mopping up rear areas and eliminating snipers.

Meal Break, Kwajalein

The advance elements were led by tanks spraying treetops with .30 caliber machine gun fire and stopping when necessary to fire 75-mm rounds into pillboxes. By 1040 the advance companies were across Carl Road.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Units advancing up the other side of the island had greater difficulty. The lead company encountered an unknown anti-tank ditch running from the landing strip to Carl Road, forcing the tanks to swing left to go along the air strip, exposing the accompanying infantrymen to fire from a pill box. It took the ocean side advance units two hours of heavy fighting to work through the Japanese rifleman in trees, shallow trenches and revetted pill boxes. The movement picked up again until they reached a similar line of defenses at Cat Strong Point. At 1040 the ocean side advance linked up with the lagoon side at the first stage objective, Carl Road.

LSTs Unloading on Kwajalein, in Support of Seventh Infantry Division Troops

The next stage of the advance pitted the advancing force against the strongest Japanese defensive positions—the main tank trap and Corn Strong Point. Once again plans called for an advance supported by tanks, a heavy pre-assault bombardment from field artillery and naval guns coupled with an air assault on the northeastern end of the island to prevent Japanese artillery and providing reinforcements. Unfortunately, a series of delays in coordinating the air, artillery and naval gunfire support assignments delayed the start of the operation until 1400. Despite the delay, the troops moved out and in a strongly coordinated infantry-tank effort advanced some 225 yards. By nightfall of the second day a rapid victory on the third day seemed likely. Despite the necessity to withdraw about 15 yards to straighten the lines, the second day's casualties were light and the Japanese seemed near the end of their strength. Despite fears of a vicious Japanese suicide attack, none materialized. T he only casualties were caused by a Japanese round and a premature burst that split the tube on an American 155- mm howitzer. General Corlett ordered his assault regiment

commanders to "Organize vigorous attack 0715 tomorrow. Finish the job not later than 1500 3 February. The Northern Force has finished the job."

The Third Day, 3 February 1944

The third day's first objective was Nathan Road, the location of the headquarters complexes. Heavy resistance was expected since well built fortifications were still intact along the coast and there was heavy vegetation throughout the island. All the defenses were well organized positions with trenches, covered by artillery and the remaining pill boxes. Once again Corlett's plan called for a preparatory ten minute artillery barrage. Once the advance began it would move northeast gradually turning to the north. This rotation of the axis of advance meant that the 32nd Infantry would have to advance more rapidly than the remainder of the troops since it had the greater distance to cover. The jump off began keeping in mind General Corlett's orders for a "vigorous attack." The 32nd Infantry moved forward under the creeping barrage about 250 yards before it began taking fire from a pillbox that controlled their route of advance. The demolished buildings in the area meant the defenders could move about quickly leaving the attackers to slow down to make sure they had eliminated the resistance. Meanwhile Corlett ordered the infantry to "keep smashing ahead." By noon the 32nd Infantry and the 184th Infantry were separated by a vertical gap. The inability of the Japanese to mount a strong counterattack and drive a wedge between the two units left the gap unexploited.



The 184th Infantry, however, was as fortunate. When they crossed the Line of Departure at 0715 they did so without armor support. Nevertheless, the units moved out for 225 yards meeting only scattered rifle and machine gun fire leading them to report at 0806 that enemy resistance was weak. Then they ran directly into an intact Japanese blockhouse supported by huge shelters and small bunkers that were part of an extensive Japanese defensive network. As they approached the structure there was an increase in fire. Since the company had hit the

block house complex without supporting weapons it waited until a 37-mm anti-tank gun arrived. Despite repeated attempts, the gun seemed to have no effect on the dense structure. Deciding to leave the blockhouse for the reserve companies and heavier weapons, the decision was made to bypass the structure. Unfortunately, the undergrowth and ruins were so thick that the company became lost and separated from its supporting units although there was only twenty yards between them. Quickly, squads and platoons became separated and the whole advance turned into a series of uncoordinated actions with small units either taking cover or attempting to ferret out the Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, tanks moved up to support the advance but since there were no leaders to direct them, they sat idle. To make matters worse, in an act of desperation, artillery fire as called in, landing only a short distance from one platoon.

Soldiers and Light Tank Moving Through Jungle, Kwajalein (right)

Battlefield, Kwajalein (below)

An hour passed when the company commander realized that two of his platoons were not reporting advances. Warned by an air observer that some Japanese near the lagoon were gathering for a counterattack, he committed part of his reserve platoon to the lagoon shore. He then went forward to join Lieutenant Klatt in the debris around the bunker complex. Captain White quickly ordered machine guns placed to cover the gaps in the lines, reorganized his lines then ordered tanks to precede the infantry in a second assault that began at 0945. But once again the attack bogged down. Captain White was unable to communicate with the tanks since the telephones mounted on the hulls were not waterproof, so crawled onto the lead tank and beat on the turret with his rifle butt. By the time the tankers got the word they were separated from the infantry units all coordination between them was lost. The battle then boiled down to planting satchel charges in the blockhouse and making sure

platoons were kept together as best as possible. Meanwhile units of both companies, exercising initiative and leadership, took individual bunkers and trenches under attack, routing out small units of Japanese soldiers. But as in the earlier actions, some units were fighting only ten yards apart without knowing of the other's presence.

The advance and the hopes of a quick end on Kwajalein were being destroyed by determined Japanese resistance. Company B could neither move forward nor bypass the area because of the numerous enemy soldiers, leading to a revised plan of attack announced at 1225. The 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry was limited to a northern boundary that curved from Noel Road to the juncture of the lagoon and Nathan Road. The 32nd Infantry was to take over all the island north of that point pinching off 184th's zone. This freed the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry to attack on a lesser front.



Once again the attack got underway but the day was not a good one. Company A's right wing advanced and took out the resistance and by 1800 reached the lagoon. Likewise Company C, despite a counterattack by the enemy reached its objective. Company E, however, was bogged down near Nob Pier and like the earlier attacks of other units, began to separate into smaller uncoordinated groups. The battalion commander lost control of the action. The 32nd Infantry also had serious problems. Some units reported making excellent advances while others became bogged down and separated.

The reports reaching the regimental headquarters painted a confusing picture. The terrain features that divided the infantry units and prevented coordinated attacks had been caused by the shell fire. Units, in some cases, were receiving fire from those all around them. General Corlett's objective changed, while only a few hours earlier he ordered his units to finish the offensive, now they had to regroup, regain the momentum and finish the attack. Unlike the first and second nights, units were disbursed in small groups, in some cases surrounded by the enemy. Units were harassed by the Japanese, who launched grenade and banzai attacks. By 0430 some units reported concentrated attacks by units of Japanese infantrymen.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

The Fourth Day, 4 February 1944

By the morning of 4 February, despite the efforts of the Japanese, it was obvious that the portion of the island remaining in their hands (1,000 yards long, 400 yards wide) would be taken. Sunrise was at 0700 and that's when the attack began. The lines that had been in confusion the night of the 3 February remained that way causing a disorganized start. As units moved forward, they came under full scale attack by the Japanese who were bypassed the day before. Thus, straightening out the lines of the 32nd Infantry did not occur until l000. Meanwhi1e, the 184th Infantry experienced the first large scale surrender, capturing thirty-one Koreans laborers and one Japanese soldier. Surrender became more common as Japanese and Koreans, living without water for four days and aided by intelligence officers using loud speakers decided to give up. All the Japanese, however, did not surrender. Live Japanese were intermingled with bodies caused by the previous days' bombardment. As late as 1900, troops were still under small arms fire from individual enemy riflemen. At dusk tanks were brought forward to reduce the last 150 yards and in a few minutes had driven over or killed the remaining Japanese defenders. The last vestiges of Japanese resistance ended at 1920 on 4 February. At 1610, General Cor1ett announced that "All organized resistance... bas ceased. The troops have been organized for mopping operations."



While the Southern Attack Force's main objective was Kwajalein Island, once that was

complete they had to secure the other islets as far north as Bigej, Ennuqenliggelap, Ebeye, Loi, South Gugegwe, North Gugegwe, Gehb, Torrulj, Mann, Legan, and Cohen. Chauncey Island was secured on 1 February. When it became apparent that the Carlos and Carlson reserve force was not needed on Kwajalein, it was ordered to capture Burton (Ebeye) on 3 February. There was a seaplane base on Ebeye and positions containing pill boxes and gun emplacements near the beaches. The Japanese had apparently expected the attack to come from the ocean side instead of the lagoon. However, newer positions were beginning to appear near the lagoon side.

The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry commanded by Colonel Hartl moved toward the beach of Ebeye in LVTs; two companies landed abreast. Despite the mechanical failure of one tractor and the collision of two others, the first wave, flanked by two LCI gunboats to provide fire support, hit the Ebeye beach at 0935. Only four men were wounded during the initial assault and the assault elements quickly moved inland from south to north. After an hour the extreme left flank met resistance on the lagoon side from Japanese troops and Korean laborers armed with rifles, machine guns, a dual purpose gun, improvised dynamite throwers and spears.

The Japanese positions were eliminated by direct artillery and mortar fire. Despite the presence of overwhelming fire power, progress was slowed on the left by enemy troops in well camouflaged positions. The Japanese waited in positions covered by palm fronds, then after American troops passed, delivered fire or grenades from the rear. At about 1900, units began consolidating for night positions and throughout the night any threat of a counterattack was greatly diminished by almost constant illumination, artillery, machine gun fire, and mortar fire. The single Japanese 17-mm dual purpose gun was silenced by 81-mm mortar fire.

The attack against the Japanese on Ebeye was resumed at 0730 on 4 February. As the troops moved forward on the right they encountered increased resistance because Japanese troops had reoccupied four pillboxes closer to the American lines. The addition of self-propelled guns and a flight of Navy bombers broke the resistance. By 1337 the island was secured. Between 3 and 4 February the remaining islands were captured by other units of the 111th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. Bennet was the last island captured at 1642 on 4 February by the Army forces from the Southern Landing Force.

Total American losses in the Southern Landing Force were reported as 142 killed, 845 wounded and two missing in action. Enemy losses were estimated at 4,938 killed and 206 prisoners, 79 of whom were Japanese and 127 were Koreans.

Hot Spot – Main Drag, Kwajalein

The Roi-Namur Assault Begins, 31 January 1944

At 0300 on 30 January, the small task group assigned to take Majuro broke off from the main convoy. At 2130 the U.S.S. *Kane* launched rubber boats led by 1st Lieutenant Harvey C. Weeks, USMC, of the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company, who landed on Calalin Island. Weeks' small unit, the first to land on a prewar Japanese possession, reported he found a Marshallese who told him there were 300-400 Japanese on Darrit Island but nowhere else on the atoll. The *Kane* continued around the eastern end of the atoll and at 0200 on 31 January landed the remainder of the reconnaissance company on Dalap Island. They learned that all but four Japanese had left Majuro. This was confirmed by another Marshallese, Michael Madison, who spoke English. Despite some difficulty in obtaining communications with the amphibious group, Captain Jones radioed the naval gunfire support ships to suspend their bombardment of the eastern end of the atoll. That afternoon the Marines who made up the reconnaissance company boarded the *Kane* and went to Majuro. At 2145 forty-two Marines landed from rubber boats and began a search of the island where they discovered Japanese Naval Warrant Officer Nagata, the lone Japanese defender of Majuro.



The Roi-Namur assault, like Kwajalein, began with taking smaller islands to secure the flanks and provide a base for logistical supplies for the assault. The 4th Marine Division's plan was similar to the Army's plan. The twin islands of Roi- Namur, connected by a small sandy strip of beach and a causeway, were the primary targets. Like Kwajalein, the day before the assault on the primary objective the outlying islands would be captured to ensure the safe passage of the invasion fleet and provide a location for artillery and supply support

for the invasion troops. At 0900 on 31 January the 1st Battalion 25th Marines, plus the Scout Company made simultaneous landings from the ocean side on Mellu (Ivan) and Ennuebing (Jacob) Islands which guarded the deepwater pass to the lagoon. After the lagoon was swept for mines, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the same regiment would land on Ennumennet (Albert) and Ennubir (Allen) islands, southeast of Namur. Unfortunately, there were only enough amphibian tractors to carry two battalion landing teams ashore at a time, which meant extensive coordination was required to make five separate landings during the course of the day.



Map of Kwajalein Atoll, Inset of Kwajalein Island

At 0535 Admiral Conolly's flag ship the *Appalachian*, in convoy with its fire support ships moved to their designated stations southwest of Mellu and Ennuebinq islands. At 0651 the *Biloxi* and the *Maryland* began shelling the two islands. Additional support ships for the Northern Landing Force included the battleships *Tennessee* and *Colorado* and the heavy cruisers *Louisville*, *Mobile*, and *Indianapolis*, the light cruiser *Santa Fe* along with the escort carriers *Sangamon*, *Suwannee*, and *Chenango* accompanied by seventeen destroyers, one destroyer escort, and three minesweepers. At 0715 a check fire order was issued to the *Maryland* and *Biloxi* to allow Navy planes to perform an aerial reconnaissance of the two islands to access the value of the pre-invasion bombardment.

The tractor shortage was exacerbated by a host of other problems. Initially, sixty minutes was allowed for debarkation from the transports to the LSTs, but higher than expected winds and heavy seas complicated the maneuvers. Instead of sixty minutes, the LVTs took twice that time. To further complicate the situation, the boat control officers left the tractors to search for a landing craft and did not return in time to lead the LVTs to the Line of Departure. The tractors wallowed in the heavy seas to wait for the troops and became damaged or swamped. At 0825 another air strike was launched and the control officer on the *Phelps* radioed Admiral Conolly that H-Hour could not be met. Admiral Conolly postponed the landing for thirty minutes and ordered another strafing and bombing run on the beaches. Finally, by 0917 there were enough tractors to make the assault and the run began with touchdown at 0952. The troops who hit Ivan were also behind schedule, touching down at 1015. Fortunately, there was only token resistance and both islands were reported secured at 1015. Attention now turned to the capture of Albert, Allen, and Abraham islands on Roi-Namur's eastern flank.

By 1116 a curtain of smoke was laid down and the minesweepers moved through Jacob Pass within 1,500 yards of Albert Island. At about the same time aircraft from the carriers began to strafe and bomb the islands along with complementary fire from the destroyers *Porterfield* and *Haraden* while the cruisers and the battleships were firing into Namur. At 1210 Admiral Conolly gave an order that would endear him to the soldiers and marines for the remainder of the Pacific War. Aware of the blockhouses that existed and their threat to the troops Admiral Conolly sent a message "Desire *Maryland* move in really close this afternoon for counter battery and counter blockhouse fire, using pointer fire for both main and secondary batteries." Forever after Admiral Conolly was affectionately referred to as "Close in Conolly."

While the pre-invasion preparations were proceeding, another landing plan mix up occurred. As the landing craft were forming up about 3,000 yards from the *Phelps*, acting as the central control vessel, she received a message to leave station and move into the lagoon for a fire support mission. Obeying, the *Phelps* dispatched a signal to Sub Chaser SC 997 to take control of the landings. General Underhill aboard the SC 997 faced a crisis; for some reason the SC 997 staff did not have a copy of the plans for boat control or a sufficient number of radios to properly communicate with the landing craft. To make matters worse, when the amphibians saw the *Phelps* leave for the lagoon they began to follow her through the pass. General Underhill quickly evaluated the situation and ordered the SC 997 to overtake the landing craft and herd them together. Finally, after a series of false starts the Marines moved out for the beaches on the two islands. The first group hit the beach at 1513 and the second island was reached at 1518. Within twenty minutes both islands were secure. Plans to assault the last island before taking Roi-Namur were complicated by delays on Albert and Allen.

While General Underhill knew about the plans to invade Abraham by 1600 the LVTs commanders were not informed. Thus, they returned to the LSTs for fuel. The delay in the return of the LVTs meant that artillery support would not be available. The Navy did not have enough time to station a ship for gunfire support and the artillery was not yet in place on the recently captured islands. Therefore, the decision was made to capture the island at 1800

with fire support provided by 81-mm and 60-mm mortars along with the guns mounted on accompanying half-tracks. The 120 Marines hit the beach and secured the island by 1915. By the close of D-Day, the 25th Marines succeeded, despite some coordination difficulties, in capturing the five islands flanking Roi-Namur. The navy had swept the lagoon for mines and an underwater demolition team found the beach clear of obstacles. Teams began to establish artillery support bases and off-load supplies. Destroyers kept up harassment and interdiction fire against the Roi-Namur garrison throughout the night as the Marines on the assault ships waited for the arrival of dawn to invade.

Roi-Namur Island Bombardment

At 0650 the *Santa Fe*, *Maryland*, *Indianapolis*, *Biloxi*, *Mustin*, and *Russel* opened fire on Roi. Twenty minutes later the *Tennessee*, *Colorado*, *Louisville*, *Mobile*, *Morris*, and *Anderson* began their bombardment of Namur. Marine artillery preparatory fire began at 0645 with the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 14th Marines shelling Namur and the 3rd and 4th Battalions firing on Roi. The coordination problems that plagued the previous day's landings reasserted themselves. The LVTs of the 10th Amphibious Tractor Battalion had been launched too far from the Line of Departure and were bucking choppy seas and strong winds. This meant the higher than average fuel consumption left many of the ungainly craft out of

fuel which spelled disaster. The LVTs were not equipped with manual fuel pumps, and were unable to pump out the water they shipped in the heavy seas. This meant that the 24th Marines could only muster 62 out of 110 tractors assigned to them. More problems occurred as they tried to substitute LCVPs. The Regimental Commander, Colonel Franklin A. Hart, USMC had not yet received the report from the underwater demolition team so he did not know if there was enough water in the lagoon to float the LCVPs.

Roi-Namur Island Bombardment, SSW View

The 23rd Marines, scheduled to assault Roi, had their own problems. Their LSTs were late reaching the lagoon and after reaching their destination had difficulty disembarking their LVTs. Meanwhile, the gunfire support ships and naval aircraft continued their devastating bombardment of the island. Roi and Namur were covered with such towering plumes of smoke that an air observer reported the ceiling as zero. As the Marines moved toward the Line of Departure confusion still existed because of the communications difficulties caused by the wet radios. When the 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines reached the Line of Departure at 1100, they believed they had failed in their mission because they had not been told of the delay in the landing time. In another case, some of the LVTs were lost, at 1045 while some of the LVTs were at the Line of Departure, but a jammed elevator on an LST meant that

others were still not ready. Eleven o'clock passed with no orders and the naval gunfire support had been lifted. Admiral Conolly ordered the landing force to begin the run to the beaches with whatever was on hand at 1112.

Roi-Namur Captured, 1-2 February 1944 and The Seizure of Engebi and Eniwetok

The Roi assault waves, led by LCI gunboats, with the assault troops (1st and 2nd Battalions, 23rd Marines) in amphibian tractors and tanks in LCMs, made their way from the Line of Departure to the beach. The 1st Battalion's armored amphibians touched down at 1133 and moved inland to the anti-tank ditch. A platoon of LVTs moved around the left flank through the water and over Wendy Point to open fire on Norbert Circle at the west end of the northern runway. The first two waves of infantry landed west of the assigned zone by 1158. Resistance was very light, with fire coming from one pillbox located on the middle of the sand strip connecting Roi and Namur and some from the debris caused by the shelling near the beach. By 1311 Colonel Jones went ashore and radioed back that "This is a pip. No opposition near the beach. Located scattered machine gun fire vicinity of split... Landing teams moving in to O-1 line. Little or no opposition [Fifteen minutes later] Give us the word and we will take the rest of the island." General Schmidt, concerned about the lack of coordination between the units on the island, ordered Colonel Jones to await orders and get his tanks under control.



At 1530 the order was issued to push off the attack. Company E, assigned the left flank, reached its objective by 1600. Companies G and F, assigned the right and center, had a tougher time, but managed to destroy a blockhouse and by 1800 the Marines had secured Roi with comparative ease, leaving only a tiny pocket of Japanese that were dealt with the next day.

The battle to take Namur was not as easy. Namur, unlike Roi, contained the bulk of the buildings, vegetation, shelters and the majority of the troops. The bombardment created ruins and did not burn off the vegetation. Thus, the message passed by an air observer flying over the beaches, "... Don't think a bird could be alive..."was over optimistic. The four assault companies of the 3rd and 2nd Battalion Landing Teams landed on Green Beaches 1 and 2 between 1145 and 1200. The plans called for the landing teams to move as quickly as possible to about 100 yards up from the beach then pause to regroup. The regrouped forces would then move as rapidly as possible to objective O-1, Sycamore Boulevard, a road running about 400 to 500 yards inland from the beach. Initial Japanese resistance to the

assault was light and unorganized. It was obvious that despite the intensive shelling, the Japanese were still able to fight and at least slow down the attack's progress. Within two hours of the landing, Companies I and K, moving forward in a skirmish line reached their first objective, where they were told to hold and prepare for a coordinated northward advance with the second battalion lading team on their right. The jump-off time was to be 1630.

Aerial View of Roi-Namur Bombardment

Building Destroyed

In the meantime, the frenzied activities of units preparing to advance were carried on. As the hour drew closer Companies I and B were on the O-1 line with Company L in reserve and Company K occupying Pauline Point. On Green Beach, Companies E and F came ashore around noon and within ten minutes Company G started to land to the right of the Yokohama Pier. By early afternoon ten light tanks were ashore and in their assembly areas. As on the rest of the island initial reaction was light. Even the area designated as Sally Point, the southeast promontory of Namur, did not present a serious obstacle to the Marines. Naval gunfire was ordered lifted at 1250 because it was falling too close to the Marines and a final dive bombing attack was launched at Natalie Point on the northeastern tip of the island. With

the dive bombing attack over, it was determined that the uneven course of the advance and the closeness of the fighting ruled out fire support.

The Great Explosion

By 1300 progress with a few exceptions had been favorable. At about 1300, a Marine demolitions group began moving forward under cover of rifle fire to take out what was thought to be a revetted gun position. The Marines placed a shaped charge against the wall of the building and then quickly tossed in a sixteen pound satchel charge. What was thought to be a gun position was a torpedo warhead storage magazine that blew up in a thick cloud of pungent black smoke. Rock, debris and fragments

An Aerial View of the Great Explosion

from the building and its contents were thrown into the air. The smoke was so acrid many went on frenzied searches for gas masks thinking the building destroyed was a poison gas storage facility. Within a few minutes two more serious, but less violent explosions rocked the island. The explosion stopped any coordinated advance, knocked out communications and accounted for half the casualties required to secure Namur.

Japanese Prisoner Taken

The 3rd Battalion Landing Team (on the left) had been in position to attack for 2½ hours while the 2nd Battalion Landing Team (on the right) was not ready until 1730 because armor support and supporting units arrived late. Thus, when the attack began at 1630 the 2nd Battalion was not ready while the Japanese had more than two hours to recover from the bombardment. Thus, while progress on the battalion's left was fairly steady, the right flank was pinned down with fire from a blockhouse. As on Kwajalein, poor communication between the infantry and armor hampered coordination among the assault units. By 1830 a few of the Marines reached Narcissus Street, less than 100 yards from the shoreline, the ultimate objective. But, by 1930 it became obvious to the Regimental Commander that darkness would overtake the advance, so he issued the order to dig in on a perimeter defense, hold where the units were and prepare for an advance early in the morning. The night proved difficult for the Marines. The Japanese who were bypassed during the day came out of their hiding places and infiltrated from the front and rear. Marines working in the rear became overzealous with rifle fire and endangered the front line troops. The only organized Japanese counter attack came about dawn when about 100 Japanese soldiers into ten and twenty man

groups fell upon two separated Marine rifle companies. The furious hand to hand fight went on for about thirty five minutes.

Tanks Maneuver Through Battlefield

The morning's final push began at 0900 assisted by medium tanks supporting Company I in the middle, Company K on the left and Company L on the right. These companies of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla J. Dyess, along with companies A, C, and E. The two battalion landing teams pushed forward along the east and west coasts of Namur. By 1100 the 3rd Battalion reached Nora Point and both battalions were in sight of one another. The supporting tanks were then sent to the rear and direct fire support was provided by half tracks. By 1215 the 1st Battalion and Company L secured Natalie Point and all that remained was mopping up. Lieutenant Colonel Dyess personally led the final assault and, while standing in a parapet directing a group of infantry in a flanking attack, was killed by enemy machine gun fire. At 1418 General Schmidt, Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division, announced the end of all organized resistance and declared the island secured. All that remained was to dig out a few remaining Japanese from the undergrowth and secure the fifty five small islets that made up the rest of the northern part Kwajalein Atoll. The 25th Regimental Combat Team occupied the remaining fifty islands between 2 and 7 February. No resistance was encountered. In 2½ days of fighting the 4th Marine Division suffered 737 causalities, of which 190 were killed or died of wounds. The Japanese losses totaled 3,472 dead, with 51 Japanese and forty Korean laborers captured.

The quicker than expected victory on Kwajalein and Roi-Namur hastened the plans to seize the remainder of the Marshalls. Engebi Island was captured on 17 February and the islets around it on 18-19 February. The assault on Eniwetok began on 18 February and concluded on 21 February. The job to capture the remainder of the islands in the Marshalls fell to the 22nd Marines. By 22 April, the conquest of the Marshall Islands, except for Wotje, Mille, Jaluit, and Maloelap was completed. Those islands were left to "wither on the vine" and were constantly harassed by American planes and ships.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Destruction (top)

Marines Advancing on the Battlefield (middle)

Funeral (bottom)

Strategic and Tactical Significance of The Marshall Islands Campaign

While the strategic victory at the Coral Sea blunted the Japanese advance toward Australia, the American victory at Midway ended the Japanese offensive in the Central Pacific. However, the Japanese still possessed the strategic initiative as the primary theater of battle shifted to the fighting in the Solomons-New Guinea-New Britain region of the South Pacific. The hard fought attrition battles in this area during 1942-1943 drained the Japanese army and navy of experienced soldiers, sailors and airmen while inflicting grievous matériel damage to both sides. The disparity in Japanese and American economic power meant that the former were unable to replace their losses fully while the latter not only replaced losses, but was able to increase its armed power. Nevertheless while the strategic initiative had passed from Japan, it had not yet been picked up by the United States. Before the Marshalls campaign it was conceivable that the Japanese might attempt to retrieve the initiative.

Marines Climbing Down Nets from a Transport into a Landing Craft

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

The success of the campaign in the Marshalls exposed the Japanese weakness in the Central Pacific, allowed the United States to seize the initiative by accelerating the operational tempo of the war. The quick seizure of the Marshalls led to bypassing Truk and the rest of the Carolines and mounting an invasion of the Marianas in June 1944. The success in the Marshalls made the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions as well as the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions available for use in the Marianas. In addition, it made the 1st Marine Division available to invade the Palaus and allowed Admiral Nimitz to transfer the 7th and 77th Infantry Divisions to the SWPA to invade the Philippines.

Within one week, one of the most complicated amphibious campaigns of World War II had been mounted and brought to a successful conclusion. The cost in men and matériel was far lower than the cost paid for the Gilberts. Only 4.7 percent of the troops committed on Kwajalein Atoll were casualties. The small number of Army and Marine Corps casualties was the result of careful planning and preparation that thoroughly assimilated the lessons learned at Tarawa, overwhelming American air, land and sea power and bad Japanese tactics. These tactics included not guarding the entrances to the lagoons with artillery and mines or planting underwater obstacles and mines on the approaches to the beaches to supplement the beach defenses already in place. The Japanese defensive plan appeared to be a tenacious defense in a maze of previously prepared positions.

The seizure of the Gilberts and the Marshalls also liberated the Army and Marines from the tyranny of their reliance on land based aircraft for air support. In doing so, both naval and air doctrine changed. Now American forces would rely on aircraft carrier mobility and move quickly towards their next objectives, the Marianas and the Philippines. In a period of less than 90 days, the United States acquired and began to exploit the strategic initiative in the Pacific War. In other words, the combined operations against the Gilberts and the Marshalls confirmed the Joint Chiefs Staff's opinion that the Central Pacific route to the Philippines and Japan was the easiest and most profitable one and the economy of force used in the campaign made a large body of troops available to accelerate that drive and later the drive in the Southwest Pacific.

At Kwajalein, the Navy served as the chief coordinating service and showed exactly what was involved in mastering the art of combining all arms in an amphibious assault—striking successfully across the seas. Even though the nature of the Pacific War changed after the Marshalls were seized, the innovations made in that campaign were important and served the Army and Navy in both the European and Pacific theaters.

Perhaps the most important innovation at Kwajalein was the amphibious headquarters ship. Introduced in the Mediterranean, it was sorely missed at Tarawa and decisively proved its worth at Kwajalein. The most effective weapon in the American arsenal was accurate, concentrated gunfire delivered from the land, the sea and the air, designed to kill as many Japanese as possible. A third factor in the Kwajalein victory was the improvements made to ship-to-shore techniques. In particular, shallow draft gunboats equipped with 20-mm, 40-

mm guns and rockets provided last minute gunfire support to the assault troops—these became a permanent part of amphibious warfare.

Other innovations included the first use of Underwater Demolition Teams in combat, the first large-scale use of amphibious trucks (DUKWs) and increased use of naval star shells to illuminate the areas behind friendly lines to frustrate the standard night infiltration tactics of the Japanese. The amphibious assault on Kwajalein Atoll set the standard pattern for this operation for the rest of the war, even though the nature of the Pacific War changed. There would be heavy and prolonged air and naval bombardment of the beachhead, supplemented by shelling from land based artillery as long as possible. Underwater Demolition Teams were used for reconnaissance, intelligence and to remove obstacles from the paths of the landing craft. Last minute gunfire support for the assault troops was supplied by from shallow draft gunboats and the troops themselves would be transported to the beachhead in amphibious tractors.

Landing Craft in the Lagoon

The tactics employed in the Marshalls showed the Army, Navy and Marine Corps cooperating and willing to learn from each other. All eagerly put the lessons learned at Tarawa and Makin to use very quickly. All cooperated in an exemplary fashion and good feeling and mutual respect between them was perhaps at its height in February 1944. Sympathetic understanding for each other's problems and exemplary levels of cooperation and coordination was the rule at Kwajalein.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign



Self - Guided Battlefield Tour

The Battle for Kwajalein, 1-4 February 1944

Kwajalein on the Day of the Invasion

STOP 1 – Landing Beaches – During World War Two, Kwajalein Island was much smaller than it is today. Since the war it has been enlarged with fill to accommodate mission requirements. Olympus Drive generally marks the location of the original shoreline on the western tip of the island. This Japanese pillbox was part of the defenses to guard these

beaches from amphibious landings and housed two or more 7.7mm machine guns. A 1995 archeological investigation suggest that this structure was so heavily damaged that American troops repaired the concrete in some places so it could be used for their own defense systems.

LCVPs Approaching the Line of Departure

Major General Charles H. Corlett's 7th Infantry Division landed on the part of the island at 0930 on February 1, 1944. Within fifteen minutes an additional 1,200 soldiers of the 7th Division landed to support the advance. Additional troops in LCVPs approaching the Line of Departure were landed throughout the operation. The 184th Infantry Regiment led the assault along the lagoon side of the island with the airfield on their right flank, while the 32nd Infantry Regiment had the ocean to their right and the airfield on their left.

Fire Support from Carlos and Carlson

First Night Of The Battle

STOP 2 – The 32nd Infantry Regiment's first day's advance concluded about 100 yards behind you, inside what is now the ammunition storage area. The 3rd Battalion, 184th Infantry set up night defense positions on the opposite side of the island. By the end of the first day American forces had grown to 6 infantry and 1 engineer battalions, along with 60 tanks and various support units. During the day most of the Japanese had fought from inside bunkers and pillboxes, but as night fell, the Japanese emerged from their positions to counter attack under cover of a chilling rainstorm.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign





These maps show Kwajalein Today, with the Locations of the Battlefield Markers, the Landings and First Two Days of the Battle on Kwajalein Island

S.L.A. Marshall Interview

The holes were everywhere. Each one had to be searched from close up. Every spot where a man might be hiding had to be stabbed out. So greatly was the beach littered with broken foliage that it was like looking though a haystack for a few poisoned needles….

The fire which cut the men down came from the side holes farther up the line. It was the kind of bitter going that made it necessary for the junior leaders to prod their men constantly. The leader of the 3rd Squad had been trying to get his men forward against the fire. Private First Class John Treager got up, rushed forward about ten yards, hit the dirt, fired a few shots with his BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), and crumpled with a bullet in his head.



Diagram of a Typical Field Fortification System

Somewhat further along, a bayonet was seen sticking up through a patch of fronds. The Jap crouched within it hadn't room to draw in the whole length of the weapon.

Private First Class Edward Fiske fired his BAR at the hole; the dried fronds caught fire from the tracers. At that point, Fiske ran out of ammunition.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Private First Class Julian Guterrez then took up the fire with is M1 (rifle). He stood directly above the hold and fired down into it. Then the hold exploded; the Jap inside had turned a grenade on himself. A man's shattered arm came flying out of the hole and hit Guterrez on the shoulder, splattering blood all over his face and clothing. The arm bounced off and fell to the side. As Guterrez looked at it, fascinated and horror-stricken, he saw another bayonet rising out of a patch of fronds just beyond the outstretched and still quivering fingers. He yelled to the man behind him. The man relayed a grenade and Guterrez pitched it with all of his might into the patch of fronds. It erupted in a shower of palm leaves and blood and flesh.

Guterrez reeled over toward the lagoon to cleanse himself of the blood. Before he could reach the water, in sight of all other men, he vomited all over the beach. Minutes passed before he could gather himself together again.

Photo of Japanese Field Fortifications

STOP 3 – Ammunition Bunker – By the end of February 2, the 32nd and 184th Infantry Regiments had secured the Japanese airfield. This surviving bunker was part of a vast array of Japanese defensive structures that once dotted the island. Most were destroyed or buried

by development during the post war years. This bunker was built to service several machine gun pillboxes in this area. One of its associated pillboxes has also survived and is located on the shoreline about 90 yards south of your current position. It was captured in the morning of February 2, 1944, by the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. As the 32nd continued its drive up the island, the Japanese mounted stiff resistance and the American infantrymen were required to reduce each pillbox and strong point along the way. At the end of the day the 32nd Infantry halted and dug in for the night near the end of the present runway, about 1200 yards east of this point.

Japanese Concrete Rifle Pit

STOP 4 – This seldom visited Japanese fighting position includes a magazine and firing pit for a machine gunner or rifleman. Its small window allowed an assistant gunner to pass ammunition from the magazine to the firing pit. The entire structure was covered with earth up to the top deck at the time of battle. The 7th Division soldiers faced approximately fifteen of these rifle pits on Kwajalein. This is the only surviving example of this type of structure. Post was photographs reveal that this particular structure received little damage during the battle. Most of the deterioration was caused by erosion from heavy surf.



Battlefield Markers 3 and 4



Beach Sniper Post and Adjoining Ammunition Shelter

Meal Break Behind a Pillbox (note the corpse of a Japanese soldier)

STOP 5 – The Third Day And The Admiralty Area – American commanders expected to face light Japanese resistance and final victory on February 3, however, they were mistaken. The defense around the Admiralty Area proved to be much more formidable that expected. Named by American intelligence officers because of the suspected location of the Japanese Navel headquarters, it was heavily developed with large numbers of supply and administrative buildings. This area had been reduced to rubble by bombing, thus it provided excellent cover for the Japanese defenders. The 7th Infantry Division did not even reach its first objective of the day near present day 6th Street, despite the loss of 310 men. Over 1,100 Japanese defenders died, many by suicide. In a large blockhouse over 200 Japanese were found dead of self-inflicted wounds.

S.L.A. Marshall Interview

Weird things can happen in such fighting. A Japanese officer charged a U.S. tank with just his bare saber. In the dusk one evening Japanese riflemen tried to walk into the American lines carrying palm branches in front of their bodies so they would not be seen. A U.S. infantryman carrying a flame-thrower approached a pillbox, and out through its door

bolted a Japanese officer in counterattack. He was squirting a fire extinguisher towards the flame gun. The liquid doused the American soldier as he let the flame go. The Japanese officer dropped dead at his feet, burned to a crisp.

STOP 6 – Bunker Hill – Stiff opposition continued to the last day of the battle as American soldiers pushed the Japanese to your present position. (Nike Road in front of the marker is the end of World War II island. The area beyond Nike Road is earthen fill added in 1964.) The mound to the front of the marker is all that remains of a Japanese 5 inch dual purpose gun. "G" Company, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment mounted the assault against this position late in the afternoon of February 4th. Kwajalein was officially declared secure by General Corlett, at 1610 hours (4:10 P.M.). Fighting continued, however, against scattered Japanese resistance for another few hours. By the end of the 4th, another 317 Americans would be killed or wounded from the stubborn Japanese resistance. Captain Albert W. Pence of "G" Company would become one of the last American casualties when he was shot near your present location at about 1900 hours (7 P.M.).

Casualties for the 7th Division on all the southern atolls were killed 142, wounded: 845. Japanese casualties amounted to: killed 4,938 and captured 206, including 127 were Koreans.

Battlefield Markers 5 and 6



Tanks on the Battlefield

Casualties for the campaign in the Marshalls was best summed up by Marine Corps General Holland Smith who concluded that "very few recommendations can be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in the Marshalls." While the Marshalls were the last of the coral atolls captured in the Pacific Theater, it provided a testing ground for the lessons learned at Tarawa and proved amphibious operations could be successful. Strategically, their capture made it possible to launch the drive against the Marianas at a far earlier date than had originally been anticipated, and therefore, in the words of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, "we [could] get on with the war."



Kwajalein Island



Roi-Namur Island

The Battle for Roi – Namur, 1-2 February 1944

Roi

STOP 1 – Roi Invasion Beaches – The assault on Roi and Namur was to be carried out by the 4th Marine Division. The plans called for the Navy to secure the pass inside the lagoon and then Marine elements would seize and secure the outlying islands. Once secured, the islets would serve as bases for artillery to support the main force landing in a coordinated assault on Roi and Namur. The wartime intelligence photographs of Roi suggest an island similar in appearance to the one you now see. The current airfield is an enlargement of the Japanese one, from which Japanese fighters flew sorties against Americans. You are standing on an area of beach that is close to the center of the Marine advance. The 1st Battalion, 23d Marines was responsible for the area designated RED Beach 2, while 2nd Battalion, 23d Marines landed in an area designated by the invasion planners as Red Beach 3 (see maps). Landing craft of the 23d Marine Regimental Combat Team came ashore on the beach you can see from this location at 1133 hours (11:33 A.M.) on February 1, 1944, and under light opposition moved across present-day Perimeter Road towards their objectives on the north side of the island.



This map of Roi-Namur today shows the various stops on this battlefield tour – Stops One and Two of the Battle Tour

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

STOP 2 – Wendy Point – As you look to your left you will notice a chain of islets. The first two, Ennuebing (nearest) and Mellu, were seized by the Marines, on January 31, in order to secure the ocean channel into the lagoon and to serve as a base for artillery and supplies. Actor Lee Marvin, then a private, was wounded while helping to secure Mellu Island. The point of land to your left was designated Wendy Point by the American intelligence officers. In 1944, it contained Japanese defensive positions consisting of rifle pits and communications trenches. The Japanese did not begin to fortify the lagoon side of the islands until late 1943; therefore, the heavier, permanent defenses were located on the northern shore of the islands. The defenders expected the Imperial Japanese Navy to play a much greater role in defense of the islands that was actually the case. An earlier Japanese plan, designated Plan Z, called for their fleet to sortie from Truk and serve as the islands' primary defense.

Marines Taking Cover Behind Palm Trees and Leaves

Self-Guided Battlefield Tour

Combat Report 3/25 Marines, 4th Marine Division

D-DAY (31 January 1944)

Reveille sounded at 0500 and D-Day had arrived. The LCVPs and LCMs were lowered at about 0530. After chow, the troops waited quietly for their turn to disembark. From the transport area, the bombing and selling of CAMOUFLAGE (Namur), BURLESQUE (Roi), JACOB and IVAN could be seen diving in to drop bombs and strafe, and then pulling out again. Columns of smoke arose from CAMOUFLAGE and BURLESQUE while the bombing continued. At 0800, the troops commenced debarkation. The transport changed position in the transport area on two occasions, but debarkation continued until all troops were in the small boats. The sea was not calm, and, as a result many of the Marines found themselves wishing the boats would head for the beach instead of circling in the transport area. The waves then moved to the LVT transfer area at mid-day. The first three or four waves transferred to LVTs, and, on signal that JACOB Pass was clear, moved into the lagoon. The LCIs could be seen up ahead shelling ALBERT and ALLEN.

STOP 3 – Japanese Cemetery – This small Japanese cemetery was dedicated to the memory of nearly 3,500 Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen who died while defending Roi and Namur. Immediately after the battle thousands of Japanese dead were interred in common graves. Following the war, some of the Japanese remains were removed to Japan. You should turn left on the next road and continue until you reach an intersection, then turn right on to Speedball Road.

STOP 4 – Japanese 5" Guns – As you approach the north shore, or ocean side, you will see an increasing number of fortifications. Continue on Speedball Road until you reach the only surviving large gun position on either Roi-Namur or Kwajalein. As you stand behind this Japanese five-inch gun position and look seaward, you hold the view of the Japanese defenders who were waiting for an ocean side attack that never came. As you look seaward, you will notice the remains of a fire direction mount. On your left rear is the ammunition storage facility that held the ammunition to serve the guns. Continue on Speedball Road to Pandanus Road and the battlefield marker located next to building 8176.



Stops Three, Four and Five of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

STOP 5 – End Of Marine Advance – As discussed at the previous site, most of the Japanese defensive structures were located to provide a defense from an ocean side invasion (note their location on the marker map). Now, look directly north to see the

end of the line of advance that concluded at 1800 (6:00 P.M.) on February 1. If you wish to visit a nearly intact pillbox proceed down the road behind building 8132 to the KYZI-FM building (No. 8161) and west along the beach. While the Marines advanced across open ground, they enjoyed the advantage of being able to attack the fortified positions to the rear. (As you begin a more in-depth examination of the Japanese fortifications, it is essential to be a safe battlefield explorer. The highly corrosive atmosphere has seriously deteriorated the World War II fortifications therefore, it is important that you not go inside the bunkers.) These pill boxes served as command posts for specific areas of the beach and were placed to provide interlocking fields of fire into an invasion force. The troops inside would fire machine guns from inside of the accordion like gun ports. The specially designed openings prevented all but direct fire from entering the bunkers. These were caused by Marine small-arms fire. Continue east on Pandanus Road to the next marker.



Diagram of a Japanese Pillbox on Roi

STOP 6 – Pfc Richard Anderson – Near this location Marine Private Richard B. Anderson, while taking a Japanese emplacement under attack, dropped an American hand grenade. In order to save the lives of his fellow Marines, he threw himself on the grenade. This location also marks the end of the advance of the left flank of the 23d Marines (see maps). They successfully secured their objective by 1700 (5:00 P.M.) on February 1. Another Japanese pillbox is located on the beach. This fortification, unlike the previous one, has been severely damaged by air and naval bombardment. Despite the heavy damage the small arms fire at the rear of the pillbox suggests some defenders survived to resist the advance. As you move back onto Eleanor Wilson Road, you will see a Japanese sea wall constructed about 1939. Continue south on Eleanor Wilson Road until you reach the headquarters of the Japanese air commander.

Self-Guided Battlefield Tour

Stop Six of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour



Moving across Roi

STOP 7 – Japanese Air Headquarters – The building was used as the headquarters from which the Japanese commander and his staff implemented the Imperial Japanese strategy for air operations. The long cylindrical structure adjacent to the headquarters building is an air raid shelter. Originally, these shelters were covered with earth for camouflage and additional protection. The Japanese military complex on Roi-Namur was more that a stationary airfield, it was also an important logistical center and base of operations for Japanese submarines. You have now completed the tour of the Roi battlefield. To continue your tour move south on Eleanor Wilson Road to Copra Road. Turn left and continue east to the intersection of Copra and TRADEX Roads.

Namur

(During the World War II Campaign, Roi and Namur were connected by a narrow causeway. The land between the two islands today is the result of fill.)



Stops Seven, Eight and Nine of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

STOP 8 – Green Beach 1 – At the intersection of Copra and TRADEX Roads looks south towards the lagoon. You can see GREEN Beach 1, where the 3d Battalion, 24th Marine Regimental Combat Team landed at 1145 (11:45 A.M.) on February 1. In 1944 a series of Japanese defenses consisting of rifle pits, communications trenches, and anti-tank ditches stretched from your right to what is now a fill area and to your left to Yokahoma Pier. The small concrete pillbox almost directly in front of you proved to be especially troublesome to the Marines until it was reduced by naval gunfire. Immediately north of where you are standing was the Japanese refrigeration building. It is painted silver and attached to the KREMS warehouse. Continue east on Copra Road until it intersects with a dirt road and stand behind the battlefield marker.

STOP 9 – Green Beach 2 – Orient yourself behind the marker and take note of the photograph in the lower right hand corner which shows U.S. Marines dismounting from an amphibious tractor. Study the photograph, and then turn toward the beach. There you will see Yokohama Pier, originally constructed by the Japanese and still in use today (see maps). During the invasion it served as a reference point for the 24th Marine Regimental Combat Team which landed at GREEN Beach. Follow the dirt road to the two large Japanese structures and continue to the marker on your left.



Map of Roi and Namur, 1944

Second Lieutenant John C. Chapin, 24th Marines

By now everything was all mixed up, with our assault wave all entangled with the armored tractors ahead of us. I ordered my driver to maneuver around them. Slowly we inched past, as their 37mm guns and .50-cal. machine guns flamed. The beach lay right before us. However, it was shrouded in such a pall of dust and smoke from our bombardment that we could see very little of it. As a result, we were unable to tell which section we were approaching (after all our hours of careful planning, based on hitting the

beach at one exact spot!) I turned to talk to my platoon sergeant, who was managing the machine gun right beside me. He was slumped over – the whole right side of his head disintegrated into a mass of gore. Up to now, the entire operation had seemed almost like a movie, or like one of the innumerable practice landings we'd made. Now one of my men lay in a welter of blood beside me, and the reality of it smashed into my consciousness. (Excerpt from Captain John C. Chapin, USMC (Ret), *Breaking the Outer Ring: Marine Landing in the Marshall Islands*, from the Marines in World War II Commemorative Series.)

On the Beach on Namur

STOP 10 – Marine Advance - The two buildings you just passed, served as Japanese diesel fuel storage facilities for the submarines that operated out of Namur. Your present position places you approximately in the center of the advance of "F" and "A" Companies on the Marine right flank about 1300 (1:00 P.M.) on February 1. From your present position look at the area a few hundred yards to your left. In 1944, it was the site of a Japanese ammunition storage building (see maps). One of the lessons learned from the battle of Tarawa was the requirement for specially trained combat engineers, known as boat teams by the Marines, to neutralize enemy fortifications with satchel charges or Bangalore torpedoes. At 1305 (1:05 P.M.) on February 1, the Marine advance was held up by automatic fire from the building. A Marine boat team moved in and threw a satchel charged inside of the structure. Unknown to

the Marines, the building was filled with high explosives. The resultant explosion threw debris hundreds of feet into the air and created such a heavy, choking smoke that some believed that the Japanese had launched a gas attack. One Marine, who was headed ashore in an assault boat, described a shock wave that was so strong that it literally stopped the boat in its place. The explosion disrupted communications and all but stopped the advance on Namur for the remainder of the day. Continue your tour by taking the left fork on the dirt road in front of you. As you intersect with another dirt road take a left and proceed north about 100 yards to a pillbox.

"Great God Almighty! The whole damn island has blown up!" On the beach another officer recalled that "trunks of palm trees and chunks of concrete as large as packing crates were flying through the air like match sticks….The hole left where the blockhouse stood was as large as a fair-sized swimming pool." (Marine artillery spotter at 1,000 feet)

The Torpedo Warehouse Explosion

STOP 11 – Nadine Point – You are entering the Japanese defensive position code-named Nadine Point by American intelligence officers. The entire area was a honeycomb of interconnected trenches. These trenches, designed to provide support and communications to the large pillbox, were discovered in 1995 during an archaeological survey of the island. The battleship U.S.S. Maryland provided fire-support to the Marines and many of the marks on the pillbox are from the Maryland's projectiles.



Stops Ten and Eleven of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

STOP 12 – Sally Point – The area around the air raid shelter and along the shoreline was another Japanese defensive complex called Sally Point. Japanese troops from this point poured heavy fire into the Marines, as they attempted to secure positions on GREEN Beach. Continue through Sally Point to the intersection of Copra and Surf Roads. Turn right on Surf Road and stop at the large ammunition bunkers.

STOP 13 – Ammunition Storage Building – The ammunition bunker you see is identical to the bunker that caused the large explosion (described in stop 10) and the delay in the advance. As you walk around the building notice the marks from the small arms fire and the heavy projectile penetration of the building. When you come upon the double door, look for holes burned though the doors, most likely by high explosive anti-tank rockets fired from a 2.36-inch bazooka. Proceed on Surf Road and turn left on a dirt road and move to the intersection of ALTAIR Road.



Stops Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

STOP 14 – Lieutenant John Powers – The push on the left flank was spear-headed by the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines. The Japanese inside their fortifications directed heavy fire into the advancing Marines and the advance began to slow. Lieutenant John V. Power posthumously received the Medal of Honor for his actions in neutralizing an enemy pillbox. As you continue your advance on ALTAIR Road you will come abreast of an air raid shelter on your left. Stop at the shelter and look to the right. A mine from your position to Nadine Point marks the end of the first day of the Marines' advance on Namur (see maps). The massive explosion of the Japanese explosives storage building (stop 10) not only held up the Marine advance, it also provided the Japanese with an opportunity to recover and better organize their defenses.

Second Lieutenant John C. Chapin

A little later I encountered another lieutenant from our company, Jack Power. He had been hit in the stomach but was still fighting. Crouching behind a concrete wall, he showed me a pillbox about 25 feet away that was full of Japs who were still very much alive and full of fight. This strong point commanded the whole area around us and was holding up our advance very effectively. It was about 50 feet long and 15 feet wide, constructed of double rows of sand-filled oil drums. Grabbing the nearest men, we explained our plan of attack and went to work. With a couple of riflemen, Jack covered the rear entrance with fire. Taking

another man and a high-explosive Bangalore torpedo, I crawled around the front and observed for a few minutes. Then we inched our way up to the silt that served as a front entrance, and I threw a grenade in to keep down any Jap who might be inclined to poke a rifle out in our faces.

Next we lighted the fuse on the Bangalore, jammed it inside the pillbox, and scrambled for shelter. The fuse was very short, we knew, and barely had tumbled into a nearby shell hole when we were overwhelmed by the last of the Bangalore. Dirt sprayed all over us, billowing acrid smoke blinded us, and the numbering concussion deafened us. In a few moments we felt all right once more, and a glance told us that we had closed that entrance permanently. We worked our way back to where we'd left Jack Power, and found that he'd managed to locate a shaped charge of high explosives in the meantime. Taking this, we repeated our job – this time blowing the rear entrance hut.

A Single Japanese Soldier Surrenders to Marines in Front of an Ammunition Bunker

That took care of that pillbox! Jack looked like he was in pretty bad shape, and I urged him to get some medical attention, but he refused and moved on alone to the next Jap pillbox (where, I later learned, he was killed in a single-handed heroic attack for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor)."

Self-Guided Battlefield Tour

STOP 15 – Private Richard Sorensen – By nightfall the Japanese had managed to regroup and launch a series of uncoordinated but vicious counterattacks against the dug-in Marines. During one such attack, near your present location, Marine Private Richard K. Sorenson rolled on a Japanese hand grenade and absorbed the blast in order to protect his fellow Marines. Private Sorenson, who received the Medal of Honor, survived and was a guest of the U.S. Army at the 50th Anniversary of the invasion of Roi and Namur in 1994. Continue down the dirt road to the shoreline to the next marker.

Sorenson Interview – 1994

As I mentioned, we landed just left of the pier and our objective was to move up to the end of the island. Toward sundown the unit I was with had moved quite rapidly and because of the explosion to our right, which had almost decimated half of G company, it had slowed them down Just before dark, General Hart wanted to straighten out the line because we were forward, and we were exposing our right flank and so he gave the word, "Go Back." But there was always that ten percent that don't get the word. And there was about thirty of us that were up in pockets up here that weren't notified to pull back to a main line of resistance. The next morning, when it became daylight, we found ourselves completely surrounded with Japanese, and it was during that time that the grenade occurred. We had other wounded with us, and it took a while to evacuate them. They couldn't, until our people behind us broke through and relived us, and they didn't know we were there, and we were subjected to our own mortar and machine gun fire for a while until they found out we were up there. That's basically what occurred. As I say I'm, we were pretty close to the water. We withdrew probably fifty yards or so and there was lots of debris in the center but there were two pockets and at one end we had a light machine gun and at the other end we had another light pile of debris in between them and sort of holed up and then there were several other holes ten, fifteen yards away on both sides that were occupied by other infantrymen. I'd say there were about thirty-five. But after that that's all I remember.



Stops Fifteen, Sixteen and Seventeen of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

STOP 16 – Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla Dyess – The last organized resistance took place around the area in which you are now standing. The remaining defenders waited for the final Marine onslaught. On the morning of February 2, the Marines launched their final assault converging from the right a left flanks on the Japanese position (see map). The assault was led by Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla J. Dyess, who was mortally wounded during the last action on the island. Return on the same path. Pass TRADEX/ALCOR complex and move south on TRADEX Road. Continue on TRADEX Road to a series of Japanese structures on your left.

STOP 17 – Japanese Support Complex – The Complex that stands before you includes (from left to right): torpedo workshop, oxygen generating plant, fuel storage building, and the main power plant. The Fourth Marine Association has erected a plaque which lists those Americans who paid the ultimate sacrifice in this battle to defeat Imperial Japan. Namur was officially declared secure at 1418 (2:18 P.M.) on February 2, 1944, after two and one-half days of fighting. American losses on Roi-Namur included 3,472 killed in action. Fifty-one Japanese were captured along with 40 Korean laborers.

Clearing a Dugout



Kwajalein Island in the Distance

Appendices

Appendix A: Chronology

From the Road to War to the Seizure of The Gilbert and the Marshall Islands (Operations Galvanic, Flintlock and Catchpole) September 1931—February 1944

1931

18 September	Japan invaded Manchuria.

1932

1 March	Manchukuo established.
15 May	Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi assassinated by Army faction.

Prime Minister Inukai

1933

March	Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.

1934

May	Amau Doctrine promulgated: Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia that challenged Washington's Open Door policy.

1936

26 February	A portion of elite Imperial Guards Division attempted a coup d'etat in Tokyo to "free the emperor from his corrupt advisors."
29 February	Coup attempt failed; mutineers arrested, tried, convicted and executed. "Conservative" faction gained control of the Japanese army.
25 November	Japan signed Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

12 December — Xian Incident: President Chiang Kai-shek arrested by dissident faction of Manchurian army. He was released after negotiations brokered by Chinese Communists.

25 December — President Chiang reached Nanjing and 2nd United Front (anti-Japanese alliance) with the Communists announced.

Chiang Kai-shek

1937

19 January — Japan formally withdrew from the Washington and London Naval Treaties restricting the size of its navy.

5 July — Formal agreement between Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party announced.

7 July — Chinese and Japanese troops clashed near Beijing (Marco Polo Bridge Incident).

27 July — Japan proclaimed a "new order" for East Asia and "total war" against China.

13 August — Japanese bombed Shanghai, beginning of China Incident.

6 October — Nine Power Conference meets in Brussels, recommended economic sanctions against Japan; action vetoed by U.S.—conference failed.

24 November — Japanese landed Hangchow Bay near Shanghai to outflank 18th Route Army. Chinese retreated upriver to Nanjing.

12 December — Japanese planes sank U.S. gunboat *Panay* on Yangzi River.

13 December — Nanjing fell to Japanese army (3 month long spate of atrocities labeled Nanjing Massacre ensued).

1938

March — Japanese National Mobilization Law promulgated.

17 May — Vinson-Trammel Naval Expansion Act passed into law.

11 July — Battle of Chang Ku-feng between Japanese and Soviet armies.

21 October — Japanese army and navy seized Canton.

Appendix A: Chronology

25 October — Japanese army took Hankow; Chinese government retreats to Chungking.

1939

7 March — Japan announced renewal of Naval Expansion Law.

31 March — Japan occupied Hainan and Spratley Islands.

24 July — Arita-Craigie Agreement: British recognized Japanese interests in China.

President Roosevelt

26 July — FDR announced abrogation of 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Friendship with Japan to take effect in January 1940.

20 August — Battle of Nomohon between Japanese and Soviet armies ended.

23 August — Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact signed.



Imperial Powers in Asia and the Pacific

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

1940



Wang Jingwei

March	Wang Jingwei (protégé of Sun Yat-sen and rival to Chiang Kai-shek) sets up Japanese puppet government in Nanjing.
22 June	French Indochinese government (Vichy) closed Haiphong-Kunming Railway to China.
	British closed Burma Road.
26 September	FDR imposed embargo on scrap iron to Japan.
27 September	Japan joined Pact of Steel (Tripartite Pact) with Germany and Italy.
17 October	British re-opened Burma Road.



Far East and the Pacific, 1941

1941

7 January	Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku proposed Operation Z (Pearl Harbor raid) in letter to Naval Staff.

Appendix A: Chronology

31 January	Japan announced creation of "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (included Indochina and Thailand).
10 April	Admiral Yamamoto formed 1st Air Fleet (4 aircraft carriers, 200 planes).
22 June	Germany invaded the Soviet Union (Barbarossa).
2 July	Imperial Liaison Conference decided a. to adhere to the Tripartite Pact and the Nonaggression Pact with the Soviet Union b. war with the Soviet Union would be undertaken only under exceptionally favorable circumstances c. continue to negotiate with the United States and strengthen its own defenses d. continue to work to destroy the Chinese government e. continue with plans to dominate southern Indochina.
24 July	FDR placed embargo on crude oil exports to Japan.
25 July	Southern Indochina occupied.
26 July	FDR froze Japanese assets in the United States.
1 August	U.S. imposed aviation gas embargo upon Japan.
6 August	Japan's new proposal for reaching agreement with U.S.
8 August	Japan's proposed Konoe-Roosevelt meeting at Honolulu.
9 August	Army General Staff definitely decides not to attack Russia in 1941.
12 August	Peacetime conscription in U.S. extended by one vote.
16 August	Draft of "Essentials for Executing the National Purpose of the Empire" drawn up by Navy presented for discussion at staff meeting between Army and Navy.
17 August	U.S. asked for clearer statement from Japanese government on its attitude and plans as preliminary requirement for holding Konoe-Roosevelt meeting.

Admiral Yamamoto

President Roosevelt

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

18 August — While continuing deliberations on "Essentials for executing the National Purpose of the Empire," Army General Staff argued for immediate decision to go to war.

28 August — Konoe directly asked Roosevelt to agree to meeting in message.

Prime Minister Konoe

30 August — Agreement definitely reached at Army-Navy staff meeting on substance of "Essentials for Executing the National Purpose of the Empire."

3 September — Roosevelt replied to Konoe message, laying stress on necessity of preliminary discussion on fundamental and essential questions between U.S. and Japan. Liaison Conference convened to make decision on "Essentials for Executing the National Purpose of the Empire."

5 September — Cabinet meeting held to approve above decision.

6 September — The "Essentials for Executing the National Purpose of the Empire" was sanctioned at the conference in the Imperial Presence. Its essence was as follows:

a. Determine not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with America (and England and Holland); in order to secure our national existence, we will proceed with war preparations so that they will be completed approximately toward the end of October.

b. At the same time, we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed to by America (and England), together with the Empire's maximum concessions, which are embodied in the attached document.

c. If, by the early part of October, there is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we would immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland).

Konoe and Ambassador Grew

6 September — After the Conference, Konoe met Ambassador Grew in hope that his strong desire to talk with Roosevelt in order to avoid war be more fully understood in Washington.

25 September — Japan makes new proposal in line with "Basic Principles for Realizing Peace Between Japan and China," adopted at Liaison Conference on September 20.

Appendix A: Chronology

2 October — Hull note to, expressing reluctance on part of U.S. government to hold Konoe-Roosevelt conference on grounds that no agreement had been reached as to basic principles and attitude between two governments.

Secretary of State Hull

5 October — Army reached the conclusion that Japan should immediately decide on going to war, in view of the hopelessness of further diplomatic efforts.

6 October — Navy defines attitude:

(1) Necessity for further diplomatic negotiations with America.

(2) Japan should agree to withdraw troops from China **in principle**. Question of withdrawing should not be regarded as constituting reasonable cause for Japan to go to war with America.

General Tojo

12 October — Conference of Five Ministers met at Konoe's private residence to discuss Japan's response to Hull note. Division in views clearly noted.

16 October — Fall of Konoe Cabinet.

18 October — General Tojo made Prime Minister and War Minister.

23-30 October — Liaison conference convened every day, except 26 October, to study 11 specific questions related to September 6 decision.

29 October — Navy Minister Shimada made up mind for waging war.

Admiral Shimada

30 October — Navy Minister expressed determination for war to senior officers of Navy Ministry.

1 November — Liaison Conference, lasting about 17 hours, confirmed substance of September 6 decision. New points:

(1) Deadline for diplomatic efforts extended to very end of November.

(2) Two proposals to be submitted to U.S. government. Proposal B represents new effort for *modus vivendi* and purported to set Japanese-U.S. relations back where they stood at beginning of July. If Japan withdraws troops from southern Indochina; U.S. will lift oil embargo and unfreeze Japanese assets.

5 November — Imperial Conference gives sanction to November 1 decision.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Ambassador Kurusu flew to U.S. to help Ambassador Nomura in negotiations.

Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu

7 November — Submits Proposal A to U.S. government.

20 November — Proposal B submitted to U.S. government.

26 November — U.S. government turns down Proposal B, taking stronger stand than previously.

27 November — Pearl Harbor attack force leaves the Kuriles. Attack could be canceled any time before the planes reached the point of no return if diplomatic circumstances warranted.

29 November — The group of ex-prime ministers (genrō) summoned to express views.

1 December — Imperial Conference made final decision on going to war with U.S.

7 December — Pearl Harbor attacked.

Japan invaded Malaya.

President Roosevelt Signing Declaration of War

8 December — Japan declared war on United States and Great Britain.

Clark Field, Philippines bombed (2nd Pearl Harbor).

9 December — Japanese invaded the Gilbert Islands.

10 December — Guam surrendered.

HMS *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* sunk.

General MacArthur

11 December — Japanese invasion of Burma began.

16 December — Japanese invaded Borneo.

22 December — Japanese invaded Philippines.

23 December — Wake Island surrendered.

MacArthur declared Manila an open city and withdrew Fil-American forces to Bataan and Corregidor.

24 December — MacArthur moved headquarters to Corregidor.

Appendix A: Chronology

25 December	Fall of Hong Kong to Japanese.
30 December	Borneo fell to Japanese.
31 December	Manila occupied by the Japanese.

1942

11 January	Japan invaded Netherlands East Indies.
20 January	Japan began major offensive in Burma.
1 February	Units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet made surprise naval and air attacks on Japanese air and naval bases at Roi, Kwajalein, Wotje, Taroa and Jaluit Islands in the Marshalls and Makin in the Gilberts.
15 February	Singapore surrendered to the Japanese.
19 February	Japanese bombed Darwin, Australia.
9 March	Java surrendered to Japanese.
10 March	Rangoon (Burma) fell to Japanese.
	Lexington and *Yorktown* raid Japanese landings in New Guinea.
13 March	Japanese landed in Solomon Islands.
5 April	Japanese 1st Air Fleet raided Ceylon.
9 April	Bataan surrendered.
18 April	Doolittle Raid on Tokyo.
28 April	Lashio (northern Burma) fell to Japanese; land route to China severed.
6 May	Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright surrendered all Fil-American forces in the Philippines.
7-8 May	Battle of Coral Sea.
20 May	Japanese completed conquest of Burma.
4-6 June	Battle of Midway

Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle

Lieutenant General Wainwright

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

2 July — Joint Chiefs of Staff approved opportunistic strategy: attack Japan in southwest Pacific—Guadalcanal and New Guinea.

17 August — Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson's 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, consisting of 221 Marines, moved by two submarines from Pearl Harbor to Makin and began a two day raid on Butaritari Island, during which scattered enemy forces are engaged and a radio station destroyed. Enemy planes attacked the Raiders on both days. Thirty Marines were lost in the action.

Lieutenant Colonel Carlson

1943



Japanese War Objectives and Planned Opening Attacks

Appendix A: Chronology



Vice Admiral Spruance

Admiral Halsey

Admiral Kincaid

15 March	Fleets in Pacific reorganized: 5th Fleet (Spruance) for Central Pacific; 3rd Fleet (Halsey) and 7th Fleet (Kincaid) Southwest Pacific.
11-25 May	Trident Conference in Washington. Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) decided to seize the Marshall Islands and to move against Japanese outer defenses. Trident Conference in Washington ends. General approval was given to the U.S. "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" calling for a drive on Japan through the Central Pacific.
27 May	Joint Staff Planners directed the Joint War Plans Committee to determine troop needs and suggest target dates for the invasion of the Marshall Islands, Pacific Ocean Area.
Mid-June	Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed Admiral Nimitz to submit plan for the occupation of the Marshalls.
1 July	Admiral Nimitz submitted concept for operations.
20 July	JCS directed Admiral Nimitz to seize bases in the Gilbert Islands and on Nauru and organize and train forces to operations in the Marshall Islands on 1 January 1944.
13 August	4th Marine Division organized.
18 August	Implementing the directive of 20 July 1943 to establish bases from which the assault on the Marshalls can be supported, an advance party landed on Nanomea, Ellice Islands, to reconnoiter and choose an airfield site.
20 August	Admiral Nimitz submitted outline plan for occupation of Kwajalein, Wotje and Maloelap.
22 August	An advance party of the 2nd Marine Airdrome Battalion landed at Nukufetau, Ellice Islands, where an air base was to be established.
17-24 August	At the Quadrant Conference at Quebec, routes of advance on Japan were laid out and operations in the Marshalls agreed to.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Rear Admiral Turner

Rear Admiral Pownall

24 August — V Amphibious Corps (VAC) formed, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner commanding.

1 September — JCS dispatched directive to Admiral Nimitz, allocating troops and naval forces for the invasion of the Marshall Islands.

16 September — 7th Infantry Division arrived at Oahu, Territory of Hawaii to begin preparations for the Marshalls.

19 September — Carrier and Army Air Forces planes made coordinated attacks on Tarawa, during which complete photographic coverage was obtained. The carrier force, Task Force (TF) 15 under Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall, included carriers *Belleau Wood*, *Princeton* and *Lexington*. The 11th Bombardment Group (Seventh Air Force) supplied the B-24s, which operate from Canton and Funafuti.

VAC estimated that the capture of Nauru with the forces available will be difficult.

20 September — 4th Marine Division assigned to VAC.

24 September — Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance recommended to Admiral Nimitz that an amphibious operation against Makin be substituted for the projected invasion of Nauru. This plan was subsequently accepted.

2 October — The 27th Infantry Division, previously authorized to plan for the invasion of Nauru, was notified that its mission will be to capture Makin Atoll in the Gilberts.

5 October — Commander-in-Chief Pacific—Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPAC—CINCPOA) issued plan for offensive in the Central Pacific. Admiral Spruance would seize Makin, Tarawa and Apamama in the Gilberts, cover amphibious landings on each with air and naval surface forces and deny the enemy use of bases in the Marshalls and at Nauru during the operation. D Day for landings were set for 19 November, later postponed to 20 November.

9 October — Nukufetau (Ellice Islands) airstrip ready for use.

12 October — Admiral Nimitz issued Operations Plan 16-43, the first formal operation plan for the Marshalls.

13 October — Photographic coverage of Makin Island obtained.

Appendix A: Chronology

20 October — Photographic coverage of Tarawa obtained.



Tarawa Map

12 November — The Southern Attack Force for Operation Galvanic (seizure of the Gilberts) completed rehearsal off New Hebrides.

13 November — The Southern Attack Force for Operation Galvanic departed from the New Hebrides. Pre-invasion air operations against the Gilberts began. B-24s from Funafuti bombed Tarawa without interception but met unusually heavy antiaircraft fire.



Original Strategic Conception and Situation, 1 November 1943

15 November — Major General Holland M. Smith issued Operations Plan 2-43, first over-all troop directive for the Marshalls.

16 November — Task Group-1 organized under VAC General Order No. 55-43.

17 November — During 13-17 November, heavy bombers from the Seventh Air Force flew 141 sorties against the Gilbert and Marshall Islands and dropped some 173 tons of bombs.

Major General H.M. Smith

19 November Land-based and carrier-based aircraft joined in the final bombardment of the Gilberts, Marshalls and Nauru to prepare for the invasion of the Gilberts.



Makin Atoll and Tarawa Atoll Maps

20 November U.S. forces invaded Makin and Tarawa Atolls (Operation Galvanic), opening a series of amphibious operations in the Central Pacific aimed ultimately at invading Japan. Air and naval gunfire bombardment preceded and closely supported assault teams. Aerial supremacy had already been achieved. At both atolls, landing forces were beset with supply difficulties and communications failures.



Appendix A: Chronology

Makin: TF 52's landing force (the 27th Infantry Division's 165th Infantry reinforced by the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry, tanks of the 193rd Tank Battalion and other supporting units), commanded by Major General Ralph C. Smith, invaded Makin. As a preliminary to the main invasion of Butaritari Island, largest of the Makin group, a special landing detachment sailed for Kotabu at 0645 and secured the island without opposition. The invasion of Butaritari began on schedule at 0830 when the 1st and 3rd Battalion Landing Teams (BLT), 165th Infantry started landing on Red Beaches 1 and 2 on the west coast. At 1041, about 10 minutes behind schedule, BLT 2 began landing on Yellow Beaches, located on the northern (lagoon) sore between On Chong's Wharf and King's Wharf. Both assault forces secured beachheads and with tank support pushed rapidly forward against light resistance, converging along the West Tank Barrier, where enemy opposition was overcome although a small pocket remained to the northwest. Artillery was emplaced on Ukiangong Point.

Major General R. Smith



Tarawa: TF 53's landing force (2nd Marines, 2nd Marine Division, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines and supporting units), commanded by Major General Julian C. Smith, invaded Betio Island,

located at the southwest tip of Tarawa atoll, where the airfield and the main enemy forces were located. The landings were made with great difficulty and very heavy casualties. Transports arrived south of the assigned area and at 0507 came under fire of the previously alerted enemy on Betio. While the transports were moving northward out of range of enemy guns, the warships attempted, with some success, to neutralize the enemy positions. Aircraft delivered brief strikes before the forces landed. Although H Hour was postponed from 0830 until 0900, first troops did not reach shore until 0910. Marines landed under direct fire, many wading from the partly exposed reef that fringes the coast. Upon reaching shore, landing teams became intermingled and disorganized. Landings were made on three adjacent beaches (Red Beaches 1, 2 and 3, from west to east) on the northwest coast. The 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, the Red Beach 1 assault force, gained a beachhead on the northwest tip of the island but was isolated there. In the center, the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines was pinned down by enemy fire on Red Beach 2. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, from the regimental reserve and the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines, from the division reserve, were committed. Fortunately, counterattacks, expected after nightfall, failed to materialize and the meager gains were held. Shortly before the invasion of Betio, a scout-sniper platoon cleared enemy positions from the main pier, partly burning it in the process.

Major General J. Smith



21 November **Makin**: The 2nd BLT, 165th Infantry, attacked on Butaritari Island, after air and artillery preparation, and overran the fortified area between the West

and East Tank Barriers as it pushed eastward to Stone Pier. The 1st BLT mopped up in the western part of the island and eliminated a pocket near the West Tank Barrier. A reconnaissance detail landed on Kuma Island early in the day, reconnoitered and withdrew.



Tarawa: Marines on Betio continued to meet grim opposition but strengthened their hold on the island assisted by aircraft, artillery and naval gunfire. Further reinforcements were landed, bringing the total number of battalions ashore to seven. The 6th Marines was released from the VAC reserve to the 2nd Marine Division and its 1st Battalion landed on Green Beach, on the western end of the island. The rest of the 8th Marines landed on Beach Red 2. The 3rd Battalion secured the entire western end of Betio (Green Beach), while the 1st and 2nd Battalions, moving from Beaches Red 2 and Red 3 pushed across the airfield to the south coast, splitting enemy forces. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines on Beach Red 3 made little progress during the day. Meanwhile artillery and naval gunfire directed against the eastern end of Betio prevented the enemy from escaping to the next island (Bairiki) and the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines landed on Bairiki after a preliminary bombardment that killed the few enemy troops there. While fighting was in progress on Betio, Company D, 2nd Tank Battalion started reconnoitering other islands of Tarawa Atoll.



The Eastern Mandates Campaign

22 November

Makin: After preparatory bombardment, the 3rd BLT, 165th Infantry took over the attack from the 2nd BLT and drove east on Butaritari well beyond the East Tank Barrier, which the enemy abandoned. Though the eastern tip of the island remained to be explored, Admiral Turner declared the island captured. General Ralph Smith assumed command ashore. On the night of 22-23 November, the Japanese were virtually wiped out when they made an unsuccessful counterattack. Steps were taken to cut off the enemy's escape from Butaritari: elements of Company A, 1st BLT made a waterborne move to the narrow neck of the island to intercept the enemy. A special detail moved to Kuma Island to halt enemy withdrawal there.



Tarawa: The Japanese on Betio underwent heavy air, naval and artillery bombardment as the battle for the island continued. The enemy was brought under cross fire as artillery was emplaced on Bairiki. Passing through 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines drove east along the south coast on a narrow front, making contact with the 2nd Marines and continuing to advance to the eastern end of the airfield. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, with elements of the 3rd Battalion attached passed east along the north coast to the eastern end of the airfield. The 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, attached to the 2nd Marines attacked a strongpoint between Red Beaches 2 and 1 and succeeded in containing it. By the end of the day, the enemy was compressed into the eastern part of Betio and retained a pocket between Red Beaches 1 and 2. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines landed on Green Beach and moved forward along the south coast behind the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. General Julian Smith established a Command Post (CP) ashore. During the night of 22-23 November, Japanese counterattacks were repelled by 1st Battalion, 6th Marines.

Appendix A: Chronology

23 November

Makin: Organized resistance on Butaritari Island ended at 1030 when advance elements of 3rd BLT, 165th Infantry reached the tip of the island. Re-embarkation of assault forces began.

Tarawa: The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, attacking through the 1st Battalion, reached the end of Betio shortly after 1300 and General Smith reported the end of organized resistance on Betio at 1330. The 8th Marines, less the 1st Battalion, moved to Bairiki. The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines moved from Bairiki to Betio and was given the task of securing the rest of the islands in Tarawa Atoll. The 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines moved to a village of Eita where the 3rd Platoon of Company D, 2nd Tank Battalion was attached to it.

24 November

Makin: The 165th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), less the 3rd Battalion left for Hawaii. The 3rd Battalion and miscellaneous units were left behind to conduct minor mopping up operations and to support construction forces. Command was turned over to Colonel Cleson H. Tenney, Garrison Force Commander. The 27th Infantry Division's casualties totaled 218, of whom 58 were killed and 8 died of wounds. Enemy casualties, aside from those subsequently inflicted during the mop up are estimated at 550, including 105 prisoners.

A Japanese submarine sunk the escort carrier USS *Liscombe Bay* off Makin; 644 persons aboard were lost.

Tarawa: Two of the 2nd Marine Division's regiments (8th and 2nd Marines) left for Hawaii. Embarking from Betio, 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, guided by scouts from the 2nd Tank Battalion began an uneventful search for the enemy on the island up along the east side of Tarawa Atoll.

25 November

Tarawa: After scouting about half way up the eastern side of the atoll, Company D, 2nd Tank Battalion was recalled to the village of Eita to prepare to reconnoiter other atolls. The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines continued its uneventful trek up Tarawa Atoll.

26 November

Tarawa: The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines reached Buariki, the last relatively large island of the atoll and prepared to attack the enemy forces believed to be there.

27 November

Tarawa: The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines cleared the enemy from Buariki. The small islet of Naa, at the northern tip of the atoll remained to be explored.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

28 November — **Tarawa**: The atoll was completely secured. No Japanese were found on Naa. Marine casualties on Tarawa totaled 3,301. Japanese losses were estimated to be 4,690 killed, 17 captured and 129 Koreans taken prisoner.

30 November — The 2nd Tank Battalion scouts reconnoitered Abaiang and Marakei Atolls north of Tarawa, finding 5 Japanese on the former.

1 December — The 2nd Tank Battalion scouts found Maiana Atoll free of enemy, concluding their mission.

4 December — **Tarawa**: Captain Jackson R. Tate, USN, Commander, Advanced Base, Tarawa, took command, relieving General Julian Smith. During December 1943 and January 1944, air bases were constructed in the Gilberts.
First aerial photo coverage of Kwajalein Atoll effected.



Appendix A: Chronology

5 December	Vice Admiral Yamada Michiyuki assumed command of Japanese aviation in the Marshalls.
7 December	Sextant Conference concluded at Cairo. CCS established a tentative timetable for the offensive against Japan: seizure of Marshalls and New Britain, January 1944; Manus, Admiralties, April 1944; Hollandia, New Guinea, June 1944; Marianas, October 1944.
14 December	Admiral Nimitz revised Operations Plan 16-43; target date postponed.

Admiral Nimitz

20 December	Admiral Nimitz issued final JCS Study, Flintlock II in which all changes have been ratified.

1944

3 January	Rear Admiral Turner issued Operations Plan A6-43; listing components (shipping and pre-D Day bombardment plan) and setting forth mission of Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51).
5 January	VAC Operations Plan 1-44 released, superseding Operations Plan 3-43.
6 January	Commander, Central Pacific issued Operations Plan for invasion of the Marshall Islands. 7th Infantry Division Field Order 1 called for occupation of Kwajalein in several phases.
13 January	Main body of TF 53 (4th Marine Division) departed San Diego. Campaign Plan Granite outlined the tentative operations to be conducted and a timetable. Carrier raid on Truk about 24 March in support of invasion of the Admiralties and Kavieng; capture of Eniwetok and Ujelang Atolls in the Marshalls (Catchpole), 1 May; capture of Mortlock and Truk in the Carolines, 1 August; invasion of the Marianas (Forager), 1 November). If Truk can be bypassed, it is proposed that the Palaus be invaded on 1 August; the 27th Infantry Division is alerted to prepare to seize Eniwetok.
22 January	Main body of Flintlock Assault Force (Joint Expeditionary Force), largest U.S. force assembled in the Pacific thus far (54,000 troops and 297 ships), sailed from Hawaii for the Marshalls. Enemy interception of land-based planes over Kwajalein ceased.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

23 January — Attack force reserve for Flintlock and Majuro Attack Group sailed for target.

Rear Admiral Mitscher

29 January — As invasion forces approached the Marshalls, carrier planes (from USS *Cowpens*, *Monterey* and *Bunker Hill*) and naval vessels joined in the final neutralization program, supplementing the action of land-based planes already in progress. Carrier aircraft from Admiral Marc Mitscher's TF 58 thoroughly covered airfields and other targets on Kwajalein Atoll; completely neutralized Taroa airfield on Maloelap Atoll; made repeated attacks on Wotje airfield. In addition, the neutralization group, Task Group (TG) 50.15 bombarded Wotje and Maloelap. Land based planes (B-24s) concentrated on Kwajalein Atoll (dropping 23 tons of bombs on Kwajalein Island) and attacked targets on Wotje, Maloelap, Jaluit and Mille Atolls.

Rear Admiral Hill

30 January — Carrier plans of TF 58 continued the neutralization of the Marshalls, attacking Eniwetok Atoll, where 19 planes were destroyed on the ground, in addition to targets on Kwajalein, Wotje and Maloelap Atolls. Immediate objectives on Kwajalein Atoll—Roi-Namur and Kwajalein Islands—were pounded during 400 sorties and subjected to naval bombardment of surface vessels for 4 hours. Assault forces arrived at target after nightfall; accompanying destroyers and cruisers turned aside en route to bombard Maloelap and Wotje. Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill's Majuro Attack Group (TG 51.2), consisting of the reinforced 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry Regiment, 27th Infantry Division and VAC Reconnaissance Troop made unopposed landings on Calalin and Dadap Islands in the atoll.

31 January — **D-Day in the Marshalls.**

Kwajalein Atoll: Under over-all command of the Fifth Fleet (TF 50), Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance, U.S. Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51, commanded by Rear Admiral Turner) invaded the Marshalls at Kwajalein Atoll, opening Operation Flintlock. Air, naval and ground operations were well coordinated. Little opposition was met and U.S. casualties were extremely light. Underwater demolition team is employed for the first time in the Pacific to explore beaches at the Western end of Kwajalein Island.

Southern Attack Force (TF 52, also commanded by Rear Admiral Turner) invaded Southern Kwajalein Atoll. Preliminary operations began early in the morning when battleships (*Pennsylvania*, *Mississippi*, *Idaho*

and *New Mexico*), heavy cruisers (*Minneapolis*, *San Francisco* and *New Orleans*) and destroyers (*Stevens*, *McKee*, *Ringgold* and *Sigsbee*) made firing runs on the island, 0618-0840. . Provisional units attached to the 17th RCT, 7th Infantry Division, secured a channel for entry of shipping into the lagoon, with occupation of Cecil (Ninni) and Carter (Gea), small islets northwest of Kwajalein Island. Reconnaissance elements and part of Company B, 111th Infantry Regiment, took Cecil without opposition by 1235 after landing earlier on Chauncey (Gehh) by mistake, where some infantrymen were left to contain the enemy. Troops of another provisional force from the 7th Infantry Division landed on Carter at 0620 and overcame opposition by 0930. After preparatory air and naval bombardment, 17th RCT began the invasion of Carlos (Ennylabegan) and Carlson (Enubaj) at 0910, 40 minutes behind schedule. BLT 1 occupied Carlos and BLT 2, Carlson, with little trouble. Artillery was put ashore on Carlson (four battalions of 105-mm howitzers and one battery of 155 mm howitzers) and registered on next objectives, Kwajalein Island (Porcelain) and Burton (Ebeye).

Marines Climbing Down Nets from a Transport into a Landing Craft, Kwajalein Atoll

The Eastern Mandates Campaign



Kwajalein Atoll Map with inset of Island

Northern Attack Force (TF 53 under Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly) invaded North Kwajalein. 4th Marine Division opened operations with preliminary landings by the 25th Marines, Reinforced, on islands adjacent to the main objective, twin islands of Roi-Namur (Burlesque-Camouflage), to secure safe passage for naval vessels into the lagoon and for artillery sites. The 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, quickly quelled token resistance on Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob (Ennubing), southwest of Roi, during the morning, making Jacob Pass available for shipping. In the afternoon, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, took Albert (Ennumennet) and the 2nd Battalion seized Allen (Ennubirr), southeast of Namur, with ease. The 3rd Battalion then proceeded to Ennugarrett (Abraham) and occupied it. Artillery was brought ashore and registered on Roi-Namur.

Rear Admiral Conolly

Majuro Atoll: The atoll was secured without a fight as VAC scouts completed an uneventful reconnaissance.

Appendix A: Chronology

1 February — Troops of the VAC opened the attack for the main objectives. That generally light opposition was met was a tribute to the effectiveness of preliminary bombardment by naval vessels, aircraft and artillery, which was closely coordinated and overwhelming.

Aerial View of Roi-Namur under Bombardment

In the **Southern Landing Force** area, the 7th Infantry Division invaded Kwajalein Island at the southern bend of the atoll, advance elements touched down at 0930. During the preparatory bombardment, supporting naval vessels fired approximately 7,000 14-, 8- and 5-inch shells into the target, while the divisional artillery fired 29,000 rounds of 105 and 155 mm ammunition. B-24s also dropped fifteen 1,000 and 2,000 pound bombs on the landing areas. BLT 184-3 and 32-1 landed abreast, the former on the north on Beaches Red 1 and 2 at the western end of the island and quickly secured the beaches. In the zone of the 184th Infantry Regiment, the enemy clung to the ruins of his main beach defenses along the lagoon shore. Both teams moved steadily eastward to the north-south

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Wilma road, which connected coastal roads Will on the north and Wallace on the south. BLT 32-2 attacked through BLT 32-1 in the afternoon. By the end of the day the 7th Infantry Division held about a third of the island, including the western edge of the airfield. Major General Charles C. Corlett, the 7th Infantry Division's Commanding General, landed on Carlson and took command ashore. U.S. forces were withdrawn from Chauncey, infantry elements to Cecil and the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop aboard *Overton*. A few naval troops were left to guard barges.

Major General Corlett



In the **Northern Landing Force** area, the 4th Marine Division landed two battalions of the 23rd Marines on the southern shore of Roi and a similar force from the 24th Marines on the south shore of Namur. Assault hour, set for 1000, was delayed because of boating difficulties, and the landings actually occurred between 1145 and noon. On Roi, which the airfield largely covers, stunned and disorganized Japanese offered no effective

resistance as the 23rd Marines sped to the north coast and cleared the island except for a small pocket in the center of the airfield. The 24th Marines was less fortunate on Namur, where thick vegetation and many buildings concealed the enemy. The 2nd and 3rd battalions pushed north abreast, the 2nd on the right, meeting considerable opposition as the Japanese rallied from the preliminary bombardment. The 2nd battalion suffered more than 50 percent of its casualties from the powerful explosion of a blockhouse containing ammunition. Reinforced by reserves from the 1st Battalion and tanks from the 23rd Marines, the 24th Marines reached a line extending from the initial objective on the eastern shore to positions 175 yards north of the initial objective on the western flank. The Landing Force Commander established a CP on Namur. Enemy infiltration attempts on the night of 2-3 February culminated in a counterattack by 100 Japanese at dawn, but the attack was repelled in close combat.

Soldiers and Light Tank Moving Through Jungle, Kwajalein

The Eastern Mandates Campaign



Marines Carrying Ammunition Boxes

Sniper, Kwajalein

2 February — In the **Southern Landing Force** campaign, the 7th Infantry Division met increased resistance, which planes, artillery and naval gunfire helped neutralize as the division concentrated on clearing Kwajalein. The 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry, passing through the 3rd Battalion, advanced along

the lagoon side of the island on the left while the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry continued to attack on the ocean side. Overwhelming enemy strong points, both assault forces soon reached Carl Road, which crossed the island at the eastern end of the airfield. As the advance continued toward the next cross island road, Nora, some 300 yards ahead, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, attacking through the 2nd Battalion, crossed an antitank ditch and cleared a strong point called Corn. Although forward elements of the division get well beyond Nora Road, the line was organized for the night short of it, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry taking up positions in the Corn strong point and the 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry on a line 75-100 yards northeast of Carl Road.

Marines Firing at Japanese Snipers, Roi-Namur

Elements of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop landed on Chauncey, where the enemy was becoming aggressive, and cleared it during a sharp fire fight. Japanese dead total 125.

In preparation for the invasion of Burton, the island was searched from destroyer and seaplane and pounded by artillery and naval gunfire.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

In the **Northern Landing Force** campaign, the 4th Marine Division completed the mop up of Roi and the capture of Namur and began a search of the remaining islands of the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll for the enemy. On Namur, the 24th Marines, with tank support, attacked with the 3rd Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right. Organized resistance ceased by 1215, ending the battle for northern Kwajalein Atoll, except for mopping up. Major General Harry Schmidt, 4th Marine Division Commanding General, announced the end of organized resistance on Namur at 1418. The 25th Marines was given the task of securing the other islands in the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll and began an uneventful search for the enemy.



Appendix A: Chronology

3 February — Admiral Hill arrived by plane from Majuro to take part in formal planning for Eniwetok with forces previously allocated as reserves for Kwajalein. Planning continued until the expeditionary force sailed on 15 February.

Japanese Killed in Action serving as Gun Crew, Kwajalein

In the **Southern Landing Force** campaign, the 7th Infantry Division attacked to clear the rest of Kwajalein Island, with Nathan Road (the east-west road opposite Nob Pier) as the immediate objective. Assault forces encountered dense construction and must destroy blockhouses and concrete positions in detail. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry advanced on the lagoon side, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry attacked on the ocean side. Beyond Nora Road, frontal attacks prove so costly, particularly in the 184th Infantry's zone where Company B was virtually halted along the lagoon at the western edge of the built-up Admiralty area, that the plan of attack was changed. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, swung left to the lagoon shore while the 2nd Battalion attacked through its right flank toward Nathan Road, forcing an exposed salient into enemy positions. The 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, assisted by the 1st Battalion, continued toward Nathan Road, advance elements getting to within 100 yards of it. Numerous enemy pockets were bypassed. Enemy counterattacks were repulsed during the night.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign



After effective naval gunfire, artillery and carrier aircraft bombardment eliminated enemy opposition, the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, invaded Burton, two companies going ashore abreast (Company A on the right; Company B on the left) on the southern part of the lagoon beach at 0935. After crossing the southern end of the island, the 1st Battalion drove north supported by amphibian tractors and later by light and medium tanks. Opposition developed about an hour after the landing, particularly on the left where Company B passed through Company C shortly before 1700. By 1900 forward elements halted for the night on a line that crossed the island just south of Bailey Pier, a concrete structure extending into the lagoon about midway up the island. The 3rd Battalion, upon landing, took responsibility for the rear area. Illumination throughout the night and the fire of supporting arms helped prevent enemy counterattacks.

Amphibious tank detachments were sent to Buster and Byron islets between Kwajalein and Burton took them without opposition.

Appendix A: Chronology

Japanese Killed in Action in Foxhole

4 February

The 184th RCT, in the southern part of the atoll, continued the difficult mop up of the enemy along the lagoon shore, completing this as far as Green Beach 4 by 1435. The 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, attacked through the 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, toward the end of the island, arriving at Nathan Road in a highly disorganized state. Here, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry passed through the 1st Battalion to complete the capture of the island. Advance elements reached Nero Point at the tip of the island by 1515, but organized resistance continued until 1920. General Corlett announced the capture of Kwajalein Island to Admiral Turner at 1610. A considerable number of Japanese and Koreans surrendered during the day.

The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry continued its northward attack on Burton, this time meeting main opposition on the right, in the zone of Company A. At 1130, the 3rd Battalion attacked through the 1st Battalion. Company K reached the northeast corner of the island at 1210 and Burton was completely secured by 1337. Troops of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry secured Burnet and Blakenship (Loi), north of Burton, capturing about 40

Marshallese on Burnet and subduing more than 20 Japanese and Koreans on Blakenship.

100th Naval Construction Battalion begins repair on Roi airfield.



5 February

As the mopping up was conducted on Kwajalein Island; other islands in the southern part of Kwajalein Atoll were reconnoitered. The 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry found three Japanese on Beverly (South Gugegwe); the 1st Battalion cleared about 200 Japanese from Berlin (North Gugegwe). Company C proceeded with tanks to Benson, next island to the north and secured it. The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop invaded Bennett (Bigej); assisted there by the 3rd Battalion, 184th Infantry with two tanks; 94 Japanese were killed before the island was secured. The 2nd Battalion (–), 17th Infantry, organized into Eastern and Western Forces, continued to mop up. The Eastern Force worked south from the north end of the southeastern leg of the atoll toward Bennett, taking five islands without opposition. The Western Force advanced north from Carlos and took four islands, three of them without opposition.

Appendix A: Chronology

After the Battle, Kwajalein

Stretcher Bearers, Kwajalein

6 February — In the **Southern Landing Force** area, the Western Force of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry occupied Cohen (Ennugenliggelap), next island north of Clifton (Eller), without opposition, bringing the offensive against southern Kwajalein Atoll to an end.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Southern Landing Force losses totaled 142 killed, 845 wounded and 2 missing. Japanese losses are estimated at 4,938 killed and 206 captured.

Marines Holding a Funeral Service, Roi-Namur

The **NORTHERN LANDING FORCE** continued its uneventful reconnaissance of the islands of North Kwajalein Atoll.

7 February — The **Northern Landing Force** concluded its uneventful search of the islands of North Kwajalein Atoll, completing the offensive against Kwajalein Atoll. During the action, the 4th Marine Division suffered 737 casualties, of whom 190 were killed or died of wounds. Japanese losses were 3,472 killed and 91 captured.

8 February — Kwajalein Atoll secured.

12 February — Japanese air attack on Roi.

TF 58, less one attack group sailed for Truk from Majuro.

15 February — Eniwetok Expeditionary Group (TG 51.11 under Admiral Hill) left Kwajalein for Eniwetok.

16 February — In preparation for invasion of Eniwetok, TG 58.4 attacked and photographed the atoll. Most buildings were destroyed, one of two coastal guns on the northeast corner was wrecked and Engebi airfield was left temporarily unserviceable. Fourteen enemy planes were estimated destroyed on the ground.

Appendix A: Chronology



17 February — Admiral Hill's Eniwetok Expeditionary Group (TG 51.11) invaded Eniwetok Atoll (Operation Catchpole) after preliminary naval gunfire, air bombardment and minesweeping operations. Troops of the VAC Reconnaissance Company made unopposed landings from the lagoon side on Canna (Rujoru) and Camellia (Aitsu) Islands, southeast of Engebi, at 1318. A quick search revealed no Japanese and artillery was brought ashore and registered on Engebi, the main objective in the northern part of the atoll. In order to insure the safety of the artillery units, VAC scouts then took several small islands in the vicinity of Canna and Camellia without enemy interference. The 4th Marine Division scouts of Company D, 4th Tank Battalion, headed for Zinnia (Bogon) west of Engebi, to block withdrawal from Engebi. In the darkness they mistakenly landed on two islands below and worked their way back to Bogon without opposition. The first day's objectives were secured without any American casualties. In preparation for the invasion of Engebi, naval gunfire was supplemented by shore-based artillery fire placed on the island and underwater demolition teams reconnoitered the beaches.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign



18 February — The 22nd Marines, supported by elements of an Army cannon company, invaded Engebi after preparatory bombardment. The enemy offered organized resistance only at the southern tip of the island, which was declared secure by 1450. Part of the assault force re-embarked for Parry. Scouting parties began to search for the enemy on the smaller islands between Engebi and the southern part of the atoll.

19 February — The 106th RCT, 27th Infantry Division, landed of the lagoon shore of Eniwetok Island after naval and air bombardment. Two battalions went ashore abreast, the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3rd Battalion on the left. Pushing through outposts, assault forces reached the ocean side of the island. The 1st Battalion then pivoted to the right to secure artillery sites in the southern part of the island. A strong enemy counterattack delayed the southward attack. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines, the reserve force, was committed to strengthen the 1st Battalion in the afternoon. The 3rd Battalion, which was to have conducted a holding action, was ordered to the north end of the island instead and at 1230 started northward cautiously. Unexpectedly slow progress on Eniwetok forced postponement of attack on Parry Island scheduled for this date.

Appendix A: Chronology



20 February — While the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry slowly worked northward on Eniwetok Island, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines, assisted by the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, overcame resistance on the southern part of the island. The 1st Battalion (—), 106th Infantry conducted mopping up operations on southern Eniwetok Island. Preparations for the assault on Parry, last of the three big islands of the atoll continued. Artillery on Eniwetok Island was registered on Parry and supplemented other bombardment. The 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion was emplaced on Japtan Island and joined the bombardment of Parry.

21 February — The capture of Eniwetok Island was completed, but mopping up continued. The 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry reached the northern tip at 1630. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines was withdrawn to prepare for the invasion of Parry, still under large-scale preliminary bombardment. The plan for the capture of Parry was completed and approved.

22 February — The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry took responsibility for the northern part of Eniwetok Island. The 3rd Battalion was withdrawn as the floating reserve for the Parry Island operation. The 22nd Marines started landing on Parry at 0900 as a three-day preliminary bombardment ended. During the preparatory phase, Parry received 944.4 tons of naval shells, 245 tons of artillery shells and 99 tons of bombs. The 22nd Marines landed on the lagoon shore and met lively resistance at once. After pushing across to the ocean shore, the 1st Battalion on the left turned north and cleared the northern part of the island by 1330. The 2nd Battalion joined by the 3rd Battalion drove south and by 1930 overwhelmed the southern part of the island, whereupon Parry is declared secure.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign



Map of the Central Pacific, Showing Geographical Relationships

Appendix B:
Order of Battle for Operations Flintlock and Catchpole
(29 January – 23 February 1944)

Kwajalein Atoll

Pacific Fleet

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at Pearl Harbor

Fifth Fleet

Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance in USS *Indianapolis*



Task Force (TF) 51 Joint Expeditionary Force

Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner in USS *Rocky Mount* also on board was Commander, Expeditionary Troops (V Amphibious Corps), Major General Holland M. Smith USMC

TF 52 Southern Attack Force

Rear Admiral Turner

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Southern Landing Force

7th Infantry Division

Major General Charles H. Corlett, Commanding General

7th Medical Battalion
7th Reconnaissance Troop
13th Engineer Battalion
17th Infantry Regiment
32nd Infantry Regiment
184th Infantry Regiment
7th Infantry Division Artillery
- 31st Field Artillery Battalion
- 48th Field Artillery Battalion
- 49th Field Artillery Battalion
- 57th Field Artillery Battalion
- 145th Field Artillery Battalion

767th Tank Battalion
708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion
50th Engineer Battalion
3rd Army Defense Battalion
4th Army Defense Battalion
Special Troops
- 7th Infantry Division Band
- 707th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
- 7th Quartermaster Company
- 7th Signal Company
- Military Police Platoon

2 destroyer transports, 4 attack transports, 1 attack cargo transport, 1 landing ship dock (LSD), 8 landing ship, tanks (LST) carrying 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Task Group (TG) 52.5 Southern Transport Group

8 attack transports, 2 attack cargo ships, 2 LSDs, 8 LSTs

TG 52.6 Control Group

3 submarine chasers and 3 landing craft

TG 52.7 Destroyer Screen

6 destroyers, 2 destroyer minesweepers

TG 52.8 Fire Support Group

Unit 1: 2 destroyers
Unit 2: 2 heavy cruisers, 2 battleships, 4 destroyers
Unit 3: 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 destroyers
Unit 4: 2 destroyers
12 LCI (L)

TG 52.9 Carrier Support Group

3 escort aircraft carriers (CVE) and 4 destroyers

TG 52.10 Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group

3 minesweepers, 4 motor minesweepers, 1 landing craft

Appendix B: U.S. Order of Battle

TG 52.11 Southern Salvage Unit

3 ocean tugs

TG 51.3 Southern Defense Group

1 destroyer escort, 4 LSTs

TG 51.4 Southern Garrison Group

5 transports and 2 destroyer escorts

TF 53 Northern Attack Force

Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly in USS *Appalachian*

TG 53.9 Initial Transport Group

4 attack transports, 1 attack cargo transport, 1 LSD

Raider Unit: 1 destroyer transport, 9 LSTs (1 with LCTs aboard), 2 submarine chasers, 3 destroyers, 1 minesweeper

TG 53.3 Minesweeper Group

4 minesweepers, 4 motor minesweepers

TG 53.4 Northern Landing Force

4th Marine Division

Major General Harry Schmidt, Commanding General

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion
4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
4th Tank Battalion
23rd Marines
24th Marines
25th Marines
14th Marines
20th Marines
15th Defense Battalion

Major General Schmidt

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

TG 53.5 Northern Support Group

Unit 1: 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers
Unit 2: 1 battleship, 2 light cruisers, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers
Unit 3: 2 destroyers, 3 LCIs
Unit 4: 2 destroyers
Unit 5: 1 destroyer, 6 LCIs

TG 53.6 Carrier Group

3 CVEs, 3 destroyers

TG 53.10 Main Attack Detachment

8 attack transports, 2 attack cargo transport, 1 LSD, 6 LSTs, 2 submarine chasers, 4 destroyers, 2 minesweepers

TG 53.12 Northern Salvage Group

3 ocean tugs

TG 51.5 Northern Defense Group

5 LSTs, 1 minesweeper

TG 51.6 Northern Garrison Group 1

4 transports, 2 destroyer escorts

TG 51.7 Northern Garrison Group 2

2 transports, 1 destroyer escort

TG 51.1 Reserve Force (later became TG 51.11 Eniwetok Expeditionary Group, 17 February – 24 February 1944)

9 attack transports, 2 attack cargo transport, 3 destroyer transports, 12 LSTs (carrying an amphibious tractor battalion), 1 LSD, 6 LCI (L), 2 minesweepers, 2 motor minesweepers, 3 ocean tugs, 2 oilers, 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 18 destroyers

Tactical Group 1

Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson, Commanding General

D Company (Scout), 4th Tank Battalion
V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company
22nd Marines
2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion

Brigadier General Watson

2nd Separate Engineer Company
2nd Separate Medical Company
2nd Separate Tank Company
2nd Separate Transport Company
10th Defense Battalion

106th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion)
104th Field Artillery Battalion
708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion
3rd Army Defense Battalion

TG 51.2 Majuro Attack Group (31 January – 1 February 1944)

Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill in *Cambria*

1 attack transport, 2 destroyer transports, 1 LST, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 CVEs, 4 destroyers, 1 minesweeper

2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry Regiment
1st Defense Battalion
V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company

TG 51.8 Defense Group

1 destroyer escort, 4 LSTs (1 with LCTs aboard)

TG 51.9 Garrison Group

6 cargo ships, 3 destroyer escorts

TF 58, Fast Carrier Force

Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher

TG 58.1 Carrier Task Group 1

2 fleet aircraft carriers (CV), 1 light aircraft carrier (CVL)
3 fast battleships, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers

TG 58.2 Carrier Task Group 2

2 CVs, 1 CVL
3 fast battleships, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers

TG 58.3 Carrier Task Group 3

1 CV, 2 CVLs
2 fast battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 9 destroyers

TG 58.4 Carrier Task Group 4

1 CV, 2 CVLs
2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 8 destroyers

TG 50.15 Neutralization Group

3 heavy cruisers, 4 destroyers, 2 minelayers

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

TF 57 Defense Forces and Land-Based Air

Rear Admiral John H. Hoover

Rear Admiral Hoover

3 aircraft tenders

TG 57.2 Strike Command

6 B-24 squadrons, 4 B-25 squadrons, 1 fighter-bomber squadron, 3 fighter squadrons

TG 57.3 Search and Patrol Group

3 Navy patrol squadrons, 4 Navy bomber squadrons, 1 photo reconnaissance squadron, 3 scout squadrons, 2 Marine bombing squadrons

Patrol Submarines

Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood at Pearl Harbor

Vice Admiral Lockwood

Truk Patrol: 3 fleet submarines
Ponape Patrol: 1 fleet submarine
Kisaie Patrol: 1 fleet submarine
Eniwetok Patrol: 1 fleet submarine

Appendix B: U.S. Order of Battle

CHART 1—TASK ORGANIZATION OF VARIOUS COMMANDS FOR THE ATTACK ON THE GILBERT ISLANDS



CHART 2—TASK ORGANIZATION OF MAJOR COMMANDS FOR THE ATTACK ON KWAJALEIN AND MAJURO ATOLLS



CHART 3—TASK ORGANIZATION OF MAJOR COMMANDS FOR THE ATTACK ON ENIWETOK ATOLL



Appendix C: Biographies of Principal American Commanders

Admiral Richard L. Conolly

Admiral Richard L. Conolly was born in Waukegan, Illinois in 1892. Appointed to the United States Naval Academy in 1910 he graduated as part of the class of 1914. Over the next four years he served in battleships and destroyers.

Admiral Conolly

The American entry into World War I found him on the destroyer USS *Smith* and he served in that ship while ship performed convoy duty in European waters, stationed at Brest, France. He was awarded a Navy Cross while attached to *Smith* for his role in salvaging the transport *Westbridge* torpedoed by a U-boat in August 1918. The citation read in part, "For distinguished service in the line of his profession on the occasion of the torpedoing of the *Westbridge*, when he, with a party of eight others remained on board for five days steering by hand and handling the lines form the tugs, while the ship was towed four hundred miles to port."

He left *Smith* in November 1918, returned to the United States and served in the fitting out of the destroyers *Foote* and *Worden*. He then served as the Executive Officer of USS *Hunt*. Beginning in August 1920 he was a student in electrical engineering at the Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Maryland and at Columbia University in the City of New York. He received a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering from Columbia in June 1922. In November 1922 he joined USS *Mississippi* and served in her until March 1924, when he became assistant Engineer Officer of USS *New York*.

Between September 1925 and June 1927, Conolly was an instructor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Physics, United States Naval Academy. In June 1927 he returned to sea duty as Engineer Officer of USS *Concord*. In August 1929, he assumed command of USS *Dupont* and served in her until he reported to the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island as a student in May 1931. He completed the junior course and stayed on as a faculty member until May 1933.

In May 1933, he became Aide and Flag Secretary on the staff of Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force. In April 1935, he went to USS *Tennessee* as Navigator and served in her until June 1936. He then reported to the Naval Academy where he again served as an instructor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Physics and later in the Department of Seamanship and Navigation. He was the head of the latter department for six months in 1938 and stayed at Annapolis until May 1939.

He assumed command of Destroyer Division 7 in May 1939 and became Commander, Destroyer Squadron 6 in January 1941. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Conolly was at sea commanding his squadron. He and his squadron participated in the raids on the Gilbert and Marshall Islands on 1 February 1942 as part of the task force commanded by Vice Admiral Halsey. In April, his destroyer squadron provided the screen for the aircraft carrier *Hornet* when it launched the Doolittle Tokyo Raid. He commanded the destroyers in Rear Admiral Spruance's task group when it bombarded Wake Island. He received a Letter of Commendation with authorization to wear the Commendation Ribbon with Combat V, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Between April 1942 and February 1943, he served on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet in Washington, D.C. In March 1943 he became Commander, Landing Craft and Base, Northwest African Waters. In that capacity he participated in the invasions of Sicily and Italy. In October 1943 he reported to Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet. During Operation Flintlock he commanded the Northern Attack Force that seized Roi-Namur. In July 1944 he was given command of Group 3, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet and in this capacity participated in the invasions of Guam and the Philippines. As an amphibious commander, he became known as "Close-in Conolly" because of his daring shore bombardments in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific. He received the Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars in lieu of second and third awards for his services which included operations at Kwajalein, Wake, Marcus, Guam, Leyte and Lingayan Gulf. After the Japanese surrender, he supervised the initial occupation of northern Honshu and Hokkaido in October 1945.

Upon his return to the United States he was appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. In this capacity he also served as naval advisor to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris and the European Advisory Commission in London. Between 1946 and 1950 he was Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Area. Between 1950 and 1952 he returned to the Naval War College as its president.

He retired in 1952 and became the second president of Long Island University and its branch C.W. Post College, which he held until his death in a plane crash in March 1962. He was responsible for the growth of the latter from 200 to 3,800 students at his death. He died seven months before his announced retirement date. He stated he wanted to make way for "a younger man with a fresh outlook." Admiral Conolly survived the hazards of service of sea and two world wars and had both a distinguished naval career followed by a second career as a university builder.

Appendix C: Biographies

General Charles Harrison Corlett

General Corlett

Born in Burchard, Nebraska on 31 July 1889, Charles Harrison Corlett graduated from West Point in 1913. Corlett was appointed to the United States Military Academy in West Point in 1909 and as a cadet was captain-manager of the polo team and played football. He graduated as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army on 12 June 1913, and was assigned to Fort Michael, Alaska.

In spring 1916 he was transferred to San Antonio, Texas, and helped clear the area where Fort Sam Houston is now located. A few weeks later, his outfit moved to Eagle Pass where action in the Mexican Campaign was expected. When nothing developed, Corlett was assigned to the National Guard Brigade in Maryland. On 11 October1916 he was promoted to first lieutenant and assigned to Fort Sam Houston and then Brownsville, Texas.

When the U.S. entered World War I, Corlett was Assistant Signal Officer of the Eastern Department in New York and was soon promoted to captain, then major. He went to France in January 1918, as Deputy Chief Signal Officer, and that October was promoted to lieutenant colonel. Just before the St. Mihiel offensive, he was stricken with pneumonia but was on duty in Paris at the time of the Armistice. As a result of the pneumonia, Corlett's health was poor and in 1919, he resigned his commission to become a manager of the Quemdo Sheep and Cattle Company in New Mexico. The life outdoors improved his health and in November 1920 he returned to military duty as a major and was assigned at Fort Harvey J. Jones, Arizona.

In September 1941 he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned to command Fort Greely, Alaska. His second wife, the former Pauline Wherry, whom he had married in August 1928, was with him. With the threat of a Japanese invasion, however, civilians were evacuated.

In World War II, General Corlett headed the Task Force which took Kiska and commanded the division which took Kwajalein in the Central Pacific under Admiral Nimitz. From there he was sent to command the XIX Corps in the European Theater. His corps made the historical breakthrough at St. Lo, captured 19 miles of the Siegfried Line and was the first American unit in Germany. Later, again under Admiral Nimitz's command, he prepared and began to train an Army to invade Japan when the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

General Corlett retired in 1946 because of illness and lived near Espanola, New Mexico. He was involved in several community activities and became New Mexico State

Commissioner of Revenue. He organized and directed the first Onate Fiesta; was on the Board of Espanola Hospital for many years; conducted the first hospital drive for a pediatric wing and was on the managing board for the School of American Research. General Corlett was also sent to Mexico by President Eisenhower to conduct the fight against a hoof and mouth disease outbreak and many other activities. He died in Espanola, New Mexico on 14 October 1971.

General Corlett's decorations include two Distinguished Service Medals (one from the Army and one from the Navy), Star of Abdon Calderon from Ecuador, Victory of Medal with three stars, Silver Star from the United States for gallantry, Legion of Merit, Mexican Border Service Medal, Commanders Order if Leopold with Palm, Croix de Guerre with Palm from Belgium and Grand Order or Orange and Nassau from Holland.

Appendix C: Biographies

Admiral Harry W. Hill

Admiral Hill

A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1911, Admiral Harry W. Hill served successively in USS *Maryland* (ARC 8), torpedo boat tender USS *Iris*, USS *Perry* (DD 11), and with the Pacific Flotilla as the Engineering Officer in USS *Albany* (CL 23). His follow-on assignments included service during World War I in USS *Texas* (BB 35) and as Navigator in USS *Wyoming* (BB 32) when both battleships were attached to the British Grand Fleet. Immediately after WW I, he served as Navigator in USS *Arkansas* (BB 33) until January 1919 when he was assigned duty as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Admiral R. E. Coontz, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet's Division Seven. In July of the same year, he transferred to similar duty on the Staff of Commander Division Six, Pacific Fleet. Continuing as Aide to Admiral Coontz as Chief of Naval Operations from 1919 to 1923, Lieutenant Commander Hill then joined USS *Concord* (CL 10) as Gunnery Officer from 1923 to 1926. After serving the next three months as Aide to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, he again had duty afloat as Gunnery Officer in USS *Maryland* (BB 46) from 1926 to 1931 and then served in the Executive Department at the Naval Academy.

Since a number of his ships won gunnery awards while under his direction, he served as Force Gunnery Officer on the Staff of Commander Battle Force, U.S. Fleet, in the Pacific from 1933 to 1934. As a Commander, he commissioned and commanded USS *Dewey* (DD 349) from October 4, 1934 to June 17, 1935, when he was again assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. In May 1938, Commander Hill completed the Senior Course at the Naval War College, and was promoted to Captain. He then served as War Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, until February 1940, after which he had a third tour of duty in the Office of Naval Operations, where he was attached to the War Plans Division until January 1942.

Captain Hill took command of the heavy cruiser USS *Wichita* (CA 45), which operated for several months on convoy duty with the British Home Fleet to the north Russian port of Murmansk. In September 1942, he was promoted to Rear Admiral and reported as Commander Battleship Division Four, Flag Ship USS *Maryland* (BB 46) serving a year in the South Pacific. He was also Commander of a task force which was the first ever to comprise both battleships and escort carriers.

In September 1943, he became Commander Amphibious Group Two, Fifth Amphibious Force, and in that capacity, participated in the capture of Tarawa, and later in operations against the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, where he commanded the amphibious and support operations of that force until the island was secured at the end of June. At the close of the war in August 1945, Admiral Hill commanded the Amphibious

Force that landed the Sixth Army for the occupation of Japan. He later served as the first Commandant of the Naval War College, Chairman of the General Board of the Navy, and Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Although he retired in the rank of Admiral in May 1952, he was not detached from his final assignment until the following August. Admiral Hill then reported as Governor of the Naval Home at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where he continued to serve on active duty until May 1954. Admiral Harry Wilbur Hill passed away on July 19, 1971.

Appendix C: Biographies

Admiral Marc A. Mitscher

Marc Andrew Mitscher was born in Hillsboro, Wisconsin, on 26 January 1887. He attended elementary and secondary schools in Washington, D.C., and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June 1910.



Admiral Mitscher

Over the next five years, Mitscher served in armored cruisers, gunboats and destroyers, and then received training as a pilot. Designated a Naval Aviator in June 1916, he served at Pensacola, Florida until 1917, when he was assigned to conduct experiments with shipboard catapults. Later in 1917 and in 1918, he served at Naval Air Stations, commanding those at Rockaway, Long Island, and Miami, Florida. In May 1919, he participated in the trans-Atlantic flight attempt of the seaplane NC-1.

Over the next 20 years, Mitscher had a variety of important aviation duties in Washington, D.C., San Diego, California, and on board ship. He was a member of the Navy team in air races held in 1922 and 1923, helped place the new aircraft carrier *Saratoga* in commission (1927), was Executive Officer of USS *Langley* (1929-1930) and of *Saratoga* (1934-1935). In 1937-39, he commanded the seaplane tender *Wright* and Patrol Wing One.

Following two years as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Captain Mitscher commanded the aircraft carrier *Hornet* in 1941-1942, launching the April 1942 Doolittle Raid and participating in the Battle of Midway. After his promotion to Rear Admiral, he commanded Patrol Wing Two and Navy air units in the Southern Pacific during the Guadalcanal and Central Solomons campaigns of 1942-1943 and during the last five months of 1943 he commanded Fleet Air, West Coast.

After commanding Task Force 58 during the Marshalls campaign, Vice Admiral Mitscher was placed in command of the Pacific Fleet's fast carriers. During 1944 he took part in the campaigns to capture the Marianas, Palaus and Leyte as well as the Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. In January-May 1945, he commanded air assaults on Iwo Jima, Okinawa and the Japanese Home Islands.

In July 1945, Mitscher became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air. During March-September 1946 he commanded the Eighth Fleet during the Navy's first major post-

World War II combat training exercises. Admiral Mitscher was then assigned to command the Atlantic Fleet. While holding that position, he died of a heart attack on 3 February 1947.

Appendix C: Biographies

Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz

Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz led the Allied naval forces to victory in the Pacific in World War II. He was born February 24, 1885, in Fredericksburg, Texas to Anna (Henke) Nimitz. He died on February 20, 1966, of complications following a stroke.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz

Nimitz's father, Chester Bernard Nimitz, did not live to see his son born. His grandfather became his surrogate father, influencing his character and values during his early years. Charles H. Nimitz was a German immigrant, former seaman, and owner of the Nimitz Hotel in Fredericksburg, Texas.

Anna married her late husband's younger brother, William Nimitz, in 1890. He was manager of the St. Charles Hotel in Kerrville, Texas. Chester eventually became chief handyman at the hotel. To get a college education he decided to get an appointment to the United States Military Academy. No appointment was available, so he then applied for the United States Naval Academy. He graduated a passed midshipman on January 30, 1905, seventh in his class of 114 at Annapolis.

He spent fours with the Asiatic Fleet. After two years' service on the U.S.S. *Ohio*, he was commissioned an ensign. His first command was the Spanish gunboat *Panay* in the Philippines. Later transferred to the destroyer *Decatur*, he ran the ship aground. As a result, he was court-martialed and reprimanded. He was also denied the battleship duty he wanted, and was ordered to serve on a submarine instead. In 1909-13, after his return to the United States, Lieutenant Nimitz was assigned to submarine duty, gaining a reputation as an expert in the field of undersea warfare. On January 25, 1909, Nimitz reported for duty under instruction in the First Submarine Flotilla. His first submarine was *Plunger* [A-1] (SS-2) which he also commanded in the Atlantic. "In those days," said Nimitz, "they were a cross between a Jules Verne fantasy and a humpbacked whale." Now a lieutenant (junior grade), Nimitz was given command of the First Submarine Flotilla, in May 1909, with additional duty in command of the *Plunger* (SS-2). He was transferred to command of the submarine *Snapper* [C-5] (SS-16) when that submarine was commissioned on February 2, 1910, and on November 18, 1910 assumed command of the *Narwhal* [D-1] (SS-17).

On October 10, 1911, he became Commander Third Submarine Division, Atlantic Torpedo Fleet. Now a lieutenant, Nimitz was ordered to the Navy Yard, Boston, Massachusetts, to oversee and assist in fitting out of the submarine *Skipjack* [E-1] (SS-24), which he was next to command – assuming command of that submarine at her commissioning on February 14, 1912. On March 20, 1912, Nimitz, while commanding the submarine E-1, was awarded the Silver Lifesaving Medal by the Treasury Department for his

heroic action in saving Fireman second class W. J. Walsh, USN, from drowning. A strong tide was running and Walsh, who could not swim, was rapidly being swept away from his ship. Nimitz dove in the water and kept Walsh afloat until both were picked up by a small boat. In June of that year, a young Lieut. Chester W. Nimitz addressed the Naval War College on the subject of submarines – "Defensive and Offensive Tactics of Submarines." Even then, Nimitz foresaw the submarine as the unparalleled commerce-destroyer that it turned out to be during World War II. From May 1912 to March 1913 he served as Commander, Atlantic Submarine Flotilla. The four consecutive submarine commands he held gave him invaluable experience in the coming world wars.

In 1913, Nimitz married Catherine Vance Freeman. They would have three daughters and a son. The newlyweds went to Europe where Nimitz was sent to Germany to study diesel engine technology. He put that knowledge to work during 1913-17 supervising the construction and installation of diesel engines in the oiler *Maumee* (AO-2) and serving as her Chief Engineer.

With the coming of the First World War, he was given the rank of commander, and served as chief of staff to Admiral Samuel S. Robison, commander of the Atlantic Submarine Force. Soon after, Nimitz was executive officer of the battleship *South Carolina*. He was then sent to Pearl Harbor where he built the submarine base and commanded the Submarine Division.

After the World War I, aware of Lieut. Nimitz's skill, a leading American engineering firm offered him a job for $25,000 a year (his Navy pay was $3,456 at the time. He refused the offer, preferring the "honorable, soul-satisfying" duties of a Naval Officer. At the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, a plan he helped develop in 1922-1923 at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., for a hypothetical Pacific war was a variant of the one eventually used in the Second World War. Then, with Admiral Robison now Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, Nimitz returned as his chief of staff.

In 1926, Nimitz developed a prototype for the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps at the University of California, Berkeley. His model was widely used throughout the country. In 1929, now holding the rank of Captain, he began two years as Commander, Submarine Division 20, followed by two more years in charge of reserve destroyers at San Diego, California. He then took the heavy cruiser *Augusta* (CA-31) to the Orient, where, under his command, she was flagship of the Asiatic Fleet in 1933-35. Three years' duty at the Bureau of Navigation in Washington, D.C., ended in 1938 with his promotion to Rear Admiral.

Following promotion to rear admiral, he commanded a cruiser division, followed by command of a battleship division. In 1939 he returned to Washington as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. It was during his service there that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. After the relief of the Pacific Fleet's commander, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Nimitz became the commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 25, 1941. With the rank of Admiral, and Fleet Admiral after December 1944, he commanded American forces during their long advance across the Pacific to full victory in August 1945.

After Pearl Harbor, Nimitz indicated his confidence in his new staff by not replacing a single officer. Forced by circumstances to abandon traditional naval doctrine favoring battleships and drawing on his own extensive and varied command experience especially in submarines, Admiral Nimitz knew the situation was not as bleak as it seemed because the Pearl Harbor submarine base was intact, as were the navy yard's repair facilities and the oil storage facilities. The aircraft carriers, the core of his fleet, survived because they were at sea. With this confidence, Nimitz directed the Navy's early raids against the Japanese mandated islands in the Central Pacific. His confidence in his intelligence staff was vindicated by the battles in the Coral Sea and at Midway Island.

As Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Nimitz proved to be the right man at the right time. He restored morale by building an aggressive combat team led by men like Halsey and Spruance. He brilliantly and instinctively chose the correct moves in the gamble of the Battle of Midway, to this day the greatest victory of the United States Navy. His biographer, E.B. Potter, described his method of command in the following manner, "He surrounded himself with the ablest men he could find and sought their advice, but he made his own decisions. He was a keen strategist who never forgot that he was dealing with human beings, on both sides of the conflict. He was aggressive in war without hate, audacious while never failing to weigh the risks."

As overall commander of the Central Pacific area Nimitz commanded all U.S. and Allied military forces in his theater bordered on the west by the Southwest Pacific area of General MacArthur's. Nimitz led the "island hopping" amphibious drive toward Japan. The Navy and the Marines took Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa; each a step closer to Japan, and each at a greater cost than the one before.

On December 19, 1944 Chester W. Nimitz was promoted to the grade of fleet admiral, newly established by the Congress about a year earlier. Only four five-star admirals were to be chosen during World War II: Leahy, King, Nimitz and Halsey.

At Japan's unconditional surrender, aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, Nimitz signed the surrender document as the representative of the United States. He was awarded the Army and Navy Distinguished Service medals and many foreign decorations.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz became Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945. On his watch, the Navy endured a massive postwar downsizing and began to find its place in the peacetime national defense establishment. He left office in December 1947, taking residence in California. As a Fleet Admiral, he technically remained on active duty, and in 1949-52, served at the United Nations.. He was a roving ambassador for the United Nations and a regent of the University of California. President Truman appointed him chairman of the Presidential Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights.

In the afterglow of World War II books written by officers involved in the war's battles and decisions fueled rivalries and controversies. Admiral Nimitz refused to take part in the

literary autopsy of the war. He felt no one would be helped and that his beloved Navy would be hurt the most in the end. Also during these years, the Admiral was often approached with business opportunities and high-salaried positions. He turned down all such offers considering instead "how the Gold Star Mothers might feel." As his son later remarked, "he maintained the Navy's image until his death."

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz died at his home on Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay on February 20, 1966. He would have been 81 years old on the day of his funeral at Golden Gate National Cemetery at San Bruno. He was the last surviving five-star admiral.

Appendix C: Biographies

General Harry Schmidt

General Schmidt

General Harry Schmidt served as Commanding General of the Fourth Marine Division during the Marshall Islands and Saipan campaigns and as Commanding General of the Fifth (V) Amphibious Corps during the Tinian and Iwo Jima campaigns during World War II.

During the battle for Iwo Jima from February 19, 1945, to March 26, 1945, he was awarded a Gold Star in lieu of the third Distinguished Service Medal for his part in this operation. His citation reads in part, "Against determined enemy resistance and incomparable natural defenses, Major General Schmidt skillfully directed the attack of his troops to capture and occupy this strategic island. He handled the various units under his command with brilliant tactical skill. His sound judgment, distinctive administrative ability and unfailing devotion to duty were vital factors in the success of the entire operation."

General Schmidt was born in Holdrege, Nebraska, on September 25, 1886. He attended Nebraska State Normal College before entering the Marine Corps as a second lieutenant on August 17, 1909. Following instruction at the Marine Officers' School at Port Royal, South Carolina, he reported in January 1911, to the Marine Barracks, Guam, Mariana Islands. While attached to this station he accompanied an expeditionary force to Chefoo, China. In October 1912, he was ordered to duty in the Philippines where he remained until detached to the United States in April 1913.

Following an assignment with the Recruiting Service in Minnesota, a tour of duty at the Marine Barracks, New Orleans, Louisiana, and temporary duty at Vera Cruz aboard the USS *Kearsarge* in 1915, he was ordered to sea duty aboard the USS Oklahoma in May, 1916. In January 1917, he went aboard the USS *Montana* and from February 25 to March 22, 1917, was ashore with the ship's landing force at Guantanamo, Cuba.

Leaving the USS *Montana* in September 1918, he spent most of the next two years at the Marine Barracks, Norfolk, Virginia. He again went to sea in June, 1920, as Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment aboard the USS *Tennessee*.

From August, 1922 to May 1926, the General was a member of the Marine Corps Schools, first as a student then as an instructor. He then spent a year in recruiting at St. Paul, Minnesota and a six month tour with the 6th Marines in China.

From February, 1928 to June 1929, General Schmidt was with the Second Brigade of Marines in Nicaragua as Brigade Intelligence and Operations Officer. He returned to the

United States to attend the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and graduated June 18, 1932. In addition to Command and General Staff School, he was a graduate of the Field Officers' Course, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.

Following graduation, he was assigned to duty with the Paymaster Department and served variously at Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; with the Department of the Pacific, San Francisco; the 4th Marines in Shanghai, China; and again with the Department of the Pacific. In June 1937, he was assigned to the Second Marine Brigade. He sailed for Shanghai, in August with the Brigade as Chief of Staff and served in that capacity until detached to the United States in February, 1938.

General Schmidt was assigned to Headquarters, Marine Corps as Executive and Personnel Officer of the Paymaster Department in July, 1938, in which capacity he was found upon this country's entry into World War II. In January 1942, he was appointed Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps where he served until ordered to the Fourth Marine Division as Commanding General, which command he assumed on August 18, 1943.

He commanded the Fourth Division in the seizure of Roi and Namur in the Marshall Islands and in the Battle for Saipan. On July 12, 1944, he assumed command of the V Amphibious Corps and led that command in the assault and capture of Tinian. For exceptional meritorious service in the seizure and occupation of the Marshall Islands and in the assault and capture of Saipan and Tinian, the General was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal. Continuing in command of the V Amphibious Corps, the General led it through the Iwo Jima Operation.

Following the conclusion of hostilities, the General led the V Amphibious Corps in the occupation of Japan. On February 15, 1946, he was ordered back to the United States to assume command of the Marine Training and Replacement Command, San Diego Area. He was serving in that capacity when he concluded his 39 year career as a Marine on July 1, 1948, when he retired at the age of 61.

In addition to the Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars, his decorations and medals include the Navy Cross, Nicaragua 1918; Legion of Merit (Army), Japan 1945; Bronze Star Medal, 1945; Presidential Unit Citation with One Bronze Star, Saipan and Tinian 1944; Navy Unit Commendation, Iwo Jima 1945; Expeditionary Medal with Two Bronze Stars, China 1911, Cuba 1917, China 1927-28; Mexican Service Medal, 1914; Victory Medal with Convoy and Escort Clasp, 1918; Yangtze Service Medal, China 1927; Second Nicaraguan Campaign Medal, 1928-30; China Service Medal, 1937-38; American Defense Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal; Nicaraguan Medal of Distinction (with Diploma); and the Nicaraguan Medal of Merit with Silver Star. General Schmidt died 10 February 1968.

Appendix C: Biographies

General Holland McTyeire Smith

General Smith

General Holland McTyeire Smith, the officer who led Marines to victory, island hopping across the Pacific during World War II, died on 12 January 1967 at the U.S. Naval Hospital, San Diego, California. Sometimes called "the father of modern amphibious warfare," he was one of America's top commanders in the Pacific during World War II. He retired in 1946 after a 41-year career that included sea duty, expeditionary service from the Philippines to Haiti and World War I combat in France.

On the eve of World War II General Smith directed extensive Army, Navy and Marine amphibious training, a major factor in successful U.S. landings in the Atlantic and Pacific. Later he helped prepare U.S. Army and Canadian troops for the Kiska and Attu landings, and then led the V Amphibious Corps in the assaults on the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas. In the latter operation, besides the V Amphibious Corps, he commanded all Expeditionary Troops in the Marianas, including those which recaptured Guam. He then served as the first Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and headed Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops) at Iwo Jima, which included all the assault troops in that battle. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his part in training America's amphibious forces on both coasts; a Gold Star in lieu of a second for his planning and execution of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands operations; a Gold Star in lieu of a third for similar service in the Marianas; and a Gold Star in lieu of a fourth for his part in the invasion and capture of Iwo Jima.

Son of Mr. and Mrs. John V. Smith, the general was born 20 April 1882, in Seale, Alabama. He received a Bachelor of Science degree from Alabama Polytechnic Institute (now Auburn University) in 1901, obtained his Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Alabama in 1903 and practiced law in Montgomery, Alabama, for a year before he was appointed a Marine second lieutenant 20 March 1905. (Later he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree by Alabama Polytechnic Institute.)

In April 1906, after completing the School of Application at Annapolis, Maryland, General Smith sailed for the Philippines, where he served on expeditionary duty with the 1st Marine Brigade until September 1908. He returned to the United States the following month and was stationed at the Marine Barracks, Annapolis, until December 1909, when he embarked for expeditionary duty in Panama. Returning from there in April 1910, he served at Annapolis; Puget Sound, Washington; San Diego, California; and the Recruiting Station, Seattle, Washington, before sailing in September 1912, to rejoin the 1st Marine Brigade in the Philippines.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Smith remained with the 1st Brigade until April 1914, when he took command of the Marine Detachment aboard the USS *Galveston*. He served in that capacity in Asiatic waters until July 1915, and returned to the United States the following month for duty at the Navy Yard, New Orleans, Louisiana. From there he was ordered to the Dominican Republic in June 1916, as a member of the 4th Marines. During that unit's operations against rebel bandits, he saw action in the march to Santiago and engagements at La Pena and Kilometer 29. Returning to the United States May 30, 1917, he sailed for France just two weeks later as commander of the 8th Machine Gun Company, 5th Marines.

In France General Smith was detached from the 5th Marines and sent to the Army Staff School at Langres, from which he was graduated in February 1918. He was then named Adjutant of the 4th Marine Brigade, in which capacity he fought in the Verdun Sector and the Aisne-Marne Defensive, including the epic Battle of Belleau Wood. Transferred to the I Corps, 1st Army, in July, 1918, he served as assistant operations officer in charge of liaison during the Aisne-Marne, Oisne-Aisne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. After the Armistice he participated in the March to the Rhine through Belgium and Luxembourg as an assistant operations officer with the 3rd Army, and served with the General Staff, U.S. Army, during the occupation of Germany. For his service at Belleau Wood he was awarded the Croix de Guerre with palm by the French government. He also received a Meritorious Service Citation from the Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, for which he was later awarded the Purple Heart Medal.

Returning to the United States in April 1919, General Smith's assignments in the next four years included duty at Norfolk, Virginia, study at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, and service in Washington, D.C., with the War Plans Section of the Office of Naval Operations. There he was the first Marine officer to serve on the Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee. Leaving Washington in May 1923, he served aboard the battleships *Wyoming* and *Arkansas* as Fleet Marine Officer, U.S. Scouting Fleet, until that September

In February, 1924, after serving at Marine Corps Headquarters and in the West Indies in connection with joint Army-Navy maneuvers, the general joined the Marine Brigade on expeditionary duty in Haiti, serving as the Chief of Staff and Officer in Charge of Operations and Training. He returned from Haiti in August, 1925, to serve as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Brigade at Quantico, Virginia, until September, 1926; as a student in the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, from then until June, 1927; and as Post Quartermaster of the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia Navy Yard, from July, 1927 to March, 1931.

In April, 1931, Smith began another tour of sea duty, this time aboard the USS *California* as Aide to the Commander and Force Marine Officer of the Battle Force, U.S. Fleet. He served in those capacities until June 1933, commanded the Marine Barracks at the Washington Navy Yard from then until January 1935, and served the following two years at San Francisco, California, as Chief of Staff, Department of the Pacific. From there he was ordered to Marine Corps Headquarters in March, 1937, to serve two years as Director of the Division of Operations and Training, after which he was Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps under Major General Thomas Holcomb from April to September, 1939.

After this last assignment General Smith assumed command of the 1st Marine Brigade at Quantico, taking that unit to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for extended amphibious training in October 1940. In February, 1941, when the brigade was redesignated the 1st Marine Division he became its first commander. He returned with the division to Quantico in April, 1941, and in June was detached from it to take command of the organization which eventually became the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Under this command, the 1st Marine Division and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions received their initial training in amphibious warfare.

Moving to San Diego in August 1942, the general took command of the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, under which he completed the amphibious indoctrination of the 2nd and 3rd Marine Divisions before they went overseas and the 7th Infantry Division and other units involved in the Aleutians operation. The Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, was later redesignated the V Amphibious Corps, and in September, 1943, as commander of that unit, General Smith arrived at Pearl Harbor to begin planning for the Gilberts campaign. He commanded the V Amphibious Corps until August 1944, when he was named Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific at Pearl Harbor. In addition to that post, he commanded Task Force 56 at Iwo Jima before returning to the United States in July, 1945, to head the Marine Training and Replacement Command at Camp Pendleton, California. A lieutenant general when he was retired 15 May 1946, at the age of 64, he was promoted to general on the retired list for having been especially commended in combat.

As already mentioned, the general held the Distinguished Service Medal with three Gold Stars in lieu of additional awards, the Croix de Guerre with palm and the Purple Heart Medal. His other medals and decorations included the Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal with three bronze stars; the Mexican Service Medal; the Dominican Campaign Medal, the World War I Victory Medal with five sector clasps; the Army of Occupation of Germany Medal; the American Defense Service Medal with Base clasp; the American Area Campaign Medal; the Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign Medal with one silver star in lieu of five bronze stars; the World War II Victory Medal; the Dominican Order of the First Merit; and the British Order of Commander of the Bath.

Following a long illness, General Smith died 12 January 1967, at the age of 84. Funeral services were held on 14 January, at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot Chapel, San Diego and the general was interred with full military honors in Ft. Rosecrans National Cemetery overlooking San Diego harbor and North Island.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance

Raymond Ames Spruance was born on July 3, 1886 in Baltimore, Maryland. He was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis and graduated in 1906. Passed midshipman upon graduation in September 1906 and operated less than a year in the North Atlantic on the battleship *Iowa* (BB-4) before transferring to the *Minnesota* (BB-22) for the global voyage of the Great White Fleet (1907-1909), during which he was commissioned a ensign in September 1908. After receiving instruction in electrical engineering he was assigned to the *Connecticut* (BB-18) for a year (1910-1911) and thereafter assigned to the Asiatic Fleet as senior engineer of the cruiser *Cincinnati* (C-7) and commander of the destroyer *Bainbridge* (DD-1) in the rank of lieutenant (junior grade) and was again promoted in 1914.

Admiral Spruance

Lieutenant Spruance was assigned to the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, where he helped to outfit and serve as electrical officer of the *Pennsylvania* (BB-38) from February 1916 through Chesapeake maneuvers until November 1917. As lieutenant commander he was assistant engineer officer at New York Navy Yard (1917-1918) and was made executive officer of the troop transport *Agamemnon* for four months and in the rank of commander. In April 1919 he commissioned and commanded the *Aaron Ward* (DD-132) for station ship duties during the flight of the NC boats and Pacific operations, and the *Percival* (DD-298) in March 1920 out of San Diego until June 1921.

Commander Spruance served a tour of duty at the Electrical Division at the Bureau of Engineering (1921-1924), and commander of the *Dale* (DD-290), followed as assistant chief of staff to Admiral Philip Andrews, commanding U.S. Naval Forces in European waters (1924-1925) on the cruiser *Pittsburgh* (ACR-4). His subsequent sea duties included command of the *Osborne* (DD-295) in European and Mediterranean waters (1925-1926), executive officer of the *Mississippi* (BB-41) with the Battle Fleet (1929-1931), and later (1938-1940) her skipper. He was promoted to the rank of captain in June 1932. He became chief of staff to Commander Destroyers Scouting Force, Adolphus E. Watson, flagship light cruiser *Raleigh* (CL-7), along the West coast (1933-1935). In December 1939, he was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral.

Having served in battleships, destroyers and cruisers through his whole career, Spruance assumed command of Cruiser Division Five, flagship heavy cruiser *Northampton* (CA-26), at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. In this office, Spruance supported Admiral Halsey's carrier *Enterprise* during the early 1942 carrier raids, including shelling of Wotje, Maloelap, Wake and Marcus Islands. Later, he escorted the task force conducting the Doolittle Raid.

Halsey, falling ill on the conclusion of the raid, appointed Spruance as his replacement as Commander, Task Force 16, E*nterprise* and *Hornet*. Spruance, under the nominal command of Rear-Admiral Fletcher, led his carriers expertly with the help of Commander Browning, Halsey's Chief-of-Staff, and justly received a large part of the praise for the US Navy success in the battle.

Following this battle, Spruance became Chief-of-Staff of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in which role he had a major part in planning future operations. In November 1943, he became Commander, 5th Fleet, commanding the Central Pacific Forces, including carriers, battleships and amphibious assets. He once again performed very well, but in the carrier staffs concern arose over the Admiral's battleship consciousness. After leading the Navy across the Pacific through the Marshalls, Spruance got to lead the attack on the Marianas, leading the 5th Fleet into the Battle of the Philippine Sea. There, his air groups destroyed the enemy aerial attacks in conjunction with a new concept for the battleships, in which Spruance would deploy them in the van, shooting down planes even before fighters would attack. Although his forces did not follow the beaten Japanese fleet, they sank the medium carrier *Hiyo*. Spruance has often been blamed for not following the retiring Imperial Japanese Navy. This is unjust because Spruance's task was to guard the invasion forces and beaches. Besides, if Spruance was to blame, so were the aviation officers responsible for ignoring torpedo-plane training which resulted in only bombs hitting most carriers except *Hiyo*.

After the Philippine Sea battle, Spruance, for the first time, turned over the 5th Fleet to Admiral Halsey (the numerical designation was changed to 3rd Fleet, but the ships remained the same, only the staffs changed), going back to Pearl Harbor to plan future landing operations. The invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were partly his work. He got back to lead the 5th Fleet in battle off those two islands, still not yet fully clear of his idea of a battleship duel. Finally returning one last time to Pearl Harbor, Spruance began planning the Operations Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, and Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu, which he would have commanded had the war gone on.

However, the atomic bombs worked successfully and with war's end, these invasions never occurred. After the war, Spruance became CINCPAC for a short term, President of the Naval War College, and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines.

A quiet, shy and intelligent officer, Spruance was the ideal man to lead the Navy in the Central Pacific, despite the problems he sometimes had with naval aviation. He was always quite interested in the opinions of his staffs, and would stand by his decisions. Precise and calculating, he was as good a planner as a combat leader. Of the two major naval personalities in Pacific fleet command, Halsey and Spruance, it must be said that Spruance rated higher for promotion to Fleet Admiral, for he was a better commander, an admirals' admiral, not a sailors' admiral as Halsey.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Admiral Richmond K. Turner

Admiral Turner

Richmond Kelly Turner was born in Portland, Oregon, on 27 May 1885. Appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy from California in 1904, he graduated in June 1908 and served in several ships over the next four years. In 1913, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Turner briefly held command of the destroyer Stewart. After receiving instruction in ordnance engineering and service on board the gunboat Marietta, he was assigned to the battleships Pennsylvania, Michigan and Mississippi during 1916-19.

From 1919 to 1922, Lieutenant Commander Turner was an Ordnance Officer at the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D.C. He then was Gunnery Officer of the battleship California, Fleet Gunnery Officer on the Staff of Commander Scouting Fleet and Commanding Officer of the destroyer Mervine. Following promotion to the rank of Commander in 1925, Turner served with the Bureau of Ordnance at the Navy Department. In 1927, he received flight training at Pensacola, Florida, and a year later became Commanding Officer of the seaplane tender Jason and Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Asiatic Fleet. He had further aviation-related assignments into the 1930s and was Executive Officer of the aircraft carrier Saratoga in 1933-34. Captain Turner attended the Naval War College and served on that institution's staff in 1935-38. He next commanded the heavy cruiser Astoria and took her on a diplomatic mission, returning the ashes of the Japanese ambassador who had died in Washington, to Japan in 1939.

Captain Turner was Director of the War Plans Division in Washington, D.C., in 1940-41 and was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral late in 1941. He was Assistant Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet from December 1941 until June 1942 and was then sent to the Pacific war zone to take command of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force. Over the next three years, while holding a variety of senior Pacific Fleet amphibious force commands as both a Rear Admiral and Vice Admiral, he planned and executed the conquest of enemy positions in the South, Central and Western Pacific, contributing greatly to ultimate victory in the Pacific War. In the rank of Admiral, he would have commanded the amphibious component of the invasion of Japan, had that nation not capitulated in August 1945.

Following the end of World War II, Admiral Turner served on the Navy Department's General Board and was U.S. Naval Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee. He retired from active duty in July 1947. Admiral Richmond K. Turner died in Monterey, California, on 12 February 1961.

Appendix D: The United States and Japanese Land Force Weaponry, 1943 - 1944

The United States Army and Marine Corps

Infantry Weapons

Weapon	Length	Weight	Caliber	Magazine Capacity	Muzzle Capacity	Rate of Fire
M1911A1 pistol	8.66 in.	2.2 lb (empty); 2.76n lb (loaded)	0.45 in.	7 rounds	853 ft. per second	
M1A1 (Thompson) submachine gun	32 in.	10.34 lb. (empty), 11.88 lb. (loaded)	0.45 in.	20 - 30 round clip	918 feet per second	700 rounds per minute
M1903 rifle (Springfield)	43.3 in.	8.58 lb.	0.30 in.	5 rounds	2,788 feet per second	
M1 rifle (Garand)	43.3 in	9.7 lb	0.30 in	8 round clip	2,778 ft per second	Semi automatic
M1 carbine	35.4 in	5 lb (empty) 5.7 lb (loaded)	0.30 in	30 round clip	1,903 ft per second	Semi automatic
M1918A2 Browning Automatic rifle (BAR)	48 in	18 lb (empty), 19.3 lb(loaded)	0.30 in	20 round box	2,805 ft per second	300 - 350 *or* 500 - 600 rounds per minute
M1919A4 (Browning light machine gun)	41 in	30.8 lb (gun), 14 lb (tripod)	0.30 in	250 round belt	2,805 ft per second	400 - 500 rounds per minute
M1917A1 (Browning heavy machine gun)	38.6 in	33 lb (gun) 52.8 lb (tripod) 8.8 lb (water)	0.30 in	250 round belt	2,805 ft per second	500 - 600 rounds per minute
Browning M2HB (Heavy Barrel)		83.6 lbs (gun only)	0.50 in	110 round belt	2,887 ft per second	450 - 550 rounds per minute

M1911A1

M1A1 submachine gun

M1903 rifle

M1 carbine

M1 rifle

M1918A2 Browning Automatic rifle



M1917A1 Browning heavy machine gun

M1919A4 Browning light machine gun



Browning M2HB

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Mortars and Anti-Tank Weapons

Weapon	Length	Weight	Range	Caliber	Traverse	Elevation/ Depression	Shell Type	Shell Weight
M2 60mm Mortar	28.75 in	Barrel 12.75 lb, Bipod 16 lb, Base 12.75 lb, Total 41.5 lb	1,968.3 yds	60mm	14º	+40º to +85º	Smoke, Explosive, Illuminating	3 lb
M1 81mm Mortar	49.6 in	Barrel 44.2 lb, Bipod 46.2 lb, Base 44.8 lb, Total 135.2 lb	3,280 yds	81mm	14º	+ 45º to +85º	Smoke, Explosive	6.8 lb
M1A1 Rocket Launcher (Bazooka)	54.7 in	13.2 lb		2.36 in				3.3 lb
M2A1 37mm antitank gun		902 lb	492 yds	37 mm	60º	-10º to +15º		1.9 lb
M2-2 Portable Flamethrower		70.4 lb	80 - 130 ft	10 sec. duration				

M1 81mm Mortar

M1A1 Rocket Launcher

M2 60mm Mortar

M2A1 37mm antitank gun

M2-2 Portable Flamethrower

Appendix D: Infantry Weapons

Artillery

Weapon	Weight	Length	Height	Width	Range	Rate of Fire (Rounds per minute)	Traverse	Elevation	Time to Emplace
M8 75mm Pack Howitzer	1,339 lbs	12 ft.	2 ft., 10 in	3 ft., 11 in	9,600 yards maximum	in bursts 6; in prolonged fire 3	3º, right & left	+45º - -5º; fires from wheels	½ min.; 3 min. when disassembled.
M2 105mm Howitzer	4,980 lbs	19 ft., 8 in	5 ft., 5 in	6 ft., 8 in	12,200 yds	in bursts 4; in prolonged fire 2	22.5º right & left	+64º, -0º; fires from wheels.	3 min.
M1 155mm Howitzer	13,400 lbs.	26.5 ft	6 ft., 11.5 in	7 ft., 11.5 in	16,600 yds. normal; 21,125 yds. with supercharge	in bursts 4; in prolonged fire 1	26.5º right & left	+60º - -2º; fires from wheels or firing jack.	5 min

M8 75mm Pack Howitzer

M2 105mm Howitzer

M1 155mm Howitzer

Armor

Type	Crew	Weight	Length	Height	Width	Maximum Speed	Armament
M4A1 Sherman Medium Tank	5	67,000 - 70,000 lbs.	19 ft., 2 in.	9 ft., 10 in.	8 ft., 7 in.	24 mph	75mm gun; 2 .30 cal. machine guns, 1 .50 cal. machine gun
M5A1 Stuart Light Tank	4	33,500 lb	15 ft., 11 in.	8 ft., 5 in.	7.5 ft.	36 mph	1 37 mm gun, 2 .30 caliber machine guns, 1 .50 caliber machine gun



M4A1 Sherman Medium Tank

M5A1 Stuart Light Tank

Imperial Japanese Army

Infantry Weapons

Weapon	Length	Weight	Caliber	Range	Ammunition Types	Magazine Capacity	Muzzle Velocity	Rate of Fire
Model 14 (1925) 8mm Pistol		2 lbs. (empty)	8 mm (.315 in.)			8 rounds	950 feet per second	
6.5mm Model 38 (Arisaka) Rifle	50.25 inches	9.08 lbs. (unloaded), 9.4 lbs. (loaded)	6.5 mm (.25 in.)			5 round, internal box	2,400 feet per second	
7.7mm Model 99 (Arisaka) Rifle	45 in.	9 lb., 2 oz. (unloaded)	7.7 mm (.303 in.)			5 round, internal box	2,400 feet per second	
Model 96 (1936) 6.5mm Light Machine Gun		20 lbs. (empty)	6.55 mm (.256 in.)			30 round	2,410 feet per second	550 rounds per minute
Model 99 (1939) 7.7mm Light Machine Gun	42 in.	20 lbs. (empty)	7.7 mm (.303 in.)			30 round	2,300 feet per second	800 rounds per minute

Model 14 8mm Pistol



6.5mm Model 38 Rifle

7.7mm Model 99 Rifle

Model 96 6.5mm Light Machine Gun



Model 99 7.7mm Light Machine Gun

Model 92 7.7mm Heavy Machine Gun





Model 93 13mm Machine Gun

Model 89 50mm Grenade Discharger

Model 99 (1939) 81mm Mortar

Appendix D: Infantry Weapons

Weapon Cont'd	Length	Weight	Caliber	Range	Ammunition Types	Magazine Capacity	Muzzle Velocity	Rate of Fire
Model 92 (1932) 7.7mm Heavy Machine Gun		122 lbs. (including tripod)	7.7 mm (.303 in.)			30 round strip	2,400 feet per second	450 rounds per minute
Model 93 (1933) 13mm Machine Gun	89 inches	87 lbs. (empty)	13.2 mm (.52 in.)			30 rounds	2,250 feet per second	
Model 89 (1929) 50mm Grenade Discharger ("Knee Mortar")		10.25 lbs.	50 mm (1.97 in.)		high explosive shell, grenade, pyrotechnic signals and incendiary			
Model 99 (1939) 81mm Mortar	25.25 in	52 lbs.	81 mm (3.19 in.)	2,200 yds.				

Artillery

Weapon	Weight	Range	Caliber	Traverse	Elevation/ Depression	Rate of Fire	Muzzle Velocity
Model 1 (1941) 47mm Gun	1,600 lbs.		47 mm (1.85 in.)	60º	+19º to -11º		2,700 feet per second
Model 92 (1932) 70mm Howitzer	468 lbs.	3,075 yds.	70 mm (2.76 in.)	45º	+50º		2,400 feet per second
Model 38 (1905) 75mm Gun		9,025 yds.	75 mm (2.95 in.)	7º	+16º to -8º	8-10 rounds per minute	
Model 41 (1908) 75mm Infantry Gun	1,200 lbs	7,800 yds.	75 mm (2.95 in.)	6º	+40º to -18º		
Model 91 (1931) 105mm Howitzer	4,250 lbs.	11,500 yds.	105 mm (4.13 in.)	45º	+45º to -7º	6-8 rounds per minute	1,790 feet per second

Model 1 (1941) 47mm Gun



Model 92 (1932) 70mm Howitzer



Model 38 (1905) 75mm Gun



Model 41 (1908) 75mm Infantry Gun



Model 91 (1931) 105mm Howitzer

Armor

Type	Crew	Weight	Length	Height	Width	Armament
Type 95 Ha-Go Light Tank	3	20,000 lbs	14 ft., 4 in	7 ft.	6 ft., 9 in.	1 37 mm gun, 1 7.7 mm rear turret machine gun, 1 7.7 mm hull machine gun



Type 95 Ha-Go Light Tank

Appendix E: American Ships and Aircraft in Operation Flintlock

Aircraft Carriers

Class	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Armament	Power Plant	Complement	Cruising Range	Ships and Dates Commissioned	Remarks
Lexington	33,000 tons	910'	105'	35'	34 knots	12x5.38," 2x2 40mm, 23x4 40mm, 16 20mm, 86 planes	Turbines with electric motor, 4 screws, 180,000 hp	3373	4,600 miles @ 25 knots; 9,500 miles @ 15 knots	Saratoga, 1927	Converted from Battle Cruiser hulls while building
Yorktown	19,800 tons	827'4"	83' at water line	31'	34 knots	8x 5.38," 8x2 40mm, 6x4 40mm, 50 20mm, 85 planes	Geared turbines with four screws, 120,000 hp	2919		Enterprise, 1938	
Essex Class, Short-Hull	27,100 tons	874'	93' at water line	28'	33 knots	12x 5.38," 10-18x4 40mm, 56-62 20mm, 103 planes	Geared turbines with four screws, 150,000 hp	3448	10,700 miles @ 25 knots; 16,900 miles @ 15 knots	Essex, 1942; Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Yorktown, 1943	
Independence (Light)	11,000 tons	619'	71' at water line	24'	32 knots	10x2 40mm, 2x4 40mm, 16-20 20mm, 33 planes	Geared turbine engines with 4 screws, 103,000 hp	1569	5,800 miles @ 25 knots; 10,100 miles @ 15 knots	Belleau Wood, Cabot, Cowpens, Langley, Monterey, Princeton, 1943	Converted from Cleveland Class (light) cruiser hulls
Bogue (Escort)	15,200 tons (full load)	495'8"	69' at water line	26'	17 knots	2 x5.38," 10x2 40mm, 27 20mm, 28 planes	1 screw, 8,500 hp	890-1205	22,500 miles @ 17 knots; 26,300 @ 15 knots	Nassau, 1943	Converted from merchant ship hulls

Sangamon (Escort)	23,350 tons (full load)	553'	75' at water line	32'	17 knots	2 5.38," 7x2 40mm, 2x4 40mm, 21 20mm, 30 planes	Geared turbines, twin screws, 13,500 hp	1080	20,000 miles @ 17 knots; 23,900 miles @ 15 knots	Chenango, Sangamon, Suwanee, 1942	Converted from tanker hulls
Casablanca (Escort)	10,982 tons (full load)	512'3"	65' at water line	22'4"	19 knots	1 5.38," 8x2 40mm, 20 20mm, 28 planes	Skinner Unaflow reciprocating engines, twin screws, 11,200 hp	860	10,200 miles @ 15 knots; 7,200 miles @ 19 knots	Coral Sea, Corregidor, Manila Bay, Natoma Bay 1943	First Escort Carriers designed and built from the keel up as such.

Lexington Class Aircraft Carrier, USS Saratoga

Yorktown Class Aircraft Carrier, USS Enterprise

Essex Class Short Hull Aircraft Carrier, USS Intrepid

Independence Class Light Carrier, USS Cabot

Bogue Class Escort Carrier, USS Nassau

Casablanca Class Escort Carrier, USS Corregidor

Sangamon Class Escort Carrier, USS Sangamon

Battleships

Class	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Armament	Complement	Power Plant	Ships and Dates Commissioned	Remarks
Pennsylvania	31,400 tons (normal) 35,929 tons (full load)	608'	106'3"	33'6"	21 knots	4x3 14.45," 12x1 5.51," 8x1 5.25," 8x1 .50-cal machine guns, 2 21" torpedo tubes; 3 planes	2555	Steam turbines, 12 boilers, 4 shafts, 31,500 hp	Pennsylvania, 1916	Older "Slow" battleships, primarily used for gunfire support and shore bombardment
New Mexico	33,000 tons (normal) 36,157 tons (full load)	624'	106'3"	34'	21.5 knots	4x3 14.5," 12x1 5.51," 8x1 5.25," 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 2 planes	1945-2116	Turbo-electric steam turbines, 6 300 psi boilers, 4 shafts, 40,000 hp	Mississippi, 1917; New Mexico, 1918; Idaho, 1919	
Tennessee	32,300 tons (normal) 40,354 tons (full load)	624'-624'6"	114'	34'	20 knots	4x3 14.5," 14x1 5.51," 4x1 5.25," 2 21" torpedo tubes; 3 planes	2243-2375	Turbo-electric engines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 26,800 hp	Tennessee 1920	
Colorado	32,600 tons (normal) 34,946 (full load)	624'	108'1"-114'	33'7"-34'8"	21 knots	4x2 16.45," 12x1 5.51," 8x1 3.50," 2 21" torpedo tubes; 3 planes	1968-2182	Turbo-electric, 8 285 psi boilers, 4 shafts, 28,900 hp	Maryland, 1921; Colorado, 1923	
North Carolina	37,484 tons (standard) 44,377 (full load)	729'	108'4"	35'6"	27 knots	3x3 16.45," 10x2 5.38," 4x4 1.1", 18x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3 planes	2339	Steam turbines, 8 575-psi boilers, 4 shafts, 121,000 shp	North Carolina, Washington, 1941	"Fast" battleship. Accompanied "fast carriers."

South Dakota	37,970 tons (standard) 44,519 tons (full load)	680'	108'2"	36'2"	27 knots	3x3 16.45," 10x2 5.38," 3x4 1.1", 12x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3 planes	2257-2354	Steam turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 130,000 shp	Alabama, Indiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, 1942	
Iowa	48,110 tons (standard) 57.540 tons (full load)	887'3"-887'7"	108'1"-108'2"	37'9"-38'	33 knots	3x3 16.50," 10x2 5.38," 19x4 40mm. 50x1 20mm; 3 planes	2753-2978	Steam turbines, 8 600 psi boilers, 4 shafts, 212,000 shp	Iowa, New Jersey, 1943	



Pennsylvania Class Battleship, USS Pennsylvania



New Mexico Class Battleship, USS Mississippi

Tennessee Class Battleship, USS Tennessee

Colorado Class Battleship, USS Maryland

North Carolina Class Battleship, USS North Carolina

South Dakota Class Battleship, USS Alabama

Iowa Class Battleship, USS Iowa

Cruisers

Class	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Armament	Complement	Cruising Range	Power Plant	Ships and Dates Commissioned	Remarks
Pensacola	9100 tons (normal) 11,512 (full load)	585'8"	65'3"	22'5"	32.5 knots	2x3 8.55," 2x2 8.55," 4 5.25," 6x4 40mm, 28x1 20mm; 2 planes	1113-1135		Steam turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp	Pensacola, 1930; Salt Lake City, 1929	Washington Naval Limitation Treaty Heavy Cruisers
Northampton	9050-9300 tons (normal) 11,826 (full load)	600'3"	66'1"	24'	32.5 knots	3x3 8.55," 4x2 5.25," 6x4 40mm, 28 20mm, 6 21" torpedo tubes; 3 planes	1020-1155		Steam turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp	Chester, 1930; Louisville, 1931	
Portland	9800-9950 tons (normal) 13,767 tons (full load)	610'3"-610'4"	66'1"	24'6"	32.5 knots	3x3 8.55," 8x1 5.25," 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3 planes	1229-1382		Steam turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp	Indianapolis, 1932; Portland, 1933	
New Orleans	9375-9973 tons (normal) 12,411 tons (full load)	588'2"	61'9"-61'10"	24'4"	32.5 knots	3x3 8.55," 8x1 5.25," 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3 planes	1042-1121		Steam turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp	Minneapolis, New Orleans, San Francisco, 1934	
Wichita	10,000 tons (normal) 13,015 (full load)	608'4	61'9	25'	32.5 knots	3x3 8.55," 8x1 5.38," 4x4 40mm, 4x2 40mm, 20x1 20mm, 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 2 planes	1343		Geared turbine engines, 8 boilers with 4 shafts, 100,000 hp	Wichita, 1939	

Baltimore	13,600 tons	673'5	70'10	26'10	33 knots	3x3 8.55," 6x2 5.38," 12x4 40mm, 28-28 20mm, 4 planes	1648-1969	4,800 miles @ 25 knots; 7,900 miles @ 15 knots	Geared turbine engines with 4 screws, 120,000 hp	Baltimore, Boston, 1943	Wartime design
Atlanta	6000 tons	541'6"-541'9"	53'2"	26'6"-26'8"	32-33 knots	16 5.38," 1x4 40mm, 9 20mm, 2 depth charge racks, 8 21" torpedo tubes	688-820		High pressure steam boilers, geared steam turbines, 85,000 shp	Oakland, 1943; San Diego, San Juan, 1942	Light Anti-aircraft Cruisers
Cleveland	10,000 tons	610'-610'1"	66'3"-66'4	24'7"-26'6"	32.5 knots	3x4 6.47," 2x6 5.38," 4x4 40mm, 2x2 40mm, 20 20mm, 3 planes	1214-1475		Geared turbines, four screws	Biloxi, Mobile, 1943; Santa Fe, 1942	Light Cruisers

Pensacola Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Salt Lake City

Northampton Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Chester



Portland Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Portland

New Orleans Class Heavy Cruiser, USS San Francisco

Wichita Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Wichita

Baltimore Heavy Class Cruiser, USS Baltimore

Atlanta Class Light Antiaircraft Cruiser, USS Oakland

Cleveland Class Light Cruiser, USS Santa Fe

Destroyers

Class	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Armament	Complement	Power Plant	Ships and Dates Commissioned	Remarks
Farragut	1375 tons	341'3	34'2"	8'10"	36.5 knots	4 5.38," 2x4 21" torpedo tubes	251	Geared turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp	Dewey, Farragut, 1934; Alwyn, Dale, Hull, MacDonough, Monaghan, 1935	
Porter	1805 tons	381'	36'2	10'3	37.5 knots	6 5.38," 2x4 21" torpedo tubes	294	Geared turbines with twin screws, 50,000 hp	Phelps, 1936	
Mahan	1395-1500 tons	341'8	34'10	9'10	36.5 knots	4 5.38," 3x4 21" torpedo tubes	251	Geared turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp	Case, Cummings, 1936	
Gridley	1500 tons	341'8	36'2	10'3	36.5 knots	4 5.38," 4x4 21" torpedo tubes	251	High-pressure steam turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp	Craven, Gridley, 1937	
Fanning	1500 tons	341'3"	34'8	17'0	35 knots	4-5 5"/38, 3x4 21" torpedo tubes	251	High-pressure super-heated boilers, geared turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp	Dunlap, Fanning, 1937	
Benham	1500 tons	341'3	34'8	17'0	36.5 knots	4 5.38," 2x4 21" torpedo tubes	251		McCall, Maury, 1938; Ellet, Stack, Sterett, Wilson, 1939	
Sims	1570 tons	347'11"	35'7	17'4	37 knots	4 5.38," 2x4 21" torpedo tubes	251	High-pressure super-heated	Anderson, Hughes, Mustin, Russell, 1939 Morris, 1940	

Benson	1620 tons	348'2	35'4	17'4	37 knots	4 5.38," 1x5 21" torpedo tubes	276		Bailey, Bancroft, Caldwell, Coghlan, Frazier, Meade, 1942	
Fletcher	2050 tons	376'6	39'4	17'9	35 knots	5 5.38," 2x5 21" torpedo tubes	329	High-pressure super-heated boilers, geared turbines with twin screws, 60,000 hp	Fletcher, 1942; Abbot, Bell, Black, Bradford, Brown, Bullard, Burns, Caperton, Charrette, Chauncey, Clarence K. Bronson, Cogswell, Colahan, Conner, Cotton, Cowell, Dortch, Erben, Franks, Gatling, Haggard, Hailey, Hale, Hall, Halligan, Haraden, Harrison, Hazelwood, Healy, Heermann, Hoel, Hopewell, Hunt, Ingersoll, Izard, John Rogers, Johnston, Kidd, Knapp, La Valette, Lewis Hancock, McCord, McKee, Miller, Murray, Owen, Porterfield, Remey, Ringgold, Schroeder, Sigsbee, Stembell, Stephen Potter, Stevens, The Sullivans, Trathen, Walker, 1943	
Evarts	1436 tons	289'5	35'1	11'10	21 knots	3 3.50," 1x2 40mm, 9 20mm, 1 hedgehog, 2 depth charge tracks, 8 "K" gun projectors	198	Diesel-electric drive with tandem-motor drive; 6,000 hp	Burden R. Hastings, Charles R. Greer, Deede, Dempsey, Duffy, Harold C. Thomas, Le Hardy, Sederstrom, Wileman, Wintle, 1943	Destroyer escorts, initially designed for convoy duty

Farragut Class Destroyer, USS Dale



Porter Class Destroyer, USS Phelps

Mahan Class Destroyer, USS Cummings

Gridley Class Destroyer, USS Craven

Fanning Class Destroyer, USS Dunlap



Benham Class Destroyer, USS Maury

Sims Class Destroyer, USS Anderson

Benson Class Destroyer, USS Bancroft

Fletcher Class Destroyer, USS Bell

Evarts Class Destroyer Escort, USS Burden R. Hastings

Submarines

Class	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Armament	Complement	Power Plant	Boats and Dates Commissioned
Porpoise, P-5 Type	1,330 tons surfaced, 1,998 tons submerged	300'6	25'	15'10	20 knots surfaced, 9 knots submerged	1 3.5," gun, 4 bow and 2 stern torpedo tubes, 18 torpedoes	73	Diesel engines for surface running/ electric motors for submerged running	Permit, 1937
Salmon	1,450 tons surfaced, 2,198 tons submerged	298'	26'	14'3	21 knots surfaced, 9 knots submerged	1 3.5" gun, 4 bow and 4 stern torpedo tubes, 24 torpedoes	75		Seal, Skipjack, 1938
Sargo	1,450 tons surfaced, 2,350 tons submerged	310'6"	27'1"	17'1"	20 knots surfaced, 9 knots submerged	1 3.5" gun, 4 bow and 4 stern torpedo tubes, 24 torpedoes	78		Sea Raven, 1939
Gato	1,526 tons surfaced, 2,424 tons submerged	311'	27'3	16'10	20 knots surfaced, 9 knots submerged	1 3.5," 1 4.5" or 1 5.5", 6 bow and 4 stern torpedo tubes, 24 torpedoes	80		Guardfish, Sunfish, 1942



Porpoise, P-5 Type Class Submarine, USS Permit



Salmon Class Submarine, USS Seal

Sargo Class Submarine, USS Squalus





Gato Class Submarine, USS Guardfish

Minecraft

Type	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Armament	Complement	Power Plant	Ships and Dates Commissioned/ Converted	Remarks
Light Minelayers (converted Flush-Deck Destroyers)	1,700 tons	314'	32'	12'	30 knots	3 3.5," 1x2 40mm, 6 20mm, 80 mines	149	Geared turbine engines, twin screws, 24,200 shp	Ramsay, 1930; Preble, 1937	Used as guide ships for small landing craft and for limited gunfire support
Fast Minesweepers (converted Flush-Deck Destroyers)	1,880 tons	314'	32'	12'6"	27 knots	3 3.5," 1x4 40mm, 5-7 20mm	149	Geared turbine engines, twin screws, 24,000 shp	Chandler, Hogan, Long, Palmer, Perry, Stansbury, Zane, 1940; Hamilton, 1942	
Raven/Auk Class Minesweepers	1,100 tons (full load)	221'2"	32'	11'	17 knots, 9-12 knots (econ)	1 3.5," 2 40mm, 8 20mm	105	Diesel electric drive, twin screws, 3,500 horse power	Sage, 1942; Chief, Heed, Motive, Oracle, Pursuit, Requisite, Revenge, 1943	
Motor Minesweepers (numbered)	320 tons (full load)	136'	24'6	6'1	13 knots	1 3.5," 2 20mm, 2 depth charge tracks + 2 extensions, 2 depth charge projectors	33	Diesel engines, twin screws, 500 hp	Placed in service, 1942-1945	8 used in Flintlock
Submarine Chasers SC-497 Class	98 tons	110'10"	17'	6'6"	20 knots	1 3.5," 2x2 .50-caliber machine guns	22	Diesel engines, twin screws 1,200 shp	Commissioned1942-1944	5 used a landing craft control and guide ships



Light Minelayer, USS Preble

Fast Minesweeper, USS Zane

Raven/Auk Class Minesweeper, USS Revenge

Submarine Chaser SC-497 Class, SC 1287

Motor Minesweeper, YMS 44

Specialized Amphibious Warfare Ships

Amphibious Force Command Ships

Class	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Armament	Speed	Complement	Power Plant	Ships and Dates Commissioned	Remarks
Appalachian	12,690 tons (full load)	459'	63'	24'	2 5.38;" 4x2 40mm; 10x2 20mm	17 knots (max); 12 knots (econ)	473-633	Geared turbine engines, single screw, 6,000 hp	Appalachian, Rocky Mount, 1943	Converted from freighter hulls, first used in invasions of Sicily and Italy



Appalachian Class Amphibious Force Command Ship, USS Appalachian

Cargo Ships and Transports

Class	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Armament	Speed	Complement	Power Plant	Ships and Dates Commissioned	Remarks
Crater (Cargo ships)	11,565 tons (full load)	441'6"	57'	30'	1 5.38," 1 3.5," 2 40mm, 6 20mm; or 1 5.38," 4 40mm, 12 20mm	11.5 knots	206	Reciprocating engines, single screw, 1,950 shp	Almaack, Mercury, 1942; Alkes, Caelum, De Grasse, Kenmore, Livingston, Rutilicus,1943	Cargo ships: several of this class were converted transports
Attack Cargo Ships									Alcoyne, Electra, 1943	Attack cargo ships converted from cargo ships
Andromeda Attack Cargo Ships	13,905 tons (full load)	459'	63'	26'	1 5.38," 4x2 40mm, 12 20mm	16.5 knots	380	Geared turbine engines, single screw, 6,000 hp	Aquarius, Centaurus, 1943	Attack Cargo ships: capacity: 4,450 deadweight cargo; 1 LCP(L); 8 LCM(3); 15-16 LCVP
Arthur Middleton Attack Transports	11,058 tons	489'	69'6"	27'4"	1 5," 4 3." 8 20mm AA, 4 .50-cal. machine guns	18.4 knots	512 Troops: 1,840		Wharton, 1939; Heywood, J. Franklin Bell, 1941; Arthur Middleton, , 1942; Calvert, Harris, Harry Lee, La Salle, Leedstown, Leonard Wood, Monrovia, Neville, Ormsby, Pierce, President Monroe, President Polk, Sheridan, Sumter, Warren, Wayne, William P. Biddle, Windsor, Zeilin, 1943	Converted to Attack Transports
Bayfield Attack Transports	16,100 tons (full load)	492'	69'6"	28'6"	1 5," 4 3." 8 20mm AA, 4 .50-cal. machine guns	18 knots	575 Troops: 1,000-2,000	Turbine engines; 8,500 hp	Bolivar, Callaway, Cambria, Custer, Du Page, Elmore, Fayette, 1943	Cargo Capacity: 200,000 cu ft; 4700 tons. Boats: 12 LCVP, 4 LCM, 3 LCP(L)

High Speed Transports (converted Destroyers)	1,190 tons	314	31'	12'	3 3.5," 2 40mm, 5 20mm, 1 depth charge track, 4 depth charge projectors	22-24 knots	666	Geared turbine engines, twin screws, 13,000 shp	Ships and Dates Converted: Manley, 1940; Schley, 1942; Kane, Overton, 1943	Used to land reconnaissance troops Boats: 4 LCP (L)

Crater Class Cargo Ship, USS Kenmore

Attack Cargo Ship, USS Whitley



Andromeda Class Attack Cargo Ship, USS Aquarius



Arthur Middleton Class Attack Transport Ship, USS LaSalle

USS Neville in convoy with other Troopships, February 1942

High Speed Transport, USS Barry

Bayfield Class Attack Transport Ship, USS Callaway

Tugs and Seaplane Tenders

Class/Type	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Complement	Power Plant	Armament	Ships and Dates Commissioned
Fleet Tugs	1646 tons (full load)	205'	38'6"	15'3"	16 knots	85	Diesel-electric engines; 1 screw; 3,000 hp	1 3.5," 2x2 40mm, 2 40mm, 6 .50 cal. Antiaircraft machine guns	Arapahoe, Chickasaw, Mataco, Molala, Tawasa, Tekesta, 1943
Seaplane Tender/ Curtiss	13,880 tons (full load)	527'4"	69'3"	22'	20 knots	1,195	Geared turbine engines; twin screws; 12,000 shp	4 5.38," 3x4 40mm, 2x2 40mm, 2 20mm	Curtiss, 1940
Seaplane Tender/ Barnegat	2,750 tons (full load)	311'	41'	20'	13 knots	215	Diesel engines, twin screws, 6,000 hp	1 5.38," 2x2 40mm, 1x4 40mm, 4x2 20mm, 2 depth charge tracks	Casco, Mackinac, 1942

Fleet Tug, USS Chickasaw



Curtiss Class Seaplane Tender, USS Curtiss

Barnegat Class Seaplane Tender, USS Casco

Landing Ships and Landing Craft

Type	Displacement	Length	Beam	Draft	Speed	Complement	Power Plant	Armament	Ships and Dates Commissioned	Remarks
Landing Ship, Dock (LSD)	7930 tons (loaded)	457'9"	72'	5'6" forward, 16'2" aft (seagoing loaded)	17 knots	266		1 5.38," 2x2 40mm, 2x4 40mm, 16 20mm	Ashland, Belle Grove, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall, Lindenwald, 1943	Carried 3 LCTs (5 medium tanks each) or 2 LCTs (2 medium tanks each), or 14 LCMs (1 medium tank each) or 1500 long tons cargo or 41 LVT, or 47 DUKW. Troops: 22 officers, 310 enlisted (40 in hammocks). Landing craft leave the flooded dock under their own power, through stern gates.
Landing Ship, Tank (LST)	1490 tons (lite); 4,080 tons (full load of 2,100 tons)	327'	50'	8' fwd; 14'4" aft (full load)	10.8 knots (max); 9 knots (econ)	125; Troop Capacity: 140	Diesel engines, twin screws	1 3.5," 1 40mm; 6 20mm	1,152 were ordered from November 1941 to August 1945	Carried 2-6 LCVPs topside, a tunnel-like hold with tanks, vehicles, guns or cargo, front doors opened onto beach. 57 at Flintlock
Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) [LCI(L)]	387 tons (full load)	160'4"	23'3	5'4" forward, 5'11" aft (full load)	15.5 knots	24	2 sets G.M. diesel engines; twin variable-pitch screws, 1600 BHP	4 20mm		Capacity: 188 troops or 75 tons cargo. 21 at Flintlock

Landing Craft, Infantry (Gunboat) [LCI(G)]				2'10" forward, 5'10" aft		70 (gun grew 54)		2-3 40mm, 3-4 20mm, 6 .50 cal, 10 Mk 7 & 2 Mk 22 rocket launchers		Converted from LCI(L) for gunfire support for landings. First use in Central Pacific at Kwajalein
Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM)	52,000 lbs (light); 52 tons (loaded)	50'	14'1"	3' forward; 4' aft	8.5 knots	4	2 110-125 hp diesel engines; twin screws	2 .50 cal machine guns		Capacity: 1 13.5 ton tank or 100 troops or 15 tons of cargo
Landing Craft, Tank (LCT)	309 tons (landing)	119'	32'	3'7" forward, 4' aft (landing)	8 knots	13	3 Gray 225 hp diesels; triple screws	2 20mm		Capacity: 4 medium or 5 30-ton tanks or 4 40-ton tanks or 3 50-ton tanks or 9 trucks or 150 tons cargo; accommodations for 8 troops
Landing Craft. Personnel (Large) [LCP(L)]	13,500 lbs (unloaded, 21,600 lbs (loaded)	36'	10'9"	3'6" aft (loaded)	10 knots	4	Diesel engines	2 .30 cal machine guns	2,193 built	Capacity: 36 troops or 8,100 lbs of cargo
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP)	18,000 lbs. (light)	36'3"	10'10"	3' aft, 2'2" forward	9 knots	3	225 hp Gray diesel or 250 hp Hall-Scott gasoline engines	2 .30-caliber machine guns		36 troops or 6,000 lb. vehicle or 8,100 lb. general cargo
Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Mk 1 (Armored) - LVT(A)1	29,050 lbs.	26'1"	10'8"		5.4 knots (water); 25 mph (land)	6	Continental W670-9A (7-cyl. air-cooled radial, ohv, 250-bhp) gasoline engine	Light tank turret with 37mm gun.	509 supplied during 1942-44 by FMC.	An amphibious tank

Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Mk 11 (Armored) - LVT(A)2	27,600 lbs.	26'1"	10'8"		5.4 knots (water); 25 mph (land)	2			450 supplied during 1943-44. All manufactured by FMC.	6,500 lbs of cargo or 24 equipped troops
DUKW Amphibious Truck	7.5 tons	31'.	8'		55 mph (land); 6 mph (water	2	GMC 270 cu in 6 cylinder gasoline engine and a 5-speed transmission		manufactured from 1942 to 1945 by General Motors Corporation	Capacity: 2 .5 tons cargo or 25 soldiers. It had 6 wheel drive, a water propeller and a 10 ton winch. All or any could be run separately or together in any combination.



Landing Ship Dock (LSD), USS Ashland

Tank Landing Ship (LST)

Landing Craft Infantry (Large) [LCI(L)]

Landing Craft Infantry (Gunboat) [LCI(G)]

Tank Landing Craft (LCT)

Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM)

Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP)



Landing Vehicle Tracked, Mk 11 (Armored) - LVT(A)2

Landing Craft Personnel (Large) [LCP(L)]

Landing Vehicle Tracked, Mk 1 (Armored) - LVT(A)1

DUKW Amphibious Truck

Ground and Naval Aircraft

Aircraft Type	Crew	Wingspan	Length	Height	Power Plant	Speed	Armament
Grumman F6F-3 Fighter "Hellcat"	1	42'10"	33'4"	11'3"	1 2000 hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engine	360 mph	6 .50 cal fixed machine guns, 2,000 lb. bombs or 6 rockets
Douglas SBD-5 Dive Bomber "Dauntless"/A-24 Attack Bomber "Banshee"	2	41'6"	32"6"	13'7"	1 1200 hp Wright 1820 engine	252 mph	2 .50 cal fixed machine guns, 2 .30 cal flexible machine guns, 2250 lb. bombs
Grumman TBF-1/General Motors TBM-1 Torpedo Bomber "Avenger"	3	54'2"	41'	16'5"	1 1700 hp Wright R-2600 engine	273 mph	1 .30 cal or 2 .50 cal fixed machine guns, 1 .50 cal and 1 .30 cal flexible machine guns, 1600 lb. bombs or 1 torpedo
Curtiss SB2C-1 Dive Bomber "Helldiver"	2	49'9"	36'4"	15'6"	1 1700 hp Wright R-2600 engine	281 mph	5 .50 cal fixed machine guns or 2 20mm guns fixed, 2 .30 cal flexible machine guns, 2650 lb. bombs
Consolidated PBY-5A Patrol Bomber "Catalina"	9	104'	64'	19'	2 1200 hp Pratt & Whitney R-1830 engines	195 mph	2 .30 cal and 2 .50 cal flexible machine guns, 4000 lb. bombs or 2 torpedoes
Martin PBM-5 Patrol Bomber "Mariner"	9	118'	79'10"	27'6"	2 2100 hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines	200 mph	8 .50 cal flexible machine guns, 12,800 lb. bombs or 2 torpedoes
Lockheed-Vega PV-1 Patrol and Reconnaissance "Ventura"	6	65'6"	51'9"	14'3"	2 2000 hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines	313 mph	5 .50 cal fixed machine guns, 4 .50 cal flexible machine guns, 5000 lb. bombs
Consolidated B-24 bomber "Liberator"/ PB4Y-1 Patrol Bomber "Liberator"	11	110'	66'4"	17'11"	4 1200 hp Pratt & Whitney R-1830 engines	270 mph	13 .50 cal flexible machine guns, 8000 lb. bombs
North American B-25 Medium Bomber "Mitchell"	5	67'7"	52'11"	16'4"	2 1700 hp Wright R-2600 engines	272 mph	4 .50 cal flexible machine guns, 4 .50 cal fixed machine guns, 3000 lb bombs
Bell P-39 Fighter/Ground Attack "Aircobra"	1	34'	30'2"	11'10"	1 1150 hp Allison V-1710 engine	360 mph	1 37mm fixed, 2 fixed .50 caliber and 2 fixed .30 cal machine guns
Curtiss P-40 Fighter "Kittyhawk"	1	37'4"	31'9"	12'4"	1 1150 hp Allison V-1710 engine	362 mph	6 .50 cal fixed machine guns

Grumman F6F-3 Fighter "Hellcat"

Douglas SBD-5 Dive Bomber "Dauntless"/A-24 Attack Bomber "Banshee"

Curtiss SB2C-1 Dive Bomber "Helldiver"

Torpedo Bombers (TBF) from USS Essex, July 1944

Consolidated PBY-5A Patrol Bomber "Catalina"

Martin PBM-5 Patrol Bomber "Mariner"



Lockheed-Veaa PV-1 Patrol and Reconnaissance "Ventura"



Consolidated B-24 Bomber "Liberator"/ PB4Y-1 Patrol Bomber "Liberator"

North American B-25 Medium Bomber "Mitchell"

Bell P-39 Fighter/Ground Attack "Aircobra"



Curtiss P-40 Fighter "Kittyhawk"

Appendix E: Selected Sources

Arnold, A.V. "Preparation for a Division Amphibious Operation." *Military Review*, 26 (May 1945): 3-11.

Corlett, Charles H. *Cowboy Pete: The Autobiography of Major General Charles H. Corlett.* Santa Fe, NM: Sleeping Fox, 1974.

Crowl, Philip A. and Edmund G. Love. *The United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls*. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955 (reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995).

Gole, Henry G. *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940.* Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2002.

Heinl, Robert D., Jr. and John A. Crown. *The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo.* Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954.

Isely, Jeter A. and Philip A. Crowl. *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Its Practice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Marshall, S.L.A. *Island Victory: The Battle of Kwajalein Atoll*. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1944 (reprint edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).

Miller, Edward S. *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Proehl, Carl W., ed. *The Fourth Marine Division in World War II*. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946 (reprint edition, Nashville: The Battery Press, 1988).

Shaw, Henry I., Bernard Nalty and Edwin Turnbladh. *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II.* Volume 3: *Central Pacific Drive*. Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1966.

The Eastern Mandates Campaign

Press Prepares Japan For Bad N

All The News All The Time

Honolulu Star-Bulletin

HOME EDITION

16 PAGES—HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, U. S. A., TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1944—16 PAGES

★★★ PRICE FIVE CENTS

MARSHALLS INVADED

U. S. Forces Land On Kwajalein Atoll

KWAJALEIN

U. S. Battles To Victory On Kwajalein

RING 57 MM TANK GU

Admiral Ni

Gen. Richa

Visit Kwa

Biggest Naval Force In History Strikes

These Men Are Leading U. S. Attacking Forces

Willis H. Hale

Christian R. Holmes Dies In New York

BEST ANSWER TO JAPAN: BUY WAR BONDS!

Honolulu Star-Bulletin

HOME EDITION

20 PAGES—HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, U. S. A., SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1944—20 PAGES

★★★ PRICE FIVE CENTS

KWAJALEIN FALLS TO U. S.

LATE NEWS

Band Leader Harry James Reclassified 1-A

Tokyo Calls For Increased Ore Production

Germans Attempting To Explain Reverses

U. S. ASSAULTS IN MARSHALLS WORRY JAPAN

Tokyo Tells Japanese Americans Invading Islands In Earnest

19 Islets In Atoll In American Hands

By ROY CUMMINGS

PEARL HARBOR Feb. 5

THIS IS WHERE ALLIED bombers destroyed