



THE GUARDIAN

THE SOURCE FOR ANTITERRORISM INFORMATION



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The first issue that we have to confront is violent extremism in all of its forms. In Ankara, I made clear that America is not—and never will be—at war with Islam. We will, however, relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat to our security—because we reject the same thing that people of all faiths reject: the killing of innocent men, women, and children. And it is my first duty as President to protect the American people.

— President Barack Obama
4 June 2009

As you may know, I was in Afghanistan last week. As we increase our presence there – and refocus our efforts with a new strategy—I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of the challenges and needs so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders—unvarnished and unscripted—has from the moment I took this job been the greatest single source for ideas on what the Department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers on Thursday, they have done their job. Now it is time for us in Washington to do ours.

— Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
13 May 2009

Al Qaeda is actually morphing. It's spreading not just here, but in other regions in places like Yemen, in places like Somalia and other places in Africa. And not just spreading, but also continuing to threaten many countries and planning to do that, which is what's going on right now.

— Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen
27 March 2009

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SUBMITTING NEWS & ARTICLES

The editors invite articles and other contributions on antiterrorism and force protection of interest to the Armed Forces. Local reproduction of our newsletter is authorized and encouraged. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Staff, DOD, or any other agency of the Federal Government.



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Guardian readers,

I am very pleased to open this edition of *The Guardian*, my first since taking the reins of the J-34 Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense. As you know, much is going on in the Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) world, and the need to keep up our momentum is as great as ever. The recent attacks against the Sri Lankan cricket team, the mounting attacks against forces in Iraq, and the attacks in Mumbai are just a few examples showing that terrorism continues to be a tactic of choice and will remain an ever-present danger for the foreseeable future.

The tragedy of 9/11 is a memory that is indelibly etched in our minds, and I expect that we all remember where we were and what we were doing on that day. As the commander of the 101st Fighter Squadron, my jets were the first to launch in response to the hijackings. At the end of the day, I vividly remember wracking my brain with the inevitable doubts of "Almost," "What if?" and "If we only had..." In time, those doubts turned to a defiant "Never again!"

Nearly eight years have passed since 9/11, and with our track record of AT/FP success, the "qualitative effect of zeros" becomes an ever greater threat to our own preparedness. When success is measured by "nothing happening," attribution of that success is extremely difficult. Did we succeed because our AT/FP processes and procedures were good, or did nothing happen because nothing was going to happen in the first place?

Terrorists do not lack for imagination. As patient opportunists, they wait for our defenses to stagnate as we accept additional risk either knowingly or unknowingly. I have a great appreciation for the inherent difficulties and scope of the challenges that lie before us in maintaining an aggressive, nonstatic defensive posture to deter and defend against the entire spectrum of threats. To help mitigate those challenges, information sharing is vital. *The Guardian* is an excellent forum for open debate as well as for sharing lessons learned and best practices. To continue the production of a high-quality product, I ask you to do the following:

- First, please contact my staff with recommendations for topics of interest and focus for the Warfighter.
- Second, write and submit articles based on your real-life operational experience and the lessons you have learned. All who deal with the challenges of AT/FP have invaluable insights that should be shared among the entire community.

J-34 has also introduced several new forums for information sharing and resource pooling. We have completed the transition from the legacy Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal (ATEP) website to Army/Defense Knowledge Online (AKO). Our "ATEP on AKO" and "ATEP on AKO-S" sites now allow for worldwide joint access, simplified posting, and resource sharing in an updated Web 2.0 format. Access is available at <https://www.us.army.mil> (search for "ATEP on AKO") and at <https://www.us.army.smil.mil> (search for "ATEP on AKO-S"). Other new products include the *Joint Forward Operations Base (JFOB) Survivability and Protective Construction Handbook* and the Critical Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) as a stand-alone website. These and other instructions and information on J-34 conferences are available at ATEP on AKO.

In conclusion, I ask that you lean forward and make "Never again!" a reality. In this era of constrained resources, challenge assumptions, drive the train of your AT/FP programs, and push those effective tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) out to others in the community. My predecessor, MG Peter Aylward, quoted Thomas Jefferson in his first *Guardian* issue, and the observation is as pertinent now as ever: "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance."

JONATHAN T. TREACY

Brigadier General, USAF | Deputy Director for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense



PROTECTING SOFT TARGETS IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS

Recent attacks expose vulnerabilities

By Mr. Alan Orlob, Vice President of Corporate Security, Marriott International

As terrorists continue to evolve their tactics, security personnel must continue to evolve countermeasures to defeat them.

Incident 1: The Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

In November 2008, the world's attention was fixed on Mumbai, India, as a deadly attack unfolded in a large, urban environment. Ten men came from the sea and executed a well-planned attack against numerous targets of symbolic and economic importance. Four of the men were tasked with attacking a well-known landmark in Mumbai—indeed, a national symbol for India—the Taj Mahal Hotel. The majestic, colonial-era “Taj” was built 105 years ago by the Tata Group. It was built during a time when Indians were not allowed to stay in luxury hotels, prompting the Tata family to build their own

luxury hotel. There it stood, at the Gateway to India.

The management staff at the Taj Mahal Hotel was informed by Indian authorities months earlier that informants had identified hotels in Mumbai for possible terrorist attacks. In response, the managers increased the level of security, modifying their security procedures and adding metal detector screening devices. Shortly before the attacks, those same authorities informed the Taj Mahal Hotel management that the subjects law enforcement were watching had been arrested and that the threat was no longer active. The heightened security measures were relaxed in response to the apparent decrease in threat level.

The Mumbai terror attacks began at the Leopold Café, located a few blocks away from the Taj. The sidewalk café was a popular place for Westerners to eat, as flocks of tourists often lined up to wait for tables. On the evening of November 26, four men entered the restaurant and took their seats. Shortly afterward, they pulled Chinese AK-47s out of their backpacks and opened fire, spraying those in the restaurant. Panic erupted among

Over the next 60 hours, the attackers continued to wreak havoc, executing hostages, shooting from hotel windows, and torching mattresses in an attempt to burn the hotel down and confuse government forces. Local police forces were caught unprepared to fight a simultaneous attack on multiple targets throughout the city by this well-prepared team aiming to sow terror and inflict mass casualties in the heart of the Mumbai



the customers and those standing outside; they bolted for refuge. At the end of the street stood the Taj Mahal Hotel. Scores of people filled the lobby, along with two of the attackers, who conversed in the midst of the crowded lobby, talking in low tones a few feet away from the reception desk. Then, the attackers removed their weapons from their backpacks, separated, and began the three-day killing spree at the Taj Mahal Hotel.

One of the attackers went to the left of the reception desk, past the Louis Vuitton store, and opened fire. The other went to the right, walked into the coffee shop, and started shooting; he then moved into the pool area and continued firing. The two attackers met at the bottom of the circular stairway and waited to be joined by two others who had come into the hotel through a rear entrance. The four attackers started up the stairs, firing their weapons at anyone they saw and throwing hand grenades down the open stairway. When they reached the fifth floor, they pulled an improvised explosive device (IED) from one of their backpacks. They detonated the ball-bearing-packed IED, sending shrapnel in every direction. The attackers began taking hostages and moved to the sixth floor, where they holed up in one of the rooms. Meanwhile, two police officers arrived at the hotel and joined the hotel security officers in their second-floor office, where they were able to follow the movements of the attackers on the hotel's security cameras; however, the outnumbered and outgunned police officers, armed only with 9-mm handguns, refused to engage the attackers.

financial district. Over the course of the next two days, smaller teams of terrorists attacked two hospitals, a gas station, a train terminal, a movie theater, and a synagogue. Finally, an experienced tactical response team—the National Security Guard (NSG) known as the “Black Cats”—arrived from New Delhi, India, and finished off the final hold-outs in the Taj Mahal Hotel.

Hardening Soft Targets

Hotels have long been perceived as “soft targets.” As the U.S. government poured millions of dollars into hardening embassies and other government buildings, hotels became more attractive targets. The result has been attacks against hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia; Amman, Jordan; Sharm-el-Sheikh and Taba, Egypt; Kabul, Afghanistan; Islamabad and Peshawar, Pakistan; and Mumbai. Hotels are not only commercial and economic hubs but also iconic landmarks, attracting Westerners, diplomats, and the wealthy. Unlike an embassy, hotels never close their doors and welcome anyone who has the desire to come inside. A strategic approach to security was missing. In the past, security was played down and physical security measures were limited. Even as the threat to hotels became clearer, some large hotel management companies did not find money in their budgets to hire a corporate security director. This approach resulted in local hotel general managers having responsibility for security and conducting their own

threat analyses. All too often, it was in these managers' interests to downplay any security threats and to focus more on keeping profit margins high by providing visitors with a warm hospitable environment.

Incident 2: Islamabad Marriott Bombing

As the hotel industry increasingly has been targeted, change is occurring, and hotels are adopting security measures never seen in the past. In high-threat environments, guests at 5-star hotels are likely to see armed security officers, bomb sniffing dogs, and metal detectors. Even so, the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan—one of only two 5-star hotels in the city—was attacked in September 2008. Located near Parliament and the numerous embassies in Islamabad, the Marriott was a gathering place for expatriates. On the night of the attack, Ramadan was being celebrated in the Muslim world, and according to some estimates, there were 1,500 guests inside the hotel breaking their fast. Restaurants were full, and banquet tables had been set up in the ballroom with a large buffet spread to accommodate the overflow.

Extensive security measures were in place. The hotel was operating at “threat condition red,” the highest level of security mandated by Marriott. There were 196 security officers (60 working at the time of the attack) for a 290-room hotel, along with four bomb sniffing dogs and 62 security cameras monitored at all times by three security officers. A “Delta Barrier,” a combination drop-down and hydraulic barrier, was in place to stop vehicles before they were inspected. Security officers were armed with shotguns at the vehicle checkpoint. Walk-through metal detectors screened everyone coming into the building. The 132-foot setback from the vehicle inspection point to the building exceeded U.S. government standards. Until recently, this level of security was never imaginable at a hotel.

Yet at 8:00 p.m. on a Saturday night, a suicide bomber in a large dump truck attempted to drive through the security measures and attack the hotel. When he hit the hydraulic barriers, they held and contained the truck. Moments later, the explosives in the truck detonated, blowing out a crater 25 feet deep and 60 feet across. Fifty-six people died in the attack, 30 of them employees of the hotel. These deaths were tragic; however, if the hotel did not have the extensive security measures in place, the body count would have been in the hundreds.

Learning and Adapting

Marriott is constantly analyzing and evaluating its security measures. Shortly after the attacks in Mumbai, I traveled there with two of my regional security directors to learn from what had happened at the hotels and to determine how we could prevent a similar attack from

The following extensive security measures were in place at the Marriott in Islamabad even as the attack occurred:

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occurring in the future. We had heard that the attackers had intimate knowledge of the hotel's layout and floor plans, which indicated that detailed surveillance had been conducted for several months before the attacks. We talked to the management about the intelligence failures, looked at the physical security measures that were in place, and came away with plans to further enhance our security.

More than 15 years ago, Marriott security began writing crisis management plans for its hotels. Well before the attacks of September 11, 2001, likely scenarios and procedures to limit vulnerabilities were developed. Marriott formed a crisis team to deal with incidents ranging from natural disasters to government takeovers. Marriott also tracked terrorist organizations and understood who Osama bin Laden was well before 9/11. At that point, the focus was more on terrorist organizations in Latin America and the Philippines than on those in the Middle East or South Asia. As the terrorist threat evolved, so did Marriott's planning and

organization. In addition to regional security directors with area expertise, dedicated intelligence analysts in Washington, DC, and Hong Kong gave Marriott a 24-hour monitoring capability. Marriott also subscribed to several commercial security services that provided open-source intelligence that was used to determine potential threats. Finally, color-coded threat levels with corresponding procedures were developed to train Marriott security personnel.

All of this effort is directed out of Marriott's corporate security offices. Instead of requiring general managers to make risk assessments and implement appropriate countermeasures without support, Marriott provides professional analysis and direction. This support ensures that decisions are made by a security team on the basis of sound intelligence. Countermeasures that may be effective in mitigating risk are mandatory; managers are required to comply with the procedures fully. Any exceptions must be submitted and evaluated by the corporate security team. Third-party auditors ensure that the hotels are in compliance with the threat-condition procedures. As new hotels are built and opened in high-threat environments, Marriott works with the architects and designers to ensure that security is part of the architectural planning for the hotel. Requirements include window film, walk-through metal detectors, and explosive vapor detectors. Exterior security cameras are specified, as are the hydraulic barriers that stopped the truck bomb in Islamabad. Marriott's training program produced security awareness posters to alert staff about what to look for when cleaning rooms. Trained covert surveillance detection teams watch for anyone taking unusual photographs or pacing off distances.

Assessing Risk

Some "security experts" recommend that people should stay at hotels with lower profiles (3-star hotels) or even at guest houses when in high-threat locations. This practice is questionable when one looks at the real threat. Internationally branded hotels typically have higher security standards, even in hotels that are not located in hostile environments. These standards include—

- Sprinkler systems and other sophisticated fire-suppression measures
- Electronic door locks to prevent unauthorized entry into a room
- Dead-bolt locks and viewports in the doors
- In-room safes and safe deposit boxes to safeguard valuables
- High food quality and sanitation standards

- Security cameras monitoring public areas
- Well-trained security staff
- Evacuation plans
- Onsite entertainment including restaurants, night clubs, fitness centers, and internet access (rather than having guests wander around the city in search of food or entertainment)

All of these factors must be taken into account when evaluating the overall level of risk.

Is there greater risk of a terrorist attack or a hotel fire? Is kidnapping or assault more likely if the hotel does not have adequate security measures? Statistically, the risk is far greater from the latter instances than from a terrorist attack. Brian Jenkins, a noted authority on terrorism and a Senior Advisor at RAND, found in his study of attacks against hotels that the risk of being killed in a hotel terrorism attack was "one in hundreds of thousands."

Conclusion: As They Evolve, We Must Evolve

In January 2009, I had the opportunity to testify before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security. My testimony consisted of in-response lessons that could be learned from the Mumbai attacks. Maintaining awareness of emerging trends and the ever-changing threat environment is critical. Awareness alone is not enough. In order to mitigate risk, concrete steps must be taken to reduce vulnerability and harden soft targets. Hotels must hire and train competent security personnel; tailor tactics, techniques, and procedures to the evolving threat; and improve physical security to limit the probability of successful terrorist attacks. Finally, the threat is dynamic. As I told the assembled senators, one of the most important lessons learned is that as terrorists continue to evolve their tactics, security personnel must continue to evolve countermeasures to defeat them.

Note: At the time of printing, Mr. Orlob was in the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta when the recent bombing took place on July 17, 2009. Mr. Orlob was unhurt and is investigating the incident. The Guardian will publish lessons learned from the Jakarta attack in a future issue.



JOINT TASK FORCE:

2008 DNC

Force Protection during a National Special Security Event

By LTC Jason Strickland, Deputy J-34 for JTF-DNC

Deliberate preparation and performance on the part of local, state, and federal authorities made for a safe and uneventful convention.

Fortunately, domestic agitators, protestors, and terrorists did not grab the spotlight during the Democratic National Convention (DNC) held August 25–29, 2008, in Denver, Colorado. DOD personnel were not harmed, did not deploy for consequence management operations, and were not needed for any civil disturbances. Instead, the political process went as planned, and Senator Barack Obama was nominated as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate for the general election. Intriguing news of potential terrorist attacks—“sleeping dragons,” “urine soakers,” and “feces bombs”—highlighted law enforcement reporting, but all

in all, it was a rather uneventful four-day convention. The lack of excitement certainly was not due to unsuccessful efforts by protestors but rather resulted from deliberate planning, preparation, and execution on the part of local, state, and federal authorities.

This article will highlight the activities of Joint Task Force – Democratic National Convention (JTF-DNC), the military component established by the governor of Colorado and the commander of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in preparation for the convention. These activities will be discussed with regard to planning and execution.

Planning

JTF-DNC Structure

In 2007, the US Secret Service (USSS) designated both the Democratic and Republican political conventions as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). With this designation, the USSS takes a primary role in partnering with local governments to plan and execute the event to ensure the safety and security of the designated protected individuals. As such, the USSS is considered the lead agency. The DOD, as a supporting federal agency acting through USNORTHCOM, in coordination with the Adjutant General of Colorado, established the dual-status (Title 10 [T10], Active Duty, and Title 32 [T32], State Active Duty) command structure of JTF-DNC (Fig. 1).¹ This organization was led by a Colorado Air National Guardsman (Brig Gen Hudson), who commanded both T10 and T32 military forces supporting the DNC. He also had a separate T32 deputy commander from the Colorado National Guard and a separate T10 deputy commander from USNORTHCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters.

From a macroperspective, this dual-status command structure benefited all participants. Title 32 and Title 10 Service members worked together in all capacities, including at the JTF-DNC Joint Operations Center and within the subordinate task forces established to carry out specific missions such as civil disturbance response and explosive ordnance disposal.

At the JTF-DNC headquarters, the J-2 and the J-34 created a "fusion center" to handle all threat information, both foreign and domestic. Based on the author's research, this was the first time during a NSSE that combined intelligence and AT/FP military task force fusion center was created to collect, analyze, process, store, and disseminate all threat information in

Command and Control Dual Status JTF




Fig.1: JTF Organization Chart

accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The JTF-DNC Fusion Center was truly a joint organization, with representatives and skill sets from the following organizations (Fig. 2):

- The Colorado National Guard (T32) provided military police support, and performed intelligence analysis and geospatial analysis.
- USNORTHCOM (T10) provided intelligence analysis (counterintelligence, geospatial, and all source), critical infrastructure protection, and meteorology.
- The Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC; T32) supported law enforcement.
- JTF-DNC was augmented by the Georgia National Guard and by Joint Force Headquarters–National Capital Region for law enforcement and intelligence analysis.




Fig.2: J2 and J34 Organization Chart

Time	Area	Type	Scale	Risk	Remarks
All Day	No Name Park	Rally	Medium	Low	Free food, medical, music; focus on working beyond 2-party system
AM	Local Park	March / Rally	Large	Low	Ethnic-focused event; focus on breaking down walls that divide the U.S.
AM	Unknown	Direct Action	Medium	Medium	Group with potential for low-level violence; possible counter protest
AM	Metro	Direct Action	Large	High	Blockades, checkpoints, etc., to "recreate the situation in the Middle East"
0900	County Park	Demonstration	Medium	Low	Pro-life group
1100	County Park	Parade / Rally	Medium	Low	High production spectacle using giant puppets to voice groups' concerns
Afternoon	Metro	Direct Action	Large	High	Disruption of delegates to main venue; blockades, theatrics, etc.
1200 – 1400	Metro	Banner Drops	Small	Medium	Focus on refugees
1400 – 2100	Convention Center	Direct Action	Medium	Medium / High	Strategic actions (immigrant rights)
1430	City Theater	Demonstration	Medium	Medium	Demonstrations against immigrants; events frequently turn violent
1900	Downtown Park	Demonstration	Medium	Low	Prayer and worship
2100	City Park	Concert	Medium	Low	Concert (unknown group)
PM	City Park	Demonstration	Small	Low	Nomination ceremonies for youth leaders in student groups
PM	Metro	Direct Action	Small	High	Focus on fundraisers; attempt to shut down sources of global warming

Fig. 3: Sample "Expected Disruption" Schedule

JTF-DNC Liaisons

To establish habitual information flow and to ensure that all members of the task force maintained a common situational awareness, JTF-DNC established liaisons with various law enforcement and intelligence agencies at all levels of government. These liaisons included the USSS's Multiagency Coordination Center; the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Intelligence Operations Center; CIAC, the state of Colorado's fusion center; and the Denver Police Department. Additionally, JTF-DNC integrated with and received excellent support from USNORTHCOM's Law Enforcement and Threat Integration Center (J-34) and from the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-North (J-2) as well as from Air Force Office of Special Investigation agents at Buckley Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado. All of these relationships allowed the exchange of information among the appropriate agencies to provide the most accurate situational awareness for visualization of the comprehensive operational environment.

The boundaries of responsibility between intelligence and force protection agencies were both deliberate and rigid and were documented appropriately in the JTF-DNC SOPs. Although force protection and intelligence personnel worked adjacent to each other, they were not from the same staff sections. Appropriately, J-2 personnel processed all information and intelligence pertaining to foreign threats, while J-34 personnel handled domestic threat reporting. Similarly, according to the ambits of their staff sections, T10 and T32 members worked within their legal realms of responsibility. Fusion center personnel maintained strict adherence to DOD Directive (DODD) 5240.1, DODD 5200.27, and Executive Order 12333. Additionally, prior to commencing operations for the DNC, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight sent representatives to inspect JTF-DNC intelligence activities to ensure compliance.

Scale = Likelihood event will be resource intensive

Risk = Likelihood event will involve criminal activity and/or violence

	SMALL: no indications of other groups participating	MEDIUM: more than one group participating	LARGE: message of event appeals to wider audience	X-LARGE: expect multiple, large groups
HIGH: habitually reported incidents	Amber	Red	Red	Red
MEDIUM: sporadically reported incidents	Green	Amber	Amber	Red
LOW: infrequently reported incidents	Green	Green	Amber	Amber

Fig. 4: Threat Assessment Matrix

Threat Assessment

The primary document used to assess threats to the convention (and, thereby, to JTF-DNC forces) was an expected disruption schedule created by analysts at the CIAC. This document listed anticipated activities, events, and protests of concern (both permitted and not permitted) by date, time, location (area), type, scale, and risk (Fig. 3). At the fusion center, that information was transferred into a matrix for planning purposes by J-34 personnel (Fig. 4). This matrix did not necessarily indicate the threat to DOD forces; however, it did provide staff with a planning tool to facilitate recommendations for the commander. Using traditional “red / amber /

by both T32 and T10 Service members, acknowledging their diverse authorities. Preparation also involved contacting all military entities within the Joint Operations Area. This contact included interaction with Reserve Officers’ Training Corps units, recruiting stations (National Guard, Active and Reserve), and Buckley AFB. JTF-DNC established contact with these entities so that if a catastrophic event occurred or if the headquarters received a specific threat to DOD

forces or facilities, the means to alert these organizations would be established and functional.

Finally, in preparation for the convention, fusion center members looked at published historical case studies from previous events that were similar in nature: the Los Angeles riots (1992), the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Seattle (1999), and the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City. The lessons learned from these events were assimilated into planning and preparation for what JTF-DNC forces might encounter. The final aspect of preparation involved extensive exercises to validate procedures and to rehearse actions. Three exercises over a five-month period refined some JTF-DNC battle drills and solidified other measures.

“Our police and public works crews engineered an extraordinary behind-the-scenes collaboration preceding and during the Democratic National Convention, which thwarted plans of those intent on disrupting our city.”

—Denver Mayor John Hickenlooper

Source: Christopher N. Osher, “Mayor: Protesters hid feces and tools”, The Denver Post, 5 September 2008

green” coding, the fusion center interpreted the data into measureable characteristics that drove the intended readiness and weapons posture levels for the subordinate task forces. An event that was considered “medium” in size and “high” in its propensity for violence, for example, received a “red” label, which dictated a higher readiness posture level. Within the parameters of the various threats, the JTF-DNC Staff Judge Advocate established distinct rules for the use of force (RUF)

Execution

JTF-DNC transitioned to Phase V (Execution) on August 22, 2008. As anticipated, events and reporting forced additional planning and immediate decisions. Information flowed into and out of the JTF-DNC Fusion Center via two separate chat channels that were established to distinguish between domestic threats and

reporting with a foreign nexus. The procedure in place to address this information was the Threat Working Group (TWG), which the commander wanted to activate within minutes of a significant incident or a credible threat report.

Initially planned on an ad hoc basis, the TWG quickly turned into a recurring event at least every 12 hours. TWG procedures that were established prior to the event served the command well because all participants knew what was expected of them. Primary TWG participants included the Command Group (JTF-DNC Commander, Deputy Commander, or J-3), J-2, J-34, J-35, the Staff Judge Advocate, the Public Affairs Office, and the task force liaison officers. Other representatives included, as necessary, the Civil Support Team, the US Department of Homeland Security Protective Security Advisor, and the Colorado National Guard Critical Infrastructure Protection–Mission Assurance Assessment team.

A variety of threat streams poured into the many law enforcement and intelligence agencies that were poised for the events associated with the DNC. The fusion center immediately filtered this abundance of reporting by vetting reports through the appropriate Commander’s Critical Information Requirements, relevance to DOD personnel and activities, and proximity to JTF-DNC forces. An array of threats were addressed by the TWG, including—

- An anthrax scare at Senator John McCain’s nearby Colorado campaign headquarters (potentially affecting locations throughout the Joint Operations Area)
- A concert by a rock group that had previously incited violence among concertgoers (the location of the concert was adjacent to billeting of a significant number of JTF-DNC members)
- A video posted on a Web page of JTF-DNC members at their billeting location
- Surveillance at a local water treatment plant (This activity and similar reporting caused concern for potential terrorist activity)
- Results of the TWG fed into a product posted twice daily by the fusion center: the JTF-DNC AT/FP Advisory.² The command disseminated this product to the staff, to subordinate commands, to USNORTHCOM, and to US Army North

Conclusion

Ultimately, the DNC went without incident. As expected, police wore riot gear and used pepper spray. Sirens filled the air most evenings, and blocked roads dotted the Mile High City’s landscape.³ But in the end, the USSS sheltered the appropriate personnel, the Denver

Ultimately, the DNC went without incident. As expected, sirens filled the air most evenings, and blocked roads dotted the Mile High City’s landscape.



But in the end, the USSS sheltered the appropriate personnel, the Denver Police Department ensured the safety of the public, and JTF-DNC protected its force.

Police Department ensured the safety of the public, and JTF-DNC protected its force. Remarks from general officers and elected officials postulated that JTF-DNC served as the model for military organizations during future NSSEs. As an integral component of JTF-DNC, activities and procedures of the fusion center served as a critical component of this model. Hopefully, the lessons learned and the observations mentioned can be incorporated for future use during the conventions in 2012.

LTC Jason Strickland is a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Planner at USNORTHCOM’s Standing Joint Force Headquarters. He has participated in four NSSEs and routinely serves as the USNORTHCOM and DOD Liaison Officer to the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center.

The author would like to recognize Lt Col Jeffrey Dyball and Mr. Sam Morris for their significant contributions to the success of the JTF-DNC Fusion Center.

- 1 Prior to any coordination between DOD and the Adjutant General (TAG) of Colorado, the President of the United States and the governor of Colorado agreed to create a dual-status command structure for this event. Following that agreement, DOD (through US Northern Command) formalized the command structure in coordination with the Colorado TAG and the National Guard Bureau.
- 2 The JTF-DNC AT/FP Advisory was for official use by DOD and law enforcement personnel only and was classified as Law Enforcement Sensitive, thereby preventing release of information beyond appropriate organizations.
- 3 Editorial. “Determined to Find a Confrontation.” Rocky Mountain News, August 27, 2008. Available at: <http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/aug/27/determined-to-find-a-confrontation/>.



IMPROVING INSTALLATION EVACUATION PLANNING

An all-hazards approach to emergency operations

By Kristie N. Ralston-Lewis, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Evacuation plans need constant monitoring, updating, and refinement to remain viable and effective in today's ever-evolving threat environment.

Does your installation's evacuation plan have an all-hazards approach that addresses natural disasters and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents? Does the evacuation plan contain the information needed to conduct evacuation operations ranging from the planning phase to recovery? Does your evacuation plan address the personal safety and security of installation personnel? If the answer is "no" to any of these questions, you may need to refine and update your installation's evacuation plan.

The recently published Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program¹ (published January 13, 2009), states that installations must now ensure that their response plans effectively address evacuation

management and mass-care planning with procedures that focus on local and remote safe havens, civilian shelter, sheltering in place, personnel accountability, family assistance, special needs, and animal-needs management. Most existing installation evacuation plans do not currently delve into this level of detail.

Observations and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina reiterated the fact that evacuations are not only difficult to conduct but also pose unique challenges.² These same challenges are present on military installations and reaffirm the need for comprehensive installation evacuation planning. This article highlights the subjects that should be included in an installation evacuation plan but does not outline an all-inclusive approach; rather, the goal is to provide an introduction

to evacuation planning to point planners in the right direction.

Evacuation Planning: Getting Started

While personnel safety and security are high priorities during emergency situations, mission continuity and protection of mission-critical resources must not be neglected. When conducting evacuation planning, begin by including provisions to address mission continuity and the protection of mission-critical operations and critical infrastructure. Keep in mind that some mission-critical facilities may need to continue operations and designated key personnel may need to stay behind. Planners must also think beyond building- or facility-specific evacuation plans and be prepared to address incidents that could involve evacuation of significant portions of the installation. From an all-hazards perspective, personnel may be able to predict some incidents or hazards requiring evacuation, while some situations may occur without warning. Installations need to be prepared to activate evacuation plans at any time. For example, hurricane evacuations will affect a much greater area and will occur with some warning time as opposed to a hazardous-material incident, which may not affect as broad an area but could require immediate evacuation. To effectively plan and prepare for the varying types of evacuations, ensure that the installation conducts hazard and vulnerability assessments. The hazard and vulnerability assessments will identify and characterize the potential hazards or threats that may affect your installation, from an all-hazards perspective.³ Once identified, the installation will be able to use this information to develop and tailor an installation-specific evacuation plan.

Early in the planning process, consider developing an evacuation decision aid versus a shelter-in-place decision aid to assist leadership with determining the appropriate course of action.⁴ Depending on the type of incident, there may not be time for an evacuation, so shelter-in-place may be the only option. Additionally, do not forget to consider the unique aspects of your installation (e.g., a hospital, a prison, a school). These areas must be included

While personnel safety and security are high priorities during emergency situations, mission continuity and protection of mission-critical resources must not be neglected.

in evacuation plans and can increase the planning complexity. Finally, ensure that all organizations with evacuation responsibilities, including installation tenants (as applicable), are incorporated into the evacuation-planning process. Identify specific personnel with evacuation roles and responsibilities. Once identified, their specific evacuation tasks will need to be predefined, trained, and exercised.

Developing the Plan: Determine Resource and Logistics Requirements

Perform a capability assessment and focus on the range of identified and projected response capabilities necessary for responding to any type of hazard.⁵ To ensure that a successful installation evacuation is accomplished, preplanning must focus on potential resource and logistics requirements. Look at the installation's current capabilities, and then determine the specific equipment and supplies required to conduct evacuation operations. Develop plans and procedures to obtain these items. This process could be time intensive, depending on the equipment or supplies required; thus, the importance of preplanning cannot be stressed enough.

Once the essential evacuation resources have been identified, consider the transportation and distribution of the evacuation equipment and supplies. Determine where these items will be needed and how they will get to the appropriate locations. Planners need to consider the resources and supplies needed to address requirements such as traffic control, fueling, basic needs or life-sustaining items, medical support (mass-care planning), and potential law enforcement requirements. Consider developing mutual aid agreements with the local community, as necessary, and coordinate with nearby installations for additional support.

Planning Evacuation Routes

Installation personnel need to be aware of the evacuation routes on and off the installation. These routes should be clearly marked. Analyze the potential evacuation routes for obstacles such as bottlenecks, areas of congestion, and barriers. Develop and analyze back-up and alternate evacuation routes in case the preplanned evacuation routes are impassable. Depending on the incident, the installation may experience transportation infrastructure disruption that may hamper evacuation operations. Ensure that evacuation-route planning includes routes for local, installation, and long-distance evacuation contingencies. Consider using geographic information systems to assist with route planning and area mapping. Address traffic-control requirements, and coordinate with local transportation and law enforcement



A US Army medical evacuation team transports a simulated casualty to the combat support hospital during a joint readiness training center exercise May 12, 2009, at Fort Polk, LA. The joint task force training exercise provides realistic and relevant training to Army brigades with integrated Air Force and special operations forces. (DOD photo by Tech Sgt Elizabeth Concepcion, US Air Force/Released)

officials regarding road status between the installation and probable relocation sites.

Installations will need to survey bridges and overpasses to determine whether they can accommodate certain military vehicles during an evacuation. Work with the local community to reduce and prevent conflict with local-population movements during an evacuation, especially if your installation is located in a metropolitan area or a highly populated region. Keep in mind that mass evacuations may involve the implementation of contraflow, or lane reversal, if major highways or roadways are involved. Determine whether a mode of mass transportation is available and investigate existing resources (e.g., buses, military vehicles). During the Hurricane Katrina evacuations, there were challenges associated with evacuating transit-dependent individuals and those without adequate transportation. For example, there were individuals that wanted to evacuate but were unable to do so because they lacked transportation. To prevent these kinds of transportation problems, determine in advance those personnel who use public transportation and how to address transportation of

these individuals during evacuation operations. If mass transportation is used, assembly areas will need to be developed and their locations will need to be well known and disseminated to installation personnel.

Facility Evacuation

Ensure that planning includes facility-specific evacuation plans. Facility floor plans should clearly designate exit routes, assembly points, and directions to assembly points if a facility evacuation occurs. Each facility should designate specific personnel and back-up personnel who are responsible for shutting down and securing the facility. These individuals must be trained to conduct these operations. Determine the length of time needed to shut down and restart facility operations to assist with the planning process. Facility personnel need to be aware of the general facility procedures that need to occur once an evacuation order is received (e.g., securing classified materials, shutting down equipment, closing or barricading doors and windows). Ensure that plans also address alternate facility evacuation routes if use of

the primary route is no longer feasible. Facility managers also should ensure that evacuation plans address the evacuation of personnel with disabilities and those who do not speak English.

Provisions for Special-Needs Populations, Pets, and Working Animals⁶

Special-needs personnel experienced significant problems during the Hurricane Katrina evacuations. For example, some special-needs personnel were unable to evacuate because of their frail conditions and lack of appropriate medical transport. Those who were dependent on service animals also experienced problems

the surrounding community during an evacuation is addressed and rehearsed for effectiveness.

Training and Exercises

Once the installation's evacuation plan has been approved, ensure that personnel are aware of the plan's content through installation training programs. Develop training and information sessions focused on evacuation operations. These sessions can include overview presentations, tabletop exercises, and public awareness campaigns. Keep in mind that training can also be a great mechanism for validating the plan's effectiveness.

Ensure that evacuation communications are addressed in your plan. When developing warning-notification messages, ensure that they are specific, clear, accurate, and consistent. The installation evacuation instructions need to include all relevant evacuation details.

because of the support animal's inability to navigate flooded streets.⁷ Furthermore, some people refused to evacuate because they were unable to bring their pets into the shelters and did not want to abandon their animals. To prevent these events from occurring on your installation, ensure that evacuation plans address special-needs personnel, including their transportation and resource requirements.⁸ Develop plans and procedures that address the evacuation of companion animals, including their transportation, and coordinate medical care for those special-needs personnel who may require it while in transit. Additionally, evacuation plans should address (as applicable to your installation) the evacuation and transportation of working animals (e.g., military dogs, horses) as well as household pets.⁹

Regularly conduct exercises that focus on familiarizing personnel with the evacuation plan, and consider including local community representatives. These exercises will assist with identifying weaknesses and determining which plan areas require improvement and will ensure that the local community is aware of the installation's evacuation plans and how the community may be affected. Ensure that after-action reports are developed and that findings are used to improve the existing plan. The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program has a Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Exercise Evaluation Guide that could serve as a valuable resource as you develop and incorporate evacuation operations into your exercise program.¹¹


Notification and Communications

Evacuees from Hurricane Katrina expressed that the calls to evacuate were unclear and confusing, which compounded an already hectic situation. Ensure that evacuation communications are addressed in your installation's plan.¹⁰ When developing warning-notification messages, ensure that messages are specific, clear, accurate, and consistent. The installation evacuation instructions need to include all relevant evacuation details. There should be no confusion regarding what personnel need to be doing when an evacuation is ordered. Back-up communications systems and procedures for installationwide notification need to be in place, and personnel will need to determine potential options for en route communications during an evacuation. Ensure that the ability to communicate with

For Additional Information

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Consequence Management Division (CSM), has developed an *Installation Evacuation Planning (IEP) Handbook* for CBRNE Incidents and Natural Disasters Affecting DOD CONUS Installations. The IEP handbook was designed to provide consolidated evacuation-planning information for all hazards and to facilitate the development and review of installation evacuation plans. The handbook is a planning guide rather than a checklist to use during an actual evacuation. The IEP handbook serves as a valuable tool for reference when developing and refining evacuation plans. For additional information or for a copy of the IEP handbook, contact DTRA CSM at CM@dtra.mil.

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- 1 Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6055.17. DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program. <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/605517p.pdf>.
 - 2 Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS Report for Congress: Federal Evacuation Policy: Issues for Congress. November 12, 2008. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homsec/RL34745.pdf>.
 - 3 Refer to DODI 6055.17 for additional information on conducting hazard and vulnerability assessments.
 - 4 John Sorensen, Barry Shumpert, and Barbara Vogt. "Planning Protective Action Decision-Making: Evacuate or Shelter-in-Place?" June 2002. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. http://emc.ornl.gov/EMCWeb/EMC/PDF/ornl_2002_144.pdf. See also, US Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration. "Evacuation Plans and Procedures eTool: Shelter-in-Place." <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/evacuation/shelterinplace.html>.
 - 5 Refer to DODI 6055.17 for additional information on conducting a capability assessment.
 - 6 For additional information, the following courses are available on the Federal Emergency Management Agency website (<http://training.fema.gov/IS/crslst.asp>): IS-197. EM, Special Needs Planning Considerations for Emergency Management; IS-10, Animals in Disaster, Module A: Awareness and Preparedness.
 - 7 *Supra* at 2.
 - 8 National Fire Protection Association. "Emergency Evacuation Planning Guide for People with Disabilities." June 2007. <http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/Forms/EvacuationGuide.pdf>.
 - 9 H.R. 3858 (P.L. 109-308): Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006.
 - 10 As per DODI 6055.17, installations must be able to warn all personnel of the hazard within 10 minutes of incident notification at the dispatch center.
 - 11 US Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. "Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place: Exercise Evaluation Guide." https://hseep.dhs.gov/support/Citizen_Evacuation_&_Shelter-In-Place_02.29.08.doc.



QRT IJFOB

The Joint Combat Outpost Quick Reaction Test and the Revised Joint Forward Operations Base Handbook

By Scott Larsen, Joint Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program, US Army Engineer Research and Development Center

Combat outposts in remote locations present special security concerns. Two critical tools have aided in confronting this complex issue.

Background

The 2008 National Defense Strategy states that our strategic environment will continue to be “defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system.”¹ Groups adopting an extremist ideology will continue to “reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny self-determination and human dignity wherever they gain power. ... Combating these violent groups will require long-term, innovative approaches.”² One such

innovation is the reemergence of counterinsurgency³ (COIN) operations. A COIN operation is described as “a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations ... [requiring] Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies.”⁴ To facilitate COIN implementation, the Army and Marine Corps developed the COIN field manual in 2006.⁵ This first COIN doctrine

in more than 20 years reinforces overall US goals of strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships as a cornerstone of peace and security.⁶

Effective COIN requires active interaction with the civilian populace.⁷ To this end, Multinational Force-Iraq command guidance directs the military to “position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases”⁸ in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.⁹ Accordingly, US forces have established combat outposts that are often in remote locations (Fig. 1).^{10,11,12} Yet moving US forces into these outposts comes with a cost: the loss of security provided by a large, established base. A recent discussion among company commanders chronicled in *Army* magazine focused on the use of these remote outposts. On the one hand, respondents agreed that the outposts do increase interaction with local nationals. On the other hand, respondents conceded that location and logistics needs of these outposts may create lucrative targets for insurgents.¹³

A recent *Guardian* article mentions that facility design trends and proactive rules of engagement appear to have reduced overall consequences of vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks.¹⁴ Yet the article also acknowledges doubt “that a terrorist in a large VBIED is going to purposefully drive into the inspection lane only to be found carrying thousands of pounds of

military or home-made explosives. The attacker will be forced to find an alternate method of gaining access that may involve a complex attack against the main gate to allow the vehicle to enter, to choose an easier target set, or to target the main gate.”¹⁵ On April 23, 2007, such an alternate attack occurred with devastating consequences. Nine soldiers were killed and 20 were wounded by an explosion at a patrol base in Iraq’s Diyala province.¹⁶ In this attack, insurgents used two VBIED-laden trucks. The first truck detonated at a checkpoint. The second truck rammed through the degraded perimeter and detonated against a barrier, creating casualties and destroying buildings in the process. Although the second truck did not explode inside the outpost compound, the attack has been labeled “one of the deadliest ground attacks against U.S. forces since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.”¹⁷

In response to this attack, the Deputy Director, Air Warfare, under the authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, directed the Joint Combat Outpost (JCOP) Quick Reaction Test (QRT) in April 2008. The basis for the QRT directive was the identification of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for defense against a complex attack directed against a combat outpost. Specifically, the QRT was to examine protective construction efforts required to stop the effects of a dual-VBIED attack against combat outposts.¹⁸



Fig.1 : Marines construct a combat outpost perimeter wall.

Marine Corps photo by Ronald W. Stauffer

QRT | The Joint Combat Outpost Quick Reaction Test

Development of a QRT has been previously described in *The Guardian* as a short-term project “designed to generate solutions that can be implemented quickly. The Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and other DOD agencies ... sponsor a QRT with an endorsement from one or more of the Services’ operational test agencies.”¹⁹ This specific QRT was designated to solve force protection problems from complex VBIED attacks against combat outposts. Initial inquiries turned up a double-wall concept that had been successfully employed on outposts in Afghanistan. The 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team erected a soil-filled container wall and later augmented it with a surrounding rock wall. A small Afghan National Police force was able to defend this outpost from a Taliban attack.²⁰ Accordingly, subsequent research for this QRT examined materials, construction, and TTPs for double-wall perimeters.

The QRT had five overall goals: Stop a threat vehicle; stop vehicle fragments; avoid the creation of hazardous debris; reduce risk from wall debris; and maintain a wall that survives at the edge of a blast crater. To this end, the QRT team²¹ identified the potential threat as 4,000 lb (TNT-equivalent) of explosives. The team developed a set of wall designs to investigate potential protective construction sizes and materials. Wall configurations included both metal and wire/fabric soil-filled containers as well as modular concrete wall sections. Moving vehicles were not used in the test. Instead, the two explosions were simulated by strategic placement of the test vehicles. The representative test-VBIED vehicles were environmentally inspected and approved out-of-service dump trucks. The vehicles were placed at locations to induce the most intense explosive effects on the wall designs. The test layout was designed to evaluate outer wall designs in the first explosion. Figure 2 shows the vehicle placed alongside the wall sections to simulate an insurgent driving up next to a wall in order to breach it. The second explosion would examine the effects on the remaining best-performing (least damaged) outer perimeter wall. Figure 3 shows the vehicle placed as if in a direct head-on attack, simulating an insurgent going through the first breach and attacking the second wall. This test methodology served to validate an optimal double-perimeter wall configuration with a minimum of testing and associated costs.

Explosive testing occurred July 28–30, 2008, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (Fig. 4).²² Test results indicated that an optimum configuration consisted of a 3.6-m (12-ft) tall inner (high) wall positioned 10.7–12.2 m (35–40 ft) behind a 1.0-m tall outer-perimeter (low) wall. In this configuration, the exterior low wall used



Fig. 2: Initial wall setup with first test vehicle. This setup allowed testing of a variety of wall configurations to determine the most effective design.



Fig. 3: Second vehicle test setup. The wire/fabric soil containers at left were most resistant to the effects of the first explosion. Note the damage to wall components.



Fig. 4: The first explosion. Note the blast wave between the fireball on the left and the reaction structure on the right.



Fig. 5: The reaction structure used for testing pressure-sensitive laminate material survived two perimeter wall explosions.

to define the perimeter will stop a 6,804-kg (15,000-lb) vehicle moving at 30 mph, without creating a significant debris hazard. The inner high wall is capable of stopping a second vehicle and most of the fragments without creating hazardous debris. The inner wall also provides additional cover and concealment benefits for the outpost interior, protecting against small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and rockets and mortars landing outside the perimeter.²³

The team also constructed a masonry wall structure that was representative of typical Middle Eastern construction. This structure was instrumented and equipped with an interior pressure-sensitive adhesive laminate. The structure was subjected to the same blast effects as the perimeter walls but at distances of 44.1 m and 36.8 m from the placement of the test vehicle. When exposed to the blasts, the brick wall was deflected inward by as much as 0.2 m (8 in). The bricks, however, were effectively held together by the laminate material; no debris entered the structure interior (Fig. 5).²⁴

JFOB | The Revised Joint Forward Operations Base Handbook

The original *Joint Forward Operations Base Survivability and Protective Construction Handbook* (JFOB Handbook) was developed in 2005 as a result of a QRT.²⁵ Since then, more than 24,000 copies of the book have been distributed to all Services worldwide. Now in its fourth edition (Fig. 6), the handbook incorporates many of the findings of the JCOP QRT. The JFOB Handbook is not,




Fig. 6

by itself, an authoritative source; however, it leverages material from a variety of sources, both authoritative and doctrinal, and consolidates them into a ready reference. The handbook contains guidelines, including materiel solutions, for small, medium, and large forward bases, with an emphasis on survivability and protective construction topics. Although the JFOB Handbook does not specifically address antiterrorism, many protective construction and security topics apply to and were

derived from antiterrorism efforts.

The fourth edition includes a new chapter dedicated to protection. This chapter highlights Joint protection functions, force protection, principles of defense, levels of protection, and protective construction. The chapter effectively divides the book: Previous chapters focus on planning and risk management, and subsequent chapters

The JFOB handbook contains guidelines, including materiel solutions, for small, medium, and large forward bases, with an emphasis on survivability and protective construction topics. Although the handbook does not specifically address antiterrorism, many protective construction and security topics apply to and were derived from antiterrorism efforts.

introduce risk reduction strategies. Tables in the chapter guide the reader to strategies that mitigate against VBIEDs; personnel-borne improvised explosive devices; rockets, artillery, and mortars; rocket-propelled grenades; small arms fire; and sniper threats. A new chapter emphasizes the importance of standoff by discussing the physics of an explosion and the blast effects. The reader is provided again with tabulated standoff guidelines for concrete walls and buildings, tents, and glass hazards. A new chapter on community engagement emphasizes emerging COIN doctrine. The remainder of the fourth edition is revised and updated throughout.

The fourth edition of the JFOB Handbook also includes material previously published in the *Joint Contingency Operations Base Force Protection Handbook* (JCOB Handbook).²⁶ The materiel support appendix in the revised JFOB Handbook was in the original JCOB Handbook and contains information on construction and equipment products provided by the Defense Logistics Agency; updated tent camp layouts, also from the original JCOB Handbook, are included. Material originally from JCOB also appears in the risk management, planning, and protective structures chapters of the revised JFOB Handbook.

The JCOP QRT results are summarized in a new JCOP chapter in which topics on threats, risks, layout and design, perimeter security, perimeter barriers, and entry control are presented. This chapter complements similar material found elsewhere in the book; however, the chapter is written with an emphasis on smaller, more austere locations that may not have the capabilities of

a full-scale forward base. The construction sequence presented is for an ideal, double-perimeter-wall combat outpost with ample standoff. Users will no doubt have to modify some details, and alternatives are presented as appropriate. Finally, the JCOP QRT performance issues are presented at the end of the chapter.

Summary

The JFOB Handbook continues to be a reference for Service members supporting protective construction at forward bases. The fourth edition is completely reorganized and contains new and updated material. With combined material from both the JCOB Handbook and the JCOP QRT, the revised JFOB Handbook covers the spectrum of small, medium, and large forward bases.

The JCOP QRT showed that a properly constructed double-wall perimeter will stop a dual-VBIED attack. A high wall of the design tested will prevent or reduce fragment hazards in the combat outpost. A low-wall perimeter will survive a blast crater and will prevent a second vehicle from entering the compound. For

The original Joint Forward Operations Base Survivability and Protective Construction Handbook (JFOB Handbook) was developed in 2005 as a result of a QRT.25 Since then, more than 24,000 copies of the book have been distributed to all Services worldwide.

structures, a “peel and stick” laminate applied to an interior masonry wall can prevent individual bricks from separating. Although blast pressure caused wall movement, the wall did not disintegrate into dangerous fragments.

The JFOB Handbook is distributed as Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 90-01-011. Copies are available electronically on the Army Knowledge Online–restricted Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal. Copies are also available on the Reimer Digital Library portion of the Army Training Information Architecture website (<https://atiam.train.army.mil/>). Printed copies of the JFOB Handbook are available from the Army Training Support Center (<https://idmsonline.atsc.army.mil>).

For additional information contact the Director, Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program (CEERD-GV-JF), USACE Engineer Research and Development Center, 3909 Halls Ferry Road, Vicksburg, MS 39180-6199 or email jfob@erdc.usace.army.mil.

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- 1 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. p. 2.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 An insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, April 12, 2001, as amended through October 17, 2008). A counterinsurgent force, in most cases US or Coalition forces, would thus support the host nation’s constituted government.
- 4 Foreword. In: Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No. 3-33.5. Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and Marine Corps. December 15, 2006.
- 5 Ibid, i.
- 6 Supra at 2, 15.
- 7 Supra at 4, 2–1.
- 8 The terms “combat outpost” and “joint security station” are frequently used to describe small, remote bases that are capable of conducting limited combat operations. Neither term appears in the *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; however, Army FM 3-90, Tactics, defines combat outpost as it is used here.
- 9 David H. Petraeus. “Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance.” *Military Review* 2008, 88(5), 2.
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- 19 Scott Larsen. "The Joint Forward Operations Base Quick Reaction Test." *The Guardian* 2006, 8(2), 27.
- 20 Paul Avallone. "Walking the Hills." *Army* 2008, 58(9), 78–79.
- 21 Quick Reaction Test team composition included representatives from Army Test and Evaluation Command, Engineer Research and Development Center, SENTEL Corporation, and Mississippi State University.
- 22 Supra at 18.
- 23 *Joint Forward Operations Base Survivability and Protective Construction Handbook*, fourth ed. Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 90-01-011 (JFOB4). Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. p. 21–14.
- 24 Ibid, 19–5.
- 25 Supra at 19, 28.
- 26 *The Joint Contingency Operations Base Force Protection Handbook*, previously published as GTA 90-01-010, is obsolete. See, supra at 23, iii.

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GUANTANAMO

Where do we go from here?

By Doyle K. Hodges, CDR United States Naval War College

The closing of the detention facility at GTMO poses various challenges in the handling of current and future detainees.

On 21 January 2009, President Obama signed an executive order mandating that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, be closed within one year.¹ This position, while controversial in some quarters, reflected the commitment of both major party Presidential candidates to end detention operations at the Guantanamo facility. Furthermore, in the *Boumediene v. Bush* decision, the Supreme Court held that the detainees have a right to habeas corpus review of their detention in Federal court.² In *Boumediene*, the Court explicitly rejected the government's argument that Guantanamo Bay's special legal status (i.e., although the facility is under the complete practical control of the United States, it is legally on the sovereign territory of Cuba) would prevent Constitutional rights such as habeas corpus from applying to the detainees held there. In light of this decision, there is no benefit to the government in continuing to hold detainees at Guantanamo. Additionally, Guantanamo Bay has become a lightning rod and a symbol for international opposition to US

policies in the long war against al Qaeda and other terrorists. Any activities conducted there would face an uphill battle in the struggle for perceived legitimacy.

If the Guantanamo Bay facility is to be closed, the government faces two pressing questions: What should be done with the detainees who remain there? What legal regime should be adopted for the detention of terrorists after Guantanamo Bay? This article shall attempt to address both questions.

Who Is Detained at Guantanamo Bay?

The current detainee population at Guantanamo Bay numbers approximately 255, down from a high of almost 750.³ Of those 255 detainees, approximately 20 are undergoing the Military Commission process to try them for various crimes.⁴ This number includes many of the 14 high-value detainees received from the Central Intelligence Agency; the conditions of detention for these detainees prior to their arrival at Guantanamo are alleged

to have violated international norms.⁵ Approximately 195 of the Guantanamo detainees have undergone review by Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) and Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), with the resulting decision that they should continue to be detained.⁶ The remaining 30–35 detainees fall into other categories, including a group of Chinese Uighur Muslims who are not classified as unlawful combatants but who cannot be returned to China due to concerns about non-*refoulement*.⁷

What Should Be Done with the Current Detainees?

The question of what should be done with those detainees already at Guantanamo Bay is answered differently depending on the status of each detainee. Those who are undergoing the Military Commission process should be transferred to a federal facility within the United States (e.g., the military prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Naval brig at Charleston, South Carolina) and should continue the process, with appropriate safeguards to ensure transparency and impartiality. Those who are not Military Commission candidates should be classified as “civilian security internees” under the Fourth Geneva Convention and detained in a facility in the United States, with case review every six months to determine whether they still pose a security threat. Those who do not fall into either category must be released, either into the custody of a foreign nation or, if no foreign nation will accept them, into the United States with appropriate oversight.


The situation of the Military Commission candidates is the easiest of the three. Although the Military Commission process has been subjected to criticism related to perceptions of predetermined outcomes,⁸ the process still provides a framework for transparent judicial determination of a detainee’s future. Although it must be safeguarded

against perceptions of prosecutorial misconduct and can perhaps be improved, this process is sufficient to address concerns about the legitimacy of detention, provided it moves forward in a timely manner. There is no obstacle to conducting Military Commissions inside the United States, and, as noted in Boumediene, there is no benefit to conducting them at Guantanamo Bay.

More challenging is the situation of detainees whose cases have been reviewed by ARBs and CSRTs that decided to continue detention. The ARB and CSRT processes are not judicial in nature, and detainees have limited opportunities to contest the evidence on which they are classified as “unlawful combatants”; ARBs and CSRTs also do not provide detainees with the assistance of legal counsel.⁹ In such cases, the US assertion of the right to continue to detain these individuals as unlawful combatants is unlikely to meet with international support or legitimacy.

Moreover, the entire framework for detaining unlawful combatants could be jeopardized if one or more of these individuals is successful in a habeas corpus review. Such a result could set a precedent that would make continued detention of all remaining detainees legally

tenuous. To avoid this potentially catastrophic legal result, the United States should categorize these individuals as civilian security internees under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Under this framework, “an appropriate court or administrative board” must review the detention at least twice yearly, with a presumption toward release.¹⁰ Adopting such a framework would provide assurance of periodic review and a presumption against indefinite detention while simultaneously affording the government the opportunity to make the case that the individual continues to pose a security threat. In the interests of garnering international legitimacy, a military lawyer should represent detainees in such proceedings. Ideally, the proceedings should be held before a judge or magistrate.



The solution for the remaining small group of detainees who are being held solely due to concerns about non-refoulement is both simpler and harder to swallow: These detainees must be released. Preferably, they would be released to a foreign nation, but if no nation will accept them, they should be released into the United States. This solution is certain to be unpopular. Although the public may perceive the procedures at Guantanamo Bay as flawed, few people would be happy to learn that their new neighbor was just released from Guantanamo. Nevertheless, reasonable measures could be implemented to minimize the risk that released detainees pose to the United States. Some detainees, for example, could be given a sum of money and released into the United States at an airport on a short-term transit visa. If the individual leaves the airport or fails to buy a ticket and get on a flight, he violates the terms of his visa and can be legitimately placed in immigration detention.¹¹ For detainees such as the Chinese Uighur Muslims, it may be possible to grant longer term visas in the United States on the condition that visa holders find gainful employment and have other reasonable restrictions on their activity.

Future Detention Operations: What Is the Legal Basis?¹²

Although the facility at Guantanamo Bay may go away, al Qaeda is unlikely to do so, and the US military will likely find itself conducting operations against al Qaeda or other transnational terrorist networks for the foreseeable future. Therefore, a legal framework for military detention operations must be developed that will withstand domestic legal scrutiny and will garner at least enough international support not to pose an obstacle to Coalition operations against terrorist networks. Such a framework should be based on a broad application of the Geneva Conventions and minimal use of the legally unprecedented “unlawful combatant” category.

The current detention framework is not satisfactory for future military detention operations. The Boumediene decision dealt specifically with detainees at Guantanamo

Bay; however, the logic by which the Court arrived at the conclusion that Guantanamo detainees have Constitutional habeas corpus rights could extend equally to unlawful combatants who are detained at theater internment facilities, such as Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan or Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca in Iraq. The Court held that the question of legal sovereignty was moot in the case of Guantanamo Bay because the



government of Cuba, which does have legal sovereignty over the territory, has no means by which to enforce their law there. Thus, if the US Constitution is not held to apply, the executive exercise of power is unchecked.¹³ Although not specifically contemplated by the Court, it would be difficult to explain why this argument would hold sway in Guantanamo Bay but not in facilities in Iraq or Afghanistan, where the US government exercises the same degree of “practical sovereignty.” Under the current legal framework for military detention of unlawful combatants, the possibility exists that Joint Task Force commanders could be inundated with legal challenges in federal court to the categorization and detention of alleged or suspected terrorists.

1. Prisoners of War and Civilian Security Internees

The Geneva Convention detention framework offers a reasonable way out of this undesirable position. Under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, those detained during military operations may be classified either as prisoners of war (POWs) or as civilian security internees. The Third Convention regulates the detention of prisoners of war. It is extremely unlikely that al Qaeda

The US military will continue to detain dangerous individuals who need to be kept off the streets for the protection of Americans and others in the operating environment.

We must develop a legal framework for such detention.

members would ever qualify as POWs: By the conditions established in the convention, POWs must either be members of the recognized armed forces of a state or must conduct themselves in accordance with the laws and customs of war.¹⁴ The Third Convention, however, does have one basic premise that must be observed: “If any doubt exists” as to whether or not an individual qualifies as a POW, his status must be determined by a “competent tribunal.”¹⁵ This requirement would stipulate a departure from the current procedures, under which all al Qaeda and Taliban forces are presumptively declared to be unlawful combatants on the authority of a memorandum signed by the President on February 7, 2002.¹⁶ Although the same criteria outlined in the memorandum could be applied, the criteria must be applied individually in a tribunal as the first step in due

process rather than “batch processing” the detainees.

The vast majority of detainees would fall into the category of civilian security internees under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Individuals in this category are “suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State” and may be interred if allowing them to remain free would be “prejudicial to the security of such State.”¹⁷ Although the convention allows such detention, it also stipulates that detainees’ rights and privileges should be returned at the earliest date consistent with security. As previously mentioned, this stipulation results in the requirement to review detention twice yearly with a presumption toward release. Modification of the existing CSRT and ARB program would likely meet these requirements if legal representation were provided for the detainees and if the government had an increasing burden of proof to demonstrate at each subsequent review that the individual still posed a security threat.

Additionally, because the detainees would be considered civilians, not combatants, there would be no “privilege” of immunity from actions they may have taken as part of the conflict. In other words, the Geneva Conventions would allow trial of terrorist suspects for murder or attempted murder if they have attacked US or Coalition forces or carried out attacks against civilians. Jurisdictionally, the convention drives a preference for host-nation courts and laws, but it is recognized that such courts and laws may not be functioning, or not functioning impartially; the convention allows the trial of civilians in duly constituted “non-political” military courts under such circumstances.¹⁸ Although trial by court martial would impose a significant administrative burden on the commander in theater, it provides an effective and internationally legitimate mechanism for holding terrorists criminally responsible for their actions.

2. Unlawful Combatants

The majority of detainees could be handled as civilian security internees, even if they did have a connection to al Qaeda or other terrorist networks. The “unlawful combatant” category, however, makes sense in a few limited cases. If US forces were to capture Osama bin Laden, for example, it would not make sense to review his case semiannually to determine whether he still posed a security threat. Additionally, it might prove exceedingly difficult legally to prove his culpability for murder or other crimes. The United States has an interest in detaining such individuals indefinitely, even if we do not have evidence to convict them of a specific crime. Such senior terrorist leaders are the only individuals who should be categorized as unlawful combatants.

Because categorization as an unlawful combatant is not recognized by international law and would effectively

carry with it a life sentence (“indefinite detention” is the same thing), the process by which an individual is classified as an unlawful combatant must be rigorous, judicial, and transparent. Several prominent scholars, including former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Matthew Waxman, have suggested establishing special federal courts to hear unlawful combatant status determinations.¹⁹ Whatever venue is determined for making such decisions, the process must afford the suspected unlawful combatant with a meaningful opportunity to contest the categorization, including the right to call witnesses, to challenge

is unlikely in the current international political environment, in which some states see the opportunity to bolster their own status by “scoring points” off of the uncomfortable position of the United States. Until an international legal consensus emerges, the United States must continue to forge a path toward a solution. Although the ultimate destination may be uncertain, remaining at Guantanamo, physically or metaphorically, is not likely to be an option for much longer. This likelihood lends all the more urgency to the question: Where do we go from here?

Ultimately, the answer to this challenging issue may lie in the adoption of a “new Geneva” that expressly recognizes the threat posed by transnational nonstate groups and provides internationally accepted guidelines for classification and treatment of such detainees.

evidence, to be represented by an attorney, and to appeal to a neutral body. At the same time, the process must honor the legitimate government interest in the protection of classified evidence and take note of the uniquely chaotic environment in which these individuals are detained.

Conclusion

Many of the challenges associated with Guantanamo Bay stem from the unique nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorist networks with the capacity to inflict organized violence on a massive scale. This capacity has previously been the exclusive purview of sovereign states. The method in which the “unlawful combatant” category and the solutions at Guantanamo were presented to the world did not help to bolster their legitimacy, but when the rhetoric is stripped away, Guantanamo represents a first attempt to respond to a new and dangerous threat. The fact that this attempt has not garnered sufficient support to have legal credibility, either internationally or, in the wake of *Boumediene*, domestically, does not diminish the seriousness or immediacy of the threat. The US military will continue to detain dangerous individuals who need to be kept off the streets for the protection of Americans and others in the operating environment. We must develop a legal framework for such detention that garners sufficient support and does not injure our soft power capacity in the War on Terror.

Ultimately, the answer to this challenging issue may lie in the adoption of a “new Geneva” that expressly recognizes the threat posed by transnational nonstate groups and provides internationally accepted guidelines for classification and treatment of such detainees. Such a process

- 1 Mark Mazzetti and William Glaberson. “Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down Guantanamo.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html>.
- 2 *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. (2008).
- 3 US Department of Defense. “Detainee Transfer Announced.” Press release, September 2, 2008. Accessed October 28, 2008. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12174>.
- 4 US Department of Defense. “Military Commissions: Commission Cases.” Accessed October 28, 2008. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html>
- 5 Dana Priest. “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons.” *Washington Post*, November 2, 2005, A01. Accessed October 28, 2008. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html>.
- 6 US Department of Defense. “Administrative Review Board Summary.” Undated (data through March 2008). Accessed October 28, 2008. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/arb3.pdf>
- 7 *Kiyemba v. Bush*, 1:05-cv-01509-UNA (not yet published in the Federal Register). Accessed October 25, 2008. Available at: [http://ccrjustice.org/files/2008-10-09%20Kiyemba%20corrected%20release%20order%20\(2008-10-09\).pdf](http://ccrjustice.org/files/2008-10-09%20Kiyemba%20corrected%20release%20order%20(2008-10-09).pdf); *Non-refoulement* is the legal principle that persons under the control of a state may not be turned over to another state if there is reason to believe that the receiving state will violate the human rights of the individual. See, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “The Principle of Non-Refoulement.” Summary Conclusion of Cambridge Roundtable (Cambridge, UK: 9–10 Jul 01). Accessed October 27, 2008. Available at: http://www.unhcr.bg/global_consult/principle_non_refoulement_en.pdf
- 8 For a recent example, see, Associated Press. “Air Force Probes General for Actions at Guantanamo.” *Washington Post*, October 26, 2008, A18. Accessed October 26, 2008. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/25/AR2008102502510.html?hpid=sec-world>.
- 9 Deputy Secretary of Defense. “Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunals for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” Memorandum, US Department of Defense, July 14, 2006. Accessed October 28, 2008. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf>; see also, Deputy Secretary of

- Defense. "Revised Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatant Detained at U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." Memorandum, US Department of Defense, July 14, 2006. Accessed October 28, 2008. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf>.
- 10 "Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August, 1949" (GC IV), Article 43. International Committee of the Red Cross website. Accessed September 6, 2008. Available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5>.
- 11 Although certain to be controversial, this solution is possible for individuals who may not pose a specific threat to the United States but who are not desirable to have as guests in the country. If such people were to show up in Paris, for example, France would have to determine whether or not to grant them entry and/or asylum. If they were returned to the United States by the recipient country, they would be placed in immigration detention.
- 12 The following section broadly paraphrases the arguments I have made in my Joint Military Operations paper. See, Doyle Hodges. "Seizing the Legal High Ground: Detainee Operations after Boumediene v. Bush." Unpublished paper, October 31, 2008.
- 13 Boumediene v. Bush, 35.
- 14 "Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August, 1949" (GC III), Article 4. International Committee of the Red Cross web site. Accessed September 6, 2008. Available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68>.
- 15 GC III, Article 5.
- 16 George W. Bush. "Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees." Memorandum, White House, February 7, 2007. Accessed October 14, 2008. Available at: http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
- 17 GC IV, Article 5.
- 18 GC IV, Articles 64 and 66.
- 19 Benjamin Wittes. "Improving Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees within the American Justice System." Testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 4, 2008, p. 4. The Brookings Institution website. Accessed September 6, 2008. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0604_detainees_wittesb.aspx?p=1; See also, Matthew Waxman. "Hearing on Guantanamo Detainees After Boumediene: Now What?" Testimony before the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), July 15, 2008, p. 3. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe website. Available at: http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=UserGroups.Home&ContentRecord_id=432&ContentType=H&ContentRecordType=H&UserGroup_id=63&Subaction=ByDate&CFID=18849146&CFTOKEN=53.

Strategic Event Assessment

EVENT: Afghanistan – Pakistan Border Operations

68,000 US forces
31,000 NATO/ISAF forces
670+ US Military Dead
400+ attacks per week during June 2009 up from 50 insurgent attacks per week during early 2004

PERCEPTION **Pakistan Public Opinion (May 2009):**
86% of Pakistanis believed “most people in Afghanistan want NATO forces to leave now”

REALITY **Afghan Public Opinion Poll (Jan 2009):**
63% Afghans approved of the presence of US troops in Afghanistan
59% of Afghans approved of the presence of NATO/ISAF forces

University of Maryland | WorldOpinion.org Poll | 17–28 May 2009

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE:

HELMAND PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN – Operations in Helmand Province signal the beginning of a reenergized, regional counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy centered around a series of “clear-and-hold” operations occurring simultaneously on both sides of the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. These operations mean to deny the Taliban and militant Islamist groups the space needed to operate.

Islamist militants continue to apply a strategy similar that worked against the Soviets during the 1980s. The Taliban and other Islamists avoid direct combat, instead withdrawing, dispersing, and harassing the main body with hit-and-run operations designed to impose casualties and slow down the operation. By raising the prospect of a long, costly, and ultimately futile struggle of questionable legitimacy, the Islamist militants hope to outlast their enemies and raise the cost of the operation to unacceptable levels. A resource-intensive campaign requires time and patience, both of which allow the militants to capitalize on the asymmetry of interests. Meanwhile, the militant Islamist groups attempt to make USG and ISAF operations appear futile, heavy-handed, and illegitimate.

The militants are able to harness their superior knowledge of the human and physical terrain and can determine the time and place of battle. The population are often used as human shields, and weapons that maximize damage with minimal exposure, like improvised explosive devices (IED) and suicide bombers, are preferred.

Pakistani news sources are vociferously opposed to any US operations being conducted on their soil to root out Islamist militants. A number of prominent news media outlets have highlighted the rise in casualties, and the British are reacting strongly to the fact that total British casualties in Afghanistan have now surpassed the number of British troops killed in Iraq. If domestic opposition rises in Pakistan and the UK, both may reduce their commitment.

A destabilized or Islamist-controlled Afghanistan remains a strategic threat to the United States. Without a functioning government in Kabul sympathetic to the West, al-Qaida could return, rebuild, and strike again.

QUOTES:

“My advice is: What you did against the earlier, do against the present invaders. This enemy [the West] is more dangerous than the earlier one [the Soviet Communists]. Their enmity with Islam and Muslim Ummah is very old, and deeper. If the communists fought against Muslims for 70 years, they have fought for 1,400 years.”

— Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-e-Islami Leader
afghanislamicpress.com, 3 July 2009

“After the American occupation of Afghanistan, the Afghan–Baluchi border region had so far been quiet and peaceful. But it seems now that the U.S. has decided to throw this region too into the fire of war.”

— *Roznama Jasarat*
“Threat of Drone Attacks on Baluchistan,”
Pakistan, 20 July 2009

“Washington may be planning to embark on a new strategy involving drone attacks in Baluchistan. . . . defeating the militants must go beyond the mere aim of bombing them out of existence. We must concede that the drone attacks have resulted in the death of at least some militants—possibly some important figures in the movement. But what they have also done is create immense anger and resentment among ordinary people, who have also been among the victims of the bombs and missiles that flatten homes and kill indiscriminately”

— *The News*
“Bombing Baluchistan” Pakistan, 20 March 2009

“Success will not be quick or easy . . . There is no simple answer. We must conduct a holistic counterinsurgency campaign, and we must do it well.”

— LTG Stanley McChrystal, Commanding General OEF
Senate Testimony, 3 June 2009

EVENT: Pakistan – Swat Valley Operations

Taliban Al-Qaeda
2,000,000 Internally Displaced People
1,700 Militants Killed
3+ months (operation ongoing)

Pakistan Public Opinion (May 2009):

69% express confidence in the Pakistani government to handle the situation in Swat
81% saw the “activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban” as a critical threat
88% think US goal is to weaken and divide the Islamic world
27% view “the current USG” positively

University of Maryland | WorldOpinion.org Poll | 17–28 May 2009

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE:

SWAT VALLEY, PAKISTAN – Former President Musharraf’s crackdown in the aftermath of the Red Mosque siege paved the way for the return of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from exile. Bhutto’s assassination and her party’s election victory transformed the political landscape and renewed a sense of legitimacy in the government. Despite a new government, Pakistani military efforts against militants operating in their country remained uneven, until recently.

The Pakistani Taliban’s forceful imposition of Shari’a in towns near Islamabad directly challenged the authority of the central government. These actions, combined with the violent actions of Islamists, forced a show-down. The Pakistani military launched a major offensive against the Pakistani Taliban, focusing in the Swat Valley. These bold operations were made possible as Pakistani public opinion turned against the destabilizing and radical influences al-Qaida and the Taliban. A June 2009 poll showed 81% of Pakistanis saw the “activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban” as a critical threat, a 47-point jump from 34% in late 2007.

Nevertheless, perceptions of United States’ intentions, policies, and actions, remain unpopular: 88% of Pakistanis think America’s goal is to “weaken and divide the Islamic world,” and only 27% view “the current USG” positively. Drone strikes are portrayed as extreme violations of Pakistani sovereignty and with no regard for civilian casualties. NATO forces do not enjoy legitimacy either, with 72% of Pakistanis disapproving of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Recent Pakistani distrust and animosity toward Taliban and al Qaeda provide the political will needed for the Pakistan military to continue reasserting control over its territory and applying pressure to militant strongholds inside Pakistan.

The importance of a regional approach is highlighted by concern expressed by senior al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Statements point to the threat a combined Pakistan and US effort poses to militant elements in the region. However, continued hostility toward US involvement in the region, combined with the perceived excesses of the Pakistan Swat operation, may allow sympathy for many jihadist groups and their goals to reemerge. US leadership is also aware of these facts. Secretary Robert Gates noted the Pakistanis “withdrew from the fight earlier this year, which frankly gave the Taliban an opportunity to surge into Afghanistan, now the Pakistanis are back in the fight,” causing Taliban and al-Qaida members operating in the border region “to watch their backs.”

QUOTES: “The Islamic Ummah in general and Afghanistan in particular are at a critical stage . . . another Crusade is being fought against the Ummah! It would have been a great thing if Pakistan had not supported the Americans against the mujahideen.”

— Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-e-Islami Leader
afghanislamicpress.com, 3 July 2009

“They’re beginning to understand that the extremists in ungoverned spaces in their West have become an existential threat to Pakistan. That’s one of the reasons the army is back in the fight; they have captured and killed more al Qaeda than anybody in the world, except maybe us.”

— Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense
American Forces Press Service, 19 December 2008

“Renewed Pakistani military action targeting al-Qaida and Taliban terrorists lodged in the western part of their country benefits Pakistan and assists in the fight against insurgents in Afghanistan.”

— Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense
Interview PBS, 17 December 2008

DD AT/HD
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