

LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNETH R. WYKLE, USA
DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
(August 1993 to August 1995)

AN ORAL HISTORY

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Introduction

Role of the Deputy Commander in Chief

Dr. Matthews: General Wykle, why do you think you were selected to be USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief]?

General Wykle: My knowledge and experience in transportation were undoubtedly considerations. I was one of the two most senior two-star Army transporters, so seniority was a factor. I think also Lieutenant General [James D., USA, former USTRANSCOM DCINC] Starling's recommendation to General Fogleman [General Ronald R., USAF, USCINCTRANS] the CINC [Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command], played a role, and most importantly was General Fogleman's assessment of me. After he looked at my background and compared it to the others who were available, I got the job. And the fact that he and I served together in Korea, that personal contact and association, worked to my benefit. Probably all those factors combined resulted in my being selected for the DCINC position.

Dr. Matthews: Was there any way in particular that you prepared yourself for the job once you had found out you had been selected? Anyone in particular of help to you?

General Wykle: I prepared by reading material USTRANSCOM mailed to me: the USTRANSCOM Charter, the CINC's Posture Statement, and information papers. I found those very helpful. The individual who was most helpful was General Starling, whom I had known for years. He briefed me on

how the command was organized and the issues that were hot. He gave me background on actions that had occurred in the last year or so. Then, once I arrived here, staff briefings brought me up to speed on the most current issues.

Dr. Matthews: How could you absorb so much so quickly?

General Wykle: I didn't come close to absorbing it. What's important is to become familiar with the issues and to associate them with those responsible for them. Those briefings early on gave me a broad background of the command and points of contact for actions.

Dr. Matthews: What is the DCINC's role at TRANSCOM? I imagine it is a combination of several areas. Aren't you an operator, a communicator, a planner, and a manager?

General Wykle: I think it's all of those, but it's primarily a Chief of Staff function. As you know, at USTRANSCOM the DCINC/Chief of Staff positions are combined. In fact, I had not been here a week or two when General Fogleman and I discussed this issue. He wanted me to, basically, stay home and mind the store. I would be "Mr. Inside" and run the command day-to-day. He would take care of the external aspects of the command. So my time was spent primarily coordinating with the staff, preparing position documents for the CINC, and providing overviews and assessments of the staff's work for him. I made recommendations to him based on the staff's work. That's a Chief of Staff role.

Dr. Matthews: You also spent a lot of time dealing with the components.

General Wykle: Yes, the DCINC is a conduit of sorts for information passing to the components and from them to us. I talked to the AMC [Air Mobility Command] vice commander and MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command] and MSC [Military Sealift Command] commanders almost daily.

Dr. Matthews: How about your role in dealing with base issues? Did you intervene in the tenant-host relationship?

General Wykle: Not much. Such issues rarely came to my level. When I first arrived, I got involved in civilian personnel issues. I had the Base Personnel Office chief over to discuss how long it was taking to process and fill our new SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] civilian billets. As a result, there was slight improvement for a while, but we are now back to that long extended fill process. That process needs to change. In my estimation, the civilian personnel system is just too bureaucratic.

Dr. Matthews: From your discussions with your counterparts at the other unified commands, do you think their roles are pretty much the same as yours?

General Wykle: It varies from command to command. Although we haven't sat down and compared notes, I think it's a function of the individual CINC and how he wants to use his DCINC. I think TRANSCOM is perhaps a bit more centralized at the top than the others, certainly more centralized than the geographic CINCs. I think the DCINCs and directors at the geographical unified commands are empowered to do more things--in terms of signing out messages, speaking for their commands, taking positions on issues--without having to go

through the DCINC or CINC. From working with ACOM [United States Atlantic Command] during the preparation for possible operations in Haiti, I concluded that the ACOM DCINC operated much more in a DCINC role than the Chief of Staff role. He went to Haiti to see the situation and returned to the command to give guidance to the staff based on first-hand knowledge.

Dr. Matthews: So you would like to see the DCINC role at USTRANSCOM be more like your counterpart at ACOM?

General Wykle: I would like to see a little better balance between the DCINC role and the Chief of Staff role. I think right now, it's probably 90 percent Chief of Staff. Consequently, there's not enough time to do DCINC-type functions. It is really tough to carve out the time to represent the command on three or four key issues at the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] level. The sealift issue that I have been working especially hard the last several months has taken 20 percent of my time. With a couple other high priority issues on the DCINC's plate, the Chief of Staff role gets slighted. So the demands on this position's time are very great.

I would like to find a way to empower the directors to do more, to free up the DCINC/Chief of Staff to really push three or four actions that are critical to the command. I have tried to do that. I've told the directors that they are empowered, but it hasn't worked because of the nature of the command: in the majority of cases, recommended command positions have to come through this office en route to the CINC for review and/or release, which has just made it extremely difficult to empower the directors.

Dr. Matthews: It sounds like a case for a BG [Brigadier General] Chief of Staff. Should we go back to that arrangement?

General Wykle: Certainly a Chief of Staff as a colonel doesn't work. The directors are not responsive to him because they are more experienced and senior. No matter how competent the individual is, it is very difficult for a colonel Chief of Staff to guide or direct the directors' work. A colonel can't critique the directors and say "change this, change that, and go back and re-look the issue." Just by the nature of our business and the command's structure, it can't work. With a BG you still have the seniority issue. I remain convinced that a separate Chief of Staff position is an unneeded management layer as long as the command retains its current centralized management structure. But, empowering the directors to do more, so less has to come through this level for a decision or for release, would reduce the DCINC's Chief of Staff workload and give him time to be a DCINC.

Dr. Matthews: How did the CINC dual-hat billet arrangement work from your viewpoint?

General Wykle: It's a good arrangement, as long as USTRANSCOM and AMC are located on the same base. I don't think it would work if the commands were geographically separated. The real challenge is for the CINC to get the right balance between the time he spends at each of the commands. My perception is that the CINC spends more time on the Air Force side than on the TRANSCOM side, so the scales are tipped in that direction, which can send negative signals to the TRANSCOM staff. They perceive that there is an emphasis on Air Force issues. From my standpoint, from

where I sit, it is not a significant factor. From the TRANSCOM staff's perception, it is.

***Derek J. Vander Schaaf,
DOD Deputy Inspector General***

Dr. Matthews: If Derek Vander Schaaf [Department of Defense Deputy Inspector General] was sitting here today, and you had this once in a lifetime chance to explain to him USTRANSCOM's position, what would you tell him? Has the command reached its potential?

General Wykle: We are not where we need to be yet. I think there is still a lot of work to be done and there is still probably more service focus within our components than we would like. There are several factors working against change, such as service/component command responsibilities outside of the unified chain of command. And the bureaucracy works against change. It's very difficult to get the resources needed to make significant changes. You think you have the resources today and the next budget cycle they are cut, taken away. Then you spend your energy trying to modify your program to be able to implement it on less dollars. In the meantime, you lose your focus. So, I would tell him that there is potential there to become more efficient and effective. It is just going to take time to get it done, even if it is legislated. Legislating change doesn't make it happen. It does establish a target or mark on the wall. But, you have to have time and resources to make change. The current system makes change difficult.

Dr. Matthews: Give me an example of such a resources issue and its impact.

General Wykle: The one that comes to mind most readily is the JTCC [Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center]. In 1993 then Deputy Secretary of Defense [William] Perry put out a memo telling us to establish the Center to reduce the number of automated transportation systems and select those that we would use as migratory systems. But OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] provided no resources to get the job done. So, we took some resources out of hide to stand up the JTCC. Then we went back to OSD to argue for the required resources, but we were only about 50 percent successful. We are doing the best job possible but it would move a lot more quickly if we had proper resources.

The MCC [Mobility Control Center] is another example. We want to become more like a commercial organization with a centralized customer service area and a 1-800-Transportation or 1-800-TRANSCOM number that our customers can call if they have a requirement or problem. We are not resourced to do that. But if you go to CSX, FEDEX, Schneider Trucking [Schneider National, Inc.], or any of the other large commercial transportation companies, you find a centralized requirements center, an "MCC," that controls all their assets from one location in the United States. USTRANSCOM can't come close to doing that because we can't generate the resources to do it.

Dr. Matthews: Vander Schaaf recommended getting rid of the component commands and rolling them all up into one huge unified transportation command. Could that be workable?

General Wykle: I don't think so, so long as you have the component commands with split responsibility. Navy is probably the best example. The Military Sealift Command commander is dual-hatted. He is responsible to CINCTRANS for common-user sealift assets, but he is also responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for support to the fleet with his combat logistics ships and his oilers. You can't combine that with the sealift mission and put it all under TRANSCOM. MSC is set up with a Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation [DBOF-T] for common-user lift and a similar fund for Navy fleet support and it would be extremely difficult to split those two functions out. You'd end up with a smaller MSC on the Navy side. Philosophically it's a good idea, but practically, it's not something desirable. Any efficiencies you gain on the common-user sealift side would be offset by increased structure or operating cost overhead to keep the Navy side going. It's probably about as efficient as you can get it now, where the same people do both functions.

***USTRANSCOM's Relationships with
Transportation Component Commands***

Dr. Matthews: How have our relationships with the component commands changed during your tenure as DCINC?

General Wykle: I think they have improved significantly, but I don't think it's anything I have done. Quite frankly, it's personality-driven to a great extent. We have had a change in leadership at the component commands since I arrived. When I first came on board, I was the junior person in terms of experience, so I didn't have the basic knowledge or background to challenge some of the things that I could later take head on. Now I am the old-timer, so to speak, so I am the historical reservoir of knowledge on many issues.

There is also a more cooperative atmosphere between TRANSCOM and our components recently. Those commanders call me once or twice a week and we chat about issues our staffs are working. We provide each other our perspectives.

MTMC is making good progress in several areas: single POV [Privately Owned Vehicle] contractor, working to reengineer movement of household goods, working to reengineer travel, trying to reengineer the organization.

I think there is a good relationship between myself and the Commander of MSC. Admiral Quast [Vice Admiral P. M., USN] is really trying to make a difference. In fact, he is making a difference. In the past, it seemed to me that the words were there but the actions were not, and now I think both the words and actions are there and I now see changes

occurring in MSC. I think we are pretty much in agreement on the VISA [Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement]. We still have work to do on what we call the constructed rate process, which is really a contracting process, how we contract for common-user sealift. Sure, we will have some differences of opinion with MSC. But, we just need to work through them in an honest and effective dialogue, get all the issues on the table, and then try to solve them, and we are moving in that direction. It's just a pain to get it done.

With AMC, I had a very good relationship with Lieutenant General Jackson [Lieutenant General John E., Jr., USAF] and after him Lieutenant General Tenoso [Lieutenant General Edwin E., USAF] and now with Lieutenant General Robertson [Lieutenant General Charles T., Jr., USAF]. He has been very supportive of USTRANSCOM and our initiatives. Overall, I think our relationships with the component commands are good and getting better.

Dr. Matthews: One of the recommendations that came out of Desert Shield/Desert Storm was that USTRANSCOM needed a peacetime, single manager charter, in part to break the TCCs' [Transportation Component Commands'] habit of going directly to their services or the unified command CINCs and vice versa, the CINCs and services dealing directly with the TCCs and cutting USTRANSCOM and the Joint Staff out of the loop. Now that we have had our peacetime mission for a couple of years, have those old habits been broken?

General Wykle: I don't think they have been broken. I think progress is being made but it just takes time. You have to convince

everyone that it is the right way to go. Fairly recently, CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command] had a requirement to move some passengers and they went directly to AMC to contract for special assignment airlift missions as opposed to using the JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System] process. As a result, we ran an analysis of the lift and went back and showed them where they could have saved \$110,000 to \$120,000 if they would have come to us to coordinate the operation. They said it would never happen again. They will use JOPES. They will come through USTRANSCOM in the future. That's a learning process and as new people come in they may bring some old habits with them. We are not there yet, but I think we are making good progress.

Single Port Manager Concept

Dr. Matthews: During your tour as DCINC, the single port manager concept evolved. Please describe its evolution and how it will benefit the DTS [Defense Transportation System].

General Wykle: It evolved from Desert Shield/Desert Storm. If you look at the world today, from a peacetime aspect, Military Traffic Management Command operates the military ocean terminals in the geographical CINC's area of operation, where we have an established theater. In Europe, MTMC operates Bremerhaven [Germany], Rotterdam [Netherlands], Felixstowe [United Kingdom], Iskenderun [Turkey], Cadiz [Spain], and Leghorn [Italy]. It operates all of those water ports and others. In the Pacific you have a similar arrangement at Pusan [Korea], Naha [Okinawa], and Yokohama [Japan] as examples. MTMC is established in

those locations in peacetime to respond to the theater commander's requirements. If we execute a war plan, MTMC is there at those ports to operate them in wartime. No glitch. No questions as to port operation responsibilities. Now, if you take a theater-type contingency such as Southwest Asia, where we do not have US forces on the ground, the supported CINC decides who is going to operate that port for him. In Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the 7th Transportation Group operated the Saudi ports. But then, as the supported CINC started to drawdown his forces, he asked for MTMC to come in and clean up the residue. So MTMC was responsible for moving all that stuff out.

Dr. Matthews: The residue?

General Wykle: Yes, the residue, the stuff that wouldn't operate, wouldn't run. They pulled it off to the side and left it and said "MTMC can get it out." Without the stress of combat or pending combat, you have more time to move it out.

Take Somalia, as another example. Again, no established theater infrastructure there so, when we first went into Somalia, the supported CINC had the Navy operate the port. And then, after about a month, it was turned over to the 7th Transportation Group, which operated it nearly until the end. MTMC had volunteered to go in and operate the port, but the supported CINC found that unacceptable. So, in established theaters, MTMC is there, but elsewhere port operations depend on the theater commander's wishes.

If the responsibility for port operations in theater varies by theater, you have different operating procedures, different

automated systems, and different means of providing support to the services. USTRANSCOM is saying that a common port manager would standardize the operation: same procedures, same documentation process, and same automated systems being used regardless of where the forces go. We are in no way suggesting that MTMC replace the 7th Transportation Group in Army force structure. But MTMC has a lot of capability to do contracting, to arrange stevedore contracts, host nation support, that type of capability. Now, having said that, I know the 7th Transportation Group has a contracting detachment attached to them, but it is not nearly as experienced as MTMC. The 7th doesn't do contracting day-to-day. They only do it in a contingency. So they lose some of that expertise as people rotate and move in and out of the organization. We are trying to bring commonality, efficiency, and effectiveness to the fight, so to speak, by having a common port manager.

Dr. Matthews: Will the relationship between MTMC and the 7th Transportation Group be codified in operational plans or in doctrine?

General Wykle: It should be. Fact is, General Thompson [Major General Roger G., Jr., USA, Commander, MTMC] and General Whaley, [Major General David A., USA]--who is commanding Fort Eustis, and responsible for training and deploying the 7th Group--signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in mid-July 1995 outlining the relation between the two organizations. That's going up the joint side--through TRANSCOM to the Joint Staff--and up through the Army side to the Joint Staff. Once all the parties

agree to the MOU, then it should be codified and set in doctrine.

Dr. Matthews: You raised an issue just a second ago, the difference between port manager and port operator. Could you explain that difference to me, please?

General Wykle: It's a little bit gray, but "manager" to me is the individual who's responsible for pulling it all together, coordinating the various pieces, being the focal point for the CINC. The "operator" is the one who's physically discharging the ships, providing the stevedore service, getting the equipment to the marshaling site. It's the physical work versus the coordination oversight, bringing the pieces together. I think the 7th Group is ideal to be the port operator. They are structured for that. They have stevedores to do that. But let's say you go into an area where you don't need military stevedores, then MTMC can contract for that work, which frees up your active duty force structure. An example today is Croatia. MTMC has people at the ports in there working the documentation, managing the port operations, and operating the ports with contract stevedores. The 7th Transportation Group's services are not required as port managers.

Dr. Matthews: In Haiti and Somalia we used contractors to operate the ports. How did that work out?

General Wykle: It worked out fine, but with a caveat. Military stevedores need to get in the initial surge, the initial contingent. They must establish a basic amount of capability and provide a minimum amount of security. Then you can bring in a

contractor like Brown & Root [Inc.] to relieve the Army so they can go do other things. But Brown & Root, for example, contract primarily for local personnel. So they are providing the command and control element that the 7th Transportation Group would otherwise provide.

Dr. Matthews: Relying on the indigenous population is fine as long as there are no bullets, SCUDS, chemical weapons, or other nasties that make them run for the hills.

General Wykle: Sure.

Dr. Matthews: Are there other potential problems with using contractors to operate ports?

General Wykle: The uncertainty of whether or not they will be where you need them. You cannot be 100 percent dependent on them. You need your organic capability and then realize that you want to transition to the contractor as soon as possible. Also you have to consider their dependability and commitment to the task. Primarily they are interested in money and, as you mentioned, if it gets somewhat dangerous, they may not show up for work. And the third piece is security. There is increased risk of pilferage, sabotage, or terrorist activity.

Lift Capability

Requirements Process

Dr. Matthews: You asked the JTCC to look at ways of improving the deployment requirements process. Why?

General Wykle: The TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data] process is convoluted. It's difficult to get timely requirements from the supported CINCs so that we can respond quickly with lift, and once we respond make sure that the right units show up to be loaded. We need a flexible, dynamic, automated tool that allows the supported CINC to quickly identify units, put together a force list, and then convert it into a requirement that transporters can use to allocate lift against. The tool has to be dynamic enough to adjust the requirement overnight and allow transporters to see that change. The tools must have a computer screen showing almost real time data with all the supporting CINCs on line simultaneously. The machine would do all this--type of load, characteristics, dimensions, and all that stuff--and would then give you the requirements. And you could change that very readily as opposed to JOPES, which is very manpower intensive and requires system expertise on the part of the user. So, how do we change the requirements process so the individual who has units and equipment to be moved can very quickly pass to the transporter what they have to move and still be able to change it on rather short notice? That is the question I asked JTCC.

Dr. Matthews: Can you give us some examples to illustrate problems with the requirements process?

General Wykle: In April 1994, as relationship between the US and North Korea deteriorated, we looked at moving some equipment to the area to augment our forces there. The supported CINC identified a particular type of unit to go. We thought it was coming from one location and the Joint Staff confirmed it was coming from that location, but the sourcing service said

no, they did not want to send that unit. They wanted to send a like-type unit from another location. So that debate went back and forth for several days before it was resolved. The situation made it difficult for USTRANSCOM to size the transportation package and move out in preparation for the deployment because the two different units required different transport packages.

During the Haiti operation, moving forces from Fort Drum [New York] down to Bayonne [New Jersey] was difficult because we couldn't get the requirement defined. We could not set the number of railcars for the deployment. It wasn't the division's fault. It was just the bureaucratic process of trying to figure out what the 10th Mountain Division was supposed to do once it got to Haiti. Once the division commander received his mission, he knew how to structure his forces. And then getting railcars spotted took time. We moved equipment by convoy from [Fort] Drum down to Bayonne--that we would have liked to have moved by rail--because we couldn't get railcars out of the commercial system quick enough. The commercial rail industry is cutting the fat out of its system. Decreasing excess capacity means increased time to marshal equipment where we need it for a contingency.

Going into Wilmington [North Carolina], again for the Haiti operation, units didn't arrive at the port in the proper scheduled sequence as specified in the TPFDD. That was okay for us. We'll load whatever comes to the port. But it's not what the combat commander wanted. His equipment didn't arrive in the order he wanted it loaded, so we had to go back and say "Hey, is this what you really want? If not,

you need to provide someone here who can tell us what your priorities are for loading.” Those are three examples that come to mind fairly readily.

***Two Major Regional Contingencies, Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement, and
National Defense Transportation Association***

Dr. Matthews: Are two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies transportation-feasible and what are your greatest concerns with being able to handle two at a time?

General Wykle: I have to answer with a caveat. It depends upon the parameters you establish and what types of assumptions you make in regard to CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] activation, access to the reserves, and warning time, those types of things. Given reasonable assumptions, yes, I feel fairly confident that we could do it. Sealift would be the next biggest concern. We have enough airlift capability today--sure, it's getting older and it's harder to maintain, it breaks more frequently--but in terms of capacity, we have enough to do the job. We certainly need the C-17 to replace the C-141 as the future core airlifter. But today, we in fact have a shortage of sealift capability. That is my biggest concern today.

Dr. Matthews: What have all those marathon sealift meetings accomplished?

General Wykle: We have been working to establish a new sealift readiness program. We are trying to design a sealift program similar to the airlift CRAF program. We want a program that gives us assured access to commercial sealift assets in the event of

a contingency. Right now, we don't have that. We have something called the SRP, the Sealift Readiness Program, but it takes a declaration of national emergency and requires us to requisition ships from commercial carriers. Using the SRP would be a significant event, one we have never experienced, not since the program's establishment in the 1950s. We have never activated the Sealift Readiness Program because of potential economic impact on the country and because of the political signal that sends. So, we are trying to design a program that's workable, that's responsive to OSD's needs, that meets the needs of the commercial industry. We want to build a program, a partnership, between DOD and the shipping industry, one that's a win-win situation for all.

Dr. Matthews: What's the biggest problem?

General Wykle: I don't think there is a major problem. We have been working on this for several months and we basically have an agreement between industry and government, the Maritime Administration, USTRANSCOM, and MSC--all the major players. In fact, we are going to brief the proposal to the maritime industry CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] on 16 August [1995]. We think the majority will sign up. Initially we had some hurdles to overcome, in terms of the climate between DOD [Department of Defense] and industry. We worked through that in the first few meetings to build a trusting relationship between the two parties. We had candid conversations. We put our issues on the table and resolved our differences. We compromised and then moved forward. It has been a very productive process.

Dr. Matthews: USTRANSCOM from its inception has attempted to bring together DOD and industry on contracting and other issues. How has the climate changed to allow this to happen now?

General Wykle: I can speculate. USTRANSCOM has matured. We have the peacetime, single manager charter from the Secretary of Defense. We certainly have the experience: Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and other operations under our belt. The carriers have worked with USTRANSCOM over the last several years, so they understand our role and are confident in our abilities.

Perhaps most significantly is CINCTrans' commitment to establishing a workable sealift readiness program. He has shown that commitment by making his DCINC personally in charge of this group and arranging with the carriers to sign up their vice presidents as their representatives. We have a group that is empowered to work through the differences and resolve the issues. We have the commitment on the part of industry and government to put the right people on the committee to give it our best shot and we will either fix it or we will agree that it's not going to be fixed in the near term so we can then move on to other things.

Dr. Matthews: What is meant by constructive rate and how will it help expedite contracting?

General Wykle: Constructive rate may not be the right term. It has a connotation that's bothering people. Some people think that the term constructive rate means that the government is making a radical change from long established and proven

contracting methods. That is not true. What we are after is the market rate, what other shippers are paying for like-type services, and then the US government should get rates as good as other shippers using like-type service. Right now the current contracting process for ocean shipping is long, laborious, and bureaucratic. We spend ten months trying to agree on a rate, we start using that rate, and two months later we are into the process of preparing for the next year's rate. That ten-month-long contracting process takes over 100 different steps. It's expensive just in terms of the manpower. There must be a better way. So we reengineered the process to make it more efficient and still protect the interest of the government and get just as good a price. The answer is the "constructive rate."

In conjunction with the carriers and an independent audit firm, we went out and looked at commercial shippers' books to find out what they are paying to ship 20-foot and 40-foot containers and "reefer" [refrigerated] vans from the West Coast of the United States to 11 different locations in the Pacific. We then compared what the commercial shippers are paying to what the US government is paying. In some cases we are paying about the same. In others the government is paying more than the commercial shippers, even though the government is using a competitive bidding process. We have demonstrated that we are not necessarily getting the lowest price through our current contracting process.

We are now looking for best value for the US government. Service, price, and readiness to meet our wartime requirement are the determining factors. We

believe by changing the current contracting process we can get the “best value” for the government. And it will be much more efficient for us if we can establish long-term relationships with carriers and form a strong partnership with them. We plan on doing a one-year test contract with four years of options that will allow the carriers to structure their business to meet our requirements, because, they will then know our business will be around more than one year and that they will gain efficiencies by decreasing their large contracting staff. They will increase profitability without raising prices. It should also make us more efficient. It will take us less time to complete contracts and therefore it will be good for the government. It is a win-win situation for the government and industry and it will form a stronger partnership between DOD and industry.

Dr. Matthews: Could the new process, which I gather is geared to long-term, sustainment-type operations, be applied to surge-type operations, like contracting for RO/ROs [Roll-On/Roll Offs] during contingencies?

General Wykle: The rates apply right now to peacetime cargo only. But, VISA, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, is designed for both peacetime and wartime operations. The rate methodology is laid out in the VISA document, but the two actions are not currently linked. Eventually, we would like to link them. If we are able to link them, then the same rate would apply in wartime as well as peacetime. We would call it a base rate. The carrier would move our cargo in peacetime through this constructive rate. In the event of a contingency, the carrier would still move our cargo for the same price, in the terms of the constructive rate.

It would probably cost the government more in a contingency, because the contract would have provisions for differentials. Let's say we are going to Southwest Asia and we are paying the constructive rate for that, but then the price of oil goes up because of a conflict. Then we would make up the difference in the cost of fuel. It's a legitimate expense that they could come back and ask the government to cover. We call those "contract differentials."

We would also pay adjustment factors. Let's say we asked a carrier to relocate a ship from the East Coast of the United States to the West Coast to move our cargo to Northeast Asia. That's an expense incurred outside the normal course of business. We would make up the difference, "the adjustment factor." The rate from the West Coast would be

the West Coast base rate plus any differentials and adjustments that the carrier incurs. The government is not required to cover them, but we must consider them, and if the carrier justifies and documents the expense, and it's fair and reasonable, then we would cover that. There are provisions to protect the government and to protect the contractor.

Dr. Matthews: Would you offer or recommend a substitute phrase for constructive rates, one that is more accurate?

General Wykle: We are considering that right now. We may call it the "uniform rate."

Dr. Matthews: How do you see the role of the NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association]? Is our relationship with the NDTA improving strategic mobility for the Department of the Defense?

General Wykle: I see the NDTA as a facilitator of discussion between us and industry. We can certainly go to an individual CEO or company one-on-one, but NDTA provides the forum for broader discussion with multiple CEOs simultaneously. There is no better example of this than the VISA effort. That's an NDTA-sponsored initiative. NDTA enables us to get together with the carriers and work issues on common ground. The NDTA allows for long term partnerships. It provides us feedback and enables us to stay more in tune to what is happening in the commercial industry. It is an educational forum for all members, business and government alike. We don't necessarily get

deliverables out of NDTA, in terms of major studies and so forth.

Dr. Matthews: Should we expect more from the relationship?

General Wykle: Maybe, but the onus is on us. We need to tell NDTA how they can help us, what we would like for them to do for us, and then they can tell us whether or not they have the capability to meet our timelines. In that regard we don't communicate perhaps as well as we should.

Fort-to-Port Leg

Dr. Matthews: I would like you to discuss the fort-to-port leg of the strategic mobility. Earlier you mentioned your concerns over decreasing rail capacity for deployment. Please elaborate.

General Wykle: I am concerned over the availability of railcars. We, the DOD, do not have enough railcars. We have about 1,000 against a requirement of 2,000 railcars, we estimate, to start loading out our high priority units immediately. While loading them we begin marshaling and obtaining additional railcars from the civilian rail industry. As I mentioned earlier, I'm concerned that sometime in the near future we'll fall short of capacity after that initial surge.

We also need to look at rail spurs and connecting roads to our bases and installations to insure that they are properly maintained so that they will hold up under the weight of a fully loaded train carrying M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, or other heavy equipment. We need to verify that the rail spurs go to the right location on the installations. At

many of the Army installations today, if you trace the rail line back, it ends at warehouses the same height as box cars. This reflects World War II rail operations. We need rail spurs going into the motor pools and marshaling yards with ramps capable of loading the railcars quickly. We need roads from installations connecting to interstates that enable us to rapidly move land convoys to the ports and the airfields.

We need ready access to the ports. To a great extent, we use commercial ports to outload equipment. So, we need agreements with the local port authorities that give us access and priority for use of piers and marshaling areas. (And that's difficult because it impacts commercial business.) Recent BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure Commission] decisions, such as the closing of Bayonne and Oakland [California], make it critical that we have the right contracts with the commercial ports to quickly outload. The commercial shipping industry is moving to larger ships with deeper drafts. We need to make sure we have the access to the commercial ports capable of accommodating these new ships.

I continue to be concerned about our ability to handle containerized ammunition. We have good capability on the East Coast, but very limited capability on the West Coast. There is a program to install a container handling capability at Concord, north of San Francisco [California].

We need to get that done, so we will be able to support the Pacific area rapidly with containerized ammunition.

Dr. Matthews: How can USTRANSCOM influence the West Coast ammunition port initiative?

General Wykle: Overall the program at Concord is on track. We just need to keep it fully funded.

Policy and Doctrine

Dr. Matthews: Part of our peacetime charter tasks us to become involved in policy and doctrine formulation in DOD. How would you assess our move into the policy and joint doctrine arenas?

General Wykle: I haven't seen a whole lot on the policy side. I think that's because most of the work in that area had been done before I arrived: National Airlift Policy and National Sealift Policy and revising those as may be appropriate, and of course, getting the charter written for USTRANSCOM. Most of that work had been accomplished by the time I got here. It was a matter of wrapping up the loose ends, so to speak.

On the joint doctrine side, I think we have seen significant progress and we have made significant contributions. The J5 is our doctrine point of contact. They have had sessions with the Joint Staff J7 to write joint doctrine. We have the opportunity to comment and input on all joint doctrine manuals that come out of the Joint Staff. Our J5 has developed a document that shows all the joint doctrinal pubs [publications] and what their status is in terms of "already written," "published," "in process," and "yet to be written." It is an excellent road map for doctrinal

issues. So, I think we have been quite successful in that area.

***Defense Transportation System 2010 and
the Joint Deployment Transportation Center***

Dr. Matthews: Is DTS 2010 on track and what are your major concerns with its action items? I know you have some concerns.

General Wykle: I'm told--that's the way to pass the buck, I guess--that DTS 2010 is on track. I have asked that very question at the IPRs [In-Progress Reviews] and Component Commanders Conferences. I think the general feeling within the command is that DTS 2010 is on track, and I accept that.

A primary concern of mine is rotation of people. Those charged with writing 2010 and moving the Action Plan forward are leaving. That knowledge base is going out the door. We must get replacements up to speed. It is a very difficult task. There is just no way to transfer all of that knowledge to replacements without losing momentum. The demands of the day-to-day business also take a huge toll. It is high ops [operations] tempo around here. Finding time to keep focused on 2010 is a real challenge.

Dr. Matthews: How do you envision the Joint Deployment Transportation Center [JDTC]?

General Wykle: We need to do a better job of coordinating and synchronizing the deployment instruction and training of each of the services. I see the JDTC's role as the integrator of those instruction and training programs. It should make sure the services are pulling in the same direction. It should

standardize training, doctrine, techniques, and procedures of deploying forces. But each service would remain responsible for training and educating their own service members. The Center would offer a common basis, a core curriculum that all the services teach and train around while maintaining their service unique pieces. But there are some pieces that apply regardless of service: how to load ships and railcars, how to get on airplanes, and how to create a TPFDD. There are certain pieces that must be standardized.

Future Mobility Capability

Dr. Matthews: What above all else worries you about our nation's future mobility capability?

General Wykle: Pace of use. We are using up our airplanes supporting ourselves, supporting our allies, supporting humanitarian missions. We are using our RRF [Ready Reserve Force] vessels and other sealift assets at a high ops tempo. While readiness is okay now, as we look to a future with smaller defense budgets, it's going to become increasingly difficult to maintain readiness and, more importantly, to replace the assets that are wearing out because they are tremendously expensive. And as we discussed earlier, we may find ourselves five years, six years down the road not having the commercial capacity to meet our needs.

Here's a historical example. We no longer move passengers by rail in this country, so that capability is gone. Now, if we are faced with a major regional contingency or two of them simultaneously, what's left? The bus! And its capability is declining significantly. Look at what's happening to our

sealift fleet and the large number of ships that have been reflagged or gone out of service over the last 15 or 20 years. We have a very small US flag fleet today. Unless we do something to retain what's left, five or six years from now, we'll have nothing.

We have a very robust airline industry today. We have been a leader in the world market in terms of capability, but look at what's happening now. They are adjusting to the market. They are forming partnerships with foreign carriers. They are doing something called code sharing, moving passengers on each others airplanes. The domestic market is changing. Airlines are going to more efficient and cheaper-to-operate airplanes that don't have the long-range international capability we seek. Some of our long-range carriers are in financial trouble when just a few years ago we thought they would be financially stable for a long time to come. If we don't do something to protect our national transportation capability, I think we could find ourselves very stretched, stressed, and challenged ten years from now. It could pose a threat to our national security.

Dr. Matthews: And we, USTRANSCOM and DOD, have so little to say in the matter.

General Wykle: Yes. It's the market, the bottom line, that drives capacity. We have worked that from the airlift side hard, the GSA [General Services Administration] City Pairs, and we've attempted to tie the small packages contract to the CRAF program. As long as we can maintain those type programs, we will be okay. But the cracks and challenges are already starting to appear. Carriers want access to

foreign passenger markets. What will they be willing to trade off that will ultimately impact us? We must maintain our US flag capability in both airlift and sealift to meet our national security needs. That's tough. That's a challenge for us.

Budget Issues

Dr. Matthews: What have we accomplished under our peacetime charter to make the DTS more efficient? What more can we do?

General Wykle: In terms of making it more efficient, the CINCs now recognize and use us as a central point of contact for strategic mobility. Now they do not have to go to the three individual services on a stovepipe basis. Also, USCINCTRANS' work on the Hill as the single voice for Defense Transportation now makes the system more efficient. The work that J8 has done over the last few years in getting a single budget for USTRANSCOM--pulling together the budgets from the components and putting it all in a USTRANSCOM budget--makes the DTS more efficient. What more can we do? In general, there's the work that Fred Lewis [Colonel Fred P., USAF, Director of the JTCC] is doing to redefine the requirements process and, specifically, establishing a 1-800-USTRANSCOM number that could be used world-wide by all of our customers, which we discussed earlier.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think TRANSCOM should try to quantify the savings and efficiencies it realizes? Is it even possible?

General Wykle: I think it's possible, but I'm not sure what we would gain by doing that. We do something like that now in terms of our

rate structure in the DBOF process, so it's kind of saying, "okay, we saved this much money in 1995 by having this cargo moved by ship versus air." I'm just not sure how to use that metric.

Dr. Matthews: I was thinking we could give such information to the GAO [General Accounting Office] when they ask the question, "What have you done to make things run more efficiently?"

General Wykle: Yes, that could be useful to the GAO, showing process improvements made as a result of forming this command or to show Congress efficiencies gained by the single manager approach. But we have to be extremely careful. If we streamline too much, we might lose our wartime capability, then we may not be able to perform our mission. A warfighter is charged to be effective, not to be efficient. In time of war, we have to be effective and get material where it is required at the time that it is required. Effectiveness is what we are paid to do. We want to be as efficient as possible in peacetime, but not at the expense of wartime effectiveness.

Dr. Matthews: Is the command's RMB [Resource Management Board] working the way we want it to work?

General Wykle: I haven't had to make a lot of budgetary decisions because the RMB is doing a good job in terms of prioritizing requirements and distributing the money. But, I think we could improve the process if we had a five-year plan such as the POM [Program Objective Memorandum]. I think we are operating a bit by the seat of our pants from year to year. As you know, we tried to get a five-year plan for our

facilities. We have something on paper. I think it is fairly good, but is it being executed? I'm not sure that it is, because I haven't asked for an IPR or follow-up on it. I think we could do better at predicting our needs in our TDY [temporary duty] and training areas, military and civilian. Also, I think we could use our historical budget records to better estimate our "contingency pot" needs.

Dr. Matthews: Would you assess for us DBOF-T? What has been our biggest problems and how have we dealt with them?

General Wykle: The biggest problem with it is where the rubber ultimately meets the road: the units in the field executing the mission. They have no one they can charge for their services. They are at the bottom of the totem pole and everyone else charges them. We charge them for transportation services, someone else charges them for depot-level repairables, which is part of the repair parts maintenance budget, someone else charges them for other services they provide. There is no way for them to charge the customer they support. How do they get reimbursed for a humanitarian mission or by some other country?

The other major problem in the DBOF-T: too much overhead which drives up the cost. Part of that overhead, of course, is the cost of readiness. We need to maintain our infrastructure: seaports, airfields, container handling cranes. We have to charge for depreciation. But with DBOF, you can't accumulate money and reinvest it in our infrastructure. Instead it just helps reduce the rates next year. In a sense, it's a false way of doing business. We must do a better job of educating our customers on the

DBOF process. They need to understand what all's included in it and that the cost of readiness is part and parcel of the cost of doing business. Overall that's a hard sell.

Dr. Matthews: As far as the methodology goes, should we go out and brief customers periodically to explain the process?

General Wykle: I don't have a real good answer for you. Our services' schools, many of them, have a financial management block of instruction. We could perhaps have DBOF training scheduled in the service schools. After all, the services have DBOF, too. For our primary customers, the CINCs and the service MAJCOMs [major commands] a periodic newsletter, publication, or message would be appropriate as well, with the promise that if they needed more information we would be glad to come and brief them. I think at their most senior levels the services understand DBOF. We need to emphasize education at the working level, where it is not well understood.

Dr. Matthews: What have we done right and what more should we do to improve our rapport with Congress?

General Wykle: Done right: CINC visits to Congressmen before his testimony. Also, we have been very forthright in our responses to Congressional questions and inquiries, which has given us excellent credibility in Congress. Last year we held a Mobility Day at Andrews Air Force Base [Maryland]. We invited Congressmen and staffers, demonstrated the C-17, and took them down to Norfolk [Virginia] and put them on a Fast Sealift Ship. They got to observe a JLOTS [Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore] operation

at Fort Story [Virginia]. We also took them over to Oceana Naval Air Station [near Norfolk, Virginia] to view railcars loaded with Bradley fighting vehicles. We demonstrated for them three key pieces of strategic mobility. (The part that was not demonstrated was the prepositioned piece.)

On the negative side, there were not as many senior staffers or junior Congressmen there as I would like to have seen attend. I think we have a challenge--in terms of marketing, advertising, selling, educating whatever term you choose--members of Congress and their staff. We also need to find ways of increasing our interaction with staffers who work on key defense committees. I think we need to make a more assertive effort to either invite them out here and give them briefings or put together briefings and go to the Hill for a couple days. Perhaps our legislative liaison folks could do a little bit more networking with the staffers. Because we are removed from Washington, we must make a special effort to get back there and do the networking.

Dr. Matthews: Should our liaison officer at the Pentagon play a greater role in that networking?

General Wykle: Potentially, he could. I would just have to caveat it. There is such a wide variety of mobility issues that he can't be expected to be knowledgeable enough to respond to all the congressional questions. He'll be forced to say "I'll have to get back with you on that." Pretty soon, they are not willing to see him.

Operations

Operational Effectiveness

Dr. Matthews: Sir, I would like to move on to operations. Give me some examples of how USTRANSCOM has improved the effectiveness of operations.

General Wykle: On the airlift side, certainly the integration of tankers with airlifters extended our reach and reduced response time. That's improved effectiveness. We moved water purification equipment non-stop from California to Rwanda. That effectiveness saved many lives. And if you think back to October 1993 and the Ranger fire fight in Mogadishu [Somalia], part of the American response was get armor on the ground quickly. So we brought in tanks and Bradleys non-stop from the United States using closely coordinated airlift and aerial refueling operations. We have also improved effectiveness through better matching of aircraft to requirements--right types of airplanes and the right mix of airplanes--to get the best use of them and avoiding wasted capability.

Similarly, I think we have done a very good job of getting the right mix of ships in our RRF and breaking out the right ships to meet exercise and contingency requirements. In 1993 and 1994 we used the FSSs [Fast Sealift Ships] a lot. Here in 1995, we haven't used one FSS. We have been using RO/ROs out of the RRF because, again, that is what meets the requirement best.

Also we are taking a systems approach to strategic mobility. We are looking at all the pieces and trying to get the right balance between the fort-to-port piece, the airlift piece, the sealift piece, the prepo[sitioning] piece, making sure that one is not out of balance with the others. We seek

to ensure that by strengthening one link we do not weaken another.

What more can we do? I think, again, we need to continue to focus on education and sales. Letting the CINCs know how we can help them and how they can help us improve lift services. Perhaps most importantly, we must maintain our focus on sealift.

Dr. Matthews: During the recent deployment to Korea we overestimated the capability of the ships we called to do the job. What did we learn from that?

General Wykle: We learned we have to do a better job in matching the cargo to the ship. We also learned that we need more flexibility on the West Coast. We have since that deployment put more RO/ROs on the West Coast and our new siting plan adds even more to give us additional flexibility in the Pacific.

Dr. Matthews: Are there other examples of where we learned from our operational mistakes?

General Wykle: The verdict's not in on one. For the Vigilant Warrior deployment to Southwest Asia last October [1994] we received a requirement to move the Marine Corps' operational preparation party from California to Diego Garcia. We contracted for an airplane to get it done. After we let the contract, the situation changed. We were informed that the plane was no longer needed, so we diverted the plane to another mission. After it was diverted, the requirement was placed back on. That plane was no longer available, so we had to scramble and get some military airplanes, C-141s, to meet that requirement. We flew east

instead of west because that's how our tanker bridge was set up at the time. It's re-learning a lesson: If you change your requirement, it's going to reverberate throughout the system. You are going to have delays, or confusion, or you won't meet your time limits.

Readiness Assessment

Dr. Matthews: What were the major hurdles we encountered in establishing the readiness assessment for USTRANSCOM?

General Wykle: Getting a common program throughout TRANSCOM and the TCCs and across the transportation modes, which have diverse equipment and completely differently operational concepts. Finding a way to establish a common base against which everyone concerned could subjectively evaluate their readiness was tough. We worked on that for about six months, meeting on a monthly basis. We debated it, came to a consensus as to what would be included, and then moved on.

Dr. Matthews: Do you see readiness assessment difficulties peculiar to USTRANSCOM, especially because of our heavy reliance on the commercial sector?

General Wykle: Yes. The commercial sector is part of our force structure and so we take it for granted that it's there. But we have no institutionalized way of assessing the readiness of those commercial carriers assets and they would certainly resist our doing so. We have to pretty much accept that they will be able to provide us with what we are asking for. (In no case are we asking for an entire fleet.) In terms of what yet needs to be done in the readiness area: better

predictability. How do we predict the future of readiness? How are we able to look out a year or 18 months and predict what our readiness posture may be?

***Deliberate Planning and Time Phased Force
Deployment Data Refinement***

Dr. Matthews: What changes do you foresee in the functions of deliberate planning and TPFDD refinement, especially in regard to USTRANSCOM's role?

General Wykle: The CINCs are becoming more and more dependent on us for lift advice. And they are more responsive to that advice. They are also improving their understanding of the strategic transportation process and constraints.

Dr. Matthews: The Functional Analysis Team recommended that we consider divesting ourselves of the TPFDD refinement conferences, maybe have ACOM take them on. What are your feelings on finding a new host for the conferences?

General Wykle: Philosophically that would be okay. If you look at it from a practical standpoint, USACOM is a force provider for all of the other CINCs and it sometimes provides forces for itself. Haiti is an example. As the force provider, ACOM has the best understanding of constraints on their forces. But, if they were to take on those conferences, some might view that as a move outside their box or beyond USACOM's charter. Some might fear that USACOM would become some type of a super command. USACOM is very sensitive to such issues right now. Rightfully so, as the command works through its new responsibilities. This is a developmental period for ACOM, not unlike the one

TRANSCOM experienced during the first two or three years of its existence.

Intransit Visibility

Dr. Matthews: What has the command accomplished since you have been here in the area of ITV [intransit visibility] capability?

General Wykle: We have lead the effort within DOD for ITV. We have been appointed the executive agent for it. We have developed some prototypes and demonstrated capabilities of various technologies. We have put together an intransit visibility integration plan that has been accepted and approved by OSD. It has been held up as an example of our contributions to the total asset visibility process. So, I think we have brought a lot to the table in the ITV area.

Dr. Matthews: When the Chairman [Joint Chiefs of Staff] was here, you related to him your frustrations with moving forward in ITV initiatives. Give us the feeling for the length of time we have been working them and what we need to do to break the log jam.

General Wykle: Some would say DOD got interested in ITV technology after the Vietnam War. Certainly since Desert Shield/Desert Storm we've emphasized intransit visibility improvements. My frustrations center on getting a decision as to what technology will be used within OSD so we can get on with fielding it. I think we are going about it slightly wrong. Too much time and effort is being spent debating specific companies' technology, what it can do or what it can't do. That's like finding an item and trying to decide how you are going to use it. I think we need to go back and

look at our concept for ITV, what the requirement is, what do we want to accomplish? Then we need to determine the architecture for putting all that together. Once you have done those things, then it's a matter of writing a requirements document for the contractors to bid on. The source selection group picks the solution (technology) that best meets the requirement and you move on. But debating which of two technologies is best without determining the requirement is going about it backwards. That's my frustration. We can't get a decision, because we are not following a logical process to get one.

Dr. Matthews: Does TRANSCOM have the power to change the situation?

General Wykle: Not directly. Indirectly we may, and I think we have worked that hard but unsuccessfully. The previous CINC [General Fogleman] wrote letters to the right people, and he volunteered to take the lead. We have demonstrated technologies and capabilities. We have drafted requirements documents. I personally have gone to meetings and IPRs and briefings and discussed the topic. The current CINC [General Robert L. Rutherford, USAF] has emphasized it. We have briefed the senior leaders who have come to TRANSCOM. They all seem supportive, but for some reason the bureaucracy is just terribly difficult to get through. I think we know what we need. I think the technology is there to meet the need. We just can't seem to bring it to closure.

Dr. Matthews: What would you recommend that General Smith do when he comes on board in this regard?

General Wykle: He needs to learn as much about the issue as soon as possible. He may know a lot about it already. I just haven't talked to him about it. Then he needs to make it someone's primary duty to get it done and I think that someone is the new deputy J4. Make the deputy J4 personally responsible for ITV. Then we have to proceed like we did with the VISA. We have to make a focused, concentrated effort to bring all the parties together to get the issues resolved. We may not have the authority and power to bring them all together, but I think we can force that issue by getting someone of the proper level to chair a committee to get it done.

Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center and Systems Migration

Dr. Matthews: Am I correct in assessing our systems migration initiative to be one of the most important contributions USTRANSCOM can make to efficiency and effectiveness of DTS?

General Wykle: Yes. I think our systems migration has the potential to have as much or more impact on the DTS as anything we are doing or have done. It is information technology, information warfare. It's leveraging technology to generate information enabling us to be more efficient, more effective, all the things we have been talking about.

Dr. Matthews: In a related question, do you think the CIM [Corporate Information Management] process and JTCC would survive a change in administration? Does this initiative cross parties?

General Wykle: I think it would survive a change in administration in Washington. What will kill the CIM Center process is poor results. If they don't earn their money, if they don't generate savings and efficiencies equal to that which the process is costing us, it will die of its own weight. The potential is there to do great things. But you get tied up in this bureaucracy again and interservice debates and discussions and the lack of resources to carry through on the great plans and then you will lose credibility over time.

Dr. Matthews: You mentioned briefly earlier in the interview the problems we had starting up the JTCC. Care to elaborate?

General Wykle: From the very beginning we had a real struggle getting it resourced. We don't have the manhours to put against the

problems to find solutions. If you accept that premise that we are not as robust as perhaps we should be, and we could do more with more resources--which is a common response to many things--then OSD has been supportive. They have championed our cause. They have given us resources within the construct. USTRANSCOM has been held up time and time again as an example of how to do the CIM process. We have had great support in terms of proposal approvals.

There is a bump in the road right now: securing resources to fund migration systems that are outside the Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation, DBOF-T. It's a common struggle with the services to get them to put in their programs the money necessary to modify their systems to be compatible with other migration systems. The services have a challenge. They have more requirements than they have dollars for, as is always the case. So which ones don't get funded? We don't want ours to fall out. So that's the battle Colonel Lewis has to fight day-to-day.

Intelligence

Dr. Matthews: Would you give some examples of how our intel[ligence] folks have contributed to our operational successes?

General Wykle: They have done a good job in terms of getting us almost real time intelligence from the other CINCs and the national intelligence agencies, which we then use to brief our aircrews, sometimes even when they are en route. They've done a lot of good work in coordinating with the other CINCs. What comes to mind immediately is their interaction with EUCOM [United States European Command] in the

Rwanda and Bosnia operations. Again, our J2 provided us near real time photographic support--overhead reconnaissance and other information--during recent ops in the CENTCOM [United States Central Command] AOR [area of responsibility]. We were able to see the airfields, the seaports, and the piers and the distances between the piers and the marshaling areas at these and other trouble spots before we ever had to go in there.

Haiti is a great example. We got some good overhead shots of Haiti. We knew what the piers looked like. We knew what the constraints were. Intel really helped us match ships to the requirements.

I think the fusion center concept is good. The four parts of intel are collect, analyze, produce, distribute, and you have to do that all in a very timely manner for it to be useful to the warfighter. The JICTRANS [Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation] is the right type of organization to meet our requirements. The most difficult piece I think is analysis. There is so much information that after awhile analysts keep seeing similar type indicators. How do you pick out what is important, the key information for the decision maker? Tough work.

Systems

Dr. Matthews: How would you assess our teleconferencing capability and the system's potential?

General Wykle: We have great capability, better than any place I have ever been, in terms of redundant systems. Our people have easy access to the system in this building, Building 1700, and AMC Headquarters. My past experience has been one studio on a base or installation. I also think our desktop video is a great system. We are expanding it right now to increase access. It has tremendous potential, but we don't use it enough or necessarily in the right ways.

Dr. Matthews: Are you and the rest of the key staff here at TRANSCOM using the CINC's Decision Support System [CDSS]?

General Wykle: I am not. It's not mature enough and it's somewhat cumbersome. Perhaps I'm overly blunt on this issue, but we are not making the progress we should be making on it. So, I think our decision makers have lost interest in it. I recently discussed the issue with our new J6. I told him he needs to get his arms around it. We need to get that program on track and bring it to maturity.

Dr. Matthews: With JOPES/GCCS [Global Command and Control System] in the transitional stage, are you confident that if we had a major regional contingency today the system would be capable of execution planning?

General Wykle: No, I'm not. We haven't fully converted to GCCS yet. In fact, it's down at this very moment. We need it today for a real world situation and it's not up and running. If this

contingency grows, we will have some difficulties. Can we get by? Yes, we can get by. But the question was “Am I confident?” and I have to say “No, I am not confident.”

Dr. Matthews: At this point in time are we worse off then we were with a brand new JOPES at the beginning of Desert Shield/Desert Storm?

General Wykle: I can't really give you a good answer because I don't use the system every day. My feeling is that we are no worse off. But, I don't think we have made much progress since Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The intent is there. People are working at it. We are moving in the right direction, but my estimation is the system is just too slow.

Dr. Matthews: How can we improve our local area net?

General Wykle: The senior staff needs to make more use of it. The directors and the O-6s need to use it a lot and then they need to give feedback to the J6 so he can fix the bugs that they've found. I don't think glitches are being brought to the J6's level. They are being handled at a worker bee level. I don't have a problem with that unless the problems are persistent. There has to be some way to raise the visibility of repetitive problems so the J6 can take strong action to fix them.

To me, it becomes tiresome when I try to get to one of the components and can't. I just quit in frustration. And unfortunately I don't report it because I am busy. I am doing other things and I don't take the time to do what's right. I suspect that attitude is widespread.

Dr. Matthews: What other glitches have you encountered?

General Wykle: Getting off base, but sometimes I can't get to AMC either. Once or twice General Robertson and I have tried to pass traffic and it doesn't work.

Dr. Matthews: It doesn't get there or it takes too long?

General Wykle: It doesn't get there. Then we test the system and supposedly it works fine. So I don't think it's an operator problem. It's connectivity. Now having said that, it is a high-tech system, so it goes up and down and at any given time Murphy can show his hand.

Manpower and Personnel

Billet Distribution and Service Mix

Dr. Matthews: I would like to move to manpower and personnel issues. Is the command manned properly, both in total numbers and distribution by directorate, to perform its mission?

General Wykle: In total numbers we are probably about right. Distribution by directorates, I have some concerns there. I think J5 is a little too lean and stretched more than any other directorate. They have some big actions down there that take considerable effort. The J6 probably won't like this when he reads it, but intuitively, I think J6 is too big. They have too many people in terms of their workload and production. That's how I see it from my level. Now, they do a lot of things that are behind the scenes that never come to my attention so my comments may not be altogether fair. But I'll stick with my intuition: I think the J6 is too

large. The J5 is my primary concern. They carry a heavy load.

Dr. Matthews: Balance between the services across the directorates?

General Wykle: I think we are Air Force heavy.

Dr. Matthews: Still too blue?

General Wykle: Yes! You look at the percentages and the breakout. I don't think that's anyone's fault per se. It's the system. It goes back to the way we stood up TRANSCOM. We took manpower out of hide, dual-hatting positions with MAC [Military Airlift Command] to establish the command. It's analogous to the way we started the JTCC. The Air Force did their job. They stepped up to the bar. They provided the authorizations from in-house to man the organizations, and so it's out of balance. The other services haven't been willing to step up and fill those positions. I think the Air Force would like to reduce the number of Air Force positions in the joint commands. But the other services won't take up the slack. I think we also could better mix the services within directorates. I think we have an imbalance at the director level, too.

Dr. Matthews: Could you be more specific?

General Wykle: I think the J1 could be Air Force or Army. I think the J2 could be Army at the directorate level. The J8 could be another service. I especially think there needs to be one or two more Army directors. At our staff meeting I look around the table and see not one Army director there. I am the only Army officer at the directorate level or above. You

don't nominate at the colonel, O-6 level. You nominate at the flag officer level and if the services don't nominate, then you are kind of in a box. We have had that happen this rotation. The services that currently occupy the position nominate again for them and the other services do not. I called the Army and asked them to nominate, but they have a limited number of flag officers and a lot of billets to fill. So the mix is not right in my estimation. It's a tough nut to crack.

Joint Transportation Reserve Unit

Dr. Matthews: The JTRU reached maturity during your TRANSCOM tour of duty. Are there ways that you would improve the JTRU?

General Wykle: Yes. I think we have done a pretty good job in the Mobility Control Center [MCC], in the J3 area. But, I would like to see us do better at integrating the JTRU across the staff. I don't think we do a very good job of utilizing JTRU weekend training. I notice a lot of JTRU people going to and from the BX and the commissary and other places on base on weekends. That's my fault as much as anyone's. I think we can use them better. We just have to make a conscious effort to do that. We also need to make them more a part of USTRANSCOM by having them augment our functions day-to-day and/or on weekend/holiday duty when they are available to serve. Even though the JTRU is here augmenting the Center, they have little interaction with the rest of us. That's my perception.

Dr. Matthew: Is the JTRU commander properly aligned in peace and for war?

General Wykle: In peace, no. It's what he does when he's here. He focuses on the JTRU. He's here for weekend-type duties, so he doesn't perform his wartime function, which is to be the Chief of Staff for this command. I think he is properly aligned for wartime. I think there is a definite role for him in wartime to be the Chief of Staff and carry out that function and free up the DCINC to do DCINC-type duties. But we don't use him effectively at all during peacetime in that role. He is primarily devoted to training, taking care of people, and so forth.

Dr. Matthews: How could we change that?

General Wykle: It's the DCINC's responsibility. The DCINC needs to find a way to better integrate the JTRU Commander in the day-to-day scheduled operations. Now, you know past JTRU commanders' schedules varied considerably. One might be available for a week, another for a month, or another one for only a day. The previous commander, Admiral Seeley [Rear Admiral Jimmie W., USNR], was a commercial airline pilot, so his schedule was quite unpredictable. It was hard to lay out a definite schedule. He came here frequently enough. There was no problem with that. But it wasn't the same time every month or the same days of the week each time. I don't know about the current one. I just haven't talked to him specifically about what his schedule will be, because he's new. If there was a way to have him for longer periods, he could function as the Chief of Staff. Then he could at least get a feel for the paperwork and get more involved with the whole operation. Like the rest of us, he should practice in peace what he'll do in war.

Ready Mobility Force

Dr. Matthews: Do you have any concerns about our ability to prime the transportation pump in preparation for a major mobilization and deployment?

General Wykle: Yes. It's time again. We need early decisions. If we don't get decisions early enough, we will not be able to adequately prime the pump and therefore the deployment will be delayed while we get the en route infrastructure laid down. Yes, you can be doing some deployment during that period of time, but you're constrained or limited. So early decisions and response time are the biggest factors. By and large we have the required capability. We will encounter some rough spots and we'll have to do some workarounds.

Dr. Matthews: Is the Ready Mobility Force a pipe dream?

General Wykle: I don't think so. I think it's a right way to go. The plan has been scrubbed pretty good. It's about the right size. But we need a policy and the authority. Those are the two things that are missing in my estimation. If we get the policy completed, get the authority properly designated, then it can become a reality very quickly.

Promotion and Quality of Troops

Dr. Matthews: Looking at the promotion record for USTRANSCOM troops, has duty here been a help or a hindrance to them?

General Wykle: I have not seen a comparison of percentage points between all the services. I do see each board results. My perception is that it's basically neutral. I mean, if you come here as an

average or mediocre officer, you'll probably leave here that way. If you come here as a top quality person, you're going to leave here as a top quality person. I think that's true whether you're in your service or in a joint assignment. Those hard-charging individuals are going to do well wherever they are and those who are not are not going to be changed by an assignment at a particular location.

I see a lot of the fitness reports. I see a lot of action officers. And my perception is our directors are doing a very good job of calling it like it is. They are very fair to their people. I believe we are getting our fair share of promotions and selections for schools.

The area where there may be a weakness, and this is a tough one, is in the real senior grades, from colonel to general. I would like to see us get a general or two out of our current group of colonels. It may be Air Force one year, Navy or Army the next. But occasionally, we need to have an O-6 promoted to flag. We haven't since I've been here other than of course the CINC's dual-hat executive position. We need a director or one of the division chiefs promoted to flag. Now, that's not something we can necessarily control here. It's a function of the quality of individuals who come to us from the services and whether they are in the running when they get here. We can't make it happen once they arrive. But we can certainly help them once they arrive if they are already a contender.

Dr. Matthews: How would you compare the quality of USTRANSCOM troops to other troops you've commanded?

General Wykle: Excellent! I'm really very pleased and satisfied with the overall quality of the TRANSCOM personnel. It's as good or better than I've seen any place I've been. That's civilian as well as military.

Dr. Matthews: Has the drawdown of the US military force had any impact on that quality? Would you predict that it's going to have an impact?

General Wykle: From a theoretical standpoint, it should get better because, as you drawdown, those who leave the service are not as high a quality as those who are being retained. But we're to the point now in all the services that very good people are leaving. So, it's not a negative connotation for someone to leave. It's just an unfortunate fact we are now losing good people. We have a saying in the Army: "best qualified, fully qualified." There are lots of people fully qualified but they are not necessarily the best. That's a hard distinction.

Organizational Issues

Functional Analysis Team and Command Reorganization Initiative

Dr. Matthews: I want to move on now to organizational issues. You chartered a Functional Analysis Team, a cross-functional team, last spring to make recommendations for possible divestiture. Why did you set this process in motion?

General Wykle: I felt that we were perhaps doing functions that we shouldn't be doing. I felt the staff workload was at the max, so I wanted to identify functions that we could divest ourselves of to create capability to work on higher priority

projects. So I created the team to look at what we were doing and help prioritize our efforts.

Dr. Matthews: Are we moving out on any of those recommendations?

General Wykle: I don't know. I haven't tracked it. I didn't set up an IPR system. I turned it over to the directors and said "Okay, here is what we are doing, this is how it is grouped, look at it and consider divestitures." But, quite frankly, I think the directors are so overloaded right now that they really haven't had the time for a serious consideration of the report.

Dr. Matthews: It takes manpower and money to undertake divestitures so you can save money and time in the long run.

General Wykle: Right, it's Catch 22. The study is there for the directors' use. I am hopeful that maybe once we get through this summer surge that they will have time to go back and take a look at the Team's recommendations for possible divestiture.

Dr. Matthews: Should we bring it to the attention of General Smith [Lieutenant General Hubert G., USA, General Wykle's replacement at USTRANSCOM]?

General Wykle: I think it would be something worthwhile for him to do as he builds his background and base of knowledge this year. It may stimulate some thought.

Dr. Matthews: At your direction, and under your guidance, the command undertook a major internal reorganization between November 1993 and February 1994. What prompted that reorganization?

General Wykle: The CINC, General Fogleman. When I arrived, he told me that was my first project. The command had been in existence since 1987. It was basically structured as it was in 1987. He felt the world had changed. Certainly the charter of TRANSCOM had changed and so we needed to take a look at our organizational structure and make any adjustments that were appropriate. He purposely did not assign it to General Starling. He wanted the individual who was going to have to implement it and live with it to look at it.

Deliberate Planning and Global Transportation Network

Dr. Matthews: Probably the most dramatic change, certainly as far as manpower and functional responsibility go, was moving deliberate plans from J5 to J3. How has that worked?

General Wykle: From the J3 standpoint it has worked very well. It tied the deliberate planners to the operational planners, who do things day-to-day, and so those who plan it now have to execute it. From the J5 standpoint, it really reduced flexibility. They are extremely strapped manpower-wise down in J5. Deliberate plans had provided them some flexibility in terms of manpower that they could put on other projects when they were outside of the deliberate planning cycle. So, that organizational change has made life more difficult for J5.

Dr. Matthews: How would you assess the move of GTN [Global Transportation Network] from J3 into J6?

General Wykle: Looking back, I would probably not do that again. The move reduced my visibility over the organization and project and also decreased our attention to it. GTN is kind of buried in J6. But it was not of great consequence because, by the time the move took place, our emphasis was on contractor source selection. We weren't trying to improve the prototype. We weren't trying to fix problems with the prototype. I think the new DCINC will have to take a look at GTN alignment and ensure that he maintains visibility over GTN development.

***TCJ8, CINC's Initiative Team,
TCJ3/J4 Reorganization***

Dr. Matthews: Were there any of the other reorganization changes, and there were numerous smaller ones, that in particular worked out well?

General Wykle: We stood up the J8, making them a separate, stand-alone organization. I think that was really good for J8 morale, for their feeling of self-worth. They are now an equal partner with the other directorates. In general, I think the reorganization initiative and process helped bring the staff together. But, I am concerned about the J5. It has a lot of work and is a small organization, which is very stressful on its people.

Then there is the Congressional Liaison Office move from J8 to the CINC's Initiatives Team [CIT]. It was not part of our reorganization process. It was done outside the process, unknown to me. The CIT chief went directly to the CINC and got approval to take the liaison group from J8. That

caused some friction and hard feelings within the staff, which persisted until the participants rotated. The action was poorly handled. I think the jury is still out on where the liaison group should reside and, if in fact, there is need for a CINC's Initiatives Team.

I have discussed the Team's role with the Team's new leader. Right now, my perception is that the Initiatives Team is a mailbox. Taskers are provided to them but they just turn around and task the staff. There is no value added there. To me, the Initiatives Team needs to have the knowledge and capability to run actions on their own, do the research on their own, and provide the product on their own, not just task someone else to do it, then initial as it comes through the process. They need to be an objective, unbiased group that can go look at a problem and provide the CINC or myself with another view. They haven't been doing that very well, in my estimation. The liaison group is outside of that process, but they work for the same guy, so I told the new CIT chief his Team needs to provide more value added to the products and not just keep a mail room.

Dr. Matthews: Initially we discussed breaking apart the J3 and J4? Why did that fall off the table?

General Wykle: I don't remember any specific decision that caused it to fall off the table. I think it was just a general assessment. If we established a separate J4, it would be a small element without flag-level coverage. The consensus was it wasn't necessary and it wouldn't work.

***Direct Reporting Units, CINC Liaison
Officers, and Direct Reporting Elements***

Dr. Matthews: Are there any other organizational changes that you would recommend for consideration by General Smith?

General Wykle: Not within the headquarters. I think the headquarters is about right. Organizationally, we really need to focus now on the components and the Direct Reporting Units [DRUs], starting with the Defense Courier Service [DCS]. I think our DCS initiative is an important one, something deserving our best shot. I don't have any pre-conceived ideas there, but I believe that organization needs help. I also think our liaison structure with the CINCs needs close scrutiny and probably some consolidation of USTRANSCOM and component command offices. There is potential there for efficiencies and increased effectiveness. The structure is now under review as a result of our most recent commanders conference. My feeling is there is going to be a lot of resistance to consolidations. It is going to be hard to do because there will be reasons for keeping it as it is. But I honestly think we can do a lot better there. We need to have one voice speaking for TRANSCOM with the CINCs, and I think we need to look at having a variety of officers out there, not all Air Force. We need to have a joint team in our CINC liaison offices.

Additionally, DTS 2010 holds great promise for integrating component command functions to gain efficiencies and effectiveness. But at the headquarters, no. I don't think we should mess with the USTRANSCOM staff anymore, not until we have had time to let what we've already done to them shake out. I'm opposed to keeping the staff in organizational change and turmoil. We need to settle down now for a year or so and see what we have.

Dr. Matthews: You are saying the relationship that you have with the Direct Reporting Elements [DREs] is just fine?

General Wykle: Would you like to see it differently?

Dr. Matthews: No sir. It's great for me and I think Public Affairs [PA] and Information Management [IM] feel the same way.

General Wykle: The idea was to empower the Direct Reporting Elements to do more. You are senior folks. I wanted you to take charge of your areas and move out. You are responsible for your functional area and don't need an intermediate layer in there trying to micromanage you. From my standpoint, it is working fine.

TCJI Reorganization and Facilities Management Alignment

Dr. Matthews: Most recently, J1 reorganized. From your standpoint, do you see that working?

General Wykle: From where I sit, I haven't seen any change, one way or the other. But, having said that, the directors have told me that they like it, especially in regard to the J1's new customer focus, single-point-of-contact. I have also received positive comments from the Commander of our JTRU [Joint Transportation Reserve Unit]. So, the customer is giving me very positive feedback.

Initially, I received some negative feedback from the people within J1 who had to implement the reorganization. They felt it diluted the expertise within J1 among various teams, so that they lost some of the service flavor. But if you look at it from the standpoint of jointness, and what a joint

headquarters is all about, it is correct to do away with the service stovepipe in J1 and replace it with more joint teams.

One area in manpower and personnel still needs work: the civilian personnel process. We are still very, very slow in filling positions. We have been working on filling the Facility Manager position for at least eight months, and we still don't have one. It is extremely frustrating for the work force to see that process take so long. While the J1 might do more, it's primarily the bureaucracy.

Dr. Matthews: How can we realign the facilities function so our First Sergeant can concentrate on the enlisted force?

General Wykle: You know that's one of the issues we debated long and hard during our reorganization deliberations. I think a Facilities Manager, if we can get that individual hired, along with Gary [Barnstable], who's our facilities maintenance person, will go a long way to fix the problem. Then I think that individual should respond directly to the DCINC's XO [Executive Officer]. The Facilities Manager will be a high enough grade person to get the job done on his own in most cases, and then if he has a problem, he can go to the XO. The XO can be the conduit to and from the DCINC and CINC. But until we get the Facilities Manager, the Chief [Chief Master Sergeant Jeffrey M. Lewin, USAF, Command First Sergeant] will need to do the job. This should serve as an incentive to the Chief to expedite hiring of a Facilities Manager. I say this facetiously because I know how hard the Chief has worked to do just that.

Joint Secretariat and Paper Flow

Dr. Matthews: I think one of the great improvements during your time here is in paperwork flow. I connect that with the establishment of the Joint Secretariat.

General Wykle: Personally I think paperwork flow has improved significantly. I see this over and over again. A piece of paper can get to the Joint Secretariat, through me to the CINC, and back through me to the Joint Secretariat in the same day. That was unheard of when I first arrived here. Best case, it would take a week to get that done, sometimes two weeks.

The improvement is a result of several initiatives. First, through the reorganization we reduced layers. The Deputy Chief of Staff was one of those layers. Second, we stood up a Joint Secretariat, a team effort. Before, the CINC had an individual who was his administrative assistant, same with the DCINC, and there were several other administrative support personnel in the chain. It was terribly fragmented. So we pulled all that together and became a team of individuals who cover for each other when one of us goes on leave or gets sick. Thirdly, we established a suspense system and put an officer in charge of it. Before we had a Deputy Chief of Staff and an Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff but we had no one in charge of administration. So we eliminated those positions, reorganized the structure, removed layers and cut a 13-step process to about a 4-step process. I think it's doing extremely well. I don't think there is a joint headquarters any place that can move paper faster than we can.

Dr. Matthews: Is there any way we can tweak it, make it even better? Anything come to mind? Automation?

General Wykle: That's what I was thinking about when you asked the question. There might be in e[lectronic]-mail. We have a lot of small taskings, questions from the CINC or from myself that directors are responding to through the written suspense system. If we did more of that by e-mail, it would speed up the process and reduce the volume of paper flow. In the best of all worlds only the large documents, the studies and major analyses, would come through the system in paper. All the Q's and A's, as I would call them, would be handled by e-mail. That might be a way to improve it even more.

Dr. Matthews: Unless you work for an operation like this--a higher headquarters military organization--you likely don't understand the importance of moving paper. You can have the greatest minds in the world making decisions but if those decisions don't get out to the people--who have to implement them--in a timely manner, then you might as well have monkeys at the top.

General Wykle: We use a cliché that goes something like this: "incomplete--*not* incorrect or inaccurate--information on time is better than perfect information late." So, it's crucially important to move paper as fast as possible.

Move to Building 1700

Dr. Matthews: The proposal for us to move the whole command into one building, Building 1700, has picked up steam in the last few months. Why?

General Wykle: The primary driver is a base-wide desire to use facilities efficiently. Could we find ways to move people out of the old World War II buildings thus improving working conditions? Building 1961, where our J6 and JAG [Judge Advocate General] are located, is a controlled access building. All the space in there is not being utilized. If it was not a controlled building, additional people from around the base could move in, perhaps upgrading their working environment. So we are asking “How do we get the maximum number of people in the best facilities?” Then we ask “What can we do to facilitate that change?” We need to look for ways to create synergy by collocating all members of a staff under one roof. Well, Building 1700 is a building large enough for all of USTRANSCOM. AFC4A, [Air Force Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Agency] now in Building 1700, has downsized considerably over the last two years. They no longer have a requirement for that entire building. There are other activities operating on a temporary basis in 1700 and some others on a more permanent basis. They all don’t need to be under one roof. The small elements can move into smaller facilities and remain together. By moving out the smaller organizations you generate space for a larger organization to go in. The overarching goal: to better utilize the space on the base, to put the maximum number of people in the best possible number of facilities and, in doing so, gain efficiencies in synergy from locating like-organizations together.

Dr. Matthews: What are the main hurdles for us?

General Wykle: It has to be fiscally prudent. We certainly do not want to do anything that's not cost effective. So, we have to show savings from a standpoint of repair and maintenance on older buildings that we would no longer occupy and could then be torn down. Those people then move to a better space.

The other big hurdle is the communications requirement. USTRANSCOM's work is with far-flung organizations requiring massive C4 [command, control, communications and computer] systems. "What's the capability of 1700's communication infrastructure?" We are looking at the cost required to meet our C4 systems requirements in 1700, which will be crucial to our decision.

Dr. Matthews: Will our look at the fiscal aspects also include the cost of moving the people in that building elsewhere or are we primarily looking at what it will cost to move our stuff over there?

General Wykle: It will be the total cost for the move. We have to be careful that people understand what is the cost to make the move as compared to the cost that would be incurred anyway. A lot of money goes into repair and maintenance of these older buildings, just to keep the roofs from leaking and the heating and latrines working. There are some buildings over on the flightline that have to come down because they are in the flight safety area for the new airfield. That will be included in the total cost of the move so we can see the whole picture, but those costs will be incurred regardless of whether we move into Building 1700. We want to separate those costs. We want to be able to identify the costs directly associated with the move versus costs that would be incurred anyway.

Total Quality Management and Leadership

Dr. Matthews: I would like to move into the more personal area of our interview. Let's talk about Total Quality Management and leadership issues. How would you define your leadership style?

General Wykle: I have an eclectic leadership style. It's somewhat situational dependent. I mean, I vary it a little bit depending upon the situation, what's required. But I am clearly a Theory Y-type manager and leader. I believe that most everyone wants to

succeed and do what's right. They might need some guidance or direction, but they don't need to be degraded or beat up or threatened. I have somewhat of a non-directive approach. I think I coach, guide, and teach as opposed to making demands and dictating.

Dr. Matthews: In my opinion, when it comes to empowerment, you practice what you preach. You really mean it. It's not just rhetoric. You let us do our work and trust us to get it done right. Is there anything in your background in particular that led you to this management philosophy, any people in particular or books, or education that set you in that direction?

General Wykle: I think it's a combination of factors that led me in this direction. Part of it is my personality, which lends itself to an empowerment philosophy and style of leadership. Certainly my childhood, the way that I was raised played a role. I came from a blue collar family with a strong work ethic. It was a hands-on type family. So, I have a hands-on type leadership style. I get involved and get my hands dirty. I like to do it so I understand it.

Over the last fifteen years or so I've worked closely with quite a few general officers. I have had the opportunity to observe them and their leadership styles. I took the best from them and tried to apply it to myself. I have never been one to avoid stealing someone else's good idea and trying it on myself.

Probably the one experience that caused it all to come together, allowed me to assess myself and realize the type of

leader I was meant to be, was the US Army War College. When I was a student there in 1981, one of my projects was to write about a three-page paper on my leadership style. That forced me to stop, assess myself, and ask, “How do I lead? What kind of a leader am I? How do I go about getting people do to things that they may not want to do but need to be done?” That caused me to put my philosophy on paper. Then I began to refine it, flesh it out. I became much more sensitive to developing leadership qualities in myself and others because of that experience.

Dr. Matthews: The last couple of years the command has put a lot of time and energy into process action teams. What do you feel they have accomplished?

General Wykle: First of all, they caused us to stop and look at various processes, assess them, and evaluate them. Based on that, we have changed some processes. In doing so, we have become more efficient. One of the best examples, which we discussed earlier, is the paper flow process. The process action team determined that a piece of paper landed in over a dozen in-boxes in the command section before it ever got to the CINC. We changed that process and we became much more efficient and timely because of it.

Dr. Matthews: What else have we done at USTRANSCOM to make quality part of the culture?

General Wykle: We have focused on quality, advertised it, championed it, and made people aware of it. I take advantage of most speaking opportunities to emphasize that we are on a quality “journey.” Quality is not a destination. You are always

working for improvement. Certainly our training classes, and Executive Quality Council have helped institutionalize quality in the command and made our employees sensitive to its principles.

Dr. Matthews: What do you recommend that we do to keep the momentum?

General Wykle: First, talk about it. Keep the visibility up. Keep marketing it. Keep reinforcing the fact that we will never be finished with it. But we also need to emphasize success along the way and that should be reinforcement and motivation to continue the journey. Second, we need to continue with the quality training and other programs that Pam Williams [Pamela O., Technical Director, TCJ1] has initiated over the last year to 18 months: the Seven Habits Course, the Quality Awareness Course, and the Quality Awards. All of those things serve to institutionalize the quality movement within the command. Third, over the next two to three years, we need to follow through on several initiatives outlined at the last executive board meeting: metrics, empowerment, customer focus, and quality of life. We are trying to refine them now, but we really need to get them implemented and then start getting feedback to further refine them and thus institutionalize them.

Dr. Matthews: How do you, personally, determine the state of troops' morale?

General Wykle: It's difficult to do. It's fleeting. It can change on you rapidly. I try to assess morale by observing, by listening to what individuals are saying around the coffee machine, or in the snack bar, or more formal forums. The quality of work

that comes to me tells me a lot about morale. And our annual surveys are guides. I take all of those indicators and put them together, giving me, I think, a very good feel for morale.

Dr. Matthews: Has our Vision Express been a success?

General Wykle: It's hard for me to answer. It's not often raised to my level and I haven't seen anything on it lately. When I first arrived here, there was a lot of frustration with Vision Express because people wanted to use it as a suggestion box. It was not and is not a suggestion program. It is more of a quality-type program to provide timely feedback to individuals so they will know what action was taken and what improvements were made. I guess by saying I haven't heard any negatives on it, I haven't heard anything to indicate that we are having difficulty with it, I would make the assumption that it is working pretty good right now.

Dr. Matthews: How would you assess the command's morale as you are walking out the door?

General Wykle: I think the morale is pretty good across the board. But, as I said, it is fleeting. It could change rapidly. My sense is that it's starting to slide. Looking at some of those indicators I just mentioned to you, I get the feeling that there is a lot of frustrations at the action office level. These past few months have been pretty stressful within the command. Unless we can change that fairly soon, I think the morale is going to take a sharp turn downward.

Dr. Matthews: Some people around here are working as hard now as they did in the CAT [Crisis Action Team] during Desert

Shield/Desert Storm. There's not a lot of surge energy left for a real world contingency.

General Wykle: Right, I sense that, too. That's why I say I think morale has peaked. It's stressful around here right now. I am sensitive to that. I knew that. I haven't figured out how to change it significantly. I am working at it.

Dr. Matthews: Have we, USTRANSCOM, honestly assessed ourselves? What do our customers really think of us?

General Wykle: I think the answer is "Yes, I think we have honestly assessed ourselves." Using the Malcolm Baldrige criteria in our assessment was good for us, but the results are, like morale, tentative and fleeting. There are peaks and valleys and the answers move around on you. It's a constant challenge to assess where you are and make the refinements and adjustments as you move through the days, weeks, and months. It is very situational dependent.

What do our customers think about us? It varies with the customer. I think from the unified CINCs' standpoint, for the most part, we are doing extremely well. I think ACOM was exceptionally pleased with our support for Haiti. The Brits were, I think, extremely pleased with our support during Quick Lift [Peacekeepers to Bosnia]. I think, if you took a survey at EUCOM, you might find some concerns. We are probably not perceived to be up to the standard that EUCOM would like for us to be. Part of the problem is personality driven which is unfortunate, so we have to work harder in that area to demonstrate our capabilities. Quick Lift increased our credibility over there,

and we just recently flew a very short-fused mission into EUCOM AOR. We had to deliver about 100,000 pounds of rations over a weekend. We did that very quickly. We were very responsive for EUCOM. Still, I think EUCOM is the command we need to work hardest on.

Dr. Matthews: What must we do in the near term and the long term to become a truly world-class quality organization?

General Wykle: In addition to what we have already discussed, we need to continually ask ourselves what product or service are we providing? It can be a staff summary sheet, talking paper, a study, a briefing. Whatever the product or service, its owner or owners need to dissect it. Then they need to determine if they are organized to execute that process to provide the product? What's the leadership, who's in charge, who's bringing it all together and coordinating? The last element then is commitment. How committed are we as individuals and as an organization to providing a quality product or service? I think if you look at it in those pieces, then we will start to institutionalize the quality movement much more than we are doing now. Then we have to practice it. Every one of us has to practice it every day and we have to demonstrate that we believe in the quality movement.

Next we use the tools to determine how well we are doing. That means metrics, customer surveys, empowerment, and recognizing quality work and quality performance. It is rewarding people for doing a great job. It doesn't necessarily mean hanging a medal on them. It doesn't necessarily mean giving a monetary award. There are other ways to recognize individuals for good deeds. We

have an entire spectrum of ways to recognize quality work. I think when you do all of those things, then you really have a world class quality organization. But it's a journey. It's constant, never ending.

Dr. Matthews: When did you start that journey?

General Wykle: I don't know.

Dr. Matthews: Isn't there a point in time for you?

General Wykle: I quite frankly don't know.

Dr. Matthews: An instance?

General Wykle: I guess I really started focusing on quality improvement in about 1985. I read In Search of Excellence [*In Search of Excellence: Lessons From America's Best-Run Companies*, Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., Warner Books, 1984] and began applying its methods to command in Europe, Japan, Korea, and at Fort Eustis [Virginia]. I brought that bag of tricks to Scott [Air Force Base, Illinois] with me and melded it with the movement already underway at TRANSCOM.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any other books you would add to the TQM [Total Quality Management] reading list?

General Wykle: The Five Pillars of TQM [*The Five Pillars of TQM: How to Make Total Quality Management Work For You*, Bill Creech, Dutton-Truman Talley, 1994] by General Creech is a very good book. I would recommend that as a good starting point. The Goal [*The Goal*, Eliyahu M. Goldratt and Jeff Cox, North River Press, Inc., 2d edition, 1992] is good from

a business perspective. I also recommend Reengineering the Corporation [*Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution*, Michael Hammer and James Champy, HarperCollins Books, 1993].

Dr. Matthews: I see you as the guru of TQM at TRANSCOM. When you leave, who will pick up the baton?

General Wykle: My guess would be General Begert [Major General William J., USAF]. He is a quality-oriented individual, the one who should pick up the baton and work with the quality office to keep us going on the quality journey. That would be my guess. What do you think?

Dr. Matthews: General Begert would certainly be a likely candidate. He brought me into the program, granted kicking and screaming, when he was our Chief of Staff.

Conclusion

Dr. Matthews: Is Goldwater-Nichols [Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986] working in the best interest of national defense? Has it gone too far in any direction?

General Wykle: I think it's working great. It's working in the interest of national defense. You look at the Panama, Persian Gulf, and Haiti operations and compare them to Grenada, the disconnects in that operation between communications and between the services. You hear fewer and fewer of those types of stories.

I don't think we've gone too far. In fact, I think we're going to go a lot farther in the joint arena. I think that as young majors and lieutenant colonels, who are now getting experience in joint assignments, go back to their services and other joint assignments, and eventually become flag officers, they'll develop a truly joint culture in our armed services.

Dr. Matthews: How has USTRANSCOM contributed to jointness in DOD?

General Wykle: The very nature of our business contributes to jointness. We demonstrate jointness through our daily support and our contingency support. We are the central point of contact for strategic lift--air, land, sea; Air Force, Army, Navy--for the unified CINCs. Our contribution to jointness is readily apparent at the OSD and Chairman's [Joint Chiefs of Staff] level during exercises and as operations unfold.

Dr. Matthews: Which of your accomplishments at USTRANSCOM are you most proud of and why?

General Wykle: I don't know if I can single one out, but I guess I would start with DTS 2010 and strategic planning. I shepherded those two initiatives along. I didn't lead the efforts, but I kept them on track. I was the sounding board, the overseer. I think they have the potential to significantly impact the command over time.

I am very proud of the work we did with the JTCC. That was kind of my baby, to get the organization stood up, get it resources, put someone in charge, get it off of dead center and moving out. I was either going to ensure it moved out or I would kill it.

I am also proud of the reorganization that occurred in early 1994 based on our study in the fall of 1993. As I mentioned to you earlier, there are a few weak spots in that reorganization, but overall I think it was the right thing to do.

We have already talked about another one: Quality. I think we have done a tremendous amount in the last two years in the quality movement, and most recently, VISA, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, which the maritime CEOs agreed to on the 16th of August [1995]. That has great potential. My hope is that in ten years VISA will be considered as important and successful as CRAF. I am proud to have been here at TRANSCOM in the embryonic stages of projects that hold great potential for the future.

Dr. Matthews: While at USTRANSCOM, what was your toughest task and why?

General Wykle: My toughest, ITV, Intransit Visibility, and why is because it hasn't been successful. I don't think I have moved that one an inch. I know there has been movement but, figuratively speaking, it's moved a very small distance since I have been here. That has been perhaps my most frustrating experience. It has been stymied by bureaucracy.

Dr. Matthews: If you had more time, money or people while at TRANSCOM, what else would you have liked to do?

General Wykle: I would liked to have finished ITV. I would like to have found ways for technology to work more for us. Technology could allow us to centralize our command and control in our MCC like the big boys now run their shows at CSX,

Schneider and FEDEX. That is our vision in DTS 2010. We have the capability within our reach today to have real-time visibility and tracking of every USTRANSCOM asset, organic and charter. So if I had more time, people and money I'd use it to bring ITV technology to the command.

Dr. Matthews: What are USTRANSCOM's greatest weaknesses and its greatest strengths?

General Wykle: Across the board, I think the quality of the people here is superb and that's a real strength for this command. I think the weakness of the command is still fragmentation between the component commands. That's a major challenge, trying to bring them together in a more synergistic manner. I don't mean that in any negative way. Everyone is working hard to do the best they possibly can. But in some way we have to get more synergy out of the components by bringing them together under the TRANSCOM umbrella. That will make the whole greater than the sum of its parts. It will make the DTS more efficient and effective.

Dr. Matthews: Can you share with us any advice that you have given to your successor, General Smith?

General Wykle: Much of it he'll read about in this oral history, but first of all, whenever we have our office call, I'm going to talk to him about the people. I'll tell him he needs to have confidence in the people and their abilities to get the work done. He needs to empower them to go and get the work done. He should avoid, to the best of his ability, micromanaging the people. Give general guidance and be patient. I'll tell him that part of the role of the DCINC is to

be a stabilizing force for the command. While he certainly needs to be responsive to the CINC, National Command Authorities, and whoever he is responding to, at the same time he needs to keep an even hand on the wheel and empower his people to go get things done. It's a cliché, but appropriate: "nose in, hands off."

Dr. Matthews: Would you give us your heart-felt assessment of this assignment?

General Wykle: It's been great. It really has. I have enjoyed it. I certainly have a great feeling of satisfaction in our people's accomplishments. I learned a lot from both of the CINCs that I have worked for, just like I have learned from other individuals I have worked for. I really love St. Louis. I think it's a great city. I regret that I haven't taken advantage of more of the opportunities it presents. The tour has been very rewarding for my family. And, as you know, my wife nearly completed her Ph.D. here. All her course work is done and she needs now only to write her dissertation. Her research is well underway. So, we both will look back on this assignment with very good memories. It's been very good for us.

Dr. Matthews: Are you going to follow Mary's career now?

General Wykle: Yes. I've told her I will follow her wherever she may go. She did that for me.

Dr. Matthews: You have nothing specific lined up for you then that you can share with us?

General Wykle: I have nothing specific lined up. I really haven't had time to think much about it. I have had a couple very low-level inquiries, but nothing where people have said "come interview with me" or anything like that.

Dr. Matthews: Where will I find you to send you the manuscript?

General Wykle: Washington, D. C., Burke, VA.

Dr. Matthews: Anything else you would like to state for the record before we turn off the recorder, sir?

General Wykle: I would say to everyone in TRANSCOM, remember your mission. Continually ask yourselves "What are we here for?" and "How well are we doing?" I would tell them don't get so wrapped up in the day-to-day business that you can't find time to think long-term. Ask "What programs do we need to sustain the capability that we currently have today?" "How do we keep them on course?" We have to look to the future so that those who come after us will have the capability to carry out the mission.

I want once more to register my concern about the direction our commercial airline industry is taking. With deregulation, with competition, with the emphasis on the bottom line, I think the nature of that industry is changing. There is more partnerships with foreign carriers. There's more code sharing. It's certainly market

oriented. Over time they may go the way of our maritime industry, where we have a significant reduction in the number of US flag carriers. We can't afford to lose our nation's long-range international commercial airlift capability, which we must tap for contingencies and wartime operations. As a nation, we need to be sensitive to that industry's changing nature and do everything we can to maintain a strong, viable airline industry for this country. It is critical to our national security.

Biography

Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle is Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

General Wykle was born in Ronceverte, West Virginia, on 20 October 1941. Upon completion of the Reserve Officers Training Course at West Virginia University in 1963, he was commissioned a Regular Army Second Lieutenant of Field Artillery and awarded a bachelor of science degree. He also holds a master of arts degree from Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana. His military education includes completion of the Field Artillery Officers Basic and Transportation Officers Advance courses, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

He has served in a variety of key command and staff positions. Command positions include: Commanding General, U.S. Army Transportation Center and Fort Eustis, Fort Eustis, Virginia; Commanding General, 19th Support Command, Camp Henry, Republic of Korea; Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan/IX Corps, Camp Zama, Japan; Commander, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Support Command, Bad Kreuznach, Germany; Commander, 68th Transportation Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado; Commander, Felixstowe Outport, United Kingdom Terminal, Felixstowe, England; and commander of transportation companies. Staff positions include: Battalion Executive Officer, 159th Transportation Battalion, Cat Lai, Republic of Vietnam; Staff Officer, Strategic Mobility Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, 21st Support Command, Kaiserslautern, Germany; and Director, Combat Service Support Directorate, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

General Wykle's awards and decorations include the Army Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), Meritorious Unit Commendation, National Defense Service Medal, Vietnam Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon (with Numeral 4), and Vietnam Campaign Medal.

He assumed the rank of lieutenant general on August 12, 1993.

He is married to the former Mary Olver of Charleston, West Virginia, and they have three children: Scott, John Paul and Carson.

(Current as of August 1993)

Glossary

ACOM	[United States] Atlantic Command
AFC4A	Air Force Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Agency
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
BG	Brigadier General
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure Commission
BX	Base Exchange
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CDSS	CINC's Decision Support System
CENTCOM	[United States] Central Command
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
CIT	CINC's Initiatives Team
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DBOF-T	Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DCS	Defense Courier Service
DOD	Department of Defense
DRU	Direct Reporting Unit
DTS	Defense Transportation System
EUCOM	[United States] European Command
FEDEX	Federal Express
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GSA	General Services Administration
GTN	Global Transportation Network
IM	Information Management
IPR	In-Progress Review
ITV	Intransit Visibility
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JDTC	Joint Deployment Transportation Center
J1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate
J2	Intelligence Directorate
J3/J4	Operations and Logistics Directorate
J5	Plans and Policy Directorate
J6	Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate
J7	Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Joint Staff

J8	Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate
JICTRANS	Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation
JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JTCC	Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center
JTRU	Joint Transportation Reserve Unit
MAJCOM	Major Command
MCC	Mobility Control Center
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	Public Affairs
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
RMB	Resource Management Board
RO/RO	Roll-On/Roll-Off
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
TCC	Transportation Component Command
TDY	Temporary Duty
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TQM	Total Quality Management
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
XO	Executive Officer

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