

# **FM 3-13**

## **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES**

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# Inform and Influence Activities

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## Preface

Field manual (FM) 3-13 provides doctrinal guidance and directions for conducting inform and influence activities (IIA) and discusses the importance of information in operational environments. It describes the Army's view of how IIA aid the commander to gain an advantage through information. It develops the other principles, tactics, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrinal publications.

The publication does not address every information-related capability commanders can use to help shape their complex operational environments. It should, however, generate introspection and provide just enough guidance to facilitate flexibility and innovative approaches for commanders to execute the art of command to inform and influence. It also provides guidance to the staff to conduct IIA to achieve the desired effects that support the commander's intent and objectives. Commanders designate an information-related capability and are only limited by available resources.

The principal audience for FM 3-13 is commanders and staffs at all echelons of command, Army civilians, and government contractors.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

FM 3-13 implements standardization agreement (STANAG) Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3 (B).

FM 3-13 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-13 is the proponent publication (the authority) have an asterisk (\*) in the glossary. Definitions for which FM 3-13 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

FM 3-13 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGWU), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

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# Introduction

The lessons learned by tactical and operational formations have caused changes in information operations during the past decade. The 2003 version of FM 3-0 described information operations as “shaping operations.” The 2008 version of FM 3-0 then introduced the five information tasks as how the Army conducts information operations that were “complementary information operations to both inform a global audience and to influence audiences within the operational area; it is a weapon against enemy command and control and is a means to affect enemy morale.” Additionally, the command and control warfighting function was “the primary integrator of information tasks...to shape the operational environment throughout the operations process.” ADRP 3-0 (which superseded FM 3-0) refined the elements of combat power so the mission command warfighting function includes two staff tasks—conduct IIA and conduct cyber electromagnetic activities—as well as additional tasks of conducting military deception and information protection. Operations security remains in the protection warfighting function. ADRP 3-0 defines IIA.

Executing information-related capabilities is the responsibility of various specialists. The Army information operations officer (functional area 30 through the command’s IIA section) serves as the integration specialist. The IIA staff officer is responsible for the plan to achieve the commander’s intended effects and is the primary integrator for holistic effects in the information environment. The IIA section maintains a close relationship and coordination with all information-related capability specialists and other staff sections. The IIA section and staff plan, coordinate, and synchronize the designated information-related capabilities’ actions through the operations process into the commander’s operation plan.

The Army continues to support the newly adopted Secretary of Defense and joint definition for *information operations*—the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 1-02). The Army recognizes the importance of information as an operational variable of an operational environment. The major contribution of IIA is to gain advantage in the information environment for the commander. Operating in today’s complex environment requires commanders and their staffs to enable and support joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to protect and reassure populations and isolate and defeat enemies. Although the Army has developed IIA and cyber electromagnetic activities as mission command staff tasks, their roles in the information effort support both information operations and strategic communication. This integration serves as economy of force to gain advantage in the information environment and to reduce the risk of information fratricide. The holistic approach of IIA in the information environment reflects the joint construct of the information-influence relational framework so that its approach is holistic, or addresses the entire information environment simultaneously rather than just one specific environment. Today’s global information and communications environment means that messages and actions delivered to one audience also reach other audiences.

The Army’s concept of IIA is the integration of information-related capabilities that informs and influences audiences simultaneously. This concept, very similar to the joint’s information-influence relational framework, supports the national strategic communication effort and information operations tasks to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries. The Army functional area (FA) 30 officer is responsible for integrating information-related capabilities to inform and influence when operating at brigade through Army Service component command headquarters. The FA 30 is also responsible for integrating information-related capability to inform, influence, disrupt, corrupt, usurp, and protect when operating at a joint headquarters.

Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which FM 3-13 is proponent have been added, rescinded, or modified for purposes of this publication. See introductory tables 1 and 2 on page v, and introductory table 3 on page vii. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms.

**Introductory Table-1. New Army terms**

<i>Term</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
information-related capabilities	New term and definition.
Soldier and leader engagement	New term and definition.

**Introductory Table-2. Rescinded Army terms**

<i>Term</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
computer network exploitation	Rescinded.
computer network operations	Rescinded.
IO assets	Rescinded.
IO capabilities	Rescinded.
IO cell	Rescinded.
IO concept of support	Rescinded.
physical destruction	Rescinded.



Introductory Table-3. Modified Army terms

<i>Term</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
deceive	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
degrade	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
deny	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
detect	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
disinformation	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
disrupt	No longer formally defined. See FM 3-90.
exploit	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
feedback	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
information fratricide	Modified.
influence	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
IO mission statement	No longer formally defined.
IO objectives	No longer formally defined.
IO resources	No longer formally defined.
IO tasks	No longer formally defined.
IO vulnerabilities	No longer formally defined.
IO vulnerability assessment team	No longer formally defined.
protect	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
misinformation	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
respond	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
restore	Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.

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## Chapter 1

# Construct of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter defines inform and influence activities. It also discusses each action in the definition and considerations of inform and influence activities.

## INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES DEFINED

1-1. *Inform and influence activities* is the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking (ADRP 3-0).

## INTEGRATE INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

1-2. All assets and capabilities at a commander's disposal have the potential to be used to inform and influence selected audiences to varying degrees. **Information-related capabilities are capabilities, techniques, or activities employing information to effect any of the three dimensions within the information environment to generate an end(s).** (See JP 3-13 regarding information operations.) Designated information-related capabilities that support inform and influence activities (IIA) and its lines of effort typically include, but are not limited to, public affairs operations, military information support operations (MISO), combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs operations, civil and cultural considerations, operations security (OPSEC), and military deception. Additionally, other capabilities the commander may allocate—components of cyber electromagnetic activities, special technical operations, presence, posture and profile, physical attack, and physical security—are capabilities not solely designed to inform or influence, but may help in achieving effects and mission objectives. Success depends on commanders and staffs effectively employing all available operational assets to best shape the information environment. (See Chapter 2 for information environment definition.)

1-3. Commanders at all echelons lead IIA as part of unified land operations. They apply IIA during the conduct of decisive action: offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities. Defense support of civil authorities' tasks can employ information-related capabilities to enable federal, state, and local responders in informing the domestic populations affected by natural or man-made disasters.

## SYNCHRONIZE THEMES, MESSAGES, AND ACTIONS WITH OPERATIONS

1-4. Commanders synchronize messages and actions with overarching themes in operations to inform and influence audiences in their area of operations and area of interest. Audiences include groups, organizations, and individuals. Commanders ensure overarching themes and their supporting messages and actions are consistent in their intent and communicated to the lowest level of command. Synchronization of messages and actions promotes and shapes the attitudes and behaviors of the audiences in the area of operations while affecting adversary or enemy information efforts. Synchronization of consistent messages and actions supports the commander's operational goals and avoids contradiction and information fratricide. **Information fratricide is the result of employing information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.**

1-5. Soldiers' actions powerfully influence the credibility of IIA. Visible actions coordinated with carefully chosen, credible words influence audiences more than uncoordinated or contradictory actions and words. All audiences—local and regional as well as adversary and enemy—compare the friendly force's message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the success of friendly operations by building trust and credibility. Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose credibility. Loss of

credibility makes land forces vulnerable to enemy and adversary information or countermessaging and places Army forces at a disadvantage. Aligning information-related capabilities with the overall operation ensures that messages are consistent with the forces' actions to amplify the credibility of those messages. It is paramount that inform and influence efforts complement not contradict. Failing to do so jeopardizes credibility.

## **INFORM**

1-6. The IIA section coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates the information-related capabilities application to accomplish the directed mission. Commanders have responsibility to conduct public affairs operations that inform U.S. audiences about their military operations to the fullest extent possible. Using information-related capabilities such as public affairs, MISO, civil affairs operations, and others enables the commander to also inform foreign audiences and to provide Army support to strategic communication. Commanders balance informing audiences about Army operations with the responsibility to protect those operations and their troops through OPSEC.

## **INFLUENCE**

1-7. IIA enable commanders in integrating and synchronizing the various means of influence to support operations. U.S. forces strictly limit their influence activities to foreign audiences. Influence activities typically focus on persuading selected foreign audiences to support U.S. objectives or to persuade those audiences to stop supporting the adversary or enemy. To accomplish operational objectives effectively, commanders may direct efforts to shape, sway, or alter foreign audience behaviors.

## **INFORM DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL AUDIENCES**

1-8. Federal laws and military regulations require U.S. forces to inform domestic audiences of their operations, programs, and activities. The global expanse of the information environment and technology enables news reports and analyses to rapidly influence public opinion and decisions concerning military operations. In addition to the domestic audience, commanders understand the imperative to keep other audiences, including interagency and multinational partners, allies, and international organizations, informed of their operations as well. They understand that truth and transparency can mitigate the impact that adversaries and enemies have when seizing on negative news stories and exploiting information to their advantage through their own information activities.

1-9. IIA support the commander's objectives through public communications to provide an accurate and informed portrayal of operations. Public communications include news releases, public service announcements, and press conferences among others. Audiences receive these messages best through the actions and words of individual Soldiers. To gather such personal information, units embed media personnel into the lowest tactical levels, ensuring their safety and security. Public communications foster a culture of engagement in which Soldiers and leaders confidently and comfortably engage the media as well as other audiences.

1-10. Homeland security and defense support of civil authorities' task can require Army information-related capabilities to enable federal, state, and local responders with informing domestic audiences of security and disaster response efforts. Units can apply information-related capabilities—such as MISO with its organic broadcast and print capabilities—to extend the reach of civil authorities in isolated disaster areas.

## **INFLUENCE FOREIGN AUDIENCES**

1-11. Victory depends on a commander's ability to shape, sway, and alter foreign audience perceptions, and ultimately behavior, especially in the area of operations. Commanders rely on IIA planning and employ information-related capabilities to unify perceptions and support effects to attain their desired end state.

1-12. MISO enable a commander to engage with and influence foreign populations in their language using media. Military information support staff officers and organic, attached, or supporting military information support units serve as a commander's resource for subject matter expertise on influencing foreign

populations. Synchronizing MISO with Soldier and leader engagement and other information-related capabilities creates a synergy that increases the effect of influence activities. In addition to MISO and other information-related capabilities, individual Soldiers influence specified foreign audiences. Soldiers communicate information through their actions, as well as through Soldier and leader engagements to achieve the commander's intent. When Soldiers' actions adhere to the rules of engagement and reinforce messages, they strengthen and increase trust and credibility. Leaders ensure Soldiers stay continually aware of current messages and consider them during conduct of operations and when engaging with the audiences in their area of operations. Through training and command information efforts, commanders empower Soldiers to influence foreign audiences significantly.

### **AFFECT ADVERSARY AND ENEMY DECISIONMAKING**

1-13. Achieving ultimate victory requires adversary and enemy decisionmakers—from the lowest to the highest levels—to capitulate to U.S. demands fully. IIA provide options for effective, economical, and most operationally advantageous means to affect their decisionmaking processes. These activities may affect those processes through messages and actions, including lethal means. Some messages and actions intend to create doubt from the individual level while others intend to deny an adversary or enemy force's ability to make timely and effective decisions.

1-14. Adversaries and enemies have proven adept at using information to gain a marked advantage over U.S. forces. Commanders may employ information-related capabilities to mitigate this advantage and gain the upper hand in the information environment. Effective IIA can affect the data, information, and knowledge adversary or enemy decisionmakers use through the employment of psychological, cyber electromagnetic, or physical actions that add, modify, or remove information from the information environment. Certain information-related capabilities affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates, processes, and stores information to support targeted decisionmakers, or they influence how audiences receive, process, interpret, and use data, information, and knowledge.

### **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES CONSIDERATIONS**

1-15. Unified land operations require commanders to consider what will affect their operational environments. Commanders lead IIA while considering the following: combat power, mission command, network enabled systems, themes, information management, knowledge management, legal considerations, and intelligence support. As an integration process, IIA help commanders with coordinating and synchronizing all information-related capabilities available to them and with requesting the support of external information-related capabilities, while accounting for the listed considerations in the operation plan.

### **COMBAT POWER**

1-16. Commanders consider how they will apply combat power. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0). Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. Combat power consists of eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The last six elements are established warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using the critical elements of leadership and information.

1-17. To help ensure mission success, commanders apply information as an element of combat power to shape and lead IIA in the three dimensions (cognitive, informational, and physical) of the information environment (see paragraphs 2-8 through 2-17). Commanders use information and actions to shape their information and operational environments to multiply the effects of friendly successes. Ultimately, commanders use information to create shared understanding and purpose throughout the area of operations, first in their own organizations and subsequently among all affected audiences. Information is critical to understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, assessing, and leading operations toward attaining the desired end state.

## MISSION COMMAND

1-18. Mission command requires commanders to lead and guide the use of information to inform and influence audiences whose actions may affect an operational environment. *Mission command* is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0).

1-19. Commanders also facilitate shared understanding and purpose, usually through the commander's intent and subsequent guidance. They conceptualize the desired messages to support overarching themes that unify activities and reinforce shared understanding. Commanders recognize and execute their critical role as key engagers through informing and influencing. Commanders ensure operational success by requiring Soldiers and leaders to communicate with people in their area of operations.

## THEMES, MESSAGES, AND ACTIONS

1-20. Commanders use their own themes and messages to support their narratives. Narratives are tied to actions in their operational environments and area of operations. A narrative is a brief description of a commander's story used to visualize the effects the commander wants to achieve in the information environment to support and shape their operational environments. An effective commander's theme supports overarching U.S. Government and higher headquarters themes, has details, and is tailored to environmental conditions in their area of operations.

1-21. Themes are planning tools that guide the development of the narrative, messages, and other information products (talking points, MISO objectives, and public affairs guidance). Themes represent the broad idea the commander wants to convey to the selected audiences. Themes are not communicated to the selected audiences, messages are. Themes are broad and enduring, and as such, they do not change frequently.

1-22. There are no IIA or information operations themes and messages, although MISO and public affairs have themes and messages to support their operations. The G-7 (S-7) may have to develop commander's themes and messages, but it does so in coordination with MISO and public affairs representatives.

1-23. Messages support themes. They can be verbal, written, gestured, or electronic communications that support a theme focused on an audience. They support a specific action or objective. Messages are tailored to specific audiences. Commanders use messages to communicate clear information and, if necessary, elicit a response or change in behavior. Messages are situation and mission dependent. Command information messages convey local commanders' policies and intent to their subordinates. The public affairs officer develops command information and public information messages. Public information messages convey information from host-nation officials to local target audiences through news, public-service information, and announcements. The public affairs officer develops these messages. Psychological messages convey specific information to selected foreign audiences to influence their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. The military information support planner or unit develops these messages. MISO messages and actions support themes established in the approved MISO program for that particular mission. (See JP 3-13.2 and FM 3-05.30 for detailed information on MISO.)

1-24. Commanders consider the perceptions and ramifications of their actions to gain and maintain support of populations in conflict areas. Commanders first understand host-nation laws and cultures, enabling them to operate more effectively in the information environment. Second, commanders determine how to inform audiences at home, gain support abroad, and generate support or empathy for the mission in their area of operations. By leading IIA, commanders ensure their staff is integrating all available information-related capabilities and other designated operational assets to support messaging and communications efforts, operational objectives, and the desired end state.

1-25. Commanders integrate and synchronize messages and actions with overarching themes and operations to inform or influence audiences in their area of operations and area of interest. Commanders use information to marginalize or defeat adversary or enemy information efforts by shaping the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences residing in the area of operations. Synchronized themes, messages, and

actions support the commander’s operational goals by integrating words, images, and deeds to avoid confusion or information fratricide.

1-26. Maneuver units at all echelons require consistent command themes and messages when conducting Soldier and leader engagements with the intent to inform or influence in their area of operations. Commands often rely on resources and assets to develop their command themes and messages that support their mission narrative and facilitate accomplishing their objectives or attaining their end state. Sometimes the G-7 (S-7) develops command themes and messages. The G-7 (S-7) verifies that the themes and messages support MISO themes and messages along with published public affairs guidance. Additionally, the G-7 (S-7) synchronizes command themes and messages with all operations to ensure actions, words, and images are all relevant, consistent, and mutually supportive.

1-27. The development of command themes and messages is a deliberate process that supports a commander’s lines of effort and objectives along each line. Themes and messages are two distinct elements with a developed theme guiding the development of supportive messages. Messages are further broken into separate talking points containing facts and sound bites informed by recent successes, accomplishments, and descriptors related to the theme and subordinate message conveyed (see figure 1-1). Target-audience vulnerabilities identified through MISO target audience analysis or other analytical means provide a way to direct messages effectively. The G-7 (S-7) develops messages after identifying vulnerabilities to optimize message and talking point development and effectiveness. As a guideline, the G-7 (S-7)—

- Limits each message to one thought.
- Keeps each message succinct.
- Keeps messages to a manageable number.
- Tailors messages for the means and method of delivery and the target audience.
- Conveys a story (the theme) by arranging the messages from first to last. The sum of the messages should then tell the story (or theme).
- Places the bottom line up front and summarizes at the end. The first message contains the most important thought.
- Considers developing “escape” messages that leaders and Soldiers can use to deflect conversations away from the MISO themes to avoid.




Figure 1-1. Message development flowchart

## LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-28. The planning and execution of specific information-related capabilities, and IIA in general, involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review, coordination, and approval. The U.S. constitution, U.S. laws, and international laws and agreements set boundaries and establish precedence for military activities in the information environment. Another country's legal basis and limitations for a military activity in the information environment may differ. U.S. forces conducting military activities in the information environment are subject to U.S. laws and policy. Although not legal experts, information-related capability specialists can ensure units follow, or at least address, established legal guidelines. (See JP 3-13 for discussion about legal support.)

1-29. In addition to standing authorizations, regulations, and laws, commanders and staffs account for other factors when considering the legal implications for specific information-related capabilities. Gaining new approval and authorization to use information-related capabilities and other supporting capabilities under certain conditions often proves a long, tedious, and manpower-intensive process. Commanders and staffs also consider perceptions of host nations or external audiences regarding the use of particular information-related capabilities as a hostile or intrusive action. Some domestic, international, criminal, and civil laws affect national security, privacy, and information exchange impact planning options. Commanders and staffs consider international treaties, agreements, and customary international laws. Lastly, they consider the effects of information-related capabilities on the structures and relationships among U.S. intelligence organizations and the overall interagency environment, including nongovernmental organizations.

## INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1-30. Planning functions for IIA depend on the intelligence warfighting function for three reasons. First, the intelligence warfighting function plans much of the Army's information collection that helps define the information environment and identifies potential audiences or physical targets for consideration. Second, intelligence provides real-time insight into the adversary or enemy use of information capabilities to its advantage or to counter friendly capabilities. Third, intelligence provides capabilities that support the collection of metrics for the assessment of effects.

1-31. IIA and information operations require intelligence support in all phases of the operations process. The G-7 (S-7) identifies gaps in information necessary for planning, execution, and assessment of effects on selected audiences to support operations. The G-7 (S-7) submits these requirements to the G-2 (S-2) as information requirements. The G-2 (S-2) incorporates them into the collection plan, and the G-3 (S-3) tasks the appropriate collection assets.



## Chapter 2

# Aspects of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter discusses the aspects of inform and influence activities. It first discusses inform and influence activities as an integrating activity with separate inform lines of effort and influence lines of effort. Then it discusses the information environment as commanders use inform and influence activities to accomplish their mission objectives. Next, the chapter addresses information operations and strategic communication. It has a discussion of decisive action. Lastly, it concludes with a discussion of stability operations.

### INTEGRATING ACTIVITY

2-1. The concept of inform and influence activities (IIA) brings together several separate functions of information-related capabilities that commanders designate to shape the information environment. Specialists with deep subject matter expertise (planners and operators) of each information-related capability integrate in their area of expertise and with other staff sections for execution coordination. The G-7 (S-7) IIA officer and section have responsibility to plan for and integrate *all* potential operational assets supporting IIA efforts. Based on assessments, this allows for message alignment, reinforcement, and consistency to support the overall concept of operations rather than individual events or missions. The G-7 (S-7) uses a line of effort to help focus an integration activity.

### LINES OF EFFORT

2-2. Two lines of effort contribute to IIA: the inform line of effort and the influence line of effort. The two lines allow the commander to employ information-related capabilities simultaneously through mission command to support unified land operations. These lines of effort enable commanders and staffs to apply the right capability or mix of capabilities to the right circumstance and audience to achieve synergy while ensuring statutory and regulatory compliance.

2-3. All activities in the information environment communicate in some way. They serve to make an impression on the minds of those that observe or hear those communications. Commanders and staffs distinguish the two lines of effort by the intention of the communicator and the message. Sometimes, a communication intended merely to inform might eventually lead to a changed opinion or behavior. A communication designed to influence may not achieve the desired outcome.

### INFORM LINE OF EFFORT

2-4. With the inform line of effort, the G-7 (S-7) focuses on providing information messages to domestic and global audiences that accurately describe operations or providing information pertinent to selected audiences in an area of operations. The G-7 (S-7) does not try to force a particular point of view on audiences, but rather provides them with facts so they can increase knowledge or make their own decisions. Providing credible, factual, and accurate information serves as the best means to counter false or misleading information disseminated by other information efforts. Maintaining transparency and credibility is paramount in the inform line of effort. Capabilities typically supporting the inform line of effort include public affairs, military information support operations (MISO), Soldier and leader engagement, and Army support to strategic communication. Capabilities such as combat camera, civil affairs operations, operations security (OPSEC), and cyber electromagnetic activities provide support for inform line of effort message execution.

## INFLUENCE LINE OF EFFORT

2-5. With the influence line of effort, the G-7 (S-7) aims to change the attitudes and behavior of foreign neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences to support the accomplishment of U.S., national, and joint operations area objectives. The influence line of effort guides selected audiences' behaviors to support objectives of U.S. commanders. Examples of influence objectives include misleading enemy decisionmakers or convincing enemy forces to surrender or cease their efforts. The influence line of effort also creates and strengthens relationships and encourages cooperation of foreign partners, civilians, and key leaders of operational foreign partners. Effective Army forces leverage relationships based on trust and mutual confidence, demonstrating how the Army provides added value to others' objectives. Capabilities that primarily support the influence line of effort include MISO and Soldier and leader engagement. Additionally, information-related capabilities—such as military deception, combat camera, civil affairs operations, OPSEC, and cyber electromagnetic activities—provide support to the influence line of effort. The influence line of effort is most closely associated with the information operations of joint operations and is adversary focused.

## INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

2-6. Some people think of the information environment as a new phenomenon. In fact, it has been present throughout history and has always been an important military consideration. With the advent of the Internet and widespread availability of wireless communications and information technology, this environment has become an even more important consideration to military planning and operations than in years past. Activities occurring in, through, or by means of the information environment have a consequential effect on an operational environment and can impact military operations and outcomes. Therefore, commanders and their staffs must understand their operational environments completely. This understanding includes the information environment and the potential impacts it can have on current and planned military operations.

## ELEMENTS OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

2-7. The *information environment* is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). Conceptually, the information environment encompasses both tangible (physical) elements and intangible elements (such as human ideas, fears, perceptions, and decisionmaking).

## DIMENSIONS OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

2-8. The information environment consists of the physical dimension, informational dimension, and cognitive dimension. See figure 2-1. Per its definition, an information-related capability is intended to use a dimension of the information environment to generate an end.

2-9. The physical dimension is composed of tangible elements such as telecommunications networks, information systems and infrastructures, satellites, broadcast facilities, meeting places, printed publications, billboards, flyers, statues, symbolic objects, organizations, groups, and people. In effect, tangible elements are the means and methods used to enable the flow of information among producers, users, audiences, and systems. While not tangible, the physical dimension also includes intangible elements such as transmission paths in the electromagnetic spectrum. Elements in the physical dimension exist on land, or in air, sea, or space and are the easiest to measure. Traditionally, combat power has been measured primarily in this dimension.

2-10. The informational dimension consists of the information itself whether static (at rest) or in transit. The informational dimension refers to content and flow of the information, such as text or images, or data that staffs can collect, process, store, disseminate, and display. A range of attributes can characterize the informational dimension: accuracy, integrity, completeness, quality, timeliness, relevance, availability, reliability, and significance. The informational dimension provides the necessary link between the physical dimension and the cognitive dimension.

2-11. The cognitive dimension is composed of the values, beliefs, concepts, intentions, and perceptions of individuals and groups transmitting and receiving information. This dimension focuses on the societal,

cultural, religious, and historical contexts that influence the perceptions of those producing the information and of the target audiences receiving the information. In this dimension, decisionmakers and target audiences are most prone to influence and perception management.




Figure 2-1. Information environment

2-12. Effective commanders avoid viewing this model in a rigid, mechanical manner; they view it as a conceptual framework to help guide and foster a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the information environment. Examining an operational problem without fully understanding the impact the information environment can have can cause an incomplete understanding of an operational environment that could limit or restrict options and result in unfavorable or undesirable outcomes. Hence, commanders direct their staffs including a comprehensive and holistic analysis of the information environment as part of the standard mission analysis.

2-13. Throughout operations, many audiences will concurrently attempt to influence the information environment to support their objectives. Military forces (both friendly and enemy), political groups and supporters, media, local and regional interest groups, and key leaders will all have investments and interests in the information environment. Certain audiences, including U.S. forces, may have pronounced advantages or disadvantages (temporary or enduring) based on a variety of factors. Factors—such as terrain, access to technologies, cultural differences, religious influences, historical animosities, and language barriers—often lend to or detract from an audience's advantages and disadvantages in the information environment. Successful commanders and their staffs understand those advantages and disadvantages, as well as the motivations, intentions, and methods of the various audiences.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

2-14. At the national strategic level, information is recognized as an instrument of national power, equal to diplomatic, military, and economic efforts. The President and Congress can implement all diplomatic, military, and economic efforts to achieve, support, or protect national strategic objectives and interests. Use of the instruments of national power sends strategic-level messages in a whole-of-government effort. Once dedicated, the execution entities of each instrument can continue to support and reinforce the specific United States Government messages. Deploying military units enables the Secretary of Defense and

military commanders to support and reinforce strategic communication, national objectives, and interests using military elements such as information operations, public affairs, special operations, and offensive, defensive, or defense support of civil authorities tasks. The Army, through its conduct of unified land operations, supports its joint ground component command or joint task force higher headquarters' strategic communication and information operations efforts and objectives. Army forces offer support through the mission command staff tasks of IIA and cyber electromagnetic activities.

## **INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

2-15. *Information operations* is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 1-02). This component supports the information-influence relational framework at the national level. (See joint doctrine about information-influence relational framework.) Information operations use of the information-influence relational framework at the joint strategic level illustrates how ways (integrated application) and means (information-related capabilities) achieve an end (influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary decisionmaking while also protecting friendly abilities).

2-16. At the operational- and tactical-Service levels, each military branch uniquely contributes to an integrated information operations effort synchronized by the joint force or joint task force headquarters J-39 division. The Army's execution of unified land operations supports its higher joint headquarters' tasks to support information operations and mission objectives through mission command's IIA and cyber electromagnetic activities staff tasks through orders and the operations process. IIA and cyber electromagnetic activities are the commander's staff integrating processes. Skilled integration specialists coordinate and synchronize designated and other information-related capabilities. They use specified working groups and staff coordination to achieve the Army's directed tasks to support information operations and the joint commander's objectives. The commander's IIA section focuses information-related capabilities (including coordinated components of cyber electromagnetic activities) to support the influence line of effort to affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking while protecting Army capabilities.

2-17. Army units may work as subordinate elements of a joint task force, or they may form the core headquarters of a joint task force or other joint headquarters. While Army forces doctrinally use the IIA staff section, G-7 (S-7), to develop an effects and information-related capabilities integration plan through the operations process, an effective Army staff begins operating according to joint doctrine and joint manning documentation organization. If the commander designates, the functional area 30 officer at the headquarters staff leads the J-39 information operations division and continues to develop an integration plan with available information-related capabilities according to JP 3-13. The Army functional area 30 officer trains for the role of a joint information operations planner.

## **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**

2-18. *Strategic communication* is focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power (JP 5-0). The themes and messages that strategic communication provides have a whole-of-government application and support national objectives and interests.

2-19. The Department of Defense supports national-level strategic communication by ensuring its military objectives synchronize with and complement other United States Government information and communication efforts. At the strategic and joint operations area levels, information operations support strategic communication by carefully coordinating the geographic combatant command theater security cooperation plan with respective American Embassy mission strategic and resource plans. At the operational and tactical levels, the Army uses IIA, in coordination with cyber electromagnetic activities, to support strategic communication and information operations-focused objectives and to execute joint directed tasks. The IIA's functional area 30 integration specialist leads synchronization and coordination with cyber electromagnetic activities and other staff entities to incorporate effects throughout the operation plan supported by the integration of information-related capabilities. The IIA section ensures commander

themes, messages, and actions in the operation plan are nested and integrated across all lines of effort and support and reinforce higher headquarters and Department of Defense objectives and United States Government strategic communication.

2-20. At the joint task force level, U.S. forces employ the information operations, strategic communication, and public affairs triad. U.S. forces use the public affairs charter not to influence but to inform. The charter supports the themes and messages that the joint and tactical commands provide. The charter includes the joint and tactical command's themes and messages in the public affairs guidance and talking points as part of the communication strategy for the command's security cooperation activities. Communication strategy is a commander's strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communications activities. The information operations specialist ensures that Department of Defense participants engaged in those security cooperation initiatives know the themes and messages, especially when forward deployed. At the operational and tactical levels, the strategic themes and messages of the joint command and the subordinate command are conveyed to the commanders of the forward deployed units by their higher headquarters during security cooperation activities.

## DECISIVE ACTION

2-21. The central idea of *unified land operations* is how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). This central idea applies to decisive action the simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities' tasks. This unifying principle connects the various tasks Army forces may perform. It adds the founding principles of flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. It incorporates the principle that operational art is the connection between strategic objectives and tactical actions, and provides a common construct for organizing military operations. An *offensive task* is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). A *defensive task* is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). *Stability operations* is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).

2-22. IIA officers and staffs plan to support decisive action throughout unified land operations. Planning and execution of information-related capabilities includes integrating capabilities and synchronizing actions that support desired effects ranging from informing and influencing (nonlethal) to destroying (lethal) in the same area of operations. What are also crucial for IIA are the second- and third-order effects from operations driven by the various audience perceptions and commanders' attempts to mitigate negative reactions and exploit positive ones.

2-23. IIA are the commander's means to affect the cognitive aspect of an operational environment. An *operational environment* is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Operational environments have always been complex and ambiguous. This is even more so in a networked and interconnected world. Threats to U.S. security and U.S. interests have become increasingly diverse, innovative, adaptive, globally connected, and networked. These threats increasingly defy the traditional definition of a threat. They operate conventionally or unconventionally using adaptive tactics and techniques to accomplish their goals. They can use sophisticated information campaigns, in combination with lethal and nonlethal attacks, on a range of targets to sway and influence local to global audiences. The complexity of threats and thus of operational environments makes simultaneous support of decisive action all the more critical for commanders and their staffs.

2-24. Commanders and staffs synchronize execution of information-related capabilities to produce complementary and reinforcing effects during the conduct of decisive action. IIA can support decisive

action simultaneously by helping a commander achieve an operational advantage while protecting friendly force critical information assets. Independent support to each task of decisive action without coordination detracts from the efficient employment of information-related capabilities. Uncoordinated, simultaneous support to decisive action can result in redundant employment of information-related capabilities and an inefficient use of resources. Likewise, uncoordinated efforts increase potential for conflicts and operational interference. This could compromise friendly intentions or result in information fratricide.

### **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE TASKS**

2-25. Inform and influence activities support offensive tasks by developing an integration plan of information-related capabilities to support operational effects. These activities either adversely affect enemy decisionmaking or influence others to accomplish or promote specific mission objectives. Commanders can use all information-related capabilities to support offensive tasks.

2-26. Inform and influence activities to support offensive tasks helps units seize the initiative. Information-related capabilities used to support offensive tasks can create a disparity between the quality of information available to friendly forces and to adversaries and enemies. Commanders apply effects including, but not limited to, destroy, disrupt, degrade, deny, deceive, and exploit to influence adversary and enemy audiences and affect their decisionmaking to create this information advantage.

### **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE TASKS**

2-27. Inform and influence activities simultaneously support defensive tasks through integration of information-related capabilities. The IIA officers may not have primary responsibility for many defensive activities. However, they remain involved and serve as the primary advisors for assessment, perception, and potential effects in the information environment from activities and procedures commanders direct. These activities and procedures protect and defend friendly information, troops, and systems, as well as the ability to continue shaping their area of operations. Integrated information-related capabilities to support the defense also deny adversaries and enemies the opportunity to exploit friendly information systems and information for their own purposes. Commanders apply actions including, but not limited to, protect, detect, and respond to maintain an operational advantage by safeguarding their area of operations.

2-28. Protect is to take action to guard against manipulation, damage, destruction, or capture of personnel, equipment, and information. In IIA, OPSEC is integrated into the operations process to mitigate the effects of adversary or enemy access to or action upon friendly personnel, networks, information systems, and equipment. It denies adversaries and enemies information about friendly information-related capabilities and intentions by controlling indicators and capabilities. Protect also includes actions to support perception management.

2-29. Detect is to discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems. Detection is the identification of adversary or enemy attempts to gain access to friendly information and network enabled systems. Timely detection and reporting enable units to initiate restoration and response.

2-30. Respond is to react quickly to an adversary or enemy information-based attack or intrusion. Timely identification of adversaries, enemies, and their intentions and capabilities enables effective responses to adversary offensive information-based operations. Inform and influence activities can attempt to mitigate undesired follow-on events or situations.

### **STABILITY OPERATIONS**

2-31. Stability operations can occur simultaneously with the execution of offensive or defensive tasks, or a phase preceding or following the execution of offensive or defensive tasks. Also, units can deploy to conduct stability operations as a stand-alone mission. It is also highly likely that, in a larger area of operations, commanders could simultaneously plan for and direct decisive action operations based on the specific characteristics of their operational environments.

2-32. Successful execution of stability operations depends heavily on keeping audiences informed, positively influencing attitudes toward defense support of civil authorities tasks, minimizing noncombatant

interference, and addressing adversary and enemy information uses when necessary. Commanders and staffs use the inform and influence lines of effort to secure the trust and confidence of various audiences to reinforce desired behaviors and to dispel adversary and enemy information. Accurate integration and synchronization of information-related capabilities within the two lines of effort is critical in stability, where inform and influence can be one of a commander's primary efforts. The G-7 (S-7), using the inform line of effort, coordinates public affairs, combat camera, and Soldier and leader engagement to inform the U.S. populace, foreign media, and foreign friendly audiences, and to correct misinformation. The influence line of effort focuses on MISO, Soldier and leader engagement, and other means necessary to influence audiences in the area of operations.

2-33. The sustained engagement of the host-nation population directly influences the attitudes and shapes the perceptions of the population. Soldier and leader engagements and MISO can amplify positive actions, counter enemy information activities, and increase support among the host-nation population (see FM 3-07). Integrating Soldier and leader engagement with MISO, other information-related capabilities, and resources from various agencies helps maintain continuity among words, images, and actions. Consistency is important and must be conducted with detailed planning and preparation. Therefore, the commander, the G-7 (S-7), and required staff elements use IIA to coordinate efforts to build and maintain local trust, to build support for host-nation government and military operations, and to reduce interference with operations. (See FM 3-07 for additional information.)

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## Chapter 3

# Capabilities of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter discusses the designated information-related capabilities and organic capabilities integrated throughout inform and influence activities. It also discusses why the integration of information-related capabilities is critical to the commander and successful operations.

## INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

3-1. Information-related capabilities support a commander's ability to inform and influence audiences across a range of operations to shape desired outcomes. When two or more capabilities are integrated and synchronized, these independent capabilities, tools, or techniques support the inform or influence lines of effort, inform and influence activities (IIA), and the Army's concept to information operations requirements. IIA integration specialists attempt to synchronize and integrate information-related capability to bring about and enhance desired effects in the information environment. Therefore, commanders may delegate any of their organic capabilities and request others to support their objectives in shaping their operational environments.

3-2. Theoretically, all capabilities send a message (or make an impression). Therefore, commanders consider all capabilities in devising solutions and plans. The commander and staff regularly use the following designated information-related capabilities to inform and influence audiences:

- Public affairs.
- Military information support operations.
- Combat camera.
- Soldier and leader engagement.
- Civil affairs operations.
- Civil and cultural considerations.
- Operations security.
- Military deception.

3-3. The commander and staffs leverage many capabilities. They can designate other capabilities to support IIA efforts. The commander can use organic capabilities and designate them to support the inform or influence lines of effort. This use enhances and reinforces the shaping of the area of operations and the accomplishment of mission objectives in the information environment. Other capabilities that can support IIA include the following:

- Cyber electromagnetic activities, including—
  - Electronic warfare.
  - Cyberspace operations.
  - Electromagnetic spectrum management operations.
- Special technical operations.
- Presence, posture, and profile.
- Physical attack.
- Physical security.

3-4. The G-7 (S-7) is responsible for coordinating, synchronizing and deconflicting the information-related capabilities when planning in the inform or influence lines of effort to support the commander's objectives, including cyber electromagnetic activities, operations security, or military deception. This coordination occurs via the IIA working group, electronic warfare working group, targeting working group, standard staff coordination, and other working groups as necessary.

## **PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

3-5. Public affairs operations fulfill the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed. They help to establish conditions that lead to confidence in the Army and its readiness to conduct unified land operations. Public affairs operations strive to enhance public understanding and garner American, as well as global, support for the Army by engaging with both domestic and foreign media entities. (See FM 3-61.1.)

3-6. Public affairs Soldiers accomplish their mission through public information, command information, and public engagement. Public information focuses on informing external audiences. It primarily engages the media and key audiences to convey Army and command themes and messages to global and American audiences. Command information focuses on internal audiences—Soldiers, civilians, and family members—who recognize that an informed force is a more ready, reliable, and resilient force. Public engagement places special emphasis on two-way communication with identified publics and communities surrounding military installations. It recognizes that a positive rapport between the Army and its host communities is mutually beneficial, supporting the Army as an institution as well as its individual Soldiers.

3-7. Integrating public affairs with other information-related capabilities helps the commander shape the information environment, provides valuable media assessment, and counters enemy propaganda and disinformation. Public affairs operations support the commander's development of themes and messages and collaborates with other information-related capabilities to protect operations security (OPSEC) and avoid information fratricide.

3-8. Public affairs Soldiers participate in the information-related capability and information integration process in the IIA section by continually assessing the media information environment to determine the degree and nature of media coverage. They take steps to correct misinformation and propaganda. They also seek to leverage other information-related capabilities—such as combat camera or civil affairs operations—to provide greater accuracy, context, and characterization while informing. Additionally, public affairs operations provide reinforcing messaging for other information-related capabilities actions and the overarching strategic communication.

## **MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

3-9. Military information support operations (MISO) is the commander's primary capability to inform and influence foreign populations in the area of operations. Military information support Soldiers conduct operations to induce or reinforce specific attitudes and behaviors favorable to U.S. military objectives. (See Army doctrine for more information on MISO.)

3-10. Military information support Soldiers provide subject matter expertise in the G-7 (S-7) IIA section. As primary members of the IIA working group, they advise, plan, provide operations oversight, and assess messages and actions that have potential or actual psychological effects. The military information support units also provide analysis, development, production, distribution, and dissemination capabilities for MISO and are the primary executors for the purpose of informing and influencing target audiences. Military information support Soldiers, when provided dedicated intelligence support, can also provide post-delivery measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. The IIA section utilizes military information support analyses of audiences and their environments. The IIA section also assesses adversary information and capability, including information for effects, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda.

3-11. Military information support planners and attached military information support units help commanders in executing Soldier and leader engagement efforts in an area of operations. Military information support Soldiers are trained, educated, equipped, and organized to plan, monitor, and assess engagement with foreign populations and select audiences. This engagement includes planning the engagements with foreign populations, leaders, key communicators, and others with the specific intent to influence to support the commander's objectives. Military information support planners plan, manage, and assess the commander's Soldier and leader engagement efforts. They support the commander's larger engagement strategy and IIA as a whole.

## COMBAT CAMERA

3-12. Combat camera video specialists provide commanders with still and video imagery capabilities to support operational and planning requirements. These forces use video documentation capabilities ranging from aerial to underwater photography to support IIA. They access areas and events inaccessible to other personnel or media. Furthermore, combat camera teams have a technological capability to transmit real-time images that in turn serve to reinforce other information-related capability efforts. Likewise, their documentation of operations provides imagery support that counters misinformation or propaganda. (See FM 3-55.12 for more information on combat camera.)

## SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

3-13. Soldier and leader engagement broadly describes interactions that occur among Soldiers, leaders, and audiences in the area of operations. Chapter 8 discusses the specific contributions of Soldier and leader engagement to IIA.

## CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

3-14. Civil affairs forces support commanders by engaging the civil component of an operational environment to conduct civil-military operations or accomplish other stated U.S. objectives. Civil affairs forces ensure the sustained legitimacy of the mission and the transparency and credibility of the military force before, during, or after other military missions. This support involves applying specialty skills (normally the responsibility of a local, regional, or national government) to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. As they relate to IIA, civil affairs operations and civil-military operations differ in purpose, focus, and specialization. Civil-military operations are a commander's activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and civilians. These activities occur in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations to facilitate military operations in an effort to influence and support U.S. national objectives. Civil-military operations may include the military forces' activities and functions normally the responsibility of a local, regional or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated civil affairs elements, other military forces, or a combination of civil affairs elements and other forces conduct civil-military operations. (See FM 3-28 and FM 3-57 for more information.)

3-15. Civil-military operations or civil affairs operations involve direct interaction with the indigenous population and institutions. Both civil-military operations and civil affairs operations focus on the indigenous population and institutions to create a favorable civil environment for military operations. IIA integrate both operations to support the commander's engagement strategy. IIA activities recognize the power of civil-military and civil affairs operations to contribute to the commander's overall IIA effort. IIA harmonize this contribution with other capabilities, such as MISO, public affairs, and Soldier and leader engagement.

## CIVIL AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-16. The elements of civil and cultural considerations help supported units and organizations understand the evolving sociocultural environment and considerations, with special focus on civilians, thereby refining decisionmaking across a broad spectrum. The commander decides how a human terrain team supports the staff. The commander can attach any of these teams to the G-7 (S-7) to maximize inform and influence efforts in the information environment.

3-17. Civil considerations involve attaching human terrain teams to deployed brigade combat teams, divisions, corps, and theater armies, and supporting the teams with a U.S.-based reachback research center. Civil considerations use observed sociocultural research and analysis to fill a large operational decisionmaking support gap. This research provides current, accurate, and reliable data generated by on-the-ground research on the specific social groups. This knowledge provides a sociocultural foundation for the staff's support to the commander's military decisionmaking process, both in planning and

execution. It also enables an effective rotation of forces by creating and maintaining an enduring, sociocultural knowledge base.

3-18. Human terrain teams fully integrate into unit staffs and conduct field research among the local population. Human terrain teams consist of 5 or 6 military and civilian personnel, and include 1 team leader, 1 or 2 social scientists, 1 research manager, and 1 or 2 analysts with specific local knowledge. When possible, teams deploy with at least 1 female to facilitate access to the often inaccessible female population.

3-19. Analysis human terrain teams deploy to support echelons above brigade (such as division and regional command levels). These teams integrate into the commander's staff, conduct unclassified open-source and field research, synthesize the information from the human terrain teams deployed with subordinate units, and analyze information to support the commander's military decisionmaking process. Analysis human terrain teams consist of 5 to 7 military and civilian personnel. A team includes a team leader, 1 or 2 social scientists, 1 or 2 research managers, and 1 or 2 analysts.

3-20. The theater coordination element, found at the theater level, consists of 6 to 8 military and civilian personnel, consisting of 1 team leader, 3 social scientists, 1 or 2 research managers, and 1 or 2 analysts. The theater coordination element provides sociocultural support to the theater staff and decisionmakers as well as coordinates and manages the social science research and analysis capability.

3-21. The Reachback Research Center is based in the continental United States. This research and analysis element provides direct support to deployed human terrain teams, analysis human terrain teams, and the theater coordination element. The Reachback Research Center consists of social scientists and military and civilian analysts organized in regionally focused cells. The Reachback Research Center supports specific combatant command sociocultural research and analysis requirements.

## **OPERATIONS SECURITY**

3-22. The Army protects human and automated decisionmaking in peacetime and in conflict using OPSEC. It is a commander's responsibility supported by Soldiers and supporting civilian staff members and operators. OPSEC enhances mission success by preserving the advantages of secrecy and surprise. OPSEC is a force multiplier. It includes reducing predictability and eliminating indicators of operations. Commanders use OPSEC countermeasures to deny adversaries knowledge of friendly operations. This requires adversaries to expend more resources to obtain the critical information needed to make decisions. (See ADRP 3-37 for more information on OPSEC.)

3-23. The focus of IIA is the integration of words, images, and actions into the commander's overall plan. OPSEC helps protect critical information. To achieve success—attaining the commander's desired effects and end state—effective messaging through words, images, and deeds must occur. A successfully executed OPSEC program enables successful messages by preventing misinformation, disinformation, and information fratricide.

## **MILITARY DECEPTION**

3-24. Military deception involves actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decisionmakers. This information-related capability intends for the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The responsibility for military deception does not fall under the direct purview of the G-7 (S-7) but is considered an influencing capability of IIA. Military deception consists of counterdeception, deception to support OPSEC, and tactical deception.

3-25. Counterdeception contributes to situational understanding by protecting friendly human and automated decisionmaking from adversary deception. Counterdeception strives to make Army commanders aware of adversary deception activities so they can formulate informed and coordinated responses.

3-26. Deception that supports OPSEC aims to protect friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment, and other assets against foreign intelligence services, international terrorist organizations, insurgents, and adversarial collections. It creates multiple false indicators to confuse the adversary or enemy. False indicators make friendly intentions harder for the adversary or enemy intelligence gathering apparatus to

interpret. Military deception also limits the enemy's ability to collect accurate intelligence on friendly forces.

3-27. Tactical deception consists of deception activities planned and conducted to support battles and engagements in real time. Tactical-level commanders plan and execute tactical deception to cause enemy actions favorable to U.S. objectives. These activities aim to gain a tactical advantage over an adversary, to mask vulnerabilities in friendly forces, and to enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces. Tactical deception usually nests in other operations as part of the joint force command or joint task force's Annex C 3-A.

## **OTHER ORGANIC CAPABILITIES USED FOR INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES**

3-28. Commanders may designate other capabilities during the operations process to support IIA efforts. During the operations process, commanders decide what other capabilities not specified as information-related capabilities to use to support the inform and influence lines of effort.

### **CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES**

3-29. *Cyber electromagnetic activities* are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0). Components of cyber electromagnetic activities are cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and electromagnetic spectrum operations. Integration of these capabilities enables Army forces to retain freedom of action while denying freedom of action to adversaries and enemies. (See Army doctrine for more information on cyber electromagnetic activities.)

3-30. Although IIA and cyber electromagnetic activities are interrelated, IIA focus on the holistic information environment. Cyber electromagnetic activities focus on the integration of cyber and electromagnetic capabilities as an enabler and warfighting platform. Each requires a specific skill set to perform the required processes. Since both contribute to affecting perceptions and decisionmaking, the activities are mutually supportive. Therefore, when leveraged to influence a cognitive outcome, cyber electromagnetic activities components (capabilities) are considered information-related capabilities that must be synchronized and integrated with IIA. Cyber electromagnetic activities reinforce messaging efforts by providing additional means for message distribution. IIA and cyber electromagnetic activities integrators also incorporate cyber electromagnetic activities components. They do this when planning support for offensive and defensive tasks and while protecting friendly use of the cyberspace domain and electromagnetic spectrum.

### **SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS**

3-31. The special technical operations process is an option when addressing IIA problem sets the staff identifies. It is also an option when traditional information-related capabilities cannot successfully attain the desired end state. The staff requests assistance through established staff channels and procedures for planning. Currently, special technical operations billets exist in division and higher echelons. From these echelons, they support these planning and execution requests and attempt to fill the gap between traditional information-related capabilities and special problem sets. When requesting integrated joint special technical operations support, the staff focuses on the desired end state and not specific capabilities or desired effects. Integrated joint special technical operations support is a complicated and thorough process. It involves many agencies to develop the concept of operations and acquire access and authorizations, typically an involved and lengthy process. Unless staffs already establish a concept of operations and authorizations, integrated joint special technical operations staffs have significant challenges planning for time-sensitive events.

## **PRESENCE, POSTURE, AND PROFILE**

3-32. Although not considered a traditional information-related capability, units often use presence and posture of other combined arms assets to deliver a commander's message to an audience. This technique demonstrates the action part of IIA and proves effective in portraying a message. Conducting a Soldier and leader engagement with Soldiers carrying weapons in full battle uniform sends a different message from sending unarmed Soldiers in standard uniform. Depending on the intended effects, the commander may designate forces to inform and influence a safer environment simply by their presence or by patrolling a village. The commander may also position forces to shape an operational environment with lethal action when necessary. All tactical action or inaction sends a message. Commanders must recognize how their actions in their area of operations support or negate the overall strategy for strategic communication.

## **PHYSICAL ATTACK**

3-33. Physical attack is the application of combat power to destroy or degrade adversary forces, sources of network enabled systems, and installations. It includes direct and indirect fires from ground, sea, and air forces. Also included are direct actions by special operations forces. Often commanders use physical attack to amplify the effects of IIA in an area of operations by degrading or destroying adversary information and communications capabilities.

## **PHYSICAL SECURITY**

3-34. *Physical security* is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0). (See Army doctrine on physical security and JP 6-0.)

## **INTEGRATED AND SYNCHRONIZED CAPABILITIES**

3-35. The complexity and scope of the information environment make it difficult to achieve the desired effects by using a single information-related capability. All information-related capabilities subject matter experts integrate and synchronize capabilities to achieve an effective holistic approach to operations. Likewise, protection of friendly network-enabled systems and their components also require careful integration and synchronization between the IIA section and the subject matter experts.

3-36. Commanders often rely on two means of integration—coordination and deconfliction. Coordination focuses on how activities or capabilities come together to reinforce and amplify each other. Deconfliction focuses on how activities or capabilities might compete for resources or create effects that negate or impair each other. Deconfliction focuses on taking action to avoid or mitigate such outcomes. Commanders effectively coordinate and deconflict employment of information-related capabilities to achieve complementary and reinforcing effects. This action decreases the probability of conflicts and interference that can compromise friendly intentions or result in information fratricide.

3-37. Commanders use synchronization to protect their forces. Information fratricide results when the effects of information-related capabilities conflict or compete with one other. More importantly, it occurs when actions contradict information-related messages or effects, creating a “say-do” gap. Such a gap places the commander's, the Army's, and the nation's credibility at risk.

## Chapter 4

# Roles, Responsibilities, and Organizations of Inform and Influence Activities

The chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of inform and influence activities personnel, organizations, and supporting elements. It first discusses the role of the commander, the roles of the G-7 (S-7), and the staff. Then it discusses the roles of others—the inform and influence activities section and working group, the 1st Information Operations Command (Land), the theater information operations groups, and supporting elements.

### ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

4-1. Advised by the G-7 (S-7) and supported by the entire staff, the commander leads inform and influence activities (IIA). The commander addresses the global audience and audiences in each area of operations through mission command and IIA, while acknowledging the social aspects and dynamics of the information environment in an area of operations.

4-2. The commander establishes and synchronizes themes and messages to inform and influence friendly, neutral, and adversary audiences and decisionmakers in the area of operations. The G-7 (S-7) coordinates and synchronizes the commander's themes and messages with the higher headquarters to maintain synergy and to ensure they do not conflict. Commanders incorporate cultural awareness, relevant social and political factors, and other informational aspects. The commander's understanding and visualization of the end state relates to the mission and operational design.

4-3. With the advice from the staff, the commander guides the integration of the information-related capabilities with other actions in the concept of operations. The staff determines how these information activities affect the various audiences and their perceptions.

4-4. Commanders, with advice from their staffs, assess how their staffs and subordinate units will use the inform and influence lines of effort to achieve the commander's intent with all audiences. The commander's intent, along with the mission narrative, describes the commander's vision of the desired end state and focuses staffs and subordinate units' planning efforts. The commander acknowledges and incorporates the effects of people in the area of operations. Staffs and subordinate units consider how operations affect attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. Attaining that desired end state can involve breaking the enemy's will or can foster wider and more enduring support among other audiences. These audiences range from the U.S. audiences to indigenous civilians in the area of operations.

4-5. Some commanders reorganize their staff based on mission requirements, strengths, and weaknesses. When operating in a joint or multinational environment, commanders may reorganize their staff to better align with higher headquarters. In addition, commanders designate resources (information-related capabilities) to employ to support IIA.

### ROLE OF THE G-7 (S-7)

4-6. The G-7 (S-7) serves as the commander's coordinating staff officer for the planning, integration, and synchronization of designated information-related capabilities. As the information environment subject matter expert, the G-7 (S-7) serves as the primary advisor to the commander when operational activity and its direct or indirect message or perception could influence the information environment. The G-7 (S-7) utilizes the results of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to determine the utility of the plan. (See chapter 7 for more information on developing measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.) An effective G-7 (S-7) clearly understands an operational environment, the information

environment, and the joint and multinational area of operations. IIA planning brings together multiple information-related capabilities (see chapter 3) and other warfighting functions to support operations. To provide unity of effort, the G-7 (S-7) oversees overall integration, coordination, and synchronization of those capabilities with other warfighting functions. Placing responsibility for synchronizing activities of the information-related capabilities on one coordinating staff officer helps commanders integrate, coordinate, and synchronize information as a combat element in the planning process.

4-7. The G-7 (S-7)'s primary responsibilities include—

- Integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing all information-related capabilities being executed as part of the commander's IIA efforts.
- Developing and maintaining the combined information overlay. (See chapter 5 for more information on the combined information overlay.)
- Monitoring execution of approved activities.
- Continuously assessing measures of performance and effectiveness against the intended plan.
- Advising the commander and staff when they might need to adjust the plan based on the assessment.
- Providing information requirements for the information collection plan.
- Advising the commander on employing subordinate commanders to help shape an operational environment.

4-8. The IIA section contributes to the overall intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) by developing IIA input and products. This section works with the G-2 (S-2) to develop products that portray the information infrastructure of the area of operations and aspects of the information environment that can affect operations. In addition to information about the adversary, these products include information on all audiences and other decisionmakers, key people, and significant groups in the area of operations. They address potential strengths and vulnerabilities of adversaries and other groups, as well as friendly forces operations security (OPSEC) considerations.

4-9. The G-7 (S-7) develops the assessment plan and coordinates assessment collection with higher, adjacent, and subordinate organizations or units. Secondary responsibilities include nesting the units' IIA strategy with information operations and unified action partner information efforts, as well as the overall strategy, themes, and messages for strategic communication. This includes both vertical and horizontal staff coordination to ensure consistency of messaging. The G-7 (S-7) accomplishes these responsibilities by conducting an IIA working group and participating in a joint information operations working group and other units' information working group.

4-10. Through the staff planning and coordinating process, the G-7 (S-7) determines and nominates nonlethal and potentially lethal targets for approval. The G-7 (S-7) establishes assessment measures for performance and effectiveness to provide post activity assessment in accordance with the decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting model. (FM 3-60 discusses targeting in detail. Chapter 6 has more information on targeting in IIA.) Coordination with the G-2 (S-2) is necessary to plan collection assets to support IIA assessment.

4-11. The G-7 (S-7) trains the IIA section on staff action battle drills and IIA mission-essential tasks. The G-7 (S-7) trains or supports training for units and other staff sections for IIA planning.

4-12. The G-7 (S-7) also has responsibility for standard leader actions. These actions include government contract management and oversight, required supply and equipment coordination with the sustainment personnel, and Soldier actions and unit readiness requirements of personnel in the IIA section.

## **ROLE OF THE STAFF**

4-13. The G-2 (S-2) section produces intelligence products about adversaries and other aspects of an operational environment. Intelligence analysts process and analyze information (including open-source information) to produce intelligence products and assessments. As a primary supporting member of the IIA working group, intelligence personnel provide information and intelligence for the G-7 (S-7). Those sections collaborate to incorporate IIA-specific data into IPB products to describe the audiences in the information environment accurately and throughout the area of interest. The G-7 (S-7) uses the products for



planning effects, information-related capabilities integration, and operational assessments of information-related capabilities actions and effects. Intelligence products focus on answering priority intelligence requirements and identifying high-payoff targets, as well as providing an initial baseline and ongoing assessment of the area of operations and enemy capabilities.

4-14. The G-7 (S-7) contributes to the overall IPB by developing requirements for information in the information environment. The G-7 (S-7) provides information requirements to help the G-2 (S-2) develop IPB templates, databases, and other products that give information about all the audiences in the area of operations and the area of interest. Information relevant to IIA include but is not limited to—

- Religion, language, and culture of key groups and decisionmakers.
- Agendas of nongovernmental organizations.
- Size and location of neutral, adversary, and enemy forces and assets.
- Military and civilian communication infrastructures and connectivity.
- Population demographics, linkages, and related information.
- Audio, video, and print media outlets and centers, and the populations they service.
- Location and types of electromagnetic systems and emitters.
- Network vulnerabilities of friendly, other, adversary, and enemy forces.

4-15. IPB to support IIA planning has a purpose, focus, and end state. The purpose is to gain an understanding of the information environment and to determine how the threat operates in that environment. The focus analyzes the threat's use of the information environment and capabilities to gain an advantage. The end state identifies the threat vulnerabilities that friendly forces can exploit or must defend against with information-related capabilities. IPB is vital to conducting effective IIA planning or information-related capabilities activities at all echelons.

4-16. A *commander's critical information requirement* is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0). Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) directly affect decisionmaking and dictate the successful execution of military operations. They include priority intelligence and friendly forces information requirements. The G-7 (S-7) recommends CCIRs to the G-3 (S-3). Commanders establish CCIRs to focus assessment efforts as well as asset allocation.

4-17. The G-3 (S-3) section exercises primary staff responsibility over information collection. Together, the G-2 (S-2) and G-3 (S-3) sections exploit all available resources to answer the priority intelligence requirements. The G-7 (S-7) section submits intelligence requirements to the G-2 (S-2) section. The staff submits intelligence requirements it cannot answer with organic assets to appropriate agencies as requests for information.

4-18. The G-5 (S-5) section is responsible for incorporating future plans with ongoing missions. The G-7 (S-7) works closely with the G-5 (G-5) section by integrating information-related capabilities to shape the information environment to give commanders an information advantage in their operational environments. The two sections also work closely to develop credible deception plans when required for maneuver operations.

4-19. The G-9 (S-9) section helps in the integration of civil affairs operations, an information-related capability of IIA. Civil affairs operations and civil-military operations complement IIA and facilitate mission accomplishment by enhancing the relationship between the civilian populace and the overall force. (See FM 3-57.)

## **ROLES OF OTHERS**

4-20. The IIA section neither owns nor controls any of a unit's assets, but it must coordinate with many who do. Therefore, IIA officers cannot support the section's mission by themselves. To plan and integrate successfully, IIA officers collaborate via several means both internally to their unit and supporting units, as well as externally to reachback units and centers.

## **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES SECTION AND WORKING GROUP**

4-21. The IIA section is part of the mission command functional cell. Functional cells coordinate and synchronize forces and activities by warfighting function. The mission command functional cell consists of the IIA section, signal staff, and civil affairs staff. In the mission command functional cell, staff sections that reside in this cell report directly to the chief of staff and not through a cell chief. The G-7 (S-7) leads the IIA section. This officer oversees the cross-functional integration of information-related capabilities and planning product development.

4-22. The IIA working group meets to analyze, coordinate, and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Cross-functional by design, working groups synchronize the contributions of multiple command post cells and staff sections, as well as any necessary external agencies or organizations. As a critical planning event, information as an element of combat power is leveraged to best achieve an operational advantage contributing to mission accomplishment. (See chapter 5 for more information.)

## **1ST INFORMATION OPERATIONS COMMAND (LAND)**

4-23. The 1st Information Operations Command (Land) provides Regular Army information operations support to the Army and other military forces through—

- Deployable information operations support teams.
- Information operations reachback planning and analysis.
- Resident and mobile information operations and cyberspace training.
- The synchronization and conduct of Army cyberspace operations.

This command coordinates with other cyberspace operations and network operations stakeholders to operationally integrate information operations, reinforce forward information operations capabilities, and defend cyberspace, enabling information operations throughout the information environment.

4-24. The 1st Information Operations Command (Land) field support teams provide information operations subject matter expertise to supported commands. The teams help those commands with the planning, execution, and assessment of information operations during contingency and exercise operations. Field support teams train to integrate information-related capabilities through IIA to support the command.

4-25. A vulnerability assessment team helps the supported command by identifying information operations and cyberspace vulnerabilities tied to issues associated with unit training, policy, procedures, equipment, and other resource areas. The team also helps with resolving those vulnerability issues.

4-26. OPSEC support teams provide supported commands with OPSEC training, help with developing OPSEC programs, and assess unit OPSEC programs.

4-27. A cyber opposing force (referred to as world-class cyber opposing force) helps supported commands during operational training events, such as major exercises and training center rotations. The cyber opposing force serves as a noncooperative, multiple tier (criminal, hybrid, nation state) cyberspace threat to challenge, train, and develop leaders to operate in a hostile cyber threat environment. The cyber opposing force executes its opposing force mission according to AR 350-2 and TC 7-100. It operates as an independent force or as a member of a larger opposing force as the exercise dictates.

4-28. The 1st Information Operations Command (Land) reachback element provides information operations and cyberspace operational planning support, intelligence analysis, and technical assistance for deployed 1st Information Operations Command (Land) support teams and commands requesting information operations reachback support. The element provides current and future operations support to help deployed teams, or the supported commands, with information operations and cyberspace planning and integration. The reachback element also provides information operations-focused intelligence products to support operational planning and execution efforts.

## **THEATER INFORMATION OPERATIONS GROUP**

4-29. A theater information operations group provides limited information-related capabilities subject matter expertise to the Army Service component command and its subordinate commands. The theater

information operations group units are affiliated with the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. There are currently four theater information operations groups in the Army with two in the U.S. Army Reserve and two in the Army National Guard. The theater information operations groups are distinct and specialized Army units deploying mission-derived modular teams from brigade combat team (BCT) through Army Service component command to support both the joint and Army missions with information operations planning, preparation, coordination, and assessment capabilities. Across the range of military operations, they provide the commander with a scalable capability that is both regionally and culturally focused.

4-30. Theater information operations group commanders deploy scalable theater information operations group elements with varying capability packages to support information operations and IIA mission requirements for Army Service component command through BCTs. Theater information operations groups have personnel to provide cyberspace team packages for planning, integration, security, and operations support. Operating primarily from the continental U.S., the theater information operations group S-2 provides direct support information operations reachback capabilities and information operations centric analysis of regional cultural, social, political, economic, and civil considerations. Additionally, each theater information operations group maintains deployable IIA integrators, as well as OPSEC and military deception planning, preparation, execution, and assessment capabilities.

4-31. Tactical field support teams provide information operations and IIA support from BCTs through Army Service component commands via the following detachments:

- Teams and elements.
- Operational field support detachments to support the Army Service component command theater security cooperative planning and joint missions.
- OPSEC support detachments to provide information operations vulnerability assessments and OPSEC planning support.
- Cyberspace support detachments to assess and enhance cyberspace operations planning and cyberspace OPSEC.
- Information operations assessment teams to evaluate the effectiveness of operational and tactical information operations efforts.
- Open-source, cultural affairs, and civil considerations analysis elements for regional ethnology planning support.

### SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

4-32. To employ IIA properly, commanders and staffs must grasp the character and impact of the information environment in their area of operations. To do this, they understand the importance of mission command systems, information management, and knowledge management. Each system and activity helps in visualizing the information environment and provides the tools to synchronize IIA events to affect the information environment.

### Mission Command System

4-33. A *mission command system* is the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). The mission command system is organized to support commanders' decisionmaking; to collect, create, and maintain relevant information; and to prepare knowledge products that support commanders' and leaders' understanding and visualization. It is designed to prepare and communicate directives and establishes the means that commanders and leaders communicate, collaborate, and facilitate the functioning of teams.

4-34. An effective G-7 (S-7) understands how to use all components of the mission command system to successfully integrate, coordinate, and synchronize the use of information-related capabilities into the supported unit's operations. The G-7 (S-7) uses various available network enabled systems to leverage existing and emerging technologies to help transfer knowledge horizontally and vertically. (See ADRP 6-0 for more on network enabled systems.)

## Information Management and Knowledge Management

4-35. The G-7 (S-7) uses information management and knowledge management activities to help commanders build and maintain situational understanding. *Situational understanding* is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (ADP 5-0). Staffs determine and communicate relevant information to build situational understanding. The common operational picture most effectively communicates relevant information commanders need in digital command posts. Commanders and staffs use the common operational picture to track and refine information and develop knowledge and understanding. The staff helps the commander in identifying information gaps, opportunities, threats to the force, and mission accomplishment using information management procedures and knowledge management principles.

4-36. *Information management* is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products (ADRP 6-0). Information management far exceeds technically controlling data. It involves all aspects of network enabled systems. These systems help the commander by anticipating and prioritizing the processing effort to answer the CCIRs. Information requirements are answered with relevant information—all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of mission command. (See ADRP 6-0 for details about information requirements.) Information requirements focus on collecting and processing data into information developed and used as knowledge.

4-37. *Knowledge management* is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking (ADRP 6-0). The staff and commanders use knowledge management to produce knowledge products that help generate collaboration, improve organizational performance, and aid in the conduct of operations. The by-products of knowledge management are improved staff performance, improved decisionmaking, and improved situational understanding. Since knowledge transfer occurs among people, knowledge management includes creating techniques and procedures to develop knowledge skills in leaders, build experience, and transfer expertise. (See FM 6-01.1 for detailed information on knowledge management.)

## Chapter 5

# Inform and Influence Activities Integration

Commanders lead inform and influence activities. This chapter discusses inform and influence activities as an integrating function. It also discusses how the G-7 (S-7) plans inform and influence activities in the military decisionmaking process. Unless otherwise specified, the use of the term staff refers to the G-7 (S-7) section or the inform and influence activities integration specialist (planner).

## INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AS AN INTEGRATING FUNCTION

5-1. As an integrating function, inform and influence activities (IIA) own no capabilities but rather holistically tie together information-related capabilities to achieve the commander's intent and accomplish operational objectives. Like command itself, integration is both art and science. Since IIA involves achieving effects in the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions, it is less about certainty and more about probability. The commander's desired end state is the goal of integration.

5-2. To integrate IIA effectively, commanders—

- Understand operational and information environments.
- Frame their commander's intent and mission narrative not only with the physical and informational end states.
- Consider the informational aspects of operations by continually asking how a relevant audience perceives operations and how they can shape these perceptions to their benefit.
- Lead the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) with IIA in mind.
- Frame themes and messages.
- Ensure that themes, messages, and actions interrelate and are cohesive.
- Develop their engagement strategy, including media engagements, Soldier and leader engagements, civil affairs engagements, and other engagements.
- Actively engage individuals and entities who will help to shape the desired end state.
- Designate information-related capabilities.

## INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES WORKING GROUP

5-3. The IIA working group is a collaborative staff meeting led by the G-7 (S-7). Its purpose is to conduct detailed integration and synchronization of information-related capabilities to support unit operations. The G-7 (S-7) is the commander's primary advisor for IIA in the information environment. The meeting aims to help information-related capabilities personnel to accomplish unit objectives, mitigate events, and forecast second- and third-order effects for the commander. The IIA working group is a critical planning event integrated into the staff's battle rhythm. It ensures that information, as an element of combat power, has an operational advantage to mission accomplishment. Figures 5-1 on page 5-2, 5-2 on page 5-3, and 5-3 on page 5-4 represent working groups at various echelons. The G-7 (S-7) personnel should attend or be a member of as many boards, bureaus, cells, or working groups as possible. Such personnel gain an understanding of unit actions and the information environment, provide input to messages and actions, help with design, and prevent information fratricide.

<p><b>Purpose:</b></p> <p>Prioritize, resource, and synchronize information-related capabilities to support the decisive, shaping, and sustaining efforts to accomplish the commander's objective.</p> <p><b>Battle Rhythm:</b></p> <p>Weekly (before targeting meeting)</p>	<p><b>Structure:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Lead:</b> G-7 (chair: G-3, COS, DCG-O, or CDR)</li> <li>• <b>Core participants:</b> MISO, PA, SJA, G-2, FAO, S-7s, assessment rep, G-3, CEMA, fires, G-9, MILDEC, OPSEC, space</li> <li>• <b>Other participants:</b> G-6, COMCAM OIC, POLAD, JVB, SOF LNO, STO/SAP rep, DoS interagency, KM, G-4, DIVENG, DIVSURG, chaplain, aviation (mission and situation dependent)</li> <li>• <b>Crisis response participants:</b> PA, G-7, COMCAM, G-3, MISO (battle drill dependent)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Inputs and Outputs:</b></p> <p><b>Inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information-related capabilities staff representative or section status (running estimates)</li> <li>• Intelligence collection assets</li> <li>• Combined information overlay, IPB</li> <li>• Media analysis and current communications plans</li> <li>• Cultural calendar</li> <li>• Engagements schedule</li> <li>• Target audience analysis</li> <li>• Theme and message MOPs and MOEs</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA effects nested with commander's intent</li> <li>• IIA synchronization matrix</li> <li>• Soldier and leader engagement plan</li> <li>• Refined themes, messages, and talking points</li> <li>• Refine operational (MISO) products</li> <li>• Targeting input</li> <li>• Updated combined information overlay, IPOE</li> <li>• Plans and orders update (asset allocation, resource and task)</li> <li>• Information requirements and long-term assessments</li> </ul>	<p><b>Agenda:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due outs and responsibilities from previous meeting</li> <li>• Calendar (host-nation, engagements, media events)</li> <li>• Intelligence update</li> <li>• Operations update, significant activities</li> <li>• Information engagement update</li> <li>• Review plans, future operations, and current operations</li> <li>• Assessment update (information requirements, Indicators)</li> <li>• Opportunity activities (exploitation or mitigation)</li> <li>• Issues</li> <li>• Review due outs and assign responsibility</li> <li>• Guidance and comments</li> </ul>

**Figure 5-1. Sample G-7 inform and influence activities working group**

5-4. Often, the brigade IIA working group has representatives from the same brigade-level staff sections and various information-related capability representations as the division IIA working group, with some deletions or modifications (see figure 5-2). These deletions or modifications are based on a brigade-sized element, either not resourced for certain capabilities and assets or because they are not staffed with the same personnel as a division or joint headquarters.

<p><b>Purpose:</b></p> <p>Prioritize, resource, and synchronize information-related capabilities to support the decisive, shaping, and sustaining efforts to accomplish the commander's objective.</p> <p><b>Battle Rhythm:</b></p> <p>Weekly (before targeting meeting)</p>	<p><b>Structure:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Lead:</b> S-7 (chair: S-3, XO, DCO, or CDR)</li> <li>• <b>Core participants:</b> MISO, PA, SJA, S-2, FAO, BN IIA reps, S-3, fires, S-9, OPSEC, CEMA</li> <li>• <b>Other participants:</b> S-6, COMCAM, CULAD, JVB, SOF LNO, KM, S-4, ENG, chaplain (mission and situation dependent)</li> <li>• <b>Crisis response participants:</b> PA, S-7, COMCAM, S-3 or battle CPT, MISO (battle drill dependent)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Inputs and Outputs:</b></p> <p><b>Inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information-related capabilities staff representative or section status (running estimates)</li> <li>• Intelligence collection assets</li> <li>• Combined information overlay, IPB</li> <li>• Media analysis and current communications plans</li> <li>• Cultural calendar</li> <li>• Engagements schedule</li> <li>• Target audience analysis</li> <li>• Theme and message MOPs and MOEs</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA effects nested with commander's intent</li> <li>• IIA synchronization matrix</li> <li>• Soldier and leader engagement plan</li> <li>• Refined themes, messages, and talking points</li> <li>• Refine operational (MISO) products</li> <li>• Targeting input</li> <li>• Updated combined information overlay, IPOE</li> <li>• Plans and orders update</li> <li>• Information requirements and long-term assessments</li> </ul>	<p><b>Agenda:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due outs and responsibilities from previous meeting</li> <li>• Intelligence update</li> <li>• Operations update</li> <li>• IIA update</li> <li>• Review plans, future operations, and current operations</li> <li>• Assessment update (information requirements, indicators)</li> <li>• Opportunity activities, significant activities (exploitation or mitigation)</li> <li>• Issues</li> <li>• Review due outs and assign responsibility</li> <li>• Guidance and comments</li> </ul>

Figure 5-2. Sample S-7 inform and influence working group

<b>Purpose:</b>	<b>Structure:</b>
<p>Prioritize, resource, and synchronize information-related capabilities to support the decisive, shaping, and sustaining efforts to accomplish the commander's objective.</p> <p><b>Battle Rhythm:</b> Weekly (before targeting meeting)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Lead:</b> J-39 (chair: J-3, COS, DCG-O, or CDR)</li> <li>• <b>Core participants:</b> MISO, PA, SJA, J-2, FAO, J-39, POLAD assessment rep, J-3, fires, J-9, MILDEC, OPSEC, space, CEMA and cyber support element, CULAD, subordinate unit G-7s,</li> <li>• <b>Other participants:</b> J-6, COMCAM OIC, JVB, SOF LNOs, STO, DoS or interagency, KM, J-4, DIVENG, DIV/SURG, chaplain, aviation, USAF LNO, Marine LNO, Navy LNO, multinational or TF LNO (mission and situation dependent)</li> <li>• <b>Crisis response participants:</b> PA, J-39, COMCAM, J-9, J-3, MISO (battle drill dependent)</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs and Outputs:</b>	<b>Agenda:</b>
<p><b>Inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information-related capabilities staff representative or section status (running estimates)</li> <li>• Intelligence collection assets</li> <li>• Combined information overlay, JIPOE</li> <li>• Media analysis and media event calendar</li> <li>• Target audience analysis</li> <li>• Theme and message MOPs and MOEs</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA effects nested with commander's intent</li> <li>• IIA synchronization matrix</li> <li>• Soldier and leader engagement plan</li> <li>• Refined themes, messages, and talking points</li> <li>• Refine operational (MISO) products</li> <li>• Targeting input</li> <li>• Updated combined information overlay, IPOE</li> <li>• Plans and orders update (asset allocation, resource and task)</li> <li>• Information requirements and long-term assessments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due outs and responsibilities from previous meeting</li> <li>• Calendar (host-nation, engagements, media events)</li> <li>• Intelligence update</li> <li>• Operations update, significant activities</li> <li>• IIA update</li> <li>• Review plans, future operations, and current operations</li> <li>• Assessment update (information requirements, indicators)</li> <li>• Opportunity activities, significant activities (exploitation or mitigation)</li> <li>• Issues</li> <li>• Review due outs and assign responsibility</li> <li>• Guidance and comments</li> </ul>

**Figure 5-3. Sample information operations working group (coalition, joint)**

5-5. Based on the situation and unit mission, a crisis action team or a contingency planning team may be required for exploiting, mitigating, or managing a situation quickly and effectively. The unit may convene a crisis IIA working group including, but not limited to, the following incidents: civilian casualties because of unit actions, kidnapping of a Soldier or U.S. citizen, downed U.S. aircraft, or a host-nation government official who has been killed or injured. The unit should develop battle drills for each adjoining contingency and identify staff actions to quickly mitigate or manage a situation. The crisis IIA working group typically consists of representatives from the following sections: public affairs, G-7; combat camera, G-3; and military information support operations (MISO). The responsibilities of each of the section representatives is described in table 5-1.



**Table 5-1. Roles and responsibilities of inform and influence activities representatives**

<b>Representative</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>		
<b>G-7 (S-7)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distribute read-ahead packets</li> <li>• Lead working group</li> <li>• Establish and enforce agenda</li> <li>• Lead information environment update</li> <li>• Recommend CCIRs</li> <li>• Keep records, track tasks, and disseminate meeting notes</li> </ul>		
<b>Cyber electromagnetic activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide automated and technical information and capabilities affecting the electromagnetic spectrum in an operational environment</li> </ul>		
<b>MISO</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advise on both psychological effects (planned) and psychological impacts (unplanned)</li> <li>• Advise on use of lethal and nonlethal means to influence selected audiences to accomplish objectives</li> <li>• Develop Soldier and leader engagement plan</li> <li>• Monitor and coordinate assigned, attached, or supporting MIS unit actions</li> <li>• Identifies status of influence efforts in the unit, laterally, and at higher and lower echelons</li> <li>• Provide target audience analysis</li> </ul>		
<b>G-2 (S-2)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide an intelligence update</li> <li>• Brief information requirements and PIRs</li> <li>• Provide information collection plan and assets</li> </ul>		
<b>G-3 (S-3)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide operations update and significant activity update</li> <li>• Task units or sections based on due outs</li> <li>• Update fragmentary orders</li> <li>• Maintain a task tracker</li> </ul>		
<b>Subordinate unit IIA representative, liaison officer</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify opportunities for IIA support to lines of effort</li> <li>• Provide input to assessments</li> <li>• Provide input to information environment update</li> </ul>		
<b>Public affairs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop media analysis products</li> <li>• Develop media engagement plan</li> <li>• Provide higher headquarters strategic communication plan</li> <li>• Provide changes to themes and messages from higher headquarters</li> <li>• Develop command information plan</li> </ul>		
<b>CA, MISO, cultural advisor, POLAD, human terrain team representative</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain host-nation calendar</li> <li>• Identify historic and cultural aspects of an operational environment</li> </ul>		
<b>JVB, protocol, SGS, command group</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain command engagement calendar, VIP list</li> </ul>		
<b>Assessments, MISO, CA, cultural advisor, others</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide assessment update (MOPs and MOEs)</li> </ul>		
<b>Other information-related capabilities representatives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Serve as SME for their staff function</li> <li>• Identify opportunities for IIA support to lines of effort</li> </ul>		
CA	civil affairs	MISO	military information support operations
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement	MOE	measure of effectiveness
G-2 (S-2)	assistant chief of staff, intelligence	MOP	measure of performance
G-3 (S-3)	assistant chief of staff, operations	PIR	priority intelligence requirement
G-7 (S-7)	assistant chief of staff, IIA	POLAD	political advisor
IIA	inform and influence activities	SGS	strategic guidance statement
JVB	Joint Visitors Bureau	SME	subject matter expert
MIS	military information support	VIP	very important person

5-6. Normally, core participants for an IIA working group at division level are representatives from the following:

- G-7.
- MISO.

- Cyber electromagnetic activities.
- Public affairs.
- Staff judge advocate.
- G-2.
- G-3.
- Foreign area officer.
- G-9.
- Military deception.
- Operations security.
- Assessment.
- Fires.
- Brigade S-7.

See figures 5-1 through 5-3 (on pages 5-2 through 5-4) and table 5-1 (on page 5-5) for more information on IIA representatives.

5-7. Depending on the mission and situation, other participants might include the following:

- G-6 representative.
- Political advisor representative.
- Joint Visitors Bureau representative.
- Special operations forces representative.
- Special technical operations representative.
- Space representative.
- Human terrain team representative.
- Department of State representative.
- Knowledge management representative.
- G-4 representative.
- Division engineer.
- Division surgeon.
- Chaplain.
- Aviation representative.
- Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force liaison officers.

## **WORKING GROUP MANAGEMENT**

5-8. The working group begins with a discussion of due outs or responsibilities assigned from the previous working group. Calendars of various types (host-nation, engagements, media events, and so forth.) are then discussed to synchronize messaging and actions. The Joint Visitors Bureau or a special staff representative provides a schedule of command group engagements over the next two weeks and highlights points of interest from past engagements. The public affairs representative discusses upcoming media events, analysis of the media, and any significant topics derived from completed events. A cultural subject matter expert discusses the host-nation calendar to inform other participants of significant dates, holidays, upcoming events, and input on the impact of completed host-nation activities. The G-2 (S-2) representative provides a brief intelligence update with IIA considerations. The G-3 representative provides the operations or significant activities update that quickly summarizes current operations, future operations, and plans. Sometimes the G-5 (S-5) representative helps with conducting this portion.

## **Information Environment Update**

5-9. The information environment update, conducted by the G-7 (S-7), builds upon the intelligence and operations updates. It considers, in most cases, aspects much larger than a unit operational environment. It aims to update the working group participants' situational understanding of the information environment.

This includes the physical, informational, and the cognitive dimensions that affect the conduct of decisive actions in an operational environment.

5-10. Some aspects of the information environment in the physical dimension are road, rail, air, river and canal systems; electricity, cell towers, cell networks, telephone, telegraph, military communications, satellites; Internet service providers, Internet cafes, radio, television, printed media; people, meeting places, organizations, and groups; information infrastructure change; and any system in which information can be transmitted or moved.

5-11. The informational dimension update includes—

- Details that constitute good information in a society or culture.
- Types of information considered important.
- The duration information remains important.
- Details or persons that make the information believable and relevant.
- Details that make the information complete.
- Specific information transiting or static in available information systems.

5-12. The cognitive dimension considers how key decisionmakers and target audiences use and respond to specific information or the loss of information, information systems, or key individuals. This dimension considers what they believe, think, perceive, and know based on their culture, religion, and history. Further, it examines what happens when an information gap that puts U.S. operations in the right context affects beliefs and perceptions of the target audience.

5-13. The G-7 (S-7) compiles and presents analysis of the information environment, but the G-7 (S-7) does not undertake the analysis alone. Routine contributors to the information environment update include representatives from G-2 (S-2), G-3 (S-2), subordinate units, cyber electromagnetic activities, G-9 (S-9), military information support units, public affairs, network operations, and space operations. Other contributors can include engineers, chaplains, special operations forces, aviation units, Department of State personnel, external organizations or liaison personnel, human terrain team, and interagency elements personnel.

### **Assessment Update**

5-14. The assessment update is a short synopsis of the impact of U.S. military presence, operations, products, and unit efforts given by the division assessments officer, with other staff elements, and subordinate units. Participants then identify opportunity activities (exploitation or mitigation) based on the host-nation calendar, media events, operations, information environment, and assessment updates. From this discussion, the division assessments officer identifies and informally assigns due-outs, tasks, suspense dates, and areas of responsibility until they can be placed into the formal orders process. Last, the assessment update addresses any related issues not covered as well as guidance and comments from senior attendees.

### **Inform and Influence Activities Working Group Input and Output**

5-15. Some inputs to the IIA working group include the following:

- Information-related capabilities staff representative or section status (running estimates).
- Intelligence collection assets.
- Combined information overlay and intelligence preparation of the battlefield overlay.
- Media analysis and media event calendar.
- Cultural calendar.
- Engagements schedule.
- Target audience analysis.
- Theme and message measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
- Synchronization matrix.

5-16. Possible outputs from an IIA working group are—

- Refined effects of information-related capabilities nested with the commander's intent.
- An updated synchronization matrix.
- An updated communication strategy.
- Refined message and talking points.
- Refined operational (MISO) messages.
- Targeting meeting input.
- An updated combined information overlay.
- Plans and orders update (asset allocation, resource, and task).
- An updated intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Commander's critical information requirements input.
- Information requirements and long-term assessments.
- Requests to higher for additional resources and assets.

## **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE STAFF PROCESS**

5-17. The MDMP is a seven-step process. The staff analyzes each problem the unit needs to address using this process to determine the proper requirements for addressing the problem.

5-18. The MDMP unifies the efforts of each staff section to solve a problem. Each staff section provides a piece contributing to the whole solution. IIA frame the problem and conceive solutions by focusing the information environment and the effects of this environment on other efforts. For example, if the problem is that extremist voices are swaying the local populace to support the adversary, then a solution might involve presenting a counternarrative to divide the populace from the adversary. Implementing this solution means understanding how the local populace receives information that they listen to and trust, what messages will resonate effectively, what friendly actions will threaten messaging efforts, and which channels of communications have the widest appeal and staying power.

5-19. From an IIA perspective, the steps of the MDMP would look like table 5-2 on pages 5-9 through 5-11, table 5-3 on page 5-13, table 5-4 on page 5-14, table 5-5 on page 5-15, table 5-6 on page 5-15, and table 5-7 on page 5-16.

Table 5-2. Mission analysis of the MDMP from an IIA perspective

<b>MDMP Task</b>	<b>Inputs</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Actions</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</b>
Conduct IPB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher HQ IPB</li> <li>• Higher HQ running estimates</li> <li>• Higher HQ OPLAN or OPORD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop IIA input to the IPB</li> <li>• Analyze key friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy leaders and decisionmakers; supporting decisionmaking processes; and communications systems</li> <li>• Identify adversary and enemy information capabilities and vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Analyze friendly information-related capabilities and vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Identify gaps in current intelligence on adversary and enemy information efforts</li> <li>• Derive IIA-related HPTs</li> <li>• Describe the part of the information environment in the commander's operational environment and its effect on friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy information efforts</li> <li>• Determine probable IIA COAs</li> <li>• Assess the potential effects of IIA on friendly, neutral, adversary and enemy operations</li> <li>• Determine additional EEFI (OPSEC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA input to IPB products. These become the combined information estimate</li> <li>• IIA IRs to G-2</li> <li>• Nominations to high-value target list for lethal and nonlethal attack (targeting)</li> <li>• Refined EEFI (OPSEC)</li> </ul>
Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specified and implied IIA-related tasks from higher HQ OPLAN or OPORD</li> <li>• IPB products</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify specified and implied IIA-related tasks in the higher HQ OPLAN or OPORD.</li> <li>• Develop IIA-related implied tasks</li> <li>• Determine if there are any IIA-related essential tasks</li> <li>• Determine additional EEFI (OPSEC)</li> <li>• Develop IIA input to the command targeting guidance</li> <li>• Assemble critical asset list, especially low-density delivery systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA-related tasks</li> <li>• Refined EEFI (OPSEC)</li> <li>• List of information-related capabilities to G-3</li> <li>• IIA input to the command targeting guidance</li> </ul>

Table 5-2. Mission analysis of the MDMP from an IIA perspective (cont.)

<b>MDMP Task</b>	<b>Inputs</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Actions</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</b>
Review available assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Current task organization (for information-related capabilities)</li> <li>• Higher HQ task organization (for information-related capabilities)</li> <li>• Status reports</li> <li>• Unit standard operating procedure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify friendly information-related capabilities</li> <li>• Determine if available information-related capabilities can perform all IIA-related tasks</li> <li>• Identify additional resources (such as fire support assets) needed to execute or support IIA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List of available information-related capabilities (IIA running estimate paragraph 2c)</li> <li>• Requests for additional Information-related capabilities, if necessary</li> </ul>
Determine constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander's initial guidance</li> <li>• Higher HQ OPLAN or OPORD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify constraints (requirements and prohibitions) on information-related capabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List of constraints on information-related capabilities (IIA annex concept of support or coordinating instructions)</li> </ul>
Identify critical facts and assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher HQ OPLAN or OPORD</li> <li>• Commander's initial guidance</li> <li>• Observations and reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify facts and assumptions affecting IIA sections</li> <li>• Submit IIA IRs for information that will confirm or disprove facts and assumptions</li> <li>• Identify facts and assumptions regarding OPSEC indicators that result in OPSEC vulnerabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List of facts and assumptions pertinent to information-related capabilities (IIA running estimate paragraph 2)</li> <li>• IIA IRs for information that will confirm or disprove facts and assumptions</li> </ul>
Conduct risk assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher HQ OPLAN or OPORD</li> <li>• IPB</li> <li>• Commander's initial guidance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify and assess hazards associated with IIA</li> <li>• Identify OPSEC indicators</li> <li>• Assess risk associated with OPSEC indicators to determine OPSEC vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Establish provisional OPSEC measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List of assessed hazards to IIA</li> <li>• IIA input to risk assessment</li> <li>• List of provisional OPSEC measures</li> </ul>
Determine initial CCIRs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA IRs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determine information the commander needs to make critical IIA decisions or to assess IIA actions</li> <li>• Identify IIA IRs to recommend as CCIRs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA IRs nominated as CCIRs</li> </ul>
Prepare the initial information collection annex	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initial IPB</li> <li>• Priority intelligence requirements or IIA IRs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify gaps in information needed to support IIA planning, execution, and assessment of early-initiation actions</li> <li>• Confirm that the initial information collection annex includes IIA IRs concerning adversary capability to collect EEFI</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA IRs for information needed to support IIA planning, execution, and assessment of early initiation actions</li> <li>• IIA IRs concerning adversary capability to collect EEFI</li> </ul>

Table 5-2. Mission analysis of the MDMP from an IIA perspective (cont.)

<b>MDMP Task</b>	<b>Inputs</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Actions</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</b>
Conduct mission analysis briefing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA running estimate</li> <li>• Unit standard operating procedure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare to brief IIA portion of mission analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA portion of mission analysis briefing</li> </ul>
Approve the restated mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restated mission</li> <li>• Mission analysis briefing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Receive and understand the approved mission statement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• None</li> </ul>
Develop initial commander's intent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher HQ commander's intent</li> <li>• Results of mission analysis</li> <li>• IIA running estimate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop recommended IIA input to the commander's intent</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recommended IIA input to the commander's intent</li> </ul>
Issue commander's guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher HQ OPLAN or OPORD</li> <li>• Results of mission analysis</li> <li>• IIA running estimate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop recommended IIA input to the commander's guidance</li> <li>• Combine the refined EEFI with the provisional OPSEC measures to produce the OPSEC planning guidance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recommended IIA input to the commander's guidance</li> <li>• Recommended OPSEC planning guidance</li> <li>• Recommended military deception guidance</li> <li>• Recommended IIA targeting guidance</li> </ul>
Issue warning order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander's intent and guidance</li> <li>• Approved restated mission, restated IIA mission, and initial IIA objectives</li> <li>• IIA mission analysis products</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare input to the warning order; Input may include—</li> <li>• Early tasking to subordinate units</li> <li>• Initial IIA mission statement</li> <li>• OPSEC planning guidance</li> <li>• Reconnaissance and surveillance tasking</li> <li>• Military deception guidance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Input to mission, commander's intent, CCIRs, and concept of operations</li> <li>• Recommended initial IIA mission statement</li> </ul>
Review facts and assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander's intent and guidance</li> <li>• Approved restated mission</li> <li>• IIA mission analysis products</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review IIA facts and assumptions</li> <li>• Refine initial IIA mission statement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updated facts and assumptions</li> <li>• Refined IIA mission statement</li> <li>• Refined OPSEC measures</li> </ul>
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement	IIA	inform and influence activities
EEFI	element of friendly information	IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence	IR	information requirement
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations	OPLAN	operation plan
G-5	assistant chief of staff, plans	OPORD	operation order
G-7	assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities	OPSEC	operations security
HQ	headquarters		

Table 5-3. Course of action development of the MDMP from an IIA perspective

<b>MDMP Task</b>	<b>Inputs</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Actions</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</b>
Analyze relative combat power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPB</li> <li>• Task organization</li> <li>• IIA running estimate</li> <li>• Vulnerability assessment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analyze IIA effects on friendly and adversary capabilities, vulnerabilities, and combat power</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Description of the potential effect on the relative combat power, stated by information-related capability</li> </ul>
Generate options	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander's intent and guidance</li> <li>• IPB</li> <li>• Friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy information assets, resources, and vulnerabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop different ways for IIA to support each COA</li> <li>• Determine information-related capabilities to use</li> <li>• Determine how to focus information-related capabilities on the overall objective</li> <li>• Determine IIA's role in the decisive and shaping operations of each COA</li> <li>• Determine possible tradeoffs between IIA and other assets</li> <li>• Develop input to military deception COAs (deception stories)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA concept of support for each COA</li> <li>• Input to military deception COAs</li> </ul>
Array initial forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restated mission</li> <li>• Commander's intent and guidance</li> <li>• IPB</li> <li>• Input to military deception plan or concept</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allocate information-related capability for each concept of support</li> <li>• Identify requirements for additional IIA resources</li> <li>• Examine effect of possible military deception COAs on force positioning</li> <li>• Identify military deception means</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initial information-related capabilities location</li> <li>• Additional information-related capabilities requirements</li> </ul>



**Table 5-3. Course of action development of the MDMP from an IIA perspective (cont.)**

<b>MDMP Task</b>	<b>Inputs</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Actions</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</b>
Develop concept of operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COAs</li> <li>• IPB</li> <li>• HVTL</li> <li>• IIA mission statement</li> <li>• Initial IIA concept of support for each COA</li> </ul>	For each COA— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop IIA concept of support</li> <li>• Develop IIA objectives</li> <li>• Synchronize IIA actions</li> <li>• Identify and prioritize IIA tasks</li> <li>• Nominate selected HVTs</li> <li>• Determine initial IIA task execution timeline</li> <li>• Refine IIA input to risk assessment</li> <li>• Develop IIA assessment plan</li> <li>• Identify additional EEFI</li> <li>• Identify and assess OPSEC indicators to determine OPSEC vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Develop OPSEC measures to shield OPSEC vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Determine residual risk associated with each OPSEC vulnerability after applying OPSEC measures</li> <li>• Determine feedback required for assessment of military deception COAs</li> </ul>	For each COA— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA input work sheet containing a refined IIA concept of support, IIA objectives, and IIA tasks</li> <li>• IIA execution timeline</li> <li>• IIA-related HVT nominations</li> <li>• Critical asset list</li> <li>• IIA input to risk management plan, including residual risk associated with each OPSEC vulnerability</li> <li>• Criteria of success and IIA IRs to support IIA assessment</li> <li>• Additional EEFI</li> <li>• OPSEC vulnerabilities</li> <li>• OPSEC measures (IIA tasks) to shield OPSEC vulnerabilities</li> </ul>
Recommend headquarters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPB</li> <li>• IIA running estimate</li> <li>• IIA vulnerability assessment</li> <li>• IIA tasks by IIA capabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assess mission command strengths and weaknesses to determine IIA-related vulnerabilities of specific headquarters</li> <li>• Reevaluate critical asset list</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recommendations concerning role of headquarters in light of mission command vulnerability assessment</li> <li>• Updated critical asset list</li> <li>• Initial list of information-related capabilities to tasks assigned</li> </ul>
Prepare COA statements and sketches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COA statement</li> <li>• An IIA concept of support and IIA objectives for each COA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Submit input for each COA statement and sketch to G-3</li> <li>• Prepare IIA concept of support statement and sketch for each COA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Input for each COA statement and sketch</li> <li>• Concept of support of IIA and sketches for each COA, stating the most important objectives for IIA</li> </ul>
COA	course of action	HVTL	high-value target list
EEFI	element of friendly information	IIA	inform and influence activities
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations	IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
G-7	assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities	IR	information requirement
HPT	high-payoff target	OPSEC	operations security
HVT	high-value target		

Table 5-4. Course of action analysis of the MDMP from an IIA perspective

Inputs	G-7 (S-7) Actions	G-7 (S-7) Outputs
<p>COAs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPB</li> <li>• IIA input work sheets</li> <li>• IIA execution timeline</li> </ul>	<p>Develop evaluation criteria for each COA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synchronize IIA tasks performed by different IIA capabilities</li> <li>• Integrate IIA concept of support into the concept of operations for each COA</li> <li>• Synchronize IIA concept of support with that of higher and adjacent headquarters</li> <li>• Identify adversary IIA capabilities and likely actions and reactions</li> <li>• War-game friendly IIA capabilities against adversary vulnerabilities</li> </ul> <p>War-game adversary IIA capabilities against friendly vulnerabilities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synchronize and deconflict initial IIA tasks</li> <li>• Refine targeting guidance and HVTL</li> <li>• Synchronize and deconflict IIA targets</li> <li>• Determine whether modifications to the COA result in additional EEFI or OPSEC vulnerabilities; if so, recommend OPSEC measures to shield them</li> <li>• Assign attack measures to HVTs</li> <li>• Test OPSEC measures</li> <li>• Determine decision points for executing OPSEC measures</li> <li>• Determine operational support needed for OPSEC measures</li> <li>• Determine OPSEC measures needed to support possible OPSEC branches and sequels</li> <li>• Determine whether any OPSEC measures require addition coordination</li> <li>• War game each military deception COA</li> <li>• Identify each military deception COA's potential branches; assess risk to the COA</li> <li>• List the most dangerous or beneficial branch on IIA decision support template or G-7 (S-7) execution matrix</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An evaluation of each military deception COA in terms of criteria established before the war game</li> </ul> <p>For each COA—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An evaluation in terms of criteria established before the war game</li> <li>• Refined IIA input work sheets</li> <li>• Refined IIA concept of support</li> <li>• Refined IIA objectives</li> <li>• Refined IIA tasks</li> <li>• Refined IIA input to attack guidance matrix and target support matrix</li> <li>• IIA IRs and requests for information identified during the war game</li> <li>• Refined EEFI and OPSEC vulnerabilities, and OPSEC measures</li> <li>• Paragraph 3 of the IIA running estimate</li> <li>• IIA input to G-3 synchronization matrix</li> <li>• IIA input to HVTL</li> </ul>
<p>COA course of action</p> <p>EEFI elements of friendly information</p> <p>G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations</p> <p>G-7 assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities</p> <p>HVT high-value target</p> <p>HVTL high-value target list</p>		<p>IIA inform and influence activities</p> <p>IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield</p> <p>IR information requirement</p> <p>OPSEC operations security</p> <p>S-7 inform and influence activities staff officer</p>

**Table 5-5. Course of action comparison of the MDMP from an IIA perspective**

<i>Inputs</i>	<i>G-7 (S-7) Actions</i>	<i>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COA evaluations from COA analysis</li> <li>• COA evaluation criteria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Compare COAs with each other to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each</li> <li>• Determine which COA is most supportable from an IIA perspective</li> <li>• Determine if any OPSEC measures require the commander's approval</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA advantages and disadvantages for each COA</li> <li>• Most supportable COA from an IIA perspective</li> <li>• IIA COA decision matrix</li> <li>• Paragraph 4, IIA running estimate</li> </ul>
COA	course of action	OPSEC operations security
G-7	assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities	
IIA	inform and influence activities	

**Table 5-6. Course of action approval of the MDMP from an IIA perspective**

<i>Inputs</i>	<i>G-7 (S-7) Actions</i>	<i>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Results from COA comparison</li> <li>• Recommended COA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide IIA input to COA recommendation</li> <li>• Reevaluate IIA input to the commander's intent and guidance</li> <li>• Refine IIA concept of support, IIA objectives, and IIA tasks for approved COA and develop associated G-7 (S-7) execution matrix</li> <li>• Prepare IIA input to the WARNO</li> <li>• Participate in COA decision briefing</li> <li>• Recommend COA that IIA can best support</li> <li>• Request decision on executing any OPSEC measures that entail significant resource expenditure or risk</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finalized IIA concept of support for approved COA</li> <li>• Finalized IIA objectives and IIA tasks based on approved COA</li> <li>• IIA input to WARNO</li> <li>• G-7 (S-7) execution matrix</li> </ul>
COA	course of action	OPSEC operations security
G-7	assistant chief of staff,	S-7 inform and influence activities staff
IIA	inform and influence activities	WARNO warning order

**Table 5-7. Orders production, dissemination, and transition of the MDMP from an IIA perspective**

<b>Inputs</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Actions</b>	<b>G-7 (S-7) Outputs</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approved COA</li> <li>• Refined commander's guidance</li> <li>• Refined commander's intent</li> <li>• IIA running estimate</li> <li>• G-7 (S-7) execution matrix</li> <li>• Finalized IIA mission statement, IIA concept of support, IIA objectives, and IIA tasks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure IIA input (such as, EEFI and tasks to support IIA to subordinate units) is placed in base OPLAN or OPORD</li> <li>• Finalize IIA annex</li> <li>• Coordinate objectives and tasks to support IIA with information-related capabilities staff officers</li> <li>• Conduct other staff coordination</li> <li>• Refine G-7 (S-7) execution matrix</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IIA synchronization matrix</li> <li>• IIA subparagraph to base OPLAN or OPORD</li> <li>• IIA annex</li> <li>• IIA input to the AGM and TSM</li> <li>• IIA input to military deception appendix</li> </ul>
AGM	attack guidance matrix	OPLAN operation plan
COA	course of action	OPORD operation order
EEFI	elements of friendly information	S-7 inform and influence activities staff officer
G-7	assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities	TSM target synchronization matrix
IIA	inform and influence activities	

5-20. For each step in the MDMP, the G-7 (S-7) or IIA planner is responsible for actions and planning products that paragraphs 5-21 through 5-33 discuss.

### RECEIPT OF MISSION

5-21. In the receipt of mission, the G-7 (S-7) participates in the commander's initial assessment actions, receives the commander's initial guidance, and performs an initial IIA assessment. Lastly, this officer prepares for subsequent planning.

5-22. The staff updates the IIA running estimate during receipt of mission. The staff also creates IIA planning products. They—

- Develop input to initial IPB, including initial essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
- Develop input to initial intelligence asset tasking.
- Submit information requirements to support IIA concerning adversary capability to collect EEFI to give to the G-2 (S-2).
- Develop an IIA input into a warning order. Input includes initial EEFI.

### MISSION ANALYSIS

5-23. During mission analysis, the G-7 (S-7) helps the G-2 (S-2) with conducting analysis and assessment regarding the information environment; gathers and shares information on threat information capabilities and vulnerabilities; and creates information environment-specific IPB products. This officer and the section coordinate IIA intelligence support requirements with the G-2 (S-2) information synchronization manager. Lastly, the G-7 (S-7) ensures the G-2 (S-2) staff clearly understands the intelligence support and products required for IIA planning, execution, and assessment.

5-24. The staff produces key IIA planning products during mission analysis. For the IIA portion of the mission analysis brief, they detail applicable concepts and objectives; IPB tasks, assets, critical factors, and assumptions; risk assessment; and information requirements. Other specific IIA products include—

- Requests for information for intelligence support.
- A refined IIA running estimate.
- A statement of the IIA strategy.

5-25. An effective mission analysis of the information environment considers all three dimensions (physical, informational, and cognitive) and the impact each potentially has on an operational environment. In most cases, the mission analysis will—

- Identify knowledge gaps translated into intelligence and information requests (typically information, information systems and infrastructure, and selected audiences).
- Identify desired effects for each of the three dimensions (physical is usually the easiest to factor; cognitive is the most difficult).
- Identify significant events and agents of change occurring in the information environment, such as the death of key personalities, loss of equipment or infrastructure, spillover of political unrest, introduction of new technologies, natural disasters, computer viruses, and others.
- Identify potential exploitation opportunities (physical, informational, and cognitive) that support or enable the operation.
- Identify friendly vulnerabilities in the current information environment (physical, informational, and cognitive) that may impact mission success.
- Identify the availability of information-related capabilities needed to achieve the desired effects.
- Identify the timelines most suitable to support planned operations.
- Identify the facts, assumptions, constraints, limitations, and regulatory restrictions affecting the employment of information-related capabilities.
- Identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- Recommend information-related capabilities.

5-26. Analysis of the information environment identifies subinformation environments, nodes, and methods that influence the larger information environment. Effective commanders and staffs understand the information environment will often be inconsistent throughout their area of operations. The information environments in different areas of a city or different rural areas often manifest different characteristics. These differences must be considered in the planning process. Key information nodes and communicators that influence the information environment serve as the equivalent to key terrain and must be identified. Communication methods change from area to area and vary between different groups and organizations; therefore, commanders and staffs analyze the methods to distinguish the specific characteristics and variances.

## **COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

5-27. During course of action (COA) development, the G-7 (S-7) provides advice on the potential impact of friendly and enemy information activities, related actions, or activities of the relative combat power of the two sides. This officer focuses IIA planning efforts on achieving an operational advantage at the decision point of each course of action. Lastly, the G-7 (S-7) develops schemes of support and objectives for IIA and input to a high-payoff target list for each course of action.

5-28. The staff produces key IIA planning products during course of action development. These include—

- Objectives and tasks for IIA annotated on the G-3 (S-3) sketch.
- The concept for the IIA graphic (IIA-specific COA sketch).
- A draft task organization and synchronization input for IIA.
- A high-value target list.
- An IIA assessment plan (measures of effectiveness and measures of performance).
- A communication strategy.

## **COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS**

5-29. During course of action analysis, the G-7 (S-7) helps the G-2 (S-2) with enemy information activities and assessments, provides input on high-value targets, and develops an IIA concept. This concept supports each friendly course of action, addresses critical event actions and messages, and reviews and refines task organization of information-related capabilities to support IIA.

5-30. The key IIA planning products built during course of action analysis include an IIA war-gaming work sheet and a draft task organization of information-related capabilities. Through war-gaming, the staff also refines and integrates IIA information requirements and elements of friendly information into the operational concept. The staff hones and synchronizes core tasks for the IIA annex.

### **COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON**

5-31. During course of action comparison, the G-7 (S-7) provides input. This input applies to course of action selection and evaluation criteria, IIA planning products, and an IIA course of action decision matrix.

### **COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL**

5-32. During course of action approval, the G-7 (S-7) participates in the course of action selection briefing. This officer is prepared to discuss how information-related capabilities support each course of action. The G-7 (S-7) helps finalize the commander's intent based on the course of action selected. The output from the G-7 (S-7) is a finalized IIA execution matrix.

### **ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION**

5-33. The G-7 (S-7) provides IIA input to the orders process (see figure 5-4 on page 5-19 and 5-20). This officer also produces or coordinates the following planning products:

- Paragraph 3.a (subparagraph 7), paragraph 3.b, and paragraph 3.c of the base order.
- Input to Annex A (Task Organization).
- Annex J (Inform and Influence Activities) and its appendixes (public affairs, military deception, MISO, and Soldier and leader engagement).
- Input to other functional area annexes—intelligence, fire support, signal, and civil affairs operations—as required.

<b>[CLASSIFICATION]</b>	Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number
<b>ANNEX J (INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number]                  [(code name)]—[(classification of title)]</b>	
<b>(U) References:</b> <i>List documents essential to understanding the attachment.</i>	
<b>(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan/Order:</b> <i>Time zone established in the base plan.</i>	
<b>1. (U) <u>Situation.</u></b> <i>Include IIA-related information that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion.</i>	
a. (U) <u>Area of Interest.</u> <i>Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) or the combined information overlay as required.</i>	
b. (U) <u>Area of Operations.</u> <i>Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).</i>	
(1) (U) <u>Terrain.</u> <i>List critical terrain aspects that impact execution of IIA tasks. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) or the combined information overlay as required.</i>	
(2) (U) <u>Weather.</u> <i>List critical weather aspects that impact execution of IIA tasks. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) or the combined information overlay as required.</i>	
c. (U) <u>Enemy Forces.</u> <i>List known and templated locations of enemy units with IIA capabilities. State enemy course of action and employment if IIA.</i>	
d. (U) <u>Friendly Forces.</u> <i>Outline the higher headquarters IIA plan. List designation, location, and outline of plan of higher, adjacent, and other IIA capabilities that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support.</i>	
e. (U) <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations.</u> <i>Identify and describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact the conduct of IIA.</i>	
f. (U) <u>Civil Considerations.</u> <i>Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.</i>	
g. (U) <u>Attachments and Detachments.</u> <i>List units that conduct IIA capabilities only as necessary to clarify task organization. Examples include tactical MIS teams, combat camera teams, and mobile public affairs detachments.</i>	
h. (U) <u>Assumptions.</u> <i>List any IIA-specific assumptions that support annex development.</i>	
<b>2. (U) <u>Mission.</u></b> <i>State the mission of IIA support of the base plan or order.</i>	
<b>3. (U) <u>Execution.</u></b>	
a. (U) <u>Scheme of Inform and Influence Activities.</u> <i>Describe how IIA support the commander's intent and concept of operations. Establish priorities of IIA support to units for each phase of the operation. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required.</i>	
b. (U) <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units.</u> <i>List IIA tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order.</i>	
c. (U) <u>Coordinating Instructions.</u> <i>List IIA tasks applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order.</i>	
<b>4. (U) <u>Sustainment.</u></b> <i>Identify IIA priorities of sustainment for key tasks.</i>	
[page number] <b>[CLASSIFICATION]</b>	

Figure 5-4. Annotated inform and influence activities annex

[CLASSIFICATION]
ANNEX J (INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[(classification of title)]
5. (U) <b>Command and Signal.</b>
a. (U) <b>Command.</b> <i>State the command post location of the G-7 (S-7).</i>
b. (U) <b>Control.</b> <i>State any IIA liaison requirements not covered in base order.</i>
c. (U) <b>Signal.</b> <i>Address any IIA-specific communication requirements.</i>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> <i>Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.</i>
[Commander's last name] [Commander's rank]
<b>OFFICIAL:</b>
[Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position]
<b>ATTACHMENTS:</b> <i>List lower-level attachment (appendixes, tabs, and exhibits).</i>
Appendix 1 – Public Affairs (Public Affairs Officer) Appendix 2 – Military Deception (Military Deception Planner) Appendix 3 – Military Information Support Operations (MISO Officer) Appendix 4 – Soldier and Leader Engagement (IIA Officer)
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> <i>Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.</i>
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure 5-4. Annotated inform and influence activities annex (continued)

## INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES PROCESSES

5-34. The G-7 (S-7) uses tools and processes such as the running estimate and the combined information overlay to gather information to plan, write, and assess IIA events. The tools and processes also help the commander in the exercise of mission command warfighting function tasks to inform and influence during operations.

### RUNNING ESTIMATE

5-35. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). The running estimate helps the G-7 (S-7) to record and track pertinent information about the information environment leading to a basis for recommendations made to commanders. Running estimates represent the analysis and expert opinion of the G-7 (S-7). Staffs maintain running estimates throughout the operations process to help commanders in the exercise of mission command.

5-36. When written, a running estimate consists of verbal summaries of available information backed up by overlays and charts. However, the running estimate format is less an outline for a written product than it is a way to organize information. The G-7 (S-7) maintains current information on all aspects of the situation, especially factors of the information environment, and is prepared to make recommendations on decisions the commander must make. The IIA running estimate format lists aspects of the situation in a logical sequence. The G-7 (S-7) can use it as a briefing aid to ensure units address all aspects of the situation.



5-37. Without being overly time-consuming, an effective IIA running estimate is as comprehensive as possible within the time available. Normally, the IIA running estimate provides enough information to complete the first draft of the IIA annex and provides IIA input to the base operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN). The estimate's view of future capabilities contributes to the commander's visualization. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the IIA running estimate provide input to the mission analysis briefing. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 provide input to the course of action decision briefing.

5-38. During peacetime and operations, the G-7 (S-7) maintains running estimates for specific missions. These estimates address decision points, branches, and sequels. If no IIA running estimate exists, the G-7 (S-7) begins developing one upon receipt of mission and continues to refine it throughout the operation. Staff officers responsible for the conduct of contributing information-related capabilities provide input to the IIA running estimate during peacetime and when they plan and execute operations. IIA input to the OPLAN or OPORD comes from the IIA running estimate.

5-39. Developing an IIA running estimate focuses on situation and information environment assessment rather than course of action development. It aims not to develop a perfect plan but to assemble information underlying an IIA concept of support that staff can modify to support the overall concept of operations.

5-40. The G-7 (S-7) uses the IIA running estimate to assess and analyze the course of action the commander is considering. It includes an evaluation of how factors in the area of operations, specifically in the information environment, may influence each course of action or mission. The running estimate includes conclusions and recommendations. A comprehensive IIA running estimate addresses all facets of operations and information and contains both facts and assumptions based on the G-7 (S-7)'s experience and expertise.


5-41. Running estimate development never stops. The G-7 (S-7) continuously maintains and updates the IIA running estimate as pertinent information is received. The G-7 (S-7) evaluates the information to determine possible effects on recommendations and conclusions about courses of actions.

### **Running Estimate and the Military Decisionmaking Process**

5-42. During mission analysis, the G-7 (S-7) produces paragraphs 1 (mission) and 2 (situation and considerations) of the IIA running estimate. These paragraphs guide all subsequent IIA planning—both for the current operation and for any branches and sequels. (See figure 5-5 on page 5-22.) By the end of mission analysis, the IIA running estimate includes the following information:

- The restated IIA mission. The G-7 (S-7) determines the initial IIA mission during the analysis of the higher headquarters OPLAN or OPORD and the restated IIA mission during mission analysis. At the same time, the commander approves the restated mission for the overall operation.
- Characteristics of the area of operations and the information environment that may influence friendly, adversary, and enemy operations.
- Adversary and enemy information capabilities in the area of operations. The information may be displayed as a situation template or combined information overlay.
- Assets and resources employed in an IIA role (determined during review of available assets).
- Critical facts and assumptions. (Facts are placed in the IIA running estimate subparagraph that concerns them.)
- IIA criteria of success for analyzing and comparing course of actions.
- IIA-related high-payoff target recommendations.
- IIA information requirements.

5-43. At the end of mission analysis, paragraph 2 of the IIA running estimate is well formed. However, it is not complete. As part of the IIA running estimate, it is updated as new information is received. Normally paragraph 2 of the IIA running estimate becomes the IIA input to the mission analysis briefing.



**Figure 5-5. Inform and influence activities running estimate and the military decisionmaking process**

### Course of Action Development, Analysis, and Comparison

5-44. The G-7 (S-7) uses the information in the IIA running estimate to refine IIA objectives and to check the soundness of the IIA concept of support for each course of action. The G-7 (S-7) assesses IIA resources, general strengths, and vulnerabilities that, if exploited by adversary or enemy, could cause the IIA supporting the course of action to fail. The G-7 (S-7) records the information gathered during course of action development for use during the course of action analysis. The information developed during the course of action analysis forms the basis for paragraph 3, course of action analysis IIA running estimate.

5-45. During course of action analysis, the G-7 (S-7) confirms and refines the following information contained in the IIA running estimate:

- IIA concept of support and objectives.
- Information-related capabilities strengths and vulnerabilities.
- Information-related capabilities resource requirements in terms of amount and effectiveness.
- IIA effectiveness of risk control measures and resultant residual risk.

5-46. The assistant G-7 (S-7) assesses the IIA concept of support against the IIA criteria of success as units war-game each course of action. The results of this assessment form the basis for the course of action comparison recorded in paragraph 4 (course of action comparison).

## Recommendations and Conclusions

5-47. The G-7 (S-7) staff analyzes the war-gaming of the concepts of support and compares results for each course of action with the others. The G-7 (S-7) rank orders the concepts of support for IIA according to how well they meet the evaluation criteria. Usually the comparison and ranking of the concepts of support are shown on a course of action decision matrix. The matrix and a narrative explanation are recorded in paragraph 4 of the running estimate. After analyzing and comparing the concepts of support, the G-7 (S-7) recommends the course of action that the comparison shows IIA can best support. The recommendation and summarized conclusions become the final paragraph of the running estimate.

5-48. Once the commander approves a course of action, the G-7 (S-7) analyzes how each information-related capability can best support it. This is not a total reevaluation. Rather, the analysis results from the course of action comparison based on the approved course of action.

5-49. The G-7 (S-7) prepares the running estimate. Upon completion of the running estimate, the G-7 (S-7) has prepared the majority of input needed for the OPLAN or OPORD. The G-7 (S-7) can build most of the IIA annex through “cut and paste” from a well-prepared running estimate.

## Running Estimate Briefing

5-50. The running estimate may be presented as a briefing to provide IIA information to the commander and staff. The G-7 (S-7) normally elaborates on key points derived from preparing the estimate, focusing principally on adversary and friendly information capabilities and vulnerabilities. Additionally, the G-7 (S-7) presents the support IIA can provide to each course of action. The briefing is part of either the mission analysis briefing (paragraphs 1 and 2) or part of the commander’s decision briefing (paragraphs 3, 4, and 5). The briefing itself consists of all of paragraph 1 and a summary of paragraphs 2 through 5 of the running estimate.

## COMBINED INFORMATION OVERLAY


5-51. The combined information overlay gives the commander and planners a visual depiction of the ways in which information affects the area of operations. Similar to the modified combined obstacle overlay, which the G-2 (S-2) develops during the IPB, the combined information overlay is a simplified depiction of numerous interconnected variables. The combined information overlay is a tool to visualize a collection of inputs that can never be completely synthesized. As such, it is never a final product; it is often updated as new information arises and as time and staffing permits. Reachback capabilities—from the 1st Information Operations Command (Land), intelligence sources, or other organizations—may provide a starting point for a combined information overlay, but the G-7 (S-7) continues to verify and refine the overlay with more localized analysis. Although the combined information overlay may include classified information, particularly when dealing with technical or military aspects of an operational environment, most information comes from open-sources dealing primarily with information and how it impacts local perceptions.

5-52. The IIA working group determines which categories of systems to incorporate into the combined information overlay. The operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time should be included. It may be useful to depict these variables on maps or diagrams. When considering the information aspects of an operational environment, examples within these variables include—

- Political. Political boundaries (cities, provinces), political party headquarters, and political survey data (favorability ratings, voting trends).
- Military. Leader affiliation, location of forces, class divisions, and readiness levels.
- Economic. Wealth dispersion, leading industries, banking, economic centers, and balance of trade.
- Social. Class distinctions, tribal systems, religion, public opinions, education and literacy levels, and displaced populations.

- Information. Print and electronic media outlets, information flow into and throughout region, Web access, and literacy.
- Infrastructure. Roads, bridges, towers, sea and airports, towns and cities, sewage, water, trash, and healthcare.

5-53. As the G-7 (S-7) analyzes these variables, the G-7 (S-7) begins to see connections between systems that impact information and information flow (see figure 5-6). For example, as terrain affects how or if information reaches isolated populations, military leaders align with certain religious groups or political systems. A region with a dominant political party may be out of line with popular opinion or a tribe may control local communications infrastructure, and so forth. Commanders recognize these connections as they visualize how their efforts can attain a desired end state, including cyberspace structures, such as networks. This understanding is especially important in planning post-combat operations.



**Figure 5-6. Linkages between systems**

5-54. Ultimately, commanders require information to help them determine where to expend their limited resources. In all probability, they want to maintain positive attitudes where they live, isolate recalcitrant populations with unfavorable opinions of U.S. forces unlikely to change, and expend most effort creating favorable situations among populations with whom they can communicate.

## Chapter 6

# Targeting and Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter discusses targeting and inform and influence activities. It first discusses the targeting process and targeting meetings. Then it discusses decide, detect, deliver, and assess. Then it discusses find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess. The chapter then covers criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. Then it discusses targeting and the military decisionmaking process. It concludes with a discussion of the synchronization matrix.

### TARGETING PROCESS

6-1. Targeting and inform and influence activities (IIA) use the same targeting process and formats as FM 3-60. No separate IIA method exists. The targeting process allows the IIA staff to synchronize limited resources in time and space to achieve the desired effects for the commander. The targeting focus of the G-7 (S-7) essentially answers the following for the staff: who are U.S. forces targeting, how will U.S. forces find them, what message will U.S. forces send them, and how effective was the sent message? Targeting is not a new or separate process from the military decisionmaking process. Targeting is a critical process for integrating among warfighting functions. (For more information on the targeting process, refer to FM 3-60.)

### TARGETING MEETINGS

6-2. Targeting meetings are chaired typically by the G-3 (S-3) fires. These meetings have a targeting warrant officer to help with synchronizing the targeting efforts of the staff. The IIA working group is a distinct and separate working group effort that feeds the staff going into targeting meetings. Members of targeting meetings look at how the staff achieves the desired effects to meet the themes and messages developed in the IIA working group for different audiences. The G-7 (S-7) looks at how the staff integrates information-related capabilities into operations to achieve the desired effects.

6-3. Targeting and IIA are both integrating processes that affect and reinforce each other. Information-related capabilities provide assets that detect targets, deliver effects, and then assess these effects. For example, individual Soldiers provide spot reports after interacting with civilians. These reports support detection efforts. Civil affairs units provide nonlethal nation-building assistance that seeks to build confidence in governance structures and separate the populace from the enemy. Public affairs assets assess the impact of a specific campaign or operation by analyzing media reporting.

### TARGETING METHODOLOGIES

6-4. Multiple methodologies exist in targeting. An effective G-7 (S-7) understands those addresses as well as other methodologies the staff uses for targeting to achieve the commander's desired effects.

### DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, AND ASSESS

6-5. While there are multiple methodologies to targeting, Army forces typically uses the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology. The D3A targeting process comprises the following four functions:

- **Decide** which targets to engage. (Which target audiences are we going to send a message?)
- **Detect** the targets. (Which intelligence collection assets will find the target?)
- **Deliver** the message. (Was the asset able to deliver the message as intended?)
- **Assess**. (How effective was the message received?)

6-6. Decide is the first step in the targeting process. This step establishes the focus and sets priorities for intelligence collection assets. It is heavily influenced by the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. During this step, forces determine to whom they aim their actions, images, and messages. Forces determine if they require a sequential order to shape an operational environment for either a friendly, neutral, or adversarial decisionmaker. They determine if they need specific enemy intelligence platforms targeted with specific information so the adversary or enemy commander takes a specific course of action. Forces also determine available specific platforms or assets, as well as duration of availability. For example, a commander may only have unmanned aircraft system support for four hours of coverage, operating in certain weather conditions. Lastly forces determine if they will cover down other assets to replace that coverage asset if or when it is lost.

6-7. The second step of the targeting process, detect, directs how sensors or surveillance and reconnaissance platforms find the specified targets. It attributes a specific platform or asset to search for a specific target in time and space to address a specific information-related capability. Typically, the staff closely coordinates with the G-2 (S-2) for developing the collection plan; however, sensors may also engage the targets once they are found. For example, a maneuver company may commence with a face-to-face meeting with tribal leaders because the staff designated these leaders as a key target audience to receive a certain message. Another example would be a signals intelligence platform searching for a radio frequency the adversary has used for mission command purposes. These detect actions focus on answering priority intelligence requirements or information requirements.

6-8. The deliver function of the targeting process is the execution of how the staff will shape the environment once the target has been identified. It identifies which assets to use in time and space, as well as what information-related capability the assets deliver. For example, a military information support team delivers loudspeaker messages and handbills during a specific phase of the operation to set conditions for the next phase.

6-9. The final step in the targeting process is assess. Assessment of effects determines if the intended target audience needs to be reengaged with the same or modified action image or message. During the IIA working group or targeting meeting, members of the staff present recommendations to the commander based on the measures of effectiveness and performance. Staffs continually determine whether or not the intended outcomes are being met, and if the commander must reestablish targeting priorities or allocate additional resources to meet the guidance. The outcome of the assessment begins the targeting cycle for the decide function again.

6-10. Combat assessment is the effectiveness of force employment during military operations, also known as battle damage assessment. Combat assessment is an aggregate of the measure of effectiveness assessment. Combat assessment answers the following questions:

- What did IIA and information operations do?
- Did IIA and information operations achieve the desired effect in the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions?
- Should the IIA and the information operations target be reengaged or modified?

### **FIND, FIX, TRACK, TARGET, ENGAGE, AND ASSESS**

6-11. Some targeting methods depend on the type of unit or mission. One such method—find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA)—is particularly useful in high-value individual targeting. Though typically used in special operations forces units, F2T2EA helps with aligning intelligence and operations assets for pinpoint targeting of personalities and exploiting vulnerabilities in a given network. For the IIA staff, targeting means continuous assessment of effects. (For more information on F2T2EA see ATP 3-60.1.)

### **CRITICALITY, ACCESSIBILITY, RECUPERABILITY, VULNERABILITY, EFFECT, AND RECOGNIZABILITY**

6-12. Criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) help in selecting the appropriate components when targeting. The CARVER method is used mainly by special operations forces units to assess, validate, and define requirements planning. Units use the CARVER

targeting process in addition to vulnerability assessments. Its use is not required but highly recommended to complete force protection plans.

6-13. The CARVER selection factors help in selecting the best targets or components to attain the commander’s desired end state. As the staff considers factors, each factor receives a numerical value. This value represents the desirability of attacking the target. Staffs place the values in a CARVER matrix (see table 6-1). After assigning values for each target or component, the sum of the values indicates the highest value target or component to attack in the limits of the requirements and commander’s intent.

**Table 6-1. CARVER value rating scale**

<i>Value</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>Value</i>
<b>5</b>	Loss would be mission stopper	Easily accessible; away from security	Extremely difficult to replace; long down time (1 year)	Special operations forces definitely have the means and expertise to attack	Favorable sociological impact, neutral impact on civilians	Easily recognized by all with no confusion	<b>5</b>
<b>4</b>	Loss would reduce mission performance considerably	Easily accessible outside	Difficult to replace with long down time (<1 year)	Special operations forces probably have the means and expertise	Favorable impact; no adverse impact on civilians	Easily recognized by most, with little confusion	<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>	Loss would reduce mission performance	Accessible	Can be replaced in a relatively short time (months)	Special operations forces may have the means and expertise to attack	Favorable impact; some adverse impact on civilians	Recognized with some training	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	Loss may reduce mission performance	Difficult to gain access	Easily replaced in a short time (weeks)	Special operations forces probably have no impact	No impact; adverse impact on civilians	Hard to recognize, confusion probable	<b>2</b>
<b>1</b>	Loss would not affect mission performance	Very difficult to gain access	Easily replaced in short time (days)	Special operations forces do not have much capability to attack	Unfavorable impact; ensured adverse impact on civilians	Extremely difficult to recognize without extensive orientation	<b>1</b>

**Note:** For specific targets, more precise target-related data can be developed for each element in the matrix.

6-14. As the staff evaluates each potential target for each CARVER factor, the analyst enters the numerical value into the matrix. After evaluating all the potential targets, the analyst adds the scores for each target.

The totals represent the relative desirability of each potential target and constitute a prioritized list of targets. Staffs consider the targets with the highest totals first for attack. (For more information on CARVER analysis, see JP 3-05 and TC 2-33.4.)

6-15. Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration in targeting. Criticality relates to the degree a target's destruction, denial, disruption, and damage impairs the adversary's political, economic, or military operations, or the degree a target component disrupts the function of a target complex. In determining criticality, staffs analyze individual targets in a target system in relation to the other elements critical to the function of the target system or complex. Critical targets may also be selected for information collection missions.

6-16. A target's accessibility is when an operational element can reach the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish its mission. A target can be accessible even if it requires the assistance of knowledgeable insiders. This assessment entails identifying and studying critical paths that the operational element must take to accomplish its objectives, and measuring those things that aid or impede access.

6-17. A target's recuperability is measured in time—how long it will take to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target. Recuperability varies with the sources and types of targeted components and the availability of spare parts. Recuperability may not be as important in terrorist targeting as the considerations of publicity, the symbolism of the target, and the desire to successfully accomplish an attack.

6-18. A target is vulnerable if there are the means and expertise to successfully attack it. When determining the vulnerability of a target, the scale of the critical component needs to be compared with the capability of the attacking element. At the strategic level, a much broader range of resources and technology are available to conduct the target attack. At the tactical level, resources may be limited to organic personnel, weapons, and munitions or assets that can be attached, borrowed, or improvised.

6-19. U.S forces only attack a target if they can achieve the desired military effects. These effects may be of a military, political, economic, informational, or psychological nature. Effects on the populace can alienate the local inhabitants, strengthen the resistance movement, or trigger reprisals against the indigenous people in the immediate target area. U.S forces calculate and weight collateral damage against the expected military benefit to determine if an attack is advisable under the concept of proportionality. Collateral damage includes, but is not limited to, civilian injuries, deaths, and adverse economic impacts of the proposed attack.

6-20. A target's recognizability is the degree to which it can be recognized by the threat, and the intelligence process, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets, under varying conditions. Weather has an obvious and significant impact on visibility. Rain, snow, and ground fog often obscure observation. Road segments with sparse vegetation and adjacent high ground provide excellent conditions for good observation. Units also consider distance, light, and season. Other factors that influence recognizability include the size and complexity of the target, the existence of distinctive target signatures, the presence of masking or camouflage, and the technical sophistication and training of the threat.

## **TARGETING AND THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS**

6-21. The D3A methodology is an integral part of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) from receipt of mission through orders production, dissemination, and transition. Like the MDMP, targeting is a leadership driven process. Targeting frequently begins simultaneously with receipt of mission, and may even begin based on a warning order. As units conduct the MDMP, targeting focuses more on the commander's intent and guidance.

6-22. The steps (see table 6-2) during the MDMP have a direct IIA action and a targeting action that occurs during the planning process.



Table 6-2. IIA action steps during the MDMP and targeting process

<i>MDMP Step</i>	<i>IO or IIA Action</i>	<i>Targeting Action</i>	
<b>Receipt of mission and mission analysis.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determine specified, implied, and essential IO or IIA tasks</li> <li>Select targets for nomination to HVTL</li> <li>Determine supporting IO or IIA capabilities</li> <li>Determine supporting IO or IIA objectives or essential IO or IIA tasks</li> <li><b>Product:</b> CIO, initial synch targets effects statements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determine specified, implied, and essential fire support tasks</li> <li>Determine HVTL</li> <li>Translate status of fire support assets into capabilities</li> <li>Develop draft targeting objectives or essential fire support tasks</li> <li>Nominate targets to HVTL</li> </ul>	
<b>COA development.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Input to concept of fires (or effects)</li> <li>Target nominations to HPTL</li> <li>Quantify effects</li> <li><b>Product:</b> initial synch matrix, effects statements refined</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop concept of fires (or effects)</li> <li>Develop initial HPTL</li> <li>Quantify effects for essential fire support tasks</li> </ul>	
<b>COA analysis and COA comparison.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Results of IIA or IO WG</li> <li>Input to TSM</li> <li>Discuss 1, 2, 3rd order effects</li> <li><b>Product:</b> synch matrix (command engagement plan)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Finalize concept of fires (or effects)</li> <li>Finalize HPTL</li> <li>Develop TSM</li> <li>Develop fire support control measures</li> </ul>	
<b>COA approval.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targets approved, added to TSM</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brief fire support plan as part of each COA</li> </ul>	
<b>Orders production, dissemination, and transition.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cross-walk IIA or IO and fire support annexes</li> <li><b>Product:</b> Annex J and Annex D</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Write fires paragraph of OPORD and fire support annex</li> </ul>	
CIO	chief information officer	IO	information operations
COA	course or action	OPORD	operation order
HPTL	high-payoff target list	TSM	target support matrix
HVTL	high-value target list	WG	working group
IIA	inform and influence activities		

**SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX**

6-23. The primary tool employed by the G-7 (S-7) and refined and driven by the IIA working group is the synchronization matrix (see figure 6-1 on page 6-6). The sample matrix is a comprehensive management tool that ties together objectives, themes, messages, targets, and assessments. Used effectively, it helps the staff ensure that themes, messages, and actions synchronize with each other and with operations to convey a unified narrative of effects.

6-24. IIA primarily strive to maximize intended consequences and mitigate unintended consequences. The G-7 (S-7) and the entire staff continually consider how to coordinate what the unit does with what it says and vice versa. The synchronization matrix facilitates this coordination.

6-25. The top portion of the synchronization matrix covers the D3A portion developed during the targeting meeting. The middle portion is refined and covered during the IIA working group as well as the themes and messages throughout the targeting process. The measures of effectiveness portion at the bottom is developed during the IIA working group and ratified during the assessments working group.

G7 Synchronization Matrix Format																		
IO Objective #1: Influence Iraqis to support GOI establishing a safe and secure environment for the establishment of a freely elected GOI & rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure.																		
DECIDE				DETECT				DELIVER				ASSESS (MOE)						
SEQ #	TGT SET	TARGET	IO OBJ Statement #/Effect	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	WHERE	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	WHERE	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	WHERE			
1.	C2	MAJ Muhammed Ibrahim-Tamini (cell number 312-857-281)	1. Exploit	STO Assets	EWS	281300APR10	AO	STO Assets	ED (location through cell phone)	281300APR10	AO	G2	INTEL report	Immediately after located	AO			
2.	IED Cell	IED cell material supplier	2. Disrupt	HUMINT/SIGINT	Intercept of interactions	301300APR10	AO	HUMINT	Introduce PP to suppliers	281300MAY10	Rasheed and Dora neighborhood	G2	Analyzing detonation reports	041300MAY10	Rasheed and Dora neighborhood			
3.	IED Cell	IED cell assistant driver (cell number 786-488-771)	3. Exploit	SIGINT	EWS	28-Apr-10	AO	SIGINT	ED (cell conversations)	28-Apr-20	AO	G2	INTEL report	As acquired	AO			
4.	IED Cell	IED cell email user	3. Exploit	CNO	CNE	Starting 28APR10	AO	CNO	CNE	28-Apr-10	AO	G2	INTEL report	As acquired	AO			
CDR/UNIT/MISSION STATEMENT			INFORMATION OPERATION OBJECTIVE STATEMENTS															
74TH Division is to kill/capture the collaborating Iraqi Army officer and disrupt the South Baghdad IED cell.			IO OBJ#	EFFECT	TARGET	ACTION	PURPOSE	NOTES										
			1.	Exploit	MAJ Muhammed Ibrahim-Tamini	Cell phone monitoring	IOT facilitate K/C operation	G7 notes										
			INFORMATION THEMES			2.	Disrupt									IED cells	Control capability	IOT force IED to switch an alternative method
			UNITE: Governance is the responsibility of the representative government. SECURITY: The people deserve freedom from fear and violence. CAPACITY: The government is responsible for providing essential services, strategic infrastructure maintenance, and security.			3.	Exploit									C2 cells	Cell and internet communications	IOT provide actionable Intel to maneuver units to K/C
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)																		
MOE#	ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTOR	SUBJECT	METRIC	BASELINE	MESSAGES		TALKING POINTS										
1.	Increase	MAJ Muhammed Ibrahim-Tamini	Location fix	By 100%	Compared to last 24 hrs	Command messages		Command talking points										
2.	Decrease	IED cells	Use of timer triggers	By 50%	Compared to last 30 days	Command messages		Command talking points										
3.	Increase	IED cells	Intelligence reporting	By 30%	Compared to previous week	Command messages		Command talking points										

Figure 6-1. Inform and influence activities synchronization matrix

6-26. The various staffs and organizations have different battle rhythms. At the targeting meeting, the synchronization for conducting intelligence and operations is coordinated to achieve the desired effects for the commander. Finally, the assessments working group considers the measures of effectiveness and determines if the appropriate effects were achieved during the targeting cycle. At that point, the cycle begins again to reengage those previously identified targets or engage new targets (see figure 6-2).




Figure 6-2. Battle rhythm

## Chapter 7

# Assessment of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter discusses assessment of inform and influence activities. First, it discusses the purpose of assessment. Then it discusses development of assessment.

## PURPOSE OF ASSESSMENT

7-1. Assessments help commanders better understand current conditions. The commander uses assessments to determine how the operation is progressing and whether the operation is achieving the desired effects. Assessing the effectiveness of inform and influence activities (IIA) challenges both the staff and commander. Assessment criteria must be measurable and tied to intermediate goals and end states. Development of assessment criteria for an operation starts at the beginning of planning cycle. The IIA section develops the mission and objectives for IIA. Each objective is supported by one or more measures of performance (tasks) and measures of effectiveness. Within each measure of effectiveness are one or more indicators that show progress towards achieving the desired outcome.

7-2. *Assessment* is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). The evaluation of the operation against criteria of success allows the commander and staff to make decisions and adjust the plan. Assessment entails the following three tasks:

- Continuously assess the reactions and vulnerabilities of relevant audiences and targets.
- Continuously monitor the situation and progress of the operation toward the commander's desired end state.
- Evaluate the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

7-3. The G-7 (S-7) uses a variety of means to conduct assessments, some internal to the organizations, others external. When time and resources permit, multiple sources help to corroborate other sources and strengthen the conclusions drawn from results. The commonly used sources are—

- Intelligence assets.
- Soldier and leader engagements.
- Civil-military operations.
- Polling and surveys, often conducted by contracted organizations.
- Media monitoring and analysis, especially local channels.
- Reports or information sharing with unified action partners.
- Reports or conversations with local partners.
- Passive monitoring, often by locals paid to submit reports of what they see and hear.
- Patrol and spot reports.


## ASSESSMENT DEVELOPMENT FOR INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

7-4. Assessment of goals and objectives is necessary when using various information-related capabilities in the conduct of IIA shaping operations. Specific indicators to measure are extremely hard to establish and must be identified early in the planning process. The identified indicators help the commander and staff to assess the effectiveness of the shaping operation.

## OBJECTIVE DEVELOPMENT

7-5. The unit mission, commander's guidance, and an understanding of the information environment provide the information required to shape the objective statement for IIA. The objective statement helps

staffs decide which effects and information-related capabilities they need to achieve the commander's intent in shaping the information environment. Figure 7-1 shows how to develop the IIA objective statement through effect, target, action, and purpose.



**Figure 7-1. Sample inform and influence activities objective statement**

7-6. The effect describes the specific desired effect (or outcome). Normally inform or influence are the most commonly used effects under the IIA construct. Additional effects such as deceive, degrade, deny, destroy, disrupt, exploit, isolate, mitigate, and neutralize are discussed in ATTP 5-0.1. The backwards planning process dictates the G-7 (S-7) start with the desired effect to ensure follow-on actions are coordinated.

7-7. The target portion is a detailed description of the target audience. The specific target audience could be a demographic of the population, an individual, or a defined area.

7-8. Action specifies the behavior or capability of the target audience. The desired target behavior of the target audience must be measurable, observable, and specific. The units or assets tasked to observe and report on the target audiences now have a specific criterion to refer to and can confirm or deny seeing the desired target behavior.

7-9. Purpose explains and justifies the benefit for the target audience. It directly links to the commander's intent and mission. Purpose is the planned rationale for the operational benefit the targets' behavior demonstrates by performing this action.

7-10. The G-7 (S-7) starts with the effect (describes the desired outcome), identifies the target (describes the detailed object of the desired effect), describes the action (specifies the capability of the target), and justifies the purpose (explains the benefit for the friendly force). In the objective of figure 7-4 (on page 7-4), the effect is to influence, the target is the locals in the area of operations Kate, the action is to vote in the upcoming elections, and the purpose is to show support for a democratically elected government and an independent nation-state.

7-11. The decisionmaker identifies the desired effect before well-intentioned ideas waste staff sections and limited resources. An effective G-7 (S-7) notes that the action phrase is measurable, observable, and specific to ease observations and measurements. The G-7 (S-7) also notes that the staff uses the action phrase to establish the measures of effectiveness as the subject.


7-12. The G-7 (S-7) develops three to five major IIA objectives during mission analysis. Staffs develop additional subordinate IIA objectives during course of action development and war gaming. These subordinate objectives are nested under a major IIA objective and have their own measures of effectiveness and performance. Also noteworthy, the IIA objective statement is the decide portion of the targeting (D3A) process (see Chapter 6).

## MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS DEVELOPMENT

7-13. Measures of effectiveness measure the results of the overall mission and execution of IIA objectives. More practically, measures of effectiveness determine if a desired condition or outcome is in place (that is, effect), even if it has not been directly caused by planned military action. The G-7 (S-7) writes objectives to articulate a specific condition or state in an operational environment. Most measures of effectiveness are crafted and used to measure the effects generated by those tasks collectively executed to achieve each IIA

objective. The G-7 (S-7) also develops more than one measure of effectiveness per objective statement and increases IIA assessment quality.

7-14. Measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or an operational environment. It is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, accomplishment of an objective, or creation of an effect. Measure of effectiveness describes what the specific target (audience) needs to do to demonstrate accomplishment of a desired effect. Since the IIA objective identified the desired effect first, the G-7 (S-7) determines how to measure the desired effect. The activity, descriptor, subject, metric, and baseline need to form a measure of effectiveness. Other observable actions can only be considered as indicators if they are not tied to activity, descriptor, subject, metric, and baseline. They may be subject to scrutiny due to a lack of proper statistical support. Figure 7-2 shows how each part of activity, descriptor, subject, metric, and baseline leads to a measure of effectiveness.



**Figure 7-2. Measure of effectiveness components**

7-15. The activity specifies a desired direction of change (increase or decrease). Increasing or decreasing describes how the specific subject (noun) is desired to change.

7-16. The descriptor is a restatement of the target mentioned in the IIA objective. The descriptor is the target audience and is responsible for performing the activity.

7-17. The subject is a noun related directly to the effected activity. The subject is what the G-7 (S-7) is trying to influence the target to do. The subject is the measurable, observable, and specific item that observers or other tasked assets can note.

7-18. The metric is the numerical percentage threshold of effectiveness that the G-7 (S-7) derives from the military decisionmaking process, commander’s guidance, research, and analysis. The metric is the percentage goal of how much the specific activity will change to prove effectiveness.

7-19. The baseline is the historical measure from which the current metric is determined to show statistical or acceptable significance. The G-7 (S-7) may have to establish a baseline metric, if no historical metrics exists. In some cases, it may take the G-7 (S-7) several months to establish a baseline. The lack of a historical basis for comparison lengthens the time to determine if the measure of effectiveness is successful.

**MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE DEVELOPMENT**


7-20. The G-7 (S-7) develops the measure of performance after the staff identifies the desired effect and develops a method to assess the effectiveness of pursuing the desired effect. Measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. Measure of performance describes what and how Army forces need to communicate to achieve the desired effect. Figure 7-3 on page 7-4 shows the key components for developing a measure of performance.

7-21. The quantity states the number of broadcasts or deliveries of a message or product. For example, it can state the number of night patrols.

7-22. The medium describes the product format used to disseminate the message. The medium can describe any type of print, broadcast, electronic, physical, or personal method to disseminate a message or a talking point.

7-23. The delivery states how and where U.S. forces delivered the medium or product to the audience. The delivery method helps to define how a selected audience reacts to a mode of delivery. The specific delivery method also allows units and assets to support the measure of performance.


7-24. The target provides a detailed description of the selected audience as described in the IIA effect. Again, an effective G-7 (S-7) diligently identifies and selects an audience to better allocate assets and better enable units to incorporate assessments into their operations.



**Figure 7-3. Measure of performance components**

7-25. IIA cannot generate effects if information-related capabilities do not execute tasks successfully. As such, assessment accounts for task execution. Because task completion affects execution as well as assessment, representatives and subordinate units of information-related capabilities report accomplishment of their respective tasks. Performance measures are not measures of success—they gauge task completion.

7-26. Measures of performance are future operations the G-7 (S-7) needs information about from units and fellow staff to generate effects. The G-7 (S-7) realizes the measure of performance nests in the detect and deliver portion of targeting. Figure 7-4 shows a completely developed measure of performance in terms of quantity, medium, delivery, and target.



**Figure 7-4. Assessment methodology for the information objective**

## Chapter 8

# Soldier and Leader Engagement of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter discusses Soldier and leader engagement. It first discusses the purpose of and defines Soldier and leader engagement. Then it identifies the principles of Soldier and leader engagement. It details the types of Soldier and leader engagement. This chapter then discusses mission command and Soldier and leader engagement. It concludes with a discussion of the engagement process.

### PURPOSE OF SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

8-1. ***Soldier and leader engagement is interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations.*** It can occur as an opportunity, a face-to-face encounter on the street, or a scheduled meeting. This interaction can also occur via telephone calls, video teleconferences, or other audiovisual mediums. Soldier and leader engagement supports both inform and influence lines of effort in the inform and influence activities (IIA) construct. Soldiers and leaders conduct this engagement to provide information or to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. This engagement provides a venue for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or incorrect information. Effectively integrating Soldier and leader engagement into operations increases the potential for commanders to mitigate unintended consequences, counter adversary information activities, and increase local support for friendly forces and their collective mission.

8-2. Commanders lead Soldier and leader engagement efforts and prepare subordinates for conducting Soldier and leader engagement activities throughout unified land operations. A fundamental and complex duty of a land force involves Soldiers having to operate among local audiences. Often, audiences in an area of operations look, act, and think differently from Soldiers. Sometimes the aims and ambitions of even a friendly or neutral audience fail to align with those of Soldiers and leaders. As such, Soldiers and leaders prepare to bridge these differences to build alliances, to encourage cooperation and noninterference, and to drive a wedge between the friendly and neutral audiences and adversary and enemy audiences.

8-3. Soldier and leader engagement is a component of a commander's communication strategy implemented by the G-7 (S-7) through IIA. The commander's communication strategy includes—

- Public affairs engagements, especially with the media.
- Planned, targeted messages and actions by military information support operations (MISO) with selected foreign audiences.
- Civil-military operations, such as humanitarian civic assistance.
- Military civic action projects.
- Engagements, such as those to support security force assistance efforts, and the capturing of key civil data.

### PRINCIPLES

8-4. In IIA, the following six principles characterize the effective conduct of Soldier and leader engagement to support decisive actions:

- Consistent.
- Culturally aware.
- Adaptive.
- Credible.

- Balanced.
- Pragmatic.

**CONSISTENT**

8-5. Soldier and leader engagements are consistent when they communicate the same essential meaning as other operational activities. Achieving consistency requires that commanders and their staffs understand effects in cognitive terms—the perceptions and interpretations that various actors and populations assign to operations and the conditions they cause. Soldiers and leaders lose credibility when audiences perceive engagement dialogue (words) as inconsistent with observable behavior (actions).

**CULTURALLY AWARE**

8-6. Soldiers and leaders conduct this engagement in the context of local customs, beliefs, and ways of communicating. Doing so builds understanding and cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and mistrust. Beyond familiarization with cultural practices, interacting with cultural awareness requires that Soldiers and leaders understand each population's communication style (direct versus indirect), their value of relationship over task, and their attitude toward time. A cultural support team facilitating an engagement illustrates how cultural awareness enhances Soldier leader engagement. Cultural support teams often consist of female Soldiers so teams can interact with indigenous women in regions where contact between an unrelated male and female is culturally unacceptable. Specially configured teams, such as cultural support teams, enable friendly forces to interact with a key demographic group while respecting cultural norms.

8-7. Indigenous communicators and leaders are sometimes the most effective at framing messages for populations in the area of operations. In the past, commanders and staffs have developed messages unilaterally from their own cultural perspective and simply translated or interpreted them into the local languages or dialects. Invariably, the intended message got lost in translation or the message conflicted with local views or norms. Leveraging key leaders or actors from target audiences allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with those same selected audiences. It increases the likelihood that an interaction will inform or influence audiences as desired. Understandably, units balance the use of such individuals against security concerns. Units employ trained influence specialists (such as military information support and noncommissioned officers) and resident cultural experts (such as foreign area officers or political advisors at higher-level headquarters) to carefully craft messages for delivery through culturally and linguistically familiar means.

**ADAPTIVE**

8-8. Adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and respond to a changing operational environment with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. Effective Soldier and leader engagement depends on adaptability. Adaptability relies on Soldiers and leaders who can think critically and use reasonable judgment, are comfortable with ambiguity, are willing to accept prudent risk, and have the ability to rapidly adjust to evolving situations. Military information support personnel often conduct Soldier and leader engagement and program management because of their assessment and selection process, training, and education. Soldier and leader engagement ties into the overall MISO influence effort.

8-9. Recognizing the interpersonal and often cross-cultural nature of Soldier and leader engagement, adaptability requires a commitment to learning. Successful adaptation requires acknowledging that in-depth understanding of the target audience in an area of operations can improve communication. Engagement characterized by an assumed superiority—a conviction that a message's inherent rightness disqualifies it from audience scrutiny—fails to support the conditions necessary to discover and adopt effective communication approaches. Thus, effective Soldier and leader engagement is more about dialogue and advising rather than dictating expected behavior.

**CREDIBLE**

8-10. Successful Soldier and leader engagement depends on trust. A fundamental criterion for trust is the degree of confidence populations have in the credibility of the Army forces with whom they interact.



Openness and transparency, with consideration for operations security, are fundamental to this effort. Thus, credibility results from an observable, sustained, and consistent pattern of factual words and principled deeds attuned to the local culture.

8-11. Establishing habitual relationships between U.S. leaders or Soldiers and representatives of key audiences helps to promote credibility. The habitual partner becomes the primary conduit through which information is passed. A conduit reduces the likelihood of information fratricide—the chance that key audiences will receive conflicting messages or commitments from U.S. or friendly partners. It also reduces engagement fatigue. Engagement fatigue happens when a single audience becomes overwhelmed by the number of Soldier and leader engagements in which it must participate. At higher levels, these habitual engagements form the basis of strategic partnering, which is especially important to security force assistance and building partner capacity.

### **BALANCED**

8-12. Soldiers and leaders balance their engagement efforts between the inclination to achieve the desired effect and the requirement to actively listen and understand another's point of view. During a single Soldier and leader engagement, Soldiers or leaders may achieve little more than increased understanding of the audience with whom they interact. Increased understanding is an acceptable objective for a Soldier and leader engagement. Understanding is critical to the success of subsequent Soldier and leader engagement as it lays the foundation for establishing solid relationships. A balanced approach to engagements helps to ensure both parties benefit from the event.

8-13. Imbalanced Soldier and leader engagement tends to have one-way communications, implying that people mutely receive information. Typically, this imbalance creates an audience perception that a Soldier considers the audience and their ideas irrelevant, leaving the audience feeling disrespected and marginalized. These perceptions potentially become significant obstacles to future engagements and achieving a commander's intent.

### **PRAGMATIC**

8-14. Communicating is difficult to predict and control. Pragmatic Soldier and leader engagement accepts the unpredictable, often opaque, nature of communications and operates with realistic expectations of message control. Leaders guide what their units say and do. However, they cannot control how others interpret friendly force messages and actions. Soldiers and leaders understand that the cultures, biases, religions, education, and experiences of the individuals and groups observing them shape perceptions or interpretations. Given the prevalence of technology, Soldiers and leaders cannot control who eventually receives communications beyond the intended receiver.

8-15. Pragmatism reflects an expectation and acceptance of prudent risk. Effective Soldiers and leaders expect small setbacks. Nurturing relationships and building trusted networks sometimes entails interacting with untrustworthy individuals. Soldiers and leaders may even reveal those maligned actors who previously went undetected.

8-16. Engagements with the local population and key leaders is a long-term, building effort assessed in terms of months or years rather than in hours or days. Pragmatism acknowledges that the effects of Soldier and leader engagement may not be immediately achievable or recognizable. Influencing audiences in an area of operations requires credibility. Building credibility, or trust, requires repeated and meaningful interaction. Recognizing any resulting change from these interactions requires familiarity or experience with the culture in which the Soldier and leader engagement occurs.

## **TYPES OF SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENTS**

8-17. In IIA, two types of Soldier and leader engagements exist—deliberate and dynamic. Deliberate and dynamic engagements differ in planning and execution.

## DELIBERATE ENGAGEMENTS

8-18. Deliberate engagements are anticipated and planned interpersonal interactions that achieve a specified effect or accomplish a specific objective. These engagements may be face-to-face interactions or they may be interactions via other means, such as telephone or video teleconference. Examples of deliberate engagements include—

- Scheduled meetings with key communicators or formal leaders.
- Participation in the planned opening of a local school.
- Delivery of information to a ministry official.

8-19. Effective deliberate Soldier and leader engagement integrates other information-related capabilities. This integration aims to achieve or complement desired effects. Examples of the integration of other information-related capability Soldier and leader engagements include—

- Humanitarian and civic assistance.
- MISO, such as delivery of products to target audiences.

8-20. Soldier and leader engagement involves method planning. As the Army's primary influence capability, military information support Soldiers are trained, educated, equipped, and organized to plan, conduct, monitor, and assess engagement with foreign populations and select audiences. This includes planning the engagements with foreign populations, leaders, key communicators, and others with the specific intent to influence the commander's objectives.

## DYNAMIC ENGAGEMENTS

8-21. Dynamic Soldier and leader engagement interactions are unanticipated or impromptu encounters for which Soldiers and leaders have not conducted deliberate planning. Dynamic interactions occur frequently. They may be spontaneous face-to-face conversations with local civilians during dismounted patrols or unsolicited visitations by local leaders to an operating base or combat outpost.

8-22. Although unplanned, effective leaders prepare their subordinates at all levels to negotiate impromptu interactions successfully before and during deployment. Preparation for Soldier and leader engagement starts as early as initial entry training when Soldiers begin internalizing the Army Values found in ADP 1. Displaying respect for others and communicating honestly (integrity) inevitably increases the likelihood of positive outcomes in any human interaction. Training for law of land warfare, rules of engagement, and culture as well as role-playing exercises prepare Soldiers and leaders to have successful interactions.

## MISSION COMMAND AND ENGAGEMENTS

8-23. IIA is an essential component of mission command. Mission command seeks to empower subordinates to lead at their levels. As Soldiers conduct Soldier and leader engagement, they use discipline and professionalism in day-to-day interactions. Such interaction amplifies positive actions, counters enemy propaganda, and increases good will and support for the friendly mission. These engagements provide the most convincing venue for conveying positive information, assuaging fears, and refuting rumors, lies, and misinformation. Conducted with detailed preparation and planning, interactions often prove crucial in garnering local support for Army operations, providing an opportunity for persuasion, and reducing friction and mistrust.

8-24. Commanders are the key engagers because their position and authority often invest them with the greatest degree of credibility and access to undertake engagements. They do more than simply model appropriate actions. During stability operations in particular, commanders maximize interactions with the local populace through frequent Soldier and leader engagement. Doing so enables commanders to—

- Assess attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors first-hand.
- Sense shifts in perceptions, both positive and negative, and take appropriate action.
- Engender the trust and confidence of the local populace.
- Sense and map the social networks active in the area of operations.
- Confirm who the key leaders are, as well as trusted, credible voices, both formal and informal.

- Bolster confidence in and consensus behind effective and mission-supportive local leaders.
- Deliver messages.
- Assess how effectively units synchronize words, images, and actions and make needed refinements.
- Quickly address adversary information.
- Ensure Soldiers and subordinate leaders effectively engage the populace in their areas.

8-25. Commanders foster a culture to achieve both their vision and their unit's mission. As commanders seek to shape a culture that exhibits and upholds the Army Values (among many other shared beliefs and practices), they shape a culture of engagement. This culture buoys Soldiers' confidence to engage many audiences, especially the populace in which they operate. Commanders may foster a culture of engagement in multiple ways:

- Guidance in the development of a robust communication strategy.
- Reporting and critical information requirements.
- Organization of the staff.
- Employment of public affairs and MISO for advice and assistance.
- Leading by example (such as actively conducting engagements).
- Training requirements (cultural, language, and negotiation training).
- Ensuring resources are provided to staff (manning, funds, and time).
- Building partner capacity with unified action partners.

8-26. Critical to fostering a culture of engagement is the commander's supplying subordinates with proper training and guidance. The commander's themes and messages and unit cultural and language training requirements provide subordinates with critical tools for engagements. Still, Soldiers and leaders will likely make mistakes as they navigate the values and norms of an unfamiliar culture. Commanders balance their response to cultural and linguistic missteps with the task to actively seek engagement with target audiences.

8-27. The staff actively contributes to the operations process and Army design methodology. The staff then takes the outcome of the commander's intent and guidance and turns it into plans and orders. Staff responsibilities include the following:

- Develop an overall IIA plan nested in the commander's intent.
- Plan and assess individual engagements.
- Synchronize actions with images as a reinforcing mechanism.
- Prevent information fratricide.
- Make maximum use of resources.
- Develop synchronization and execution matrixes.
- Ensure information sharing.
- Coordinate through the G-7 (S-7) for other information-related capabilities to support planning and execution of Soldier and leader engagement.
- Help the commander in developing themes and messages.
- Utilizing the targeting process, integrate and synchronize deliberate engagements, and ensure deconfliction.
- Analyze target audiences or individuals of interest; provide targeting packets.
- Collect, analyze, and maintain engagement data.
- Assess results of engagements.
- Coordinate refinement of future engagements.
- Recommend reengagement.
- Update the IIA running estimate.

8-28. Chapter 4 discusses other staff responsibilities during the planning process. Chapter 3 discusses information-related capabilities and IIA in the planning process.


## ENGAGEMENT PROCESS

8-29. Soldier and leader engagements involve detailed planning. They also involve developing the commander's intent, messages, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) with specific focus on the information environment, rules of engagement, and an assessment of the area of operations. Throughout the engagement process, staffs consider all these elements and develop them further.

8-30. The engagement process for Soldier and leader engagements nests with the operations process of plan, prepare, execute, and assess (see figure 8-1). Each requirement in the engagement process details requirements for successful Soldier and leader engagements. The G-7 (S-7) has responsibility to integrate all information-related capabilities into the overall operations process for the commander. The G-7 (S-7) coordinates with the military information support planner to ensure Soldier and leader engagements are synchronized with all other information-related capabilities.

### PLAN

8-31. Commanders decide what they want to achieve during engagements with their various engagement targets and target audiences in the area of operations. Soldier and leader engagement objectives nest with the commander's intent and the overall objectives established to attain the commander's desired end state. The G-7 (S-7) makes the necessary recommendations to the commander for Soldier and leader engagement objectives and ensuring these objectives nest with and support the commander's intent and overall objectives.



**Figure 8-1. Engagement process**

8-32. The G-7 (S-7) provides recommendations to the commander for the frequency and timing of Soldier and leader engagements. Continuous messaging to the engagement target and target audiences requires subordinate leaders and Soldiers to have detailed guidance for the time and frequency of engagements. Leaders verify that the timing of the engagement does not conflict with other operations. Effective commanders coordinate and synchronize engagement activities using a working group occurring in the unit's battle rhythm such as the IIA working group. This ensures the optimal timing of engagements and mutual support of other information-related capabilities and ongoing operations.

8-33. The G-7 (S-7) recommends engagement targets to the commander for approval as a part of unit battle rhythm and targeting cycle decision briefs. During their IPB planning efforts, the G-7 (S-7) recommends to the commander who to engage, when to engage, and where to engage the target audience. When deciding those involved, the G-7 (S-7) identifies the key informal and formal leaders, key communicators, actors, and other influential personalities in their area of operations. Soldier and leader engagements are ideally

targeted engagements deliberately planned using the analysis conducted during IPB. Critical to this process is the social and link analysis to determine the scope of influence that each engagement target may have. Properly identifying leader engagement targets maximizes the second- and third-order effects of the delivered messages. Leader engagement targets with a broader scope of influence potentially create a larger cascading effect across the area of operations.

8-34. The G-7 (S-7), in coordination with MISO planners, utilizes this analysis to determine the command themes and messages to emphasize to specific target audiences during Soldier and leader engagements. These command themes and messages must nest with the command themes and messages of the higher headquarter and the MISO themes and messages for that area of operations. The G-7 (S-7) also ensures command themes and messages align with any published public affairs guidance to avoid delivering conflicting messages. Specific engagement targets and target audiences must have reinforced messaging through other outputs as affected by additional information-related capabilities in the information environment. To ensure maximum effect on the engagement targets and target audiences, the G-7 (S-7) synchronizes these additional information-related capabilities outputs for consistency with Soldier and leader engagement messages. Military information support forces have the best qualifications to analyze operational environments and populations in those environments.

8-35. The G-7 (S-7) coordinates closely with other staff elements and subordinate units to recommend the best venue for a planned Soldier and leader engagement. This venue selection maximizes the opportunity for success in accomplishing the desired objective or attaining the desired end state. The G-7 (S-7) integrates and synchronizes other information-related capabilities with the venue to maximize the opportunity for operational success. Commanders determine the best location and setting in which to conduct Soldier and leader engagements. The combined information overlay, intelligence estimates, cultural assessments, and running estimates often influence the venue selection for Soldier and leader engagements. Furthermore, target audiences seek their own engagements with Soldiers and leaders. Examples of Soldier and leader engagement venues include—

- Private meetings.
- Local government meetings.
- Civic, market, or community meetings.
- Public forum or town hall meetings.
- Civil affairs operations.
- Civil military operations.
- Face-to-face public interactions.
- Telephone conversations.
- Video teleconferences.

## **PREPARE**

8-36. Soldiers and leaders prepare for deliberate engagements as they would any task or mission. Some IIA preparation such as language and cultural preparation occurs before deployment. Cultural understanding, survival-level language, and negotiation training prepare Soldiers and leaders to address the typically unfamiliar and dynamic foreign environment encountered during an engagement.

## **Engagement Plan**

8-37. The G-7 (S-7) can prepare Soldiers and leaders for an engagement by organizing the event into three distinct steps: introduction, business, and post-business. These steps form the engagement plan by providing a logical structure to the engagement and details for the engagement work sheets (see figure 8-2). For an effective Soldier and leader engagement, the G-7 (S-7) uses local customs, etiquette, and beliefs to guide and inform planning of each of these steps. Ignoring such key details detracts from the overall effectiveness of a deliberate engagement and contributes to not accomplishing the desired objective or attaining the desired end state for an engagement.

<b>CONTACT:</b> Faris Nasser Hussein (Deputy/Provincial Governor)		<b>DTG:</b> 081310OCT08	<b>Copy</b> 1 of 1
<b>INTENDED OUTCOME:</b> Faris agrees to direct ISF to conduct joint operations with 1BCT that leads to the establishment of JSS posts replacing BCT-only COPs.			
<b>INTENDED OUTCOME STRATEGY:</b> D/PG agrees to JSS occupation time line for ISF within all of the population centers in Ghazi Province within the 2-month suspense set by division.		<b>COUNTERPARTS PREDICTED INTENDED OUTCOME/STRATEGY:</b> Increase his political standing by taking credit for the increased security being provided. This will be supported by his taking credit for negotiating an American presence to continue the training of ISF that leads to an overall increased ISF capability throughout the Ghazi Province. This increase in political standing will be compounded by determining an American timeline for withdrawal.	
<b>IO MESSAGE:</b> The population will become more supportive of the government as an Iraqi-led security effort secures the population			
<b>TALKING POINTS supporting Intended Outcome:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Greater security allows for more rapid progress in improving ESS.</li> <li>Improved ESS equals greater legitimacy for the government.</li> <li>Increase in Iraqi leadership of security effort will increase public confidence in ISF and government.</li> <li>Increased positive sentiment will increase his public standing as a capable politician.</li> <li>Increased public standing will increase his power base and support an increase in his roles and responsibilities within the Gol.</li> </ul>		<b>Order of Events:</b> 1310 - Greeting 1312 - Small Talk (family, sheep farm) 1330 - Business (security, Iraqi lead, legitimacy, increased public standing) 1355 - Review of agreements/small talk 1410 - Meeting complete	
<b>Possible Impasse Issues:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Timeline for occupying the COPs with ISF.</li> <li>Will not occupy until greater security is provided to provincial leader's homes.</li> <li>Will not occupy until electrical issues have been resolved w/n province (14-hour blackouts).</li> </ul>		<b>Offers/ZOPA:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agree to conduct security assessment for all provincial leader homes.</li> <li>Establishment of JSSs to increase security of provincial leader homes.</li> </ul>	
<b>TALKING POINTS supporting possible impasse issues:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CF will not remain in Iraq forever and ISF must continue to make improvements in leading the security effort within the province.</li> <li>Population will become less supportive of his efforts if they feel that there is a stall in improvements to their quality of life.</li> <li>Population will feel less secure for their own safety if they perceive that there is less of a security effort in their communities than with the provincial leadership.</li> <li>Electrical assessment is complete and acquisition of the generators is in progress.</li> </ul>			
<b>Counterpart's Bio:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eldest son of prominent family with connections to national government (cousin to elected official).</li> <li>Exiled to Jordan to avoid military service during Saddam Hussein's regime.</li> <li>Asked to return to serve in Medina Jabal following the fall of Saddam Hussein.</li> <li>Increased political posture by being a champion for economic development.</li> <li>Married with two sons (20 and 18). Has siblings still in Jordan.</li> <li>Has a successful sheep farm in Jordan, pursuing business opportunities in media (radio/print). MBA from Bagdad University.</li> </ul>		<b>Coordination Measures:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IP SLE (93d MP)</li> </ul>	<b>EXIT STRATEGY:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apologize up front for having only an hour for the meeting due to competing requirements with division.</li> </ul>
<b>Previous Promises Made:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Electrical assessment of the province to be completed with the Ministry of Electricity.</li> <li>D/PG to "look into" running an IP recruiting drive.</li> </ul>		<b>Promises Kept:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>D/PG reduced curfews by 25 percent.</li> </ul>	
<b>PRINCIPLE'S BATNA:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishment of JSSs agreed upon with a more concrete plan to be completed by the BCT for presentation back to the D/PG (reinforce that it is the D/PG's idea and we owe him the plan to accomplish ICW-ISF).</li> </ul> <b>COUNTERPART BATNA (predicted):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BCT continues to provide security in the COPs while ISF focuses on security of provincial leadership.</li> </ul>			
<b>LEGEND</b>			
BATNA	best alternative to a negotiated agreement	ESS	essential services
D/PG	deputy/provincial government	Gol	government of Iraq
JSS	joint security station	COP	common operational picture
ICW	in coordination with	CF	coalition force
ISF	Iraqi security force	IP	Iraqi Police
		MP	military police
		BCT	brigade combat team
		MBA	Master of Business Administration
		SLE	Soldier and leader engagement
		ZOPA	zone of possible agreement

Figure 8-2. Sample engagement work sheet

**The Introduction**

8-38. The introduction potentially sets the tone for the remainder of the engagement. Some key considerations to observe during the introduction step include—

- Position immediately next to the engaged audience and ensure the designated process has enough access to record accurate details of the meeting.
- Establish rapport with the engaged audience. Use the appropriate greeting phrase in the native language, when possible. If hosting the engagement, adhere to as many local customs as applicable.
- Introduce and record the names and positions of everyone in attendance.
- Follow the norms provided by the local culture and customs during the introduction. If it is appropriate to serve a beverage, offer small talk, and discuss personal issues, then be prepared to do so.
- Apologize in advance for any cultural mistakes made and comment they are not intentional. Ask the engaged audience to please identify any mistakes made for learning and future engagements.

- Be careful about telling jokes; they can backfire when translated.
- Transition from the introduction step to the business step with a prepared transition. Do not just bluntly start speaking to the specifics of the meeting if the local custom does not dictate such behavior.

### ***Business***

8-39. The business step is the focus of the engagement. In this step, the spokesperson uses the planned talking points and works toward the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) for the given engagement. Soldiers consider the following during this step:

- Avoid making or implying promises that cannot be kept.
- Use open-ended questions to facilitate discussion. Yes or no answers tend to be incomplete and inaccurate.
- Address all talking points relevant to the engagement. Utilize the talking points to focus the discussion and reduce any wasted time.
- Focus on avoiding or overcoming impasses and working toward the anticipated ZOPA.
- It may be necessary at times to restate or reframe a question or statement. Reframing ensures that what is said is not misunderstood and helps communicate the meaning when working through an interpreter.
- Have a planned signal with the process observer or other assistant for any situation where the spokesperson may need to break from the engagement (for example, someone has called for the spokesperson to return to the headquarters due to an unforeseen emergency).

### ***Post-Business***

8-40. Post-business includes—

- Summarizing what both parties agreed to and clarifying expected actions by both parties.
- Agreeing on a general date for a follow-up engagement, if required.
- Taking a photo with the engaged audience to build rapport and use in subsequent engagements as a gift to be presented in an effort to create a feeling of reciprocity.
- Receiving a thorough debriefing from the G-7 (S-7) of the process observer, translator, and spokesperson as soon as possible following the engagement.


8-41. Using engagement reports for post-business effectively captures important information from an engagement to share with other commands or staff sections. The G-7 (S-7) integrates engagement reporting with routine reporting systems and mechanisms common to the unit and its higher headquarters. Regardless of the reporting conduit, a timely engagement report ensures situational awareness across the area of operations. For units with engagement targets that have patterns of life beyond their unit boundaries, situational awareness can potentially impact adjacent units and the higher headquarters.

8-42. Effective engagement reports include—

- Reporting unit with contact information.
- Engagement target name, demographic data, and location.
- Known affiliations and personality links of the engagement target.
- Purpose for the engagement.
- Background of the engagement and synopsis of previous engagements.
- Attendees.
- Summary of the engagement outcome and duration.
- Additional atmospherics and attitudes.
- Initial assessment of success in reaching intended outcome.
- Promises made.
- Date-time group of agreed follow-up meeting (if required).

## Negotiations Preparation

8-43. Preparing for Soldier and leader engagements includes deliberately planning through a process that identifies the intended outcome or desired end state for the engagement. Specifically for Soldier and leader engagements, pre-engagement analysis identifies the commander's desired end state of the engagement, the target's desired end state, and the consequences from not attaining the desired end states for both parties. Typical negotiation strategies label these determinations as the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) and the ZOPA. The BATNA identifies what each party is walking away to in the event that there is no achievement of a desired end state. A BATNA can be conditions, situations, numeric quantities, or alternate solutions to be pursued through subsequent Soldier and leader engagement with other parties. The ZOPA identifies the area where the principal's desired end state overlaps with that of the engagement target's. In this area, both can agree to the parameters of a solution or outcome for which the engagement was designed to achieve. In Soldier and leader engagements, this outcome could be to inform or influence the engagement target, and it may not necessarily be an agreement that provides a tangible result. In such a scenario, the ZOPA may relate more to incentives applied to influence the engagement target or to the level or quantity of details that provide the target enough insight to be considered informed. An effective principal prepares to address potential impasses that may hamper engagement efforts. To have a successful engagement, principals identify potential impasses during planning and develop strategies that properly address them in order. Additionally, attaining the desired end state involves not only the principal reaching an objective, but engagement targets feeling as though they gained something of value from the meeting. Commanders, staffs, and ultimately the engagement target must view any Soldier and leader engagement as a win-win and not as a win-lose situation (see figure 8-3).



**Figure 8-3. ZOPA and BATNA**

## Other Necessary Information

8-44. Units have numerous methods for capturing the data necessary to conduct engagements while deploying in overseas contingency operations. In preparation for conducting an engagement, leaders know or have the following information:

- Engagement target's name.
- Title or role of subject or target.
- Relevant affiliations of target (religious, political, social link analysis).
- Location of the engagement.
- Date-time group of the engagement.
- Picture (if available).
- Pictures of other personalities accompanying the target.
- Others to be present at engagement and summary of relevance to event.



- Commander's intent or desired end state of the engagement.
- Best alternative to negotiated agreement (if negotiating) for both parties.
- Zone of possible agreement between parties.
- Supported themes, messages, and specific talking points.
- Local grievances or sensitive issues.
- Summary of previous engagements (if conducted) should include agreements made, kept, and those unmet.
- Updates on target's actions or situations the target was involved in since last meeting.
- Agenda for the leader engagement (general order of events).

8-45. In preparation for an engagement, review relevant guidance from the higher headquarters as well as recent updates to running estimates or activity in the area of operations. Reviewing the commander's intent, command themes and messages, and public affairs guidance decreases the risk that information provided or action taken during a Soldier and leader engagement contradicts higher-level guidance and themes. Finally, review local grievances and enemy activity. Understanding the issues most relevant to engagement targets and the target audience allows the Soldier to plan responses to potential accusations or queries.

8-46. IIA units rehearse planned engagements under conditions that closely approximate the environment and conditions in which they will conduct the engagement. If they use an interpreter, include the interpreter in the rehearsal. Rehearse the planned dialogue used during the Soldier and leader engagement or use a back-translation for a document. (A back-translation is a translated document translated back into the original language and then compared with the original to ensure the meanings match.) Following these procedures helps in mitigating the risk of information fratricide.

## **EXECUTE**

8-47. During the execution of an engagement, a Soldier or leader considers the following:

- Avoid rushing through the meeting. Plan for enough time to accommodate the culture and avoid making the engaged audience feel they are low on the priority list. Prepare for small talk before discussing business. Take cues from the audience.
- Ask permission to take photos of the engaged audience. Staffs can later use these photos to update personality profiles and target folders.
- Never assume the engaged audience does not speak or understand English.
- When listening or speaking, always maintain eye contact with the audience. Watch the audience's gestures, eyes, and body language, not those of the translator.
- Speak in short sentences. Do not recite a long paragraph and expect the translator to convey the message accurately. The engaged audiences should feel that they are being conversed with, not being lectured to. One to two sentences at a time is a good rule.
- Avoid using acronyms, slang, and idioms. Keep the language simple.
- Treat all members of the engaged audience with courtesy and respect.
- Avoid elevating position or embellishing authority. Avoid making promises but follow up as soon as possible to not decrease the engaged audience's respect or lose credibility with them.
- Know the body language from all parties. Ensure the body language does not negate the message.
- Utilize a process observer during the meeting to record key notes, the atmosphere, and body language of participants.






## **ASSESS**

8-48. One of the most difficult aspects of Soldier and leader engagement is assessment. Any assessment related specifically to Soldier and leader engagement feeds the larger assessment used in determining overall success in accomplishing the commander's operational objectives or attaining the desired end state. During the planning process, the G-7 (S-7) supports the overall assessment process by developing—

- Soldier and leader engagement target list.
- Measures of performance.
- Measures of effectiveness.
- Input into the commander’s critical information requirements.
- Reporting protocols.

**Soldier and Leader Engagement Target List**

8-49. The Soldier and leader engagement target list is a high pay-off target list for Soldier and leader engagement. The G-7 (S-7) prioritizes and gains approval of the list by the commander for face-to-face engagement to influence the targets and help in accomplishing operational objectives and attaining the desired end state. From the assessment perspective, this list provides a means to focus Soldier and leader engagements toward the highest priority selected audiences for the commander. The G-7 (S-7) coordinates staff for focused information collection efforts and other nonstandard collection assets aimed at collecting on the engagement target list of personalities or groups. This coordination ensures the priority intelligence requirements or information requirements are fed with information stemming from collection guidance given to collection assets (see figure 8-4).

Target # AO	Soldier and leader engagement target list	Excution criteria	Photo
<b>Target # AO: 1</b>	<b>Target Name:</b> (Organization) Provincial governor Bursuq Dharr al Tamimi (Shia)	Sewage Water Electric Acedemics Trash	 No picture available
<b>Target # AO: 2</b>	<b>Target Name:</b> (Organization) Mayor of Medina Jabal Marzuq Azim Nuri al Khuzaai (Shia)	Sewage Water Electric Acedemics Trash	 No picture available
<b>Target # AO: 3</b>	<b>Target Name:</b> (Organization) Mayor of Medina Wasl Kedar Kamal Latif al-Dulaymi (Sunni)	Sewage Water Electric Acedemics Trash	 No picture available
<b>Target # AO: 4</b>	<b>Target Name:</b> (Organization) Mayor of Nahiat al Bab al Sharq Bahdai Hassan Surjakli (Kurd)	Sewage Water Electric Acedemics Trash	 No picture available
<b>Target # AO: 5</b>	<b>Target Name:</b> (Organization) Mayor of Mezra'a Mazik Ahmar Hamid Mansoor Aziz al Tamimi (Shia)	Sewage Water Electric Acedemics Trash	 No picture available

AO area of operations

**Figure 8-4. Example Soldier and leader target list**

**Measures of Performance**

8-50. The staff measures the performance of tasks to support Soldier and leader engagements through detailed reporting received from units and assets tasked by the G-3 (S-3) to engage personalities or groups

on the Soldier and leader engagement target list. The details of this measurement verify the engagement occurred, the spokesperson delivered the proper messages, and the engagement target understood the message as intended. Such efforts with measures of performance can be difficult to assess; however, redundant coverage of collection assets in addition to subsequent Soldier and leader engagements provides additional clarity and refinement to this measurement.

### **Measures of Effectiveness**

8-51. The staff measures the effectiveness of tasks accomplished through the same means as measures of performance. Generally, the executor of a Soldier and leader engagement provides details with regard to measures of performance. However, with measures of effectiveness, staff cannot observe an immediate effect. The effectiveness of Soldier and leader engagements takes time to determine based upon the eventual actions and words of the engagement target. Additionally, personalities and groups in the engagement target's sphere of influence may provide even greater insights into the overall effectiveness of Soldier and leader engagements in attaining the end state. As such, it will be necessary for the G-7 (S-7) to continue to monitor intelligence collection reporting dedicated and tasked against priority intelligence requirements and intelligence requirements that feed the assessments and measures of effectiveness.

### **Input into Commander's Critical Information Requirement**

8-52. An effective G-7 (S-7) engages in the staff planning processes that drive intelligence and information collection requirements. Such requirements provide the majority of intelligence and information that determines measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Without this coordination and integration with other staff elements, the G-7 (S-7) causes inefficiency. Inefficiency comes from redundant reporting requirements and ad hoc reporting channels. The G-7 (S-7) coordination with the G-2 (S-2) and the G-3 (S-3) ensures the specific information requirements needed to feed measures of performance and measures of effectiveness are properly captured, recorded, tasked, and disseminated to the collection assets and subordinate units.

### **Reporting Protocols**

8-53. The G-7 (S-7) formalizes reporting requirements for information captured from Soldier and leader engagement through staff coordination with the G-2 (S-2) and the G-3 (S-3). To drive the assessment of Soldier and leader engagements, the G-7 (S-7) identifies the no-later-than reporting suspense and required specific information. The G-7 (S-7) then coordinates this identification through the G-2 (S-2) and G-3 (S-3) to incorporate it into the operation order or plan and information collection plan. Disciplined reporting through standardized reporting mechanisms ensures that subordinate units and collection assets are not over-tasked and facilitates greater staff integration between the G-7 (S-7) and other coordinating staff sections.

### **Other Assessments**

8-54. An after action review following a Soldier and leader engagement captures relevant information from the outcome of an engagement. The G-7 (S-7) may conduct an after action review in lieu of or subsequent to the initial debrief following an engagement. Although this process sometimes seems unnecessary, a thorough after action review brings many realizations of minute details not initially captured during a debrief. All participants sitting collectively in an after action review provide greater insights on any Soldier and leader engagement and enable establishing a way forward for subsequent engagements or the employment of other information-related capabilities. After action reviews help responsible parties to complete the details of their engagement reports before dissemination.

8-55. An effective G-7 (S-7) uses subjective commander's assessments as an assessment tool since they can provide invaluable insights into the effects of Soldier and leader engagements within a commander's area of operations. The G-7 (S-7) considers subjective assessments in addition to the initial impressions experienced by participants during engagement interactions. These subjective assessments can inform the assessment of both measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Interpreters or process observers often provide helpful insight into capturing cultural idiosyncrasies. They may notice some nonverbal cues, facial expressions and gestures, voice intonation and inflection, or certain idiomatic

expressions and jargon that may otherwise be overlooked and not incorporated in the metric-focused reporting of other techniques that inform assessments.

# Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-13 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (\*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADP</b>	Army doctrine publication
<b>ADRP</b>	Army doctrine reference publication
<b>AJP</b>	allied joint publication
<b>AR</b>	Army regulation
<b>ATTP</b>	Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
<b>BATNA</b>	best alternative to a negotiated agreement
<b>BCT</b>	brigade combat team
<b>CARVER</b>	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability
<b>CCIR</b>	commander's critical information requirement
<b>COA</b>	course of action
<b>D3A</b>	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
<b>DA</b>	Department of the Army
<b>EEFI</b>	essential elements of friendly information
<b>F2T2EA</b>	find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess
<b>F3EAD</b>	find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate
<b>FA</b>	functional area
<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>G-2</b>	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
<b>G-3</b>	assistant chief of staff, operations
<b>G-5</b>	assistant chief of staff, plans
<b>G-7</b>	assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities
<b>G-9</b>	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
<b>IIA</b>	inform and influence activities
<b>IPB</b>	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
<b>IR</b>	information requirement
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>MDMP</b>	military decisionmaking process
<b>MISO</b>	military information support operations
<b>MOE</b>	measure of effectiveness
<b>OPLAN</b>	operation plan
<b>OPORD</b>	operation order
<b>OPSEC</b>	operations security
<b>S-2</b>	intelligence staff officer
<b>S-3</b>	operations staff officer

S-5	plans staff officer
S-7	inform and influence activities staff officer
S-9	civil affairs operations staff officer
STANAG	standardization agreement
TC	training circular
U.S.	United States
ZOPA	zone of possible agreement

## SECTION II – TERMS

### **assessment**

The determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

### **combat power**

(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. (ADRP 3-0)

### **commander's critical information requirement**

An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. (JP 3-0)

### **cyber electromagnetic activities**

Activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system. (ADRP 3-0)

### **defensive task**

A task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. (ADRP 3-0)

### **inform and influence activities**

The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking. (ADRP 3-0)

### **information environment**

The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13)

### **\*information fratricide**

The result of employing information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.

### **information management**

The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products. (ADRP 6-0)

### **information operations**

The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 1-02)

### **\*information-related capabilities**

Capabilities, techniques, or activities employing information to effect any of the three dimensions within the information environment to generate an end(s).

**knowledge management**

The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking. (ADRP 6-0)

**mission command**

(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

**mission command system**

The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations. (ADP 6-0)

**offensive task**

A task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. (ADRP 3-0)

**operational environment**

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

**physical security**

That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 3-0)

**running estimate**

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)

**situational understanding**

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

**\*Soldier and leader engagement**

Interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations.

**strategic communication**

Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 5-0)

**unified land operations**

How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (ADP 3-0)

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Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by old number.

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These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

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### RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

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