

General Ronald R. Fogleman
Commander in Chief
United States Transportation Command
and
Commander
Air Mobility Command:
An Oral History

Conducted by:

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Preface

On 26 August 1994, President Clinton nominated General Ronald R. Fogleman to become the fifteenth Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force (CSAF), and shortly thereafter General Fogleman accepted our invitation to conduct an oral history interview dealing with his two-year tenure as Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC). Subsequently, General Fogleman arranged for us to fly with him on an official CSAF visit to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. We recorded the interview en route on 1 December and on the return trip to Andrews AFB, Maryland, the following day. Our discussions were organized around approximately 100 questions that we had submitted to him prior to the flight.

The oral history covers a wide range of issues including readiness, recent operations, jointness, reserve forces, and the integration of the three transportation modes: air, land, and sea. General Fogleman's answers to our questions are candid, illuminating, and provocative. We believe his oral history will be of great interest and use to government and business decision makers, in general, and to defense transportation operators and planners, in particular. It will also be an important primary source document for academic and government historians.

Several of our associates deserve special thanks for their assistance with this project. Ms Lynnette E. Percival, automation clerk in USTRANSCOM Research Center (TCRC), and Ms Kathy A. Wilcoxson, editorial assistant in the AMC Office of History, skillfully transcribed the interview tapes in a timely fashion. They, along with Ms Margaret J. Nigra, a historian assigned to TCRC, and Mr Kevin D. Safford, a temporary hire in the Research Center, edited the manuscript, compiled the glossary, and prepared the final copy for printing. Thanks also to Dr. Kent M. Beck from the USTRANSCOM Quality Office for his editorial comments.

We will distribute additional copies of this oral history upon request.

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Command Orientation

Dr. Matthews: General Fogleman, what vision did you bring with you for the two commands when you became USCINCTRANS [Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command] and Commander, AMC [Air Mobility Command]?

Gen Fogleman: Shortly after notification that I was being considered for those positions, I began to talk to mobility experts in the Military Airlift Command [MAC], the Strategic Air Command [SAC], and the United States Transportation Command [USTRANSCOM]. Most valuable was General Johnson [Air Force General Hansford T., USCINCTRANS,* 1989-1992]. He called me and said, “I understand that you are being considered for command of TRANSCOM and MAC. I would like to quietly send you some information, documents I think would be valuable for you to look at.” Over the next couple of months, he sent me background information on TRANSCOM, the work that was underway by General Kross [Air Force Major General Walter, Commander, Provisional Air Mobility Command, and later Lieutenant General and Vice Commander, AMC] on the Provisional Air Mobility Command,* and on the influential, non-military organizations that would be of assistance to me, like the National Defense Transportation Association [NDTA] and the Airlift Association, later known as the Airlift/Tanker Association.

Another key event in my education in the strategic mobility mission was an aircraft trip in the spring of 1992, much like this

*General Johnson was also first and only Commander in Chief of the new Air Mobility Command. When he retired in August 1992, the title reverted to Commander, Air Mobility Command.

one, in the Western Pacific with General Rutherford [Air Force Lieutenant General Robert L., then serving as Vice Commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and General Fogleman's successor at USTRANSCOM and AMC]. He generously gave me about six hours of his time. He gave me his perspective on TRANSCOM and MAC. He discussed with me the personalities of the commands' senior leaders and wing commanders. He told me about how MAC was organized, how AMC was planned to be organized, and how some of the tenets of the objective Air Force and the objective wing structure* did or did not fit in with these plans. He also explained to me the importance of the en route structure. General Rutherford played an instrumental role in preparing me to assume command at Scott [Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois]. That's why I was so very pleased he followed me there.

With the information I received from Generals Johnson and Rutherford and others, I sat down at my home computer and formulated my vision for the commands. I started on a macro level: our national military strategy. This was the spring of 1992, two years after President [George] Bush had articulated his new national security posture that would reduce our overseas basing and leave us with a CONUS [continental United States]-based force that would be moved forward during crises. Obviously, such a posture meant that TRANSCOM and its component commands would play a critical role in national security. So, naturally, I started to get excited about my role as CINCTRANS. I next began to study the various elements of TRANSCOM--air, land, and sea--

* Activated on 15 January 1992, the Provisional Air Mobility Command stood up on ---. It's mission was to whatever.

* footnote objective wing and objective Air Force

and what each of these components brought to the transportation equation. When I looked at the air side--and I had to look closest there because I was going to be dual-hatted as commander of the air component, what struck me was how differently the command would be from its predecessors, old MAC and old SAC. There would still be airlifters and aerial refuelers, but we were going to mix them differently. The tanker force, historically tied to nuclear alert, would now be available for day-to-day conventional tasking. That reality, combined with the historic strategic airlift force and its air refueling capability, gave us a whole new concept of strategic mobility to support the new, larger Air Force mosaic of Global Reach/Global Power. So, I focused on Air Mobility Command initially because I thought that was going to be my most difficult challenge. As I fleshed out my vision for the command on my computer, three major areas rose to the top of my list: the total force, divestiture candidates, and how we were going to make sure that strategic mobility experts received the recognition they deserved. I wanted to break down that "airlifter and aerial refueler as second-class citizens" syndrome.

On my first day at Scott I met with my AMC field commanders and presented them my vision of the new Air Mobility Command. I told them that "on my watch the command will focus on its primary mission, strategic air mobility. In order to do that, we must divest ourselves of secondary responsibilities," some of which have been resident within old MAC for many years. I laid out for those assembled my divestiture candidates: bases, WC-135s, combat rescue, and ultimately the C-130s, although the C-130s were not on the list at that time. My vision of the new command supported the new national military posture.

Dr. Matthews: How did they take to an outsider mapping out their future?

Gen Fogleman: There was a lot of concern. From the very beginning, I emphasized that it wasn't their command nor was it my command. It was our command, and we were going to go about building it together. Of utmost importance, we were going to build it as an integral part of the new United States Air Force. We were going to look professional, we were going to be professional, and we would never again be considered by anyone to be second-class citizens.

My approach to quality was another area I emphasized. At that time, the Air Force was kicking off its Quality Program.* In many respects, MAC had been in the lead. It had a very proactive program, as I could see from MAC news releases and articles in Scott's base newspaper. But 90 percent of what I read centered on quality issues. There wasn't much on the mission or what the command was really doing that was important. This caused me to stand up before those commanders that first day and say: "I want to emphasize that the mission of this command is not quality. What we are going to do is perform our mission of strategic air mobility in a quality fashion."

Now, back to your question. As you suggested, I was somewhat handicapped by a lack of previous affiliation with and background in airlift, aerial refueling, and transportation. This was no secret, so I put my cards on the table. I told them it was my sincere desire, belief, and vision that they should never again have an outsider inflicted on them as their commander. I explained that there had been a series of events, premature retirements, for example, that led the Air Force senior leadership to make me their commander.

*Total Quality Management.

It was mostly a matter of timing. There was a void; no three-stars ready to be four-stars had sent me to Scott. I made a pact with my people that day. I would begin working immediately to grow the future leadership of this command, so that it would never again have an outsider at its helm. That was an absolute cornerstone of my vision.

Dr. Leland: What initiatives are helping groom leaders for the two posts?

Gen Fogleman: We have the Mobility Enhancement Crossflow Program [tanker/airlift cockpit exchange] and the Air Mobility Warfare Center. We are also making a concerted effort to identify colonel slots on the Air Staff and putting more mobility people into those slots.

Dr. Matthews: How did you educate yourself about Military Sealift Command [MSC] and Military Traffic Management Command [MTMC]? Did you formulate visions for them?

Gen Fogleman: Prior to my arrival at Scott, all I really knew about them was from what I would call “book learning.” So, I did not initially have any great insights into how I might want to try to move or vector those components. But soon after taking command, I traveled to Washington to meet with the MSC and MTMC senior leadership in their own headquarters where they could describe their day-to-day operations. At that time, General Dick Larson [Army Major General Richard G.] was commander of MTMC, and Admiral Mike Kalleres [Navy Vice Admiral Michael P.] was the new commander at MSC. I received from them firsthand knowledge of what they did.

Dr. Matthews: Does MSC have anything to learn from AMC’s divestiture policy?

Gen Fogleman: I don't believe Military Sealift Command is in a position to divest itself of service responsibilities. In all three components, you have certain functions that are purely service related. I used to categorize those in rough orders of magnitude: about 85 percent of everything that happened in Air Mobility Command was in direct support of TRANSCOM; about 60 percent of everything that happened in Military Traffic Management Command was in direct support of TRANSCOM; and about 50 percent of what happened in Military Sealift Command was in direct support of TRANSCOM. MSC's percentage was shrinking, not because any of the activities associated with TRANSCOM were shrinking, but because when the Navy downsized, it transferred its support ships for the Navy's fleet to Military Sealift Command rather than having them embedded in the deployed fleet. This expanded the scope of MSC. I don't think the commander of MSC was or is in a position to divest himself of such responsibility. The only other solution would have been to form another, wholly different Navy command, which I think would have been impossible and prohibitive in this era of budget reductions and downsizing.

Dr. Matthews: How else did you learn about TRANSCOM and its Army and Navy components?

Gen Fogleman: Another key player in my educational process was Dane Starling [Army Lieutenant General James D.], the TRANSCOM DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief]. I used him extensively as a sounding board. I'd say to him, "This is what this country boy sees as the truth," in regard to a TRANSCOM, MSC, or MTMC issue. "Am I on course?" And if not, he'd steer me straight.

Early in my tour, I also had the opportunity to interface with NDTA. The perspectives its members from the airlines, maritime,

rail, and trucking industries shared with me early on led me to become very proactive with industry throughout my time as CINCTRANS. Generally, though, I would characterize my start in TRANSCOM and with the Navy and Army components as considerably slower than it was at Air Mobility Command.

Dr. Matthews: Once you had been oriented to TRANSCOM, what did you plan for the command?

Gen Fogleman: Plan is the right word. At the time of my arrival at Scott, TRANSCOM was engrossed in formalizing its charter to codify its new authorities and responsibilities under the Cheney [Richard B., Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)] memo of February 1992. Our people had not had time to map out a strategic plan to reach its vision. My number one goal for TRANSCOM was to institutionalize its planning process, that is, to set it on course to realize its vision as outlined by the command under General Johnson.

USTRANSCOM's Reputation and Advocates

Dr. Matthews: How was TRANSCOM's credibility when you arrived?

Gen Fogleman: It was very strong in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], the Joint Staff, and among the CINCs [Commanders in Chief]. Until Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I'm not so sure that TRANSCOM wasn't looked upon as an expanded JDA [Joint Deployment Agency*] or thinly disguised Air Force headquarters. It was the manner in which General Johnson conducted himself and the credibility he gained in Desert Shield/Desert Storm that convinced

* footnote the JDA and how it was absorbed into TRANSCOM

people this new organization called TRANSCOM had a great future. Obviously, the command during the Gulf War convinced the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)] and the Secretary of Defense of its potential. I believe it was the command's contributions during the war that led directly to Secretary Cheney issuing the TRANSCOM peacetime, single manager authorities and responsibilities memo to the service secretaries.

Now, just because the Secretary of Defense signed out the memo didn't guarantee its implementation and success. In fact, the threat remained great. After the war, there were some fairly accurate histories written about the conflict but, from this professional historian's perspective, there was also a hell of a lot of revisionist history. This was prompted in part, I believe, by the services who began recognizing that historical assessments of the war would eventually drive budgets and resources. Those revisionist histories gave ammo to those in the Pentagon and elsewhere who wanted to protect the traditional authorities and responsibilities of the service secretaries. So, it was crucial that TRANSCOM maintained OSD and JCS advocacy throughout the charter process. Clearly, on my watch, General Powell [Army General Colin L., Chairman, JCS, 1989-1993] and Secretary Cheney were loyal advocates for TRANSCOM in its battles with the services over the new authorities and responsibilities. I believe that it was the Chairman and Secretary's personal observations and intimate knowledge of TRANSCOM's true contributions to the war effort that kept the charter moving through DOD [Department of Defense].

Dr. Matthews: Who else in DOD spoke for us?

Gen Fogleman: General Shali [Army General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS, 1993-1997] and Secretaries Aspin [Les A., Secretary of

Defense, 1993-1994] and Perry [William J., Secretary of Defense, 1994-1997]. I worked very closely with John [M.] Deutch [Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), 1993-1994, and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1994-1995], one of our strongest supporters. For day-to-day operations and in crises, our right-hand men on the Joint Staff were Gary Mears [Air Force Lieutenant General Gary H.], the J4 [Director for Logistics] and his Deputy, “Bat” LaPlante [Navy Vice Admiral John B., who succeeded Lieutenant General Mears as Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff]. From time to time, we had friction with the folks in OSD/P&L [Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics)], but that’s understandable because of the tough policy issues our charter raised.

Dr. Matthews: Who were TRANSCOM’s advocates outside of DOD?

Gen Fogleman: Outside of DOD, DOT [Department of Transportation] worked closely with us. Because of the importance of the RRF [Ready Reserve Force] to our mission, I established a strong rapport with the Maritime Administrator, Captain Warren [G.] Leback [United States Maritime Service, Retired], and later his successor, former TRANSCOM DCINC Admiral Al Herberger [Navy Vice Admiral Albert J., Retired]. My friend General Tom Richards [Air Force General Thomas C., Retired], the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] Administrator, was extremely helpful in working Title XIII insurance [for commercial aircraft flying under contract to AMC] issues. And, of course, Secretary of Transportation Peña [Federico F.] has both a broad vision and an excellent grasp of the commercial transportation industry’s contributions to national defense. He was and is a strong TRANSCOM supporter. As you know, Secretary Peña helped cement the DOD/DOT relationship by accepting our invitation to visit the command at Scott and by

bringing along with him his various modal administrators. In a sense, we had a coalition of support in DOD and DOT that facilitated my role as the DOD advocate on the Hill for strategic mobility issues and single point of contact for the Defense Transportation System [DTS].

Dr. Matthews: Who were our strongest advocates in Congress?

Gen Fogleman: On the Hill, we had broad-based support for TRANSCOM beyond the traditional Defense committees. The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, chaired by Congressman Gerry [E.] Studds [Democrat-Massachusetts], was very supportive. In particular, I found Defense Subcommittee [House Appropriations Committee (HAC)] members [Representatives] Murtha [John P., Democrat-Pennsylvania, Chairman] and Dicks [Norman D., Democrat-Washington] to be staunch allies of strategic mobility and TRANSCOM. Elsewhere on the HAC, we had stronger support from staffers than we had from the principals, unless, of course, we happened to be involved in an activity that directly affected a congressman's district. On the other side of the house, I found Senators Inouye [Daniel K., Democrat-Hawaii, Chairman] and Stevens [Ted, Republican-Alaska, Ranking Minority Member] from the Defense Subcommittee [Senate Appropriations Committee] and Kennedy [Edward M., Democrat-Massachusetts], Glenn [John, Democrat-Ohio], and Cohen [William S., Republican-Maine] from the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] to be tremendously helpful. These senior statesmen had a tremendous grasp of mobility issues, as did Senators Nunn [Sam, Democrat-Georgia, Chairman, SASC] and Thurmond [Strom, Republican-South Carolina, Ranking Minority Member, SASC]. Strongly behind us on sealift issues were Senators Breaux [John B., Democrat-Louisiana] and Lott [Trent, Republican-

Mississippi] [Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, respectively, Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Commerce, Science, and Technology Committee]. Overall, we had very strong advocacy in the Senate, because of its bipartisan support for defense in general, and, in particular, its understanding that with our new military strategy came the requirement for a viable DTS.

Dr. Matthews: You discussed TRANSCOM support in OSD, Joint Staff, DOT, and in Congress. What was it like among your counterparts at the other unified commands?

Gen Fogleman: As I mentioned, the support out there was very strong based on proven performance in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the half dozen or so crises that followed. In an attempt to retain and solidify that support, I took both of my component commanders on a whirlwind visit to the unified commands in October and November 1992. That turned out to be very productive. The CINCs allowed us to come in and say, "Look, here's what TRANSCOM used to be, and here's what TRANSCOM is today. Here's what each component can do for you. Oh, by the way, here's what you can do to help us better serve you." I think that approach paid great dividends. Thereafter, when the CINCs needed to call upon us, they knew us personally as well as professionally. I found these personal relationships to be immensely helpful for the remainder of my tour.

USTRANSCOM's Peacetime Authorities and Responsibilities

Dr. Matthews: How has TRANSCOM exerted its new peacetime authorities? Have we shown that we deserve them?

Gen Fogleman: Yes. As early as Hurricane Andrew,* while I was still trying to figure out how to find my office, the Chairman turned to me as the single CINC for transportation to make things happen. Of course, the experienced and extraordinary combination of Dane Starling at TRANSCOM, and Walt Kross and John Handy [Air Force Brigadier General John W., commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), and later Major General and USTRANSCOM Director of Operations and Logistics (TCJ3/J4)] at AMC allowed me to make decisions, which somebody who was more knowledgeable of the apparent constraints would never have made. But I just made them because I thought it was what the CINC ought to do. I was never challenged on my decisions during Hurricane Andrew. In fact, I was complimented.

The next major crisis was in Somalia.* As things started to unfold there, I was confident enough to be proactive. Based on my initial discussions with the Chairman, I directed the staff to position mobility resources so that when the supported CINC finally put out the call for forces, we would be ahead of the game. Yes, we have used our new authorities in positive, proactive ways. Activating the RRF, requests for Title XIII insurance, and just having the

*Hurricane Andrew hit the Bahamas, southern Florida, and Louisiana between 23 and 26 August 1992. Damage in Florida alone was estimated at \$20.6 billion. AMC flew 724 missions, transporting over 13,500 relief workers and nearly 21,500 tons of relief supplies.

* footnote Restore Hope

authority to direct the components to start moving assets in anticipation of deployment orders have really expedited our deployment capability. Somalia was truly a seamless transition.

Dr. Leland: Was your proactive stance the key?

Gen Fogleman: It was amazing to behold. The TRANSCOM staff became more emboldened by every move, so we were further and further out ahead of each crisis as it occurred over the two-year period. We were not reluctant, for instance, to build a tanker bridge before we had an execute order. If the execute order came, we were ready to go. If it did not come, we would have written it off as a training exercise and just learned from it. It's that proactive stance and "can do" attitude that has won the command so many kudos over the last couple of years. Now that CINCTRANS has the authority to move out, TRANSCOM and the TCCs [Transportation Component Commands] have built up their confidence to be proactive in working with other CINCs. While others are still trying to dot the "i's" and cross the "t's," TRANSCOM is moving people and cargo. Yes, TRANSCOM deserves its new authorities.

Dr. Matthews: How about financial efficiencies? Do you have some specific or gut feelings where we saved the taxpayer money in the last couple of years under our peacetime charter?

Gen Fogleman: In this area, TRANSCOM has yet to achieve its full potential. When I came on board, we really didn't have an independent J8 [Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate (TCJ8)]. We had instead a J5/8 [TCJ5 (Directorate of Plans and Policy) combined with a TCJ8 with a Rear Admiral as director and two deputies, one each for the J5 and J8]. During that first year, we built a true stand-alone J8 capability that allowed us at long last

to gather financial data and analyze it. For that initiative, we are indebted to two individuals. Admiral Vern Clark [Navy Rear Admiral Vernon E.] had the vision to see that the establishment of a stand-alone J8 was best for the command even when it meant losing a sizable chunk of his domain. The second guy was the command's first stand-alone J8 director, Captain Bob Osterhoudt [Navy Captain Robert R.], who understood DBOF [Defense Business Operating Fund] and started us down the path of accounting and accountability. Also, we launched an active campaign to establish a mindset to use the most cost-effective method of transportation. Gone are the days of knee-jerk decisions to send it by air. But again, it's work in progress. The greatest efficiencies and savings are charted in our strategic plan, DTS 2010. Our Mobility Control Group [MCG] and DTS agents will allow us to make real-time decisions about how to get passengers and cargo from one place to another in the most efficient manner.

Dr. Matthews: One more question on our authorities and responsibilities. From your operational experience as CINCTRANS, where do you think TRANSCOM's responsibility should end in theater?

Gen Fogleman: TRANSCOM's responsibility is to provide intransit visibility from port to port, the aerial port and the seaport. TRANSCOM ought to run the ports, and MTMC should be the single seaport operator in all theaters. Theater logistics are the responsibility of the theater commander. CINCTRANS should not be involved in intratheater activity. I should add that we all need to work harder on joint doctrine in the theater logistics area.

Organization, Roles, and Functions

Dr. Matthews: Derek Vander Schaaf, the Deputy DOD Inspector General, recommended that we meld the TCCs into TRANSCOM to create one huge unified transportation command. Does his proposal have merit?

Gen Fogleman: I have great respect for Derek Vander Schaaf, and while I may not always agree with what he says, I have found it is worthwhile to have him come and look at your organization. He tends to give you an entirely new perspective. But in this case, from what I know about his proposal, I'd be inclined not to adopt it. Instead, we need to stay on track with our strategic plan, DTS 2010. Our Mobility Control Group will bring together in one place activities that are resident within each of the components to create a new synergism. As you know, we elected to institute the MCG over time. First of all, we are going to try to link all those functions electronically so we do not have to spend the money to collocate everybody. I must tell you that I believe we will do it and be able to make real-time decisions on modal operations. We will greatly increase our ability to provide tailored service to our customers. The reason I never wanted to push consolidation all the way, as Derek Vander Schaaf recommended, was because components bring service resources and service perspectives to the table. I would not want to try to replicate that expertise at a unified command.

Dr. Leland: What prompted you to establish the CINC's Initiative Team and AMC's Command Analysis Division?

Gen Fogleman: The number of contingencies and the level of day-to-day work were so great that I felt it was not in the best interests of the mission to task the J-staff and directorates for special, tough projects. I wanted to be able to give a select group of people

issues to study and analyze without being distracted by day-to-day activities. Over my 30-year career I have found it very difficult for the functional staff to do the quality work required for the kinds of projects that support long-range or strategic planning.

Dr. Leland: To what degree has the restructuring of AMC's numbered air forces succeeded in fulfilling their missions of ensuring quality training and combat readiness? Would you suggest any near-term organizational changes for either TRANSCOM or AMC?

Gen Fogleman: Let me take the two questions in reverse order. First, do I have any near-term recommendations for restructuring TRANSCOM and AMC? The future TRANSCOM structure has been laid out very clearly in DTS 2010. Since it's well documented, I won't talk a lot about it. It's a very good plan, a blueprint for the future DTS. But it should not be followed blindly. It should remain a living, breathing document. On the Air Mobility Command side, we had underway, by late 1993, most of the initiatives I felt needed to be done. We pulled functions out of the headquarters and out of the field offices and brought them all together in the organization called the Air Mobility Warfare Center [Fort Dix, New Jersey]. We also disestablished the Requirements Directorate [AMC/XR] and rolled it into XP [AMC Plans and Programs Directorate]. I think, in the aggregate, that has worked well. There are, from the overall Air Force perspective, some other functions at the major command level that should be considered for consolidation. For example, information management might fit in with the communications, computer, and electronics business. There is a lot of overlap there.

Now, let me go to the first part of the question. The restructure of the numbered air forces was tremendously traumatic within the Air

Mobility Command. That trauma had several causes. The old command and control system was layered. We had one command and control function in the headquarters, one in the numbered air forces, and one in the air divisions. Stripping away the command and control function from the field and consolidating it all in the TACC gored the field commanders' oxen. It was a traumatic experience for those guys. Lay on top of that the accompanying reductions to a 99-person ceiling at each numbered air force. In all candor, I must tell you that when I arrived at AMC--and this is not a hit on anybody--the numbered air forces were struggling. They had not come to grips with their new role and mission. They were still trying to do everything they had done before the restructuring and manpower cuts. Even though they had no command and control charter, they continued to be involved in that business. They were not focusing on and doing what we wanted them to do: to be out there among their troops, understanding the state of readiness and providing feedback and input to the MAJCOM [major command] headquarters. It took a lot of hard work and discussion with the numbered air force commanders--and they in turn with their staffs--for them to understand that I truly wanted them traveling to their units.

There were several ways I wanted the numbered air force commanders to have an impact on readiness. One was through the personal observations they gained from flying the line [accompanying flight crews on missions] and meeting with their troops. Second, I empowered them--in fact I encouraged them--to work directly with the IG [Inspector General] to construct IG scenarios to evaluate their units. I wanted them to look at their units critically and identify strengths and weaknesses. If they knew the IG was coming to town, I wanted them to tell him, "Hey,

I would like you to evaluate this or that function or activity and either validate or expose my unit's weaknesses and strengths." Third, I wanted them to have a major role in building the commander's readiness report system, the process whereby once a month each numbered air force commander sent a message to the vice commander of Air Mobility Command stating his concerns. When the numbered air force commander made an input, he knew it was going to be read, and the vice knew it would be accurate. My vice commanders, General Kross and after him General Jackson [Air Force Lieutenant General John E., Jr.], were real horses in whipping the staff to bring that readiness initiative to fruition.

Dr. Matthews: General Fogleman, over the last two to three years, TRANSCOM has taken on several new roles and functions, including DBOF-T [DBOF-Transportation] and CIM-T [Corporate Information Management-Transportation]. Are there other functions or responsibilities out there that TRANSCOM should absorb? On the other side of the coin, are there ones that we should divest ourselves of?

Gen Fogleman: Generally, I think we have struck a pretty good balance. While I was the CINC, I was not forced to take on any responsibility I did not think was appropriate. There are two activities on the margin, one that probably should go away from TRANSCOM and another that might flow to TRANSCOM. The first is program management for GTN [Global Transportation Network]. Now, I'm not exactly sure what the solution is, but clearly CINCTRANS needs to have a large voice in how GTN unfolds and how its requirements are stated. I successfully avoided forming a Major Force Program 11-type function, on the Special Ops [US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)] model, for the transportation

business because I did not think it was the appropriate role for a unified commander to be involved in system development and acquisition. Unified commanders should not build a whole infrastructure of acquisition experts and contract law experts to manage programs. If CINCTRANS gets into that business, he cannot help but have his attention diverted from his primary mission in life, which is looking at how best to operate today and tomorrow's Defense Transportation System. Now, having said that, I was convinced that we should keep the GTN Program Office at TRANSCOM and use the acquisition authorities of the Secretary of the Air Force to supervise and monitor the program. Over time, GTN program management probably needs to migrate away from TRANSCOM.

Second: ITV [intransit visibility]. I was always willing to become more involved in intransit visibility issues, not without some frustration, however, because I could not get the kind of authority I wanted. Secretary Klugh [James R., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics)] came to TRANSCOM, sat down with us and showed us that he clearly understood intransit visibility issues. We explained to him what we were trying to do, but he had competing demands from the other services. I think if OSD were to give the ITV charter to TRANSCOM, the command could do it and do it effectively.

You mentioned CIM-T and DBOF-T. DBOF-T was always there; we just didn't have a way to manage it. So as we discussed earlier, we established the J8. The CIM-T, in my view, is just conveniently located at Scott. USTRANSCOM's relationship to the CIM-T is simple. It provides real estate. Somebody has to be in charge of haircuts and shoe shines. In terms of policy guidance

and workload for the JTCC [Joint Transportation CIM Center], those kinds of things flow directly from OSD. That is appropriate.

Dr. Matthews: Are there some in Congress, OSD, or elsewhere who would like us to become more involved in the acquisition business?

Gen Fogleman: Yes. There are staffers and a couple of members on the Hill who say, “Well, General, wouldn’t it be better if you didn’t have to depend on the services for acquisition because the Air Force wants to trade off its airlift modernization for fighters, and the Navy wants to trade off its sealift modernization for aircraft carriers?” I saw danger there. If we took them seriously, over time this idea would gain momentum, as it did in special operations. If, as a unified commander, I had said, “Hey, this acquisition business is seriously flawed, we need to do this or that,” I think I could have gained an audience. I don’t know whether I would have been successful, but, the point is, I was fundamentally opposed to taking it on.

Dr. Matthews: At one of our quality offsites you asked the staff to identify all DOD funding for ITV initiatives. Why?

Gen Fogleman: The answer is two-fold. One was genuine intellectual curiosity. I wanted to know how much money DOD was spending on ITV. I figured it was a bunch. The second reason was because GTN was so dependent upon legacy systems [automatic data processing systems being phased out or scheduled to be phased out]. If other organizations were developing or planning to develop follow-on systems to these legacy systems that were not open and could not exchange information with GTN, we needed to know about them and stop or redirect the effort. One of the ways we could gain their attention was to aggregate all the ITV money in one pot and then

have some sort of review process whereby none of the money got dealt back to the services unless it was shown to be supportive, not only of service need, but also of the overall Defense Transportation System. The JTCC, in its migration strategy initiative, has done a great deal of work on identifying current and planned ITV systems, so that CINCTRANS can, in fact, advise OSD on them.

Dispersed Air Mobility Forces

Dr. Leland: Why did AMC divest itself of the C-130s and what have been the early results of placing the C-130s under the Air Combat Command (ACC)?

Gen Fogleman: I was the initiator of the divestiture of the C-130s. In the spring of 1993, Colin Powell issued his roles and missions report to Congress, which was based, in part, on a revision of the Unified Command Plan. USLANTCOM [US Atlantic Command] became USACOM [still called US Atlantic Command]. Forces Command lost its specified command status and Air Combat Command became the air component for USACOM. Previous to that, we did not have a single air component answerable to a single command with responsibility for operations in the United States. It looked to me like the air component commander in the United States deserved the same kind of treatment as the air component commanders overseas. That meant giving control of theater airlift for the CONUS to Air Combat Command.

There were operational imperatives as well. The C-130s became an integral part of the Bosnian operation.* I could not begin to

* this is Provide Promise, I think.

imagine how I, as the commander of Air Mobility Command--six time zones away and with no real-time intelligence--could have been a value added. So, if it was a good thing for the air component commander to have C-130s in the theater, then it ought to be applicable wherever you have an air component commander.

Dr. Leland:

In addition to AMC, several other Air Force commands operate air mobility forces. What challenges did this pose to you as CINCTrans and Commander AMC? Would it be better if all tanker, aeromedical evacuation, and airlift forces were under AMC?

Gen Fogleman:

Let me answer the second question first. If we were to find ourselves in a greatly restructured world where there was a greatly reduced US presence in the Pacific or in Europe, then we might want to return to a situation like the one at the end of World War II, where the only command in the US Air Force with a truly global responsibility day in and day out was the old Air Transport Command. It was in that era that Air Transport Command--later MATS [Military Air Transport Service], then MAC--established overseas bases, like Yokota [Air Base (AB), Japan] or Rhein-Main [AB, Germany], which served as lily pads or pockets of AMC presence around the globe. The result was that a major air command commander, located in the United States, had spheres of influence smack dab in the middle of another CINC's AOR [Area of Responsibility], USAFE [United States Air Forces in Europe] and PACAF. This resulted in something of a disconnect. I could conceive that if we continue to draw down overseas to the point where somebody at Scott has a greater vested interest in Ramstein [AB, Germany] than anyone else in the theater, we might find ourselves going back to the arrangement worked out after World War II.

Now, back to the first part of your question. The dispersal of some of the strategic air mobility forces--tanker assets in USAFE, PACAF, and AMC--is less than perfect. But CINCTrans' overarching access to the other CINCs makes it work. As does the TACC.

Dr. Leland: What is your assessment of the TACC's operation since AMC's standup?

Gen Fogleman: I think that the single greatest contributor to the success of AMC and many of the TRANSCOM activities and actions has been the TACC. With the TACC, we have finally gained centralized command and control visibility over our global operations. I can't say enough good about the TACC.

USTRANSCOM and Jointness

Dr. Matthews: How has TRANSCOM contributed to jointness over the last two years?

Gen Fogleman: We contributed to jointness by performing our primary mission everyday. That mission is to provide transportation system assets for the unified CINCs, joint task force commanders, and the National Command Authorities. We operate for all services and with all three components. The classic example is the Somalia deployment and redeployment. At the outset of the deployment to Mogadishu [Somalia], we were able to use wide-body jets because of the relatively permissive environment. We sustained the force through a combination of sealift and organic military air. But when it came time to pull large numbers of US forces out of Mogadishu in late 1993 and early 1994, the threat situation had

changed to the point where those commercial wide-bodies had become very attractive targets. So we looked for an alternate way to move a large number of troops out of Mogadishu and decided to use ships. We activated a RRF troopship and chartered a cruise ship. We then put our soldiers on board the ships and shuttled them from Mogadishu to Mombasa [Kenya], where we put them on commercial wide-bodies and brought them home. By integrating airlift and sealift and using joint assets, we lowered the overall risk to our forces.

Dr. Matthews: How did your time at TRANSCOM make you more joint minded?

Gen Fogleman: Just by being immersed in it. Sitting at the staff meeting every day, you look around and see members of the various services. You read messages from all the services. Your people are engaged in joint operations. When I returned to the States after leaving Mogadishu or Mombasa or Addis Ababa [Ethiopia] or Cairo West [AB, Egypt], Sarajevo [Bosnia-Herzegovina] or Split [Croatia], I would reflect on what I had just seen. There were always mixes of airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines. One could not help but be impressed by the fact that we fight jointly now. Seeing it and living it made me more sensitive to the joint aspects and ramifications of all issues. Now, when making decisions, I try to recognize all of the services' sensitivities, positions, requirements, and the contributions that they can make in any given situation. That type of decision making is what makes a joint operation so much more effective than a unilateral one.

Dr. Matthews: Do you believe that in the future, command of a unified command will be a prerequisite to become a service chief?

Gen Fogleman: While that may not be a written requirement, I will tell you that I think there will be very few service chiefs in the future who have not served as a CINC.

Dr. Matthews: Why did the Air Force withdraw its recommendation to disestablish the USSOCOM?

Gen Fogleman: Since I've become Air Force Chief of Staff, I've been trying to come to grips with the roles and missions issues. When I was CINCTRANS, Mr. White [John P.], the head of the Roles and Missions Commission, and members of his staff came and talked to me about CINCTRANS' inputs to the roles and missions study. They also wanted me to tell them what I thought about General McPeak's [Merrill A., Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 1990-1994] position on the USSOCOM question. I told them I strongly believed that a service could only have one chief at a time and that General McPeak was our chief. Therefore, even though it had been announced that I was the "Chief Apparent," it was only appropriate for me to discuss roles and missions wearing my CINCTRANS hat. In my first month as chief, I've met with the Air Force roles and missions cell, with all the Air Force four-stars, and with Mr. White. So with a high degree of certainty I can present the corporate Air Force position to the commission.

Back to your question. I recently told Mr. White that I believe there is something "special" about special operations and that before the stand-up of the unified command, the services had a very poor track record of nurturing and providing for special operations assets. Like TRANSCOM, they're global. They serve all of the CINCs daily. Right now they are deeply engaged in Haiti.* So, I will tell the Roles and Missions Commission that

* footnote what is going on in Haiti

disestablishing the unified Special Operations Command will not be productive nor in the best interest of the nation. That will be the corporate Air Force position.

Dr. Matthews: What do you feel are the most important landmarks in the evolution of jointness since Goldwater-Nichols [DOD Reorganization Act, 26 September 1986],* not just in strategic mobility, but overall?

Gen Fogleman: The appointment of General Colin Powell to be Chairman, JCS, was a major milestone. Clearly, he understood the authorities and responsibilities that rested in the Chairman, and General Powell demonstrated that the underlining principles of Goldwater-Nichols were valid. He also had a management style that worked very well to reinforce those principles. Before the Powell chairmanship, there were great and frequent debates within the Tank [the JCS conference room in the Pentagon] on substantive joint issues. General Powell had a technique of dealing bilaterally with the service chiefs. Rather than allow them to gather around the table in the Tank where he might lose control of the discussion, he was prone to have fewer Tank sessions. He would talk with each of the chiefs about issues and then convene a Tank session and tell them what they had agreed to. That practice facilitated a consensus and position without going through the acrimony of service arguments being vented in a forum. General Shalikashvili was his special assistant, and he observed General Powell's management technique. While I cannot yet document it, I'm quite sure that General Shalikashvili and his vice, Bill Owens [Navy Admiral William A., Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff], fundamentally use the same approach.

* maybe from Driscoll's oral history?

Another emerging landmark in the evolution of jointness is the increasing strength of the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, the so-called enhanced JROC. With Vice Chairman Owens' lead, they are moving out of their traditional realm and into resource allocation between the services. That will further erode the services' roles and missions as well as their functions of organizing, training, and equipping forces. As long as the enhanced JROC operates on a level playing field, and as long as the services are ably represented in that forum by their vice chiefs, I think the JROC will play a useful role. Historically, the services tend not to want to give up anything on their own, whereas through this process called JWCA [Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment], the JROC can look at what the Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Army do, and then determine if they are functioning in a redundant manner. If the JROC finds redundancy, it can decide, for example, which weapon system gives us the greatest capability. Then it can make recommendations as to which service should stay in the business and which one should get out. The JROC will have a major impact on jointness.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything in Colin Powell's management style that encouraged jointness at the unified CINC level?

Gen Fogleman: He was very accessible and quite willing to share information. He kept us informed so we could put our actions in the context of a larger picture. He treated me, and I believe the other CINCs also, in a very responsible and equitable manner. For example, if there was to be a resource cut in a CINC's realm, he would explain to the CINC how and why the cut would benefit another CINC's area.

Reserve Forces

Dr. Matthews: Title 10 of the US Code vests the services with authority to train and equip forces. In contrast, CINCs are responsible for ensuring readiness of assigned active component and reserve component forces. What should be the CINC's role in determining the type of training for assigned forces, both active and reserve?

Gen Fogleman: It's important to understand the dimensions of readiness and training. There are two dimensions: the unit level and the CINC level. Providing a combat-ready unit and making sure it gets the requisite training are responsibilities of the services. The CINCs, then, are responsible for pulling these units together into a coherent fighting force. A CINC's responsibility is to ensure that the units supporting him are given the opportunity to train in the manner they are going to be deployed. The CINC has to assess. As part of his assessment, he might say, "That squadron is combat ready in your view Mr. Service Chief, but it is not prepared to do what I need to use it to do; therefore, I would like to have you either change the training, or I must conduct joint training exercises that will give the squadron the necessary skills to do the job." So I don't necessarily see a conflict.

Dr. Matthews: Should we put more emphasis on joint training?

Gen Fogleman: Yes, and we are. Joint training has been given much greater emphasis with the establishment of USACOM. One of the bedrock planks in the USACOM charter is joint training.

Dr. Matthews: Please discuss what role the CINC should play in the mobilization and force allocation process. Should the CINC, rather than the services, submit mobilization allocation packages for assigned components?

Gen Fogleman: If the question is, “Who determines what forces should be mobilized in time of crisis,” then my answer would be “the system is not perfect.” During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the President exercised his 200,000 call-up authority. We did not have, in the joint staff or within OSD, a single point of contact for allocating call-up authority to each service as a function of the force list that the CINC wanted. As the CINC started shopping for his force list and the word filtered back to the services, each service then wanted to mobilize their reserves. You ended up with tremendous disconnects.

Based on a couple of near crises and a partial crisis, I am convinced we can correct the problem. Let’s talk about the recent crisis in Korea.* The Chairman called in his CINCs--CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command], CINCUNK [Commander in Chief, United Nations (UN) Command Korea], CINCTRANS, and CINACOM [Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command], because CINACOM now has the responsibility for stateside training. Each one stood up and briefed his force list requirements for the campaign. TRANSCOM said, “We need about 10,500 reservists to get things moving. Without them nothing will move.” CINCUSOC [Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command] then gave a similar pitch, as did the other CINCs. It became obvious to SECDEF and the Chairman that there was no one to referee the contradictions. Nobody was in charge. So the Chairman asked the J-5 on the Joint Staff for force list requirements. We have recognized the problem and are fixing it.

* what thing in korea

Dr. Matthews: Do you think the Ready Mobility Force will eventually pass Congressional scrutiny?

Gen Fogleman: No. I've talked recently with Secretary Debbie Lee [Deborah R., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)] about the Ready Mobility Force, and while we need it badly, Congress sees it as a fundamental constitutional issue. That is, they have given that authority to the President; they do not want to see the President delegate it further down the chain. That's basically it.

Dr. Matthews: A couple years back when I wrote about the stand-up of the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit [JTRU]--our reserve unit that evolved out of Desert Shield/Desert Storm--I predicted it would be the archetype for other unified commands. Do you think the other unified commands will eventually adopt it as a way of doing business?

Gen Fogleman: I think the idea will spread. In fact, we started forming a second joint reserve unit out at SPACECOM [US Space Command]. USACOM is ripe for this kind of unit. Secretary Perry, in his initiative on quality of life for active duty folks, is looking for ways to make our Guard and Reserve more accessible. It's only a matter of time before JTRU-type organizations are formed at the other unified commands.

Dr. Matthews: JTRU came to maturity on your watch. A major addition was the Coast Guard element. Are there any other ways we could strengthen the JTRU?

Gen Fogleman: I'm not aware of any. I'll tell you why I think it's been a success at TRANSCOM. The program has enjoyed great support from superb reservists and outstanding commanders like Admirals Seeley [Navy Reserve Rear Admiral (upper half) Jimmie W.] and

Smith [Navy Reserve Rear Admiral (upper half) Robert, III]. The active duty people see the inherent value of this reserve organization. They work with these people almost every day, during peacetime and during crises. It is an organization that has sold itself by its professionalism and the way that it folds right in. It's a real success story.

Training

Dr. Matthews: Why did you decide to champion the National Deployment Transportation University [NDTU]?

Gen Fogleman: As CINCTRANS and Commander AMC, I wanted to concentrate on my primary missions and avoid getting bogged down in areas like acquisition and training. That's why I sponsored an Air Mobility Warfare Center, as sort of a counterpart to the Army's Transportation School at Fort Eustis [Virginia]. Unfortunately, no such entity exists within the Navy. In fact, there's not a transportation career field for either officers or enlisted personnel in the Navy to the best of my knowledge. Anyway, I foresaw this new transportation university as an extension of the existing infrastructure. You would have a collection of colleges, for the lack of a better description. The Air Mobility Warfare Center would be one of the colleges of the university, as would the Transportation School at Fort Eustis. But it would be the university that I would go to as CINCTRANS and say, "Hey, look. I need a course that will produce these kinds of people with these skills. Please go tell your colleges." And I wouldn't be bogged down in the training business.

Dr. Matthews: Would it be primarily a training or an educational institution?

Gen Fogleman: More training and less education. But education and training are not mutually exclusive. Remember what the Air Mobility School was like at Scott? Would you classify that as education or training?

Dr. Matthews: Its mission was education. They taught broad issues, strategic issues and how mobility fits into the picture of national security.

Gen Fogleman: We've moved that curriculum into the Air Mobility Warfare Center along with air mobility training activities that were formerly scattered among half a dozen geographically separated units. The first class is "Advanced Studies in Air Mobility Management." And we've really sweetened the pot by saying, "You're going there for a year, and, by the way, you get a master's degree when you come out." We already have accreditation through AFIT [Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio] for the Air Mobility Warfare Center.

Dr. Leland: Will there be a master's degree program at the new university?

Gen Fogleman: Not at the university but rather at our Air Mobility Warfare Center. However, not everyone who attends courses at the Air Mobility Warfare Center, nor everyone who completes courses built by the transportation university will come out with a master's degree.

Dr. Matthews: Do you foresee the JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System] training organization calling NDTU home?

Gen Fogleman: Yes. That's the kind of training that should be resident in the Air Mobility Warfare Center college of the National Deployment Transportation University. In other words, this university forms the overarching structure. Its president looks for the best of the breed, the best off-the-shelf transportation courses to form the core

of the new curriculum. Who has the best JOPES training? Who has the best transportation load planning? In that way, the university helps build the curriculum and training that will educate and train our future joint mobility experts.

Dr. Matthews: As Air Force Chief of Staff, will you be able to continue to support this concept?

Gen Fogleman: I will if the current CINCTRANS is on board. When the chiefs come together for a vote in the Tank, I have the knowledge and understanding of the concept so I can, hopefully, persuade my colleagues that it makes sense for the long term.

Liaison Network and Intelligence Support

Dr. Matthews: An assortment of liaison officers are assigned to TRANSCOM. It's alphabet soup: DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], NSA [National Security Agency], DMA [Defense Mapping Agency], USCG [United States Coast Guard], and, most recently, MARAD [Maritime Administration]. Where else should the liaison network be expanded? On your watch, we talked about having State Department and United Nations [UN] liaisons.

Gen Fogleman: Beyond those two areas I don't have any specific suggestions. The liaisons we have in that alphabet soup perform valuable functions. When TRANSCOM personnel work up a concept of operations in response to a crisis, they need to offer their expertise and the worldwide strategic perspectives of their organizations. Their access to national collection systems is vitally important to the TRANSCOM mission.

Dr. Leland: Are the national intelligence agencies paying enough attention to the needs of defense transportation customers for timely information?

Gen Fogleman: The answer is, "They pay as much attention as we ask." On my watch, I cannot think of one time when we sent them a request for information or coverage that they did not satisfy in a very timely way. On more than one occasion, those liaison people would go from our staff meeting directly back into their agency for products that would help the J2 [Intelligence Directorate, USTRANSCOM] put together whatever we needed.

Dr. Matthews: What will JICTRANS [Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation] add to TRANSCOM and strategic mobility?

Gen Fogleman: I was a big supporter of the JICTRANS concept, which offers the CINC 24-hour coverage. I wanted to have a facility--an organizational structure--that would support all the components with integrated intelligence. In the past, MTMC and MSC did not have such advantages. In the future, if MTMC or MSC need transportation intelligence, the JICTRANS will supply it.

Dr. Matthews: What would be the benefits of having a TRANSCOM liaison at the UN?

Gen Fogleman: Recent UN operations have shown that the UN simply doesn't have the logistical infrastructure to carry out its mission. We would not want to try and build that infrastructure, but, by having a liaison there to whom our ambassador could turn for the basics--how long will it take to get there, what kind of basing would you need, for instance--would be very valuable for our delegation. And, again, we would get some feedback through that liaison on what might be coming TRANSCOM's way.

Dr. Matthews: Did operations in Somalia show UN officials what the United States military has to offer in the way of efficient transportation?

Gen Fogleman: In this aspect, Rwanda* was probably more important than Somalia. Eventually, we had to send schedulers and loadmasters to Switzerland to assist the United Nations committee on refugees [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva]. The UN couldn't figure out how to efficiently schedule airlift into Rwanda and neighboring countries where we faced a very constrained MOG [Maximum on Ground*].

Dr. Matthews: What does our liaison network at the unified commands contribute?

Gen Fogleman: The TRANSCOM liaisons on the unified command staffs play a valuable role in a couple ways. They have their finger on their CINC's pulse. They sit at staff meetings with the CINC and hear his operations and intelligence briefings. They might hear the CINC say, "J3, start putting together a concept of ops." Then, if the liaison officer is good, five minutes after the meeting is over, he will be calling the TRANSCOM J3/J4 saying, "There is nothing definitive here yet, but this is of interest to my CINC out here so it ought to be of interest to you guys back there." That's how you get out ahead of the game. It helps us become proactive rather than reactive. Just as important, the liaisons are on the spot to explain to their CINC what it is that CINCTrans can bring to the game.

Dual-Hat Issue

* footnote support hope

* , i.e. the maximum number of aircraft that can be parked, serviced, and launched at an installation within a planned ground time

Dr. Matthews: There was an article a couple of weeks back in the *Early Bird* discussing a possible increase in the number of three-star flag officers. How might that change the nominative process at the CINC level work so, for example, a four-star sailor would someday run TRANSCOM, or an Army general lead Atlantic Command?

Gen Fogleman: Let me explain to you what this is about. The Chairman came to each of the services and said, "Okay, Air Force, you have ten four-stars right now. Army, you have eleven, and so on, by service. Air Force, what if I took your three dual-hatted four-star slots--CINCTRANS, CINCSPACE [Commander in Chief, United States Space Command], and DCINC EUCOM [Deputy Commander in Chief, United States European Command]--and put them into a pool, and then I allowed you to bid on any of those jobs. Would you agree to do that?" The Air Force said, "Yeah. We would do that." The Air Force gave up its three dual-hat billets, the Army gave up five, the Navy gave up two, and the Marines gave up one. This means that when General Rutherford leaves, if some other service gets command of TRANSCOM, then AMC would either have to become a three-star billet, or I would have to move the billet somewhere else, which I would do, that is, I would ensure Commander AMC remains a four-star billet. Now, on the other hand, if the Air Force bids on TRANSCOM, EUCOM, SPACECOM, and ACOM, and it gets command of all four, it could end up with four in the O-10 slot [four-star billets]. But because the Air Force had given up those three billets to the pool, it can have three additional three-star billets. There's a similar process in the three-star arena.

Dr. Leland: How close is this to becoming policy?

Gen Fogleman: It's a done deal. I signed off on it yesterday [30 November 1994]. It's going to be a two-year test.

Dr. Leland: Was it difficult being dual-hatted?

Gen Fogleman: In the main, I did not find being dual-hatted a big problem. With my Air Force hat on, I would review a proposal coming out of the Air Staff and take a stand as the Air Mobility Command Commander that said, "I'm either ambivalent," or, "Okay, I agree with this action. However, you need to know that my unified commander is going to object to this." Then, as the unified commander, I'd review the same action. While it may have had a minimal impact on the Air Force, this particular Air Staff-proposed action might have a major impact on the Defense Transportation System. Therefore, in my role as the unified commander, I had to say, "No." On occasion, there would be two pieces of paper back in Washington, both signed by the same guy, different job descriptions, taking different positions on the same issue. You have to do that to stay intellectually honest, and after a while the people in Washington figured that out. It was not a big problem.

Dr. Matthews: What's the key to making the dual-hat arrangement work?

Gen Fogleman: First, the dual-hatted commander must avoid getting bogged down in the nuts and bolts of day-to-day activities in running the headquarters. Had I not been dual-hatted, I would have probably spent much more time digging around in the details of US Transportation Command's daily business. I don't think a CINC should be a person of detail. A CINC should be looking at broader policy issues and trying to work across the components. The second key to making dual-hatting work is to have first-rate deputies. If I stayed in town, the workload was not a big issue. It

was easily managed. If I were traveling, I would be totally dependent upon my DCINC and vice commander. They're the people who make it work. The third condition is having one secretary, one executive officer, and the same telephone number in both offices. Therefore, for people off the installation, it was transparent as to what office the CINC was operating from on any given day.

En Route Structure

Dr. Leland: At the time you became AMC Commander, the Air Force Chief of Staff wanted to put AMC's overseas en route structure under the theater commanders. As a result, AMC cut back its overseas locations and personnel by two-thirds. How is this reorganization, centered around the Air Mobility Operations Groups at McGuire [AFB, New Jersey] and Travis [AFB, California], working out?

Gen Fogleman: It's probably too soon to tell, but I would like to clarify the issue. It is true that the Air Force Chief of Staff, my predecessor, pushed a divestiture concept based on "one base, one boss." Although General Johnson was able to hold that at arms length, I knew it was going to be a big issue for me from my discussions with General Rutherford prior to my arrival at Scott. Basically, General Rutherford's advice was that I ought not rush into en route base divestiture. "You need to look at it closely," he told me. As I researched the issue, I discovered that the en route structure tended to expand and contract in response to prolonged crises, such as Vietnam, or the increasing or decreasing numbers of GIs stationed overseas. When I was told I was going to get the TRANSCOM and AMC jobs, I went in and talked to General McPeak about the en route structure. I asked him not to force me into any decisions

right away. “Let me learn more about it first, and then I will come back to you and tell you what I think is right,” I said. He agreed.

Returning to Scott, I chartered a multi-command study group that generally reinforced what I had believed: if we are going to have a global operation, we can not afford to be in the “rent-a-maintenance guy, rent-a-transporter” mode. The natural inclination is for people to support their own major command and not the equipment that’s traveling through. The issue was bigger than the Air Force. The en route structure supported the unified commanders, the users around the world, so I believed it should not be settled within an Air Force construct. As Air Mobility Command Commander, and certainly as CINCTRANS, I believed very strongly that we had to keep the en route structure under the control of TRANSCOM’s air component command. Our study group’s review, though, was quite revealing. Here we were trying to implement a national military strategy that said pull as much back into the CONUS as possible and then plan to deploy it forward in the event of a crisis, but we were not doing that with the en route structure. In that area, we appeared to be out of step.

As a result, we decided to restructure the system. We took the excess capacity out of those en route locations and moved it back to the CONUS and into the Air Mobility Operations Groups. We also found that there were locations where the workload had dropped to the point where we didn’t need a permanent presence. At those locations, contracting was desirable and feasible. Through the restructure, we maintained our en route capability and improved conditions for our people. Many more could now live in the United States, and we relieved those remaining overseas of their mobility tasking. Instead of having two jobs to worry about, they only had to worry about one: providing en route support.

The plan came together on 1 July 1994, when the mobility ops groups stood up. I am hopeful that the people who come after me will understand and utilize the concept, because it will work, thanks in great part to the magnificent job done by my XP, General Phil Ford [Air Force Major General Phillip J., Director, Plans and Programs, AMC].

Marriage of Airlift and Aerial Refueling

Dr. Leland: What did you do to integrate the tanker forces--aircraft and people--into the total strategic mobility equation?

Gen Fogleman: What we had to do was break down the “we-they” culture. That is, on a SAC base, if there was a bomber squadron and a tanker squadron, the tanker squadron was normally given the lower priority in terms of resources. Likewise, in the larger Air Force, the airlift troops seemed to be accorded lower status and respect than the other combat troops. So, what I tried to do was explain that whether or not that perception of past discrimination was true or false, it was no longer relevant because the change in the national security strategy now put a premium on our ability to project forces from the CONUS. Those tanker and airlift forces were the keystone to deterrence, the bedrock of national strategy. That wasn’t just rhetoric. It was fact. As a team, we were going to make tanker forces and airlift forces more flexible and capable. At the same time, we were going to expand the traditional tanker concept of operations by acknowledging the fact that they had residual lift capability. We put tanker people into the forefront of deployments. We let them run detachments. We absolutely insisted that we didn’t talk about ourselves as tanker people or airlift people. We were air mobility folks. That philosophy set the climate for integration.

We also facilitated integration through reorganization. When we stood up AMC, we had two numbered air forces, the Twenty-First and Twenty-Second, responsible for airlift, and one, the Fifteenth, responsible for tankers. As long as we retained that organization, we would always have a split in the mobility forces. That situation was a primary driver behind my recommendation to the Chief [of Staff of the Air Force] that we disestablish one of our numbered air forces and put both tanker and airlift assets, people and aircraft, in the remaining two.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything you did to integrate the tanker culture into TRANSCOM?

Gen Fogleman: Getting Air Mobility Command people to rethink operations, like air bridges and to optimize our ability to air refuel, began to change the way that TRANSCOM did business because we could then deliver people and goods faster and with a higher degree of on-time assurance. It was the integration of tanker and airlift forces that suddenly gave CINCTrans the ability to give his fellow CINCs and the Chairman some options. Take the deployment of Patriot missiles to Korea, for example. The TRANSCOM staff was able to lay out two options for the Chairman. "If there is an operational imperative to have the forces in Korea within eight days, we can do it with a combination of tankers and airlift. If time is not imperative, then we can do it more efficiently with both airlift and sealift, and we can get you there in this amount of time." The Chairman, on more than one occasion, told me how valuable it was to have those kinds of options.

Dr. Leland: How did your emphasis on qualifying airlift crews for air refueling operations pay dividends during Vigilant Warrior* and other operations?

Gen Fogleman: It gave us increased flexibility. I had a misconception when I started in this business about how much of the airlift force was air refueling qualified. I assumed that since all of the airplanes were capable of being air refueled, all the aircrews were qualified to do it. I discovered early in Restore Hope how limited we were with air refueling-qualified aircrews and told the staff to fix the problem. Let me share with you one of my fundamental beliefs: basic pilot skills must match aircraft capabilities, in this case, air refueling. The need for strategic mobility flexibility plus that underlying philosophy became the bedrock on which we built our policy of maximizing the number of air refueling-qualified crews. As a result, we really increased our flexibility during Vigilant Warrior, so I hope we keep moving in that direction.

Dr. Leland: Operation Restore Hope was the first time the air mobility forces engaged in a major operation in their post-Cold War configuration. How did they do and what were the lessons?

Gen Fogleman: They did a superb job. It was the first time TRANSCOM transitioned from peace to contingency in the post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm era. We were able to do things that we could not do before, such as prepositioning tanker task forces and prepositioning assets and people to open operating locations in the theater. Those actions were a great help, especially in combination with increasing numbers of direct flights from the CONUS, which was made possible by more crews being qualified in air refueling. Aerial refueling and our proactive stance helped compensate for

* footnote vigilant warrior

the low and unacceptable departure reliabilities of our aging aircraft.

Dr. Leland: Before Restore Hope, tankers were deployed from several units to form a tanker task force. Your policy was to deploy all of the tankers required for a specific task force from a single tanker unit. How has this improved overall performance and how have tanker personnel responded to this new way of doing business?

Gen Fogleman: The tanker personnel really liked the integrated unit deployment. They liked having somebody from their own unit in charge. They knew one another. There was a bond, a trust, between them. During the Cold War, with the bulk of the tankers tied up in SIOP [Single Integrated Operational Plan for nuclear war], you could only take little salami slices from a lot of different units to build a tanker task force. In the post-Cold War period, we continued for some time in the SIOP mode. When the tanker folks came to us with the idea of an integral unit tanker deployment, the lights came on. It made so much sense, and in my view it's been a great success.

Core Airlifter, CRAF, and 60K Loader

Dr. Leland: What are the best arguments to use when explaining the need for the C-17?

Gen Fogleman: The best arguments are the requirements stated in the Mobility Requirements Study [MRS] and its updated successor that came out of the Bottom-Up Review. We need to make sure that everybody understands we're not fighting for the C-17 just because it's some high-tech, precious Air Force tool. This is an airplane the nation needs to move its surface forces forward to fight. And we need them now. The C-17 greatly improves our capability to

move the Army's outsize and large oversize equipment directly to where the Army wants it. These are all core airlift capabilities needed to support the national military strategy of "Global Reach, Global Power." They are capabilities not possible with a commercial freighter design. Presently the aging C-141 is our core airlifter, but its capabilities must be replaced and enhanced. Not only is the C-17 twice as productive as the C-141 at about the same operating cost, it also provides multiple new and much needed capabilities, especially as we focus more and more on rapid force projection from the CONUS. With the C-17 we can access more airfields, put more aircraft on small parking aprons, and get more cargo through those congested airfields, which have become commonplace during contingencies.

Dr. Leland: How many do we need?

Gen Fogleman: Every review tells us we need at least 120 C-17s, so we need to go for 120. If we don't get that many, we, the Air Force, bear the responsibility for screwing it up. The Air Force was in charge of procurement, and we didn't do it well.

Dr. Leland: What caused you to give at least some consideration to a commercial derivative aircraft for military airlift?

Gen Fogleman: My primary motivation was what appeared to be the possible collapse of the C-141 fleet in the summer of 1993. The weep-hole problem was serious. It was immediate, and we weren't sure what the long-term impact would be. At the time, I saw an opportunity to buy off-the-shelf, nondevelopmental airplanes at a reasonable cost to help pick up the slack if we lost our core airlifter.

There's a lot of misunderstanding about how critically the C-17, or something like it, is needed. Critics of the C-17 have put forth the

argument that a commercial transport derivative could fulfill the role of a military airlifter and save the government billions of dollars.

It cannot do the core military missions that we are buying the C-17 to do, that is, to fly the missions the C-141 has performed so well for so many years. The commercial freighter can't carry outsized Army vehicles, and it doesn't have a roll-on/roll-off capability. It can't access small, austere airfields or maneuver on the ground like the C-17. Neither is a commercial freighter air refuelable. The commercial freighter, of course, was not designed to perform a military mission. Any money that might be saved in purchasing a commercial derivative may not be worth the price the nation would ultimately pay by not being able to complete the core airlift mission.

Dr. Leland: Do you feel AMC succeeded in conveying the message that airlift was both "hurting" and "ready?"

Gen Fogleman: I hope we have. We tried very hard--on the Hill, the Joint Staff, and OSD--to show that the airlift capability for this country derives from national policy. We drove home the fact that national policy put one-third of our airlift capability in the civilian sector. So, it was unavailable to us day in and day out. Half of the remaining capability resided in the Guard and Reserve, so, on a day-to-day basis, much of the residual airlift capability was also unavailable to us. Stated more directly, national policy determined that roughly one-third of our stated airlift capability--in the form of active duty aircraft and aircrews--was available to us day in and day out. I think people began to understand that just because every CINC can't get all the airlift he wants everyday doesn't mean that the airlift system's broken. In fact, it means the system is working the

way it's supposed to. In a sense, TRANSCOM has to allocate a shortfall to each of the CINCs. But if we had to mobilize the airlift system in a crisis, it would work as laid out in national policy. I don't think we ever failed anybody in a crisis. Due in large part to our educational efforts, I think we have dispelled the notion that a one-third, day-to-day airlift capability means that the backbone of our airlift fleet is broken. More importantly, we've proven that in a crisis we're ready.

Dr. Leland: Are you confident about the future of the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet]?

Gen Fogleman: For the most part, yes. General Johnson's White Paper on CRAF, which he signed just before he retired, is the single most important document dealing with commercial airlift augmentation produced since Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It identified what we needed to do to keep the airlines in the CRAF. It also identified what we were doing to drive them away. General Johnson's bottom line was to eliminate disincentives and increase incentives. With that as a guideline and the NDTA airlift committee as the forum, we called together representatives from the aviation industry to discuss the CRAF's future. We wrestled with the issues and attempted to put into the new CRAF contract as many of the incentives as possible. We also tried to eliminate as many of the disincentives as possible. A major goal was to capture more of the day-to-day government business for CRAF. That led to the arrangement with GSA [General Services Administration] on City Pairs.* If you look at CRAF capacity today and compare it to what it was in 1990, you'll find a great improvement. But in terms of the numbers of aircraft, we have a way to go.

* whereby federal government air travelers must fly aboard CRAF carriers when on official business

Dr. Leland: How would the 60K loader have helped us in recent contingencies?

Gen Fogleman: It would have helped a lot. The big advantages of the 60K loader are its air transportability and its flexibility to operate with both commercial wide-bodies and the KC-10, as well as with the C-141, C-5, and C-17. In virtually every crisis or contingency over the last few years, we've tapped commercial wide-bodies, and we've made increasingly greater use of our KC-10s. This was particularly true when the C-141 fleet was down. The 60K loader is probably the single most important piece of equipment coming down the road for the Air Mobility Command.

Readiness Assessment

Dr. Matthews: What are the difficulties in defining the readiness of a unified command?

Gen Fogleman: The biggest difficulty is that each of the component commands reports readiness in a different way. Readiness has two dimensions. The services are charged under Title 10 with organizing, training, and equipping forces. They are responsible for ensuring the readiness of individual units. A CINC, however, is responsible for the readiness of a total system. For example, the Air Mobility Command could report a unit as ready to perform a particular mission, but CINCTRANS might not intend to use the unit in that role. Thus, while the unit would be ready from AMC's perspective, it might not be ready from the standpoint of supporting CINCTRANS' overarching mission. At TRANSCOM, we dedicated an individual to building us a readiness recording and monitoring system. We were very successful. I'm a bit disappointed that more people from the other unified commands,

the JCS, and OSD did not come out and look at our system. Quite frankly, I am seeing briefings brought into the Pentagon advocating a variety of readiness reporting systems that don't come close to matching TRANSCOM's. TRANSCOM was light-years ahead of them a year ago. TRANSCOM needs to do a little more missionary work in that area.

Dr. Matthews: Have you seen anything from the other unified commands that TRANSCOM should consider adopting?

Gen Fogleman: Not in the readiness area, but we should continue to look at what they're doing because we might yet find something useful. US Strategic Command has a system that looks very much like ours.

Dr. Matthews: TRANSCOM's Operational Readiness Division has had some difficulty setting readiness parameters for the strategic rail and highway systems. What does the CINC need to know about road and rail to grasp their readiness capability?

Gen Fogleman: In the end, TRANSCOM measures throughput. We need to understand the capacity of the rail and road systems to support the required throughput. CINCTRANS, as he moves towards DTS 2010, has the opportunity to balance throughput among the rail, road, and air systems. In other words, if, for some reason, he discovers an insufficient throughput by road--due to a shortage of trucks or road capacity as a result of construction or a natural disaster--he can divert cargo for transport by train or plane or even by barge down the Mississippi River. A CINC engaged in such readiness assessments and throughput decisions gives the system much more flexibility than in the past under Military Traffic Management Command.

Dr. Matthews: Unfortunately, you did not see your Decision Support System fully operational as CINCTRANS. How do you believe that system will improve readiness and decision making? How will that system be an improvement over the one you used in Korea?

Gen Fogleman: The one in Korea was a design system. It never became operational because we didn't have the interfaces necessary for readiness visibility. The greatest value of the TRANSCOM Decision Support System will be accessibility. Anybody, anywhere in the command--at the component level or in the headquarters--will be able to come on-line immediately and look at our readiness status in a wide variety of areas.

Dr. Matthews: During the Haitian operation, you stated that you made considerable use of teleconferencing. How did teleconferencing improve command and control?

Gen Fogleman: Let me explain to the staff the historical significance of teleconferencing. On the eve of the Haitian operation, teleconferencing enabled the CINCs to sit down with their Commander in Chief, President [William Jefferson] Clinton. He could see and hear every one of his unified commanders who would be supporting the plan. He could see and hear the supported CINC interact with supporting CINCs as they gave rundowns on their parts of the action. Seeing as well as hearing real-time how the forces would be integrated increased confidence in the plan. There's also the danger of micro-management, but that clearly did not happen. But the real value of video teleconferencing was not in eye-to-eye discussions with the President. And it was not in Admiral Miller's daily conferences. The simple fact that the system was up and available for our people to use to talk to their counterparts on the other CINCs' staffs was perhaps its greatest

value. The opening of another communications channel can only help joint operations.

Planning, Policy, and Technology

Dr. Matthews: How will technology change the transportation business?

Gen Fogleman: It isn't likely we will see any startling breakthroughs in transportation or weapon systems during the next 20 years. Instead, we are going to make great strides in the areas of information storage, transmission, retrieval, and exploitation. Going to paperless technical data, like inventory disks and putting medical records on military ID cards, will greatly improve the strategic mobility business. In fact, we are already seeing the value of RF [Radio Frequency, multi-directional] tags.

There are other initiatives underway I think will help us. While at Scott, I pushed hard for equipping all of our airplanes with GPS [Global Positioning System] and satellite communications [SATCOM] so that hopefully, some day, we will be able to do databurst and position reporting, those kinds of things. As Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I've directed that the program be funded. Considering the huge payoff, it's a relatively small cost to put satellite communications on all of our airlift and tanker aircraft, so that they can communicate directly with the TACC from anywhere in the world. When I was Commander of Air Mobility Command, I used one of our C-141s as a part of our strap-on test bed for SATCOM and GPS. So, I was able to see these systems in actual operation.

Dr. Matthews: Under your leadership, TRANSCOM set goals and objectives, envisioned a DTS Ought-To-Be in the Year 2010, and developed a strategic plan to get there. This was tough, yet rewarding work.

What did TRANSCOM learn along the way that others who wish to follow suit should know?

Gen Fogleman: You have just about framed the answer. It's tough but rewarding work. I come from a school that believes the spoken word is philosophy, and the written word is guidance. The vision is vitally important to the process, but the vision will never come to fruition without written guidance to provide the framework. Without a plan that has milestones, the vision will remain nothing more than a philosophical discussion. Perhaps most importantly, you can't dictate to an organization. You must have "buy-in" from all of the participants, and this, in turn, makes them dedicated to the process. The "buy-in" must continue from the outset and continue forever. Building and maintaining a team dedicated to the vision is tough but critical to the process.

Dr. Matthews: And the reward?

Gen Fogleman: The cost of transportation is our customers' biggest complaint. I think DTS 2010 will provide them a more responsive service at a lower price. Early in my tenure as CINCTRANS, I talked with our customers and with industry to learn their perception of TRANSCOM's failings. I discovered that the component commands were speaking with three tongues rather than one. Soon I was able to identify the overlaps in missions and functions among the component commands. As I became more knowledgeable and more confident in my job as CINC, I was more prone to exercise my charter and the Goldwater-Nichols authorities to restructure the way my components did business. As a result, we worked with the TCCs to create a process that presented a single face to both the customer and industry. A quicker response means money saved.

Dr. Matthews: What role has TRANSCOM played in shaping National Transportation Planning and Policy?

Gen Fogleman: Our influence has been subtle. We've continually worked to open lines of communication and increase the interface with the Department of Transportation. For example, having the Secretary of Transportation come to TRANSCOM and see what we do firsthand was very useful. Anytime you work in a cooperative mode versus a confrontational mode, both entities benefit. Having Admiral Al Herberger, former TRANSCOM DCINC, as the Maritime Administrator certainly facilitates joint DOD and DOT actions. The TRANSCOM-DOT connections may not have an immediate, direct pay off, but it helps both departments look at issues in a wider context. It allows us to take an initiative like the ISTEA [Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991] legislation and go out to our components and say, "Hey, look, this money is out there, and you ought to be dealing with local government entities to improve access to your installations, because it is in their best interest and because it keeps the installation viable. It also helps the nation because we have a better Defense Transportation System."

RRF, MARAD, and JLOTS

Dr. Matthews: How did TRANSCOM's relationship with the Maritime Administration [MARAD] change while you were our CINC?

Gen Fogleman: I think it was good when I got there, and I think it was better when I left. Two points struck me about the relationship: first, the importance of MARAD to our operations and, second, the confrontational mode that existed between MARAD and MSC. The issue of who should fund and operate the RRF was a very

contentious one. With your help, I did a little historical research on the issue. I looked at how the relationship had developed through the '70s and '80s up to the present and discovered that MARAD was doing the work, no matter who controlled the funding. If DOD were once again to take over RRF funding from DOT, it would either have to replicate the same skills and functions that exist in MARAD or contract with MARAD to get the job done. Based upon my research, I initially elected to support the status quo, that is, for the funding to remain with MARAD and for MARAD and TRANSCOM to determine jointly how we spent the money. During the last legislative round this year, MARAD was pushing so hard for maritime reform that they allowed the funding of the RRF to slip off their scope. As a result, we were greatly shorted in our funding, and OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services collaborated to get the funding for the RRF back into the defense budget. Quite frankly, I came to see the value in that move. With RRF money in the defense budget, we can argue against trade-offs for other commercial programs. It may get traded off against other defense programs, but TRANSCOM will be there as the RRF's advocate. Stated bluntly, the money is safer under DOD than under DOT. But, as in the past, DOD will pass the money to MARAD for RRF maintenance and activation. The key will be for TRANSCOM and MARAD to continue to sit down together and figure out how to get the maximum readiness out of the RRF for the number of dollars allocated.

Dr. Matthews: What more could TRANSCOM do as an advocate for the merchant marine and maritime reform?

Gen Fogleman: Clearly, we need to stay engaged because the US flag fleet has a genuine requirement for some relief. If there was one area that I would point to as a disappointment during my time as

CINCTRANS, it would be maritime reform. I was never successful in getting the senior leadership in OSD to acknowledge a requirement for a given number of commercial ships, and thus, acknowledge a DOD responsibility to fund a certain amount of the maritime reform to save the US flag fleet. We worked the issue from several angles. For example, we tried to show that a chunk of the money expended on RRF breakbulk ships could have gone instead into maritime reform in exchange for an airtight agreement from industry that they would be there for us when we needed them. Unfortunately, I was unable to put the whole package together.

Dr. Matthews: Would you recommend that General Rutherford continue to work it?

Gen Fogleman: Yes, I think it's vital to us. Everybody wrings their hands over our airlift shortfall, which is real. But so is the sealift shortfall. You look at any of the war plans. The real limiting factor in just about every one of them is sealift.

Dr. Matthews: What is JLOTS' [Joint Logistics Over the Shore's] potential contribution to our deployment efforts? Are the CINCs behind it now?

Gen Fogleman: JLOTS is a great capability and one we need in our bag of tricks. JLOTS was specifically designed, built, and procured for the scenario of the Russians moving south through Iran en route to the Gulf oil fields. The JLOTS system was geared to the Persian Gulf, which has relatively shallow gradient beaches and protected waters. When the Soviet threat went away, we were left with this tremendous JLOTS investment. We were faced with finding ways to make it pay off. But I found that nobody wanted to exercise it.

As you know, I sent out a message that said, “Look, either love it or leave it, but let’s vote and get on with it.” Of course, everybody came in and said, “Sure, we want it. We need to be able to operate over the shore in the event a seaport is denied to us.” I know a little bit of back-door politicking went on to get that response. When I sent the message out, a “union” involved with JLOTS saw their empire going away. The people charged with maintaining and operating it went into a hard-sell mode with the CINCs. I was not disappointed with the outcome. The discussions certainly raised the CINCs’ awareness level of JLOTS’ capabilities and limitations, and we decided to keep it. And we have JCS money allocated over the next several years to perform JLOTS exercises around the world. This funding resulted from a TRANSCOM major budget issue that we submitted to the Defense Resources Board of Review. Anyway, I’m not sure we’ve written the final chapter on JLOTS.

Personnel and Quality of Life

Dr. Matthews: Are the services sending their best and brightest to TRANSCOM?

Gen Fogleman: I hope they are. If they aren’t, we have a very deliberate process to correct it. All of the promotion lists of the services are reviewed by the Joint Staff to make sure the promotion rates are comparable between the joint world and the service world. And I can tell you that the service chiefs take this very seriously, as does the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But it is a process that takes constant attention. You will never solve it once and for all. That’s why the J1 [Manpower and Personnel Directorate, USTRANSCOM] has got to be brutally honest in bringing forward nomination packages and in dealing with service personnel.

Dr. Matthews: What are the incentives?

Gen Fogleman: TRANSCOM is where the action is. This has been one of TRANSCOM's greatest draws during the last couple of years. Our action officers go out and sell the command to their potential successors, though not intentionally looking for replacements. Outsiders see that TRANSCOM troops are the movers and shakers who are really engaged in world events. Those big T-tails, with the American flag, show America's presence, concern, and daily involvement around the globe. The importance and high visibility of our mission really helps sell the command. But success or failure, I must add, will greatly depend on the quality of the flag officers we get. If our flag officers are seen as people who have a future--if they are viable members of their own services--then the troops of all the services will want to serve at TRANSCOM and be part of the strategic mobility community.

Dr. Leland: Why did you initiate Phoenix Pace and why did you keep it in place during the Rwanda operation and the deployment of troops to Haiti?

Gen Fogleman: When I arrived at Air Mobility Command, I went to our units and talked to the crews. I found very motivated, dedicated professional people, who were frustrated by the way we were using them. They felt they had no control over their lives. If there was an operational airplane on the ramp, and a crisis came up, we would grab a crew, put them in the airplane, and off they'd go. This practice--really a mindset--had permeated the entire command. I thought it was short-sighted and wrong, but its strongest defenders were wing commanders and the staff at Air Mobility Command headquarters.

Phoenix Pace was designed to show everybody in this business that a commander has an obligation to pull his troops off the line from time to time and allow them to refit and refurbish. The idea was that, if we worked together, we could pull a given unit off for two weeks and let the Guard, the Reserve, or another active duty unit pick up the slack. It turned out to be doable. We just had to break old habits. That's why I was so hard-nosed about it during Rwanda and Haiti. We had not gone to war. Sure, these were major contingencies, but when we looked at them closely, we decided they wouldn't last very long. So, to make a point, I refused to pull the people back from Phoenix Pace. I said, "Hey, we have been functioning this way for a year and a half now. We know how to do it, and we know it works." Under the program, every commander had some strategic reserve. I had a whole wing's worth of active-duty assets in reserve I could have used had one of these operations escalated dramatically. In the meantime, it was important to demonstrate to the troops that we were serious about Phoenix Pace.

Dr. Leland: How has AMC's Third Pilot Program reduced the number of banked pilots? Did it operate as you intended?

Gen Fogleman: This is work in progress. The immediate effect has been increased availability of operational slots. Therefore, we didn't have to put people into the bank. That part of it has worked, but I don't know yet if the program will eventually function as we planned. The idea was that the unit could decide when they wanted to make a third pilot a full-fledged copilot. In all fairness to the units, the KC-135 force went through a tremendous amount of turbulence when we consolidated them into four wings, but I would expect these third pilots to progress through their training very rapidly.

Dr. Leland: On your visits to AMC installations, what concerns did the command's men and women most often express, and how successful has AMC been in addressing them?

Gen Fogleman: I did not find an overarching theme, except concern over instability caused by BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure Commission]. As far as quality of life issues go, we are most deficient in our facilities. In the last two years, we made great progress in that area, primarily due to General Gene Lupia [Air Force Brigadier General Eugene A., Director of Civil Engineering, AMC] and his civil engineering staff. They worked relentlessly to get our base commanders the resources they needed to improve dorms and military family housing. General Lupia and his staff put together a series of standards books that made it possible for our people to understand what we expected in terms of facilities. At the same time, those publications showed the Air Staff and OSD that the standards we had set were not outlandish. It showed them AMC's situation relative to the standards and to other commands, which helped us in funding and priority.

Dr. Leland: What housing and facility projects are still needed in AMC?

Gen Fogleman: AMC needs whole house upgrades in the military family housing areas. In some places, we have shortages of family housing. There are two other major deficiencies we will be living with for some time. The single, largest problem is unaccompanied housing. Overall in the Air Force, I'm told that about 20 percent of our barracks and dormitories still have gang latrines. In AMC, that number is about 38 percent, so we are clearly way out of line. We also need to work hard on increasing the single room occupancy rate. The other major deficiency is in flight line operations and maintenance facilities. For some reason, these structures have

never been given proper priority or attention. We've launched a major initiative on four AMC bases to begin fixing the problem.

Personal

Dr. Leland: What are the characteristics of a strong leader?

Gen Fogleman: A leader, by definition, is someone who makes things happen. Now before you make things happen, you have to have a vision and the strength and will power to see a vision through to completion. A leader must also have the courage of his convictions. In Air Mobility Command, we emphasized integrity, competence, and courage.

Dr. Leland: From your perspective as a military historian, who most exemplifies your definition of a leader?

Gen Fogleman: George C. Marshall* is probably the premier American military figure of the twentieth century. But I have many heroes, like the airmen who led and staffed our Army Air Forces during the really hard times of the 1920s and 1930s. By just doing their jobs one day at a time, they prepared themselves for the enormous challenges they would face during World War II. I admire them greatly.

Dr. Leland: How did you draw upon your training as a historian while AMC Commander and CINCTRANS?

Gen Fogleman: I think I did it more implicitly than explicitly. In other words, I recognize the value of looking at issues in a broad perspective rather than as isolated events. I am inclined to look for historical analogies and then go back and re-read the history of the period

* footnote George Marshall

that I think is parallel. Also, as an historian, I am perhaps more inclined than others to come to you, my historians--at AMC, TRANSCOM, and the Air Staff--for information and research assistance.

Dr. Leland: As CINCTRANS and AMC Commander, what accomplishments are you most proud of?

Gen Fogleman: Hard question. I think I was most proud of the manner in which the people of our commands, time and time again, have responded to almost continual taskings. I was very proud to call myself part of those organizations.

Dr. Leland: What do you see as the two commands' greatest challenges for the future?

Gen Fogleman: The greatest challenge is sustaining force modernization, particularly in the Air Mobility Command. We must see the core airlifter through to completion and meet the material handling requirements.

Dr. Matthews: If there was one more thing you could have done at TRANSCOM, or one more thing you could have done at AMC, what would it have been?

Gen Fogleman: I'm not sure. Perhaps for TRANSCOM, two things: putting DTS 2010 on fast forward and concluding ITV activity by fielding the Global Transportation Network. In the Air Mobility Command, I would have liked to have finished the Global Positioning System and SATCOM modifications.

Dr. Matthews: What is your heartfelt assessment of these last two assignments?

Gen Fogleman: I've said it publicly, and I sincerely mean it: the two years I spent as Commander of Air Mobility Command and Commander in Chief of US Transportation Command were the most rewarding of my career. I had the challenge of learning a new business, and while I may be overstating my accomplishments, I think I learned a lot about transportation. I had the opportunity to work with groups of people, at all levels, whom I had never dealt with before. People within the tanker and airlift communities and the transportation experts in the joint arena and at the component commands were the most professional I've ever met. And because I was a CINC, I was given a rare opportunity to work within the senior levels of the Department of Defense. So the tour was most rewarding, both personally and professionally.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything you would like to put on the record that we've missed?

Gen Fogleman: After seven pages of questions, I am ready for a break. I would be remiss, however, if I did not acknowledge the great work and devotion to duty of the two DCINCs and the two Vice Commanders who served with me. Dane Starling and Ken Wykle were the glue that held TRANSCOM together on a day-to-day basis. Walt Kross and John Jackson were the two most influential officers in AMC in the daily operations of the command and, more importantly, in setting the tone that established the culture of excellence in the command. All four are unsung heroes who deserve special praise.

BIOGRAPHY

General Ronald R. Fogleman is Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), and Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. As USCINCTRANS, he is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the nation's defense transportation requirements. He exercises peacetime and combat command over service components from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As Commander of AMC, he provides operationally trained, equipped and mission-ready air mobility forces to support U.S. requirements and the warfighting commanders in chief.

General Fogleman graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1963. In early assignments he instructed student pilots, performed combat duty as a fighter pilot and high-speed forward air traffic controller in Vietnam and Thailand, was a history instructor at the Air Force Academy, and conducted flight operations in Europe, including duty as an F-15 aircraft demonstration pilot for numerous international airshows. Over the past decade, he has commanded an Air Force wing and air division, directed Air Force programs at the Pentagon, and served as Commander of the Pacific Air Forces' 7th Air Force, with added responsibility as deputy commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and commander of Korean and U.S. air components assigned under the Combined Forces Command.

General Fogleman and his wife, Miss Jane, have two sons.

EDUCATION:

- 1963 Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy.
- 1971 Master's degree in military history and political science, Duke University.
- 1976 Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. June 1963-September 1964, pilot training, 3576th Student Squadron, Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
2. September 1964-May 1967, T-37 Flight Training Instructor, 3575th Pilot Training Squadron, Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
3. May 1967-December 1967, Flight Examiner, 3575th Pilot Training Wing, Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
4. December 1967-June 1968, F-100 Combat Crew Training, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona.
5. June 1968-December 1968, F-100 Fighter Pilot, 510th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam.
6. December 1968-April 1969, Operations Commando Sabre F-100 Forward Air Controller, 37th Tactical Fighter Wing, South Vietnam.
7. April 1969-September 1969, F-100 Fighter Pilot, 510th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam.

8. September 1969-December 1970, Student, history preparation for U.S. Air Force Academy Instructor, Duke University, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
9. December 1970-April 1973, History Instructor, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado.
10. April 1973-August 1974, F-4D/E Flight Commander, 421st Tactical Fighter Squadron, Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand.
11. August 1974-July 1975, Chief, Rated Officer Career Planing Section, Headquarters Air Reserve Personnel Center, Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado.
12. July 1975-August 1976, Student Officer, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
13. August 1977-February 1978, Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations, later, Chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Division, 36th Tactical Fighter Wing, Bitburg Air Base, West Germany.
14. March 1978-June 1979, Deputy Commander for Operations, 32nd Tactical Fighter Squadron, Camp New Amsterdam, Netherlands.
15. June 1979-August 1981, Chief, Tactical Forces Division, Directorate of Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D. C.
16. August 1981-June 1982, Vice Commander, 388th Tactical Training Wing, Hill Air Force Base, Utah.
17. June 1982-March 1983, Director of Flight Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
18. March 1983-August 1984, Commander, 56th Tactical Training Wing, MacDill Air Force, Florida.
19. August 1984-March 1986, Commander, 836th Air Division, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona.
20. March 1986-January 1988, Deputy Director, Programs and Evaluation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources; Chairman, Programs Review Council, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D. C.
21. January 1988-June 1990, Director, Programs and Evaluation, and Chairman, Air Staff Board, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D. C.
22. July 1990-August 1992, Commander, 7th Air Force, Deputy Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; and Commander, Republic of Korea/U.S. Air Component Command, Combined Forces Command, Osan Air Base, Korea.
23. August 1992-present, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM; and Commander, AMC, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

FLIGHT INFORMATION:

Rating: Command Pilot, Parachutist
Flight hours: More than 5,500
Aircraft flown: T-37, T-33, F-100, F-4, F-15, F-16, A-10, UH-1, C-21, C-141
Pilot wings from: Republic of Korea

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal	Air Medal with 17 Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Service Medal	Aerial Achievement Medal
Silver Star	Air Force Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster	Vietnam Service Medal with three Service Stars
Distinguished Flying Cross with Oak Leaf Cluster	Order of National Security Merit, Kooksun
Purple Heart	
Meritorious Service Medal	
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm	

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS:

Fellow, Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces Society.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations, New York City.
Recipient, Lance Sijan Award for Leadership.

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant	Jun 5, 1963	Colonel	Jan 1, 1980
First Lieutenant	Dec 5, 1964	Brigadier General	Oct 1, 1985
Captain	Mar 10, 1967	Major General	Feb 1, 1988
Major	Mar 1, 1971	Lieutenant General	Jul 1, 1990
Lieutenant Colonel	May 1, 1975	General	Sep 1, 1992

[Current as of June 1993]

Narrative Justification for Award of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal

General Ronald R. Fogleman, United States Air Force, distinguished himself by unsurpassed and widely-acknowledged superior performance while serving in a position of significant and extensive responsibility as Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), and Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC), United States Air Force, from 25 August 1992 to 18 October 1994. Throughout this period, General Fogleman provided superlative leadership and wise counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and other senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials in the face of numerous challenges.

During his tenure as USCINCTRANS, General Fogleman provided direction, guidance, and support to over 150 joint deployment operations and exercises including strategic and commercial lift for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces. Some of the significant operations included: Restore Hope (Somalia); Desert Sortie (redeployment of Desert Shield/Desert Storm forces); movement of Patriot missiles to Korea; Support Hope (humanitarian support of Rwandan refugees); Uphold Democracy (support for restoring the ousted democratic government of Haiti); GTMO (support of Haitian migrants at Guantanamo AB, Cuba); and humanitarian relief during Hurricane Andrew, Typhoon Omar, Hurricane Iniki, and floods in the midwestern United States.

By fostering a closer working relationship with the Maritime Administration, he raised the readiness of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels to its highest level in history. He accomplished this through the acquisition of 12 roll-on/roll-off vessels, insistence on higher readiness standards, development of new retention crews, and improved strategic berthing of high-priority vessels.

Under General Fogleman's guidance and direction, the Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation (JICTRANS) was established. This newly consolidated intelligence facility is capable of producing tightly focused, predictive intelligence to meet critical needs of the joint planning and execution community. JICTRANS products are in great demand worldwide by transportation planners, operators, and the regional CINCs (Commanders in Chief). General Fogleman's central role in creating JICTRANS has received personal endorsement and praise from all segments including Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) William J. Perry, who personally praised JICTRANS for providing "excellent products" while exemplifying "forward thinking" and "responsiveness to warfighters" during the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Rwanda.

General Fogleman personally guided USTRANSCOM in assuming a new medical mission, as mandated by DOD Directive 5154.6. As a result, USTRANSCOM greatly expanded its medical regulatory and patient movement support to the unified commands and the services. Significantly improved global intransit visibility (ITV) of patients and command and control of intertheater patient movement are now hallmarks of the DOD system. Ultimately, this new mission will allow more patients to be evacuated during

peak combat periods with less degradation to a commander's sustained lift capability. An additional by-product of the new medical mission was the merger of the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office and the Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Center to form the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC). In addition to significantly increasing DOD's ability to process patient movement, the GPMRC was designated as the first reinvention laboratory initiative at USTRANSCOM. Working concurrently with the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence), General Fogleman led the command in reengineering the way patients are regulated and evacuated throughout the world as well as the subsequent redesign of the command and control system needed to incorporate the reengineered improvements. The result was "TRANSCOM's Regulating And Command & Control Evacuation System" (TRAC²ES), which integrated the separate theater patient movement processes with those of the continental United States (CONUS) into a centralized global system. This system also decentralized execution to the outside of CONUS theaters and provided by-name patient ITV in both peace and war.

In September 1993, the SECDEF instructed the CINCs to accept a more active role in determining readiness. The USTRANSCOM readiness program was given priority emphasis and was amplified to comply with SECDEF instructions. As a result, USTRANSCOM began operational and logistical evaluations of commercial airports, runways, en route structures, merchant mariners, the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), and strategic highway and railway networks. This action resulted in a more comprehensive evaluation of Defense Transportation System (DTS) readiness.

The command's Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU), the first multi-service reserve unit established within the DOD, has been a "role model" for other commands to achieve Total Force integration. General Fogleman pioneered the initiative of joint service reserve training within USTRANSCOM that ultimately qualified many JTRU reserve members for full participation in USTRANSCOM Command Center activities. This innovative approach set a new standard of excellence and enabled reserve personnel to work side by side with their active duty counterparts as required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

General Fogleman orchestrated the further integration of AMC and the Strategic Air Command into a combined air mobility command. In addition, he conceived and directed an innovative use of aerial refueling, which substantially increased the flexibility and capability of airlift missions. General Fogleman also actively guided the revitalization of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, which had suffered from a severe drop in civil aviation participation immediately following the Gulf War. His efforts have reestablished CRAF as a viable option for increased airlift in times of crisis.

Seeking to continually improve the DTS, General Fogleman directed a bottom-up review of the airlift channel process. This massive review involved the CINCs, services, and other governmental agencies and resulted in a \$315 million annual savings to the 350-channel system, primarily from reduction of channel frequency. This initiative continues to produce improved efficiency and cost savings by reducing C-141 flying

hours, thereby extending the aircraft's life until a new core aircraft becomes fully operational.

General Fogleman continued the momentum initiated by his predecessor's proclamation of 1992 as "The Year of the Container." He led DOD efforts to develop and establish joint and service intermodal container doctrine. Analyzing the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and MRS Bottom-Up Review, he directed the development of containers uniquely required for the DOD container fleet. General Fogleman is also credited with USTRANSCOM's design and development of a versatile joint container adaptable for all services.

Working with the chief executive officers of the maritime industry, he began the process of reengineering and reinvigorating the SRP. The new SRP will ensure a more orderly transition from peacetime contingencies to wartime. In addition, General Fogleman laid the foundation for a new era of DOD-civilian cooperation by initiating a program to develop a military/civilian, joint-use, intermodal facility. This facility will enhance commercial operations and will be available for force projection in contingencies. Combining resources of the military and commercial industry will benefit the DTS, and it will serve as a model for joint-use activities into the twenty-first century.

Through his direct involvement, General Fogleman solved one of the major force projection deficiencies identified in the MRS. He identified the requirement for a West Coast Containerized Ammunition Port to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as one of the critical elements for timely force projection. His hands-on involvement ensured its funding throughout the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.

General Fogleman's vision and understanding of the significance of ITV in movement of cargo and passengers resulted in his declaration of 1994 as the "Year of In-Transit Visibility." His perception of the need for ITV became the catalyst for development of a DOD plan that clearly spells out an operational concept based on customer ITV requirements. These concepts form the basis for the blueprint in the design of an automated ITV capability at the "ready" for use in peace or war. Major progress has been made to provide this vital link, largely due to General Fogleman's vision, dynamic leadership, and tenacity.

General Fogleman orchestrated the development of a single, comprehensive transportation and traffic management publication for DOD, the Defense Transportation Regulation, divided into passenger, cargo, mobility, and personal property parts. This aggressive action will reduce 2,200 pages of regulation by 50 percent while maintaining a quality, easy-to-use policy and procedural guide for the traffic managers throughout the worldwide DTS.

He elevated to the warfighting CINCs' attention the paramount importance of Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) as a capability to close the force in the absence of fixed or degraded port facilities. Until then, JLOTS operations planning and training were receiving marginal attention. As a result of General Fogleman's involvement,

warfighting CINCs now identify their operational plan requirements for JLOTS, and a five-year JLOTS exercise plan was incorporated in the JCS Joint Training Master Schedule.

General Fogleman was in the forefront of identifying and resolving funding issues crucial to the DTS. He was given the responsibility for total financial control of all common user transportation assets. This meant USCINCTRANS had to create a joint financial structure from three service-specific financial operations. USTRANSCOM is the only unified command funded through the Defense Business Operations Fund-Transportation (DBOF-T), with FY94 funds totaling \$5.4 billion. He faced four immediate leadership and managerial challenges: integration of programming, budget formulation, budget organization development, and staffing the budget execution. He met these challenges brilliantly, and his efforts resulted in submission of the first-ever DBOF-T budget and POM. He has institutionalized a logical, solid system of program analysis and financial management that is well respected throughout the defense transportation industry.

Through General Fogleman's vision and determination, the Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center for Transportation was organized within USTRANSCOM. This directorate-level organization guides the evolution of the DTS to achieve the vision established in the Transportation Functional Strategic Plan by employing CIM techniques to document, analyze, and improve the DTS.

Assessing the rapidly changing strategic environment and its impact upon the DOD, General Fogleman set out to conceptualize the DTS of the future to support national security and warfighting strategies of the next century. Under his leadership, the command established a vision in a bold report, *The "Ought To Be" Defense Transportation System for the Year 2010*. The report outlined how the forces of customers, business competition, and change would affect our nation's future commercial and defense transportation systems. With the 2010 Vision articulated, General Fogleman then formed a team dedicated to developing the strategic plan required to smoothly transition the command toward the DTS 2010 structure.

As a practitioner of Total Quality Management, General Fogleman implemented quality as a way of life throughout USTRANSCOM. At the 1992 Transportation Component Commanders' Conference, he established five major goals with specific underlying objectives which gave the DTS a focus for the future and a basis for today's decisions. General Fogleman led the command on a journey of continuous quality improvement, focusing on the needs of the command's customers while measuring the command's performance in filling customer requirements. Under his guidance, USTRANSCOM was the first unified command to conduct a unit self-assessment using Malcolm Baldrige scoring criteria. This assessment will provide a baseline for future measures of performance.

Glossary

AB	Air Base
ACOM	see USACOM
AFB	Air Force Base
AFIT	Air Force Institute of Technology
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	area of responsibility
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure Commission
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIM-T	Corporate Information Management-Transportation
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCACOM	Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
CINCSOC	Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command
CINCTRANS	see USCINCTRANS
CINCUNK	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command Korea
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CONUS	continental United States
DBOF	Defense Business Operating Fund
DBOF-T	Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DCINCUSEUCOM	Deputy Commander in Chief, United States European Command
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Department of Transportation
DTS	Defense Transportation System
EUCOM	see USEUCOM
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
GPS	Global Positioning System
GSA	General Services Administration
GTN	Global Transportation Network
HAC	House Appropriations Committee
IG	Inspector General
ITV	intransit visibility

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Joint Deployment Agency
JICTRANS	Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation
JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over the Shore
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
JTCC	Joint Transportation CIM (Corporate Information Management) Center
JTRU	Joint Transportation Reserve Unit
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAJCOM	major command
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MCG	Mobility Control Group
MOG	Maximum on Ground
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
NDTU	National Deployment Transportation University
NSA	National Security Agency
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
P&L	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics), Office of the Secretary of Defense
RF	radio frequency
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SATCOM	satellite communications
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SPACECOM	United States Space Command
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TCC	Transportation Component Commands
TRANSCOM	see USTRANSCOM

UN	United Nations
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USCINCSpace	Commander in Chief, United States Space Command
USCINTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USLANTCOM	United States Atlantic Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

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