

General Robert L. Rutherford
Commander in Chief
United States Transportation Command
and
Commander
Air Mobility Command:
An Oral History

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Preface

The oral history covers a wide range of issues including readiness, recent operations, jointness, reserve forces, and the integration of the three transportation modes: air, land, and sea. General Rutherford's answers to our questions are candid, illuminating, and provocative. We believe his oral history will be of great interest and use to government and business decision makers, in general, and to defense transportation operators and planners, in particular. It will also be an important primary source document for academic and government historians.

Our associate, Margaret J. Nigra, a historian assigned to the Research Center, deserves special thanks for her assistance with this project. She transcribed and edited the manuscript, compiled the glossary, and prepared the final copy for printing.

We will distribute additional copies of this oral history upon request.

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Introduction

Dr. Matthews: Sir, when I look over your career as CINCTRANS [Commander in Chief [USTRANSCOM], if I were to pick one overarching theme, it would be your attempts to bring increased efficiency to USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command], its component commands, and the Defense Transportation System [DTS] without decreasing the command's effectiveness to fight war. That theme will likely follow through this entire interview. I'd like to start by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of USTRANSCOM by directorate. Tell us if you think there's a way we could bring greater efficiency to the directorates, starting with J1 [Manpower and Personnel Directorate] and after we finish with the J-staff, I'd like to take on the broader issues of how USTRANSCOM and the Transportation Component Commands [TCCs] are reengineering to increase efficiency. J1, Sir.

USTRANSCOM J-Staff

Gen Rutherford: Really no comment about J1. I think they operate fairly effectively and efficiently. They're primarily in the administrative side of the house, so no comment there.

J2 [Intelligence Directorate]. We are still trying to come of age in the J2 business. Our intelligence requirements are a little bit different from those of the other CINCs [Commanders in Chief]. We are not well-aligned in the intelligence community today to address transportation-related intelligence questions. For example, this last week [end of May 1996] we were talking about going into

the Central African Republic, and we were trying to find out the fuel situation in central Africa. No one had the answers, so we had to go to the defense attaches and have them do a survey. I can find out all about the Hutus and Tutsis and other central African ethnic groups, but I can't find out if I have fuel or not. Our requirements, generally speaking, are not that time sensitive. The length of a runway, the condition of a taxiway does not change overnight. If we were going into a combat zone where the enemy was bombing airfields, it might be different, but that's not the way we normally do business. We are coming to grips, I think, with our requirements, slowly but surely. It's just been a long time getting there. Any follow up questions on J2?

Dr. Matthews: I'd like you to comment on how the J2 has helped you operationally while you've been here. What contributions have they made? Anything specific stand out?

Gen Rutherford: I've frequently said our biggest problem is getting ahead of movement issues. J2 has been able to anticipate what's about to come apart at the seams and what we might be required to react to. That's been very useful. Many times that requires friendly intell[igence] as much as it does enemy intell. So we have to have a good feel for what the "watchman's" concerned about, what we might become involved in. We can't do our job unless we start to move before the action begins. It takes us anywhere from 24 to 36 hours to come up to speed to respond to a contingency, a breaking contingency, and we would like to be more responsive. The only way you can do that is to have good friendly intell.

Dr. Matthews: Are you satisfied with the way the directorate's organized, with the

JICTRANS [Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation]?

Gen Rutherford: Yes, I don't have any problems with that.

I try not to get into headquarters organizational issues. I'll let the director worry about that. If he can't organize his directorate to provide the correct information I need, I probably need a new director. I'm most interested in discussing the results coming out the other end, operational issues.

Customer Service

Dr. Matthews: Let's not proceed then with the other directorates and instead go to USTRANSCOM's streamlining efforts. What would you say have been our accomplishments to date in bringing greater efficiency to the DTS?

Gen Rutherford: One of the keys in the process is making sure that we know what the customer's desires are, what he expects. And to that extent, in our strategic planning process we have come a little closer together in understanding each other's capabilities and desires. I think we have improved our efficiency and our effectiveness. You will recall that this headquarters was set up to do two things. Number one, to plan and number two, to execute. I think we've done a pretty good job. Don't misunderstand me. It is not perfect and it has a long way to go. But given where we started, I think we've come a long way. We've developed a good rapport with the regional CINCs. For instance, I think we have a good working relationship with them in the deliberate planning process.

And we are getting TRANSCOM more involved in the execution

process. Up to this point, we've largely handled requirements and passed those down to the components to execute. We are about to start making the first moves to get us more involved in the execution process and the tracking of that process. And frankly, that's been one of our problems. If you ask about value-added in a process, if you go down to one of our components, they don't think we add a lot of value. To them, we just get in the way of the flow of things. But I think we're adding more and more value to the process by asking the right questions when the requirements come down, and by making sure the people who are requesting support are sensitive to the issues. We're being heard, I think, more than ever before. In that regard, we have improved the efficiency of the system.

I just mentioned the Central African Republic. A recurring issue for us is the prepositioning of stage [aircraft] crews. You have to have stage crews in advance or you will have planes in theater ready to load, but the crews will be out of rest. Then the process goes into a hold mode. In this case, we were able to convince the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and [US] EUCOM [United States European Command] to act immediately to allow us to preposition stage crews. It's all part of the education process, I think. They don't get into the details. "They" meaning EUCOM, "they" meaning the Joint Staff, don't get into the nuts and bolts of how we perform our job and they shouldn't. But they need to be sensitive to the kinds of things we need in order for us to respond to their requirements.

Tanker Airlift Control Center

Mr. Cossaboom: Talking about efficiencies, you kicked off a Tiger Team^{*} at the Air Mobility Command [AMC] to look at the functions and relationships of the DO [Director of Operations] and TACC [Tanker Airlift Control Center]. The dichotomy between the DO and the TACC, I know, has been under discussion. How do you think that will turn out?

Gen Rutherford: The TACC is very close to my heart because, as you recall in a previous life as the Vice Commander,^{**} I felt strongly that it was needed. I saw it coming to fruition about the time I left MAC [Military Airlift Command].^{***} When I returned three years later, I took another look at the TACC, and it was not quite what I had envisioned. I discovered we had taken a large part of the operations and logistics work and put it in the TACC. As a result, the DO and LO [Director of Logistics] had washed their hands of those responsibilities. Consequently, we were not using our best expertise to work problems evolving in day-to-day operations. If we are going to have directors of operations and logistics on the staff, then they need to do more than future planning. They need to be involved in day-to-day operations also. So we are adjusting the relationship to get the DO and the LG back into the process. If they don't understand the ongoing, day-to-day problems, it's pretty hard for them to write policies and procedures to correct those problems. Hopefully, by putting the DO and LG back in the execution business, we'll get a better product. We'll see.

^{*}Team of experts assigned to solve a particular problem.

^{**}Vice Commander, Military Airlift Command, 16 May 1991-27 May 1992.

Military Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command

Dr. Matthews: Let's take a look now at the other two component commands, Military Traffic Management Command [MTMC] and Military Sealift Command [MSC]. What are the greatest payoffs and efficiencies in the near term?

Gen Rutherford: Let me start with MTMC. MTMC is fairly large in size. It's not really in the TRANSCOM mode in comparison to its mission, roles, and functions. It's more in the mode of pre-TRANSCOM organizational structure, to the extent that it is still very much engaged in supporting day-to-day operations of the regional CINCs versus supporting the common user transportation mission. I've begun to draw a line between those two missions because of the pressure we're under now to decrease transportation costs. How you draw the line is a matter of whether you put it in this pocket or that pocket. To most taxpayers, it doesn't make a lot of difference, but to some it does. And frankly, we're doing a lot of Service-related functions in MTMC. As a result, we're in the process of redefining some of those lines and taking a closer look at how we do business. We still have a large complement of MTMC personnel in Europe. We have a very small complement of MTMC personnel in the Middle East. We have about half the number of MTMC people in Korea that we have in Europe. When you see such an imbalance, you begin to ask questions about what we're doing and why we're doing it.

I've been more involved in the sealift side of the house. MSC is

***MAC was inactivated 31 May 1992 and AMC activated on 1 June 1992, in the largest reorganization of the Air Force since 1947.

primarily focused on its Service-unique mission rather than common user support. As you know, they've taken on a reengineering effort. That effort radically redefined the alignment of their staff, took some people out of their boxes, and forced them to look around to see how they might improve their operation. Again, I think there's plenty of opportunity for improvements. I would tell you that the contracting process in MSC just begs for process improvement. So, we've looked at how we've awarded contracts in the past, and we're starting to lean towards a best value/uniform commercial rate [UCR] that will greatly reduce the amount of time it takes to prepare for and let contracts. We were spending more time preparing to award contracts than the contracts were actually lasting in some cases. It was just a constant dialogue between MSC and contractors over establishing contracts. It was extremely burdensome for all concerned, TRANSCOM, MSC, and even more so for the companies with which we do business. I think our initiatives will allow us to concentrate more on actions and less on process.

Our reengineering discussions are headed in the right direction. We're not as far along as I would like to be, but I think we're getting a clearer view of not only how we might reorganize but how we might reengineer to gain maximum efficiency. And there's plenty of opportunity to do that. Many of our processes and procedures have been around for longer than I have been alive, so it's about time we look at them critically.

“Clean Sheet” Initiative

Three Proposals

Dr. Matthews: We have underway a “Clean Sheet” initiative that is looking at how we might recreate TRANSCOM from scratch. There are three basic proposals on the table: TRANSCOM without components, as proposed by the Department of Defense [DOD] Deputy Inspector General [IG] back in 1988; a two-component proposal, which would combine MTMC and parts of MSC into a “surface” command; and a three-component proposal, with significant consolidation in the field and at the headquarters. Each proposal identifies varying degrees of increased efficiencies. Which one of these proposals do you advocate?

Gen Rutherford: You can make arguments on any side of the ledger here, but before we go off with these sweeping reorganization proposals we have to make sure we don’t lose our wartime effectiveness. I could make the case that says as a result of intermodalism and other changes in the industry, there’s no longer a need for components. Having said that, then I could also make the case that you need to retain the component commands’ expertise. The components have been around for a long time, and they understand the business. TRANSCOM, as we exist today, doesn’t have a really sound institutional base, especially for the ground transportation side of the house. Find someone in this headquarters who really understands personal property shipments!

And while some might say “it’s time to look outside your box and

reengineer,” there’s something to be said for that institutional memory, too. So you’re constantly weighing the pros and cons. I don’t think USTRANSCOM is ready, at this stage of the game to take the big leap and go out and undertake another major reorganization. I think there’s plenty of opportunity to refine and improve the components’ efficiencies and effectiveness as we have them aligned today before we take the next dive off the board.

And I don’t think the system’s broken right now, per se. If you look at Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and more recent contingency operations, we’ve carried them off quite effectively. Could you save a lot of manpower through a major reorganization? If you look at how we do our job on a day-to-day basis--dependency on the commercial industry and on the [Air National] Guard and Reserves--I don’t think so. I think our fixed costs are fairly low, a four-billion dollar business. Considering what we do, our overhead is fairly low. So I’m not sure why we would want to reorganize today. That doesn’t mean that somewhere down the road we might not reconsider and take the big plunge. But I’d like to get automated systems up to speed and operating before we go change the whole process. People are in a big hurry to make a lot of changes, but I’m not sure they understand that there’s not a lot of payback in restructuring the whole command now. And frankly, it might be such a shock to the system that we...

Dr. Matthews: ... might break it?

Gen Rutherford: I don’t think we’d break it, but we might stumble in the execution. I’m quite supportive of finding new ways to do business, but at the same time I recognize that day-to-day I have to operate. We must first and foremost be prepared to support the warfighting CINCs’

needs. Those who would propose radical and immediate reorganizational changes, which may or may not work, do not bear responsibility for timely delivery of forces during wartime. I'm not anxious to pursue any of the three reorganizational "Clean Sheet" options right now. We will continue to talk about and think about them, and make considered and incremental changes. We have some warts but we understand those problems and how to work around them. This is a very complex, time-sensitive business. The consequences of failure, in my mind, are unthinkable. We must improve the process while avoiding past mistakes. I think we're headed in the right direction. We need to stay steady on course.

Unified Command vice Agency

Dr. Matthews: Early on, when we were looking at this "Clean Sheet" initiative, you expressed concern that if we moved too far in the direction of a single, huge unified transportation command, we would risk becoming an agency and thus lose our "CINCdom." Would you explain to us your thought process in that regard?

Gen Rutherford: I think it's very important how we are perceived in the joint community. As a unified command, we can deal with the other CINCs who are our customers on an equal basis, on the same level of organizational structure. That equality, I think, makes possible timely and effective strategic mobility. If we became an agency, like the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], I think we'd go off and concentrate on the business side of the house more and more. We would be further removed from the CINCs' warfighting concerns and consequently, we would no longer serve them successfully.

Strategic mobility would lose its visibility and influence, to the detriment of national security, if USTRANSCOM became an agency vice a “CINCdom.”

Dr. Matthews: Why do you think that we would necessarily become an agency under a radical reorganization?

Gen Rutherford: Because our people would start concentrating on the business side of the house versus the warfighting side of the house. It’s easy to do. We were formed because of readiness concerns, not because of business concerns. It’s only as budgets have become tighter that we’ve started to take on business-related issues. Let us remember why there is a TRANSCOM, what our core mission is. I think, in effect, we were an agency once before, the Joint Deployment Agency [JDA]. We were unsuccessful as an agency, that is why we have a TRANSCOM today.

Geographical Location

Dr. Matthews: It seems the geographical issue is missing from all our reorganizational studies to date. Looking at our current reengineering initiatives, have you reached any conclusion as to where USTRANSCOM and its components, or parts of the components, should be located?

Gen Rutherford: Again, I can make a case that says everything ought to be out here [at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois]. I can make a case that says everything ought to be in Washington, D.C. Frankly, I think we should be away from Washington, but it doesn’t overly concern me that our components are elsewhere. It might be more convenient

for us if our components were located here. It might be less convenient for them, in many respects. You have to remember that MTMC and MSC, to a very large degree, are contract organizations. If you want to look at their core business, that's basically what they do day in and day out. And a lot of the people involved in that process are located in the Washington, D.C. area. I can't go hard over one way or the other on geography. I think you would lose probably more than you would gain by moving the components here, but if there were some reason that MTMC or MSC had to move, then I might try to direct them in this direction. As long as they don't have to move, then I don't think we should make any proposal to move them.

Outsourcing

Mr. Cossaboom: You talked about saving manpower. That's obviously one of the concerns of Congress and DOD. How viable an option is outsourcing [to contract for services]? How far can we go?

Gen Rutherford: There's a lot of opportunity for us to outsource. The real trick here is defining our requirement and making sure we have reliable people to do the job for us. But if you get right down to it, we are probably one of DOD's premier examples of outsourcing. Look at the percentage of the job that the commercial sector does for us on a day-to-day basis! I can't think of a better example of outsourcing. But possibly there's more we can do. We were discussing the MTMC mission earlier. In my mind, many of the functions performed by MTMC port personnel could also be outsourced to a good, reliable contractor. MTMC will tell you that's not the case, but I think it is the case. I think it could be

done fairly easily.

Mr. Cossaboom: What about AMC base operations support [BOS] or portions of BOS?

Gen Rutherford: Yes. Short of the medical side of the house, just about all of those proposals you've heard laid on the table, I'm for them. I've seen several models along those lines. Security, for example. I think that can easily be outsourced. The Navy does it. Air Force Materiel Command [AFMC] uses civilians. In some cases, contract guards could do the job. Roads and grounds, maintenance of housing, maintenance of buildings, all those could possibly be outsourced. We've proven we can do it. The only thing that's keeping us from doing more outsourcing is our deployment requirements. The Air Force has been slow to pick up and grab that ball, and really address the issue. For example, we need to determine how many civil engineers and how many security police we need to deploy. And I'm afraid, as this train presses on down the track, we may, in the Air Force, end up with the same kind of problems that the Army faces today. The Army has made fairly significant reductions in their combat support and combat service support areas, and they're finding out they've got to go to outsourcing because now they don't have the required wartime capability.

Now having said that, if we intend to deploy civil engineers, we need to look very carefully at tapping the Guard and Reserve. There are plenty of civil engineer-types out there in the civilian sector who belong to the Guard and Reserve. I think there's plenty of opportunity for us to do more outsourcing by relying more on the Guard and Reserve to meet the deployment requirements.

Some will say that it will be hard to call them up during contingencies. But we are already at a point where we are very dependent upon the Guard and Reserve to be able to do even a moderate-sized contingency. It's the next logical step. If I had all the money in the world, all the people in the world, I wouldn't outsource, but given today's realities, we will have to do it, and it's going to come in very sizable doses, it seems to me.

Core Mission Distractions

Dr. Matthews: TRANSCOM has done such a superb job over the last few years in performing its mission that we seem to be attracting some jobs outside of our strategic mobility roles and functions such as Defense Courier Service [DCS], which is one of our customers, Operational Support Airlift [OSA], and medical regulating. Do you feel that taking on these sideshows, so to speak, might keep us from concentrating on our primary mission?

Gen Rutherford: That is a very good question, one that probably troubles me most. It's not only those you've mentioned. It's also personal property shipment, the DOD rent-a-car program, etc., which are really not directly related to readiness or our core mission.

Dr. Matthews: Sir, up until recently, I never thought that TRANSCOM would get so involved in its components' operations, like privately owned vehicles [POVs] and household goods.

Gen Rutherford: As we have those issues thrown to us, we need to be very careful we don't lose sight of the core mission. It could be easy for us to lose our focus. And you're right, we have picked up additional

responsibilities that require manpower and effort that could be better spent on the core mission. But our progress in the planning and execution area has given us a little bit more time to work some of these peripheral issues. We just need to be very careful as we move down these side roads. I have talked to General Kross [General Walter, USAF, USCINCTRANS designate*] about the issue. No doubt he will engage in the debate early on. Still, these “sideshow” are missions that have to be done. Someone has to do them. No one is running around the Department of Defense today with a lot of extra resources to take on additional missions. We have to do our share.

Mr. Cossaboom: Would you say there’s also a perception that the joint command, TRANSCOM, is more efficient at handling that kind of problem than an individual component and that’s why USTRANSCOM winds up with some of the cats and dogs?

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

Gen Rutherford: Yes. There’s no doubt about that, especially when one of the components becomes bogged down on an issue. USTRANSCOM has been quite successful in serving as a referee. That’s what we have done in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement [VISA] program. We didn’t get into VISA because we had this great vision of VISA. We got into VISA because of the trouble our component and our suppliers were having in communicating with each other. So the VISA initiative was as much to open a dialogue and smooth the waters as it was to try to establish a Civil Reserve Air Fleet [CRAF]-like program for sealift. Our component would

*General Kross became USCINCTRANS on 15 July 1996 with the retirement of General Rutherford.

never have been able to pull it off without TRANSCOM's assistance. We also have greater access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], and industry than do our components. It is useful in many cases for us to become engaged.

These are lengthy processes. I mentioned personal property. MTMC has been working this issue for some six years, very aggressively for the last two years, and now fifteen days before the report is due to Congress on how to resolve the problems with industry, TRANSCOM has been asked to step into the fray and chair a committee to come up with an alternate plan.

Acquisition and Contracting

Dr. Matthews: Would you give us an idea of what your role as CINCTRANS is in the acquisition process today? Would you recommend any kind of changes or increased role in the acquisition process?

Gen Rutherford: As CINCTRANS my only real fiscal input to the Services is my annual list of POM [Program Objective Memorandum] priorities. I monitor their submissions, and if I don't like what I see, then I tell them so. And if we are unsuccessful at resolving acquisition-related issues, and here I'm talking about funding, then we can attempt to resolve them at the Joint Staff/DOD level, which during my tenure we have been successful in doing. We're also engaged in the National Defense Features [NDF] initiative for ships, which is an acquisition issue. We have become active in this process to make sure that NDF meets our needs. There's a lot of political pressure involved in this program. MSC could get run over in a

hurry without USTRANSCOM's advocacy. And TRANSCOM played on the fringes of the C-17 acquisition, as all the CINCs did. They were supportive of the program, making sure the Air Force verbalized the requirement correctly.

One area that we are likely to get more involved in, as we refine our organization and operations, is contracting. We do not have contracting authority right now. However, if you go back and read our 1992 charter, I think the Secretary of Defense anticipated that we would. And having worked through VISA, and now that we are about to get into the personal property shipment area, probably as a next step TRANSCOM will pick up contracting authority. Then the day-to-day letting of contracts for transportation services will come through TRANSCOM. Now, I don't mean I want contracting authority to go out and acquire ships. I don't have that expertise, don't want it, and couldn't acquire it off the street even if I went looking for it. Same for airplanes, railroad cars, or any other transportation assets. However, I think that ultimately TRANSCOM will have to get involved in contracting for services. The responsibility for execution of the DOD transportation mission is TRANSCOM's. How we execute is directly related to how we contract for services. If the Services fail to recognize and respond to our contracting needs, I believe TRANSCOM must assume responsibility for its contracting needs.

Defense Business Operation Fund-Transportation

Dr. Matthews: How would you evaluate the successes of the Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation [DBOF-T]? What are its pros and cons?

Gen Rutherford: Great idea. Users need to know what transportation is costing. If everything's free, they'll want more of it. We need to sensitize the user to that cost. The problem with DBOF to date has been the sorry state of DOD accounting systems. They are so bad that we don't know what things cost. Never have. Our accounting Systems are set up to record and track what we have spent, but they're not very good at anything else.

Dr. Matthews: Is that why some segments of Congress want to eliminate DBOF?

Gen Rutherford: Most of the people in Congress who want to do away with DBOF think that DOD is shuffling dollars back and forth without congressional oversight. They think there's too much latitude and flexibility in the brew for the devil to play with. And to a certain degree that may be true. One of the reasons we set up DBOF in DOD was to give us more flexibility to move money back and forth across programs. Do we operate better? Frankly, I think we do. To me, DBOF is not a bad word. It's a great idea, and I think if we ever get the accounting systems to support the concept, then it would be well worthwhile.

Dual-Hat Arrangement

Mr. Cossaboom: As the Vice Commander at AMC and now CINCTRANS, you've been on both sides of the dual-hat arrangement. What are the advantages and disadvantages?

Gen Rutherford: One advantage is it takes one less four-star to do the job, but let me address the issue from a different angle. There's been criticism about an Air Force general officer being in this job since

TRANSCOM stood up. If you want to do something thirty days from now, then you can afford to think about ground transportation and sealift. If you want to do something tomorrow, which is typically the kind of contingencies we're involved in, that means airlift. The most dynamic part of what we do on a day-to-day basis in TRANSCOM deals with the airlift function. A dual-hatted Army or Navy CINC could probably do the job if he had airlift experience and knew the airlift system, and as long as he had an Air Force vice commander who understood the airlift side of the house. It's easier to do this job day-to-day, to talk to the Chairman about what we could do tomorrow, etc., if you have a solid background in air mobility. True, the Army is the biggest user of airlift so you might argue "have an Army person up here."

Fact is, I can't make a strong case to break the dual-hat arrangement. I don't think the demands of the job are such that it requires two people. Some might think otherwise. If you split it off, those two commanders will find something to do on a day-to-day basis. And frankly, I could use more hours of the day upon occasion. But I think one person can wear both hats. If the workload ever becomes such that you can't do it, you probably ought to split it. Then there's the emotional angle. Some people say USTRANSCOM is just another Air Force command because it's dual-hatted with AMC. To a large degree, such comments can't be substantiated. They are decision-dependent, short-lived.

Reserves

Dr. Matthews: Coming out of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, one of our top ten recommendations/lessons learned was that we needed a Ready

Mobility Force [RMF] to prime the transportation system prior to a major deployment. This is directly related to the issue of warning time. This ready mobility force has been on and off the agenda as far as Congress is concerned. Do you see hope that someday we'll have some type of RMF?

Gen Rutherford: I think you do today. The force is out there operating 153 missions today. That's the lowest I've seen in about four months. The airplanes are available. This last week, which happens to be on my mind, we were going into the Central African Republic. We didn't launch a bunch of airplanes from the states. We started taking airplanes that were already in the system and diverting them for a higher priority purpose.

We've also established Air Mobility Operations Groups [AMOGs], which give us a ready en route structure. Rather than picking up a team here and there and so forth, we have an organization in place containing essential deployment elements. They're ready to go. That's their job on a day-to-day basis. There are some who say that the AMOGs eats up a lot of resources, and to a certain degree they do. There will be pressures on us to reduce the size of the AMOGs and put those resources back out in the en route structure to meet the peacetime needs. We might want to go with just one AMOG instead of two. We may not need 2,000 people waiting to do this job, although they stay quite busy handling day-to-day activity and exercises. We may need something like 1,500 or 1,000. I don't know what the right number is, but we need to leave the current structure alone for awhile to see how it shakes out. So I would tell you our forces are as probably as ready as any.

Readiness

*Defense Commissary Agency and
Army and Air Force Exchange Service*

Dr. Matthews: What are the readiness ramifications for USTRANSCOM of DeCA [Defense Commissary Agency] and AAFES [Army and Air Force Exchange Service] moving out of the DTS and actually contracting directly with private transportation companies?

Gen Rutherford: Bear with me as I lay some groundwork to answer your question. We're extremely dependent upon the commercial sector to meet the strategic mobility mission. We've been very fortunate in enticing American flag carriers to provide the number of aircraft we need to do the job. And I think that in 1997, our capability will be well above both the passenger and cargo requirement. We don't have the same kind of arrangement in the sealift side of the house. We have a Sealift Readiness Program, the SRP, which allows us to go out and requisition ships, US flag ships, off the open market. It doesn't get us any crews. All it does is get us some "bottoms" [ships]. Although we have never used that program, there has always been a threat to use it. And frankly that creates a lot of concern in industry and a lot of uncertainty on our side of the house on whether that's an effective arrangement. Frankly, I don't think it is.

As I mentioned earlier, we are working to build a CRAF-like program for sealift. That's VISA. The key to VISA is an arrangement with the US flag liners that guarantees them day-to-day business for their wartime commitment to us. This arrangement becomes even more important, given the fact that this industry's about to lose the subsidies that have attracted US flag sealift carriers to the SRP program. Having said that, if we look at

what we're moving by sealift today, about half of it comes out of DeCA and AAFES. Unless we can capture that business base, it will be awfully difficult to entice the US flag carriers to sign up to a CRAF-like sealift program. That's why DeCA and AAFES are so important to us. Clearly the national policy says that we must use US flag carriers to move DOD cargo. As a matter of fact, the law says so. It's not whether or not we move on US flag carriers, it's whether we have a couple of DOD partners trying to arrange their own sealift. It's an issue that has to be addressed at the DOD policy level. I think OSD agrees with our approach. Having said that, DeCA and AAFES have done a lot of spade work on the Hill and have some advocates there who would like to see DeCA and AAFES be able to negotiate their own contracts for movement of goods. I think we will eventually prevail.

Air Mobility Operations Groups

Mr. Cossaboom: En route structure is crucial to air mobility readiness. We have done some reorganizing of the en route structure. Is it where you would like to see it?

Gen Rutherford: We still have some problems in the en route structure. We decided to implement the AMOGs a few years ago, and we manned them this last fall. The command is still a little uncertain about whether we got that right. I've asked the Numbered Air Force [NAF] commanders to recommend to me what they think we ought to do with the AMOGs/en route structure. My own personal opinion is that we cannot afford the manpower we have tied up in AMOGs. While it is a great asset to have in wartime, that's a lot of manpower--we have about 2,000 people in the AMOG structure

right now-waiting for a major contingency to come along. So, I think eventually we'll see some of that AMOG manpower moving back out to the en route structure, and the AMOGs being downsized a bit.

Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet

Mr. Cossaboom: Another key aspect of air mobility readiness is the CRAF, which you touched on earlier, both passenger and cargo capabilities. Have we met our cargo and passenger requirements?

Gen Rutherford: Yes. As a matter of fact, if we look at the 1997 contract we might begin to wonder if we have too much CRAF. To a large degree, the reason people are signing up to CRAF is because they want our business. And for the first time, in the 1997 contract, I think we will meet the cargo, passenger, and aeromedical airlift requirements. But continued commitment depends upon what's happening out there in the commercial sector and, as we all know, it's a one-year contract. I would tell you that we haven't seen major changes in the level of commitments since the Desert Shield/Desert Storm backlash. Commitments have remained fairly steady since then. I think the CRAF program is very healthy right now. We just need to make sure it stays that way.

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

Dr. Matthews: You related the DeCA/AAFES issue to VISA. Are there other major issues that we have to confront, nuts to crack, to get VISA at

a full-fledged Stage I, II, and III* on the books?

Gen Rutherford: Although not directly connected to VISA, there's a contracting issue that motivated the major sealift carriers to come to the table. We've always awarded contracts to the lowest bidder. It's a very cumbersome process that we go through to award those contracts. As a matter of fact, if you laid it out, it's about 14-15 months to get ready to award a 12-month contract. So we're constantly in the process of working contracts, and the carriers said this was ridiculous, which it is. "Oh by the way," they said, "you're not that much of our business base so you need to clean up the process." We are trying to do that right now. We're looking at uniform commercial rates and also best value rates [BVRs] as two alternative approaches to contracting. There are those in OSD who have tied this procurement contracting question to VISA and so, given the fact the carriers have also tied it to VISA, we're going to have to address the issue eventually.

Having said that, VISA--the way we've laid it out--does not require a contracting fix now. I think that we will be successful this October [1996] in getting the Secretary of Defense to extend the VISA charter. (As you know, he gave us a one-year charter.) The extension will mean VISA is an acceptable approach, unlike SRP, for US carriers to commit to DOD. But we will have to come back and answer the contracting questions, because the carriers will not be happy very long unless we do.

*Stages I and II would meet all known sealift requirements. Stage III would meet additional requirements short of requisitioning.

Sealift Capability

Large Medium Speed Roll- On/Roll-Off Ships

Dr. Matthews: When you arrived at USTRANSCOM, we had launched upon a program to correct our sealift surge shortfall. There have been some problems in the program, which I know have caused you concern.

Gen Rutherford: There are a couple of points to be made. First of all, following Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Mobility Requirements Study [MRS], later validated by the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review [MRS BURU], said we would need ten million square feet of surge sealift capability. The key to getting there is a massive LMSR building program. We initially said we needed 20 LMSRs. We've since dropped that requirement down to 19, including 8 ships for PREPO [prepositioning] and 11 ships for surge sealift.

In addition to those LMSRs, we need additional RO/RO [Roll-on/Roll-Off] capability. We determined we needed 36 smaller RO/ROs to be able to meet the requirement. We felt we needed to get that capability fairly rapidly--and I still think that way--but there weren't any RO/ROs of the type we needed on the US market. So we convinced Congress to allow us to go out and buy foreign-built used RO/ROs and have them converted in US shipyards. Congress agreed, as much for monetary reasons--it is cheaper to buy foreign and retrofit than to build ships from scratch in US shipyards--as for military reasons.

There are forces on the Hill right now who don't like that approach. They want us to go buy new ships built in US shipyards. The difference in cost is probably a factor of five for initial procurement, 30 million versus 150 million or so. So that's a consideration. The other consideration in building a new ship is time. It will take us anywhere from three to five years to build a ship compared to buying a used RO/RO on the market and seeing it in the fleet within about six to nine months. So, we've bought 31 of those 36 ships and, with some money made available to us in 1994, we are converting 2 more. But we were stopped before we bought the last 3 ships by those forces on the Hill who want us to build new ships. The language that came out of the House National Security Procurement Subcommittee said "Go buy some new ships for the Marine Corps' PREPO and take those used RO/ROs you have out there that are in the PREPO fleet right now and let the Marines use them for a little while, then bring them back into the surge sealift fleet when you get their new ones."

Well, obviously that didn't fill the immediate requirement. As a matter of fact, it made matters worse given the fact the Marine Corps' PREPO comes after the surge sealift requirement. Then the appropriators came back and said "We don't think you ought to go buy new ships. You ought to go buy used ships." We have a disconnect between the authorizers and the appropriators on the Hill right now. We'll probably just wait this one out this year.

Dr. Matthews: What is the importance of the transferring of funding responsibility from Department of Transportation [DOT] to DOD for Ready Reserve Force [RRF] RO/RO acquisition?

Gen Rutherford: It gives us better assurance that we'll get the funds we need,

primarily because funding issues now go through the right committees, the defense committees, over on the Hill. As you know, under the previous arrangement, we lost funding to the crime bill. I don't think that will happen again under the current arrangement. Now it comes out of the DOD budget.

Dr. Matthews: Shortly before you arrived on the scene as CINCTRANS, there was some discussion, I'm not sure how serious, about TRANSCOM becoming more deeply involved in overseeing the repositioning force to serve as an "honest broker" if two CINCs wanted the ships at the same time, and to help guarantee that the ships would become common user after they were unloaded. Is there any more talk about that?

Gen Rutherford: There's general agreement that the Marine Corps' PREPO fleet 27 will revert to the common user fleet once they are unloaded. Everybody seems to acknowledge it. Having said that, our charter specifically does not include a provision for us to oversee the PREPO fleet, but I think we could do that very easily. If we go back and review the TRANSCOM charter for some reason, then we probably could readdress it.

Seaports of Embarkation and Reserves

Dr. Matthews: What is your assessment of seaports of embarkation [SPOEs] here in the continental United States [CONUS] as far as readiness goes?

Gen Rutherford: I think we're in fairly decent shape. We have port planning orders to do what we need to do, and there are some very capable ports available to us. But we need to remain vigilant. We're in the

process of closing two major ports, one on the east coast and one on the west coast, Bayonne, New Jersey, and Oakland, California, respectively. So we will become more dependent on commercial ports. But I think we will continue to get the priority to go in and use what we need.

One of the crucial issues here is movement of ammunition through commercial ports. And we are confident we can do it safely in peace and war. The east coast port, Sunny Point [Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North Carolina], is a very capable port and can meet our requirements for [US] CENTCOM [United States Central Command]. We're not as fortunate on the west coast. The Army is working that problem [lack of a west coast ammunition port] very hard and by 1999 I think we'll have the capability to move at least 700 TEU [twenty-foot equivalent unit] containers a day westward. Until then we're very vulnerable. If something should happen in the next two years or so, we would have to use commercial ports on the west coast to support Korea.

Dr. Matthews: You previously discussed with us the reserve component and its ability, on the air side, to prime the transportation system for a surge. But there's also the seaport aspect. In Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we were fortunate to have a Transportation Terminal Unit [TTU] activated for an exercise, and they were instrumental in loading the first Fast Sealift Ships [FSSs] and RRF RO/ROs. Do you feel like there is a shortfall today for getting those surge ships loaded?

Gen Rutherford: Again it depends upon how fast we're allowed to call up the Reserve. You can't do it on the airlift side either unless you call up the Reserve personnel. General Shali [General John M.

Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman, JCS] has acknowledged repeatedly the absolute need for Reserve mobility personnel in the early stages of any major contingency to support the transportation side of the house. How big is that number? It's in the neighborhood of around 10,000 people. We're going to have to get those people on board within about 48 hours if our forces are to move out on time. You have about four days to do it on the sealift side, but you only have about 48 hours to do it on the airlift side. You can't do the airlift piece and you can't do the sealift piece unless you have the reservists.

Road and Rail

Dr. Matthews: How about the road and rail piece? Would you assess the readiness of that surface mode for us?

Gen Rutherford: I think it's very healthy in terms of road. There's plenty of excess commercial capacity out there today to support our requirements. The railroads are getting busier and busier, and there's not the excess capacity on the railroad side that we have on the truck side.

One of our main concerns is the availability of the heavy lift rail cars. That's why the Army is buying a few more every year. We've purchased or contracted for close to 1,000. We need 1,300 to 1,400. The number was much bigger until the Army reevaluated their requirements this last year and reduced the number of heavy lift cars by about 700-800. In general, I think we can continue to count on rail to be responsive to our needs.

Dr. Matthews: How about the mergers of the rail lines proposed and actual? Is there any impact there for TRANSCOM's mission?

Gen Rutherford: Not immediate. Who knows in the long term? As you get fewer and fewer carriers, obviously you become more and more concerned. In the long term we need to watch declining rail capacity. It's diminishing as we speak. That means that the rail industry will have to reprioritize. Given what's happening in the industry, it will be increasingly difficult for them to go to their customers, with whom they have established close relationships, and say "Sorry, we'll have to carry DOD cargo today." We need to keep on top of that.

Air Mobility Fleet

C-5, KC-135, and KC-10

Mr. Cossaboom: I would like you to discuss the condition of the air mobility fleet. After the C-141, which airplane do we replace or fix?

Gen Rutherford: After we get the C-17 on board, we need to look at--based upon our mission, and not necessarily the condition of the airplanes--the C-5. We are heavily dependent upon those airplanes and they're just not meeting our reliability expectations. We've been working that problem for some time, and I don't see any easy solutions. You can spend megabucks to re-engine the airplane, which is the aircraft's biggest problem right now, and you might gain three percent of additional reliability. We need machines that are at least

90 percent reliable in terms of departure reliability and when you're talking about 65-70-75 percent reliability for the C-5 it's very troubling. So, we need to replace the C-5 next. I don't think you can just SLEP [Service Life Extension Program] the airplane and improve it's reliability. The B [model] is not much better than the A [model].

Next, after the C-5, we need to work on the KC-135, simply because it's been around for a long, long time. Our engineers are looking at the airplane right now, and they think it will take us well out into the next century. The airplanes only have about 13,000 flying hours on them on the average, which is not much for an airplane of that type. Our analysis shows some corrosion problems, but structurally it's a pretty good airplane. I need to make another point here. Given what the replacement tanker will cost, once you start replacing the KC-135s you're not going to end up with a force of 550. Maybe 200 to 220 tankers are what we can expect to see.

I'm very pleased with the KC-10. We are using it heavily, and a few more problems are starting to show up. But it's still an extremely reliable and capable machine.

Mr. Cossaboom: When you talk about replacing the C-5, is the C-17 an option for that replacement?

Gen Rutherford: Very definitely it's an option. Whether it's the right option remains to be seen. We have to go back and do the analysis to make sure we fully understand the requirements in the next century. The C-17 has a box that's about as big as the C-5. It's as wide but it's not as long. In some situations, especially in those

where there's a MOG [maximum on ground] limitation, that can be a big plus. Cost is also a big issue. When we start talking about C-5 replacements, SLEPing the C-5 will be very cheap in comparison to buying new C-17s.

Mr. Cossaboom: The C-5D*?

Gen Rutherford: Yes, and there will be some who promise a lot in return from SLEPing. We need to be very skeptical of those proposals. We need to make sure we really know what we're getting. If we choose that route, I would like to see them warrantied for reliability in some way, otherwise we can put money in those airplanes and not end up with much more reliability than what we have today, which is the problem.

C-17

Mr. Cossaboom: We've touched on the C-17. I'd like to go back and discuss it in more detail. When you arrived as CINC, we had the okay to purchase 40 C-17s with the understanding that we'd look at what was described as the NDAA [Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft]. What kind of strategy or strategies did we use to gain permission to buy the 120 C-17s?

Gen Rutherford: Our strategy was to conduct a thorough analysis to make sure we understood all the variables. And as you know, SAFMA [Strategic Airlift Force Mix Analysis] was one of the most detailed looks that's ever been taken of strategic airlift. Using the Cray

*Two C-5s were modified to support NASA's space shuttle mission and labeled C-5C.

computer, we conducted modeling of the two MRC [major regional contingency] equation. That took us beyond just million-ton-miles per day, which is a comparatively easy computation, one being touted by the people like RAND, GAO [Government Accounting Office], and others. It was close to being the right answer, but it wasn't completely right. With SAFMA we came a lot closer. All of us, when we looked at the GAO and the RAND studies, didn't feel comfortable with them. And the reason we didn't feel comfortable was because we knew they didn't address some of the variables that needed to be addressed.

Yet there were still some things that could not be modeled in SAFMA, like brigade airdrop. We needed to make sure those were all accounted for in the process. As we progressed through the process, we began to get a feel for how OT&E [Operational Test and Evaluation] and UT&E [Unit Test and Evaluation] would work. We also started to get the first peek under the tent about how our RM&AE [Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability Evaluation] might come out. It all looked really good, so our confidence level in the C- 17 continued to rise. Still, we were keenly aware that the airplane could go out and perform superbly for 1,000 days, but one accident and the resulting headlines could cause great damage to the aircraft's credibility. So we were very concerned that we didn't over extend the airplane while still demonstrating its capabilities. Our strategy of conducting a fair analysis, completing a proper evaluation that included a wide variety of factors, and picking our best people to fly the first airplane paid off for all concerned. The decision was based upon capability, with the money being about a wash before it was all over, said, and done.

Mr. Cossaboom: The decision was made last November. Was there any point before then that you were confident it was going to be the 120 C-17s?

Gen Rutherford: No. [Laughter]

Mr. Cossaboom: Right to the last minute.

Gen Rutherford: Well, not really. The make or break event was the RM&AE, which occurred in July [1995]. Once we got that behind us, it was obvious that we were going to buy some more C-17s. But then, as we sat down to negotiate with McDonnell Douglas about cost and so on and so forth, the C-17 just looked increasingly more attractive to us. When we finally rolled up the analysis and laid the numbers out, it became apparent what decision we should make. But I didn't get to make that decision. I made an input but Dr. Kaminski [Dr. Paul G., Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology] made the final decision. He made the right decision in November.

Mr. Cossaboom: Yours was obviously one of the key inputs. Were there any others, from the CINCs or Services?

Gen Rutherford: Yes. All the other CINCs rolled in and supported the C-17. That obviously helped. They had people watching the program. They were very interested in it. We made sure they got the information that they needed. Secretary of Defense [William J.] Perry and General Shali's support to the program was crucial. Both of them had flown on the airplane. More importantly they talked to the people who maintain and fly the aircraft. One of the big inputs, of

course, is the kid down there who makes this thing work. We were all overflowing with praise about the airplane so I think that made a big point. I was pleased we were able to use the aircraft in Bosnia. I think that just reinforced what we had proven last July, that it was a very capable airplane. It matured very rapidly. And it was ready to go to work.

Dr. Matthews: The GAO has been in my office a couple of times looking at Bosnia-Herzegovina lessons learned, especially in regard to the C-17. My read on it is they're very skeptical that the C-17 is as good as it is. [Laughter] Is there anything we need to tweak on the aircraft?

Gen Rutherford: There's always things you can change on an airplane. I'd like to change the intercom switch on the KC-135 now. It has no volume control. That's one of our high priorities. So, with every airplane I've flown, I'd like to change something. But if you said I couldn't change anything and I'd have to take the C-17 the way it is today, that would be okay by me. We will continue to refine that aircraft just like we refine others.

Reliability Rates

Mr. Cossaboom: You've tenaciously worked the question of mission reliability rates, both departure and arrival. Is that because of our customers concerns or was it self-motivated?

Gen Rutherford: Self-motivated, which I think says a lot about this command. If we can become more reliable, if we can take some of the noise out of what we do on a day-to-day basis, it will be much easier for us to

do the job. But to meet our customers' expectations, first and foremost, we must be dependable. If we say we're going to be somewhere with something, someone on the other end is counting on us. A prime example is the Liberian operation.* The embassy was about to be overrun and we needed to get some equipment there fast. We face similar crises time and time again. The criticality of airlift necessitates our building reliability into the system.

*The evacuation of United States citizens from Liberia, 7 April-6 May 1996.

Over time we were becoming comfortable with 65 and 70 percent departure reliability rates. Once such complacency sets in, then you have nowhere to go but down. We are trying to reverse that trend and raise expectations. I think we're making progress.

Mr. Cossaboom: What's your comfort level? 90 percent? 95 percent?

Gen Rutherford: I'd be very comfortable with 90 percent across the board. I think that's achievable. 100 percent is not achievable. But once I rule out the occasional acts of God, 90 percent is achievable.

Joint Endeavor and Airlift Management Part I

Mr. Cossaboom: I'd like to go back to Joint Endeavor.* Were we prepared for it?

Gen Rutherford: We were ill-prepared to run that operation. When we think strategic lift, we don't typically think theater lift. What we needed to do over there was set up a Berlin Airlift-type operation,** a shuttle operation. We were slow on the take there. We eventually got there, but it was painful. We wanted to hand massage each mission, when what we really needed to do was to establish a capability in theater and then let the user shuttle as he saw fit.

*UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in December 1995.

**On 24 June 1948, the Soviets cut off land access to the city of Berlin. From 26 June 1948 to 30 September 1949, the United States and its allies airlifted food, coal, and other supplies into the city. By the time the blockade lifted, the allies had flown 279,114 flights and airlifted in 2,324,257 tons of supplies, making it the greatest airlift operation until Desert Shield.

We also learned that USEUCOM's organizational structure could not support the deployment. Their air force component, USAFE [United States Air Forces Europe], did not have the airlift expertise required. We had to go in and supplement it. As a matter of fact, we ended up doing it. They ended up, to a certain degree, supplementing us.

I was troubled by the seam that developed between the C-130 operation and our strategic operation. That is not healthy. It was very confusing and disjointed the first couple of weeks. It got sorted out in time, I think, but it's something the Air Force and the joint community need to go back and address pretty soon. We can't say "You guys over there are going to carry small boxes, and you guys over here are going to carry big boxes." There needs to be one chain of command to control lift dedicated to getting the troops what they need. I mean, we used the same runways and we used the same ports. It doesn't make any sense to split the airlift fleet down the center. My bottom line here is we have to get the C-130 force and the strategic airlift force back together in some way, shape, or form to close the seam that became very visible in Joint Endeavor, as well as almost every other major operation we've mounted within the last four to five years.

Other Operational Lessons Learned

Mr. Cossaboom: In addition to Joint Endeavor, there have been some other operations during your tenure: relocating Cuban migrants, Haiti, Liberia, the Oklahoma City bombing, Hurricanes Opal and

Marilyn. Any particular challenges or lessons learned that stick out in your mind from those?

Gen Rutherford: Yes. The overarching lesson I learned from them is we are very successful at what we do and our customers agree. But we have to work smarter. For example, it takes us too long to come up to speed. That is caused, in part, by the way we are organized and in the way we plan for contingencies. We are taking some steps right now to reorganize the TACC and the DO complex. And we're starting to do a little bit better job of contingency planning. We've started to exercise the TACC staff so that they will flow naturally and quickly into an operation. We must have checklists. We need to have standard recurrent questions with prepared options depending on the location of the contingency. Just fill in the blanks. If the customer can't provide all of the required information early on, you make some assumptions about what you want to do, and you go with it. I told the staff this morning, "We must go look at the FDOs [flexible deterrent options] for theater CINC operation plans and put something on the shelf for each of them." There should be a plan sitting on the shelf right now that tells us how many people we want to position, where we want to position them, and how many airplanes it's going to take, etc. That doesn't exist today, which is just unconscionable. One of our problems is that when we get a tasking, we want to sit around and ask questions all day long--AMC to TRANSCOM, TRANSCOM to the theater CINC or through JCS, and eventually the State Department or the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]--but we don't seem to learn that there is not always one right answer. What we need to do is to say, "Well, let's make some assumptions about what we're going to do and how we're going to do it, and go ahead and lay it in and get it working." Time is lift. Sitting around

discussing what we might do doesn't get the critical equipment moved.

I've also learned that, despite the need to improve reliability rates, the troops are doing a damn good job out in the field. They're maintaining the aircraft in the face of dwindling resources and equipment constraints. They're very dedicated to doing the job. Such a smooth field operation has allowed me to spend considerable time working headquarters planning, executing, and equipping issues, which need the most attention and where improvements, in our case, can reap large dividends.

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Dr. Matthews: AMC and TRANSCOM's other component commands have, over the years, contributed very quietly to national security and political objectives. One example would be the Cooperative Threat Reduction operation, which has been going on now for several years. What is the importance of that operation, besides showing the "T-Tails,"* America's presence?

Gen Rutherford: Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction, we're providing equipment and expertise to disarm the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Although we've flown quite a few missions in support of the operation, like you say, it hasn't attracted a lot of attention. It doesn't make the headlines. Nevertheless, bringing plutonium and uranium out to be reprocessed and, in some cases, disposed of, is a highly beneficial effort, and we're proud we can play a role in it.

*The term refers to AMC's air mobility fleet.

Dr. Matthews: In what ways has USTRANSCOM and its component commands helped to create closer ties between the US military and the former Soviet Union's military?

Gen Rutherford: We haven't been overly active in that area. We've visited with the units over there. We've been into the region on operational missions. They've seen our capabilities.

Dr. Matthews: Is there more you think we should do in that regard?

Gen Rutherford: When they're ready for it. Right now, the Russian military is preoccupied with a number of other higher priority issues, such as getting paid.

Merger of Tanker and Airlift Cultures

Mr. Cossaboom: With the creation the Air Mobility Command in 1992, the Air Force merged the airlift and tanker forces. How well does that work?

Gen Rutherford: They are very compatible. There are a lot of similarities. I've found it beneficial to compare, upon occasion, the tanker maintenance side of the house with the airlift side. Both work on big airplanes. Lots of similarities there even though they came from different cultures.

Mr. Cossaboom: Have the cultures merged?

Gen Rutherford: We're not there yet, but we're a lot further along than I thought we would be at this stage of the game. There's a lot of interaction

between the two in the flying side of the house. And many people walking through our headquarters building today would be, I think, surprised to see how the tankers and the lifters have come together. There's probably still some good-natured rivalry between them, but I don't sense that any one group feels like a poor relative. I think the tanker community would tell you they are pleased with the progress in the integration of the two cultures.

A significant difference between the two cultures is command and control. Tankers have two roles. One is in theater and the other is getting there and back. Our airlift and aerial refueling missions are quite compatible getting there and back, but the tankers get off on their own when they start operating intertheater and, as you know, that's the only time TRANSCOM chops opcon [transfers operational control] of its assets. We had 40 tankers chopped to EUCOM and CENTCOM when we were preparing for operations in the Central African Republic. When I was asked to provide tankers and lift, I said "Well guys, rather than us flying tankers all the way from the CONUS to Central Africa to cover this potential contingency, how about us just borrowing some of our tankers, which are already 'opconned' over to you, given it's a high priority." I did that intentionally just to raise the issue and, given the opportunity, I'd do it again.

We have to remember these are precious assets. They can do more than one thing at a time. We could have backfilled the EUCOM and CENTCOM tanker assets in 48 hours. I realize that NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft] may need to take off and fly but maybe if we have to evac[uate] some people out of Bujumbura [Burundi], or some other Third World nation, then maybe those

NATO AWACS can wait a little while to get their fuel. The point I'm making is all too often theater CINCs ask TRANSCOM to duplicate capability already at their disposal. This is especially true on the tanker side. Sorry I strayed from the question, but I wanted to make this point.

Readiness Assessment

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel that TRANSCOM's readiness assessment process is giving you and the Chairman what you need to perform the command's mission?

Gen Rutherford: The assessments process is good for the staff because it makes us think about what we might have to do today with what we have on the shelf. It is very useful for the staff to think through that process. I also think the reporting has improved over the last year to a point where we know with certainty what our key, critical shortfalls are today. I'm not sure that we knew what they were a year ago. We began to really understand issues like MHE [material handling equipment] and dedicated SATCOM [satellite communications] frequencies. The readiness assessment process forced the staff to work through such problems to determine what they really mean to the mission. So it's been very useful. I'm encouraged by it.

Joint Endeavor and Airlift Management

Part II

Dr. Matthews: I put together a chronology on Joint Endeavor for you and General Smith [Lieutenant General Hubert H., USA, Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM]. When it got to your desk, you did some editing on it, not much, but there was one point that really caught my eye. I had given you and USTRANSCOM credit for taking the initiative to start the forward stationing of our strategic lift resources in Germany. You crossed that out and rewrote it to say it was the Chairman's initiative. Perhaps you would relate the conversation you had with the Chairman and others such as the USEUCOM DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief] regarding the deployment for Joint Endeavor.

Gen Rutherford: General Shali and I talk on a weekly basis. It was more frequent than that during Joint Endeavor. Obviously he was somewhat concerned, given the weather, about what was going on with the deployment over there. When it became obvious that things were not moving quite on schedule in Europe, he asked that we lean forward to assist in any way possible. As a result, I had several conversations with the USEUCOM DCINC on how we might be able to help. I told him of the Chairman's expressed concerns, and by that time USTRANSCOM had formulated a plan to move some assets forward. It was General Shali who encouraged us to lean forward. But, I must admit, we probably set the stage for him to do so.

Dr. Matthews: When we had the Joint Endeavor lessons learned briefing at TRANSCOM, General Begert [Major General William J., USAF, Director of Operations and Logistics, USTRANSCOM], in the discussion of ITV [intransit visibility], stated his surprise that some people in OSD and at the Joint Staff were actually touting the operation as an ITV success story because of our RI [radio

frequency] tags and other ITV initiatives. You then related for the group an anecdote about what was really happening with ITV. Could you recall that anecdote for the record?

Gen Rutherford: [Laughter] I'm not sure I can recall it.

Dr. Matthews: You were on board a plane.

Gen Rutherford: Oh yes. On the 26th of December [1995], when I was en route to Taszar [Hungary], I went to the back end of the C-141 to talk to the Army troops traveling with their "Humvees" [High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles]. I asked how things were going and what they would be doing. They actually thought they were going to Tuzla [Bosnia-Herzegovina]. Of course the airplane was going to Taszar, which is where we offloaded them. So much for an ITV success story.

It wasn't a breakdown in technology in terms of ITV. To make ITV work, you have to have a plan. You have to have a general concept of what you're doing and then you can track to that plan, but just knowing that something is down at the other end doesn't necessarily tell you how much you have left to move or where the rest of the stuff is. We made some advances in ITV technology, but we have a long way to go in figuring out what the warfighter needs and where it is in the process. EUCOM was calling USAREUR [United States Army Europe], who was calling their units to find out what had moved and what had not moved. Once they got that input, which was typically about noon the day before the next day's operation, then we would start putting together a plan for the next day's airlift operation. By the time the word got down to the unit to move to the aerial port, many times it was very

late at night. We were getting ready to execute, and the unit hadn't even started to move out of their barracks to the aerial port. Some troops were actually living in buses four or five days straight, the call forward was so fouled up. That should give you a feel for the sorry state of planning that went into the effort and how disjointed it all had become. It might have been planned properly in some people's minds but there wasn't any flexibility to accommodate for the inevitable "fog of war."

Dr. Matthews: I'd like to come back to ITV after we finish with Joint Endeavor. Tom, do you have questions on Joint Endeavor?

Mr. Cossaboom: You've talked some about the use of strategic airlift in theater, particularly the C-17. Was Joint Endeavor an appropriate use of strategic airlift?

Gen Rutherford: We sized the C-17 force to account for strategic lift requirements associated with two MRCs, while at the same time retaining a capability to do strategic brigade airdrop. In the early stages of a MRC, we will need the C-17 to do the strategic mission. But the C-17 is fully capable of doing the tactical mission, as we validated in Bosnia. And while we have a sizable C-130 force, it is a lot easier to do the job in theater with the C-17 simply because it has, like the C-130, short field capabilities as well as a tremendously more capable airframe than the C-130, in terms of what it can haul. You can carry more on the ramp of the C-17 than you can carry inside a C-130. I think over time there will be a growing crescendo of support for additional C-17s so we can meet the supported CINC's requirements both to the theater and within the theater. At 120 C-17s, we don't have the capacity to do both the strategic and theater missions in the first 120 days of a MRC.

Mr. Cossaboom: How do we set up a management structure to handle an operation using C-17s in both an intertheater and intratheater role?

Gen Rutherford: My biggest concern coming out of Joint Endeavor is how we handle a mix of strategic and theater airlift assets. Frankly, I think the problem is even more severe than that. I have serious reservations about the theater component commands' ability to support even the normal day-to-day tactical C-130 airlift operation, much less a mix of strategic and tactical airlift during a contingency. Specifically, I mean PACAF [Pacific Air Forces] and USAFE--and I've been the PACAF commander and USAFE/DO--so I think I have a pretty good knowledge of their capabilities. They just don't have the airlift expertise that's contained in USTRANSCOM, a unified command charged to conduct the mobility business day in and day out. They don't have senior leadership familiar with the nuances of lift.

Mr. Cossaboom: Do we need a single manager for all airlift, including C-130s?

Gen Rutherford: The bottom line is that it would sure simplify the process, and I think the Air Force and the joint community need to move in that direction. To come to that conclusion, I've drawn from my theater experience as well as my experiences as AMC commander and CINCTRANS.

Mr. Cossaboom: Did your opinion change between being the vice commander at AMC, commander at PACAF, and back to being AMC commander?

Gen Rutherford: No. As a matter of fact, having spent some time in MAC before

going out to PACAF I was already attuned to the C-130 issue. While at PACAF, the C-130s came to us and we viewed them as stepchildren. The staff really didn't know what they had. Today, neither PACAF nor USAFE have senior officers, colonels or generals, who really understand the airlift ball game.

Dr. Matthews: Over the last couple of weeks, the J5 [Plans and Policy Directorate] folks have been in the Research Center researching the C-130 ownership issue. The question is "why did TRANSCOM retain 50 of the C-130s in Forces For [unified command document]? We haven't been able to come up with a good answer. Might you have that answer or are you the one asking the question?"

Gen Rutherford: I don't have the answer. I suspect that when the Air Force went through the process of moving the C-130s over to the tactical air forces, TRANSCOM probably said it occasionally had some need for C-130 aircraft. What the staff told me the other day was that those airplanes were retained as backfill for CONUS movement of equipment and supplies during a major regional contingency. Given the healthy status of the CRAF's short range national segment, the commercial airline sector's increasing capability to move high priority parts and equipment expeditiously, and what we would and can do with the strategic fleet, I really don't see the need for those 50 C-130s.

There are occasionally missions where we, TRANSCOM, task some C-130s to support another unified command. Management of the aircraft can get chaotic given current command and control lines. Joint Endeavor serves as an example. During the early stages of the deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, USAFE started

to experience maintenance problems with their C-130s. USAFE asked EUCOM to request additional C-ISO augmentation. EUCOM made the request to JCS, who tasked the force provider, USACOM [United States Atlantic Command]. ACOM came to TRANSCOM, who tasked ACC [Air Combat Command] to provide the assets. By the time the additional C-130s arrived intheater, TRANSCOM's strategic lift had cleared out the theater backlog, so USAFE released the C-130s back to ACC without anyone in the joint command being notified or consulted. If TRANSCOM controlled the C-130s, none of this would have been necessary. That gives you a feel for how troubled the lines of command and control of strategic and theater lift are right now.

Operational Support Airlift Management and the Flight Check Mission

Mr. Cossaboom: When we talk about some of the fall-out from those tangled lines, do you think single management for airlift would have helped prevent the crash that killed Secretary Brown* [Ronald H., Secretary of Commerce]?

Gen Rutherford: I think you'll always have some OSA [Operational Support Airlift] forces that are under theater command and control and that's the way it should be. Now having said that, do we assign those assets to a theater or do we assign them to one central manager? I think that's an Air Force decision. We're going to have some OSA assets permanently assigned in the theater. Those assets had been

*Secretary Brown's US Air Force CT-43 aircraft crashed near Dubrovnik, Croatia, on 3 April 1996, killing all on board. The airlift aircraft belonged to

assigned to MAC. Because of the “one base, one boss,” rule they ended up going to the theater. Consequently, the Air Force lost some oversight, a bad situation for an aircraft that attracts so much attention. It’s worth reevaluating, and I think we will probably iron it out at the upcoming CORONA.*

Dr. Matthews: Do you think it’s inevitable that when TRANSCOM does its usual great job in the OSA project, consolidating OSA scheduling, the command will become even more deeply involved in OSA, perhaps even taking over the assets, people, and planes?

Gen Rutherford: I don’t think TRANSCOM necessarily needs to have a component, AMC, with control of all the OSA assets. I think there needs to be consistent policy and procedures applied to how those assets are used. Yet I think you’ll see a move to bring more efficiencies and increased effectiveness to OSA and more of the operation under control of TRANSCOM. But I remain unconvinced that one Service, in this case the Air Force component command of USTRANSCOM, running all OSA is necessarily the way to go. The first step, of course, is centralized scheduling.

Mr. Cossaboom: The flight check mission moved from MAC to the FAA in 1991. Was that the right decision?

Gen Rutherford: I’m happy with the flight check arrangements. As a matter of fact, I think we had tied up a lot of resources in that business over time. We were doing things that the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] was chartered to do and had appropriated money to do. We performed those duties under the guise that if we went

USAFE.

to war, they would be our responsibility. We don't need to go back and revisit the issue.

Time Phased Force Deployment Data,

In transit Visibility, and Transportation

Education

Dr. Matthews: It seems like every time we kick off a major operation we have a TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data] that's inaccurate and incomplete. What can we do to fix that problem?

Gen Rutherford: We will never have a perfect plan. TPFDDs are based on assumptions--forces to be deployed, the way the situation is developing intheater, timing of Reserve call-up, and warning time--any one of which can change with tremendous impact on a TPFDD. We must retain flexibility in the plan to adjust to the circumstances as they arise.

Standing up TRANSCOM helped to focus DOD planning efforts more on transportation. And, as we have moved the troops back to the CONUS in the post-Cold War era, the warfighters have been forced to think more seriously about how they are going to get to the war. As a result of that, our TPFDDs are getting better day in and day out. Where we come up short today is in the Services' training programs in transportation and logistics. Many of the up-and-comers--like company and brigade commanders--are not

*A conference hosted by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

getting the kind of education they need to use the transportation system. I think the problem is more widely recognized, but we have a long way to go. One of the things I have tried to push with General Shali and with the Service Chiefs is a better education of the nuances of the transportation system and how we can better help the warfighters do their job. Part of that education is how to put a TPFDD together and how to use it during a contingency.

Dr. Matthews: Is the Joint Deployment Training Center going to serve a key role in that education?

Gen Rutherford: Yes. But what I fear is that, once again, we'll send all the transporters off for transportation education and the users will miss the boat, so to speak. It's the users, the operators, who need to understand how "their" transportation system works.

Dr. Matthews: A couple more questions on ITV. Over the years TRANSCOM, especially at the National Defense Transportation Association [NDTA] conferences, has taken hits on its inability to get with it. To quote a few of the commercial industry representatives, "We've got it. We've had it for years. Get with us and get on with it." What is your explanation for why it's taken so long for DOD to get with ITV?

Gen Rutherford: This is not a simple issue. It's one thing to go to Federal Express to move a package and to have them track it in the system and record the fact that it was received. For the DOD we're talking about, for example in Desert Storm, moving a city the size of Oklahoma City [Oklahoma] 8,000 miles in a period of 90 to 120 days. I mean that's a huge undertaking, especially considering the massive and frequent changes in requirements. Additionally, each

of the users have a little bit different requirement for movement information. We've come a long way in defining each of our major customers' requirements. But the bottom line is there is no current off-the-shelf system, commercial or otherwise, that can come close to meeting the DOD ITV requirement. Existing systems would be overwhelmed in the first hour of a major contingency.

I think GTN [Global Transportation Network] will take us a long way towards resolving intransit visibility deficiencies, but again the problem is going to be "garbage in-garbage out." As long as we continue to receive containers, for example, that are marked only with "Bosnia" on the side, we're going to have problems figuring out what's inside or where in Bosnia it's supposed to go. Today I can tell you that a container is at Dover [Air Force Base, Delaware] and I can tell you when that container gets to Ramstein [Air Base, Germany]. I can tell you when we move that container to Tazsar. I cannot tell you what's in that container, and even if I get it to Tazsar, I bet the troops there can't figure out who it's intended for at the foxhole level. The DTS users and customers, as well as USTRANSCOM, must follow established procedures if GTN is going to fulfill its potential.

En Route Basing

Mr. Cossaboom: We talked a little bit about the en route structure earlier, in particular, its manpower aspects. I'd like to ask about bases, too. How many en route bases, those on standby, do we really need in Europe and in the Pacific?

Gen Rutherford: I'm not prepared to give you the exact number because it depends on the capabilities of the base, obviously. If we have some bases with big ramps and a lot of fuel, then we may not need as many as we would if we have bases with small ramps and less fuel capacity.

I can talk to you about the location of bases. You need some in the Iberian Peninsula. You need some in Central Europe and that's simply because of the flight legs. You could use a different structure, but it would take you longer to get there. The ideal situation is to have a flight plan that runs through Europe and down through Spain and then you can one-hop into there and one-hop into the [Persian] Gulf, for example. If you're going west, you can go into Alaska and from Alaska directly into Korea with recovery in Japan, but you must have an intermediate stop, such as Alaska, in there somewhere. And if you don't have a place for airlifters to stop, you will need bases for tankers to provide air-to-air refueling for airlifters.

The answer in Europe is probably somewhere around six to eight bases to handle both the tankers and the lifters as required in current plans. That's considering a fairly robust ramp system and fuel capacity. We don't have those today. When we were asked to restructure in Spain a few years ago, we had in the agreement, subject to Spanish concurrence, return rights to Torrejon [Air Base, Spain]. Since that time, the Spanish have become somewhat concerned about increasing the US presence there. They have some political issues they have to deal with. In the meantime, we've sat here and watched the infrastructure at Torrejon deteriorate. Now we need to put some money back into the base if we plan to use it. Of utmost importance, we need to understand what it is the Spanish are willing to commit to, and if they are not

going to let us back into Torrejon, there's no sense in reestablishing the infrastructure there. We need to look at other alternatives, and that's just what we are doing now.

Mr. Cossaboom: Zaragoza [Air Base, Spain] perhaps?

Gen Rutherford: Yes, Zaragoza. But politics play a role there, too, as elsewhere in Europe. Our allies may not necessarily agree with what we're planning or undertaking. We couldn't use French bases in the Libya operation,^{*} for example. One thing for sure, we should not put all of our eggs in one basket by depending strictly on German bases or French bases or Spanish bases. We are in the process of going back through the entire infrastructure, one more time, to confirm what it is we need to do the job, and then we will try to reach an agreement with the regional CINCs and the JCS on our conclusions. When we reach consensus, we need to get the State Department "ginned up" to support us in negotiations with the various governments. When we are assured of our allies' support, then we can get on with fixing the infrastructure. In general, we need to raise the visibility of our en route infrastructure problems. The situation is bad and getting worse.

Mr. Cossaboom: Another question that often comes up during operations is "who provides BOS?" Policy says that it should be the theater commander, but in many cases AMC and TRANSCOM wind up providing much of the BOS.

Gen Rutherford: In fact, the theaters only have so much capability to backfill for BOS, and whether the theater controls it or we control it, it is

^{*}On 14 April 1986, the United States bombed "terrorists centers" in Libya.

probably going to be the same people who go over and do the job. For example, if we want to open up Moron [Air Base, Spain] and also Rhein-Main [Air Base, Germany] at the same time, we don't have that capability in USAFE today to do it. So USAFE would have to turn around and source through AFPC [Air Force Personnel Center] for someone to come over to do the job. AFPC would probably turn to us, because we have a big part of the BOS infrastructure, and task us to fill the requirement. To make a long story short, what we ultimately did at Rhein-Main during Joint Endeavor was say "Okay USAFE, where do you need help" rather than wait for the process to run its eventual course. We just went ahead and sent over the people: food service, MWR [Morale, Welfare, and Recreation], fuel truck drivers, etc.

Mr. Cossaboom: Cops are another one that seems to come up.

Gen Rutherford: Yes. But that's true even in peacetime. If you look at our security police, we continually have them on the road TDY [temporary duty].

Mr. Cossaboom: When we provide BOS at an en route base, should we then own the base for the period it's active?

Gen Rutherford: I can't get all excited about ownership of support bases. Commanders can work those issues out. For Joint Endeavor we had a USAFE support commander and, frankly, I was glad he was there on the spot. I sent a commander over for our troops, and the two of them got along pretty well.

The intheater support I need will more than likely come from

USAFE or PACAF. I would hate to have to fly cots and blankets over from the States. It's much easier if the theater CINCs and their air components have control of the bases and responsibility to provide that stuff. In the best of all worlds, I could just go in and say I need the following, and they would go pull it out for me. Unfortunately, I can't say that's the case now.

I will tell you if a base exists for the sole purpose of providing support to a strategic lift operation, such as Yokota [Air Base, Japan], then you might start making a case for that base to belong to Air Mobility Command. The local commander, who is working for the PACAF commander is going to make decisions based upon local considerations, like quiet hours, and not necessarily on strategic airlift operations. The local commander wants to avoid getting the locals all excited and a lot of press coverage in Japan over the noise. There are no problems if there are no crises. During day-to-day peacetime operations we just say we won't fly during those hours. But if the strategic lift is being slowed during a crisis by that decision, let me tell you, I might have a different view than the PACAF commander. And the same is true at Ramstein, etc. I think we need to look at the primary purpose of the installation and establish reporting lines accordingly. I mean, AMC has a far greater interest in what goes on at Yokota than does the PACAF commander. Now at Misawa [Air Base, Japan] and Kadena [Air Base, Japan], that's not the case. Although strategic mobility aircraft might use those bases, PACAF has a lot of things going on there, much more so than I do.

USCINCTRANS as Supported CINC

Dr. Matthews: I would like you to discuss another “ownership” issue. The Joint Staff is looking at making USCINCTRANS, in certain instances, the supported CINC. What are your feelings on that? In what geographical areas and under what kind of circumstances might it be justified?

Gen Rutherford: The Joint Staff is looking at the former Soviet Union, which is controlled by the Joint Staff and not EUCOM. They are considering making USCINCTRANS the supported CINC if the operation is predominately or wholly transportation. I think you can make that case, but I think it would be unlikely to happen, especially given the current Chairman’s view of the world. General Shali, having been a regional CINC, is of the opinion regional CINCs need to be concerned about everything that goes on in their region. And to a certain degree, that’s true. But I don’t think it would change dramatically the way we do business if we were a supported versus a supporting CINC in the former Soviet Union. We complete the mission by using good common sense and by working closely with our fellow CINCs.

The only time during my tenure here when I thought maybe we should have run the show was when we moved the British into Split [Croatia].* That was entirely a Lift operation. We knew what was going on and EUCOM really didn’t. EUCOM’s involvement just complicated and extended the lines of communication, from our standpoint anyway. Now, EUCOM would probably say “I have to live with the British all the time. They’re in my AOR [area of responsibility].” But from a purely

*Operation Quick Lift was the deployment of British and Dutch forces to Split, Croatia, from 4 July to 10 August 1995, to assist in the UN peacekeeping effort underway in Bosnia.

operational standpoint, that's one situation where it might have made some sense for us to be the supported CINC.

USTRANSCOM and Congress

Dr. Matthews: Would you reflect back on your time here, sir, and give us a feel for the command's working relationships with Congress, the Services, the TCCs, the Joint Staff, and other organizations?

Gen Rutherford: The understanding and appreciation for transportation is very strong on the Hill right now. Both appropriations committees' support is exhibited in legislative language. The Senate Appropriations Committee has been especially strong and solidly supportive of USTRANSCOM. House Representative Young [C. W. "Bill," R-Florida], leading the defense side, has been an absolute jewel. He has pushed to make sure that we are getting what we need to do the job. On the authorizations side, the Senate Armed Services Committee has been equally supportive.

On the House side we've had to work a few shipbuilding problems. Recognizing that the HNSC [House National Security Committee] Military Procurement Subcommittee is headed by Congressman Duncan Hunter [Republican] from California and represents the district of NASSCO [National Steel and Shipbuilding Company], you can understand his concern about shipbuilding issues. The only nut we have not been able to crack is the RRF RO/RO "new versus used issue," and it's been Congressman Hunter and his supporters who have created some roadblocks for us there. I'm encouraged this year by the language coming out of the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] and also the appropriations committees, both House and Senate, which will hopefully break

that roadblock. We'll have to see how it comes out of Congress. All in all, I think we're making excellent progress winning congressional support for sealift.

As for the C-17, I don't know of any detractors on the Hill right now. They've all come on board, obviously. We got the multi-year contract signed this last year. There was some concern that we weren't moving fast enough. They wanted a six-year contract versus a seven-year contract. Actually, I think what they wanted to do was find a better deal, largely for political reasons, than the one we had put together.

Dr. Matthews: Looking back over your time here, sir, what have we done to build rapport with Congress?

Gen Rutherford: Congress has been fairly easy to work with because we have our act together, and we've made sure staffers have been informed of transportation issues and our concerns. In most cases, we've won them over simply by sitting down and talking to them. It's the disinformation campaign that we've found hard to combat. Staffers read the papers, and they think that's the whole story. When we've had problems with staffers, the most effective solution we've found is to go to the principals. Only the CINC has the wherewithal to open the doors to get in and work directly with the principals to get the issues resolved. As I said earlier, the only big problem we've had with Congress was over local issues in the shipbuilding arena where it didn't make any difference what we had to say, it was still going to come out the same way.

We would like to have the principals very familiar with our mission. Take them out to fly on the C-17, show them it's a great

airplane. They simply don't have time to do that. They really don't. You might be able to get their staff out occasionally, but generally speaking the staffers don't have time either. You just have to take your fifteen minutes with them when you get it, have your case together and state it properly, and most of the time they will be very supportive.

It has been especially helpful for us to have MRS BURU, a detailed and highly credible study of transportation requirements, to point to. I've found few people who challenge its assumptions or conclusions. It formed the basis for the requirements, so then we only had to talk about how to meet the requirements. I'm sure if we do another Bottom-Up Review following the elections, we'll have to go back through the same issues. People will think--because we reduced the size of the force and because we changed the way we plan to use it--that transportation will not be the important factor that it is today. And I would tell you that the key problem in transportation is getting the DTS started, getting in on the front end of moving things. And given that most of the force will be located far from where an operation will occur, the requirements during the opening days of a small one or big one are going to be about the same. It's going to be a maximum effort, big or small. In the first 30 days you are going to use all the airplanes and ships available. You have to get something in place to at least hold the fort until the cavalry arrives, whether there is one or two MRCs. It will be interesting to see how the next scrub goes. I'm sure there will be some questions about the transportation requirement. But I don't see a solid and convincing case being made to reduce the number of airlift aircraft or sealift ships.

USTRANSCOM and the Transportation

Component Commands

Gen Rutherford: As for our relationships with the TCCs, I'm sure their view is different from mine. When I arrived here we were in a running gun battle between the providers of commercial sealift and procurement staffs in MSC. I think we've pretty well overcome most of that animosity. On second thought, I don't want to sound naive. We haven't overcome most of it. Let me say, we have discussions headed in the right direction. They are starting to talk to each other. The work we've done on VISA, best value rates, and the procurement process, I think, has gotten us back on track. Admiral Quast [Vice Admiral Philip M., USN, Commander, MSC] can take a lot of credit for improvements. It was not easy for him to work through his staff. He had to make some tough decisions personally to get MSC off the dime.

MTMC is the core of what we do on a day-to-day basis. It is our interface with the Army, who is our biggest user. MTMC has done some streamlining and improved the efficiency of their operation. But they still have a ways to go. Their processes, which have been around since World War II, need reengineering. Congress is helping us by putting pressure on us to streamline. Some of our people are starting to think "out of the box," so I believe we will get MTMC where it needs to be.

Likewise, we have streamlining work yet to do at AMC. The Air Force reengineering effort that we went through pretty well sized down AMC. But there is more to come.

In summary, I think TRANSCOM's relationship with the TCCs is

a healthy one. But I wouldn't say it is warm. The problem is TRANSCOM has inserted itself into the relationship. The components have been doing what they do for many years and now TRANSCOM is trying to fulfill its charter to bring the three TCCs together to give us a seamless transportation system. Of course, we're going to step on some toes and there is going to be some hard feelings. But seamless transportation was what TRANSCOM was set up to do, and we're in process of moving out and doing it. We're still a fairly young command as commands go. We're just getting started. Okay, who was the next one?

Dr. Matthews: Services, sir.

USTRANSCOM and the Services

Gen Rutherford: I think our relationships with the Services are pretty good. The Services are under pressure funding-wise to figure out how to fit nine pounds into a five-pound bag. So they are particularly concerned about the demands we place upon them for monetary resources. The Air Force is currently concerned about the subsidy they pay, associated with the size of the operation. I would tell you that it is out of one pocket and into another. The Air Force has stepped up to the C-17 funding. The Air Force has not been reluctant partners in that case.

The Army was slow to undertake their transportation improvement enhancement program, but they are starting to make progress. Now that the Army understands its importance, I really think we have a pretty good working relationship with them. Referring back to what I said about downsizing MTMC, there is some concern on

the Army's part. Hopefully we won't have a big battle, but a smaller MTMC is inevitable.

On the Navy side of the house, we had difficulty last year with the shipbuilding program and maintenance of RRF RO/ROs. They appeared to be convenient places to reduce the budget. So the budgeteers got into trying to pull some money out of there. We eventually got that back on track, but it was not without some hard feelings on behalf of the Navy programmers. This year I was very encouraged by the way the Navy program came in. They signed up and put the money in exactly as we thought it was needed. All in all, I've been very pleased with our relationship with the Services. Every time I've gone to the Chiefs, they've been very supportive.

Dr. Matthews: In the past, USTRANSCOM's business with the Joint Staff has predominantly been conducted with JS-J4 [Joint Staff Logistics Directorate]. Is that still the case or have we moved more into the JS-J3 [Joint Staff Operations Directorate] area?

Gen Rutherford: For day-to-day business, policies, and procedures, we usually work with the J4. We usually work the hot issues with the J3 and the Director of the Joint Staff General Kross,* who in this case has a transportation background. I think we are probably working more now outside of J4 channels than we have in the past.

Defense Logistics Agency and Defense

Information Systems Agency

Mr. Cossaboom: Would you talk briefly about TRANSCOM's relationships with DLA and DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency]?

Gen Rutherford: They are interested in the business arrangements and reducing their costs. And that's good. That's where their focus should be. Recently, we have been drawn into discussions with them about TRANSCOM's overhead costs. Now whether you have someone else paying a subsidy over here because DLA doesn't want to pay it or DISA doesn't want to pay it, that's something we can argue about a long time and disagree on forever. The cost to the taxpayer is the same regardless of which organization pays the bill. Actually the Comptroller back at OSD has to step in and say "Okay guys, this is the way it's going to be." We also depend upon the transportation policy people in OSD to make the calls. OSD has had to get DLA back in the box. They wanted to write their own contracts for airlift, outside of the CRAF program. We need to make sure that everyone understands the big transportation picture.

Conclusion

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986

Dr. Matthews: Sir, we'd like to move into the summary part of the interview now with a look at some broader, more philosophical issues. We'd like this part of the discussion to cover your entire career. How do you

*General Kross was Director of the Joint Staff from July 1994 to July 1996.

think Goldwater-Nichols [Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986] improved the way the DOD does business and do you think we've gone too far in the jointness arena?

Gen Rutherford: No. And had you asked me back in 1986, I would have told you Congress was way off base because I had a different perspective at the time. I think we probably have it just about right now. As a matter of fact, in some areas I think there's still a way to go, but I'm not sure we need legislation to make us more joint. As we evolve over time, we will become more joint.

There are still segments of the warfighting business that have a heavy Service input, where one Service is off doing business the way they did before Goldwater-Nichols. To a certain extent, I think it's good. You have competing interests now where before you had the Services doing the balancing act between working budgets and warfighting issues. Now the CINCs have a little more say in how to do that. So, it's probably about right. I do not, by the way, think CINCs should be in the budgeting process. I think the USSOCOM [US Special Operations Command] arrangement, in which they have their Major Force Program, is the wrong one.

Quality of the Troops

Mr. Cossaboom: When you entered the Air Force, we were in the era of the draft. As you've risen in command ranks, we've transitioned to the all-volunteer force. Would you comment on the quality of the troops, both officer and enlisted, in the draft era compared to today?

Gen Rutherford: You have to remember my early career was spent entirely in the

Air Force, and we didn't have non-volunteers in the Air Force even at that stage of the game. There might have been a time during the Korean War when we had a few non-volunteers, but I don't think so. Shortly after we did away with the draft and, during the latter phases of the Vietnam War and the years following it, we were in deep trouble. We were spending more time in the Air Force working people problems than we were taking care of the mission. I've referred to it as the period when we almost lost our Air Force. It was not good.

Having said that, as I look around today, I'm really encouraged. Our people are here because they want to be here. In the process of downsizing, we've released some very good people. We have culled the force, if you will, and those remaining are the really sharp young men and women. As a matter of fact, they are the best I've seen in my 35 years. They are smart, much smarter than we were in our young days. They are dedicated and they are enthusiastic.

In particular, we have a much stronger NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] corps today than we had in the past. I believe it's because we devoted the time and the resources to provide them a professional military education. We have helped them to become supervisors and leaders. I think our emphasis on the NCO force is really paying off.

Of course, the officer corps is also superb. The only time in my career when I questioned the young officers we had in the Air Force was back in the early 1980s when it seemed to me that careerism reached its height. The philosophy then was selfish, self-centered. I called it the "What's in it for me" generation. I

don't notice that today. When you sit down with a bunch of young officers, the first question out of their mouth is not "Sir, how do I become a general officer." That was quite frequently the question you got back in the early 1980s. And if you didn't get it as the first one, it sure was the second one. I'm pleased to say I don't hear that today.

Future Force

Dr. Matthews: Looking out into the next century--2017, I think that's where we're at with the strategic plan today--what concerns you most about the future of strategic mobility and national defense?

Gen Rutherford: In terms of strategic mobility, I think that 2017 is just like tomorrow in some respects. We are establishing the groundwork today for what the forces will look like in 2017.

There are a couple of areas we need to work especially hard. The people who are going to deploy need to be trained in transportation. They need to understand the system and how the system works for them. And there is very little understanding of strategic mobility outside the transportation community today. That's number one.

The other thing that concerns me is this seam we have between the port and foxhole, reception and onward movement in theater. Right now, the hand-off, that seam, is ill-defined. I'm afraid the onward movement of supplies, once they arrive at the in theater port, is not as well thought out as it needs to be.

Those are the two areas I think we need to work the hardest on in

the transportation side of the house. And probably the latter, reception and forward movement, is the most important. I think you'll see us spend considerable time in the coming months and years working that issue.

But before you can get people serious about reception and forward movement, you have to make sure they understand the system. I'm really disappointed and concerned with our customers' lack of understanding of the deployment system.

Dr. Matthews: What more should TRANSCOM do to educate the user?

Gen Rutherford: Last time I checked, the training responsibility belonged to the Services. What TRANSCOM has to do is generate enough interest in the Services to institutionalize the training of their people in transportation procedures, capabilities, and systems. Now, I'm not talking about one or two TURBO CADS* operations a year. I'm talking about institutionalizing the deployment. All the Services want to talk about is employment. Employment is very exciting. That's what people visualize when they think about being in the military, fighting wars. But you have to get to the war. In some way--in the schools, in the educational process--we have to get more and more people to think about how we get to the war.

Dr Matthews: Throughout history, operators have considered logisticians poor relations.

*TURBO CADS is a CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] exercise designed to stress the DOD containerized ammunition distribution system [CAD]] from origin to destination using commercial/DOD intermodal container systems.

Gen Rutherford: It hasn't changed. I've noticed, as a result of Joint Endeavor lessons learned, there is an increased interest in transportation and logistics. Hopefully General Shali will carry through. He understands the problem. General Reimer [Dennis J., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army] understands the problem. But there are only so many hours in the day they can devote to deployment education and that time is at the expense of something else. So, they have to make tough decisions. They have to give up something if they are going to learn how best to use USTRANSCOM and the DTS. I think we're starting to make a little progress.

Dr. Matthews: How do your principle transportation concerns rank in overall defense needs and strategy?

Gen Rutherford: Clarify.

Dr. Matthews: You talked about not enough time to do everything that needs to be done. Your transportation concerns like education, are they pretty low on the list of the unified commanders and Services?

Gen Rutherford: I would say they are low on the list, yes. And the reason they are low on the list is we transporters always seem to work our way through it. Ultimately we figure out how to do it. We don't do it the easy way, but ultimately, by brute force, we do what needs to be done. As we get an increasingly smaller force stationed in the CONUS, we may reach a point where we are forced to recognize the error of our ways. If you look back to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, had the bad guys moved south faster, we could well have come to that recognition sooner. Had Saddam Hussein pulled into Saudi Arabia with about four or five divisions in those early days, we wouldn't be sitting here talking about whether we're going to

buy foreign RO/RO ships. We wouldn't be talking about how much money it costs to preposition equipment ashore and afloat. We wouldn't be talking about the need for a C-17. We would have a clearer understanding about the importance of transportation to national security. I would tell you, we would be training differently today.

Management Style

Dr. Matthews: Sir, how would you describe your management style?

Gen Rutherford: [Laughter] I enjoy seeing others perform and perform well. I am very happy to sit back and establish priorities, provide the resources, and then let the troops do their job. Having said that, I don't believe you should turn your head and forget about what's going on out there in the field. I think you need to monitor what's going on.

I like to see people who think "out of the box." The time is past for those who adopt the old-time solutions and apply them to a situation because that's the way they've always done it. We need to come up with new ways of getting the job done with fewer resources.

I ask a lot of questions of staffs and commanders, and I don't necessarily care what the answer is. All I want to know is that someone knows the answer. If I ask a question based upon my experience and a little common sense, and I feel that maybe I'm not getting quite the right answer or the answer leads me to believe my staff might be heading in the wrong direction, I ask a few more

questions. If I continue to get an uneasy feeling, I'd better take some time to dig into the issue to make sure we're headed in the right direction.

To summarize, I would like to be a lazy commander. I would like to just sit back and think about priorities and lay them out, divvy up the resources, and watch it all happen. Unfortunately, that's utopia and I haven't found it yet. I tend to dig into things. I demand a lot of people. I think we can always do things better. Our business is a very serious one. We're spending a lot of the taxpayers' money, so I expect an extremely high level of performance. Also, I think the caliber of people we have today can produce to that high level.

Career Retrospective

Mr. Cossaboom: Over your whole career, are there any accomplishments of which you are most proud?

Gen Rutherford: [Laughter] I'm proud to have served my country for 35 years. But I can't think of anything that should be written on my tombstone. I'm very pleased that I've been able to serve my country as a general officer for about 14 years. Unfortunately during that time I've moved around the system so fast--I don't know how many jobs I've had in those 14 years, but it must be about twelve or thirteen--I haven't often had the opportunity to go into a position and make a big impact. It takes considerable time in a big organization to change the culture, and the most important gains are cultural. I'd go into a new job and ask "What is the thing I can work on for a year and a half here that I might be able to improve

upon.” While at the Military Personnel Center [MPG, now the Air Force Personnel Center], I concluded early on that we had become detached from the people side of the equation. In the assignment process, people had become numbers on pieces of paper. We were just putting names in the blanks. I tried to concentrate on getting the MPG staff to think more about the people aspect of the personnel business.

Recruiting was one of the best jobs I ever had. I sincerely enjoyed the work. My people taught me more than I ever taught them. As recruiting commander, I was a cheerleader and my troops were salesmen. It’s the closest thing to a sales organization you’ll ever run across in military life. They were really superb people. Unfortunately, I couldn’t give them bonuses when they met their goals. I just walked around and patted them on the back a lot. I’m proud we made all of our goals when I was commander there. I think we kept the quality of enlistees very high.

My time in programming at the Pentagon coincided with the Air Force drawdown. We had hit our zenith in the Reagan-build years, and we were turning around and heading in the other direction. It was probably the toughest job I had as a general officer, convincing everyone in the Air Force that they had to pull in their fangs and start accepting less. As I look back at the results, I’m very pleased at the way we went about it. I think we did much better than the other Services. We went ahead and made the reductions and got it behind us early on. I think the Air Force has benefited as a result.

I am very pleased that at PACAF we were able to institutionalize a quality of life program. When I arrived, we had serious problems,

primarily in Alaska and Korea. That program is starting to come to fruition.

For TRANSCOM and AMC, I'm pleased with the C-17 program and the progress we've made with VISA. I'm equally pleased with the progress we've made in the CRAF program. I think this next year will be the first year that we've ever met all of our goals in the CRAF program. We also have the shipbuilding program back on track. Don't misunderstand me, there's still some challenges out there.

Mr. Cossaboom: As you look back over your career, is there anything you would do differently? Any regrets?

Gen Rutherford: No. Wouldn't change any of it. There have been high points and low points, but going through all of that is just part of the job.

Most Influential and Memorable People

Mr. Cossaboom: Looking back over your entire career, who were the people who most influenced you?

Gen Rutherford: [Laughter] Is this a personal bio?

Mr. Cossaboom: To a certain extent, yes.

Gen Rutherford: I think back to my first flight commander who took me under his wing and eventually got me into stan/eval [standards and evaluation]. It was at that point that a new wing commander came in and I was the guy who ended up checking him out [in the

airplane]. He liked what he saw, I guess, because he ultimately hired me into my first headquarters job when I was a young captain. He traveled a lot. He wanted me to serve as his pilot, so in addition to my staff duties, I would accompany him all over the United States. We established a pretty good working relationship.

Dr. Matthews: What's his name, sir?

Gen Rutherford: Ernie Cragg* [Major General Ernest T., USAF]. He was the DO of ATC [Air Training Command] at the time. He was replaced by Brigadier General "Tid" [James H., USAF] Watkins.** I did the same thing for him, flew him here and there, in addition to working on his staff. He had come out of colonels assignments in the Pentagon. He asked me what I wanted to do and I said I didn't know. And he said "Well, let me get you a job." He got me a job in colonels assignments, and in three years I ended up working in general officer assignments. It was there I first met [General Robert J. Dixon [USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, HQ USAF]. General Dixon was a taskmaster of the highest order, and I really enjoyed working for him. I learned more about the "big" Air Force from him than I did anybody else along the way. It's those kinds of people who have most influenced my career, those who have given me the opportunity to show my stuff. If I had not worked for them, I probably would have been a civilian long before the 15th of July 1996.

Mr. Cossaboom: If you had to identify the most memorable person you ever met in your Air Force career, who would it have been?

*Director of Operations, Air Training Command, 2 August 1967-30 June 1969.

**Director of Operations, Air Training Command, 1 July 1969-31 January 1971.

Gen Rutherford: The most memorable I've met? Oh, I've met a lot of people but if I was going to identify the most memorable person I have worked for, then it would be General Dixon. Definitely memorable. [Laughter] We used to say if he quit talking to you, if he quit chewing on your rear, you were in deep trouble. That was really true. He always kept you on your toes. He was a task master but he was also one of the greatest teachers I have ever known.

Dr. Matthews: How about on the political side, people you have met in Congress or other elected officials?

Gen Rutherford: In Congress I enjoy being with and deeply respect Senator Ted Stevens [R-Alaska, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee], Senator Inouye [Daniel K., D-Hawaii] and Representative Young [C. W. "Bill," R-Florida]. They're sound people, secure in their jobs, and working for the good of the nation. There's no doubt in my mind of that, so I respect them. I really do. There are many others, such as Senator Cohen [William S., R-Maine], who I don't necessarily see eye to eye with, but I really respect. Senator Cohen is a very intelligent man.

I also had the opportunity to meet the President [William J. Clinton]. I thoroughly enjoy being around him. I think he does his utmost to be supportive of the American military. He has a genuine interest in our people.

Dr. Matthews: Any specific advice for General Kross?

Gen Rutherford: No, he's been around this business a long time and he doesn't need any advice. I'll leave him a couple of notes on the desk.

[Laughter]

Mr. Cossaboom: Is there anything else you want included in this interview?

Gen Rutherford: Nothing that I can think of.

Biography

General Robert L. Rutherford is Commander in Chief of the United States Transportation Command, and Commander of the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. As a unified command commander in chief, he is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the nation's defense transportation requirements. He exercises command over service transportation components from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As commander of AMC, he provides operationally trained, equipped and mission-ready air mobility forces to support U.S. requirements.

The general entered the Air Force in 1961 as a distinguished graduate of the Southwest Texas State University's Reserve Officer Training Corps program. During his 35-year Air Force career, he has held nine command positions at squadron, wing, numbered air force, and major command levels. The general is a command pilot with more than 5,000 flying hours in various airlift, tanker, fighter, and trainer aircraft. He has flown 161 combat missions in the F-4 fighter, including 101 missions over North Vietnam.

In addition to his command experience, General Rutherford has been assigned to duties in the personnel, manpower, and programs and resources arenas with nearly nine years of work at Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., and the Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

The general and his wife, Kita, both Texans, are the parents of two sons who are Air Force officers.

BDUC~ON:

- 1961 Bachelor's degree in business administration, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas.
- 1964 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
- 1971 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.
- 1979 Master's degree in business administration, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama.
- 1979 Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
- 1986 National and International Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. July 1961-October 1966, student, Undergraduate Pilot Training, then flight training instructor and T-38 instructor pilot, Reese Air Force Base, Texas.
2. October 1966-April 1967, F-4 pilot, 479th Tactical Fighter Wing, George Air Force Base, California.
3. April 1967-July 1967, F-4 aircraft commander, 4th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
- 4 July 1967-May 1968, F-4 aircraft commander, 435th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand.
5. May 1968-January 1971, operations staff officer, Airspace and Air Traffic Control Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.
6. January 1971-July 1971, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.
7. July 1971-May 1972, staff officer, Colonels Group, Directorate of Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

8. June 1972-May 1973, chief, critical skill management division, Colonels Group, Directorate of Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
9. May 1973-February 1975, chief, Regular General Officer Assignment Division, Directorate of Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
10. February 1975-September 1975, T-38 instructor pilot; commander, 71st Flying Training Squadron, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.
11. September 1975-July 1978, deputy commander for operations, 38th Flying Training Wing; assistant deputy commander for operations, 347th Tactical Fighter Wing; commander, 339th Tactical Fighter Squadron; commander, 347th Combat Support Group, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.
12. August 1978-July 1979, student, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
13. July 1979-June 1980, deputy commander for operations, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea.
14. June 1980-August 1982, vice commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing; commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Group; commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan.
15. September 1982-September 1983, vice commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, and assistant deputy chief of staff for military personnel, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

16. September 1983-January 1985, commander, U.S. Air Force Recruiting Service, and deputy chief of staff for recruiting, Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.
17. January 1985-March 1987, deputy director of programs and evaluation, director of manpower and organization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
18. March 1987-April 1988, deputy chief of staff for operations and deputy director of operations for the European Air Combat Operations Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, West Germany.
19. April 1988-October 1989, commander, 17th Air Force; commander, Kried Sector Three; and commander, Allied Tactical Operations Center, Sembach Air Base, West Germany.
20. October 1989-May 1991, deputy chief of staff for programs and resources, deputy chief of staff for productivity and programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
21. May 1991-May 1992, vice commander, Military Airlift Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
22. May 1992-October 1994, vice commander, then commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.
23. October 1994-present, commander in chief United States

Transposition Command and commander, Air Mobility
Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

FLIGHT INFORMATION:

Rating: Command Pilot

Flight Hours: More than 5,000

Aircraft Flown: T-37, T-38, F-4,

C-17

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters

Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

F-15, F-16, F-111, C-54, C-130, C-135, C-141,

Air Medal with 11 oak leaf clusters

Vietnam Service Medal with two service stars

Republic of Palm

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Vietnam Gallantry Cross with

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1961 Colonel Mar 1, 1978

First Lieutenant Jan 16, 1963 Brigadier General Jun
11 1983

Captain Jan 16, 1966 Major General Aug 1, 1986

Major Jul 1, 1969 Lieutenant General Oct 1, 1989

Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 1973 General Feb 1, 1993

rCurrent as of July 1996~

Narrative Justification for Award of the

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Robert L. Rutherford

General Robert L. Rutherford, United States Air Force, distinguished himself by exceptionally distinguished meritorious service, as the Commander in Chief United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), and as Commander, Air Mobility Command, United States Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, from 12 October 1994 to 31 July 1996. Throughout this period, General Rutherford provided superlative leadership and wise counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior Department of Defense officials in the face of numerous challenges.

During his tenure as USCINCTRANS, General Rutherford provided direction, guidance, and support to a multitude of joint operations including strategic and commercial lift for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces. Some of the significant operations included Operation DESERT SORTIE (redeployment of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM forces), Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (humanitarian assistance in Southern Turkey and Northern Iraq), Operation SEA SIGNAL (Cuba), Operation PROVIDE PROMISE (UN humanitarian mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina), Operation ABLE SENTRY (regional security for

the Niacedonia-Serbian border), Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (UN operation in Haiti), Operation ASSURED RESPONSE (for Liberian NEO), and Operation JOIM ENDEAVOR where USTRANSCOM flew 4,000 missions delivering over 24,000 passengers and 64,000 short tons of cargo while moving another 400,000 square feet of cargo via surface transportation. Other operations included: Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Rest and Recuperation Program, where USTRANSCOM coordinated and contracted airlift⁴ for approximately 25,000 troops deployed to Bosnia; humanitarian operations in Angola, Rwanda, Albania, Germany, India, Pakistan, Africa, Bangladesh, Laos, Japan, Zambia, Mongolia, Ukraine, and Croatia; support for 16 counterdrug missions, involving the Drug Enforcement Agency, State Department, and FORSCOM; and Phase I of Operation LASER STRIKE, involving US training and intelligence support to allied nations to combat illegal drug flow.

Under General Rutherford, USTRANSCOM achieved the first significant step in determining force sufficiency and transportation feasibility of a two war scenario by completing a transportation feasibility analysis for deployment of forces and sustainment of major regional contingencies in support of USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT. Analysis encompassed adequacy of air, land, and sea transport assets, ports of embarkation and debarkation, and infrastructure needed to move the massive amounts of personnel and cargo necessary to execute the warfighting CINCs' plans. This analysis is the foundation for supporting deployment of dual major regional contingencies.

As USCINCTRANS, General Rutherford provided support for more than 200 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) programmed exercises. He vigorously promoted inclusion of increased logistics play into CJCS exercise design, increasing USTRANSCOM functional and doctrinal expertise to supported CINCs and providing realistic joint logistics training to all participants. During a time of exercise budget constraints and limited resources, he restructured the deployment concept of operations to shift airlift requirements to sealift. This decreased the airlift utilization rate by nearly 30 percent and saved millions of transportation dollars for the exercise program. Additionally, to improve transportation support to the warfighting CINCs, General Rutherford stressed maximum use of the Commercial Ticket Program, resulting in a 75 percent savings for units deploying on CJCS exercises. Committed to improving the Defense Transportation System, he insisted problems identified during USTRANSCOM exercises and operations be collected in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System and resolved through USTRANSCOM's Remedial Action Project Program. General Rutherford's efforts ensured USTRANSCOM met its charter to supply coordinated transportation for military deployments around the world.

General Rutherford increased the scope of USTRANSCOM's readiness programs, which has been vital in identifying shortfalls and developing solutions to critical mobility problems, directly enhancing USTRANSCOM's ability to respond. He improved the joint monthly readiness review process by providing more detailed products through the use of video teleconference to enhance coordination among key players. General Rutherford provided detailed, accurate

information to congressional leadership through the Force Readiness Assessment to Congress. These readiness initiatives ensured constant tracking and prompt follow up of critical issues impacting mission readiness. General Rutherford led the Secretary of Defense-directed analysis and consideration of the Operational Support Airlift (OSA) Project. He authored extensive CINC reports to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlining recommendations for OSA use within DOD, including proposed flying hour reductions and the streamlining of OSA fleet wartime requirements. From the ground level, he guided the development of the operational concept for project implementation. The plan culminated in a new OSA scheduling activity, which superbly reduced manpower, funding, facilities, and equipment while increasing organization efficiency.

His keen insight into the political pitfalls and technical aspects of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been instrumental in establishing a flawless program to ship over SIB of equipment over the next 4 years to the former Soviet Union. This effort, and the inclusive equipment, supports the nuclear reduction program of the former Soviet Union States. To date, over 30 short tons of cargo have been moved by air and over 36,000 measurement tons of cargo moved by sea.

Focusing on customer needs, General Rutherford facilitated transition to a joint mobility control group, focusing all command and control efforts to enhance customer service. The restructured joint mobility assessment team

initiative will bring the deployable

customer service team in support of a seamless hand off concept into reality. Contract negotiations for the Joint Training Organization saved over \$500M.

He closely monitored execution of mobility enhancement funds (MEF) during 1995 and captured several program funds that were not executable for various reasons. This resulted in the redirection of approximately \$300K in nonexecuted MEF funds, allowing completion of ramp certification of eight fast sealift ships (FSS), allowing discharge of these ships in-stream during Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (SLOTS) operations.

General Rutherford spearheaded JLOTS employment in regional CINC exercises. He assisted USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM in developing exercise concepts that would include JLOTS into FUERTES DEFENSAS 95 and BRIGHT STAR 95. During MARKET SQUARE 96, USTRANSCOM supported USACOM's liquid SLOTS exercise. Under USTRANSCOM's oversight, ready reserve force SLOTS upgrades were accomplished. USTRANSCOM coordinated with MARAD during a 1995 turbo activation exercise, saving MARAD \$1.5M in activation costs associated with a ship's required certificate of inspection. MARAD then applied these funds to complete Cape May's JLOTS conversion, significantly enhancing her utility in support of a

major regional contingency.

As monitor for Service Logistics Over-The-Shore (LOTS) procurement programs, USTRANSCOM provided Joint Staff/J4 critical information on the opportunity for a joint procurement program and the consequences of divergent noncompatible programs. Based on this information, Joint Staff/J4 included the issue as a joint requirements oversight council agenda item. This prompted the Army and Navy to initiate work on a memorandum of agreement on a joint causeway procurement program.

General Rutherford pioneered major revisions to the Defense Travel Regulation (DTR) Part I (passenger movements) and Part II (cargo movements) which were approved and implemented. This was a major stride in creating a single comprehensive DOD regulation giving end-users the information they need to do the job. The command also made significant progress developing Parts III and IV (mobility and personal property movement). By replacing approximately 2,200 pages of multi-Service publications into a single joint publication, this four-part DTR will eliminate duplication, streamline operations, and update procedures consistent with the intent of national performance review.

As DOD lead agent for developing and providing an integrated in-transit visibility (ITV)

capability for all DOD customers, General Rutherford and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics), developed the Defense ITV Integration Plan. Anchored by the Global Transportation Network (GYN), it will be the USTRANSCOM command and control system and serve as the DOD system for providing ITV capability. The first module delivered will enhance ITV capability in concert with the goals established in the ITV plan.

Under General Rutherford's leadership, USTRANSCOM aggressively implemented use of electronic data interchange (EDI) for defense transportation. A Systems integration testing phase was pressed into action to validate business and Systems processes required for generation and paying transportation bills. General Rutherford championed the promotion of using generic transaction sets to minimize software maintenance costs while standardizing business practices and data exchanges. Results will improve information exchanges between all trading partners and produce direct benefits to DOD through significant reduction in administrative costs.

The Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center (JTCC), chartered in August 1993, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Defense Transportation System (DTS), made great strides under the direction and guidance of General Rutherford. The DTS systems migration effort is focused on eliminating duplication of system capabilities and redirecting systems toward a hardware independent family of modules to provide the capability of sharing information. To date, the JTCC has recommended; and OSD has approved 23 systems as migration

systems. Another 64 systems were eliminated, resulting in considerable cost-savings and increased efficiency within DOD.

During numerous congressional hearings and visits, General Rutherford advocated a strong, efficient and dependable DTS. At every opportunity, he championed the importance and high priority of the 138,000 plus men and women of the Total Force Defense Transportation System team. He voiced strong support for improved quality of life initiatives for military service members to adequately compensate them for the tremendous sacrifices they make in their service to our nation. He clearly articulated the critical nature of strategic mobility in supporting joint warfighting operations. He promoted the importance of developing and maintaining the robust capability of our nation's organic and commercial sealift, airlift, transportation infrastructure, and command and control systems.

General Rutherford continues to direct the development of decision support technology for TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES), and global command and control networks supporting strategic patient movement. This includes accelerated development and fielding of TRAC2ES Fly-Away (Version 1) supporting Operation JOINT FXDEAVOR which provides the first operational C2 capabilities at a deployed Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC). He initiated a comprehensive review of current strategic Aeromedical Evacuation (AL) requirements and capabilities to further support the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(JSCP) deliberate planning scenarios (2 MRC) as well as incorporating sufficient flexibility in the assessment to account for new aeromedical doctrine of transporting “stabilized” versus “stable patients.”

The command’s Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU), the first multi-service reserve unit established within the DOD, has been a ‘role model’ for other commands to achieve

“Total Force” integration. General Rutherford was the leader in total support of the reserve program, achieving full integration of reservists into the command structure. His support for the Total Force concept and single standard for excellence among active duty and reserve members initiated a formal joint reserve training program, consisting of command-validated joint reserve training requirements. The training program led to the qualification and full participation of reserve members in every aspect of the command mission in which reservists were assigned. General Rutherford’s leadership, and uncompromising excellence brought the concept of joint service reserve support and Total Force integration to maturity.

After assignment of the Defense Courier Service (DCS) to USTRANSCOM in December 1994, General Rutherford quickly grasped the intricacies and took immediate action to improve DCS. Recognizing the need to make DCS more efficient, he initiated a complete reorganization of DCS

to include elimination of 11 courier stations, 3 regional management headquarters, and a Headquarters DCS reduction of 13 manpower billets. These actions netted a total savings of 81 manpower billets, and resulted in a \$3 million annual budget reduction. Additionally, he improved procedures and raised efficiency by establishing new United Parcel Service missions to Europe and the Far East. These innovative management changes enabled customers to realize a \$5 million annual savings while significantly improving courier service.

The singularly distinctive accomplishments of General Rutherford culminate a long and distinguished career in the service of his country and reflect the highest credit upon himself the United States Air Force, and the Department of Defense.

Citation

To Accompany The Award Of

The Defense Distinguished Service Medal

To

Robert L. Rutherford

General Robert L. Rutherford, United States Air Force, distinguished himself by exceptionally distinguished meritorious service as Commander in Chief United States Transportation Command, and Commander,

Air Mobility Command, United States Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, from ~ 2 October ~ 1994 to 31 July 1996. During this period, he provided superlative leadership and counsel to the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and members of the United States Congress on matters relating to Defense Transportation. General Rutherford provided direction and supported joint deployment exercises including strategic and commercial lift for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces worldwide. The most significant operations included: DESERT SORTIE; PROVIDE COMFORT; SEA SIGNAL; PROVIDE PROMISE; ABLE SENTRY; UPHOLD DEMOCRACY; ASSURED RESPONSE; and JOINT ENDEAVOR, where United States Transportation Command flew more than 4,000 missions delivering over 24,000 passengers and 64,000 short tons of cargo while moving another 400,000 square feet of surface cargo. General Rutherford also directed United States Transportation Command's involvement in humanitarian missions conducted in Angola, Rwanda, Albania, Germany, India, Pakistan, Africa, Bangladesh, Laos, Japan, Zambia, Mongolia, Ukraine, and Croatia. Under General Rutherford's guidance, USTRANSCOM supported 16 counterdrug missions, supporting the Drug Enforcement Agency, State Department, and Forces Command. He recently supported Operation LASER STRIKE, involving United States training and intelligence support to allied nations to disrupt illegal drug flow worldwide. Under his leadership and vision, General Rutherford made significant, outstanding, and lasting contributions to preparing the Defense Transportation System for the twenty-first century. The singularly distinctive accomplishments of General Rutherford culminate a long and distinguished career in the service of his country and reflect the highest credit upon himself the

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Glossary

AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
ACC	Air Combat Command
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command
AFPC	Air Force Personnel Center
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMOG	Air Mobility Operations Group
AOR	area of responsibility
ATC	Air Training Command
AWACS	Advanced Warning Airborne Control System
BOS	Base Operations Support
BVR	best value rate
CADS	containerized ammunition distribution system
CENTCOM	See USCENTCOM
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCEUR	See USCINCEUR
CINCTRANS	See USCINCTRANS
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet
DBOF-T	Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DCS	Defense Courier Service
DeCA	Defense Commissary Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DO	Director for Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Department of Transportation
DTS	Defense Transportation System
EUCOM	See USEUCOM
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FDO	flexible deterrent options
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
GAO	Government Audit Agency
GTN	Global Transportation Network

HNSC	House National Security Committee
IG	Inspector General
ITV	intransit visibility
J1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate
J2	Intelligence Directorate
J5	Plans and Policy Directorate
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Joint Deployment Agency
JICTRANS	Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation
JS-J3	Joint Staff Directorate of Operations
JS-J4	Joint Staff Directorate of Logistics
LG	Director for Logistics
LMSR	Large Medium Speed RO/RO
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MHE	material handling equipment
MOG	maximum on ground
MPC	Military Personnel Center
MRC	major regional contingency
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
MRS BURU	Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
NAF	Numbered Air Force
NASSCO	National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA	Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft
NDF	National Defense Features
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
OPCON	operational control
OSA	Operational Support Airlift
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OT&E	Operational Test and Evaluation
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POV	privately owned vehicle
PREPO	prepositioning

RF	radio frequency
RM&AE	Readiness, Maintainability and Availability Evaluation
RMF	Ready Mobility Force
RO/RO	Roll-On/Roll-Off
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SAFMA	Strategic Air Force Mix Analysis
SATCOM	satellite communication
SLEP	Service Life Extension Program
SPOE	seaport of embarkation
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TCC	Transportation Component Command
TDY	temporary duty
TEU	Twenty-ton Equivalent Unit
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TRANSCOM	See USTRANSCOM
TTU	Transportation Terminal Unit
UCR	Uniform Commercial Rate
USA	United States Army
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, USEUCOM
USCINTRANS	Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USN	United States Navy
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UT&E	Unit Test and Evaluation
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

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