

25X1




26 April 1957

25X1




Copy No. 134

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 2
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 06 Dec 79 REVIEWER: 

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1



TOP SECRET

State Department review completed

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100020001-4

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100020001-4

25X1A

CONTENTS

25X1A

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

ok 2. BRITISH SEE BID FOR MIDDLE EAST TALKS IN BULGANIN LETTER [redacted]

25X1A

25X6

[redacted]

ok 4. IRAQI OFFICERS ARRESTED FOR ANTIREGIME ACTIVITIES

[redacted]

25X1A

ok 6. WEST GERMAN PROBLEMS WITH STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS [redacted]

25X1A

ok 7. OVERSEAS CHINESE ISSUE IN SOUTH VIETNAM MAY BE REACHING CRITICAL STAGE [redacted]

25X1A

ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted]

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

2. BRITISH SEE BID FOR MIDDLE EAST TALKS IN
BULGANIN LETTER


25X1A



The British Foreign Office, in a preliminary appraisal of Premier Bulganin's letter to Prime Minister Macmillan, feels that it contains a veiled bid to participate in talks on the Middle East with the United States, Britain and France. While a definitive British attitude has not yet been formed, the Foreign Office seems to think that the USSR cannot be excluded indefinitely from talks concerning developments in the Middle East.

Comment

There have been no recent indications that London believes the situation in the Middle East could be eased by seeking an accommodation with the USSR. Macmillan may nevertheless again be considering a trip to Moscow.



25X6

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100020001-4

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100020001-4

25X1A

25X1A

4. IRAQI OFFICERS ARRESTED FOR ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1A

A group of younger Iraqi army officers, including a colonel, were arrested on 16 April for antigovernment activities,

25X1
25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

It is not known whether the arrests were carried out to stop an actual conspiracy, or as a warning to disaffected officers.

25X1

[Redacted]

Comment

There have been a number of reports of discontent among the younger Iraqi officer element because of what they consider to be Premier Nuri Said's anti-Nasr, pro-Western policy. It is not believed, however, that the Iraqi army is seriously disaffected.

26 Apr 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 7

25X1A

[Redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100020001-4

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100020001-4

25X1A

6. WEST GERMAN PROBLEMS WITH STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS

25X1A

[REDACTED] Commenting on Bonn's suggestion to suspend the status-of-forces negotiations, Ambassador Bruce remarks that although West German officials are undoubtedly seeking a negotiating advantage, they also genuinely fear an agreement unacceptable to the Bundestag. Bruce points out that on two of the most difficult unresolved items in the negotiations--relating to freedom of the Western forces in Germany to maneuver, and to Allied retention of real estate requisitioned from the Germans--the Allied proposals not only exceed rights granted by the Bonn Conventions and those under status-of-forces agreements in other NATO countries, but also run counter to German laws.

There is intense public interest in both these subjects, he observes, since German citizens want their houses and property back and do not want to be disturbed by maneuvers. He thinks German unwillingness to come to grips with these hard problems is chiefly responsible for the proposal to end the negotiations.

Comment The West German government would undoubtedly consider itself in a perilous position, in view of the coming election, if it announced highly unpopular status-of-forces agreements on maneuvers and property requisitioning at this time.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

7. OVERSEAS CHINESE ISSUE IN SOUTH VIETNAM MAY BE REACHING CRITICAL STAGE

25X1A


| | |
|--|--|
| | |
| | <p>Tension between Taipei and Saigon continues to increase as a result of enforcement of South Vietnam's decree imposing mandatory citizenship on locally born Chinese. Taipei's insistence that the Chinese be given the freedom to choose their citizenship, repeated in a diplomatic note of protest dated 23 April, is unacceptable to the Ngo Dinh Diem government.</p> |

Pressure on the Overseas Chinese to comply with the Vietnamese government's decree is likely to increase, despite the economic dislocation which is bound to result. Shops and businesses owned by noncitizen Chinese engaged in eleven important businesses proscribed to foreigners, in which the Chinese predominate, are already being closed down in the provinces and there are signs that enforcement is about to be tightened in Saigon. There are not enough Vietnamese with the necessary capital and experience to take over these businesses.

Saigon's uncompromising attitude and Taipei's ineffective protection have made the harassed Overseas Chinese vulnerable to Communist exploitation. There is also a danger of the outbreak of violence between the Vietnamese and local Chinese.

25X1

25X1A



25X1A



ANNEX

Watch Report 350, 25 April 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee


No: 350

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities by either Israel or the Arab states is improbable in the immediate future. Unsettled issues and tensions, particularly the internal situation in Jordan, continue to constitute possibilities for violence. Should there be intensified disorders or civil war in Jordan, military intervention by neighboring Arab states probably would occur, and Israeli intervention would be a possibility.

25X1A



25X1A

