# An Evaluation of Occupant Protection in Frontal Interior Impact for Unrestrained Front Seat Occupants of Cars and Light Trucks 

The United States Guvernment does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers' names appear only because they are considered essential to the object of this report.


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| A/C | air conditioning |
| :--- | :--- |
| ACIR | Automotive Crash Injury Research |
| AIS | Abbreviated Injury Scale |
| BMDP | Biomedical programs (P series) |
| CDC | Collision Deformation Classification |
| CRASH | Computer Reconstruction of Accident Speeds on the Highway |
| Delta V | velocity change during impact |
| df | degrees of freedom |
| DV | Delta V |
| FARS | unit of acceleration approximately equal to 32.2 ft/sec ${ }^{2}$ |
| g | General Motors Corp. |
| GM | General Motors Research |
| GMR | Head Injury Criterion |
| HIC | Highway Safety Research Institute, now called UMTRI |
| HSRI | Instrument Panel |
| IP | Motional Accident Sampling System |
| LIP | Mower Instrument Panel |
| MIP | Mid Instrument Panel |
| mph | miles per hour |
| MPV | Multipurpose Passenger Vehicle |
| MVMA | MVMACD |


| NCSS | National Crash Severity Study |
| :--- | :--- |
| NHTSA | National Highway Traffic Safety Administration |
| PADS2 | Passenger And Driver Simulation program, version 2 |
| PDOF | Principal Direction Of Force |
| R | correlation coefficient |
| RF | Right Front |
| SAE | Society of Automotive Engineers |
| SAS | Statistical Analysis System |
| Sqrt | square root |
| SWRI | Southwest Research Institute |
| TIP | Top Instrument Panel |
| TSC | Transportation Systems Center |
| UCLA | University of California at Los Angeles |
| VIN | Vehicle Identification Number |
| VINA | Vehicle Identification Number Analysis program |

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


#### Abstract

Roger Daniel (Ford), Don Hendricks (Calspan Field Services, Inc.), Dick Humphrey (GM) and Dick Wilson (GM) responded to my inquiries on the history of instrument panels and on the weight and safety equipment of light trucks.


## SUMMARY

"Occupant Protection in Interior Impact" is the title of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 201. More generally, it is the synthesis of occupant compartment geometry, energy absorbing materials on the interior surfaces of the compartment and the integrity and controlled crush of the entire vehicle structure. It is all the parts of a vehicle other than the restraint system - which, if well designed, combine to make the occupant compartment a potentially safe environment even in a severe crash.

The instrument panel is the single most important component for protecting the unrestrained right front passenger in a frontal crash. It is the large interior surface immediately in front of the passenger, whose knees are almost certain to contact the lower instrument panel. The chest is likely to impact the mid panel and the head may rebound from the windshield and contact the top surface of the panel. Appropriate design and energy absorbing materials can lessen the injuries from these contacts. But the influence of the

panel is not limited to these direct contacts by the passenger. A panel with appropriate geometry and force deflection characteristics can help keep the unrestrained passenger in an upright position during the crash and reduce the severity of the interactions with the windshield, the roof header and other components.

During the 1960's and 1970's, the manufacturers gradually modified the instrument panels of cars and light trucks in ways believed to reduce the injury risk for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes. Instrument panel tops were padded in most cars by the mid 1960's. Subsequently, Standard 201 required the padding in all cars as of January 1, 1968 and in light trucks after September 1, 1981. The manufacturers gradually reduced the rigidity of mid and lower instrument panels (although Standard 201, as promulgated, does not set requirements in those areas). The panels were extended back further toward the passenger and the knee impact area enlarged. Softer, larger panels were believed to be helpful in reducing direct contact injuries and to decelerate the passenger more evenly over a longer time period ("ride down"), also keeping him in an upright position.

Executive Order 12291 (February 1981) requires agencies to evaluate their existing regulations. The objectives of an evaluation are to determine the actual benefits - lives saved, injuries prevented, damage avoided - and costs of safety equipment installed in production vehicles in connection with a standard. Standard 201 is the regulation on performance of the instrument panel during interior impacts. As explained
above, though, many of the actual modifications of instrument panels were made well in advance of Standard 201 or were in areas of the panel not specifically covered by the standard. One objective of this report is to evaluate the cumulative reduction of fatalities and injuries of unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes as a result of all the instrument panel modifications that have been gradually made in cars and light trucks since the early 1960's. The study also takes a preliminary look at the correlation between injury severity, for various body regions, and certain parameters describing the geometry and force deflection characteristics of instrument panels.

By now, NHTSA has published evaluations of nearly all major safety devices regulated by its safety standards, especially those which protect unrestrained drivers and/or right front passengers of passenger cars in frontal impacts - e.g. energy absorbing steering assemblies and High Penetration Resistant windshields. Each of the previous evaluations gave an estimate of the number of lives saved by a particular safety device. That makes it appropriate to add a second objective to this "evaluation of occupant protection in interior impacts for front seat occupants in frontal crashes." The goal is to estimate the cumulative reduction in frontal fatality risk for unrestrained drivers and right front passengers of cars of the 1980's, relative to cars of the 1960's i.e., estimate the total of lives saved by all of the preceding safety devices combined plus the effects on crashworthiness of any other vehicle modifications that have not been evaluated or are not associated with a specific safety standard. For example, the change from rear wheel drive
to front wheel drive in the 1980 's is not connected to any particular safety standard but might nonetheless have safety implications if it affects vehicle crush characteristics. The analysis concludes the NHTSA evaluation of occupant protection in frontal crashes, addressing questions such as:
o What is the net contribution of the vehicle modifications made during the 1960-84 period? When did the reductions take place?
o Do the individual fatality reductions estimated for various safety standards in previous NHTSA evaluations add up to this evaluation's estimate of the overall reduction in fatalities from model year 1966 to 1969 (when most of those standards were implemented)?
o Did cars get any safer after 1970, thanks to improvements not necessarily related to NHTSA's standards?

The evaluation for passenger car occupants consists of three analyses. First, National Crash Severity Study (NCSS) data were statistically analyzed to determine the risk of serious injuries specifically due to contact with the instrument panel, by model year (1960-78), for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes. The analysis controlled for confounding factors such as differences in the crash severities of older and newer cars.

But panel modifications, as stated above, can even affect some of the injuries not directly due to panel contact. The second analysis gauges the effect of panel design on the right front passenger's overall injury risk, based on simulation of 5 th, 50 th and 95 th percentile passenger interactions with the vehicle interior in 25-30 mph frontal barrier crashes, using the MVMA2D computer model. Crashes are simulated with
instrument panels having the geometry and force deflection characteristics of cars of a wide range of model years (1965-83) and body styles - but with all other vehicle factors, such as the crash pulse, the materials of the windshield, etc. held constant. The trend, by model year, of the injury criteria predicted by these simulations, is thus in a sense attributable to changes in the instrument panel, since everything else is held constant. The simulations also permit a preliminary correlational analysis of various types of injury with instrument panel characteristics. Of course, the computer simulations of this report, which for the most part were not validated by actual crash tests, need to be interpreted cautiously and in particular should not be used for predicting the injury risk in specific makes and models of cars - but a large sample of simulations gives a good idea of the historical trend of injury risk.

The third analysis looks at the 16,000 fatal head on collisions of cars of two different model years on the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) to see in each collision which driver is more likely to be killed - the one in the older car or in the newer car - taking into account such other factors such as the difference in vehicle weights, the drivers' ages, etc. The individual comparisons are combined into a model which predicts the unrestrained driver's fatality risk index as a function of model year, controlling for vehicle weight - and the decrease of this index from model year 1964 to 1984 estimates the cumulative reduction in frontal fatality risk, as a result of vehicle modifications (other than weight changes) during those years. The model is then extended to right front passengers. This approach using head on collisions eliminates most
of the sources of bias that have often been present in earlier analyses to estimate fatality risk by model year: reporting biases, effects of factors other than vehicle modifications. When cars of two different model years collide head on, but with the same car weight, driver age, etc. and the fatalities occur consistently more often in the older car than in the newer one, the only conclusion is that the newer car is safer.

The study's most important results for unrestrained right front passengers of passenger cars are conveyed in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Figure 1 shows the relative risk of serious injury due to instrument panel contact, by model year (1960-78), based on the NCSS analysis. The average risk for 1971-78 cars is assigned a value of 100 . Figure 2 shows the relative overall injury performance of instrument panels of different model years (1965-83) in the MVMA2D simulations. The measure of performance in Figure 2 cannot be translated into actual injury rates, but positive values mean higher injury risk and negative values, lower risk. Figure 3 shows the overall fatality risk index for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes, by model year (1964-84). The average risk for 1973-84 cars is assigned the index value of 100 . The three curves are derived from completely unrelated data sources and measure different types of risk, yet they all show nearly the same pattern: a large reduction (about 20 percent) of risk in cars of the later 1960's, followed by an additional smaller reduction (another 10 percent) in the early 1970's and a leveling off after that. These reductions coincide with the instrument panel modifications made by the manufacturers. It can be concluded that these modifications were effective in reducing injuries and fatalities -

 1960－66 RISK
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FIGURE 3: OVERALL FATALITY RISK INDEX FOR UNRESTRAINED RIGHT FRONT PASSENGERS IN FRONTAL CRASHES (Adjusted for Car Weight Changes; 1973-84 Average = 100)
including, but not limited to the casualties specifically due to direct contact with the panel - and that a large proportion, if not most of the net reduction of overall fatality risk for right front passengers in frontal crashes is due to the panel modifications.

Figure 4 shows the overall fatality risk index for unrestrained drivers in frontal crashes, by model year (1964-84). The average risk for 1973-84 cars is again assigned the index value of 100 . Figure 4 shows a large reduction (about 12 percent) in model years 1967-68, when energy absorbing steering assemblies were installed in passenger cars, with little net change from then on. The net difference between the 1964 and 1984 cars amounts to about 1300 driver fatalities per year - nearly the same as the reduction attributed by NHTSA's 1981 evaluation to the energy absorbing steering assembly. It seems that the energy absorbing steering assembly has been the vehicle modification of the 1964-84 period with the largest effect on unrestrained drivers' fatality risk in frontal crashes.

The study of light trucks included statistical analyses of injury rates in National Accident Sampling System (NASS) and NCSS data and a calibration of fatality risk indices similar to those for passenger cars. Because sample sizes were smaller, the results were not nearly as conclusive as for passenger cars.

The least firm section of this report is its use of computer simulations, generally not verified by crash or sled tests, to compare the injury risk with instrument panels of different model years. While the

simulations showed strong, intuitively reasonable correlations between certain types of panel design and high injury risk, it cannot be guaranteed that similar correlations would be found in real crashes. The FARS analysis for light trucks did not have precise curb weight data for the trucks. All of the NCSS, FARS and NASS analyses have relatively large sampling errors.

Although the evaluation concludes that instrument panel design has improved significantly since 1960 , the panel still accounts for a large percentage of the serious injuries in frontal crashes. The major advances in biomechanics and simulation procedures during the past 10 years have encouraged NHTSA to undertake a research program on frontal protection for the right front passenger. An initial objective of that research is quantification of the injury consequences of changing various instrument panel design parameters - based in part on computer simulations which have been validated by crash or sled test data, a more accurate approach than the one used in this evaluation. The eventual goal is optimization of panel design.

Although the evaluation primarily investigates the safety of unrestrained occupants of cars of the $1960-84$ era, it must not be forgotten that safety belts are the most important safety equipment introduced during that time. The effect of safety belts is not included in the fatality indices shown in Figures 3 and 4, but, regardless of the model year, belt users would have had a fatality risk far lower than unrestrained front seat occupants. following:

## Principal Findings

## Instrument panel as an injury source in 1970-78 passenger cars

o 56 percent of unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes who have nonminor (AIS 2 or greater) injuries receive at least one of these injuries from contact with the instrument panel; 44 percent receive all of their nonminor injuries from panel contact.
o 45 percent of nonminor instrument panel contact injuries are torso injuries; 18 percent involve the head or neck; 37 percent, the legs or arms .

0
47 percent of unrestrained right front passenger fatalities in frontal crashes receive at least one life threatening (AIS 4 or greater) 'injury from contact with the instrument panel; 27 percent receive all of their life threatening injuries from panel contact.

Instrument panel design changes - based on measurements in actual cars
o The rigidity of mid and lower instrument panels decreased steadily from model year 1965 to 1977.
o The vertical-longitudinal periphery of the instrument panel - i.e., the distance from the bottom of the windshield to the back of the dashboard to the lowest point on the panel $(a+b+c$ on the diagram
at the beginning of the Summary) - increased steadily from model year 1965 to 1977.
o In 1965-66 cars, the mid instrument panel slopes down and away from the passenger. By 1979, mid instrument panels were more nearly vertical or even sloped down and toward the passenger.

- The windshield is slightly more horizontal in cars of the late 1970's than in cars of the 1960's.


## Instrument panel contact injury risk, by model year

o Let 100 be the average risk of nonminor (AIS 2+) injury due to instrument panel contact for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes of 1971-78 model cars. The estimated risk index, by model year group is:

| Model Years | Relative <br> Risk Factor | $90 \%$ Confidence <br> Bounds |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1960-66$ | 140 | 109 to 171 |
| $1967-70$ | 107 | 81 to 134 |
| $1971-74$ | 90 | 76 to 104 |
| $1975-78$ | 110 | 85 to 136 |

0 Injury risk is 23 percent lower in 1967-70 cars than in 1960-66 cars.
o Injury risk is 29 percent lower in 1971-78 cars than in 1960-66 cars.
o The reduction from 1960-66 to 1967-78 cars is statistically significant. The differences among the three later model year groups are nonsignificant.

Instrument panel design vs. injury risk, by model year (simulation results)
o Overall injury risk for unrestrained right front passengers in computer simulations of $25-30 \mathrm{mph}$ frontal barrier crashes is significantly lower with 1969-71 and 1975-83 instrument panels than with 1965-66 panels. The $1975-83$ panels may perform even slightly better than the 1969-71 panels.
o Head and neck injury risk, femur injury risk and chest g's are significantly lower with 1975-83 panels than with 1965-66 panels.
o Chest deflection, however, may be as severe or more severe with the 1975-83 panels than with the earlier panels.

Correlation of injury with instrument panel parameters (simulation results)
o A preliminary analysis of the computer simulations (which for the most part were not validated by actual crash tests) shows lower overall injury risk in the cars whose panels protruded toward the passenger and downwards (large vertical-longitudinal periphery) and whose lower instrument panels could be crushed for many inches before they became rigid.
o The least severe chest deflection was predicted in cars with soft mid instrument panels and hard lower instrument panels.
o The lowest chest g's were predicted in cars with soft lower instrument panels.
o This study uses a head injury score based to a large extent on HIC. More favorable head injury scores were found in simulations of cars with more nearly horizontal windshields and soft lower instrument panels (which help keep the passenger in an upright position during the crash).
o Femur loads were lowest in cars with soft lower instrument panels. The panels also had a large vertical-longitudinal periphery and the mid instrument panel did not slope downward towards the passenger's knees.
o Since the more recent cars had softer, longer panels than cars of the mid 1960's, it is appropriate that they had lower predictions for every type of injury except for inconclusive results on chest deflection.

Drivers' overall fatality risk index in frontal crashes, by model year
o Let 100 be the average fatality risk for unrestrained drivers in frontal crashes of 1973-84 model cars. The estimated risk index, by model year group is:

Relative
Model Years Risk Index

1964-66
117
1968-70 103
1971-74 100
1975-78 102
1979-81 100
1982-84 101

The appropriate interpretation of the risk index is that if the fleet
of 1964-66 cars had been replaced by a fleet of 1968-70 type cars with the same weights, driver ages, etc., there would have been only 103/117 as many driver fatalities in frontal crashes - i.e., a reduction of 12 percent.

- The fatality risk for unrestrained drivers is 12 percent lower in 1968-70 cars than in 1964-66 cars. It has remained almost constant since model year 1968.
- The 12 percent reduction in drivers' fatality risk in frontal crashes coincides with the installation of energy absorbing steering columns in 1967-68 cars - which an earlier NHTSA evaluation has credited with a 12 percent reduction of fatality risk in frontal crashes.


## Passengers' overall fatality risk index in frontal crashes, by model year

- Let 100 be the average fatality risk for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes of 1973-84 model cars. The estimated risk index, by model year group is:

Relative
Model Years Risk Index

1964-66
136
1968-70 109
1971-74 106
1975-78 98
1979-81 97
1982-84 103

- The fatality risk for unrestrained right front passengers is 20 percent lower in 1968-70 cars than in 1964-66 cars.

0 The fatality risk for unrestrained right front passengers is 26 percent lower in 1973-84 cars than in 1964-66 cars.
o The big reduction of right front passengers' fatality risk in cars of the late 1960's, followed by a further, more gradual reduction in the early to mid 1970's, coincides with the manufacturers' modifications of instrument panels.

0 In cars of model years 1960-65, right front passengers' fatality risk in frontal crashes was 25 percent higher than for the drivers of the same cars. Since model year 1971, driver and right front passenger fatality risk have been about equal.

Lives saved per year by all frontal crashworthiness improvements in cars
0 The fatality risk index for unrestrained drivers in frontal crashes dropped from 117 in $1964-66$ cars to 100 in 1973-84 cars. That is equivalent to saving 1300 lives per year.
o The overall benefit for drivers can be apportioned as follows:
Lives Saved
Energy absorbing steering assemblies
1100-1300
All other vehicle modifications
$0-200$

0 The fatality risk index for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes dropped from 136 in 1964-66 cars to 100 in 1973-84 cars. That is equivalent to saving 900 lives per year.

0 The overall benefit for right front passengers can be apportioned as follows:

Lives Saved
Instrument panel modifications
400-700
Windshield glazing and mounting
100-300 All other vehicle modifications
$\frac{0-400}{900}$

- All the passenger car modifications of the 1964-84 period, other than restraint systems, save a total of 2200 front seat occupant fatalities per year in frontal crashes.


## Light trucks: injury risk by model year

0 The NASS and NCSS files do not contain enough cases for finding meaningful trends in the nonminor injury rate in frontal crashes of light trucks, vans and multipurpose passenger vehicles. The observed injury rates are:

Model Years
Right Front Passengers Drivers
NASS AIS 2+ Injury Rate ..... (\%)
1966-70

12.9

9.7

1971-74 1975-78 1979-81 1982-85
7.4
7.5
9.1
8.2
12.3
10.7
10.9
12.3

NCSS Hospitalization Rate (\%)
$1961-70$
$1971-74$
11.4
6.0
7.6
10.8

1975-78
14.1
10.1

## Light trucks: drivers' fatality risk index in frontals, by model year

o Let 100 be the average fatality risk for unrestrained drivers in frontal crashes of 1973-84 model light trucks, vans and multipurpose passenger vehicles. The estimated risk index, by model year group is:

Model Years
1964-68
1969-72
1973-76
1977-81
1982-84

Relative Risk Index

127
116
106
98
96

0 The fatality risk for unrestrained drivers is 16 percent lower in 1977-81 trucks than in $1969-72$ trucks. It has remained almost constant since model year 1977.
o The 16 percent reduction in drivers' fatality risk in frontal crashes coincides with the installation of energy absorbing steering columns in pickup trucks and the phasing out of forward control vehicles.

Light trucks: passengers' fatality risk index in frontals, by model year
0 Let 100 be the average fatality risk for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes of 1973-84 model light trucks, vans and multipurpose passenger vehicles. The estimated risk index, by model year group is:

Model Years
1964-68
1969-72
1973-76
1977-81
1982-84

Relative Risk Index

135
114
1069797

0 The fatality risk for unrestrained right front passengers is 15 percent lower in 1977-81 trucks than in 1969-72 trucks and 28 percent lower than in 1964-68 trucks. It has remained almost constant since model year 1977.

0 Throughout model years 1960-84, right front passengers' fatality risk in frontal crashes was consistently close to 10 percent lower than for the drivers of the same trucks.

## Conclusions

- Instrument panel modifications, implemented by manufacturers on a voluntary basis during the later 1960's and early to mid 1970's, have significantly reduced the fatalities and serious injuries of right front passengers in frontal crashes.

0 The safety literature of 1968-70 claims that instrument panels were becoming softer and extending further toward the passenger and the floor. Tests and measurements of instrument panels in production vehicles of the 1965-80 era show the claims are correct.

- The safety literature of $1968-70$ claims that softer and more extensive instrument panels reduce injury risk by cushioning direct impacts, providing better ride down and keeping the passenger in an upright position during the crash. The computer simulations of crashes with production instrument panels support all of these claims.
o Cars of the 1970's are significantly safer than cars of the same weight from the mid 1960's for unrestrained front seat occupants in frontal crashes. But cars of the mid 1980's are about as safe in frontal crashes as cars of the same weight from the mid 1970's.

Energy absorbing steering assemblies meeting Standards 203 and 204 are responsible for most of the improvement in frontal crashworthiness for unrestrained drivers in cars of the 1964-84 era.

- The manufacturers' voluntary improvements to instrument panels are responsible for most of the improvement in frontal crashworthiness for unrestrained right front passengers in cars of the 1964-84 era. Windshield modifications meeting Standards 205 and 212 account for a smaller share of the fatality reduction.
o No firm conclusions can be drawn on the frontal crashworthiness of light trucks. The preliminary analysis of fatal accident data showed promising reductions of risk during the early to mid 1970's, a time of major safety improvements to light trucks. But the small samples of nonfatal accident data do not show similar trends in the injury rates.


## CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.1 Evaluation of NHTSA regulations and programs

Executive Order 12291, dated February 17, 1981, requires Federal agencies to perform evaluations of their existing regulations [18]. The evaluations should determine the actual costs and actual benefits of existing rules. More recently, Executive Order 12498, dated January 4, 1985, requires agencies to develop a regulatory planning process including publication of plans to review existing regulations pursuant to Executive Order 12291 [19].

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration began to evaluate its existing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards in 1975 [38]. Its goals have been to monitor the actual benefits and costs of safety equipment installed in production vehicles in response to standards. More generally, evaluations compare a standard's actual on the road performance and effectiveness with goals that may have been specified when the rule was initially promulgated - e.g., in its preamble, regulatory impact analysis, or other supporting documents - including analyses of possible benefits or impacts that had not been originally anticipated. The agency has published 16 comprehensive evaluations of safety standards or other vehicle programs to date. NHTSA intends to evaluate every one of its safety standards that can be associated with a tangible, clearly defined modification in production vehicles and whose costs and benefits can be measured by analyzing data on production vehicles.


#### Abstract

1.2 Evaluation of Standard 201

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 201 "specifies requirements to afford impact protection for occupants" in interior impacts [5]. It took effect for passenger cars on January 1, 1968 and was extended to light trucks, vans and multipurpose passenger vehicles on September 1 , 1981.


Standard 201 is commonly thought of as the safety standard responsible for "padded instrument panels" and other modifications to instrument panels. In particular, the standard is commonly associated with reducing the risk of injury for the right front passenger in frontal crashes. These perceptions engender some misconceptions about the standard. First, manufacturers' efforts to improve the safety of the interior compartment did not come about solely because of Standard 201. Instrument panels that were padded in some form or another were optional or standard on most makes and models of passenger cars by 1963 [4]. Second, Standard 201 is not limited to instrument panels, but sets energy absorption requirements for seatbacks, sun visors and armrests, too. As for instrument panels, the standard's requirements are limited to certain designated "head impact areas," which are typically just the top of the instrument panel. Finally, because of Standard 201's force limit (a 3 millisecond peak of 80 g 's for a 15 pound headform in a 15 mph impact), mere padding is not sufficient to meet the standard; rather, the padding and the structure under it must meet a dynamic impact test.

The effect of Standard 201 on manufacturers' modifications of
the interior compartment may reach beyond what is actually required by the standard. The original December 1966 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking contemplated force limits for the "knee" and "child" impact areas (i.e., the lower and mid instrument panel) [15], but they did not become part of the standard [57]. Again, in 1970, NHTSA proposed to add a knee impact test, forbid certain types of protrusions from the panel and extend Standard 201 to light trucks [16]. Only the extension to light trucks was eventually adopted and it did not take effect until September 1981 [17]. Even though Standard 201 did not finally adopt the requirements for mid and lower instrument panels, the proposals for such requirements more or less coincided with voluntary efforts by the manufacturers to improve those parts of the panel. Similarly, light trucks tended to meet Standard 201 many years before it was a requirement, in part, perhaps, because the extension to light trucks was proposed many years before it was promulgated [20]. Thus, in a wider sense, Standard 201 can be somehow associated with instrument panel improvements beyond those specifically mentioned in the standard.

### 1.3 Evaluation objectives

Standard 201 may be the last of the early (pre 1975) safety standards to be evaluated by NHTSA. As stated above, NHTSA intends to evaluate every standard that can be associated with tangible modifications to production vehicles and whose benefits are measurable by analyzing data on production vehicles. Most of the other early standards associated with safety devices having readily measurable, potentially significant benefits have been evaluated:

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105 - dual master cylinders and front disc brakes [40]
108 - side marker lamps [34]
202 - head restraints [33]
203 - energy absorbing steering assemblies [32]
204 - steering column displacement [32]
205 - High Penetration Resistant windshields [36]
207 - seat back locks [39]
208 - manual safety belts [21], [37]
212 - adhesive bonding of the windshield [36]
213 - child safety seats [31]
214 - side door beams [35]
301 - fuel system integrity [47]
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Standard 201 is harder to evaluate than the preceding standards because it is not associated with a single safety device but rather a series of evolutionary improvements to instrument panels. The dates of the improvements are not well known, varying from model to model and even within models. Many of the improvements were in areas not specifically regulated by the standard. Injury reductions cannot readily be isolated to specific panel modifications: the various components of the panel, plus other components of the car, work together as a unit to provide a safe, or unsafe, interior environment for the occupant. A series of simple "before - after" analyses of effectiveness, one for each specific panel modification, is impossible. Instead, the best that can be done is to track the relative safety of instrument panels in frontal crashes over a long range of model years: from the early 1960's to the early 1980's. This study is really a historical evaluation of occupant protection in frontal interior impact.

The evaluation for passenger car occupants consists of three analyses, ranging from the most specific to the most general. The first analysis (Chapter 2), based on National Crash Severity study data, specifically examines the proportion of right front passengers, involved
in frontal towaway crashes, who have serious injuries due to contact with the instrument panel. How has the injury risk changed from model year 1960 through 1978?

Changes in instrument panel geometry or materials, however, can affect more than just the risk of injury due to contact with the instrument pane1. For example, a panel that is small and far away from the passenger may not result in many direct contact injuries but may indirectly increase overall injury risk by leaving the passenger more exposed to contact with other components. The second analysis (Chapter 3) gauges the effect of instrument panel design on the right front passenger's overall injury risk. Statistical analysis of accident data would not be suitable here. Many vehicle factors besides the panel may affect the trend of overall injury risk from one model year to the next. The statistical analysis would not tell whether the panel changes or other vehicle modifications were responsible for the trend. Instead, computer simulations of occupant interactions with the vehicle interior, specifically the MVMA2D program [3], are used to isolate the effect of the panel. Crashes are simulated with instrument panels having the geometry and force deflection characteristics of cars of a wide range of model years (196583) and body styles - but with other conditions, such as the crash pulse, the seat position, and the materials of the windshield, etc. held constant. The variation of the injury criteria, from simulation to simulation, are thus in a sense attributable to changes in the instrument panel. The results of the analysis are expressed in nonparametric terms i.e., they test if instrument panels of the 1970's are significantly safer
than those of the 1960's, but do not tell how much safer or how many injuries are avoided. The current (1987) state of the art in computer simulations makes it unwise to carry through the injury criteria predicted by the simulations to actual injury rates when the simulations have not been "validated" by crash or sled tests with the vehicle being simulated. In other words, rather than estimating the occupant's actual injury risk as a function of model year, the analysis will compare the relative ranking of cars of different model years on a variety of injury criteria calculated by the simulations. The analysis can also examine the correlation between injury severity, for various body regions, and certain parameters describing the geometry and force deflection characteristics of instrument panels.

The third analysis (Chapter 4) goes beyond evaluating instrument panels and tracks the relative fatality risk of right front passengers and drivers in frontal crashes, by model year, for cars of model years 1964-84. Moreover, the fatality risk is controlled for vehicle weight differences, occupant age, belt usage, etc. In other words, for two cars of different model years, but having the same weight, occupants of the same age, involved in frontal crashes of the same severity, etc., the analysis predicts which of the cars has higher fatality risk. The analysis is performed because this is the last NHTSA evaluation of the major early frontal crashworthiness standards. Each of the previous evaluations gave an estimate of the number of lives saved by a particular safety device. This analysis estimates the total of lives saved by all of the preceding safety devices combined plus the effects on crashworthiness
of any other vehicle modifications that have not been evaluated or are not associated with a specific safety standard. Two examples are the change from genuine to pillared hardtops in the 1970's and from rear wheel drive to front wheel drive in the 1980's. The change to pillared hardtops was not related to any particular standard, but may to a significant extent have been motivated by evidence that it would enhance safety. The change to front wheel drive was principally motivated by factors other than safety but could nonetheless have safety implications if it affects vehicle crush characteristics. The purpose of the analysis is twofold:

O Is the sum of the fatality reductions ascribed by the NHTSA evaluations to the individual safety standards consistent with the actual reduction in overall fatality risk during the model years that the standards were mostly implemented (1966-69)?
o Did cars get any safer after that, thanks to improvements not necessarily related to NHTSA's standards?

This evaluation is certainly not the first attempt to evaluate the net effectiveness of vehicle improvements during the past 20-30 years, based on aggregate analysis of fatality or injury rates by model year rather than summing up estimates of casualties saved by individual safety devices. The General Accounting Office [11], Graham [22], and Malliaris [41], among others, performed multivariate analyses on casualty rates per 100 crash exposed occupants, or 10,000 vehicle registration years, or $100,000,000$ vehicle miles, as a function of model year and other variables. The studies, though, are believed to be biased because of two secular trends that are difficult to control for:
o The "age" effect, whereby older cars tend to have higher reported casualty rates than new ones, because many of the low severity crashes of the older cars go unreported. Thus, there is a spurious reduction of injury risk for the cars of later model years.
o The "calendar year" effect. In order to circumvent the "age" effect, the comparison is limited, say, to cars of the same age, e.g., model year 1968 in calendar year 1970 vs. model year 1978 in calendar year 1980. But casualty rates, especially per $100,000,000$ vehicle miles, have been dropping steadily for reasons primarily unrelated to the vehicle. Thus, the 1978 cars have a much lower casualty rate in 1980 than the 1968 cars did in 1970, because all cars had lower casualty rates in the later calendar years.

Since both of these secular biases tend to make the cars of later model years look safer, most of the earlier analyses exaggerated the benefits of safety improvements.

What makes a less biased analysis now possible is the accumulation of 12 years of Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) data, containing over 16,000 fatal head-on collisions of two passenger cars. When two cars meet head-on, both drivers have, as it were, been exposed to the same frontal crash and the likelihood of one driver vs. the other being killed can be predicted as a function of the model years of the two cars, the vehicle weights, the drivers' ages and belt usage, etc. The "age" and "calendar year" biases do not apply because the two cars are involved in the same crash.

Essentially, each head-on collision is used as one of the pairs in a "double pair comparison analysis [12]." Logistic regression with maximum likelihood estimation [29] is used to combine the results of all the individual double pair comparison analyses into a coherent model which estimates the relative fatality risk as a function of the vehicle's model year and other vehicle and occupant characteristics, as will be explained in Chapter 4.

The study of light trucks (Chapter 5) includes statistical analyses of injury rates in National Accident Sampling System and National Crash Severity Study data and a calibration of fatality risk indices similar to those for passenger cars. The accident samples, however, are much smaller than those for cars.
1.4 Instrument panel modifications. $1960-80$

In a 30 mph frontal barrier
impact of a typical vehicle, the average sized unrestrained right front passenger contacts the instrument panel with three body regions. About 60-70 milliseconds after impact, his knees contact the lower instrument panel and drive into it, forwards, at first, and later upwards because the rigid toeboard holds his feet and forces his knees to flex. If the lower panel is stiff and relatively close to the occupant, it can slow down the forward movement of his torso, substantially. At $80-90$ milliseconds his head hits the windshield and rebounc's downwards. Close to 100 milliseconds after impact, the chest contacts the mid instrument panel. At about 110 milliseconds, the car has been fully
decelerated and disengages from the barrier. Finally, around $130 \mathrm{millise}-$ conds, his head, which had bounced off the windshield, strikes the top surface of the instrument panel. This sequence of impacts provides the framework for reducing injury risk by modifying the instrument panel.

Padding on instrument panels, installed for the purpose of reducing injury risk, first became available as optional equipment in 1956 [4]. By 1963, most cars could be purchased with some padding on the instrument panel, usually as an option but sometimes as standard equipment. By the time that Standard 201 took effect (January 1, 1968), most cars already had padded instrument panel tops. Biomechanics research of the 1960's made it clear that the thin, relatively soft padding typically used on instrument panels was of little value in protecting the chest or legs from blunt impact trauma. It might be useful for reducing head injuries in low severity impacts, but at higher crash severities padding alone is insufficient for head injury protection; there would have to be a carefully designed energy absorbing structure underneath the padding [25].

During the early 1960's it was envisioned that the lap belts then being installed in passenger cars would be widely used. The lap belt would keep the occupant's torso and legs away from the panel. The lap belted occupant would hit only the top of the panel with his head. The primary emphasis of research, as well as Standard 201, was on the energy absorption characteristics of the top of the panel.

Soon it became evident that most passengers, especially those
who tended to get into severe crashes, were unrestrained. The instrument panel, rather than the lap belt, was now seen as the primary locus of the right front passenger's interaction with the vehicle interior in a frontal crash. The panel ought to be designed to dissipate the kinetic energy of the unrestrained passenger's torso and legs at a safe force level and hold the passenger in a posture that would minimize the probability of serious injury from other vehicle interior components. This approach to instrument panel design was articulated by Wilson at GM and Daniel at Ford in 1969 and 1970 papers [9], [58].

One of the most important safety improvements consistent with this approach was the gradual reduction of the rigidity of the mid and lower instrument panels during the 1960's and, to a lesser extent, the 1970's, as well [6], [58]. Panels were designed to deform at a controlled rate. Daniel explicitly set targets of 1200 pounds maximum force deflection for the chest in a 20 mph impact and 1400 pounds optimum for the knees in a 12 mph impact [9]. The latter would be low enough to prevent serious femur or pelvic injury but high enough to slow down the occupant's torso and reduce the speed of the chest to mid instrument panel impact to 20 mph or less. The 1200 pound load on the chest was considered tolerable and would give the panel the potential of protecting the unrestrained occupant in a 30 mph barrier crash. Happily, the understanding that less rigid panels were safer coincided with the increased availability and use of plastics as a partial substitute for more rigid steel. The ever increasing weight consciousness in car design was impetus for thinning steel panel structures.

Certain especially rigid and unsafe instrument panel designs were discontinued, such as the all die cast panel, the rigid "eyebrow" extension of the top of the instrument panel towards the occupant [8], and the panel which is a continuation of the firewall material.

Wilson and Daniel especially stress the concept of "ride down" [9], [58]. The closer the panel to the unrestrained occupant, the sooner the occupant will contact the panel in a crash. Early contact is advantageous because the car and its panel are still moving forward and the velocity difference between the passenger and the panel is not yet as great as it will be later. Since the passenger contacts the panel while the car is still moving forward, he and the panel together "ride down" the last part of the car's impact. Essentially, some of the occupant's kinetic energy is dissipated by the exterior vehicle structure rather than the panel or the occupant himself. Designers of the late 1960's sought ways to bring the instrument panel closer to the occupants and enhance ride down. It had to be done with subtlety, because vehicle seats are adjustable. If occupants find the panel so close that they cannot sit comfortably, they will adjust the seat backwards and lose the ride down advantage. Designers found ways to move panels closer to occupants without causing discomfort. The rear surface of the panel was made more nearly vertical, whereas previously the panel often protruded toward the occupant at the top and then swung away from the occupant at the chest and knee level. Interestingly, it is primarily the unrestrained passenger who benefits from being close to the instrument panel; the lap and shoulder belted passenger gets most of his ride down from the belt system and may
be able to avoid head to panel contact if the panel is far enough away.

Instrument panels were lowered as cars were built with lower beltines and the lower instrument panel was extended downwards. The advantages are twofold. Short occupants are less likely to contact the rigid mid instrument panel with their heads on their way forwards. A well defined lower instrument panel, extending fairly low, is well engaged by the knees and a large portion of the occupant's kinetic energy is dissipated through this contact. By the time the occupant's chest contacts the mid instrument panel, it has already been slowed down to some extent. By contrast, a narrow lower instrument panel, sloping away from the occupant, might be pushed out of the way rather than fully engaged by the knees and provide little energy absorption.

Researchers became aware of the role of the instrument panel in reducing the severity of contacts with other vehicle components. Daniel felt this was best achieved by keeping the occupant's "torso in an upright position while providing ample space for both head and chest deceleration at safe load levels [9]." Maintaining the torso in an upright position is a delicate task of fine tuning the relative positions and force deflection characteristics of the mid and lower instrument panels and the windshield. For example, if the lower panel is too prominent and rigid, the occupant will pitch forward, with greater head injury risk. But if the lower panel is too recessed and soft, the chest to mid panel impact will be severe.

Over the years, manufacturers have made an effort to remove knobs or other hard protrusions from parts of the instrument panel that are likely to be contacted by adults or children. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has been vigorous in alerting the safety community about hazardous protrusions from the panel [50].

It is noteworthy that panels were improved gradually, with different makes and models changing in different years and that most of these improvements were not necessitated by Standard 201. As Wilson reported in 1969, "Many other areas of the vehicle have been improved gradually over the years. The knee impact region of the instrument panel is one such area. Lower instrument panel improvements, while not as well publicized as those made in windshields and [steering] columns, have nonetheless reduced lower extremity and hip injuries significantly [58]."

Force deflection tests and measurements were performed on 21 actual instrument panels of cars ranging from model year 1965 to 1983 (Chapter 3). That makes it possible to check if instrument panels were indeed modified in the ways described above.

Although instrument panel design has improved significantly since 1960, the panel still accounts for a large percentage of the serious injuries in frontal crashes, as discussed in the next section. The major advances in biomechanics and simulation procedures during the past 10 years have encouraged NHTSA to undertake a research program on frontal protection for the right front passenger. Primary objectives of that
research will be a quantitative evaluation of the injury consequences of changing various instrument panel design parameters, followed by optimization of panel design [6].


#### Abstract

1.5 Injury risk due to instrument panel contact

Huelke conducted in-depth investigations of crashes involving model year 1961-65 cars and found the instrument panel responsible for 13 of the 45 right front passenger fatalities [27]. That is 29 percent of all fatalities and the overwhelming majority of the deaths in frontal crashes.


Malliaris, Hitchcock and Hedlund analyzed NCSS data (principally cars of the 1970's and late 1960's) and found that the instrument panel accounts for 11.2 percent of the "harm" occurring to all passenger car occupants in all crashes [42]. The panel ranks third as a source of harm; only the steering assembly and occupant ejection rank higher. The panel is the most important cause of harm to legs and arms, accounting for 30 percent of the harm.

Tables 1-1 and 1-2 take a more detailed look at the injuries for cars of model years $1970-78$ on NCSS. The first column of Table 1-1 examines the occupants most likely to contact the instrument panel: right front passengers in frontal crashes. Among passengers who had at least one nonminor (AIS 2 or greater [1]) injury, 41 percent sustained nonminor injuries only from contacting the instrument panel. An additional 7 percent had nonminor injuries from the panel and from another source, but

| NCSS, Cars of MY 1970-78 | Right Front <br> Passengers |  | Drivers |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Percent of Persons <br> With AIS 2+ Injuries <br> (Known Contact Points) | Frontal <br> Crashes | All <br> Crashes | Frontal <br> Crashes | All <br> Crashes |
| AIS 2+ inj. from panel only |  |  |  |  |

## TABLE 1-2

ROLE OF INSTRUMENT PANEL AS SOURCE OF FATAL INJURIES

## NCSS, Cars of MY 1970-78 <br> Percent of Persons with Fatal Injuries (Known Contact Points)

Right Front Passengers
$\begin{array}{lcc}\text { Frontal } & \text { All } & \text { Frontal } \\ \text { Crashes } & \text { Crashes } & \text { Crashes }\end{array}$

27
Fatal inj. from panel only
Life threatening injuries from panel and other sources 20

Fatal inj. from other sources only $\frac{53}{100}$
$N$ of fatalities in sample 15 .
or same

11
10Fatal inj. from other sources only $\frac{53}{100}$$\frac{72}{100}$

$$
\frac{86}{100}
$$

Drivers
All Crashes6

$$
\frac{91}{100}
$$

the panel contact resulted in a higher AIS than the other sources. Thus, 48 percent received their most severe injury from the panel and would have a lower maximum AIS if the panel injury could be ameliorated. Yet another 8 percent had nonminor injuries from the panel and from other sources, but the AIS from the panel did not exceed the AIS from other sources. In other words, a majority of 56 percent of right front passengers in frontal crashes with AIS 2+ injuries included the instrument panel among their AIS 2+ injury sources.

When nonfrontal crash modes are included (second column of Table 1-1), the proportion of right front passenger injuries due to the panel is of course lower. Drivers have a much lower risk than right front passengers of sustaining their primary injury from the panel (13 percent of drivers vs. 48 percent of passengers sustained their most severe AIS from the panel in frontal crashes). But 17 percent of drivers had a secondary nonminor injury from the panel, so a total of 30 percent of the drivers with AIS 2+ injuries in frontal crashes had an AIS 2+ injury from the panel.

Table 1-2 shows that the instrument panel is slightly less common as a source of fatal injury than for nonfatal AIS 2-5 injuries. The first column shows that 27 percent of the right front passengers killed in frontal crashes sustained their highest AIS from the panel and did not sustain a life threatening injury (AIS 4-6) from any other source. These fatalities are the most likely to be saved by panel improvements. An additional 20 percent of the fatalities had life
threatening injuries from the panel and from other sources. Thus, a total of 47 percent of the right front passenger fatalities in frontal crashes had life threatening injuries from contacting the panel. For drivers, this total is 14 percent, with only 4 percent sustaining life threatening injuries from the panel and no other sources.

The NCSS file contained 245 individual AIS $2+$ injuries due to instrument panel contact for right front passengers in cars of model years 1971-78 in frontal crashes. The distribution of these injuries by body region is:

| Head or neck | 18 percent |
| :--- | :--- |
| Chest, abdomen or pelvis | 45 percent |
| Legs or arms | 37 percent |

$1.6 \quad$ Review of previous effectiveness studies
Campbell performed "A Study of Injuries Related to Padding on Instrument Panels" in 1963 [4]. At that time, padding was available as an option on most cars. He found records of 792 front seat passengers of cars with padding among the frontal crashes on the Automotive Crash Injury Research file. For each of these persons he found a matching case: a passenger in a car without padding of the same make and model year, with similar crash severity and occupant characteristics. This is an excellent technique for analyzing a large but biased file like ACIR. The passengers with the padded instrument panels had a statistically significant reduction of head injuries relative to their counterparts in the unpadded cars, while both groups had about the same risk of neck, thorax, abdomen, arm and leg injuries. They had 24 percent fewer head injuries of AIS severity
level 2 or greater.

Nahum et al had been conducting in depth investigations of selected accidents since 1962 at UCLA. In 1968, they examined the risk of leg injury due to instrument panel contact, as a function of model year [45]. Among 251 front seat occupants of cars of model years 1957-64, 40 had leg injuries of AIS severity level 2 or greater, due to instrument panel contact. Only 10 of 213 occupants of cars of model years 1965-67 had such injuries. That is a 71 percent reduction of 1 eg injury risk. The effectiveness estimate is undoubtedly exaggerated, however, due to uncorrected biases in the data. In the later years, UCLA was investigating accidents that were, on the average, less severe than their earlier samples. Thus, there are substantial spurious or exaggerated reductions of almost all types of injuries, in their data, for newer cars [44].

NHTSA performed a preliminary evaluation of the effect of Standard 201 in passenger cars as part of its 1979 Regulatory Evaluation for extending the standard to light trucks [20], p. 27. Simple tabulation of National Crash Severity Study (NCSS) data showed that occupants of pre Standard 201 cars (model year 1967 and earlier) had a 1.27 percent likelihood of injuries of AIS 3 or greater involving contact with one of the components subsequently regulated by Standard 201 (instrument panels, seatbacks, armrests or sunvisors). Occupants of post Standard 201 cars had a 0.81 percent injury risk. That is a 36 percent reduction in the risk of serious injuries due to contact with components regulated by Standard 201. Next, the Regulatory Evaluation assumes "that the equipment
used to meet the requirements of FMVSS 201...were the only forces acting to reduce the occupant injury level of the post 1968 models for occupants who hit the FMVSS 201...components [20], p.32." In fact, the discussion of Section 1.4 shows that some of the most important instrument panel improvements of the late 1960's were in the geometry and force deflection characteristics of the chest and knee impact areas and were not directly mandated by Standard 201, even though they were implemented in passenger cars at about the same time as the standard. If the extension of Standard 201 to light trucks were to be accompanied by corresponding voluntary improvements to the chest and knee impact areas of light trucks then it might be reasonable to predict, as the Regulatory Evaluation does, that the extension of Standard 201 to light trucks would be accompanied by a serious injury reduction from Standard 201 components on the order of 36 percent (except in the 44 percent of light trucks believed to "already comply" with Standard 201). But if the knee and chest improvements had already been implemented years before Standard 201 took effect for light trucks, the primary injury reduction could be expected in the model years when the improvements were made rather than at the time that Standard 201 officially took effect.

## CHAPTER 2

## ANALYSES OF NCSS DATA

National Crash Severity Study (NCSS) data on unrestrained right front passengers of cars involved in frontal crashes were divided into four groups according to the age of the cars: model years 1960-66, 1967-70, 1971-74 and 1975-78. The rate of instrument panel contact injury - specifically, the number of AIS 2 or greater injuries per 100 crash involved occupants - was computed for each group. The injury rates were adjusted with control variables in order to correct for potential biases in the NCSS data. The adjusted injury rates in the three later groups were significantly lower than in the 1960-66 cars, with reductions in the 20 to 35 percent range.

### 2.1 Description of the NCSS data

Since 1977, NCSS has been a primary source of detailed information on vehicle and injury performance in highway accidents involving passenger cars. NCSS is a probability sample of 12,050 towaway accidents which occurred during 1977-79 and were investigated by 7 multidisciplinary teams. A detailed description of NCSS may be found in [49].

In this report, NCSS is used to study unrestrained right front passengers' risk of nonminor injury, due to instrument panel contact, in frontal crashes. Did the risk change for more recent model year cars, as the panels were gradualiy modified, for the group of occupants most likely to be affected by the modifications? As explained in Chapter 1, many
small changes were made to instrument panels, in different model years in different cars. It is not meaningful to designate a single "transition" model year - e.g., the year in which Standard 201 took effect (1968) and compare injury risk in the years immediately before and after the transition, as was done, for example, in NHTSA's evaluations of windshield improvements [36] or seat back locks [39]. It is more appropriate to calculate the injury risk for cars of each model year and to track the trend in the injury rate over the $1960-78$ model year range represented in NCSS. In particular, since NCSS does not contain enough cases for statistically meaningful injury rates for a single model year, it is best to group several adjacent years. Thus injury risk is computed for cars of model years 1960-66, 1967-70, 1971-74 and 1975-78. The year 1966 is the earliest cutoff that can be used for the oldest group and still make it large enough to have enough cases for statistically meaningful injury rates; the last three groups are of roughly equal size on NCSS.

NCSS codes the injury location, type, severity (AIS [1]) and contact source for up to 6 injuries per occupant. The contact source codes in NCSS are detailed and divide the instrument panel into subregions. Since the objective is to study overall nonminor (AIS 2 or greater) injury risk due to contact with the panel or any structures on or underneath it, the following NCSS codes for contacts with subregions of the panel are all included among "instrument panel contact injuries":

```
    1 Instrument panel
    4 Glove compartment area
    5 Hardware items (ashtray, instruments, knobs, keys)
    6 Heater or A/C ducts
    7 A/C or ventilating ducts
10 Radio
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NCSS is not a simple random sample but a stratified sample with 4 strata and unequal sampling proportions: 100, 25, 10 and 5 percent. Cases from the 4 strata are counted 1, 4, 10 or 20 times, respectively, in tabulations of NCSS data. As a result, the cell entries in some NCSS tables are much larger than would appear at first glance. Over 95 percent of the observed AIS 2 or greater injuries in NCSS come from the 100 percent sampling stratum. Yet the remaining 5 percent, because of their higher weight factors, contribute disproportionately to sampling variances of NCSS statistics. For that reason, injuries of passengers who were not killed or hospitalized (or were not in the 100 percent sampling stratum) are considered "minor" even if they were AIS 2. This somewhat artificial threshold of "nonminor injury" is indispensable for statistically meaningful results (see [32], pp. 146-149).

The measure of injury risk used with NCSS is the number of individual AIS 2 or greater injuries due to panel contact per 1000 unrestrained right front passengers involved in frontal towaway crashes. For example, if there are 10 passengers and 9 are uninjured while the tenth is hospitalized and has an AIS 2 head injury and an AIS 3 chest injury from contacting the panel, the injury risk is 200 per 1000 passengers.

### 2.2 Unadjusted injury rates by model year group

Table 2-1, which is based on simple computation of the injury rates in (weighted) raw NCSS data, shows lower injury risk in the newer cars. There were 953 (weighted) unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes of cars of model years 1960-66. Within that group, the

## TABLE 2-1

NONMINOR INSTRUMENT PANEL CONTACT INJURIES*, BY MODEL YEAR UNRESTRAINED RIGHT FRONT PASSENGERS OF PASSENGER CARS, IN FRONTAL CRASHES, NCSS

| Mode1 | n of <br> Years | Weighted <br> N of <br> Passengers | Injuries per <br> 1000 Passengers | Reduction <br> Rel. to MY <br> $60-66$ (\%) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1960-66$ | 58 | 953 | 60.86 |  |
| $1967-70$ | 107 | 2323 | 46.06 | 24 |
| $1971-74$ | 125 | 3001 | 41.65 | 32 |
| $1975-78$ | 120 | 2174 | 55.20 | 9 |

[^0]hospitalized passengers had among them 58 nonminor injuries involving contact with the instrument panel. That is an injury rate of 60.86 per 1000 passengers. For model years 1967-70, there were 107 injuries among 2323 passengers, an injury rate of 46.06 per 1000 . The injury rate for the 1967-70 cars is 24 percent lower than in the 1960-66 cars. Similarly, the observed injury rate in the 1971-74 cars is 32 percent lower than in the 1960-66 autos and in the $1975-78$ cars it is 9 percent lower than in the oldest model year group.

Injury rates computed directly from NCSS data, however, tend to give biased effectiveness estimates, especially when old cars are compared to new ones. One kind of bias, present on many accident files, stems from the fact that older cars tend to have more "severe" crashes than newer ones; that inflates the injury rates in the older cars and exaggerates effectiveness estimates [38]. There is an even stronger bias in the opposite direction, unique to NCSS injury rates involving contacts with specific components [32], pp. 142-145. The NCSS teams with the highest rates of missing data on injury contact source also happened to be located in areas where a large percentage of the cars on the road are 10 or more years old. Thus, the older cars have an artificially low reported instrument panel contact injury rate because so many of the panel contact injuries are reported as being of unknown source. In the newer cars, the reported injury rates are closer to the true rates; the reduction of risk from older to newer cars is understated.

For unbiased estimates of the effect of instrument panel
changes on injury risk, it is necessary to adjust the injury rates in Table 2-1 to account for differences in the crash severities of the newer and older cars as well as the team to team differences in contact point reporting rates.


#### Abstract

2.3 Adjustment of the NCSS injury rates

The modeling procedure used to adjust the NCSS injury rates is iterative selection of control variables. The procedure, which resembles stepwise regression, was developed in NHTSA's evaluation of energy absorbing steering assemblies [32], pp. 164-183 and refined in the evaluation of side door beams [35], pp. 225-252. It can be used here with minor changes.


### 2.3.1 Adjustment procedure

The starting point is the set of four unadjusted injury rates shown in Table 2-1. A list of potential control variables, defined below, is drawn from the NCSS data elements. For each potential control, the (weighted) occupant count $N_{i j}$ is tabulated for each of the 4 values $i$ of model year group and each value or class interval $j$ of the control group. The injury count $n_{i j}$ is likewise tabulated. Table 2-2 works out the procedure, as an example, for the control variable, "passenger age." The actual $N_{i j}$ and $n_{i j}$ are shown in the two left columns of the top section of the table. An artificial 3 way contingency table of model year by control variable by injury is formed by defining

$$
c_{i j 1}=n_{i j}
$$

to be the count of injuries and

## EXAMPLE: PASSENGER AGE AS A CONTROL VARIABLE

$\left.\begin{array}{lccc}\text { Model } & \begin{array}{c}\text { Weighted } \\ \text { N of } \\ \text { Passengers }\end{array} & & \begin{array}{c}\text { n of } \\ \text { Injuries }\end{array} \\ \text { ACTUAL DATA } & & & \begin{array}{c}\text { N of Passengers } \\ \text { Minus }\end{array} \\ \text { n of Injuries }\end{array}\right)$

| ADJUSTED | Adjusted <br> EFFECTIVENESS <br> "Expected" <br> Injuries | Adjusted <br> Reduction $(\%)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |


| $1960-66$ | $6622(32.7 / 752)+1829(25.3 / 201)$ | $=$ | 518.17 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| $1967-70$ | $6622(57.5 / 1801)+1829(49.5 / 522)$ | $=$ | 384.86 |
| $1971-74$ | $6622(74.4 / 2443)+1829(50.6 / 558)$ | $=$ | 367.52 |
| $1975-78$ | $6622(60.3 / 1626)+1829(59.7 / 548)$ | $=$ | 444.83 |

$$
C_{i j 2}=\left(N_{i j}-n_{i j}\right)
$$

to be the count of passengers minus the count of injuries. In Table 2-2, the contingency table is formed by the two right columns in the top section labeled "actual data." The cell entries of the 3 way table $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{ijk}}$ are smoothed by the BMDP4F multidimensional contingency table analysis program [10]. In Table 2-2, the smoothed data are shown in the two right columns in the middle section of the page labeled "smoothed data." The marginals of the four model year groups are adjusted (using the smoothed cell entries) to have the same distribution of the control variable. The injury reduction for the three later model year groups, relative to the 1960-66 cars, are recalculated using the "expected" cell entries, resulting in effectiveness estimates $R_{2}, R_{3}$ and $R_{4}$ superseding the estimates of 24.3 percent, 31.6 percent and 9.3 percent obtained from the unadjusted data (Table 2-1). The calculation of the "expected" $n$ of injuries and the adjusted effectiveness estimates is carried out in the last section of Table 2-2. Let

$$
D_{2}=R_{2}-24.3, \quad D_{3}=R_{3}-31.6, \quad D_{4}=R_{4}-9.3
$$

be the deviations of the new estimates from the earlier ones and let $D$ be the sum of the absolute values of these deviations. In Table 2-2,

$$
D=1.4+2.5+4.9=8.8
$$

D is a measure of how much the control variable influences the effectiveness estimates. The control variable which results in the greatest value of $D$ is chosen as the first control variable. This is the "first step" of the "stepwise regression." The remaining control variables are scanned. Those for which $D$ has a value of less than 5 percent are not used in later steps, for they have little influence on the effectiveness estimate.

Next, for each of the control variables still in the running, form the artificial 4 way table of model year group, by the first control variable, by that variable, by count of injuries/count of passengers minus count of injuries. The cell entries are again smoothed, the marginals adjusted and the injury reductions recalculated. Let $D^{*}$ be the sum of the absolute values of the deviations of the recalculated injury reductions from those obtained in the previous step. The control variable which results in the greatest value of $D$ is chosen as the second control variable. This is the "second step." The process continues until none of the remaining control variables produces $D$ as large as 5 percent or until all tables have too many cells for the amount of data available (viz., fewer than 5 injury cases per cell). The injury reductions calculated in the last step are the adjusted estimates of effectiveness based on NCSS.

### 2.3.2 Control variables

Eight potential control variables were analyzed. The variables and their categories or class intervals as used in the analysis were the following:

- NCSS team (Calspan, HSRI, Indiana - Miami, Kentucky, SWRI, Dynamic Science)
- Delta $V$ (less than $20 \mathrm{mph}, 20 \mathrm{mph}$ or more)
o Principal Direction of Force (12:00, other)
o Vehicle or object struck (collision with car or light truck, collision with heavy truck or single vehicle crash)
- Damage - horizontal location (centered damage - 2nd letter or Collision Deformation Classification [7] is D or C, other)
- Vehicle weight (less than 3650 pounds, 3650 pounds or more)
- Passenger age (5 to 34 or unknown, 35 or more)
o Sex (male, female)
Where continuous variables were divided into two class intervals (Delta $V$, vehicle weight, age), the boundary was placed at the median value for the injuries in the 1960-66 cars. When categorical variables were collapsed to two categories (PDOF, vehicle/object struck, damage - horizontal location), the approach was to group the "more severe" and the "less severe" categories and to split the 1960-66 injury cases as evenly as possible between the two groups.

The Indiana and Miami teams are grouped into a single category because they had nearly identical vehicle age distributions and missing data rates on contact points [32], p. 144.

Delta $V$ is estimated on NCSS by the CRASH program [43] and is missing in about 41 percent of frontal impacts. When Delta $V$ is estimated on NCSS, that estimate is used here. When Delta $V$ is missing, a rougher approximation is obtained, for use in this analysis, from the Collision Deformation Classification (CDC) of the damaged vehicle. As in NHTSA's evaluation of child safety seats, the approximation consists of two steps [31], pp. 221-222. First, the CRASH program is executed, using the CDC of the case vehicle and assuming the damage is the result of impacting a rigid immobile fixed object [43], pp. 5, 20-22. The result $D V^{H}$ of this first step, however, usually overestimates Delta $V$ in comparison with a reconstruction based on the full CRASH program [31], p. 222, perhaps because CRASH overestimates the extent of damage that occurs in the
"average" car with a given CDC. The second step is to obtain a best estimate DV, by the formula

$$
D V=4.645+.7082 D V^{H}
$$

which is a regression equation derived by comparing $D V^{H}$ to the Delta $V$ actually reported on NCSS, for those cases where it was estimated by the full CRASH program. Since all NCSS cases which were known to be frontal also had a full $C D C$, there were no missing data on the Delta $V$ variable used in this analysis.

Cases were not used in the analysis if they had missing data on the weight of the vehicle or the passenger's sex or if they were vehicle to vehicle collisions and the type of the other vehicle was unknown. Child passengers less than 5 years old as well as all restrained passengers were excluded since their injury mechanisms are quite different from unrestrained adults.

### 2.3.3 Results

NCSS Team was by far the most influential control variable in the first step of the adjustment procedure. Table 2-3 shows that the effectiveness estimate for each of the three later model year groups, relative to the 1960-66 cars, increased substantially after adjusting for NCSS team. The injury reduction for 1967-70 cars relative to 1960-66 cars was 24.3 percent in the unadjusted data (first line of Table 2-3) and 33.7 percent after adjusting for team to team differences (2nd line of Table 2-3). For the newer cars, the bias was even greater: effectiveness in the 1971-74 cars rose from 31.6 to 42.3 percent ( +10.7 ) and in the $1975-78$

TABLE 2-3
ADJUSTMENT OF INSTRUMENT PANEL INJURY RATES BY CONTROL VARIABLES
(AIS 2 or greater injuries per 100 occupants,
right front passengers of passenger cars, NCSS)

Injury Reduction Relative to 1960-66 Cars

| Control Variable | 1967-70 Cars |  | 1971-74 Cars |  | 1975-78 Cars |  | SumofChanges | Disposition of Control Variable |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Obs. Red | Change in Red. | Obs. <br> Red. | Change <br> in Red. | Obs. Red. | Change in Red. |  |  |
| NO CONTROL VARIABLES | 24.3 |  | 31.6 |  | 9.3 |  |  |  |
| NCSS team | 33.7 | +9.4 | 42.3 | +10.7 | 29.7 | +20.4 | 40.5 | $\checkmark$ |
| Delta V | 17.4 | -6.9 | 29.6 | -2.0 | 13.8 | +4.7 | 13.6 |  |
| Sex | 25.2 | +0.9 | 34.6 | +3.0 | 14.3 | +5.0 | 8.9 |  |
| Passenger age | 25.7 | +1.4 | 29.1 | -2.5 | 14.2 | +4.9 | 8.8 |  |
| PDOF | 21.6 | -2.7 | 29.5 | -2.1 | 5.3 | -4.0 | 8.8 |  |
| Vehicle weight | 27.1 | +2.8 | 32.7 | +1.1 | 10.4 | +1.1 | 5.0 |  |
| Veh.lobj. struck | 25.2 | +0.9 | 31.3 | -0.3 | 6.4 | -2.9 | 4.1 | x |
| Damage - horizontal | 22.3 | -2.0 | 30.6 | -1.0 | 8.9 | -0.4 | 3.4 | x |
| NCSS team | 33.7 |  | 42.3 |  | 29.7 |  |  |  |
| NCSS team Delta V | 23.3) | -10.4 | 36.0) | -6.3 | (21.0) | -8.7 | 25.4 | - |
| NCSS team PDOF | 30.1 | -3.6 | 39.9 | -2.4 | 20.1 | -9.6 | 15.6 | XX |
| NCSS team passenger age | 31.2 | -2.5 | 38.6 | -3.7 | 26.7 | -3.0 | 9.2 | xx |
| NCSS team vehicle weight | 35.5 | +1.8 | 42.9 | +0.6 | 24.7 | -5.0 | 7.4 | xx |
| NCSS team sex | 32.5 | -1.2 | 42.9 | +0.6 | 25.9 | -3.8 | 5.6 | xx |
| selected <br> $x$ deleted: sum of incremental <br> $x x$ deleted: would have too many | ges les ls at $n$ | $s$ than ext step |  |  |  |  |  |  |

cars from 9.3 to 29.7 percent (+20.4). As explained in Section 2.1, the older cars are overrepresented in the teams with high missing data rates on contact points and, as a result, have spuriously low instrument panel contact injury rates. The sum of the absolute values of the changes in effectiveness is

$$
9.4+10.7+20.4=40.5
$$

Delta $V$ was the second most influential control variable, with the absolute values of the changes adding up to 13.6. Effectiveness in the 1967-70 and 1971-74 cars dropped after adjustment for Delta $V$, since they had lower speed crashes than the $1960-66$ cars, but effectiveness increased in the 1975-78 cars, which were overrepresented at some of the Northern NCSS teams where crashes happened to be more severe than average. Sex, passenger age, $P D O F$ and vehicle weight had moderate influence, with the sum of the changes ranging from 8.9 to 5.0 . Adjustment for sex, age and vehicle weight generally increased effectiveness, while adjustment for PDOF reduced it. The type of vehicle or object struck and the horizontal damage location had little influence because they were basically uncorrelated with vehicle model year; the sum of the changes was less than 5 percent.

The result of the first step of the iterative procedure is to select NCSS team as the first control variable and to drop vehicle/object struck and horizontal damage location from further consideration as controls.

The starting point for the second step of the iterative procedure is shown beneath the solid line in Table 2-3. The effectiveness estimates, adjusted for NCSS team, are 33.7, 42.3 and 29.7 percent. Effectiveness is recalculated, adjusted for NCSS team and each of the remaining control variables, one at a time. Delta $V$ is the most influential control variable at the second step, since the results adjusted for NCSS team and Delta $V$ differ the most from those adjusted for NCSS team alone. Effectiveness fell from 33.7 to 23.3 percent in the $1967-70$ cars, relative to the 1960-66 cars, a drop of 10.4 percent. Effectiveness fell from 42.3 to 36.0 percent in the 1971-74 cars (-6.3) and from 29.7 to 21.0 in the $1975-78$ cars ( -8.7 ). It is noteworthy that Delta $V$ had a positive influence on effectiveness in the 1975-78 cars at the first step and a negative one on this step; that is due to the intercorrelation between the control variables NCSS team and Delta $V$, as described above. The sum of the drops is 25.4 percent. PDOF, age, vehicle weight and sex had less influence; the sum of the changes ranged from 15.6 down to 5.6 percent.

The result of the second step is that Delta $V$, in addition to NCSS team, is selected as a control variable. At this point, further steps are inadvisable. The 58 injury cases in the 1960-66 cars are already subdivided among 12 cells ( 6 team groups $x 2$ intervals of Delta V). Further splitting of the data would take the average cases per cell well below the permissible minimum of 5 .

The best estimates of effectiveness, based on the iterative procedure, are the following:
Reduction Rel.Model Yearsto 1960-66 (\%)
1967-70 ..... 23.3
1971-74 ..... 36
1975-78 ..... 21

If the average for model years 1971-78 (i.e., the arithmetic average of the risks for 1971-74 and 1975-78) is arbitrarily assigned a risk factor of 100 , the relative risk factors for each of the model year groups are:

Model Years
1960-66
1967-70
1971-74
1975-78

Relative
Risk Factor
140
107
90
110

The relative risk factors are tabulated in Figure $2-1$. They will subsequently be compared to the results of Chapters 3 and 4 , where impact protection for the passenger in frontal crashes is analyzed by quite different methods.

### 2.3.4 Sampling error of the effectiveness estimates

Sampling errors for the injury risk in each model year group are derived by a jackknife procedure identical to the one used in NHTSA's evaluation of steering assemblies [32], pp. 187-193. The NCSS sample of unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes is divided into 10 systematic random subsamples of equal size. One subsample is removed and the injury rates for each model year group is recomputed for the remaining $9 / 10$ of the sample, adjusting for NCSS team and Delta $V$ and using the same data smoothing technique as was applied to the full sample. The subsample is returned, another removed, and the injury rates recalculated, etc. The variation found in the 10 calculation is the basis for establishing

sampling errors. The advantage of the jackknife technique is that it gives an empirical assessment of the effects on variance of the NCSS sampling plan and the particular control variables chosen. These effects can vary considerably from one analysis to another.

The absolute and relative sampling errors were the following:

|  | Injury <br> Risk | Standard <br> Deviation | Coefficient <br> of Variation | Confidence <br> Bounds |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Model <br> Years | X | S | $\mathrm{S} / \mathrm{X}$ | $\mathrm{X} \pm 1.833 \mathrm{~S}$ |
| $1960-66$ | 140 | 17.02 | .1216 | 109 to 171 |
| $1967-70$ | 107 | 14.50 | .1355 | 81 to 134 |
| $1971-74$ | 90 | 7.68 | .0853 | 76 to 104 |
| $1975-78$ | 110 | 14.07 | .1279 | 85 to 136 |

The injury risk is the relative measure defined in the preceding section, i.e., injury rates were multiplied by a constant so that the 1971-78 average comes out to 100 . The confidence bounds are 90 percent bounds: 1.833 is the critical value (alpha $=.05$ ) of a $t$ distribution with 9 df , the appropriate value to use since the jackknife procedure was based on 10 subsamples.

Is the observed reduction of injury risk statistically significant? Perhaps the most appropriate comparison would be the average for 1971-78 vs. 1960-66. The average injury risk for 1971-78 is 100 and its standard deviation is

$$
\left(7.68^{2}+14.07^{2}\right) .5 / 2=8.01
$$

The $t$ value for the difference between the 1960-66 and the 1971-78 injury risk is

$$
(140-100) /\left(17.02^{2}+8.01^{2}\right)^{.5}=2.13
$$

Since this value is within the critical region of a $t$ distribution with 9 df (alpha $=.05$ ), the reduction is significant. Rough confidence bounds for the reduction are given by

$$
\begin{gathered}
(1-100 / 140) \pm 1.833(100 / 140)\left[(17.02 / 140)^{2}+(8.01 / 100)^{2}\right] \cdot 5 \\
\\
=29 \pm 19 \text { percent } \\
\\
=10 \text { to } 48 \text { percent }
\end{gathered}
$$

### 2.4 Benefits of instrument panel improvements

In 1982, when the large majority of passenger cars on the road in the United States had been built in model year 1971 or later and the overwhelming majority had been built in 1967 or later, there were 66,700 right front passengers of passenger cars who sustained nonfatal injuries at AIS levels 2 to 5 [21], p. VI-7. The estimate is based on the National Accident Sampling System. The NCSS data analyzed in Table l-1 suggest that 30 percent of right front passengers who had AIS 2 or greater injuries received them from instrument panel contacts and no other sources. In other words, 20,000 right front passengers had AIS 2 or greater injuries from the instrument panel alone - at a time when most cars were built in 1971 or later and had a "relative risk factor" of 100 for instrument panel contact injury. If all the cars on the road in 1982 had 1960-66 type instrument panels, where the relative risk factor was 140, the number of injured persons would have increased to

$$
(140 / 100) \times 20,000=28,000
$$

In other words, the instrument panel improvements of the mid to late 1960's and early 1970's saved 8,000 right front passengers per year from sustaining more than a minor injury.

Also in 1982, there were 5200 right front passenger fatalities [21], p. VI-4. Table 1-2 indicates that about 17 percent, or 880 of the fatalities were caused primarily by contact with the instrument panel, with no other life threatening injury sources. A case by case analysis of NCSS suggested that about half of frontal fatalities involve catastrophic collapse of the passenger compartment or Delta $V$ above 35 mph [30], Table 4. A conservative assumption is that they would not be saved by instrument panel improvements. That leaves 440 passengers killed by instrument panel contact alone in otherwise survivable crashes. If all the cars on the road in 1982 had 1960-66 type instrument panels, where the relative risk factor was 140 rather than 100 , the number of fatalities would have increased to

$$
(140 / 100) \times 440=616
$$

In other words, a fairly conservative estimate is that instrument panel improvements saved about 176 lives per year. The estimate is based on the distribution of fatalities in cars of the mid 1970's. If a larger proportion of fatalities in cars of the early 1960's were due to instrument panel contact (29 percent in Huelke's 1961-65 data [27]) and occurred under otherwise survivable conditions, the estimate of lives saved by the panel improvements could be twice as high. If, in addition, panel improvements helped reduce risk of injury from components other than the panel (see Section 1.4), the benefits could be even greater.

### 2.5 Possible effert on injuries from other components

An important hypothesis in Section 1.3 is that changes in instrument panel geometry or materials can affect more than just the risk
of injury due to contact with the panel. A well designed panel, by providing ride down and keeping the occupant in an upright position, can limit the severity of impacts into the windshield, header, pillars, etc. If so, the overall injury rate for unrestrained right front passengers in frontal crashes ought to decrease in parallel with the panel contact injury rate. Indeed, Table 2-4 shows that 11.8 percent of passengers of model year 1960-66 cars were hospitalized in frontal crashes on NCSS, but only 7.7 percent of 1967-70 car passengers: a 35 percent reduction. The casualty rate in 1971-74 cars is 36 percent lower than in 1960-66, while in 1975-78 cars it is 26 percent lower. The reductions in overall injury risk closely parallel the previous findings on panel contact injuries.

One shortcoming of Table 2-4 is that it cannot distinguish injury reductions due to panel modifications of the 1960-78 era from the effects of other frontal crashworthiness improvements. The only really well known improvement is the High Penetration Resistant windshield, which was introduced in 1966. Perhaps the 1960-65 cars should not be included in the analysis, since they had the old windshield. Table 2-4 shows, however, that the casualty rate for 1966 cars alone ( $12.7 \%$ ) is about the same as for 1960-66 cars (11.8\%). The large reductions of hospitalization in the 1967-78 cars, at least according to NCSS, would still be there even if the 1960-65 cars were excluded from the analysis. These reductions in overall injury risk can probably be attributed in large measure to the improvement of the instrument panel. The effect of the panel on overall injury risk is analyzed in far greater detail in Chapter 3.

# NONMINOR (HOSPITALIZATION OR FATALITY) INJURY RATE, BY MODEL YEAR, UNRESTRAINED RIGHT FRONT PASSENGERS OF PASSENGER CARS, IN FRONTAL CRASHES, NCSS 

| Mode1 <br> Years | nof <br> Hospitalized <br> Passengers | N of <br> Passengers | Casualty <br> Rate (\%) | Reduction <br> Rel. to MY <br> $60-66$ (\%) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1960-66$ | 112 | 953 | 11.8 |  |
| 1966 only | 44 | 346 | 12.7 |  |
| $1967-70$ | 178 | 2323 | 7.7 | 35 |
| $1971-74$ | 227 | 3001 | 7.6 | 36 |
| $1975-78$ | 189 | 2174 | 8.7 | 26 |

## CHAPTER 3

## MVMA2D COMPUTER SIMULATIONS OF FRONTAL CRASHES

Computer simulations of the trajectories of unrestrained right front passengers in frontal barrier crashes were performed for 21 passenger cars ranging from model year 1965 to 83 - at two speeds (25 and 30 mph ) for each of three occupant sizes. The simulations were based on the MVMA2D model [3]. Since the objective was to evaluate instrument panels, only the parameters relating to panel geometry and force deflection characteristics, as observed in tests of actual panels, were varied from car to car. Other parameters such as the windshield composition or the vehicle crash pulse were kept identical across all simulations. A nonparametric analysis of the injury criteria predicted by the simulations showed significantly lower injury risk for cars of the late 1960's than cars of the mid 1960's and a possible additional reduction for cars of the mid to late 1970's. A statistical analysis of the parameters relating to panel geometry and force deflection characteristics confirms that panels were gradually modified during the $1965-80$ period in the ways described in Section 1.4. A correlation analysis between the injury scores obtained in the simulations and the geometry and force deflection measurements shows that the panel modifications described as "improvements" in Section 1.4 for the most part are indeed associated with reductions of torso, head and femur injury risk. In other words, the MVMA2D simulations suggest that panels became safer - and that they became safer for the reasons stated in the literature.

The detailed procedures used in the simulations are more understandable if the findings of Chapter 2 are briefly reviewed: unrestrained right front passengers in 1967-78 cars had significantly lower risk of instrument panel contact injuries in actual crashes than 1960-66 cars. Chapter 2 is primarily limited to injuries caused directly by panel contact, but changes in panel geometry or materials can affect even those injuries not directly due to contact with the panel (see Section 1.3). The analysis of accident data could not easily discern the indirect effects of the panel improvements (which were implemented gradually over many years) from the possible effects of other vehicle modifications unrelated to the panel. In addition, there were just enough NCSS cases for significant results on overall panel contact injury risk; it would have been futile to study head, thorax and femur injuries separately or to attempt to relate the injury reductions to specific panel modifications.

The MVMA2D simulation model, unlike accident data, makes it possible to study the effects on panel modifications in isolation. The model is run for a series of hypothetical cars that have the panel characteristics of a variety of actual vehicles (model years 1965 through 1983) but are alike in all respects other than the panel. It becomes possible to discern the extent to which changes in the panel caused the later cars to have lower overall injury risk for various body regions than the old cars.

The approach, then, is to measure the instrument panel geometry
and force deflection characteristics, in a consistent manner, for vehicles of different model years. The approach uses a "generic" vehicle whose crash pulse, materials and geometry, other than in the panel region, are close to the average values for the vehicle fleet. The input data to the simulation, in each case, are the instrument panel values for a specific make, model and model year and the generic values for parts of the car other than the panel. (As described in Appendix $A$, the crash pulse of a 1979 Ford Granada and the seat and floor geometry and materials of a 1983 Chevrolet Celebrity are the generic values used in all the simulations.)

For a fair comparison between older and newer cars, the same makes and models ought to be represented for the different model year groups. In each model year group, there should be the same variety of car manufacturers and sizes. In other words, there should be a matrix of cars of various manufacturers and market categories in each of several model year groups. Simulations need to be performed for a range of impact speeds and occupant types.

### 3.2 Some preliminary words of caution regarding simulation results

The state of the art for the MVMA2D simulation model, as of 1987, is that injury predictions for a given vehicle in a particular crash mode cannot be guaranteed for accuracy unless "validated" by an actual crash test, with dummies, duplicating the simulation. None of the simulations of older ca"s were validated by actual crash tests; neither were the simulations with 5 th and 95 th percentile dummies in the newer cars or the 25 mph barrier crashes. In particular, the 5 th and 95 th
percentile dummy parameters in these simulations are derived from $a$ preliminary scaling of the 50 th percentile Hybrid III dummy to other sizes. No such dummies have actually been constructed as of Summer 1987. The scaling factors may need to be revised after construction and testing of actual dummies.

Thus, the injury scores for individual makes and models of cars, as reported in this chapter, ought not be regarded as predictions of what would actually happen in highway accidents. Moreover, as stated above, the simulations were not intended to model the actual cars but a hypothetical vehicle having the panel geometry and force deflection of one car and the crash pulse, windshield materials, etc. of another. For example, a car whose instrument panel performed poorly in combination with the "generic" Granada crash pulse and Celebrity seat might have performed better with its own crash pulse and seat. A related problem is that MVMA2D is sensitive to small changes of input parameters such as panel geometry or force deflection; these parameters, in turn, were measured on sample cars using techniques that are to some extent judgmental and nonrepeatable. The objective, to be sure, is not to rate individual cars but to compare averages across groups of cars: specifically, older vs. more recent cars.

As stated above, there were excellent correlations between the panel characteristics on the various cars and the injury scores. It should be noted, though, that these are injury scores predicted by MVMA2D rather than those that might occur in real crashes. The correlations
might only be reflecting assumptions built into the simulation model and do not necessarily prove a cause and effect relationship between panel improvements and injury reduction in actual crashes. In particular, the parameters used to simulate the occupant seemed to have a fairly strong linkage between body regions. As a result, abrupt decelerations of the femurs were propagated as high noncontact $g$ 's to the chest and head, perhaps more so than would occur in real crashes. That may explain the high correlation, in the simulations, between stiff lower instrument panels and high chest $g^{\prime} s$ and HIC - but the correlation might not be so high in the real world.

In the statistical analyses, all the simulation results (HIC, chest g's, etc.) as well as the vehicle descriptors (force-deflection, etc.) were transformed to normal scores based on rank orders. As a result, the analyses are all nonparametric in the sense that they can show if injury scores were significantly reduced, but they cannot indicate by what percentage the injury risk was reduced. It is not valid to attempt to translate the trends in the graphs to quantitative statements about injury reduction: e.g., if one of the graphs shows a 2 inch drop in the "injury score" from 1965 to 1970 and a 1 inch drop from 1970 to 1975, it cannot be inferred that the first set of panel improvements gave twice the injury reduction as the latter. The nonparametric approach was purposely chosen as a precaution against making quantitative inferences about injury reduction from the simulation results; it also makes the data much easier to handle statistically. In the analyses, composite injury scores are defined for various body regions and for the entire body, based on
weighted averages of the normalized rank order scores. It must be emphasized that the weighting schemes are not intended to represent the exact contribution of each injury criterion to overall injury risk. It is definitely not appropriate to use the composite injury scores for making quantitative trade-offs between one type of injury and another - e.g., "a particular vehicle modification reduces injury criterion 1 by 10 percent and increases criterion 2 by 10 percent, but this has a net benefit because criterion 1 is twice as important as criterion 2."

NHTSA is currently undertaking a research program based on validated MVMA2D simulations and other data [6]. It will include a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the effect on injury risk as a result of modifying instrument panel and other vehicle parameters. Primary objectives of that research will be a quantitative evaluation of the injury consequences of changing various design parameters, followed by optimization of panel design. The work in this chapter, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with evaluating existing panels; it compares historical trends in panel design and injury risk, suggesting possible associations between some design parameters and injury risk, but not at a level of detail or precision suitable for optimizing panel design.
3.3 Planning and running the simulations
A total of 126 MVMA2D simulations were run: 21 cars at each of two frontal barrier impact speeds ( 25 and 30 mph ) and 3 dummy sizes (50th percentile male, 5 th percentile female and 95th percentile male). The test matrix of cars was meant to cover 6 broad manufacturer/market classes
which, together, represent a large portion of the market:

1. Full sized Ford
2. Full sized GM
3. Compact GM
4. Compact Chrysler and similar cars
5. Volkswagen (subcompact) and similar cars
6. Nissan or Honda (subcompact)

It includes four model year groups:

1. Pre-standard (1965-66)
2. Early post-standard (1969-71)
3. Pre-downsized big cars and rear wheel drive small cars (1974-76)
4. Downsized big cars and front wheel drive small cars (1977-83)

Appendix A, Section 1, describes the difficulties of obtaining MVMA2D input data on cars corresponding to each of the above groups. The final test matrix included 21 cars for which simulations were feasible:

## Car

MY
Group Group
11
66 Ford Galaxie 500
269 Ford LTD
$3 \quad 76$ Ford LTD
$4 \quad 79$ Ford LTD
2165 Chevrolet BelAir 269 Chevrolet BelAir 376 Chevrolet Caprice Classic 478 Buick LeSabre

3166 Chevrolet Chevy II
269 Chevrolet Nova
483 Chevrolet Celebrity
4166 Plymouth Valiant
269 Dodge Dart
$3 \quad 77$ Plymouth Volare
$3 \quad 79$ Ford Mustang
$5 \quad 1 \quad 66$ VW Beetle outlier 74 VW Beetle

480 Dodge Omni
$6 \quad 2 \quad 71$ Datsun 1200
$4 \quad 75$ Honda Civic
478 Honda Accord

Appendix $A$ describes the steps undertaken to assemble a full MVMA2D input data set for each of the cars, including the vehicle interior geometry, the force deflection characteristics, definitions of the dummies and crash pulses plus the necessary control parameters. The principal difficulty is that the source data for some of the cars is incomplete or was measured differently than on others. Appendix $A$ lists the techniques and assumptions used to assure that the simulation models were run in a consistent manner. It also shows how the the input data for the various cars differed only in the force deflection and geometry of the instrument panels, but were the same for other vehicle factors, as specified in the analytic objectives.

### 3.4 Simulation results: injury risk by model year group

### 3.4.1 Raw injury scores

Ten injury scores were computed from each of the simulations:
Femur Peak axial load at knee (pounds - sum of 2 knees)
Neck Peak shear force, upper neck joint (pounds)
Peak compressive force, upper neck joint (pounds)
Peak neck moment (inch-pounds)
Head Head Injury Criterion (HIC) Peak head g's

Chest Chest g's ( 3 millisecond peak) GMR modified Severity Index (resultant) Peak deflection of the front part of the chest ellipse - as output by MVMA2D (inches)
$S$ Delta $S$ - i.e., peak (deflection $x$ rate of deflection), front part of chest ellipse (inches-inches/second)

The peak shear and compressive neck forces are the maximum differences between the force on the neck and the force on the head. The peak neck moment is the maximum difference between the moments on the upper neck and
the lower neck. Chest deflection and (deflection $x$ rate of deflection), as defined above, are obtained from the printout on the chest to mid IP interaction. Chest deflection is the maximum deflection of the front part of the chest ellipse, as defined in MVMA2D, not the deflection between sternum and spine, as commonly defined in injury criteria. Peak (deflection $x$ rate of deflection) is henceforth abbreviated as $S$ Delta $S$. The deflections and $S$ Delta $S$ values obtained in the simulations should not be equated to levels found in laboratory tests.

Four chest severity scores were selected to represent various hypotheses about parameters related to chest injury. Peak $g$ 's and the Chest Severity Index are both based on acceleration and are correlated with one another. Direct contacts and noncontact phenomena can make contributions to both of them. Chest deflection and $S$ Delta $S$ measure the severity of direct contacts to the chest. They are correlated with one another but not necessarily with the first two measures. Likewise, three neck and two head severity scores are selected to represent the variety of parameters associated with injury and to provide some redundancy.

After the analyses of the preceding variables were completed, it was suggested that peak angular acceleration may be an important factor in head injury, worthy of study. Section 3.7 presents some analyses of angular acceleration, finding it to be closely correlated with other head and neck injury measures.

Table 3-1 shows the results of the 30 mph barrier crash

 $\stackrel{u}{u}$
$\pm$
$\pm$





|  | $\begin{aligned} & \pi \\ & \stackrel{\pi}{0} \\ & \stackrel{y}{\infty} \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\sim}{\sim}{ }_{\sim}^{\infty} \sim$ | 吕 | N ¢ N | N ${ }_{\sim}^{\infty}$ | Now |  | No | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\stackrel{\boxed{\circ}}{\mathbf{\circ}}$ | $\stackrel{\sim}{n} \pm \stackrel{\infty}{\infty}$ | N ¢ ¢ M N | $\stackrel{n}{\sim}$ | $\stackrel{N}{N}$ | M $\begin{gathered}\text { ¢ } \\ \sim \\ \sim\end{gathered}$ | 多 N | 용 ㄲ․ $\dot{m} \dot{\operatorname{rig}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{N} \underset{\sim}{\infty} \underset{\sim}{0} \\ & \dot{M} \underset{\sim}{\circ} \end{aligned}$ |
| $\pm$ | $\stackrel{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\overleftarrow{~}}}{\stackrel{y}{c}}$ | $\overline{\operatorname{in}} \bar{\sim}_{0}^{\infty}$ | $\stackrel{\sim}{N} \stackrel{\infty}{\infty} \stackrel{0}{-}$ | 통 | $\underset{\infty}{\circ} \underset{\sim}{\Xi}$ | $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{p}} \stackrel{\sim}{m} \underset{\mathrm{~m}}{\infty}$ | No | 8 | 초N |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { u } \\ & \text { on } \\ & \text { ひ } \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{lll} 0 & 0 \\ \infty \\ \infty \\ \hline \infty & \dot{\circ} \end{array}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \forall ~ N ~ o ~ \\ & \text { gi } \\ & \hline 1 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\underset{\sim}{\dot{O}} \underset{\sim}{\infty}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \infty \text { 人 } \\ & \dot{\circ} \dot{\circ} \dot{\circ} \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\square}{\square} \stackrel{\infty}{N} \stackrel{\infty}{\sim}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { ロ్ల } \\ & \text { T } \end{aligned}$ |  | ㅇNN | ¢ ¢ ¢ | の $\sim_{n}$ |  | M N | 으요 | 回すN |  |
|  | ㅂㅗㅗ | $\bar{o}$ | $\underset{6}{\circ} \text { N }$ | \％No | $\frac{\infty}{\sim}{\underset{\sim}{\infty}}_{\infty}^{\infty} \stackrel{n}{0}$ | 응 | $\underset{\sim}{\dot{N}} \underset{\sim}{\infty}$ | \％NN | ¢ |
|  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\circ}{\sim} \dot{\sim} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\circ} \\ & = \end{aligned}$ |  | $\underset{\sim}{N}$ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ} \stackrel{-}{N} \underset{N}{N}$ | ㅌNN NNN |  | $\underset{\sim}{N} \underset{\sim}{N} \underset{\sim}{N} \stackrel{n}{N}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 艺 } \\ & \text { む } \end{aligned}$ | $\dot{\dot{E}}$ | $\underset{M}{N} \underset{\infty}{\infty}$ | $\underset{\sim}{\circ} \hat{O} \underset{\sim}{O}$ | 앙 ㅇNN | $\stackrel{n}{n} \stackrel{0}{\mathrm{n}} \stackrel{n}{\mathrm{n}}$ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ} \stackrel{\circ}{\ddagger} \stackrel{g}{N}$ | 응 | $\stackrel{n}{\sim} \frac{m}{\sigma} \text { 楊 }$ | 翤罦 |
|  |  | ホ サ サ ¢ | M | 둥웅 | $\infty_{0}^{\infty}$ |  | ¢ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\sim} \stackrel{\circ}{N} \stackrel{o}{m}$ | N |
| 亮 | $\underset{\sim}{\pi}$ | N 승 NㅡN | $\stackrel{\sim}{\sim}$ | $\underset{N}{N} \underset{\sim}{\infty} \underset{N}{N}$ | $\underset{N}{N} \underset{\sim}{\underset{\sim}{N}} \underset{\sim}{N}$ |  | $\underset{\sim}{-\infty} \underset{\sim}{\infty}$ |  | $\stackrel{\sim}{\circ} \mathrm{m}$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 䆣 } \\ & \text { 右 } \end{aligned}$ |  | ถ้ำำ | 응 ถึํ ํํㅇ |  | \％ั欠） |  | \％ำ | ¢ัก |
|  | $\frac{9}{\square}$ | 믄 | 믕 | 뭉 | 문 | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{y}{u} \\ & \stackrel{B}{\mathrm{O}} \end{aligned}$ | － | $\xrightarrow{3}$ | $\xrightarrow{3}$ |
|  | $\stackrel{\square}{>}$ | － | $\stackrel{\sim}{\sim}$ | \％ | $\bigcirc$ | $\stackrel{\infty}{\sim}$ | $\stackrel{0}{\sim}$ | 8 | ¢ ¢ |

TABLE 3-1 (Continued)

MVMA2D RESULTS: 30 MPH CRASHES


TABLE 3-1 (Concluded)
MNMA2D RESULTS: 30 MPH CRASHES

|  |  |  | Femur |  | Neck |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Vehicle | Dummy | Axial | Shear | Comp. | Moment | HIC | Peak g's | Peak g's | Index | Def1 | SDeltaS |
|  | 800 mni | 50\% | 3774 | 381 | 406 | 3238 | 1015 | 94 | 76.7 | 460 | 4.36 | 764 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1209 | 572 | 580 | 1943 | 1121 | 143 | 52.9 | 226 | 4.03 | 594 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1569 | 391 | 682 | 5045 | 777 | 92 | 44.1 | 117 | 3.70 | 408 |
|  | 74 Beetle | 50\% | 3199 | 566 | 498 | 3224 | 1944 | 105 | 121.9 | 1181 | 4.47 | 1068 |
|  |  | 5\% | 4596 | 517 | 712 | 3205 | 3085 | 189 | 160.5 | 1531 | 3.90 | 881 |
|  |  | 95\% | 4526 | 961 | 820 | 8906 | 866 | 89 | 86.8 | 661 | 4.18 | 831 |
| $\xrightarrow{\square}$ | 66 Beetle | 50\% | 3232 | 800 | 524 | 5309 | 767 | 119 | 111.2 | 1077 | 1.90 | 210 |
|  |  | 5\% | 4836 | 864 | 1079 | 4101 | 6895 | 243 | 176.2 | 1744 | 1.36 | 149 |
|  |  | 95\% | 4290 | 835 | 684 | 6999 | 717 | 107 | 95.4 | 624 | 1.53 | 135 |
|  | 78 Accord | 50\% | 2627 | 293 | 208 | 2379 | 797 | 89 | 81.8 | 666 | 4.26 | 1207 |
|  |  | 5\% | 2242 | 159 | 70 | 782 | 1158 | 141 | 74.8 | 517 | 4.18 | 916 |
|  |  | 95\% | 3116 | 1005 | 642 | 5235 | 1865 | 127 | 75.5 | 445 | 4.18 | 835 |
|  | 75 Civic | 50\% | 1543 | 442 | 1044 | 4429 | 1496 | 101 | 68.1 | 349 | 3.28 | 444 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1519 | 417 | 800 | 2120 | 962 | 119 | 90.1 | 768 | 2.46 | 297 |
|  |  | 95\% | 2239 | 401 | 1015 | 4930 | 555 | 78 | 83.7 | 505 | 3.08 | 435 |
|  | 71 Datsun | 50\% | 3018 | 395 | 887 | 4132 | 1030 | 109 | 61.7 | 254 | 4.24 | 687 |
|  |  | 5\% | 937 | 525 | 727 | 2461 | 1562 | 139 | 70.8 | 516 | 2.89 | 362 |
|  |  | 95\% | 2273 | 297 | 1038 | 5580 | 692 | 87 | 67.1 | 297 | 3.96 | 642 |

simulations, with 50th, 5th and 95th percentile dummies, for all cars, while Table 3-2 shows the results of the 25 mph simulations. The tables display considerable variations from car to car; however, as explained in Section 3.2, it is not the purpose of the study to estimate injury risk for particular makes and models of cars and the results for a particular car are not necessarily representative of what would have happened in a real crash or even in a staged collision. The median values of HIC and chest g's in the tables are:

Speed Median HIC Median Chest g's
$25 \quad 705$ 30952
67.5
79.9

These values are of the same magnitude as actual barrier crash tests with unrestrained dummies in the right front seat. For example, NHTSA's sled tests with unrestrained dummies in a 1981 Chevrolet Citation sled buck [39], p. 40, had a median HIC of 402 at 26.5 mph and 1794 at 30 mph (HIC varied greatly from test to test with the unrestrained dummies). The median chest g's were 69 at 26.5 mph and 82 at 30 mph - close indeed to the simulation results.

Although the medians for the simulations are consistent with laboratory test results, Tables 3-1 and 3-2 nevertheless show individual cases of extremely high HIC or chest g's. These readings are apparently attributable to the rigidity of the joints of the simulated occupants. When their knees penetrate to the stiffest part of the lower IP or when their feet drive against the toeboard or firewall, the high acceleration spikes are soon propagated to their chests and heads (noncontact forces) where they are added to the direct contact forces occurring at that
table 3-2
MVMA2D RESULTS: 25 MPH CRASHES

|  |  |  | Femur |  | Neck |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Vehicle | Dummy | Axial | Shear | Comp. | Moment | HIC | Peak g's | Peak g's | Index | Def1 | SDeltas |
|  | 79 Ford | 50\% | 1764 | 210 | 289 | 2185 | 881 | 87 | 58.6 | 203 | 1.40 | 86 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1166 | 208 | 139 | 906 | 922 | 156 | 64.4 | 277 | 1.41 | 89 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1973 | 201 | 570 | 3275 | 449 | 79 | 64.6 | 217 | . 55 | 22 |
|  | 76 Ford | 50\% | 1031 | 366 | 622 | 2883 | 416 | 90 | 51.6 | 134 | 2.54 | 264 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1182 | 223 | 417 | 1236 | 624 | 151 | 66.7 | 319 | 1.85 | 190 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1133 | 174 | 826 | 3704 | 421 | 69 | 53.9 | 125 | 1.90 | 172 |
|  | 69 Ford | 50\% | 1590 | 235 | 234 | 2147 | 931 | 87 | 80.8 | 482 | . 70 | 42 |
| G |  | 5\% | 1475 | 173 | 165 | 1065 | 699 | 130 | 74.9 | 381 | 1.03 | 71 |
| O |  | 95\% | 1720 | 228 | 625 | 3424 | 358 | 66 | 54.0 | 95 | . 05 | 0 |
|  | 66 Ford | 50\% | 2129 | 638 | 507 | 2351 | 2029 | 120 | 81.3 | 506 | . 94 | 62 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1833 | 412 | 271 | 1866 | 1882 | 128 | 92.8 | 682 | . 35 | 13 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1610 | 456 | 439 | 4110 | 563 | 79 | 65.8 | 187 | 1.12 | 70 |
|  | 78 Buick | 50\% | 1654 | 397 | 884 | 4042 | 778 | 80 | 47.0 | 78 | 1.04 | 52 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1209 | 424 | 715 | 2187 | 916 | 130 | 57.7 | 188 | 1.16 | 76 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1543 | 496 | 966 | 4076 | 565 | 79 | 58.8 | 142 | . 74 | 38 |
|  | 76 Chevy | 50\% | 1197 | 301 | 583 | 2107 | 388 | 108 | 63.0 | 253 | 1.83 | 144 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1235 | 188 | 392 | 1790 | 2798 | 197 | 80.2 | 657 | 1.54 | 133 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1561 | 457 | 637 | 4005 | 572 | 75 | 59.8 | 145 | . 98 | 50 |
|  | 69 Chevy | 50\% | 1447 | 329 | 761 | 3431 | 623 | 90 | 65.2 | 296 | 2.21 | 223 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1180 | 317 | 542 | 1594 | 661 | 152 | 76.6 | 462 | 1.79 | 190 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1583 | 116 | 895 | 4206 | 358 | 71 | 71.1 | 315 | 1.45 | 134 |
|  | 65 Chevy | 50\% | 1662 | 186 | 429 | 2589 | 1175 | 97 | 77.0 | 509 | 1.28 | 111 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1731 | 278 | 850 | 3980 | 1452 | 183 | 100.1 | 679 | . 49 | 30 |
|  |  | 95\% | 2113 | 426 | 555 | 4517 | 562 | 80 | 70.8 | 251 | . 43 | 17 |

## TABLE 3-2 (Continued)

MVMA2D RESULTS: 25 MPH CRASHES

|  |  |  | Femur |  | Neck | Head |  |  | Chest |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Vehicle | Dunmy | Axial | Shear | Comp. | Moment | HIC | Peak g's | Peak g's | Index | Def1 | SDeltaS |
|  | 83 Celebrity | 50\% | 1524 | 449 | 767 | 2798 | 512 | 75 | 49.7 | 97 | . 96 | 58 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1277 | 225 | 406 | 1141 | 569 | 114 | 62.1 | 241 | 1.44 | 221 |
|  |  | 95\% | 2208 | 383 | 930 | 4702 | 594 | 85 | 80.7 | 421 | none | none |
|  | 69 Nova | 50\% | 2686 | 316 | 568 | 2952 | 1086 | 106 | 81.9 | 563 | . 59 | 216 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1975 | 218 | 270 | 1605 | 1257 | 161 | 91.6 | 567 | . 79 | 48 |
|  |  | 95\% | 3101 | 602 | 662 | 4112 | 862 | 73 | 73.1 | 366 | . 02 | 0 |
|  | 66 Nova | 50\% | 2208 | 489 | 301 | 3280 | 1219 | 100 | 86.6 | 701 | 1.98 | 230 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1643 | 353 | 437 | 2720 | 1591 | 172 | 101.8 | 828 | 1.48 | 163 |
| $\checkmark$ |  | 95\% | 2520 | 510 | 467 | 4140 | 869 | 80 | 70.4 | 319 | 1.41 | 135 |
|  | 79 Mustang | 50\% | 2096 | 236 | 580 | 2506 | 621 | 75 | 85.3 | 659 | 2.54 | 311 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1741 | 210 | 160 | 1173 | 716 | 144 | 58.9 | 227 | 3.12 | 371 |
|  |  | 95\% | 2283 | 197 | 466 | 2283 | 344 | 70 | 77.2 | 421 | 2.68 | 318 |
|  | 77 Volare | 50\% | 855 | 364 | 803 | 3325 | 479 | 80 | 39.2 | 54 | 2.37 | 172 |
|  |  | 5\% | 751 | 133 | 108 | 1457 | 762 | 138 | 51.9 | 133 | 2.99 | 312 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1150 | 366 | 872 | 3518 | 418 | 76 | 52.3 | 94 | 2.09 | 168 |
|  | 69 Dart | 50\% | 1411 | 228 | 615 | 2581 | 410 | 93 | 53.7 | 165 | 2.12 | 203 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1332 | 171 | 418 | 2030 | 1532 | 168 | 73.7 | 395 | 1.74 | 161 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1920 | 196 | 804 | 3934 | 358 | 71 | 67.7 | 255 | 1.33 | 115 |
|  | 66 Valiant | 50\% | 1584 | 212 | 594 | 2733 | 722 | 75 | 67.5 | 444 | 1.83 | 202 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1422 | 280 | 124 | 1576 | 904 | 120 | 82.4 | 500 | 2.18 | 261 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1800 | 223 | 667 | 3984 | 359 | 74 | 82.4 | 453 | 1.02 | 85 |

## TABLE 3-2 (Concluded)

MVMA2D RESULTS: 25 MPH CRASHES

|  |  |  | Femur |  | Neck |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Vehicle | Dummy | Axial | Shear | Comp . | Moment | HIC | Peak g's | Peak g's | Index | Defl | SDeltaS |
|  | 800 mni | 50\% | 1532 | 147 | 223 | 1732 | 595 | 86 | 35.6 | 45 | 2.70 | 181 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1178 | 425 | 373 | 1327 | 712 | 122 | 48.0 | 68 | 2.24 | 167 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1369 | 280 | 513 | 3045 | 433 | 83 | 40.3 | 37 | 1.84 | 119 |
|  | 74 Beetle | 50\% | 2669 | 354 | 455 | 3182 | 1039 | 108 | 83.9 | 635 | 2.33 | 284 |
|  |  | 5\% | 3669 | 279 | 521 | 2649 | 1442 | 149 | 129.0 | 1097 | 2.51 | 384 |
|  |  | 95\% | 3887 | 452 | 941 | 6348 | 899 | 83 | 73.9 | 382 | 1.90 | 200 |
| $\cdots$ | 66 Beetle | 50\% | 2827 | 458 | 703 | 4112 | 1474 | 112 | 79.1 | 530 | . 24 | 4 |
|  |  | 5\% | 4278 | 492 | 764 | 3828 | 2639 | 161 | 114.2 | 1004 | . 54 | 31 |
|  |  | 95\% | 3490 | 493 | 816 | 6307 | 605 | 97 | 78.4 | 417 | . 04 | 0 |
|  | 78 Accord | 50\% | 2140 | 266 | 128 | 1711 | 571 | 88 | 59.3 | 234 | 3.26 | 435 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1890 | 180 | 37 | 826 | 781 | 126 | 54.6 | 171 | 2.90 | 296 |
|  |  | 95\% | 2620 | 798 | 517 | 2978 | 1098 | 111 | 61.6 | 201 | 1.89 | 170 |
|  | 75 Civic | 50\% | 1213 | 494 | 958 | 3356 | 987 | 96 | 46.2 | 79 | . 53 | 25 |
|  |  | 5\% | 1208 | 305 | 590 | 1683 | 705 | 109 | 78.6 | 494 | 1.08 | 81 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1891 | 317 | 978 | 4401 | 424 | 70 | 69.4 | 273 | . 33 | 14 |
|  | 71 Datsun | 50\% | 967 | 552 | 766 | 3004 | 610 | 85 | 42.7 | 69 | 1.72 | 134 |
|  |  | 5\% | 809 | 504 | 719 | 2117 | 1280 | 116 | 57.5 | 209 | 1.21 | 95 |
|  |  | 95\% | 1609 | 378 | 808 | 4535 | 429 | 80 | 59.8 | 149 | 1.19 | 88 |

instant, resulting in even larger net acceleration spikes for the head and chest. Moreover, an aggressive lower IP (or a largely absent lower IP, causing the lower body momentum to be stopped by the even more aggressive foot to firewall contact) would cause any occupant to pitch forward head first, further increasing HIC, but especially more rigid occupants like the ones in the simulations. Since acceleration is raised to the 2.5 power in the calculation of HIC, twice the acceleration results in 5.65 times the HIC. Some of the high HICs for 5th percentile occupants were due to direct head contact with the mid IP in the large older cars but, interestingly, none of the high HICs were due to contacting the headerwhich was the cause of some very high HICs in the Citation sled tests [39], p. 40. Conversely, the unusually low values or complete absence of chest deflection in some of the simulations are likewise attributable to the rigidity of the simulated occupant and the 2 dimensional nature of the simulation. The simulated occupant maintains a seated posture; if the lower IP is aggressive, the chest is kept away from the mid IP or at least slowed down a lot before contacting it. When the feet become enmeshed in the toeboard or firewall, the knees have nowhere to go but up, further preserving the occupant's seated posture. Although similar upward motion of the knees is seen in laboratory tests with unrestrained dummies [51], it may have been exaggerated in these simulations.

### 3.4.2 Normalized rank order scores

Tables $3-1$ and $3-2$ provide 60 scores for each vehicle: 10 different injury measures for each of 3 dummy sizes at 2 speeds. The first step of the statistical analysis is to rank the 21 vehicles on each
of the 60 scores. For example, the 78 Accord has the lowest neck compressive force for 5 th percentile dummies in 30 mph crashes, so it receives a rank score of 1 on that attribute; the 77 Volare is second lowest, so it gets a 2 ; the 76 Ford LTD is the median, receiving a score of 11 ; the 66 Beetle is highest, so it gets a 21. The rank scores are nonparametric in the sense that a difference of 1 in rank scores does not correspond to any particular difference in the underlying raw injury score.

Next, the rank scores $R_{i}$ are converted into a normally distributed variable $Y_{i}$ by Blom's formula

$$
Y_{\mathbf{i}}=\operatorname{PSI}\left(\left(R_{\mathbf{j}}-.375\right) / 21.25\right)
$$

where PSI is the inverse cumulative normal (probit) function [26], p. 362. For example, the f.ccord would receive a score of -1.89 ; the Volare, -1.43 ; the 76 Ford would receive a score of 0 ; and the 66 Beetle, +1.89 . The higher the score, the higher the predicted injury risk.

Now there are 60 scores, each of which has the unit normal distribution. The great advantage of these normal scores is that linear combinations of them will still be normally distributed and easy to analyze. The next step is to develop weighted sums of the scores representing overall predictions of injury performance.

FEMRANK is the variable denoting the overall femur severity score for a particular vehicle.
$\operatorname{FEMRANK}=\operatorname{sqrt}(1 / 6)[\operatorname{FEMUR}(50,25)+\operatorname{FEMUR}(5,25)+\operatorname{FEMUR}(95,25)$
$+\operatorname{FEMUR}(50,30)+\operatorname{FEMUR}(5,30)+\operatorname{FEMUR}(95,30)]$
where $\operatorname{FEMUR}(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{j})$ is the normalized rank score for femur load for the $\mathfrak{i t h}$
percentile dummy in a $j$ mph crash. The purpose of dividing by the square root of 6 is that if the $6 \operatorname{FEMUR}(i, j)$ were independent unit normal variables then FEMRANK would also be a unit normal variable. It puts FEMRANK on the same scale as its component parts. (Of course, in reality, the 6 simulations for the same car are not independent and FEMRANK has standard deviation greater than 1. For statistical significance tests, it is necessary to compute the actual standard deviation of FEMRANK.)

HNRANK is the overall head and neck injury severity score for a particular vehicle.

```
HNRANK = sqrt(1/66) [2xHIC(50,25)+2xHIC(5,25)+2xHIC(95,25)
    +2xHIC(50,30)+2xHIC(5,30)+2xHIC(95,30)
    +2xHEADG(50,25)+2xHEADG(5,25)+2xHEADG(95,25)
    +2xHEADG(50,30)+2xHEADG(5,30)+2xHEADG(95,30)
    +SHEAR (50,25)+SHEAR (5,25)+SHEAR (95,25)
    +SHEAR (50,30)+SHEAR (5,30)+SHEAR (95,30)
    +COMPRESS (50,25)+COMPRESS (5,25)+COMPRESS (95,25)
    +COMPRESS}(50,30)+COMPRESS (5,30)+COMPRESS (95,30
    +MOMENT (50,25)+MOMENT (5,25)+MOMENT (95,25)
    +MOMENT}(50,30)+MOMENT (5,30)+MOMENT(95,30)
```

Again, the purpose of dividing by the square root of 66 is that if the component parts were independent unit normal variables then HNRANK would also be a unit normal variable. The head injury scores are multiplied by 2 in the preceding formula but the neck injury scores are not. Thereby each head score contributes 4 times as much to the variance of HNRANK as each neck score. Since there are 12 head scores and 18 neck scores, the ratio of the contributions of head and neck injury in the variance of HNRANK is 48:18, which is appropriate, since head injuries are more frequent than neck injuries.

Three measures of chest injury risk will be used in the
analyses. GRANK is a chest severity score based on acceleration measurements (peak g's and the Severity Index).

GRANK $=\operatorname{sqrt}(1 / 12)[$ CHESTG(50,25)+CHESTG(5,25)+CHESTG(95,25)

+ CHESTG $(50,30)+$ CHESTG 5,30$)+$ CHESTG 95,30$)$
$+\operatorname{CSI}(50,25)+\operatorname{CSI}(5,25)+\operatorname{CSI}(95,25)$
$+\operatorname{CSI}(50,30)+\operatorname{CSI}(5,30)+\operatorname{CSI}(95,30)]$
DFLRANK is a score based on chest deflection and $S$ Delta $S$ (deformations due to direct contact).

DFLRANK $=\operatorname{sqrt}(1 / 12)[S D e l t a S(50,25)+S D e l t a S(5,25)+S D e l t a S(95,25)$ + SDeltaS $(50,30)+$ SDeltaS $(5,30)+$ SDeltaS $(95,30)$ $+\operatorname{DEFL}(50,25)+\operatorname{DEFL}(5,25)+\operatorname{DEFL}(95,25)$ $+\operatorname{DEFL}(50,30)+\operatorname{DEFL}(5,30)+\operatorname{DEFL}(95,30)]$

Finally, CRNK is the average of the GRANK and DFLRANK and it is the most comprehensive measure of overall chest injury risk.

```
CRNK = sqrt(1/2) [DFLRANK + GRANK]
```

Three measures of overall injury risk (average for all body regions) will be analyzed. TRNK25 is the overall injury risk in 25 mph crashes.

```
TRNK25 = sqrt(1/108) [2xHIC(50,25) +2xHIC(5,25)+2xHIC(95,25)
    +2xHEADG(50,25)+2xHEADG(5,25)+2xHEADG(95,25)
    +SHEAR(50,25)+SHEAR(5,25)+SHEAR(95,25)
    +COMPRESS(50,25)+COMPRESS(5,25)+COMPRESS(95,25)
    +MOMENT}(50,25)+MOMENT(5,25)+MOMENT(95,25
    +2xCHESTG(50,25)+2xCHESTG(5,25)+2xCHESTG(95,25)
    +2xCSI (50,25)+2xCSI (5,25)+2xCSI (95,25)
    +2xSDeltaS(50,25)+2xSDeltaS(5,25)+2xSDeltaS(95,25)
    +2xDEFL(50,25)+2\timesDEFL(5,25)+2xDEFL(95,25)
    +3xFEMUR (50,25)+3xFEMUR (5,25)+3xFEMUR (95,25)]
```

The components are given integer weights which yield a total contribution to variance of 24 for the head scores, 9 for the neck scores, 48 for the chest scores and 27 for the femur scores - a reasonable distribution for a study focusing on the effects of instrument panels on overall injury risk. TRNK30 is the overall injury risk in 30 mph crashes, defined the
same way. Finally,

$$
\text { TRNK }=\operatorname{sqrt}(1 / 2)[\text { TRNK25 }+ \text { TRNK30] }
$$

is the most comprehensive measure of passengers' overall injury risk and the most important dependent variable in the analysis.

It must be reemphasized that the weighted composite scores are not intended to represent the exact contribution of each injury criterion to overall injury risk. It is definitely not appropriate to use them for making quantitative trade-offs between one type of injury and another. Rather, the scores are weighted to represent the relative importance of the various body regions in overall injury severity and to give fair representation to a variety of factors that have been suggested as influential in causing injury to individual body regions. Since the newer cars turn out to have generally better scores on almost all the injury criteria, the details of the weighting scheme are not so important for evaluating the direction of the overall injury trend - but these scores might not be suitable for precision tasks (beyond the scope of this report) such as optimizing panel design.

### 3.4.3 Analysis: injury risk by model year group

As defined in Section 3.4.2, the dependent variables for the injury analysis are the following normalized rank order scores:

TRNK Overall injury score
CRNK Chest injury score
GRANK Chest injury score (acceleration measurements only)
DFLRANK Chest injury score (deflection \& S Delta S)
FEMRANK Femur injury score
HNRANK Head and neck injury score
TRNK25 Overall injury score (25 mph crashes only)
TRNK30 Overall injury score (30 mph crashes only)

Table 3-3 lists the scores for each vehicle, ordered by car group (as defined in the test matrix of Section 3.3.1). The table shows many variations from car to car, but a general trend to lower injuries for the later cars on all the variables except DFLRANK. The trend is more easily seen if the data are graphed by model year. Figure 3-1 shows the observations of TRNK, the overall injury score, by model year. Each data point on the graph is one car; the number denotes the car group to which the car of that model year belongs. There is a sizable drop in the injury scores from the cluster of cars around MY 1966 to the cluster around MY 1969 and a smaller drop from the 1969 cluster to the later cars. One evident outlier is the 1974 Beetle, which had much higher injury scores on the simulations than the other cars of the mid 1970's. It will be seen (in Section 3.5 and Table 3-5) that the 74 Beetle, although meeting the requirements of Standard 201, generally had panel geometry and materials more characteristic of pre 1966 cars. Therefore, it ought not to be included in the model year group containing the cars of the late 60 's and early 1970's, the way it was originally listed in Section 3.3.1. Instead, it is not included in any of the four model year groups, although the data are used in all the analyses that do not specifically pertain to model year groups.

The main objective, however, is not to compare individual cars but rather the average results for the four model year groups. Table 3-4 lists the results by model year groupings and, in the lower section, the average result for each model year group. For example, the average overall injury score TRNK is 2.26 in model year group 1 ( $65-66$ cars); it


TABLE 3-3
MVMA2D RESULTS: NORMALIZED RANK ORDER SCORES, BY CAR GROUP

|  | Car Group | MY Group |  | Vehicle | TRNK | CRNK | GRANK | DFLRANK | FEMRANK | HNRANK | TRNK25 | TRNK30 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 1 | 66 | Ford Galaxie 500 | 1.34 | -1.01 | 1.86 | -3.29 | . 90 | 2.82 | . 73 | 1.16 |
|  |  | 2 | 69 | Ford LTD | -2.92 | -2.19 | -. 01 | -3.08 | . 20 | -2.82 | -2.91 | -1.22 |
|  |  | 3 | 76 | Ford LTD | -2.74 | . 13 | -2.73 | 2.92 | -2.73 | -2.64 | -1.70 | -2.17 |
|  |  | 4 | 79 | Ford LTD | -1.67 | $-1.75$ | -. 59 | -1.89 | . 09 | -. 99 | -1.56 | -. 81 |
|  | 2 | 1 | 65 | Chevrolet Belair | . 58 | . 00 | 2.19 | -2.19 | -. 07 | 1.12 | . 95 | -. 13 |
|  |  | 2 | 69 | Chevrolet Belair | - . 33 | 1.41 | . 19 | 1.81 | -1.50 | -. 94 | -. 06 | -. 41 |
|  |  | 3 | 76 | Cherrolet Caprice | -1.24 | -. 60 | -. 87 | . 02 | -1.98 | . 29 | -. 27 | -1.48 |
| ু |  | 4 | 78 | Buick LeSabre | -2.12 | -3.50 | -2.67 | -2.28 | $-1.50$ | 1.74 | -1. 24 | -1.75 |
|  | 3 | 1 | 66 | Chevrolet Chevy II | 4.94 | 3.36 | 3.83 | . 93 | 1.82 | 3.25 | 3.71 | 3.28 |
|  |  | 2 | 69 | Chevrolet Nova | 2.65 | -. 33 | 3.74 | -4.20 | 3.06 | 2.42 | 1.50 | 2.24 |
|  |  | 4 | 83 | Chevrolet Celebrity | -1.87 | -2.13 | . 14 | -3.15 | . 27 | -1.07 | $-1.17$ | -1.48 |
|  | 4 | 1 | 66 | Plymouth Valiant | -. 28 | 2.31 | 2.22 | 1.04 | -. 30 | -3.02 | . 26 | -. 65 |
|  |  | 2 | 69 | Dodge Dart | -. 61 | . 65 | -. 18 | 1.10 | -. 16 | -1.75 | -. 56 | -. 31 |
|  |  | 3 | 77 | Plymouth Volare | -4.08 | -1.55 | -5.27 | 3.08 | -3.74 | -2.14 | -2.82 | -2.95 |
|  |  | 3 | 79 | Ford Mustang | . 32 | 3.71 | . 56 | 4.69 | 1.11 | -4.91 | 1.38 | -. 93 |
|  | 5 | 1 | 66 | VW Beetle | 4.73 | - . 75 | 3.60 | -4.67 | 3.95 | 5.90 | 3.40 | 3.30 |
|  |  | none | 74 | VW Beetle | 7.71 | 5.82 | 3.95 | 4.28 | 3.57 | 3.69 | 5.51 | 5.40 |
|  |  | 4 | 80 | Dodge Omni | -2.88 | -2.38 | -5.36 | 1.99 | -1.24 | -1.20 | -3.14 | -. 92 |
|  | 6 | 2 | 71 | Datsun 1200 | -1.62 | -1.99 | -2.99 | . 17 | -1.98 | 1.26 | -1.67 | -. 63 |
|  |  | 4 | 75 | Honda Civic | -1.96 | -1.79 | -. 48 | -2.05 | -1.64 | . 09 | -1.50 | -1.27 |
|  |  | 4 |  | Honda Accord | 2.04 | 2.57 | -1.12 | 4.76 | 1.86 | -1. 10 | 1.17 | 1.72 |

TRNK=Overall injury score
GRANK=Chest injury score (acceleration measurements only) FEMRANK=Femur injury score
TRNK25=Overall injury score ( 25 mph crashes only)

CRNK=Chest injury score
DFLRANK=Chest injury score (deflection \& S Delta S)
HNRANK=Head and neck injury score
TRNK30=Overall injury score ( 30 mph crashes only)
tABLE 3-4
MVMA2D RESULTS: NORMALIZED RANK ORDER SCORES, BY MODEL YEAR GROUP


TRNK=Overall injury score
GRANK=Chest injury score (acceleration measurements only)
FEMRANK=Femur injury score
CRNK=Chest injury score
DFLRANK=Chest injury score (deflection \& S Delta S)
HNRANK=Head and neck injury score
TRNK30=Overall injury score ( 30 mph crashes only)
drops to -0.57 in model year group 2 ( $69-71$ cars); TRNK averages -1.93 in MY group 3 (pre-downsized big cars and rear wheel drive smaller cars) and -1.41 in MY group 4 (downsized big cars and front wheel drive small cars). The combined average for the 10 cars of model year groups 3 and 4 (cars of the mid 1970's to early 1980's) is -1.62 .

Is the reduction of the overall injury scores statistically significant? Perhaps the most appropriate comparison would be the average for groups 3 and 4 (1975-83) vs. group 1 (1965-66). An ordinary t test of the difference between two sample means is performed, comparing the sample of 5 values of TRNK from MY group 1 vs. the 10 values of TRNK in MY groups 3 and 4. The $t$ statistic is 3.61 , so the reduction clearly is statistically significant $(d f=13$, one sided $\mathrm{p}=.0016$ ). In other words, the simulations predict that the panel geometry and materials of 1975-83 cars provide greater safety to unrestrained right front passengers than do the panels of 1965-66 cars - although they do not predict how much safer.

The overall injury scores in cars of MY group 2 (1969-71) are also significantly lower than in group $1(1965-66): t=1.99, \mathrm{df}=8$, one sided $p=.041$. But the reduction from group 2 (average score -0.57 ) to groups 3 and 4 (average score -1.62 ) does not achieve statistical significance: $\mathrm{t}=1.05, \mathrm{df}=13$, one-sided $\mathrm{p}=.16$. Thus, the simulations indicate a significant injury reduction for cars of the late 1960's relative to cars of the mid 1960's and a possible additional reduction for cars of the 1970's relative to cars of the late 1960's.

The average values of TRNK for the four MY groups are marked as circled $X$ 's on Figure $3-1$ (and the outlying 1974 Beetle likewise circled). A bold horizontal line is drawn through TRNK $=-1.62$, the average value for groups 3 and 4 combined. Dotted lines are drawn through TRNK = $-1.62 \pm 2$. They do not imply confidence bounds in a rigorous sense but they give a rough idea of the "noise" range. Note that 4 out of the 5 1965-66 cars are above the upper dotted line, while 4 out of the 5 1969-71 cars and 9 out of the 10 1975-83 cars are below it. Above all, note the similarity of the patterns in Figures 3-1 and 2-1 (the NCSS analysis): a big reduction in cars of the mid to late 1960's, followed by a smaller reduction and a leveling off in the 1970's.

Figure 3-2 presents the results for the combined chest injury score CRNK. Although the trend is toward lower injury risk (according to Table 3-4, CRNK averages 0.78 in MY group 1, -0.49 in MY group 2 and -0.73 in combined groups 3 and 4), it is clear from Figure 3-2 that the variations within MY groups are almost as large as those between groups. Indeed, the difference between group 1 and combined groups 3 and 4 is not statistically significant: $t=1.27, d f=13$, one-sided $p=.12$. Figures 3-3 and 3-4 decompose CRNK into its components GRANK (acceleration based chest scores) and DFLRANK (direct contact deformation based scores). Now it becomes clear why CRNK has only a slight trend: GRANK has a strong favorable trend toward lower chest g's in the later cars while DFLRANK may be going in the opposite direction. The reduction in GRANK from group 1 (average value 2.74) to groups 3 and 4 (average value -1.84 ) is obviously significant: $t=4.57, d f=13$, one-sided $p=.0003$. The increase in




DFLRANK from group 1 (average value -1.63) to groups 3 and 4 (average value 0.81 ) is, however, nonsignificant: $t=-1.54, d f=13$, one-sided $p=$ .08. It can be seen in Figure $3-3$ that the values of GRANK for the 1965-66 cars are all well above the "noise" range for the later cars, whereas in Figure 3-4, the DFLRANK values are far more dispersed.

Figure 3-5 indicates that FEMRANK, the femur injury score, has a moderate trend toward lower injury in the later model years, although there is some overlap between the earlier and later cars. The reduction in FEMRANK from group 1 (average value 1.26) to groups 3 and 4 (average value -0.95 ) is statistically significant: $t=2.31, \mathrm{df}=13$, one-sided p $=.02$.

Head and neck injury, as predicted by HNRANK, also decreased in the later cars. Figure 3-6 shows that 4 of the 5 cars in MY group 1 had HNRANK predictions above the error range for the later cars. The reduction in HNRANK from group 1 (average value 2.01) to groups 3 and 4 (average value -1.19 ) is significant: $t=2.47, \mathrm{df}=13$, one-sided $\mathrm{p}=$ .014.

There are hardly any differences in average performance on the 25 mph and 30 mph crashes. Figure $3-7$ shows almost the same trend on TRNK25, the overall injury score based on the 25 mph simulations, as Figure 3-8 does on TRNK30: a big reduction in cars of the later 1960's followed by a possible additional reduction and a levelling off in the 1970's. It is the same trend as in Figure 3-1 (TRNK, the combination of



FIGURE 3-8: TRNK30 (Overall Injury Score - 30 mph crashes) BY MODEL YEAR
(3)



TRNK25 and TRNK30). The reduction in TRNK25 from group 1 (average value 1.81) to groups 3 and 4 (average value -1.09) is significant: $t=3.46$; $d f$ $=13$, one-sided $p=.002$. TRNK30 likewise drops significantly from group 1 (average value 1.39) to groups 3 and 4 (average value -1.20 ): $t=3.28$, $\mathrm{df}=13$, one-sided $\mathrm{p}=.003$.

### 3.5 Instrument panel geometry and force deflection - by model year

The preceding analyses of injury scores by model year group showed some clear trends - always in the right direction except for DFLRANK (chest deflection and S Delta S). The input data to the simulations - instrument panel geometry and force deflection characteristics can also be statistically analyzed to see if panel design changed significantly over the years and to relate the changes in injury scores (as predicted by the simulation models - see Section 3.2) to specific changes in panel design. In particular, did panel design really change in the ways described in the literature (see Section 1.4)? Did these panel modifications ameliorate injury risk as predicted by researchers?

The first step of the analysis is to look only at the changes of panel design over the model years 1965-83. Cohen performed similar analyses, but with different vehicles and characterizations of the panel parameters [6]. The analysis here is based on the 21 cars of the test matrix and uses 6 parameters to describe the vehicle interior - 3 for geometry and 3 for force deflection:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { IPL } & \text { Instrument panel length } \\
\text { AMIP } & \text { Angle of the mid IP } \\
\text { AWSH } & \text { Rake angle of the windshield }
\end{array}
$$

| FDMIP | Max. force deflection of mid IP in first 3 inches |
| :--- | :--- |
| FDLIP6 | Max. force deflection of lower IP at 6 inches |
| LIP2000 | Inches till lower IP reaches 2000 pounds force defl. |

IPL is the perimeter length from the front of the top IP to the bottom of the lower IP in a longitudinal cross section of the car down the middle to the right front passenger's seat position. IPL was obtained by adding the lengths of the top, mid and lower IP measurements by the contractor (for the older cars) or TSC (for the newer cars). The panel measurements derived from crash test data (Accord, Celebrity, Mustang and Omni) were not used here, since some length has been "added" as an aid to running MVMA2D (see Section 3.3.3). AMIP is the angle between the mid IP surface and a vector pointing toward the front of the car. When AMIP is less than 90, the mid IP slopes downward toward the passenger; when AMIP is greater than 90, the mid IP falls away from the passenger. AWSH is measured the same way as AMIP, but usually has values well over 90 . The more "raked" the windshield, the greater AWSH. IPL, AMIP and AWSH are illustrated in the accompanying diagram.


FDMIP, FDLIP6 and LIP2000, illustrated on the force deflection curves in the accompanying diagram, are based on the actual input data used in the MVMA2D simulations, which sometimes differ from the numbers supplied by the contractor, as explained in Section 3.4.3. FDMIP is the maximum force deflection of the mid instrument panel anywhere in the first 3 inches of penetration. The 3 inch cutoff is selected because the passengers' chests typically penetrate that far or less in the simulations. FDLIP6 is the force deflection of the lower IP at exactly 6 inches Mid IP


DEFLECTION (rimes)

penetration depth. In most of the 30 mph simulations, the knees penetrate well beyond 6 inches. Thus FDLIP6 describes the aggressiveness of the lower IP in the earlier stages of the passenger's interaction with the panel. LIP2000 is the amount of penetration needed to reach 2000 pounds force deflection in the lower IP, a force level that will stop the passenger's forward motion in a few inches. It describes the aggressiveness of the lower IP in the later stages of the passenger's contact. On 4 cars where the force never reached 2000 pounds in the MVMA2D input data, LIP2000 was arbitrarily set at 18 inches - i.e., a number higher than for any of the other cars. In general, the stiffer the panel, the higher FDMIP and FDLIP6 and the lower LIP2000.

Next, the measurements were converted to normalized rank order scores, somewhat resembling the process for the injury scores (see Section 3.4.2). The 21 cars were given ranks from 1 (lowest measurement) to 21 (highest measurement) on each of the six variables and the ranks were transformed to unit normal variates by the formula in Section 3.4.2. The normalized rank order scores can readily be analyzed by conventional methods for correlation with model year and with the injury scores.

Table 3-5 shows the values of the 6 parameters for each of the 21 cars, organized by manufacturer/market class. Although there are exceptions, the general trend in each class is that IPL, AWSH and LIP2000 increased while AMIP, FDMIP and FDLIP6 decreased. In Table 3-6, the cars are listed by model year group. The lower part of the table shows the average values for each model year group. For example, the normalized

INSTRUMENT PANEL GEOMETRY AND FORCE DEFLECTION: NORMALIZED RANK ORDER SCORES, BY CAR GROUP

|  | Car Group | MY Group |  | Vehicle | IPL | AMIP | AWSH |  | FDMIP | FDLIP6 | LIP2000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 1 |  | Ford Galaxie 500 | -1.16 | 1.89 | . 30 |  | . 78 | 1.16 | -1.43 |
|  |  | 2 |  | Ford LTD | - . 23 | . 00 | . 63 |  | -. 49 | . 36 | -. 78 |
|  |  | 3 | 76 | Ford LTD | 1.16 | . 63 | . 95 |  | . 30 | -. 63 | 1.36 |
|  |  | 4 |  | Ford LTD | -. 36 | -. 56 | . 12 |  | -1.89 | . 00 | -. 49 |
|  | 2 | 1 | 65 | Chevrolet Belair | . 00 | . 49 | -. 12 |  | . 30 | . 49 | -. 24 |
|  |  | 2 | 69 | Chevrolet BelAir | . 36 | . 12 | -. 95 |  | . 00 | -. 30 | . 12 |
|  |  | 3 | 76 | Chevrolet Caprice | . 95 | -. 56 | -. 30 |  | -. 24 | -. 30 | . 36 |
|  |  | 4 | 78 | Buick LeSabre | -. 95 | . 24 | . 63 |  | -. 95 | -. 12 | 1.36 |
| $\underset{N}{\infty}$ | 3 | 1 | 66 | Chevrolet Chevy II | -. 63 | . 78 | -. 63 |  | 1.89 | . 78 | -. 95 |
|  |  | 2 | 69 | Chevrolet Nova | -. 49 | 1.43 | -. 30 |  | $-.12$ | 1.89 | -1.16 |
|  |  | 4 | 83 | Chevrolet Celebrity | 1.89 | -1.89 | 1.16 |  | -7.43 | . 24 | -. 12 |
|  | 4 | 1 | 66 | Plymouth Valiant | - . 78 | 1.16 | . 63 |  | 1.16 | . 63 | -. 63 |
|  |  | 2 | 69 | Dodge Dart | -. 12 | . 95 | . 30 |  | . 49 | -. 49 | -. 36 |
|  |  | 3 | 77 | Plymouth Volare | . 78 | . 36 | -. 78 | - | . 12 | -. 78 | . 78 |
|  |  | 3 | 79 | Ford Mustang | . 63 | - . 78 | 1.43 |  | $-1.16$ | -1.16 | . 49 |
|  | 5 | 1 | 66 | WW Beetle | -1.89 | -. 36 | -1.89 |  | -. 63 | . 95 | 1.36 |
|  |  | none | 74 | VW Beetle | -1.43 | - . 24 | -1.43 |  | 1.43 | 1.43 | -1.89 |
|  |  | 4 | 80 | Dodge Omni | 1.43 | -. 95 | . 00 |  | -. 36 | -1.89 | 1.35 |
| 6 |  | 2 |  | Datsun 1200 | . 12 | -. 12 | -1. 16 |  | . 63 | -1.43 | . 63 |
|  |  | 4 |  | Honda Civic | . 24 | -1.43 | -. 49 |  | . 95 | . 12 | . 24 |
|  |  | 4 |  | Honda Accord | . 49 | -1. 16 | 1.89 |  | -. 78 | -. 95 | . 00 |

[^1]AMIP=Angle of the mid IP
FDMIP=Max. force/deflection of mid IP in 1st 3 inches LIP2000=Penetration at which lower IP reaches 2000 lbs

INSTRUMENT PANEL GEOMETRY AND FORCE DEFLECTION: NORMALIZED RANK ORDER SCORES, BY MODEL YEAR GROUP


IPL=Instrument panel length
AWSH=Windshield rake angle
FDLIP6=Force deflection of lower IP at 6 inches

AMIP=Angle of the mid IP
FDMIP=Max. force/deflection of mid IP in lst 3 inches LIP2000=Penetration at which 1 ower IP reaches 2000 lbs
rank order score for IPL averaged -0.89 in the $65-66$ cars, -0.07 in the 1969-7I cars and 0.63 in the 1975-83 cars (combination of groups 3 and 4).

Figure 3-9 graphs the values of IPL for the 21 cars by model year. The numbers of the data points represent the manufacturer/market class. The circled X's are the averages for the four model year groups and the outlier 1974 Beetle is also circled (its panel length is far below the general trend). Figure $3-9$ shows a strong positive correlation between model year and instrument panel length. Indeed the linear correlation between IPL and model year is . 64 and it is statistically significant ( $\mathrm{df}=19, \mathrm{p}=.0018$ ). The increase in IPL from MY group 1 (average value -0.89 ) to MY groups 3 and 4 (average value 0.63 ) is likewise significant $(t=3.48, d f=13, p=.004)$. The trend is consistent with statements in the literature (see Section 1.4) that panels became more protrusive and extended lower, so as to enhance ride down and provide better engagement by the passenger's knees.

Figure 3-10 graphs the values of AMIP by model year as well as the averages for the four model year groups. Figure $3-10$ shows a clear negative correlation between model year and the angle of the mid IP. Indeed the linear correlation between AMIP and model year is -.71 and it is statistically significant $(p=.0003)$. The decrease in AMIP from MY group 1 (average value 0.79 ) to MY groups 3 and 4 (average value -0.61 ) is likewise significant $(t=3.12, d f=13, p=.008)$. The trend is consistent with statements in Section 1.4 that panels dropped away from passengers in the older cars hut have become more nearly vertical or taper down


toward the passenger in more recent cars.

The historical record of windshield rake angles is shown in Figure 3-11. The normalized rank order scores vary widely from car to car. (The wide variations in fact represent slight differences in the actual rake angles.) Nevertheless, there appears to be a modest trend to more raked windshields in the more recent cars. The linear correlation between model year and AWSH is .42 , which is on the borderline of statistical significance $(p .=.054)$. The increase in AWSH from MY group 1 (average value -0.34 ) to MY groups 3 and 4 (average value 0.46 ) does not achieve significance $(t=1.59, d f=13, p=.14)$. Nevertheless, the data are consistent with earlier statements that windshields have become more raked (more nearly horizontal).

Figure 3-12 shows a definite trend toward softer mid instrument panels. The linear correlation between model year and FDMIP is -0.60 , which is statistically significant $(p=.004)$. The reduction in FDMIP from MY group 1 (average value 0.69) to MY groups 3 and 4 (average value -0.54 ) is also significant $(t=2.55, d f=13, p=.02)$. The results are certainly consistent with statements in the literature that instrument panels have become softer.

Lower instrument panels have also become softer, as evidenced by Figures $3-13$ and $3-14$. Figure $3-13$ shows a strong negative trend for FDLIP6, the lower IP force deflection at 6 inches depth - although, perhaps, some of the latest cars have flattened out or even reversed the




trend by having a sort of knee bolster. The correlation between FDLIP6 and model year is -.54 , which is significant $(p=.011)$. The reduction in FDLIP6 from MY group 1 (average value 0.80 ) to MY groups 3 and 4 (average value -0.55 ) is also significant $(t=4.29, d f=13, p=.0009)$. Figure 3-14 shows a corresponding positive trend for LIP2000, the depth at which the lower IP reaches 2000 pounds force deflection. The correlation between LIP2000 and model year is . 40, which approaches significance ( $p=$ .011). The increase in LIP2000 from MY group 1 (average value -0.37) to MY groups 3 and 4 (average value 0.53 ) is also borderline significant ( $t=$ 2.06, $\mathrm{df}=13, \mathrm{p}=.06$ ). These statistics understate the real trend; the 66 Beetle reached a fairly high rigidity in a relatively short distance, but never reached 2000 pounds, so its very high value of LIP2000 is deceptive. Without the 66 Beetle, the average for MY group 1 is -0.82 rather than -0.37. This average is shown on Figure 3-14 as an $X$ inside a dotted circle.

The statistical analysis of the instrument panel measurements confirms each of the statements made in Section 1.4 about what happened to the panels during the 1960-80 period.

### 3.6 Relation of injury risk to panel geometry and force deflection

Since the injury scores and the instrument panel parameters are all expressed as normalized rank orders, it is straightforward to perform correlational analyses relating the injury scores

TRNK Overall injury score
CRNK Chest injury score
GRANK Chest injury score (acceleration measurements only)

DFLRANK Chest injury score (chest deflection and S Delta S) FEMRANK Femur injury score HNRANK Head and neck injury score TRNK25 Overall injury score ( 25 mph crashes only) TRNK30 Overall injury score ( 30 mph crashes only)
to the instrument panel parameters

| IPL | Instrument panel length |
| :--- | :--- |
| AMIP | Angle of the mid IP |
| AWSH | Rake angle of the windshield |
|  |  |
| FDMIP | Max. force deflection of mid IP in first 3 inches |
| FDLIP6 | Max. force deflection of lower IP at 6 inches |
| LIP2000 | Inches till lower IP reaches 2000 pounds force defl. |

The scope of the analysis, as stated in Section 3.2, is to offer some preliminary explanations of why instrument panels of cars of the 1970's have more satisfactory injury performance than cars of the mid 1960's - not to obtain estimates of injury severity as a function of panel design or to find the design which results in the lowest possible injury. The analysis is carried out in two stages: simple correlation and multiple correlation (stepwise regression). The 21 data points for the correlation and regression analyses are the 21 cars of the sled test matrix: values of the injury scores and IP parameters have been computed for each of the cars and are shown in Tables 3-3 and 3-5. The simple correlation approach is useful as a preliminary scan, indicating what parameters have the strongest association with various types of injury and whether these parameters have changed historically. Its shortcoming is that the panel geometry and force deflection parameters themselves are often intercorrelated (e.g., cars with soft mid IP's often tend to have soft lower IP's). The effects of two parameters working together or against one another can be masked in the simple correlation analysis. Multiple regression analysis is more helpful for explaining why certain panel features are
especially associated with high or low injury risk.

Table 3-7 shows the linear correlations of each of the IP parameters with each of the injury scores, as well as with model year. For example, the correlation between TRNK, the overall injury score and IPL, the instrument panel length is -.64 . This is a statistically significant correlation ( $\mathrm{df}=19, \mathrm{p}=.002$ ). Indeed, Figure $3-15$, a scatterplot of TRNK by IPL for the 21 cars, clearly shows an association between longer instrument panels and lower injury risk. The numbers on the graph indicate the manufacturer/market classes of the cars. Appendix D contains 48 scatterplots similar to Figure 3-15, one for each injury score - panel parameter combination.

Table 3-7 indicates which panel parameters have significant correlations (single asterisk, $R=.44$ or more, $d f=19, p$ less than .05 ) or borderline correlations (double asterisk, R from . 36 to . 43 , p from . 05 to .ll) with injury scores. The most important question is whether the correlation of a panel parameter with injury and its correlation with model year have the same or opposite signs. For example, IPL has positive correlation with MY and negative correlation with TRNK. In other words, more recent cars have longer instrument panels and longer panels are associated with lower injury risk. The increase in IPL helps explain why injuries decreased in the more recent cars. But FDLIP6 has negative correlation with MY and negative correlation with DFLRANK. In other words, more recent cars have softer lower IP's which are less helpful in slowing the chest to mid IP contact. The decrease in FDLIP6 helps explain

TABLE 3-7
MVMALD INJURY PREDICTIONS VS. INSTRUMENT PANEL GEOMETRY AND FORCE DEFLECTION: CORRELATIONS OF NORMALIZED RANK ORDER SCORES

| Correlation Coefficient |  | IPL | AMIP | AWSH | FDMIP | FDLIP6 | LIP2000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MY | model year | .64* | -.71* | .42** | -.60* | -.54* | .39** |
| TRNK | overall injury | -.64* | . 18 | $\underline{-.36}{ }^{* *}$ | . $38{ }^{* *}$ | . 62 * | -. 52 * |
| CRNK | chest injury | -. 23 | . 13 | -. 01 | .43** | . 22 | -. $46^{*}$ |
| GRANK | chest injury (accel. measurements) | $\underline{-.63 *}$ | . 31 | -. 22 | . 31 | .84* | -.67* |
| DFLRANK | chest inj. (deflection \& S Delta S) | . 33 | -. 14 | . 20 | . 19 | -. 54 * | . 10 |
| FEMRANK | femur injury | -.59* | . 06 | -. 11 | . 02 | . 63 * | -.52* |
| HNRANK | head and neck injury | $\underline{-.65 *}$ | . 19 | -.66* | . 30 | . $59 *$ | -. 20 |
| TRNK25 | overall injury (25 mph crashes) | $\underline{-.60 *}$ | . 18 | -. 31 | .37** | . 60 * | $\underline{-.47 *}$ |
| TRNK30 | overall injury (30 mph crashes) | $\underline{-.65 *}$ | . 17 | $\underline{-.40 * *}$ | .38** | . 60 * | $\underline{-.54 *}$ |

IPL=Instrument pane 1 length
AWSH=Windshield rake angle
FDLIP6=Force deflection of lower IP at 6 inches

AMIP=Angle of the mid IP
FDMIP=Max. force/deflection of mid IP in 1st 3 inches LIP2000=Penetration at which lower IP reaches 2000 1bs
*Significant correlation ( $R=.44$ or more, $d f=19, p$ less than .05 )
**Borderline correlation ( $R$ from .36 to $.43, p$ from .05 to .11)
Bold underline - consistent with injury reduction in later cars
Dotted underline - consistent with injuries increasing in later cars

why chest compression increased in the more recent cars, at least according to MVMA2D.

Table 3-8 shows the combination of panel parameters, selected by stepwise multiple regression, that gives the best prediction of the injury scores. For example, IPL is the first independent variable selected for a model to predict TRNK and LIP2000 is the second; adding further parameters to the model does not significantly improve the predictions. The multiple correlation coefficient for the model is . 70 (which exceeds the correlations of TRNK with any of the individual parameters - see Table 3-7). The coefficients for IPL and LIP2000 in the regression model are both negative; since IPL and LIP2000 increased in more recent cars, the model would tend to predict lower injury risk in the newer cars. Figure $3-16$ is a scatterplot of the 21 actual values of TRNK, based on the MVMA2D simulations, vs. the expected values based on the regression model using IPL and LIP2000. The numbers on the graph indicate the model year groups of the cars. Appendix $E$ contains 8 scatterplots similar to Figure 3-16, one regression model for each injury score.

The results in Table 3-7 and 3-8 are easiest to understand by starting with the injuries to individual body regions (FEMRANK, HNRANK, GRANK, DFLRANK) and working back to the more comprehensive measures (CRNK, TRNK, TRNK25, TRNK30). FEMRANK, the femur injury score, understandably has a strong positive correlation with FDLIP6 ( $R=.63$ ) and a strong negative correlation with LIP2000 (-.52). In other words, the more rigid the lower IP, the higher the femur injury risk. It also has a strong

TABLE 3-8
MVMA2D INJURY PREDICTIONS VS. INSTRUMENT PANEL GEOMETRY AND FORCE DEFLECTION: MODELS SELECTED BY STEPWISE REGRESSION


negative correlation with IPL (-.59) - i.e., longer and more obtrusive panels, with their improved ride down qualities and better knee contact areas, are associated with lower femur injury risk. Another possible explanation is that IPL has strong negative intercorrelation with FDLIP6 (R=-.66); since FDLIP6 is highly correlated with FEMRANK, IPL would have at least some negative association with FEMRANK, even if there were no cause and effect relationship.

A clearer picture emerges in the multiple regression analysis. As might be expected, FDLIP6, the force on the lower IP at 6 inches deflection, is the first variable selected, with a positive coefficient; LIP2000, the deflection of the lower IP at which force reaches 2000 pounds, is not selected since it is largely redundant with FDLIP6. AMIP, the angle of the mid instrument panel, which only has +.06 correlation with FEMRANK in Table 3-7, is the second variable selected in the regression. Its relationship with FEMRANK had been masked by its intercorrelation with FDLIP6 and IPL (the newer cars tend to have higher IPL, lower FDLIP6 and lower AMIP). Surprisingly, the coefficient is negative - i.e., if the mid IP slopes toward the occupant, femur injury risk is higher. It might have been expected that such a slope would produce earlier knee to lower IP contact and better ride down; what actually happened is that the cars with mid IP's vertical or sloping toward the occupant tended to have lower IP's that were fairly high up and sloped sharply away from the passenger. This was perhaps a compensatory measure to provide seating comfort. The result was that passengers' knees slid forward in the simulation until the feet engaged the firewall and a harder part of the
lower IP was reached - resulting in a large combined femur load.

IPL, the perimeter length of the panel, is the third and last variable selected by the regression, with a negative coefficient, suggesting that longer and more obtrusive panels may indeed be associated with lower femur injury risk. The multiple $R$ is .74. Since FDLIP6 and IPL have strong correlations with model year in the opposite direction of their regression coefficients, they tend to make femur injury decrease in the more recent cars but AMIP, whose correlation with model year is in the same direction as its regression coefficient, partially counteracts that effect (as indicated by the dotted underlining of AMIP in Table 3-8). The net effect is that femur injury risk declined in cars of the late 1960's and early 1970's, as panels became softer and longer, but the decline leveled off in later years as AMIP began to decrease (see Figure 3-5).

HNRANK, the head and neck injury score, has a strong negative correlation with the windshield rake angle AWSH (-.66) and IPL (-.65) and a strong positive correlation with FDLIP6 (.59). In the stepwise regression, however, only AWSH and FDLIP6 are selected. The correlation of IPL with HNRANK seems mainly due to its intercorrelation with the other two parameters. The regression, with a multiple $R$ of .78 , gives a negative coefficient to AWSH and a positve one to FDLIP6. The more raked the windshield, the lower the head and neck injury risk; specifically, a raked windshield results in earlier head contact and better ride down for the unrestrained occupant - a desirable effect only slightly offset by a penalty of greater head and neck rotation. The strong relationship of

HNRANK with FDLIP6 shows that a stiff lower IP stops the passenger's lower body and makes him plunge head first, with greater force, into the windshield. As stated in Section 1.4, a relatively soft lower IP is needed to maintain the upright position of the unrestrained passenger during the collision, preventing excessive head injuries. Since AWSH and FDLIP6 have correlations with model year in the opposite direction of their correlations with HNRANK, it is appropriate that head and neck injury decreased in the more recent cars (see Figure 3-6).

GRANK, the chest acceleration score, has exceptional correlation with FDLIP6 (.84). It is the only independent variable which makes a significant contribution in the regression analysis. A lower IP with high force deflection at about 6 inches depth sends strong noncontact g's to the chest at about the same time that the chest contacts the mid IP, resulting in a high spike, at least in these MVMA2D simulations in which the occupant seemed to have a fairly strong linkage between body regions. As a result, abrupt decelerations of the femurs were propagated as high noncontact g's to the chest and head, perhaps more so than would occur in real crashes. LIP2000 and IPL also have significant linear correlations with GRANK, but this would appear to be due to their intercorrelation with FDLIP6. It is interesting to note that FDMIP, mid instrument panel stiffness, only has limited correlation with GRANK (.31). Since FDLIP6 is much lower in newer cars than in older cars, so is GRANK (see Figure 3-3).

DFLRANK, the chest injury score based on chest deflection and S Delta $S$, is also strongly correlated with FDLIP6 (-.54), but in the
opposite direction. FDLIP6 is the first variable selected by the stepwise regression. FDMIP, the maximum force of the mid instrument panel during its first 3 inches of deflection, is the second; the effect of FDMIP, which is masked in Table 3-7 due to its positive intercorrelation with FDLIP6, becomes clear in the regression. The multiple $R$ is .65. Logically, FDLIP6 has a negative coefficient and FDMIP, a positive one. In other words, the stiffer the lower IP, the better a job it does slowing the occupant's torso, by applying force through the knees, before the chest contacts the mid IP. But the stiffer the mid IP, the more severe the chest injuries due to direct contact with it. Thus, a lower IP like a knee bolster - quickly developing high forces and perhaps protruding toward the occupant - is desirable for reducing DFLRANK but might be detrimental for other types of injuries to unrestrained passengers because they pitch head forward rather than staying in an upright position. Since FDLIP6 is lower for newer cars, DFLRANK would tend to increase for newer cars, but the effect is partially counteracted by FDMIP, which is also lower for newer cars and has the opposite sign in the regression (see Figure 3-4).

That complete; the analysis of four specific injury types. As might have been expected, windshield rake angle was an important factor in head injuries and irrelevant to the other injuries; mid IP stiffness was important in predicting direct contact chest injury and irrelevant to the other types. Lower IP stiffness, however, was important not only in femur injury but also was selected as a key variable in each of the other types. A stiff lower IP transmitted noncontact accelerations to the head
and chest and caused the unrestrained passenger to lose his upright posture but it had the desirable effect of slowing the chest to mid IP interaction. Longer and more obtrusive instrument panels were associated with reductions of nearly all types of injuries, perhaps because they have better ride down qualities, but perhaps merely because they tend to be softer, too (intercorrelation with the other parameters). IP length was selected as an important variable, though, in only one of the regressions.

The analysis of composite injury measures begins with CRNK, the combination of acceleration and deflection based chest injury scores. As stated above, chest g's increased in the MVMA2D simulations when FDLIP6 increased, while chest deflection was reduced. The effects cancel one another and, as a result, CRNK has little correlation with FDLIP6 (.22). Table 3-7 shows that CRNK has a significant negative correlation with LIP2000 (-.46), the penetration depth at which the force deflection for the lower IP reaches 2000 pounds. LIP2000 is a variable generally describing the stiffness of the lower IP after deformations well beyond 6 inches: the stiffer the panel, the lower LIP2000. LIP2000 has significant correlation with GRANK (-.67) but not with DFLRANK (.10); only the first 6 inches or so of the lower IP have the possibility of significantly slowing the occupant before the chest contacts the mid IP, whereas at greater depths the lower IP transmits forces to the torso through the femurs when the chest is already in contact with the mid IP. FDMIP, as might be expected, has positive correlation with CRANK, although of borderline significance (.43). Table 3-8 shows that the stepwise regression in fact selects LIP2000 and FDMIP as the key variables, although the multiple $R$ of
.53 is inferior to the regressions for the other injury scores. The best compromise for chest injury is obtained with a soft mid IP and with a lower IP that is neither too hard nor too soft, but dissipates energy gradually over a long stroke. Since newer cars tend to have lower FDMIP and higher LIP2000 than older cars, CRNK tends to be slightly lower, on the average, for the newer cars (see Figure 3-2).

TRNK, the overall injury score, has significant or borderline significant correlation with nearly all of the panel parameters. TRNK, after all, is the composite of FEMRANK, HNRANK, GRANK and DFLRANK and each of the panel parameters has significant association with at least one of those injury types. Specifically, IPL (-.64), LIP2000 (-.52) and AWSH (-.36) have negative correlation with TRNK, while FDLIP6 (.62) and FDMIP (.38) have positive correlation. The regression selects IPL and LIP2000 as the two most important parameters, both with negative coefficients and a multiple R of .70 . Longer, lower, more obtrusive instrument panels with an extensive depth of deformable material (taking a long time to reach 2000 pounds force) were associated with reductions of almost all the individual injury types for unrestrained occupants: they have good ride down qualities, help keep the occupant in an upright position and assure a good knee to lower panc. 1 contact. Since more recent cars tend to have significantly higher values of IPL and LIP2000, it is not surprising that unrestrained right front passengers are predicted to have lower overall injury risk in frontal crashes (see Figure 3-1).

TRNK30 and TRNK25, the overall injury scores in 30 and 25 mph
crashes, have virtually the same correlation patterns as one another and as TRNK. The regression for TRNK3O results in selection of the same variables as for TRNK - IPL and LIP2000 - with the same signs for the regression coefficients and a multiple $R$ of .72 . The regression for TRNK25, appropriately, results in the selection of FDLIP6 rather than LIP2000, to accompany IPL. (The positive coefficient for FDLIP6 is, however, equivalent to a negative coefficient for LIP2000). In the more severe $30, \mathrm{mph}$ crashes, the performance of the lower IP after extensive deformation, as expressed by LIP2000, seems to be more important. In the 25 mph crashes, the lower IP performance in the earlier stages of crush, as expressed by FDLIP6, is the critical factor. Since the lower instrument panels of newer cars tend to be softer throughout the first 12 inches or so of crush - i.e., lower FDLIP6 and higher LIP2000 - and also have higher IPL, both TRNK25 and TRNK30 tend to be lower in the more recent cars (see Figures 3-7 and 3-8).

### 3.7 A comment on engular acceleration of the head

MVMA2D prints out the angular acceleration of the center of mass of the head, in radians/second ${ }^{2}$, throughout the simulation. The peak absolute values during the first 160 milliseconds are:

30 mph crashes
25 mph crashes

|  | 50 th <br> $\%$ ile | 5 th <br> $\%$ ile | 95 th <br> $\%$ ile | 50 th <br> $\%$ ile | 5 th <br> $\%$ ile | 95 th <br> $\%$ ile |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 7166 | 13212 |
| 79 Ford | 12593 | 13666 | 10417 | 4794 |  |  |
| 76 Ford | 8440 | 8923 | 10057 | 8661 | 10276 | 7676 |
| 69 Ford | 12037 | 13048 | 10344 | 11281 | 13732 | 6849 |
| 66 Ford | 14077 | 24401 | 9212 | 14378 | 14716 | 11658 |


|  | 30 mph crashes |  |  | 25 mph crashes |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $50 \text { th }$ $\% \text { ile }$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5 \text { th } \\ \% \text { ile } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 95th } \\ & \% \text { ile } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 50 \text { th } \\ & \% \text { ile } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5th } \\ & \% \text { ile } \end{aligned}$ | 95th <br> \%ile |
| 78 Buick | 11438 | 10122 | 14762 | 11366 | 13708 | 10361 |
| 76 Chevy | 6032 | 12260 | 6836 | 5243 | 12085 | 9880 |
| 69 Chevy | 10417 | 11692 | 9863 | 10722 | 7755 | 7872 |
| 65 Chevy | 9601 | 21790 | 7985 | 7997 | 25525 | 12287 |
| 83 Celebrity | 10519 | 5962 | 14358 | 6470 | 7333 | 10271 |
| 69 Nova | 17725 | 23010 | 13326 | 6261 | 15147 | 7337 |
| 66 Nova | 15150 | 17797 | 11385 | 11187 | 18078 | 11465 |
| 79 Mustang | 9411 | 5628 | 8001 | 9693 | 7211 | 6046 |
| 77 Volare | 9943 | 14683 | 11525 | 9945 | 8623 | 7962 |
| 69 Dart | 6447 | 23753 | 10258 | 7839 | 21594 | 8358 |
| 66 Valiant | 8763 | 13046 | 9713 | 7798 | 9368 | 5516 |
| 80 Omni | 16219 | 10643 | 14259 | 10516 | 8882 | 7605 |
| 74 Beetle | 11694 | 17548 | 10111 | 12611 | 14657 | 10413 |
| 66 Beetle | 10536 | 21895 | 8694 | 9365 | 15859 | 10460 |
| 78 Accord | 11209 | 7963 | 13669 | 7488 | 6029 | 6396 |
| 75 Civic | 10334 | 14444 | 12087 | 9379 | 11219 | 7566 |
| 71 Datsun | 11316 | 14058 | 10805 | 7807 | 12067 | 8676 |

Some of the exceptionally severe accelerations for the 5 th percentile dummies occurred in cars where they strike the mid instrument panel with their heads.

The results are converted into normalized rank order scores as in Section 3.4.2 and then combined into a single variable.

```
HAARANK = sqrt(1/6) [HAA(50,25)+HAA(5,25)+HAA(95,25)
    +HAA(50,30)+HAA(5,30)+HAA(95,30)]
```

where $H A A(i, j)$ is the normalized rank score for femur load for the ith percentile dummy in a $j$ mph crash. The composite HAARANK scores for each vehicle are:

| 79 Ford | .- .74 | 79 Mustang | -2.52 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: |
| 76 Ford | -1.30 | 77 Volare | -.02 |
| 69 Ford | . .43 | 69 Dart | . .44 |
| 66 Ford | 2.45 | 66 Valiant | -1.78 |
| 78 Buick | 1.43 | 80 Omni | .60 |
| 76 Chevy | -2.31 | 74 Beetle | 1.41 |
| 69 Chevy | -.68 | 66 Beetle | .78 |
| 65 Chevy | .92 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| 83 Celebrity | -.79 | 78 Accord | -1.51 |
| 69 Nova | 1.04 | 75 Civic | -.04 |
| 66 Nova | 2.14 | 71 Datsun | .09 |

HAARANK has excellent correlation with HNRANK (the composite measure of HIC, head g's and 3 neck injury scores defined in Section 3.4.2): $\mathrm{R}=.70, \mathrm{df}=19, \mathrm{p}=.0004$. That is one of the highest correlations between two injury measures in this study. Not surprisingly, HAARANK displays many of the same characteristics as HNRANK. For example, head angular acceleration tends to be lower in the newer cars. The average value of HAARANK is 0.90 in MY group 1, 0.26 in MY group 2, -1.54 in group 3 and -0.18 in group 4. The average value for groups 3 and 4 (MY 1975-83 cars), -0.72 , is significantly lower than the average for MY group 1 (1965-66 cars): $t=2.13$, $d f=13$, one-sided $p=.03$.

HAARANK and HNRANK also have similar correlation patterns with the 6 parameters describing panel geometry and force deflection:
correlation with

|  | IPL | AMIP | AWSH | FDMIP | FDLIP6 | LIP2000 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HAARANK | -.56 | .44 | -.44 | .40 | .49 | -.33 |
| HNRANK | -.65 | .19 | -.66 | .30 | .59 | -.20 |

The most noticeable difference is that HAARANK is significantly correlated
with AMIP, but not HNRANK. In other words, when the mid panel slopes downward toward the passenger, angular acceleration of the head is less severe than when the top of the instrument panel protrudes toward the passenger, catches the chest, and allows the head to spin. In the stepwise regression analysis, IPL is the only independent variable which makes a significant contribution. Large (and soft) panels do the best job keeping the passenger in an upright position and minimizing angular acceleration of the head.

## CHAPTER 4

FRONTAL FATALITY RISK BY MODEL YEAR: ANALYSES OF FARS DATA

Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) head on collisions of two passenger cars, one of model year $X$ and the other of model year $Y$, were tabulated to see how often the driver of the car of model year $X$ was killed vs. how often the driver of the car of model year $Y$. A statistical analysis was performed to measure the intrinsic frontal fatality risk of cars of each model year, after controlling for differences of the vehicle weights, belt usage, etc., of cars of different model years. Driver fatality risk in frontal crashes declined by about 12 percent from model years 1964-66 to 1968-69 and remained almost constant between model years 1969 and 1984 - for cars of the same weight. The 12 percent reduction is almost entirely attributable to the introduction of energy absorbing steering assemblies in 1967-68 [32], p. xix.

The analysis was extended to right front passengers; their fatality risk in frontal crashes declined by about 20 percent from model years 1964-66 to 1968-70, possibly declined by another 9 percent or so in the early to mid 1970's and remained fairly constant from then till model year 1984 - for cars of the same weight. The reductions virtually duplicate the pattern seen in the analyses of instrument panel improvements (Chapters 2 and 3). Better instrument panels and, to a lesser extent, windshields and doors seem to account for most of the reduction of unrestrained right front passengers' fatality risk in frontal crashes during the 1964-84 period.

In head on collisions, the effect of vehicle weight is of paramount importance, overwhelming the effect of safety improvements and other vehicle design changes. A head on collision between a 3100 pound car of the 1964-66 era and a 3000 pound car of the 1975-84 era is about equally risky for the occupants of both cars - a 100 pound weight advantage would make up for all the safety equipment lacking in the older car.

### 4.1 Analysis objectives, approach and key variables

The objective of the analysis, as stated in Section 1.3, is to compare the intrinsic fatality risk in frontal crashes for drivers and right front passengers of cars of different model years: to track the fatality risk trend from model year 1964 to 1984 . It will provide a measure of how much safer cars have become over the past 20 years and an estimate of how many lives are saved. This "macro" estimate of lives saved includes the effects of all the occupant protection devices previously evaluated by NHTSA plus the effects on crashworthiness of any other vehicle modifications that have not been evaluated or are not associated with a specific safety standard. Two examples are the change from genuine to pillared hardtops in the 1970's and from rear wheel drive to front wheel drive in the 1980's. The purpose of the analysis is twofold:

O Is the sum of the fatality reductions ascribed by the NHTSA evaluations to the individual safety standards consistent with the actual reduction in overall fatality risk during the model years that the standards were mostly implemented (1966-69)?
o Did cars get any safer after that, thanks to improvements not necessarily related to NHTSA's standards?

Previous attempts to compare the intrinsic fatality risks of
cars of two different model years have typically been confounded by reporting biases or by secular trends unrelated to vehicle safety improvements. For example, the number of injured occupants per 100 crash involved occupants typically increases, especially in State accident data, as cars get older - because noninjury crashes of older cars are often unreported. The spurious inflation of the injury rates for the older cars is misinterpreted to mean that they are less safe. As another example, the fatality rate per $100,000,000$ car miles (or per million registered vehicle years) has greatly declined since 1966 , for reasons only partly related to the vehicle. Regression models based on historical trend in the fatality rates inevitably tend to attribute too much of the decline to vehicle factors, because many of the factors that are really responsible for the decline are almost impossible to quantify.

Analyses of head on collisions between two passenger cars, fatal to at least one or perhaps both drivers, do not suffer from the preceding shortcomings. Virtually all fatal head on collisions, since 1975, have been reported to FARS, so there is no problem with reporting bias. When two cars collide head on, both drivers have, so to speak, the same frontal crash experience. If car $A$ and car $B$ have the same weight, consider the head on collisions between car $A$ and $\operatorname{car} B$ in which the drivers have the same age, sex, etc.: if, in these collisions, the driver of car $A$ is killed significantly less often than the driver of car $B$, it can only mean that car $A$ is safer for drivers than car B. Thus, fatal head on collisions are suitable for comparing the intrinsic fatality risk of two different cars, given their involvement in a crash (the analysis
does not take into account the relative crash avoidance capabilities of the cars).

Likewise, frontal crash involvements of passenger cars having a driver and a right front passenger - one or both of whom was killed - have been reported to FARS since 1975. If the damage is neither concentrated on the right front nor on the left front, the driver and right front passenger had about the same frontal crash experience. Consider those crashes of car A in which the driver and right front passenger have the same age, sex, etc.: if the right front passenger is killed significantly less often than the driver, it can only mean that car $A$ is safer for right front passengers than for drivers.

Finally, the results of the two analyses can be composed to obtain a comparison of the intrinsic risk for right front passengers. For example, if
car $A$ is safer for right front passengers than for drivers
car $A$ is safer for drivers than car $B$
car $B$ is safer for drivers than for right front passengers
then car A is safer for right front passengers than car B.

Unfortunately, even in 12 years of FARS data (1975-86), there are relatively few crashes in which both cars have the same weight and their drivers have the same age, sex, etc. The analysis should include all the head on collisions, including those where the vehicle weights or driver characteristics differ. It should quantify the relative effects of each of those factors and characterize the relative fatality risk of the
two drivers by a statement like
In this particular head on collision configuration, the driver of car A is, on the average, 9 percent less likely to be killed than the driver of car $B$ : since car $A$ is $x$ pounds heavier than car $B$, this accounts for a 4 percent reduction; since driver $A$ is y years younger than driver $B$, this accounts for a 3 percent reduction; and, finally, car $A$ is intrinsically 2 percent safer than car B (i.e., that would be the risk reduction if there were no differences on the other factors).

The critical variables that need to be controlled for in the analysis of drivers in head on collisions are
o vehicle weigh: - specifically the ratio of the weights of the two cars
o exact damage location - although both drivers in a head on collision experience frontal crash forces, in these very severe crashes the driver may be more endangered by intrusion related phenomena if the damage is along the left front; less along the right front. It is necessary to consider both cars' exact damage location.
o driver age - specifically, some transformation that expresses how much "younger" one driver is than the other
o driver sex - since some believe that females are more vulnerable to fatal injury than males in identical crash situations [13]
o belt usage
o drivers' alcohol consumption - since some believe that intoxication reduces a person's ability to survive impact trauma

After controlling for these factors, what will remain may be considered the "intrinsic" difference in the safety of the two vehicles. Note that a car's level of belt usage is not considered as part of its "intrinsic" safety but rather as one of the differences to be controlled for. That is because belt usage depends largely on the types of people who purchase a certain car and tends to decline as the car ages. The analysis seeks to find which of two cars has a "friendlier" interior and vehicle structure
after controlling for belt usage.

Finally, the objective is not to compare the safety of individual makes and models of cars, but the averages for each model year. Thus, the only descriptors that will be entered for each car are its model year and the preceding list of control variables. The final product of the model will be a safety index for each model year from 1964 to 1984. If, for example, the index for 1966 is $A$ and for 1976 is $B$, then the drivers of 1976 cars are intrinsically [1-(B/A)] safer than they would have been in 1966 cars of the same weight, when all types of head on collisions are taken into account.

The model for right front passengers, as stated above, is performed in two stages. The first stage is an evaluation of the relative intrinsic fatality risk of right front passengers and drivers of the same car, by model year. The data for this model are not limited to cars involved in head on crashes, but include all cars that were in frontal impacts and had a driver and a right front passenger, at least one of whom was killed. For example, the ratio of passenger to driver fatalities, after controlling for differences in age, sex, etc. and making an adjustment for vehicle damage location, if off-center, might be $R_{B}$ in model year 1976 and $R_{A}$ in 1966. In the second stage, these relative ratios are combined with the driver safety indices of the preceding model to get passenger safety indices - viz., $R_{B} \times B$ in model year 1976 and $R_{A} \times A$ in 1966. Thus, right front passengers of 1976 cars are intrinsically $\left[1-\left(R_{B} \times B / R_{A} x A\right)\right]$ safer than they would have been in

1966 cars of the same weight, when all types of head on collisions are taken into account. The two stage approach is needed because the FARS files do not have an adequate sample of head on crashes between two cars, each of which had a right front passenger, at least one of whom was killed (such cases are much rarer than head on crashes in which at least one driver was killed, since nearly all cars have a driver, but far fewer have passengers). If the FARS sample had been adequate, it would have been possible to do a single model for the right front passengers, just like the driver model.
4.2 Analysis for drivers in head on collisions

### 4.2.1 FARS data reduction

Over 16,000 head on collisions involving two passenger cars and fatal to at least one of the drivers were extracted from the 1975-86 FARS files. A "head on" collision had to be a crash involving exactly two vehicles (VE_FORMS $=2$ ); both vehicles had to be passenger cars (BODY_TYP 1-13) of model years 1964-84; both had to have frontal damage (IMPACT2 $=$ 11, 12 or 1); the "most harmful event" for each vehicle had to be a collision with another motor vehicle, in transport or in "other roadway" (prior to 1979, this variable was not defined on FARS, so it was not used as a filter). A 2 vehicle file was designed, with one record for each collision, containing information on vehicle no. 1 and its driver and on vehicle no. 2 and its driver. The file contained the FARS variables on each vehicle's make, model, model year, body style, and principal impact point plus each driver's age, sex, manual and automatic restraint usage, and whether or not alcohol had been consumed (DRINKING).

The most important control variable for the analysis is the vehicle's weight. The FARS weight variable VIN_WGT, deciphered from the VIN by the computer program VINA [55], is not usable for several reasons. It does not provide estimates for cars of model years 1964 and 65 . It purports to give estimates of "shipping weight" (unoccupied car without fuel or other fluids) and does so until model year 1982 or 83 . But starting in those years, VINA seems to estimate the "curb weight" (unoccupied car with fuel and other fluids) for some makes and models, resulting in a spurious increase of 100 pounds or so over the previous model year. Since fatality risk in head on collisions is highly sensitive to vehicle weight, a trial run of the regression analysis with VINA weights compensated for the spurious weight increase by making the 1982-84 cars far more "intrinsically dangerous" than the 1968-81 cars.

The remedy was to obtain a source of vehicle weight information that is consistent from model year to model year and provides a complete record from 1964 to 1984: the curb weights published in Automotive News Almanacs [2] based on reports from the manufacturers. Typically, the Almanacs list one weight for each make/model code and model year in FARS. If so, every car, except station wagons, of that make/model code and model year was assigned the Almanac weight. Often, though, there are two or more weights in the Almanacs corresponding to a single code in FARS. Most typically, for popular American cars, the Almanacs list weights for 6 and 8 cylinder models (or 4 and 6). In those cases, Ward's Automotive Yearbooks [56] were consulted to find the sales mix and a sales weighted average of the vehicle weights was used. For some imports, disaggregated
sales data were unavailable; if the two or more weights listed in the Almanac - corresponding to a single FARS code - were close together, their simple average was used. If they were far apart (e.g., Mercedes, where many different models are collapsed to one or two FARS codes), the make/model was dropped from the analysis. Appendix $F$ lists the curb weights used in the analyses of this chapter by make/model code and model year.

Station wagons are a special case since they weigh more than a coupe or sedan of the same make, model and engine type, but the Almanacs do not give separate estimates for station wagons. An analysis of the VINA weights in FARS, however, showed the following average weight increases for station wagons relative to other cars of the same make, model and model year:

Imports $\quad 5.2$ percent weight increase
Domestic up to 3500 lbs
8.5 percent weight increase

Domestic over 3500 lbs 13.4 percent weight increase
These increases have been fairly consistent over the past 25 years. Therefore, if a car was a station wagon (BODY_TYP = 6), the Almanac weight was increased by the amount shown above.

The same approach cannot be used for light trucks because a single make/model code in FARS (e.g., Chevrolet van) may correspond to a number of different vehicles with a wide variety of curb weights (viz., different wheelbases and gross weight ratings). A detailed analysis of the VIN might shed light on the curb weight; trucks, however, can vary widely in their cargo weight - and neither FARS nor the VIN tell how much
cargo a truck was carrying at the time of the accident or the extent to which the cargo should be counted toward the effective vehicle mass during the collision.

The FARS information on manual and automatic restraints was transformed into three binomial variables suitable for logistic regression analysis: LAPI, LAPSH1, and UNKRESI for the driver of vehicle no. 1 and 3 similar variables for the driver of vehicle no. 2.

LAP1 $=1$ if FARS explicitly states that "lap belt only" was used or if the car was MY 1973 and earlier and FARS states "restraint used, type not specified." Else LAPI $=0$.

LAPSHI = 1 if FARS explicitly states that "lap and shoulder belts" were used, or if the car was MY 1974 and later and FARS states "restraint used, type not specified," or if automatic belts were in use or an air bag deployed. Else LAPSH1 $=0$.

UNKRESI $=1$ if FARS states that restraint use was unknown. Else UNKRESI $=0$.
4.2.2 A simple model: no control for vehicle weight or other factors

As a "rehearsal" for the logistic regression of fatality risk by model year, vehicle weight and other factors, it is instructive to build a simpler model which measures the relative fatality risk when two cars of different model years collide head on, without adjustment for differences in weight, etc. The simple model illustrates the procedures used to translate tabulations of fatalities into risk indices; its results will show the overwhelming influence of vehicle weight on fatality risk in head on collisions.

The starting point for the simple model is a tabulation of the
head on crashes in FARS (more specifically the file created from FARS in Section 4.2.1) by model year of the "case" vehicle, model year of the "other" vehicle and where the fatalities occurred. Crashes where both cars are of the same model year are not used in this analysis. For example, there were $N=108$ head on collisions between 1975 and 1979 cars that killed at least one of the drivers.

In 18 collisions, the 75 driver died, the 79 survived In 71 collisions, the 79 driver died, the 75 survived In 19 collisions, both drivers died

Of course, the large disparity in the fatalities is due to the greater mass of the 1975 cars. The above statistics supply two data points for the logistic regression. First, considering 1975 as the "case" vehicle model year and 1979 as the "other" vehicle: a case vehicle driver died in 37 of the 108 collisions. The ratio of collisions with a case vehicle fatality to total collisions is $R=37 / 108=.343$. Second, with 1979 as the "case" vehicle and 1975 as the "other," $R=90 / 108=.833$. A partial list of tabulation results is:

| Case MY | Other MY | R | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| 75 | 66 | .375 | 48 |
| 75 | 70 | .491 | 106 |
| 75 | 74 | .582 | 165 |
| 75 | 77 | .542 | 155 |
| 75 | 79 | .253 | 108 |
| 75 | 81 |  | 47 |
| 79 |  |  |  |
| 79 | 70 | .633 | 30 |
| 79 | 75 | .833 | 73 |
| 79 | 82 | .474 | 108 |
|  |  |  | 78 |

Each of the preceding tabulation results, plus all other results for case vehicle model year and other vehicle model year ranging
from 63 to 85 (but not equal to one another) furnish one data point for the regression. The dependent variable in the regression is

$$
\operatorname{LOGODDS}=\log [R /(1-R)]
$$

(where $R$ is set to .01 if it is zero and .99 if it is one, so as to avoid infinite values for LOGODDS). The independent variables are M63, M64, $\ldots, M 84$, where $M i=1$ if the case vehicle model year is $\mathbf{i}, \mathrm{Mi}=-1$ if the other vehicle model year is $\mathbf{i}$ and $M i=0$, otherwise. A weighted logistic regression on aggregate data is performed, the weight factor being $N$.

The regression coefficients are

| INTERCEPT | .309 | M70 | -1.02 | M78 | -.55 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: |
| M63 | .45 | M71 | -.88 | M79 | -.42 |
| M64 | -.58 | M72 | -.99 | M80 | -.09 |
| M65 | -.58 | M73 | -1.25 | M81 | -.10 |
| M66 | -.62 | M74 | -1.19 | M82 | .05 |
| M67 | -.75 | M75 | -1.31 | M83 | -.03 |
| M68 | -1.05 | M76 | -1.09 | M84 | -.02 |
| M69 | -1.19 | M77 | -1.02 | M85" | .00 |

There is no actual M85 variable, but all the other model year coefficients are measured relative to the risk for 1985 cars. The more negative the coefficient, the lower the fatality risk. The results for model years 1963 and 1985 are unreliable due to the small sample size, which is why these model years were subsequently not used in the analyses. $R^{2}$ is .7l.

The regression results are used to generate fatality risk indices by an abstract form of double pair comparison analysis [12]. The easiest way to explain the method is first to review an example of conventional double pair comparison analysis: let $p_{1}$ be the number of lap belted rear seat passenger fatalities and $d_{1}$ be the number of unrestrained driver fatalities in the actual FARS crashes where there was
a lap belted back seat passenger and an unrestrained driver and at least one of them died. Let $p_{2}$ be the number of unrestrained rear seat passenger fatalities and $d_{2}$ be the number of unrestrained driver fatalities in the actual FARS crashes where there was a unrestrained back seat passenger and an unrestrained driver and at least one of them died. Then

$$
\left(p_{1} / d_{1}\right) /\left(p_{2} / d_{2}\right)
$$

estimates the fatality risk of lap belted back seat passengers relative to unrestrained back seat passengers (since the unrestrained drivers act as a control group).

The more abstract form of the analysis that will be used here is largely parallel. Construct a file of all head on collisions on FARS which were fatal to at least one driver (actually this file has each collision twice: once with vehicle no. 1 as the case vehicle and once with vehicle no. 2 as the case vehicle; it has over 32,000 crash situations). Consider the hypothetical situation where each case vehicle is replaced by a 1975 car, while the other vehicle stays what it actually is. Use the regression coefficients to estimate P 75 , the proportion of the 32,000 case vehicle drivers who are killed and C75, the proportion of the 32,000 control group (other vehicle) drivers who are killed. Now consider another hypothetical situation where each case vehicle is replaced by a 1979 car, while the other vehicle stays what it actually is. Use the regression coefficients to estimate P79, the proportion of the 32,000 case vehicle drivers who ary killed and C79, the proportion of the 32,000 control group (other vehicle) drivers who are killed. Then
estimates the fatality risk for drivers of model year 1975 cars in head on collisions relative to the risk for drivers of model year 1979 cars (since the drivers of the "other" cars act as a control group).

P75 and C75 are estimated as follows. Recall that . 309 is the regression intercept; let Ai be the estimated regression coefficient for model year $i$ and $N(i, j)$ be the actual number of head on crashes on FARS involving model years $i$ and $j$. Let $R(i, j)$ be the regression's estimate of the ratio of driver fatalities in the cars of model year $\mathfrak{i}$ to $N(i, j)$. In other words

$$
R(i, j)=1 /[1+\exp (A j-A i-.309)]
$$

whereas

$$
R(j, i)=1 /[1+\exp (A i-A j-.309)]
$$

If the case vehicle is always replaced by a model year 1975 car,

$$
\begin{aligned}
P 75 & =\sum N(i, j) R(75, j) / \sum N(i, j) \\
& =\sum N(i, j) /[1+\exp (A j-A 75-.309)] / \sum N(i, j)
\end{aligned}
$$

whereas

$$
\begin{aligned}
C 75 & =\sum N(j, i) R(j, 75) / \sum N(j, i) \\
& =\sum N(j, i) /[1+\exp (A 75-A j-.309)] / \sum N(j, i)
\end{aligned}
$$

The quantities $\mathrm{Pi} / \mathrm{Ci}$ for the various model years become more tangible through indexing. The unadjusted frontal fatality risk index for drivers shall be set to 100 for the average of model years 1973 through 1984 - i.e., let

$$
U=100 /(P 73 / C 73+\ldots+P 84 / C 84)
$$

and define

$$
U i=U(P i / C i)
$$

to be the risk index for model year i. The unadjusted risk indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 92 | 1971 | 71 | 1978 | 94 |
| ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: |
| 1965 | 92 | 1972 | 66 | 1979 | 105 |
| 1966 | 89 | 1973 | 53 | 1980 | 137 |
| 1967 | 80 | 1974 | 55 | 1981 | 137 |
| 1968 | 62 | 1975 | 50 | 1982 | 155 |
| 1969 | 55 | 1976 | 60 | 1983 | 145 |
| 1970 | 64 | 1977 | 64 | 1984 | 145 |

The appropriate interpretation of the risk index is that, in head on collisions between cars of model year 1975 and 1979, there would typically be 50 fatalities in the MY 75 cars for every 105 fatalities in the MY 1979 cars. The unadjusted risk index does not control for any differences in driver age, etc., that may have occurred in the actual FARS crashes. Since it does not control for vehicle weight, it is only appropriate for head on crashes, where the relative weights of the two vehicles is critically important. It would not apply at all to frontal single vehicle crashes, where the vehicle weight factor has a much smaller effect.

Figure $4-1$ is a graph of the unadjusted risk index by model year. It shows even more clearly the trends that can be found in the above table. Unadjusted risk declined steadily from 1964 to 1969, a period during which cars got bigger and received some well known safety improvements. There was a moderate rise from 1970 to 1971-72: even though big cars got bigger, this was more than offset by the increased market share for imported subcompacts and the introduction of domestic subcompacts. The index fell sharply during $1972-75$ as cars reached their all
FIGURE 4－1：UNADJUSTED FATALITY RISK INDEX FOR DRIVERS，BY MODEL YEAR
RISK FACTOR AY MODEL YEAR（1973－84 RYERAGE－100）
UNADJUSTED DRIVER OATA
plot of ranz＊at sybbol used is o
plot of rahzant sybbol used is o

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $⿴ 囗 十 心$ | 0 | 0 |  |  |


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time heaviest weights, although there was a slight increase in 1974 when the first fuel shortage depressed big car sales. The index rose steeply after 1976 and had reached unprecedented heights by 1982; it was a period of downsizing and increasing market share for imported small cars. It finally leveled off in 1983-84, when a fuel glut led to a halt in downsizing.
"Downsizing" is well known to occur when manufacturers completely restyle their cars, using a smaller platform, etc. What is perhaps not so well known is that manufacturers can easily increase or decrease the weights of their cars by a considerable amount every year, even between major restylings, as they adapt to changing market demand for various engines or options or to federal regulations concerning bumpers, emissions, etc. It is interesting to see how the basic full-sized Chevrolet changed its average weight every year - not just in the well known downsizing year of 1977:

| 1964 | 3555 | 1971 | 4011 | 1978 | 3788 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1965 | 3644 | 1972 | 4171 | 1979 | 3720 |
| 1966 | 3649 | 1973 | 4303 | 1980 | 3496 |
| 1967 | 3696 | 1974 | 4354 | 1981 | 3586 |
| 1968 | 3695 | 1975 | 4318 | 1982 | 3609 |
| 1969 | 3794 | 1976 | 4361 | 1983 | 3593 |
| 1970 | 3883 | 1977 | 3769 | 1984 | 3592 |

Note how weight crept up steadily from 1964 to 1974 and that the major downsizing of 1977 only brought the weight back to the 1969 levels. Also note that the small weight changes from year to year for this high volume car tend to be consistent with the trend in the safety index - upwards in the years that the index declined, and vice versa.


#### Abstract

4.2.3 A model which controls for vehicle weight and other factors

The simple model defined in the preceding section was a logistic regression on aggregated data. For each combination of the two categorical independent variables (MY of the case vehicle and MY of the other vehicle), the dependent variable was the fatality rate in the FARS cases which had those values of the independent variables. There were usually enough FARS cases to produce meaningful fatality rates for each combination and allow a linear regression of the log odds of the fatality rate by the independent variables.


At first glance, it would appear that the same technique could be used for a model that adjusts for vehicle weight, driver age, etc. Subdivide the control variables into ranges and calculate the fatality rate for each combination of the independent variables - e.g., when MY of car no. 1 is 1975 and weight of car no. 1 is $4000-4499$ pounds; MY of car no. 2 is 1979 and weight of car no. 2 is $3000-3499$ pounds; driver no. 1 is 20-39 years old and driver no. 2 is $40-59$ years old; etc. This approach cannot be used because the 32,000 available cases are insufficient to produce meaningful injury rates in each cell (21 values of MY for car no. $1 \times 21$ values of MY for car no. 2 x 5 weight ranges for car no. 1 x 5 weight ranges for car no. $2 \times 3$ age ranges for driver no. $1 \times 3$ age ranges for driver no. $2 x$ etc.). Furthermore, since the dependent variable is believed to be extremely sensitive to vehicle weight, it would be far too coarse to subdivide vehicle weight into class intervals as broad as 500 pounds. Vehicle weight ought to be treated as a continuous variable.

A more satisfactory analysis approach is to perform logistic regression on disaggregate data, using maximum likelihood principles [29]. Here, each of the 32,000 available FARS cases is a data point in the regression (i.e., the 16,000 actual FARS head on collisions, treating car no. 1 as the case vehicle and car no. 2 as the other vehicle and then again these same 16,000 collisions, but now treating car no. 2 as the case vehicle and car no. 1 as the other vehicle). Unlike the simple model, crashes where both cars are of the same model year are included in the analysis. The dependent variable is the outcome for the driver of the case vehicle, equaling 1 if the driver died and 0 if he survived. The independent variables are the actual model years, weights, etc. of the vehicles and the ages, gender, belt usage, etc. of the drivers. The regression procedure takes this large number of individual observations of success (driver survival) or failure (driver fatality) under different actual circumstances to predict the driver fatality rate under any hypothetical combination of circumstances. Specifically the model generates an equation which expresses the log odds of the fatality rate as a linear combination of the independent variables - just like the equation produced by a conventional logistic regression on aggregate data.

The independent variables are defined as follows:

- M64, M65, .... M83 are the same as in the simple model -i.e., $M i=1$ if the case vehicle model year is $\mathbf{i}, \mathrm{Mi}=-1$ if the other vehicle model year is $\mathbf{i}$ and $M i=0$, otherwise.

0 LWGT is the log of the ratio of the weight of the case vehicle to the weight of the other vehicle (i.e., the model assumes a logistic relationship between the fatality risk and the weight ratio)

- PDOF compares the exact impact location for the two vehicles. Let IMPACT2c be the point of impact for the case vehicle; IMPACT20, for the other other vehicle. Define

```
PDOF = 0 if IMPACT2c = IMPACT2o
    =.5 if IMPACT2C = 1 and IMPACT2O = 12 or if
    IMPACT2c = 12 and IMPACT20 = 11
    = 1 if IMPACT2c = 1 and IMPACT2o = 11
    =-.5 if IMPACT2c = 11 and IMPACT2O = 12 or if
    IMPACT2c = 12 and IMPACT2O = 1
    = -1 if IMPACT2c = 11 and IMPACT2o = 1
```

The more positive PDOF, the less dangerous the situation for the driver of the case vehicle relative to the other vehicle.

0 LAGE is based on a comparison of the ages of the two drivers. Let AGEc be the age of the driver of the case vehicle and AGEo be the age of the driver of the other vehicle. Define

$$
\operatorname{LAGE}=\log (120-\text { AGEo })-\log (120-\operatorname{AGEc})
$$

The rationale for the transformation of the age variable is that adults' fatality risk in crashes at first increases slowly as age increases but ever more rapidly with increasing age [13]; so does the transformed variable log(120 - age). Cases where either driver's age is unknown are excluded from the analysis.

- $S E X=0$ if both drivers were males or both were females
$=1$ if the driver of the case vehicle was male and the other, female
$=-1 \quad$ if the driver of the case vehicle was female and the other, male

Cases where either driver's gender is unknown are excluded from the analysis.

- LAP = LAPc - LAPo, where LAPC and LAPo are as defined in Section 4.2.1.
- LAPSH = LAPSHC - LAPSHo, where LAPSHC and LAPSHo are as defined in Section 4.2.1.
o UNKRES = UNKRESc - UNKRESo, where UNKRESc and UNKRESo are as defined in Section 4.2.1.

> 0 DRINK $=1 \begin{aligned} & \text { if drinking was reported for the driver of the case } \\ & \text { vehicle (DRINKING }=1) \text { but was not reported or was } \\ & \text { unknown for the driver of the other vehicle }\end{aligned}$ DRINK $=-1 \begin{aligned} & \text { if drinking was reported for the driver of the other } \\ & \text { vehicle but was not reported or was unknown for the } \\ & \text { driver of the case vehicle }\end{aligned}$ DRINK $=0$ otherwise

The regression coefficients are

| INTERCEPT | .538 | LWGT | -5.421 | PDOF | -.092 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: |
| LAGE | 2.841 | SEX | .261 | LAP | -.604 |
| LAPSH | -.746 | UNKRES | -.216 | DRINK | .198 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| M64 | .30 | M71 | .17 | M78 | .22 |
| M65 | .34 | M72 | .19 | M79 | .24 |
| M66 | .62 | $M 73$ | .01 | M80 | .02 |
| M67 | .44 | $M 74$ | -.06 | M81 | -.09 |
| M68 | .13 | $M 75$ | -.02 | M82 | .15 |
| M69 | .12 | M76 | .13 | M83 | .11 |
| M70 | .15 | $M 77$ | .12 | M84" | .00 |

There is no actual M84 variable, but all the other model year coefficients are measured relative to the risk for 1984 cars. The more negative the coefficient, the lower the fatality risk. All of the control variables have coefficients with the appropriate sign - i.e., the case vehicle driver's fatality risk is higher when the case vehicle weight is lower, the damage location is toward the case vehicle's driver and away from the other vehicle's driver, the case vehicle driver is older, a female, unrestrained and having consumed alcohol. The regression coefficient is statistically significant (two sided alpha less than .05) for LWGT (chi square $=7144.76$ ), LAGE (chi square $=2588.78$ ), $\operatorname{SEX}$ (chi square $=99.91$ ), LAP (chi square $=43.62$ ), LAPSH (chi square $=107.52$ ), UNKRES (chi square $=10.36$ ) and DRINK (chi square $=48.88$ ). It is borderline significant (one sided alpha less than .10) for PDOF (chi square $=1.96$ ). Appropriately, the effect for LAPSH is larger than that for LAP, which is in turn
greater than the one for UNKRES (restraint use maybe but unknown for sure).

In 89.6 percent of the cases, the model correctly predicted the actual outcome - i.e., predicted a fatality risk greater than .5 in cases where the case vehicle occupant died or predicted a fatality risk less than .5 in cases where the case vehicle occupant survived.

An abstract form of double pair comparison analysis, nearly identical to what was used in the simple model (see Section 4.2.2), generates fatality risk indices from the regression results. Construct a file of all head on collisions on FARS which were fatal to at least one driver (actually this file has each collision twice: once with vehicle no. 1 as the case vehicle and once with vehicle no. 2 as the case vehicle; it has over 32,000 crash situations). Recall that .538 is the regression intercept and that $-5.421,-.092,2.841, .261,-.604,-.746,-.216$ and .198 are the regression coefficients for LWGT, PDOF, LAGE, SEX, LAP, LAPSH, UNKRES and DRINK, respectively. Let $A i$ be the regression coefficient for model year i. Select any particular one of the 32,000 actual crash situations on the file; suppose the case vehicle was of model year $\mathfrak{i}$ and the other vehicle was of model year $j$. The regression model predicts that the likelihood of a case vehicle driver fatality in that crash situation is

```
p=1/[1 + exp (Aj-Ai-.538+5.421LWGT+.092PDOF-2.841LAGE-.261SEX
    +.604LAP+.746LAPSH+.216UNKRES-.198DRINK)]
```


## whereas

$c=1 /[1+\exp (A i-A j-.538-5.421 L W G T-.092 P D O F+2.841$ LAGE +.261 SEX -.604LAP-.746LAPSH-.216UNKRES+. 198DRINK)]
is the regression model's estimate of the likelihood that the driver of the other vehicle died in the crash (where LWGT, PDOF, etc. are the actual values of those independent variables for that particular crash).

Now consider the hypothetical situation where the case vehicle is replaced by a 1975 car of the same weight, while the other vehicle stays what it actually is. The damage locations stay the same as in the actual case. So do the characteristics of both drivers: their age, sex, belt usage and alcohol status. In short, the only thing that changes is the "model year" of the case vehicle - i.e., the level of safety equipment and structure of the actual case vehicle is replaced by the level of safety equipment and structure that was characteristic of 1975 cars. The values of LWGT, PDOF, LAGE, SEX, LAP, LAPSH, UNKRES and DRINK remain the same. In this hypothetical situation, the regression model would predict that the likelihood of a case vehicle driver fatality is no longer $p$ but rather

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { p75 }=1 /[1+\exp (\text { (Aj-A75-. } 538+5.421 \text { LWGT+.092PDOF-2.841LAGE-. } 261 \text { SEX } \\
+.604 L A P+.746 L A P S H+.216 U N K R E S-.198 D R I N K)]
\end{gathered}
$$

whereas $c$ is replaced by
c75 = $1 /[1+\exp (A 75-A j-.538-5.421 L W G T-.092 P D O F+2.841 L A G E+.261 S E X$ -.604LAP-.746LAPSH-. 216 UNKRES+. 198DRINK)]
as the regression model's estimate of the likelihood that the driver of the other vehicle died in the crash

Just let P75 be the sum of the values of p75 for the 32,000 crash situations on the file and C75 be the sum of the c75's. Similarly calculate Pi and Ci for all the other model years from 1964 to 84 . Then,
for example,
(P75/C75) / (P79/C79)
estimates the intrinsic fatality risk of model year 1975 cars in frontal collisions relative to the intrinsic risk of model year 1979 cars of the same weight - averaged over the gamut of driver ages, etc. and crash situations that occur in the United States.

The quantities $\mathrm{Pi} / \mathrm{Ci}$ for the various model years become more tangible through indexing. The adjusted frontal fatality risk index for drivers shall be set to 100 for the average of model years 1973 through 1984 - i.e., let

$$
A D J=100 /(P 73 / C 73+\ldots+P 84 / C 84)
$$

and define

$$
A D J i=A D J \times(P i / C i)
$$

to be the risk index for model year i. The adjusted risk indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 111 | 1971 | 105 | 1978 | 107 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 113 | 1972 | 106 | 1979 | 108 |
| 1966 | 128 | 1973 | 97 | 1980 | 98 |
| 1967 | 118 | 1974 | 94 | 1981 | 93 |
| 1968 | 103 | 1975 | 96 | 1982 | 104 |
| 1969 | 102 | 1976 | 103 | 1983 | 102 |
| 1970 | 104 | 1977 | 102 | 1984 | 97 |

The appropriate interpretation of the risk index is that if the fleet of 1966 cars had been replaced by a fleet of 1968 type cars of the same weights, there would have been only $103 / 128$ of the head on crash fatalities. Since the adjusted risk index controls for vehicle weight, it might be appropriate not only for head on crashes but also for other types of frontal impacts.

Figure $4-2$ is a graph of the adjusted risk index by model year. It shows even more clearly the trends that can be found in the above table. Driver fatality risk in frontal crashes declined sharply in model year 1967-68, the years in which the important safety modifications, especially the introduction of energy absorbing steering columns, took place. There was a 12 percent reduction from the 1964-66 average index of 117.3 to the 1968-70 average of 103. After model year 1968, there is little net change in fatality risk. The 1973-84 average of 100 is 3 percent below the 1968-70 average of 103 , although that difference could easily be in the "noise" range. The standard deviation of the regression coefficients for the individual model years is about . 105. A change of 2 standard deviations in the regression coefficient would increase or decrease the index by about 9. Thus, dotted lines are drawn on Figure 4-2 at index values 109 and 91 , representing the 95 percent noise band around the 1973-84 average value of 100 . Every index value before 1968 is above the noise band. Every index value from 1968 onwards is within the noise band; the oscillations of the index within the noise band does not appear to have any obvious pattern.

Figure 4-3 shows the enormous effect of controlling for vehicle weight and other factors. It is a graph of the adjusted (plain line) and unadjusted (hashed line) risk indices, on the same scale. (The unadjusted index, however is not exactly the same as in Figure 4-1; here it has been made fully comparable to the adjusted index - instead of dividing the unadjusted $\mathrm{Pi} / \mathrm{Ci}$ by the 1973-84 average of the unadjusted $\mathrm{Pi} / \mathrm{Ci}$, they are divided by the 1973-84 average of the adjusted Pi/Ci.) The fluctuations


of the adjusted index after 1968 are almost trivial in comparison to the large changes in the unadjusted index. Even the larger dip of the adjusted index in 1968, as a result of the major safety improvements of the late 1960 's, is small compared to the effects of vehicle weight changes on fatality risk in head on collisions. From 1966 to 1977, when cars were heavier than usual, the unadjusted index is always lower than the adjusted; in 1964-65 and from 1978 onward it is higher, sometimes much higher.

Since the effect of vehicle weight is so crucial, it is appropriate to ask if the regression model used the appropriate mathematical formulation for the effect of weight on fatality risk. Specifically, is it reasonable to assume a linear relationship between the $\log$ odds of a fatality occurring in the case vehicle (LOGODDS) and the $\log$ of the ratio of the case vehicle weight to the other vehicle's weight (LWGT)? The question was addressed by running a logistic regression model on aggregate data, i.e., a weighted linear regression in which the independent variable is LWGT, ranging from -1.12 to +1.28 , subdivided into 75 class intervals each of width .04 . The 32,000 FARS cases are tabulated by LWGT class intervals and LOGODDS, the dependent variable, is the proportion of cases in each class interval where the case vehicle driver died. The weight factor for the regression is the number of FARS cases in each class interval of the independent variable. Figure 4-4 shows that the 75 data points have a fantastic linear fit, except at the edges, where fatality rates are based on handfuls of FARS cases. R squared is .975. Clearly, logistic regression is a good procedure for dealing with the effect of

vehicle weight. There does not appear to be any danger that weight effects will be spuriously attributed to other factors because of a nonlinear LWGT - LOGODDS relationship.

### 4.3 Extension of the analysis to right front passengers

The analysis for right front passengers, as explained in Section 4.1, is performed in two stages, so as to maximize the sample size of the data. The first stage is a model which assesses the relative fatality risk of right front passengers and drivers of the same car, by model year, controlling for differences in the age and sex, etc. of the occupants (Sections 4.3.1-4.3.3). The data are not limited to head on crashes but include other frontal impacts, as well. In the second stage, these ratios of passenger to driver fatality risk are combined with the driver fatality indices of Section 4.2 .3 to obtain passenger safety indices (Section 4.3.4).

### 4.3.1 FARS data reduction

The $1975-86$ FARS files contain records of nearly 34,000 frontal impacts of passenger cars of model years 1964-84 in which there were a driver and a right front passenger and at least one of them died. A frontal impact is one whose principal impact location was 11,12 or 1 o'clock. Passenger cars were vehicles with BODY_TYP 1-13. If a car had two RF passengers, only the first was included in the analysis (the second RF passenger is typically a child sitting on somebody's lap). Right front passengers age 4 or less were excluded, partly because the other chapters of this report are limited to analyses for older children and adults,
partly because the models use occupant age as a control variable and need fatality risk to increase steadily as age increases - which is only true from about age 5 onwards.

Only those cars in which the driver and the RF passenger were unrestrained are used in the analysis, in contrast to the preceding model for head on collisions. The preceding model looked at drivers of two different cars: the belt usage of one is relatively uncorrelated with the other's belt usage. To exclude all cases in which one driver or the other was not known to be unrestrained would have reduced the sample size intolerably. Instead, belt usage became a control variable. Here, on the other hand, driver and front passenger belt usage in the same car are highly correlated. The analysis can be limited to cases where both are unrestrained (which is what is really wanted, for consistency with Chapters 2 and 3 ) without losing too much of the sample.

A 2 occupant file was created, with one record for each frontally impacted car, containing information on the driver and the RF passenger. The file contained the FARS variables on the vehicle's make, model, model year, body style and principal impact point, plus the driver and RF passenger's age, sex and alcohol status. Cases where either occupant's age or gender were unknown was not used.

Vehicle weight is not a control variable in this model. Since the driver and RF passenger are occupants of the same car, they are both, so to speak, in cars of the same weight. On the other hand, impact
location is more important as a control variable, since a frontal impact with a fixed object that is more toward one side of the car is generally more threatening to the occupant on that side of the car.

### 4.3.2 A simple model: no control variables

As a "rehearsal" for the logistic regression of passenger vs. driver fatality risk by model year, occupant age, etc. it is useful to build a simpler model which presents the ratio of RF passenger to driver fatalities as a function of model year, without control for other factors.

The starting point for the simple model is a tabulation of the frontal impacts by model year (ranging from 1960 to 1985 in this case) and fatality status of the driver and RF passenger. For example, there were 1173 frontal impacts on FARS of cars of model year 1965 and 2382 of model year 1975. The fatality status was:

| Model | Driver Died <br> Year | Passenger Died <br> Driver Survived | Both Died |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1965 | 441 |  |  |
| 1975 | 972 | 565 | 167 |
|  |  | 905 | 505 |

The next step is to compute the ratio of RF passenger to driver fatalities. (The formulation of the dependent variable is different from the models of Section 4.2, where it was the number of fatalities in the case vehicle divided by the total number of crashes; the reason is that the fatality ratio, as defined here, would not have been suitable for the type of regressions used in Section 4.2.) For example, in model year 1965, $565+167=732$ RF passengers died and $441+167=608$ drivers
died. This is a ratio of 120 RF passenger fatalities per 100 driver fatalities. The ratios of RF passenger fatalities per 100 drivers killed, by model year, are:

| 1960 | 126 | 1969 | 106 | 1978 | 93 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1961 | 132 | 1970 | 106 | 1979 | 94 |
| 1962 | 121 | 1971 | 100 | 1980 | 97 |
| 1963 | 126 | 1972 | 107 | 1981 | 103 |
| 1964 | 126 | 1973 | 105 | 1982 | 104 |
| 1965 | 120 | 1974 | 107 | 1983 | 106 |
| 1966 | 110 | 1975 | 95 | 1984 | 97 |
| 1967 | 109 | 1976 | 96 | 1985 | 101 |
| 1968 | 112 | 1977 | 95 |  |  |

Figure $4-5$ is a graph of the unadjusted fatality ratios by model year. It clearly shows a higher fatality rate for $R F$ passengers than for drivers in cars of the early to mid 1960's. The gap between the two seating positions narrowed in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In cars of the later 1970's, the fatality rate for RF passengers was slightly lower than for drivers, but by the 1980's, the rates were again close to equal.

### 4.3.3 A model which controls for occupant and impact characteristics

The simple model defined in the preceding section did not require any regression analysis at all. There was one data point ( $R F$ to driver fatality ratio) for each model year. When control variables are introduced, there are several data points for each model year - e.g., the fatality ratio when both occupants are young males and the impact is in the 11:00 area, etc. A more complex analysis, including regression, is needed to compute the average fatality ratio in each model year after
FIGURE 4-5: UNADJUSTED RATIO OF RF PASSENGER TO DRIVER FATALITIES, BY MODEL YEAR

controlling for differences in the occupant and impact location variables. Nevertheless, it is possible to keep the model simple enough to use logistic regression on aggregate data. In the driver model (Section 4.2.3), there were far too many cells for logistic regression on aggregate data: partly because each collision involved 2 cars, resulting in $21 \times 21$ $=441$ model year combinations for $1964-84$ cars; partly because the ultrasensitive vehicle weight variable (for both cars) would have had to be subdivided into many class intervals, etc. Here, only one car is analyzed in each case, so there are only 21 model year cells. Vehicle weight is not a control variable at all; nor is belt usage, since the analysis is limited to unrestrained occupants, as explained in Section 4.3.1. Alcohol status is also inadvisable as a control variable, since it is too often unreported for RF passengers. That leaves age, gender and impact location: the first can be subdivided into a manageable number of class intervals; the other two are already categorical variables with few categories.

Specifically, the independent variables in the regression are defined as follows:
o M64, M65, ..., M83 are model year indicators - i.e., Mi = 1 if the car's model year is $\mathfrak{i}$ and $M i=0$, otherwise (and all the Mi's are zero if the model year is 84).

- $\mathrm{PDOF}=0$ if IMPACT2 $=12$

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
=1 & \text { if IMPACT2 }=11 \\
=-1 & \text { if IMPACT2 }=1
\end{array}
$$

The more positive PDOF, the less dangerous the situation for the RF passenger relative to the driver.

- LAGE is based on a comparison of the ages of the driver and the RF passenger. Let AGEp be the age of the RF passenger and AGEd be the age of the driver. Define

$$
\text { LAGE }=\log (120-\text { AGEd })-\log (120-A G E p)
$$

LAGE is subdivided into 10 class intervals. Here are the ranges of the class intervals and the point value of LAGE that is substituted for all the values in the class interval:

| If LAGE ranges | Set |
| :---: | :---: |
| from to | LAGE to |
| less than -1.0 | -1.05 |
| -1.0 - . 6 | - . 75 |
| -. 6 -. 4 | - . 5 |
| -. 4 - . 2 | - . 3 |
| -. 20 | - . 1 |
| 0 . 2 | . 1 |
| . 2 . 4 | . 3 |
| .4 . 6 | . 5 |
| . 61.0 | . 75 |
| 1.0 and greater | 1.05 |

- SEX $=0$ if both occupants were males or both were females
= 1 if the RF passenger was male and the driver, female
$=-1$ if the RF passenger was female and the driver, male

There are $21 \times 3 \times 10 \times 3=1890$ possible combinations of the independent variables. The nearly 34,000 FARS cases meeting the criteria of Section 4.3.1 are tabulated by the independent variables. In 1243 of the 1890 potential combinations of the independent variables, there is at least one FARS case. Each of these 1243 cells is one data point in the regression. The ratio $R$ of $R F$ passenger to driver fatalities among the FARS cases in that cell is calculated just like in the simple model (Section 4.3.2). (Logistic regression cannot be performed if this ratio is zero or infinite. In order to avoid such values of the ratio, cells in which there were zero RF fatalities or zero driver fatalities were modified to have . 1 RF or driver fatalities.) The dependent variable in
the regression is

$$
\text { LOGODDS }=\log (R)
$$

The weight factor for the weighted logistic regression is the number of FARS cases in each cell.

The regression coefficients are

| INTERCEPT | .008 | PDOF | -.768 | LAGE | 2.204 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: |
| SEX | -.207 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | M71 | .05 | M78 | -.12 |
| M64 | .23 | M72 | .05 | M79 | -.06 |
| M65 | .22 | M73 | .04 | M80 | -.08 |
| M66 | .03 | M74 | .11 | M81 | .07 |
| M67 | .09 | M75 | -.02 | M82 | .04 |
| M68 | .08 | M76 | .00 | M83 | .03 |
| M69 | .05 | M77 | -.02 | M84" | .00 |

There is no actual M84 variable, but all the other model year coefficients are measured relative to the risk for 1984 cars. The more negative the coefficient, the lower the fatality risk for the RF passenger relative to the driver. All of the control variables have coefficients with the appropriate sign - i.e., the RF passenger's fatality risk is higher, relative to the driver, when the damage location is toward the right front of the vehicle, the RF passenger is older than the driver, and the RF passenger is a female while the driver is male. The regression coefficients for all the control variables are statistically significant (two sided alpha less than .05; in fact it is less than .0001): for PDOF, $t=$ 33.31 ( $d f=1219$ ); for LAGE, $t=37.30$; for $S E X, t=-10.83$. $R$ squared for the model is . 684 .

An abstract form of double pair comparison analysis, nearly identical to what was used in the simple model for drivers (see Section
4.2.2), generates adjusted fatality ratios from the regression results. Use the file of 1243 cells describing the variety of frontal impacts of 1964-84 cars on FARS in which there was an unrestrained driver and an unrestrained RF passenger and at least one died. Recall that . 008 is the regression intercept and that $-.768,2.204$ and -.207 are the regression coefficients for PDOF, LAGE and SEX, respectively. Let $A i$ be the regression coefficient for model year i. Select any particular one of the 1243 cells on the file; suppose the vehicle was of model year $i$ and that the cell contained a total of $N$ actual RF passenger plus driver fatalities. The regression model predicts that the number of RF passenger fatalities in that cell is

$$
p=N /[1+\exp (-A i-.008+.768 P D O F-2.204 L A G E+.207 S E X)]
$$

whereas

$$
c=N-p
$$

is the regression model's estimate of the number of driver fatalities in that cell (where PDOF, LAGE, etc. are the actual values of those independent variables for that particular crash).

Now consider the hypothetical situation where the cars in that cell are replaced by 1975 cars, while the damage location and occupant characteristics remain unchanged. In short, the only thing that changes is the "model year" of the vehicle - i.e., the level of safety equipment and structure of the actual case vehicle is replaced by the level of safety equipment and structure that was characteristic of 1975 cars. In this hypothetical situation, the regression model would predict that the the number of RF passenger fatalities in that cell is no longer $p$ but

$$
\mathrm{p} 75=\mathrm{N} /[1+\exp (-A 75-.008+.768 \mathrm{PDOF}-2.204 L A G E+.207 S E X)]
$$

whereas the number of driver fatalities changes from $c$ to $\mathrm{c} 75=\mathrm{N}-\mathrm{p} 75$

Just let P75 be the sum of the values of p75 for the 1243 cells on the file and C75 be the sum of the C75's. Similarly calculate Pi and Ci for all the other model years from 1964 to 84 . Then, for example, P75/C75
estimates the intrinsic fatality risk of unrestrained RF passengers relative to unrestrained drivers of the same age and sex in model year 1975 cars involved in centered frontal collisions. The ratios of RF passenger fatalities per 100 drivers killed, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 124 | 1971 | 104 | 1978 | 89 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 123 | 1972 | 104 | 1979 | 94 |
| 1966 | 102 | 1973 | 104 | 1980 | 93 |
| 1967 | 108 | 1974 | 110 | 1981 | 106 |
| 1968 | 108 | 1975 | 98 | 1982 | 104 |
| 1969 | 104 | 1976 | 100 | 1983 | 103 |
| 1970 | 106 | 1977 | 98 | 1984 | 100 |

Figure $4-6$ is a graph of the adjusted fatality ratio by model year, whereas Figure 4-7 graphs the adjusted (plain line) and unadjusted (hashed line) fatality ratios on the same scale. Unlike the head on collision model (Section 4.2.3), there is little difference between the adjusted and the unadjusted data. The control variables are of little importance, despite their strong correlation with the dependent variable, because they had only modest intercorrelation with the model year of the car. In general, the unadjusted fatality ratio is slightly higher than the adjusted, possibly reflecting the fact that females are more likely to

FIGURE 4-7: ADJUSTED (Plain Line) AND UNADJUSTED (Hatched Line) RATIOS OF RF PASSENGER TO DRIVER FATALItIES



PLDI UF P?FAJJJ*:Ar
RrRawn
130
130
125
$\stackrel{3}{-}$
115
$\stackrel{0}{-}$
$1+0 \quad \stackrel{+}{5}$ 7
be RF passengers and males, the drivers. The unadjusted fatality ratio tends to exceed the adjusted ratio especially in the earlier model years, perhaps because there used to be relatively more fixed object impacts involving the right front of the car. But all the adjustment effects are trivial, especially in comparison to the effect of vehicle weight on what happened in the head on collisions (Figure 4-3).

Here, the adjusted and unadjusted fatality ratios show basically the same thing: that unrestrained RF passengers were $20-25$ percent more vulnerable than unrestrained drivers in frontal crashes in cars of model years 1960-65. It is no wonder that the RF position was called the "suicide seat" in those days. Something important was done to improve safety for the RF position in the mid to late 1960's, because the fatality ratio dropped from the $120-125$ to the $105-110$ range despite the introduction of energy absorbing steering assemblies in front of the driver position during that period. In other words, the improvements for the RF seating position were even more effective than the energy absorbing steering assembly was for drivers. The fatality ratio remains at close to 105 in cars of the early 1970's and drops below 100 in the later 1970's, recovering to about 100 in the early 1980 's. The 95 percent noise bands on either side of the hypothesis that drivers and passengers have equal risk are represented by the dotted, approximately parabolic curves on Figure 4-7. They are based on the data in the simple model: if $n$ is the actual number of driver plus RF passenger fatalities in a particular model year,

$$
100[.5+1.96 \operatorname{sqrt}(.5 \times .5 / n)] /[.5-1.96 \operatorname{sqrt}(.5 \times .5 / n)]
$$

and
$100[.5-1.96 \operatorname{sqrt}(.5 \times .5 / n)] /[.5+1.96 \operatorname{sqrt}(.5 \times .5 / n)]$
are the upper and lower critical values (two sided alpha $=.05$ ) for the hypothesis that the fatality ratio is 100 . Figure $4-7$ shows that the high values of the fatality ratio in 1960-65 cars are well above the noise bands, whereas almost all the values from 1969 onwards are within the noise bands. Nevertheless, there seems to be a pattern of movement from the upper noise band to the lower one during the 1970's suggesting that the reduction of the fatality ratio during that time may be more than just random variation.

### 4.3.4 Fatality index for right front passengers

An absolute fatality index for unrestrained RF passengers in frontal crashes is obtained by multiplying each model year's adjusted driver index (Section 4.2.3) by the adjusted ratio of RF passenger to driver fatality risk. The RF passenger risk indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 137 | 1971 | 109 | 1978 | 96 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 139 | 1972 | 110 | 1979 | 101 |
| 1966 | 131 | 1973 | 101 | 1980 | 91 |
| 1967 | 128 | 1974 | 104 | 1981 | 99 |
| 1968 | 111 | 1975 | 94 | 1982 | 108 |
| 1969 | 107 | 1976 | 102 | 1983 | 105 |
| 1970 | 110 | 1977 | 100 | 1984 | 97 |

The appropriate interpretation of the risk index is that if the fleet of 1966 cars had been replaced by a fleet of 1968 type cars of the same weights, there would have been only $111 / 131$ of the RF passenger fatalities in head on crashes. Since the adjusted risk index controls for vehicle weight, it might be appropriate not only for head on crashes but also for other types of frontal impacts.

Figure $4-8$ is a graph of the adjusted risk index for unrestrained RF passengers, by model year. Fatality risk declined steadily in cars of the mid to late 1960's, especially in model year 1968, dropping from an average index of 135.7 in model years $1964-66$ to 109.1 in model years 1968-70 - a 20 percent fatality reduction. After model year 1969, there may have been an additional, smaller drop in fatality risk. The 1973-84 average of 99.7 is 9 percent below the 1968-70 average of 109.1, although it is possible that the difference is in the "noise" range. The risk indices in Figure 4-8 are calculated by multiplying two more or less Independently derived statistics (the driver risk index and the RF to driver fatality ratio), each of which has a coefficient of variation close to 4.5 percent; the product should have coefficient of variation close to 6.4 percent. The dotted lines drawn on Figure 4-8 at index values 112.2 and 87.2 represent the 95 percent noise band around the 1973-84 average value of 99.7. Every index value before 1968 is well above the noise band. Every value from 1968 onwards is within the noise band; nevertheless, the proximity to the upper dotted line of each of the first 5 values after 1968 does suggest that there was a subsequent reduction of risk in the early to mid 1970's, which leveled out in the later 1970's.

What is most remarkable about Figure $4-8$ is its similarity to Figures 2-1 (the NCSS analysis) and 3-1 (the MVMA2D simulations). In each case, the casualty risk for the unrestrained $R F$ passenger declined by a substantial amount from cars of the mid 1960's to the late 1960's, followed by a smaller reduction in the early 1970's and leveling out in the mid 1970's and early 1980's. The three results are based on
FIGURE 4-8: ADJUSTED FATALITY RISK index for rf passengers, by model year



#### Abstract

independent data sources and measure different phenomena: Figure 2-1 measures the injury risk due to direct contact with the instrument panel. Figure 3-1 measures the effect of instrument panel changes not only on direct contact injuries but also on other injuries, as a result of modification of occupant trajectories. Figure $4-8$ describes the effect not only of instrument panel changes but also the effects of any other changes in vehicle equipment and structures. Not only the timing but even the magnitude of the reductions are similar: | Overall Fatality Risk Index | IP Contact Injury Index |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Section 2.3.3) |  |


What inferences can be made from the consistency of the three analyses? The NCSS analyses (Chapter 2) show that instrument panel improvements reduced injuries due to instrument panel contact; they show when the reductions took place and how large they were. The NCSS analyses do not reveal if the panel improvements led to modifications of occupant trajectories, affecting injuries due to contacts other than the instrument panel. The MVMA2D simulations (Chapter 3) confirm that panel improvements reduced direct contact injuries and furthermore reveal that the panel improvements ameliorated the trajectories of unrestrained RF passengers in frontal crashes, resulting in reductions of injuries other than those due to direct contact with the panel (e.g., the head injury reductions shown in Figure 3-6). These reductions had the same timing and statistical
significance as the direct contact injury reductions - but the nonparametric approach of the MVMA2D analyses makes it impossible to gauge the exact magnitude of the reductions. Now, the FARS analysis shows an overall reduction of fatality risk whose timing coincides with the other two analyses and whose magnitude coincides with the direct contact injury reductions in NCSS. The most reasonable inference - since there have been no other known frontal crashworthiness improvements with comparable overall benefits at the RF seating position - is that the overall fatality reductions shown in Figure $4-8$ are mostly due to improved instrument panels and that the effect of the panel improvements on overall casualty risk of unrestrained RF passengers in frontal crashes is about the same as their effect on direct contact injuries: close to a 20 percent reduction in the mid to late 1960's, followed by nearly 10 percent additional reduction in the early 1970's, leveling off after that.

### 4.4 Combined index for drivers and right front passengers

An assessment of the overall crashworthiness of cars for unrestrained front seat occupants in frontal crashes can be obtained by taking the weighted average of the driver and RF passenger adjusted fatality indices. The appropriate weighting is 3 to 1 , since driver fatalities outnumber RF passengers killed by that margin [21], p. VI-4. The combined risk indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 117 | 1971 | 106 | 1978 | 104 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 120 | 1972 | 107 | 1979 | 106 |
| 1966 | 129 | 1973 | 98 | 1980 | 96 |
| 1967 | 121 | 1974 | 97 | 1981 | 94 |
| 1968 | 105 | 1975 | 95 | 1982 | 105 |
| 1969 | 104 | 1976 | 103 | 1983 | 103 |
| 1970 | 105 | 1977 | 102 | 1984 | 97 |

These risk indices have already been adjusted for vehicle weight and other factors; they compare the relative safety of two cars of different model years but having the same weight, age of occupants, etc.

Figure $4-9$ is a graph of the combined risk index by model year. It looks a lot like the driver's risk index (Figure 4-2), which is not surprising since the combined index is 3 parts driver and 1 part passenger. Averaging in the RF passenger index does seem to have made the curve in Figure 4-9 smoother than the one in Figure 4-2, though. The 95 percent noise bands are shown by the two dotted lines at index values 110 and 91 (almost the same as for the driver model). Overall fatality risk of unrestrained front seat occupants in frontal crashes dropped by 14 percent between model years 1964-66 (average index 121.9) and 1968-70 (average index 104.6). Every index value before 1968 is above the noise bands. After model year 1968, there is little net change in fatality risk. The 1973-84 average of 100 is 4 percent below the 1968-70 average of 104.6, although that difference could easily be in the "noise" range. Every index value from 1968 onwards is within the noise band; the oscillations of the index within the noise band does not appear to have any obvious pattern.

### 4.5 Lives saved by frontal crashworthiness improvements

The safety indices for the driver (Section 4.2 .3 and Figure 4-2) and the right front passenger (Section 4.3.4 and Figure 4-8) can be used to obtain estimates of the number of lives saved per year, in frontal crashes, as a result of all vehicle modifications other than belts during
FIGURE 4-9: COMBINED ADJUSTED FATALITY RISK INDEX FOR DRIVERS AND RF PASSENGERS, BY MODEL YEAR

126
126
123
$c$
$c$
$c$
$c$
6
6
~ $\wedge$


the 1964-84 period.

During the mid 1980's, there have been about 20,000 driver and right front passenger fatalities per year in cars: 15,000 drivers and 5,000 right front passengers [21], p. VI-4, [14], p. 7-2. Half of the fatalities have been in frontal crashes (principal impact point 11,12 or 1:00 in FARS): 7,500 drivers and 2,500 RF passengers [14], p. 6-12. The automobile mix that was on the road during the mid 1980's consists largely of 1973-84 cars, which have a fatality index of 100 for drivers and 99.7 for RF passengers. If these had been replaced by older type cars of the same weights (and the same levels of belt usage), the fatality index would have been higher than 100 and the number of fatalities would have increased proportionately.

The estimated numbers of driver fatalities that would have occurred in the mid 1980's with older type cars are:

| Type of Cars | Safety Index | Estimated Driver <br> Fatalities | Lives <br> Saved |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1973-84$ | 100 | 7500 (actual) |  |
| $1968-70$ | 103 | 7725 | 225 |
| $1964-66$ | 117.3 | 8800 | 1075 |
|  |  |  | $\overline{1300}$ |

The safety indices suggest that a total of 1300 drivers per year are being saved in frontal crashes as a result of vehicle modifications (other than belts and crash avoidance measures) implemented during 1964-84. About 1075 were saved by improvements during the late 1960's and 225 by all subsequent modifications.

This aggregate measure of safety benefits corresponds well with NHTSA's estimate of lives saved by a single safety device, the energy absorbing steering assembly, which benefits unrestrained drivers in frontal crashes. NHTSA's evaluation estimated that energy absorbing steering assemblies, which were implemented in 1967-68 and subsequently were improved or refined slightly, save 1347 lives per year [32], p. xix. That estimate, however, used 1978 aggregate fatalities as the "baseline" and would be reduced to 1125 if it were calculated by the same technique today, since the baseline number of potentially fatal crashes has dropped by 17 percent since 1978 (due to factors unrelated to vehicle crashworthiness, viz., fewer young drivers, shift from cars to light trucks, etc.). The estimate of 1125 lives saved by energy absorbing steering assemblies alone is almost identical to the 1075 lives saved in the late 1960's and accounts for just about all of the 1300 fatality reduction in the full 1964-84 period. The other NHTSA evaluations do not claim that any other specific safety devices saved unrestrained drivers in frontal crashes. The fatality index corroborates this assessment.

The estimated numbers of right front passenger fatalities that would have occurred in the mid 1980's with older type cars are:

| Type of Cars | Safety Index | Estimated RF <br> Passgr. Fatalities | Lives <br> Saved |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1973-84$ | 99.7 | 2500 (actual) |  |
| $1968-70$ | 109.1 | 2735 | 235 |
| $1964-66$ | 135.7 | 3400 | 665 |

The safety indices suggest that a total of 900 RF passengers per year are
being saved in frontal crashes as a result of vehicle modifications (other than belts and crash avoidance measures) implemented during 1964-84. About 665 were saved by improvements during the late 1960's and 235 by all subsequent modifications.

Many if not most of these 900 lives saved can be attributed to instrument panel improvements. Earlier NHTSA evaluations claim about 112 lives saved per year by adhesive bonding of the windshield [36], p. xxx; a large part of that saving would accrue to $R F$ passengers in frontal crashes. The windshield evaluation also suggests that a few RF passengers may be saved by the High Penetration Resistant windshield - by avoiding laceration of major vessels or ejection through the windshield - but the number is in all likelihood below 100 per year. That leaves 700 of the 900 lifesavings unaccounted for. It is unlikely that vehicle structural modifications or vehicle design changes not specifically recognized as safety related had any major effect on the RF passenger, since no such effect was seen for drivers. That leaves the instrument panel.

Section 2.4 presented a conservative estimate that instrument panel improvements have saved 176 lives per year - based only on their reduction of injuries directly involving panel contact and taking into account that only about 30 percent of frontal RF passenger fatalities (see Table 1-1) involve panel contact and no other source and that 50 percent of frontal fatal crashes involved collapse of the passenger compartment or Delta $V$ above 35 mph . But the MVMA2D simulations of Chapter 3 clearly demonstrated that the panel improvements of the late 1960's and early

1970's ameliorated occupant trajectories in frontal crashes and reduced the risk of many types of injury to the same extent as those directly involving panel contact. That would allow for an estimate of lives saved which is 2 to 3 times higher than the one in Section 2.4. Finally, as described in Section 4.3.4, the reductions in the RF passenger fatality index coincide with the instrument panel improvements described in the literature and the injury reductions seen in NCSS and the MVMA2D simulations.

The most reasonable estimate for lives saved per year in passenger cars by instrument panel improvements would be in the 400 to 700 range - most if not all the reduction in the fatality index that is not accounted for by previously evaluated safety devices.

A total of 2200 drivers and right front passengers of passenger cars are saved per year in frontal crashes as a result of vehicle modifications which affect crashworthiness, other than belts, and which have been implemented during 1964-84.

## CHAPTER 5

## ANALYSES OF LIGHT TRUCKS

NHTSA's crash data files on light trucks and vans are considerably smaller than those on passenger cars, making it difficult to analyze the trend in injury risk over the years. The National Accident Sampling System (NASS) for 1982-85 contains a relatively large sample of truck accidents. The injury rate (at AIS 2 or greater) of unrestrained right front passengers of light trucks in frontal crashes does not show a clear trend from model year 1966 through model year 1985. Likewise, the National Crash Severity Study (NCSS) injury rates do not change significantly between model years 1960 and 1978.

In frontal impacts of light trucks on the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), the fatality risk of right front passengers, relative to drivers, has remained almost constant through model years 1964-84. There are some preliminary indications that the absolute fatality risk for drivers and passengers in head on crashes decreased substantially in trucks of the mid 1970's and perhaps also in the late 1960's, after controlling for the weight of the truck. The findings must be considered tentative, though, until more accurate data on the weights of the trucks become available.
5.1 Analyses of NASS data

NASS is a probability sample of motor vehicle accidents in the United States [46]. NASS began to operate in 1979. During 1982-85, 50

NASS teams were collecting data on a consistent set of accident, vehicle and occupant variables - the NASS data sets for 1982-85 are combined and analyzed as a homogeneous file. In this report, NASS is used to study the overall nonminor injury risk (AIS 2 [1] or greater) of unrestrained right front passengers of light trucks, vans and multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPV). The analysis is not limited, as in Chapter 2, to injuries due to instrument panel contact - partly because the sample size of light truck occupants would be far to small for such an analysis and partly because it was shown in Chapters 3 and 4 that panel improvements can significantly reduce many types of injuries in frontal crashes - not just those due to direct contact with the panel. Another advantage of using the overall injury rate is that there is no worry about the team to team differences in missing data on contact points - a major cause of bias in Chapter 2. Such bias would be unacceptable here, because the samples are not large enough to permit the bias control techniques used in Chapter 2.

In light trucks, just as in passenger cars, there is no single "transition" model year where all instrument panel modifications were made. The analysis for light trucks, like the one for passenger cars (Chapter 2), is not a simple "before - after" comparison but rather tracks the injury rate over a series of model year groups: 1966-70, 1971-74, 1975-78, 1979-81 and 1982-85. The year 1966 is chosen to start the series because all light trucks have High Penetration Resistant windshields from then on; thus, the overall injury rates are not affected by glazing modifications [36]. The last model year group starts with 1982 because that is the model year in which Standard 201 was extended to light trucks (see Section 1.2).

NASS is not a simple random sample, but a stratified cluster sample with numerous strata and a variety of unequal sampling proportions. The most appropriate weights for NASS data in effectiveness analyses (as opposed to using them for national estimates) are the "Ockham weights" developed by Partyka [48]. They give the same weight to all the cases in a given stratum and time period; the cases in the stratum containing most of the fatalities are given a weight of 1 ; the other strata are given weights equal to the ratio of the sampling interval for that stratum to the interval for the first stratum. The 1983 Ockham weights listed in [48] are appropriate for NASS up to mid 1984; yet another set of weight was needed for the later 1984 and the 1985 files. Use of the Ockham weights and limitation of the data to towaway crashes make the various years of NASS quite similar to NCSS.

The injury rate used with NASS is the (weighted) number of right front passengers in frontal towaway crashes with AIS 2 or greater injuries per 100 (weighted) RF passengers in frontal towaway crashes. Table 5-1 shows that the injury rate had no consistent trend among the various model year groups. In trucks of model years 1966-70, there were 18.239 (weighted) injured passengers among a total of 141.637 passengers: an injury rate of 12.9 percent. The injury rate dropped to 7.4 percent in the 1971-74 trucks, returned to 9.1 percent in the 1975-78 trucks and 12.3 percent in the 1979-81 trucks, and leveled off at 10.9 percent in the 1982-85 trucks. The lower part of Table 5-1 shows the actual, unweighted number of cases on which the injury rates are based. There are only about one fifth as many injury cases as were available for the passenger car

## TABLE 5-1

NONMINOR (AIS 2 OR GREATER) INJURY RATE, BY MODEL YEAR UNRESTRAINED RIGHT FRONT PASSENGERS OF LIGHT TRUCKS, VANS AND MPV'S, IN FRONTAL TOWAWAY CRASHES, NASS 1982-85

| Model <br> Years | nof <br> Casualties | AIS 2+ <br> Casualty <br> Rassengers |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rate |  |  |

analyses of Chapter 2 (compare the lower part of Table 5-1 with Table $2-1$ ). With only $11,19,26,20$ and 23 actual injury cases in the five model year groups, the fluctuations of the injury rates in Table 5-1 could easily be due to sampling error alone. Unless the true reduction of injury risk in light trucks has been dramatic, it would have been unreasonable to expect these data to reveal a significant trend.

For comparison purposes, Table 5-2 shows the injury rates of drivers of light trucks in frontal crashes, by model year group. Since drivers outnumber RF passengers by 3 to 1 , the sample sizes are 3 times as large. Yet Table 5-2 does not show any clear trend for the drivers' injury rates: they varied from 9.7 percent in the $1966-70$ trucks to 7.5 percent in the 1971-74 trucks, then back up to 8.2 percent in model years 1975-78, 10.7 percent in 1979-81 and 12.3 percent in 1982-85. It is not clear whether this $U$ shaped pattern of the injury rates is purely coincidental, reflects a real reduction of injury rates subsequently masked by a bias in NASS data against the newer trucks (such as the shift in the light truck market toward smaller vehicles and the inreasing recreational use of light trucks), or (least likely) indicates a real improvement followed by a real worsening of injury risk.
5.2 Analyses of NCSS data

The NCSS sample, operational during 1977-79 for passenger cars (see Section 2.1), was extended part of the time to include light trucks. For model years up to 1978, it provides a sample not quite as large as NASS. The most statistically meaningful injury rate for use with NCSS

## TABLE 5-2

NONMINOR (AIS 2 OR GREATER) INJURY RATE, BY MODEL YEAR UNRESTRAINED DRIVERS OF LIGHT TRUCKS, VANS AND MPV'S, IN FRONTAL TOWAWAY CRASHES, NASS 1982-85

| Mode1 <br> Years | n of <br> Casualties | N of <br> Drivers | AIS 2+ <br> Casualty <br> Rate (\%) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1966-70$ | OCKHAM WEIGHTED DATA |  |  |

## UNWEIGHTED DATA

| $1966-70$ | 32 | 174 | 18.4 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1971-74$ | 45 | 342 | 13.2 |
| $1975-78$ | 84 | 547 | 15.3 |
| $1979-81$ | 74 | 436 | 17.0 |
| $1982-85$ | 87 | 369 | 23.6 |

data is the proportion of right front passengers who were killed or hospitalized - since all fatalities and hospitalizations are in the 100 percent sampling stratum of NCSS, but not all AIS 2 injuries.

Table 5-3 shows that the NCSS injury rate had no consistent trend among the various model year groups. In trucks of model years 1961-70, the injury rate was 11.4 percent. The rate dropped to 7.6 percent in the 1971-74 trucks, but returned to 14.1 percent in the 1975-78 trucks. The average for $1971-78,10.6$ percent, is almost the same as the average for 1961-70. Of course, the sample sizes, as shown in the lower part of Table 5-3 are small and only drastic real trends are likely to have been revealed by the data.

For comparison purposes, Table 5-4 shows the NCSS injury rates of drivers. It is a surprisingly low 6.0 percent for model years 1961-70 and rises to 10.8 percent in 1971-74 and 10.1 percent in 1975-78. The trend is at variance to what happened to right front passengers in NCSS and drivers in NASS (Table 5-2), reflecting the small sample sizes which make all injury rates subject to a lot of sampling error.

The NASS and NCSS data, in combination, suggest that no overwhelming changes (e.g., 40 percent or more) have occurred in the nonfatal injury risk of right front passengers of light trucks in frontal crashes during model years 1966-85. The samples were inadequate for the detection of smaller changes on the order of 10 or 20 percent, especially if they took place gradually during that period.

## TABLE 5-3

# NONMINOR (HOSPITALIZATION OR FATALITY) INJURY RATE, BY MODEL YEAR, UNRESTRAINED RIGHT FRONT PASSENGERS OF LIGHT TRUCKS, VANS AND MPV'S, IN FRONTAL CRASHES, NCSS 

n of

| Mode | Hospitalized | $N$ of | Casualty |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Years | Passengers | Passengers | Rate (\%) |

WEIGHTED DATA
1961-70 ..... 14123
11.4
1971-74 ..... 151977.6
1975-78 ..... 24
170 ..... 14.1
UNWEIGHTED DATA
1961-70 ..... 14 ..... 37 ..... 37.8
1971-74 ..... 15 ..... 56 ..... 26.8
1975-78 ..... 24 ..... 74 ..... 32.4

# NONMINOR (HOSPITALIZATION OR FATALITY) INJURY RATE, BY MODEL YEAR, UNRESTRAINED DRIVERS OF LIGHT TRUCKS, VANS AND MPV'S, IN FRONTAL CRASHES, NCSS 

| Model <br> Years | n of Hospitalized Drivers | N of Drivers | Casualty <br> Rate (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WEIGHTED DATA |  |  |  |
| 1961-70 | 26 | 431 | 6.0 |
| 1971-74 | 69 | 636 | 10.8 |
| 1975-78 | 76 | 750 | 10.1 |
| UNWEIGHTED DATA |  |  |  |
| 1961-70 | 26 | 101 | 25.7 |
| 1971-74 | 69 | 169 | 40.8 |
| 1975-78 | 76 | 229 | 33.2 |

## 5.3

Analyses of fatality trends in FARS data
Chapter 4 presented a two part strategy for estimating the fatality risk index by model year of drivers and right front passengers of passenger cars in frontal crashes: in head on crashes of cars of two different model years, analyze which driver is more likely to be killed, controlling for differences in the weights, etc., of the two cars (Section 4.2); in frontal impacts where there is a driver and a right front passenger, analyze which of the two is more likely to be killed, as a function of the car's model year (Section 4.3). The second part of the strategy can be carried out as easily for light trucks as for cars. The head on collision model, though, requires exact data on the weights of the vehicles. Such data on light trucks were not available at the time of this study. A preliminary head on collision model for light trucks, using average truck weights by model year derived from NASS and NCSS data, is presented in Section 5.3.3.

### 5.3.1 Fatality ratio of right front passengers to drivers

Although the estimation of the fatality ratio was the second part of the modeling process in Chapter 4, it is discussed first here because it does not rely on vehicle weight data and the results can be accepted with confidence. The $1975-86$ FARS files contain records of nearly 10,000 frontal impacts of light trucks, vans or MPV's in which there were a driver and a right front passenger and at least one of them died. Light trucks, vans and MPV's included FARS BODY_TYP codes 39-41, 43-44 or 50-52 until 1981 and 40-69 during 1982-86. (Short utility vehicles - code 12 - could also have been included in the analysis but
weren't.) All other definitions and procedures are the same as in Sections 4.3.

A simple model is built, presenting the ratio of $R F$ passenger to driver fatalities as a function of model year, without control for other factors, based directly of tabulation of the cases by model year and fatality status of the driver and the $R F$ passenger. The ratios of $R F$ passenger fatalities per 100 drivers killed, by model year, are:

| 1960 | 105 | 1969 | 85 | 1978 | 86 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1961 | 68 | 1970 | 78 | 1979 | 92 |
| 1962 | 91 | 1971 | 93 | 1980 | 89 |
| 1963 | 94 | 1972 | 96 | 1981 | 86 |
| 1964 | 104 | 1973 | 93 | 1982 | 89 |
| 1965 | 101 | 1974 | 92 | 1983 | 94 |
| 1966 | 89 | 1975 | 90 | 1984 | 88 |
| 1967 | 93 | 1976 | 85 | 1985 | 100 |
| 1968 | 92 | 1977 | 89 |  |  |

Figure $5-1$ is a graph of the unadjusted fatality ratios by model year. Unlike the situation for passenger cars, the fatality risk of RF passengers of light trucks has been consistently about 90 percent as high as for drivers throughout the $1960-85$ model year range. The 95 percent noise bands on either side of the hypothesis that RF passenger fatality risk is 90 percent as high as drivers' are represented by the dotted, approximately parabolic curves on Figure 5-1. All of the observed fatality ratios during the $1964-84$ period are within the noise bands and most of the fluctuations are small compared to the width of the bands.

In Section 4.3.3, the simple fatality ratios for passenger cars were adjusted for differences in the age and sex of the drivers and
FIGURE 5-1: UNADJUSTED RATIO OF RF PASSENGER TO DRIVER FATALItIES, LIGHT TRUCKS, bY MODEL YEAR

passengers, etc. All of the adjustments made little or no difference, as shown in Figure 4-7. A similar regression analysis for light trucks also showed that the adjustment procedure would hardly change the results.

In summary, the fatality risk for RF passengers of light trucks has remained constant relative to drivers' fatality risk. If drivers' fatality risk was reduced between 1964 and 1984, the passengers' risk would have been reduced by about the same amount.

### 5.3.2 A simple model for driver risk: no control for vehicle weight

The 1975-86 FARS files contain over 30,000 head on collisions
fatal to at least one of the drivers and involving two passenger cars or a passenger car and a light truck or two light trucks; while 16,000 of these collisions involved only passenger cars, 14,000 involved at least one light truck. The accident records were collected in a file, using the procedures of Section 4.2.1.

The starting point for the simple model is a tabulation of the head on crashes by model year and body style (i.e., car or light truck) of the case vehicle, model year and body style of the "other" vehicle, and where the fatalities occurred. For example, suppose there were $\mathrm{N}=100$ head on collisions between 1975 trucks and 1979 cars that killed at least one of the drivers. Suppose that

In 10 collisions, the 75 truck driver died, the 79 car driver survived In 80 collisions, the 79 car driver died, the 75 truck driver survived In 10 collisions, both drivers died
(This was not an actual data point but just an example. Of course, the
large disparity in the fatalities would primarily be due to the greater mass of the 1975 trucks.) The above statistics supply two data points for the logistic regression. First, considering 1975 truck as the "case" vehicle model year and 1979 car as the "other" vehicle: a case vehicle driver died in 20 of the 100 collisions. The ratio of collisions with a case vehicle fatality to total collisions is $R=20 / 100=2$. Second, with the 1979 car as the "case" vehicle and the 1975 truck as the "other," $R=90 / 100=.9$. Each combination of case vehicle model year and body style and other vehicle model year and body style (with model year ranging from 64 to 84 ) furnishes one data point for the regression. The dependent variable in the regression is

$$
\operatorname{LOGODDS}=\log [R /(1-R)]
$$

(where $R$ is set to .01 if it is zero and .99 if it is one, so as to avoid infinite values for LOGODDS). The independent variables are M64, ..., M83 and $T 64, \ldots, T 84$, where $M i=1$ if the case vehicle is a car and its model year is $\mathbf{i}, \mathrm{Mi}=-1$ if the other vehicle is a car and its model year is $\mathfrak{i}$ and $\mathrm{Mi}=0$, otherwise. $\mathrm{Ti}=1$ if the case vehicle is a truck and its model year is $\mathbf{i}, \mathrm{Ti}=-1$ if the other vehicle is a truck and its model year is $i$ and $T i=0$, otherwise. A weighted logistic regression on aggregate data is performed, the weight factor being $N$.

The regression coefficients are

| INTERCEPT | -.32 | M71 | -.83 | M78 | -.61 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- | ---: |
| M64 | -.66 | M72 | -.97 | M79 | -.42 |
| M65 | -.71 | M73 | -1.19 | M80 | -.02 |
| M66 | -.59 | M74 | -1.13 | M81 | -.05 |
| M67 | -.74 | M75 | -1.28 | M82 | .09 |
| M68 | -1.02 | M76 | -1.05 | M83 | .06 |
| M69 | -1.13 | M77 | -1.00 | M84" | .00 |
| M70 | -1.01 |  |  |  |  |


| T64 | -1.33 | T71 | -1.96 | T78 | -2.27 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| T65 | -1.40 | T72 | -1.85 | T79 | -2.34 |
| T66 | -1.42 | T73 | -2.09 | T80 | -1.97 |
| T67 | -1.66 | T74 | -2.06 | T81 | -1.86 |
| T68 | -1.73 | T75 | -2.16 | T82 | -1.78 |
| T69 | -1.92 | T76 | -2.23 | T83 | -1.92 |
| T70 | -1.77 | T77 | -2.28 | T84 | -1.72 |

$R^{2}$ is .73. There is no actual $M 84$ variable, but all the other model year coefficients are measured relative to the risk for 1984 cars. The more negative the coefficient, the lower the fatality risk. The regression coefficients for the trucks are always lower than those for cars, reflecting, among other things, the greater weight of the trucks and the tendency for their drivers to be younger and male. The regression coefficients for the passenger cars differ only trivially from those obtained in the simple model for car to car collisions only (Section 4.2.2) This is reassuring evidence that the models developed in Chapter 4, which were based on car to car collisions only, are also valid, as a minimum, for car to truck collisions.

The regression results are used to generate fatality risk indices by an abstract form of double pair comparison analysis [12], as in Section 4.2.2. Construct a file of all head on collisions involving cars or light trucks which were fatal to at least one driver (actually this file has each collision twice: once with vehicle no. 1 as the case vehicle and once with vehicle no. 2 as the case vehicle; it has over 60,000 crash situations). Consider the hypothetical situation where each case vehicle is replaced by a 1975 truck, while the other vehicle stays what it actually is. Use the regression coefficients to estimate TP75, the proportion of the 60,000 case vehicle drivers who are killed and TC75, the
proportion of the 60,000 control group (other vehicle) drivers who are killed. Now consider another hypothetical situation where each case vehicle is replaced by a 1979 truck, while the other vehicle stays what it actually is. Use the regression coefficients to estimate TP79, the proportion of the 60,000 case vehicle drivers who are killed and TC79, the proportion of the 60,000 control group (other vehicle) drivers who are killed. Then

## (TP75/TC75) / (TP79/TC79)

estimates the fatality risk for drivers of model year 1975 trucks in head on collisions relative to the risk for drivers of model year 1979 trucks (since the drivers of the "other" vehicles act as a control group).

TP75 and TC75 are estimated as follows. Recall that .320 is the regression intercept; let Aik be the estimated regression coefficient for model year $i$ and body type $k$ ( $k=0$ for cars and $k=1$ for trucks). Let $N(i, k, j, m)$ be the actual number of head on crashes on FARS involving a vehicle of model year $i$ and body type $k$ and a vehicle of model year $j$ and body type $m$. Let $R(i, k, j, m)$ be the regression's estimate of the ratio of driver fatalities in the vehicles of model year $i$ and body type $k$ to $N(i, k, j, m)$. In other words

$$
R(i, k, j, m)=1 /[1+\exp (A j m-A i k-.320)]
$$

whereas

$$
R(j, m, i, k)=1 /[1+\exp (A i k-A j m-.320)]
$$

If the case vehicle is always replaced by a model year 1975 truck,

$$
\begin{aligned}
T P 75 & =\sum N(i, k, j, m) R(75,1, j, m) / \sum N(i, k, j, m) \\
& =\sum N(i, k, j, m) /\left[1+\exp \left(A j-A_{75,1}-320\right)\right] / \sum N(i, k, j, m)
\end{aligned}
$$

whereas

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{TC75} & =\sum N(j, m, i, k) R(j, m, 75,1) / \sum N(j, m, i, k) \\
& =\sum N(j, m, i, k) /\left[1+\exp \left(A_{75}, 1^{-A j}-.320\right)\right] / \sum N(j, m, i, k)
\end{aligned}
$$

The quantities TPi/TCi for the various model years become more tangible through indexing. The unadjusted frontal fatality risk index for drivers of light trucks shall be set to 100 for the average of model years 1973 through 1984 - i.e., let

$$
U=100 /(T P 73 / T C 73+\ldots+T P 84 / T C 84)
$$

and define

$$
U i=U(T P i / T C i)
$$

to be the risk index for light trucks of model year i. The unadjusted risk indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 176 | 1971 | 107 | 1978 | 83 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 167 | 1972 | 117 | 1979 | 79 |
| 1966 | 165 | 1973 | 96 | 1980 | 106 |
| 1967 | 136 | 1974 | 99 | 1981 | 116 |
| 1968 | 129 | 1975 | 91 | 1982 | 124 |
| 1969 | 111 | 1976 | 86 | 1983 | 110 |
| 1970 | 125 | 1977 | 83 | 1984 | 129 |

The appropriate interpretation of the risk index is that, in head on collisions between trucks of model year 1970 and 1979, there would typically be 125 fatalities in the MY 75 trucks for every 79 fatalities in the MY 1979 trucks. The unadjusted risk index does not control for any differences in driver age, etc., that may have occurred in the actual FARS crashes. Since it does not control for vehicle weight, it is only appropriate for head on crashes, where the relative weights of the two vehicles is critically important. It would not apply at all to frontal single vehicle crashes, where the vehicle weight factor has a much smaller effect.

Figure $5-2$ is a graph of the unadjusted risk index by model year. It shows even more clearly the trends that can be found in the above table. Unadjusted risk declined steadily from 1964 to 1979. In the first half of that period, trucks got bigger. During the second half, trucks did not grow much heavier, if at all, but there were some well known safety related improvements such as the installation of energy absorbing steering columns in pickup trucks [28] and the gradual elimination of forward control vehicles. The index rose steeply beginning in 1980; it was a period of downsizing and increasing market share for imported small trucks. Nevertheless, the unadjusted risk index is not nearly as high in trucks of the mid 1980's (110-130) as it was in trucks of the mid 1960's (135-175) despite the fact that trucks of the mid 1980's may be as light as trucks of the mid 1960's. This is already evidence that the intrinsic fatality risk for drivers of light trucks has been reduced during the past 25 years.

An unadjusted fatality index for RF passengers of light trucks in frontal crashes is obtained by multiplying each model year's driver index by the ratio of $R F$ passenger to driver fatality risk and then multiplying by a constant (close to 1.1) so that the average of the 1973-84 indices is 100. The RF passenger indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 203 | 1971 | 111 | 1978 | 80 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 189 | 1972 | 126 | 1979 | 81 |
| 1966 | 163 | 1973 | 100 | 1980 | 105 |
| 1967 | 141 | 1974 | 102 | 1981 | 112 |
| 1968 | 133 | 1975 | 91 | 1982 | 123 |
| 1969 | 105 | 1976 | 81 | 1983 | 116 |
| 1970 | 109 | 1977 | 82 | 1984 | 127 |

Figure 5-3 graphs the RF passenger fatality index. It shows the same
FIGURE 5-2: UNADJUSTED FATALITY RISK INDEX FOR DRIVERS OF LIGHT TRUCKS, BY MODEL YEAR
UnADJUSTED RISK FaCtor by model year (1973-84 ayerage $=100$ )
TRUCK DRIVER RISK index
plot of adjamy symbol used is a
$\stackrel{\circ}{\stackrel{\circ}{-}}$
ㄷ

-
FIGURE 5-3: UNADJUSTED FATALITY RISK INDEX FOR RF PASSENGERS OF LIGHT TRUCKS, BY MODEL YEAR

trends as the driver index, since the ratio of RF passenger to driver fatalities was close to .9 throughout 1964-84.

### 5.3.3 A preliminary model controlling for vehicle weight

In the model for head on collisions of passenger cars (Section 4.2.3), it was possible to obtain a good estimate of the weight of each car from Automotive News Almanac listings of weights by make, model and model year [2] and merge this information with the FARS make/model codes. The same cannot be done for light trucks because each "model" of truck, as defined on FARS (e.g., 1969 Ford Van) may comprise trucks of many different series and greatly different weights. Publications such as the annual Truck Index [53] provide weights for each series of trucks, but a complex decoding of VINs would be needed to merge the data with FARS. That effort was beyond the scope of this study.

Instead, the weight data in the Truck Index are used indirectiy and on an aggregate basis. The NCSS and NASS files list the curb weight of each light truck, based on decoding of the VIN and looking it up in the Truck Index tables. These data are used to estimate the average curb weight of all the light trucks of a specific model year on FARS. These weights do not include any cargo weights, nor do they take into account how much of the cargo weight, if any, should be added to the effective mass of a truck. Similarly, the Automotive News car weights are used to find the average weight of all the cars of a specific model year on FARS. The adjusted model uses the same logistic regression on aggregate data as the simple model of the preceding section, except that information is
added to indicate the average weight of the case vehicles of a given model year and body type - and likewise for the other vehicle in the collision.

Specifically, the light trucks in 1982-85 NASS data are tabulated by model year (1964-84) and type of light truck (BODYTYPE codes 40-49 are vans, 50-54 are pickups and 55-59 are defined to be MPV's in this analysis). In each cell, note the actual unweighted number of NASS cases and the average curb weight of the trucks. The same is done with the NCSS (here VBDYSTY codes 5-6 are vans, 7 is MPV and 8 is pickup), which continues as far as model year 1978. All the light trucks on the FARS file of head on collisions (see Section 5.3.2) are tabulated by model year and type of truck (up to calendar year 1981, BODY_TYP codes 39-44 and 52 are MPV's, 50 is pickup and 51 is van; starting in calendar year 1982, BODY_TYP codes 40-49 are vans, 50-54 are pickups and 55-59 are MPV's, as in NASS). Consider, for example, the data for model year 1977:

Pickups

|  | N | Avg. <br> Weight | N | Avg. <br> Weight | N | Avg, <br> Weight |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NASS | 133 | 3690 | 47 | 3936 | 25 | 4188 |
| NCSS | 137 | 3803 | 49 | 3945 | 31 | 3952 |
| NASS + NCSS | 270 | 3747 | 96 | 3941 | 56 | 4057 |
| FARS | 882 |  | 239 |  | 112 |  |

Since there are 133 MY 77 pickups in NASS, weighing an average of 3690 pounds and 137 pickups in NCSS weighing an average of 3803 pounds, the overall average for the 270 pickups in NASS plus NCSS is 3747 pounds. Similarly, the overall average for vans is 3941 pounds and for MPV's, 4057
pounds. Since there are 882 pickups, 239 vans and 112 MPV's on FARS, the average weight of model year 1977 trucks on FARS, based on NASS and NCSS data is
$(3747 \times 882+3941 \times 239+4057 \times 112) /(882+239+112)=3813$ pounds The average weight of model year 1977 trucks on FARS, based only on NASS data is

$$
(3690 \times 882+3936 \times 239+4188 \times 112) /(882+239+112)=3783 \text { pounds }
$$

In model year 1977, the weight based on NASS and NCSS data is 30 pounds higher than the one based on NASS alone, presumably reflecting a slightly heavier mix of trucks at the NCSS sites than at the NASS locations. In fact, during the 1964-78 model years where both NASS and NCSS data are available, the NASS + NCSS estimate averages 35 pounds higher per model year than the NASS estimate. Thus, the NASS + NCSS estimate is used for model years 1964-78 and the NASS estimate +35 pounds is used for model years 1979-84. Finally, even by this procedure, the extimates for 1964 and 1972 were unreasonably high. The 1964 estimate was lowered to 3400 pounds, for consistency with the next two years. The 1972 estimate was high because the 1972 pickups on NASS were inexplicably several hundred pounds heavier than pickups of neighboring model years. Therefore the 1972 average was estimated again, using only the NCSS pickups. By this procedure, the average weights of light trucks, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 3400 | 1971 | 3683 | 1978 | 3874 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1965 | 3406 | 1972 | 3788 | 1979 | 3875 |
| 1966 | 3439 | 1973 | 3826 | 1980 | 3684 |
| 1967 | 3599 | 1974 | 3824 | 1981 | 3509 |
| 1968 | 3630 | 1975 | 3808 | 1982 | 3436 |
| 1969 | 3665 | 1976 | 3858 | 1983 | 3554 |
| 1970 | 3677 | 1977 | 3813 | 1984 | 3378 |

The average weights of the passenger cars on FARS by model year, based on the weights of individual makes and models as listed in Automotive News Almanacs (see Section 4.2.1), are:

| 1964 | 3165 | 1971 | 3352 | 1978 | 3219 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1965 | 3203 | 1972 | 3486 | 1979 | 3050 |
| 1966 | 3393 | 1973 | 3601 | 1980 | 2757 |
| 1967 | 3351 | 1974 | 3541 | 1981 | 2727 |
| 1968 | 3449 | 1975 | 3709 | 1982 | 2680 |
| 1969 | 3529 | 1976 | 3602 | 1983 | 2784 |
| 1970 | 3453 | 1977 | 3536 | 1984 | 2743 |

Figure 5-4 graphs the average weight of passenger cars and light trucks by model year. Both types of vehicles gained about 500 pounds during the 1960's and early 1970's and lost it later on. But there are two major differences between cars and trucks. The average weight of cars began to decline in 1976 and the weight reduction was essentially completed by 1980; during that period, cars became 1000 pounds lighter due to downsizing and replacement of large cars by imports and subcompacts. Light trucks, on the other hand, had relatively constant weight throughout 1973-79 and only began downsizing in 1980; by 1984 they had shed about 500 pounds - only half as much as cars. Light trucks of the mid 1980's weighed about the same as those of the mid 1960's, while cars became a net 500 pounds lighter in the 20 year period.

At this point it becomes possible to rerun the logistic regression on aggregate data that was used in the simple model (Section 5.3.2), but with the added information on the average weight of cars or light trucks of a given model year. Initially, it was attempted to run exactly the same regression as in the simple model, but with the additional independent variable LWGT, which is the logarithm of the ratio of the
FIGURE 5-4: AVERAGE WEIGHT OF CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, BY MODEL YEAR

average weight of the case vehicles (of that body type and model year) to the other vehicles - e.g., if the case vehicles are 1975 trucks and the other vehicles are 1979 cars, $L W G T=\log (3808 / 3050)$. The regression was unsuccessful, assigning an unreasonably high coefficient of -8.30 to LWGT, because LWGT is confounded with the other independent variables and the regression cannot tell their effects apart. (Here, each model year and body type has exactly one weight - the average weight - whereas in the disaggregate logistic regression for passenger cars in Section 4.2.3 there was a great variety of individual car weights among the various cars of the same model year.)

A better approach is to run the regression in two steps. First, the dependent variable LOGODDS (same as in the simple model) is regressed against just two independent variables: LWGT and TRUCK (which is 1 if the case vehicle is a truck and the other vehicle a car, -1 if vice versa, and 0 if both are trucks or both are cars). With $R$ squared of .72, the best fit is

$$
\text { LOGODDS }=.320-4.298 \text { LWGT - . } 735 \text { TRUCK }
$$

That is a plausible coefficient for LWGT; since aggregate rather than disaggregate data are used, it is reasonable to expect a coefficient slightly lower than the 5.421 derived in the disaggregate regression for passenger cars in Section 4.2.3.

The second step is to transform the dependent variable LOGODDS into

$$
\text { LOGODDS' }=\text { LOGODDS }+4.298 \text { LWGT }
$$

which is, so to speak, the log of the fatality odds ratio that would have been observed if the case vehicles and the other vehicles had the same average weight. Next, a regression is performed with the same variables as in the simple model, but with LOGODDS' rather than LOGODDS as the dependent variable. The regression coefficients are

| INTERCEPT | .32 | M71 | .03 | M78 | .08 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| M64 | -.04 | M72 | .06 | M79 | .04 |
| M65 | -.05 | M73 | -.02 | M80 | .00 |
| M66 | .32 | M74 | -.03 | M81 | -.08 |
| M67 | .12 | M75 | .02 | M82 | -.01 |
| M68 | -.03 | M76 | .12 | M83 | -13 |
| M69 | -.05 | M77 | .09 | M84" | .00 |
| M70 | -.02 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| T64 | -.41 | T71 | -.70 | T78 | -.79 |
| T65 | -.47 | T72 | -.46 | T79 | -.85 |
| T66 | -.44 | T73 | -.66 | T80 | -.70 |
| T67 | -.49 | T74 | -.63 | T81 | -.80 |
| T68 | -.52 | T75 | -.75 | T82 | -.81 |
| T69 | -.67 | T76 | -.77 | T83 | -.81 |
| T70 | -.51 | T77 | -.86 | T84 | -.83 |

$R^{2}$ is .42 , which is excellent considering that the vehicle weight effect has been eliminated from the regression by its incorporation in the dependent variable.

The regression coefficients are used to estimate risk factors such as TP75/TC75 exactly as in the unadjusted model of Section 5.3.2, except that the formulas

$$
R(i, k, j, m)=1 /[1+\exp (A j m-A i k-.320)]
$$

and

$$
R(j, m, i, k)=1 /[1+\exp (A i k-A j m-.320)]
$$

are replaced by

$$
R(i, k, j, m)=1 /[1+\exp (A j m-A i k-.320+4.298 L W G T)]
$$

and

$$
R(j, m, i, k)=1 /[1+\exp (A i k-A j m-.320-4.298 L W G T)]
$$

The adjusted frontal fatality risk index for drivers of light trucks shall be set to 100 for the average of model years 1973 through 1984 - i.e., let

$$
U=100 /(T P 73 / T C 73+\ldots+T P 84 / T C 84)
$$

and define

$$
U i=U(T P i / T C i)
$$

to be the risk index for light trucks of model year $\mathbf{i}$. The adjusted risk indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 132 | 1971 | 106 | 1978 | 99 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 127 | 1972 | 127 | 1979 | 94 |
| 1966 | 129 | 1973 | 109 | 1980 | 105 |
| 1967 | 124 | 1974 | 112 | 1981 | 98 |
| 1968 | 121 | 1975 | 101 | 1982 | 97 |
| 1969 | 108 | 1976 | 100 | 1983 | 97 |
| 1970 | 123 | 1977 | 93 | 1984 | 95 |

The appropriate interpretation of the risk index is that if the fleet of 1968 light trucks had been replaced by a fleet of 1978 type light trucks of the same weights, there would have been only $99 / 121$ of the head on crash fatalities. Since the adjusted risk index controls for vehicle weight, it might be appropriate not only for head on crashes but also for other types of frontal impacts.

Figure $5-5$ is a graph of the adjusted risk index for drivers by model year. It is not so clear where the trend line should go in the early 1970's because of the fluctuation of the indices - due to possible inaccuracies in the truck weight data plus generally small sample sizes (as indicated by the wide 95 percent noise bands around the 1973-84
FIGURE 5-5: ADJUSTED FATALITY RISK INDEX FOR DRIVERS OF LIGHT TRUCKS, by mOdel year

average of 100; the upper noise band is the parabolic dotted curve and the lower band doesn't even fit on the graph; sampling error is estimated by the same procedure as in Section 4.2.3). Nevertheless, the important trends are quite clear. Fatality risk dropped by a moderate amount in the late 1960's and early 1970's and then declined steeply in the mid 1970's: the time when energy absorbing steering assemblies were voluntarily installed in pickup trucks while production of forward control vehicles was generally curtailed. Those are the two most obvious vehicle modifications that could be expected to benefit drivers in frontal crashes - and it appears they did. Fatality risk dropped by a total of about 20 percent from the mid 1960's to trucks of the mid 1970's. Fatality risk has been nearly constant since about 1977.

An adjusted fatality index for RF passengers of light trucks in frontal crashes is obtained by multiplying each model year's driver index by the ratio of $R F$ passenger to driver fatality risk and then multiplying by a constant (close to 1.1) so that the average of the 1973-84 indices is 100. The RF passenger indices, by model year, are:

| 1964 | 153 | 1971 | 110 | 1978 | 95 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1965 | 143 | 1972 | 137 | 1979 | 97 |
| 1966 | 127 | 1973 | 113 | 1980 | 105 |
| 1967 | 129 | 1974 | 115 | 1981 | 94 |
| 1968 | 125 | 1975 | 102 | 1982 | 96 |
| 1969 | 102 | 1976 | 95 | 1983 | 102 |
| 1970 | 107 | 1977 | 93 | 1984 | 94 |

Figure 5-6 graphs the RF passenger fatality index. Although sampling error is fairly large, as indicated by the 95 percent noise bands, it seems likely that fatality risk dropped by about 20-25 percent from trucks of the 1966-68 period (average index 127) to 1975-80 trucks (average index
98). The fluctuations in the individual points make it difficult to determine exactly where the greatest drop occurred, but it was somewhere in the $1969-75$ period. Fatality risk was virtually constant during model years 1975-84. The data suggest that the instrument panel improvements typically made on cars during the late 1960's and early 1970's (see Section 1.4) may have been extended to light trucks, with corresponding benefits, a few years later - but undoubtedly no later than the mid 1970's and well in advance of the September 1, 1981 effective date of the extension of Standard 201 to light trucks. Structural improvements of trucks such as the gradual phasing out of forward control vehicles may also have been responsible for some of the reduction.

In summary, these preliminary fatality indices show a reduction of fatality risk in frontal crashes of about 20 percent for drivers and right front passengers of light trucks. Most of the reduction was achieved in trucks of the early to mid 1970's, with little change after that. The statistical analyses of NASS and NCSS data (Sections 5.1 and 5.2) did not show a corresponding reduction of nonfatal injury risk but, as noted there, the sample sizes were too small to reliably detect any reductions unless they were up in the 40 percent range. Thus, the FARS results are not inconsistent with NASS and NCSS. It is possible that some improvements to light trucks in fact did reduce fatalities but had less effect on nonfatal injuries (the phasing out of forward control vehicles is a good candidate, since this would be primarily beneficial in the more severe crashes). It is also possible that there was a reduction of nonfatal injury risk parallel to the fatality reduction, but the small

NASS and NCSS samples did not show it. Finally, if more detailed truck weight data become available, a more refined analysis of the fatality risk indices might change some of the results.

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## APPENDIX A <br> PLANNING AND RUNNING THE MVMA2D SIMULATIONS

1. Test matrix
2. Geometry and force deflection measurements
3. Derivation of MVMA2D geometry
4. Derivation of MVMA2D force deflection characteristics
5. Running MVMA2D
6. Anomalies and exceptions in the simulations
7. Test matrix Originally, instrument panel and windshield geometry and force deflection characteristics were measured for 19 passenger cars of model years 1975-83 [52]. The work was completed by a NHTSA contractor in 1983. The measurements were the input data for the PADS2 simulation of occupant trajectories [24], which at that time was believed appropriate for modeling the trajectory of the unrestrained right front passenger. For this study, six manufacturer/market classes were selected from among the 19 cars and the same contractor was assigned to find older cars in these classes and perform identical measurements on them. The original design called for tests in the following manufacturer/market classes, which, together, represent a large portion of the market:
8. Full sized Ford
9. Full sized GM
10. Compact GM
11. Compact Chrysler
12. Volkswagen (subcompact)
13. Nissan or Honda (subcompact)

Four model year groups were to be represented:

1. Pre-standard (1965-66)
2. Early post-standard (1969-71)
3. Pre-downsized big cars and rear wheel drive small cars (1974-76)
4. Downsized big cars and front wheel drive small cars (1977-83) Where possible, there should be a car of each market class in each model year group. (Some combinations, such as 1965-66 Nissan, were dropped because such cars were uncommon or nonexistent in the United States.)

Thirteen specific older cars were selected which, in combination with some of the 19 that had already been tested, would fill out the matrix to the maximum possible extent. These 13 older cars were the 1966 , 69 and 76 full-sized Fords, the 1965, 69 and 76 full-sized Chevrolets, the

1966 and 69 Nova, the 1966 and 69 Dart or Valiant, the 1966 and 74 VW Beetles and the 1971 Datsun 1200. The cars were tested by the contractor (see next section) and the PADS2 input data supplied to NHTSA in 1984. In 1985 it became evident that PADS2 was not suitable for modeling the unrestrained right front passenger and that the MVMA2D simulation model would have to be used instead. At that point neither the 13 older vehicles nor the original 19 cars were available for retesting to obtain a full MVMA2D input data set. Those cars whose instrument panels had been dynamically tested - all 13 old cars and 10 of the 19 newer ones - could at least be converted to partial MVMA2D input sets. But newer cars whose panels had not been dynamically tested or for which certain geometry measurements were unavailable had to be replaced in the matrix. In some cases the substitutes only resembled rather than met the characteristics that were originally demanded. The final result was a matrix of 21 cars for which MVMA2D simulations were feasible:

| Car | MY |
| :---: | :---: |
| Group | Group |



| 5 | 1 | 66 VW Beetle |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | 2 | 74 VW Beetle |
|  | 4 | 80 Dodge Omni |
|  |  |  |
| 6 | 2 | 71 Datsun 1200 |
|  | 4 | 75 Honda Civic |
|  | 4 | 78 Honda Accord |

There were no problems obtaining data on full sized Ford and GM cars from each of the 4 model year groups. No 1974-76 Nova was available for MVMA2D input and the Celebrity was the closest thing to the Citation in the original matrix. The 1979 Mustang only fits in with the Chrysler compacts in that it is about the same size. It is not a substitute for the Aries or Reliant because it has rear wheel drive. It is a sort of replicate for the Volare. The Dodge Omni came closest to the VW Rabbit among available vehicles. The Honda Civic and Accord both have front wheel drive, so there is no post-1975 Japanese car with rear wheel drive in the matrix. The resulting matrix falls short of a "complete block" design but it was the best available under the circumstances.
2. Geometry and force deflection measurements $O n$ the 13 older cars, the contractor obtained the information to describe the seven contact planes of the PADS2 model [23], pp. 6-11. PADS2 and MVMA2D are both two dimensional models and it is only necessary to describe the longitudinal and vertical components of locations, velocities, etc. The seven planes are the "lower," "mid," and "upper" instrument panels, the windshield, the header, the seat cushion and the seatback. The endpoints of these planes are measured relative to the point where the toeboard intersects the floorboard, which is the origin in the two dimensional coordinate system of PADS2. The length and angle of the planes is also measured. Since
most instrument panels do not have straight, clearly defined lower, mid and upper regions, the contractor had to use judgment to express the panel contours as 3 straight lines. Seat location was measured when the seat was in the middle of its track.

The situation was more complicated for the newer cars. The contractor measured the panel, windshield and header, but could not measure the seats since only the front section of the car was purchased. The Transportation Systems Center (TSC) performed its own set of PADS2 measurements, including the seats [54]. The panel measurements differed from the contractor's and seats were measured in their furthest back position. Finally, measurements were obtained from NHTSA crash test data on those of the newer cars which had been crash tested [6]. This last set of measurements is believed to be the most accurate and, moreover includes all the geometry data needed for running MVMA2D. These measurements based on crash tests were used wherever they were available (on the Accord, Celebrity, Mustang and Omni); otherwise, the TSC measurements, with correction for the seat location, were used (on the 79 Ford LTD, the LeSabre, the Volare and the Civic).

The contractor performed dynamic tests of mid and lower instrument panel force deflection characteristics by firing a body form at the instrument panel at a specified speed [23], pp. 17-27. First, two dummy knees were fired into the lower instrument panel at 15 mph and at the angle normally seen in barrier crashes. Then, a dummy chest block was fired into the mid instrument panel at 20 mph . That is the order in which
impacts occur in actual crashes (see Section 1.4). The data reduction system provided measurements of force deflection as a function of crush depth, both on the way in and on the rebound. The 15 and 20 mph impact speeds were selected as being representative of a 30 mph barrier collision. Due to "ride down," as explained in Section 1.4, the passenger contacts the panel at less than 30 mph . However, in most of the older cars, there is less ride down and these impact speeds are more characteristic of a 25 than a 30 mph barrier crash. Dynamic force deflection is velocity sensitive, so the results are definitely not appropriate for crashes less than 25 or more than 30 mph . It was decided to use the contractor's dynamic force deflection measurements, as is, for both 25 and 30 mph simulations, but not to perform simulations for speeds other than 25 and 30 mph . It should also be noted that the force deflection measurements are sensitive to changes in the location and direction of the impact and may differ a fair amount for two different cars of the same make, model and model year. The same contractor performed the tests on the newer and the older cars, using the same methods. Unlike the panel geometry situation, there are no comparability problems here.

Dynamic tests were not conducted on top instrument panels. Instead, the contractor measured static force deflection by forcing a dummy headform into the top panel at a rate of 2 inches per second, after the panel had already been statically compressed by the knee and chest forms [23], pp. 12-17 and 21.
3. Derivation of MVMA2D geometry MVMA2D allows much latitude for defining
the frame of reference, describing the interior surfaces, etc. TSC, however, has developed a paradigm for modeling the interior surfaces facing the unrestrained right front passenger. The same approach is used for all 21 cars of the matrix. All cars will be modeled as having 8 "regions": the top IP, the mid IP, the lower IP, the windshield, the roof (consisting of 2 "line segments": roof top and header), the floor (consisting of 3 line segments: floorboard, toeboard and firewall), the seat (consisting of 2 line segments: seat back and seat cushion) and the seat frame (consisting of the seat beam).

The contractor's and TSC's PADS2 measurements provide no information about the floor (floorboard, toeboard and firewall) other than that the toeboard-floorboard junction is the point $(0,0)$ in the PADS2 coordinate system. Therefore, a generic floor was developed and used for all cars except those 4 in the matrix for which floor measurements (the Accord, Celebrity, Mustang and Omni) had been obtained from crash test data. The generic floor's coordinates was the average of 11 cars for which measurements had been obtained from crash test data (the 4 above plus 7 not included in the matrix - but excluding the 81 Concord whose measurements were quite different from the others). In MVMA2D coordinates, the average floorboard extended from $(8,-6)$ to $(58.37,-6)$, the toeboard from $(58.37,-6)$ to $(63.71,-10.61)$ and the firewall from $(63.71,-10.61)$ to $(63.71,-30)$. In particular, for all cars in the matrix except the 4 mentioned above, ( 0,0 ) in PADS2 corresponds to (58.37,-6) in MVMA2D coordinates.

Finally, the seat beam at its front end has coordinates $(X, Z+5)$, where $(X, Z)$ is the front end of the seat cushion (recall that $Z$ is a negative number). The back end of the seat beam is ( $X-5.83, Z+6.55$ ). These are the locations of the seat beam, relative to the seat cushion, in the generic Celebrity seat.
4. Derivation of MVMA2D force deflection characteristics On the Accord, Celebrity, Mustang and Omni, TSC's force deflection data for instrument panels, already in MVMA2D format, were used. On the other 17 cars, visual inspection of the contractor's graphs, using the dynamic data for the mid and lower IP's and the static data for the top IP, provided a series of deflection-force pairs and ratios for permanent to total deformation (G) and stored to total energy (R). These become a piecewise linear "static" force deflection curve and $G$ and $R$ coefficients in MVMA2D [3], pp. 261-273.

One problem with the contractor's dynamic tests is that they often did not go deep enough into the lower IP (e.g., 8 inches or less). Additional data points were needed to run MVMA2D, where penetrations of 12 inches or more often occur in 30 mph barrier crashes. Several techniques were used to extend the data. (1) Sometimes the contractor's static test results could be used from the point where the dynamic test results left off. (2) If the contractor's dynamic data show an upward trend at the end, it is possible to extrapolate that trend. (3) If the contractor's dynamic data show no upward trend at the end and the static data are not helpful, continue at a constant force until deformation approaches the firewall and then finish with a force/deflection curve similar to the firewall's.

The locations of the lower, mid and upper IP were translated from PADS2 to MVMA2D coordinates (except for the Accord, Celebrity, Mustang and Omni, which were already in MVMA2D coordinates), with ( 0,0 ) in PADS2 corresponding to $(58.37,-6)$ in MVMA2D. The windshield and header endpoints, however, were not directly translated, because it was believed that the contractor/TSC data start the windshield too low in some cases. Instead, the windshield was assumed to start at the endpoint of the top IP and the header from the endpoint of the windshield. The rooftop was assumed horizontal, starting at the endpoint of the header. It is important to note that the actual windshield and header rake angles were entered for each car, rather than "generic" values. The windshield rake angle is an important component of a car's frontal interior geometry, affecting the location and severity of instrument panel contact, especially the head to panel contact. Thus, although the windshield rake angle is not a characteristic of the panel per se, it was felt that it should be considered in any analysis of the effects of panel geometry on injury risk.

One problem with MVMA2D is the way it handles "edge effects" (the diminution of the force deflection if contact between a body region and a vehicle surface is close to their edges) [3], pp. 102-108. When the panel is treated as 3 separate regions, the "edge effect" can result in inappropriate reductions of force deflection characteristics. The remedy was to continue the lower IP an additional 8 inches in both directions and the mid IP downward for 8 inches - while telling MVMA2D to ignore the knee and hip to mid IP and the chest to lower IP interactions. The remedy was not needed on the Accord, Celebrity, Mustang and Omni since TSC had
already lengthened the panels in a similar way.

TSC developed stable initial seating postures for the 5 th, 50 th and 95th percentile dummies in the Celebrity. It was decided to use the Celebrity seat and these postures as "generic" for all cars - but the vertical alignment of the seat relative to the panel could vary from car to car. In other words, use the vertical coordinates, dummy angles, etc., of the Celebrity but raise or lower the IP, windshield, header and roof. For example, if the contractor reported that the seat cushion in one of the older cars is one inch higher than in the Celebrity, lower the IP, windshield, etc. in that old car by an inch.

The procedure described so far is the one that would be used for 50 th percentile dummies in older cars. That is because the contractor measured the seated height in the mid position. But seat tracks are not level: seats rise as they are pushed forward. The amount of vertical motion varies from car to car and is unknown for the older cars. Therefore, a generic value was used for all the cars: the average value for 27 relatively new cars measured by TSC (and stored in their data base PCFG3). The averages are . 404 inches upward in the fore position and .348 inches downward in the aft position. But the Celebrity seat (see above) only moved up. 188 inches in the fore position and down .187 inches in the aft position. Thus, to get generic vertical movements, it will be necessary to move the rcof, windshield and IP down an additional (.404.188) inches in the forward position runs and up an additional (.348.187) inches in the aft position runs.

The preceding discussion applies to the older cars. For the 4 newer cars whose seat height data comes from TSC, the height was measured in the aft position. To translate that height to mid position, . 348 inches has to be subtracted first. Then proceed as above.

Horizontal alignment of the seat also varies from car to car and was measured by the contractor (in the mid position) or TSC (in the furthest back position). Some of the seats, however, appear to be unreasonably close or far from the instrument panel. Since distance from the seat to the panel can significantly affect injury risk, errors in this measurement should be avoided. It was decided to take a generic value of 24 inches from the back of the mid IP to the seatback/seat cushion junction for the 50th percentile dummy in the mid position. This, to the nearest inch, is the average distance in the vehicle setups based on crash test data and it is also within an inch of the average for MGA's older cars. A further motivation for using a generic value is that occupants will tend to move the seat backwards or forwards until they are sitting at a "comfortable" distance from the panel. For the 5 th percentile dummy in the forward position, move the seat 2.774 inches forward (average value in 27 cars measured by TSC). For the 95 th percentile in the aft position, move it 2.815 inches backward. The $X$ coordinate of the dummy's chest c.g. has to be moved, as needed, to keep the dummy in a stable position on the seat. These generic values for the $X$ coordinates of the seat and the dummy, relative to the mid IP, were even used for the Accord, Celebrity, Mustang and Omni - the only case where input data based on crash tests were superseded.

If the contractor could not perform a static head to top IP test, the top IP data from a similar vehicle was used (e.g., 75 Honda Civic for 71 Datsun 1200).

Generic force deflection characteristics were used for all components other than the instrument panel: the windshield, floor, toeboard, firewall, roof, header, and seat beam. The values that TSC derived for the Celebrity [6] were used for all the other cars.
5. Running MVMA2D The remaining items needed for running the simulation are occupant parameters, a list of occupant body region to vehicle contact surface interactions, the crash pulse and control statements. In the 50th percentile runs, the simulated occupant has the body dimensions, mass distribution, joint characteristics, etc, of a Hybrid III dummy. The 5th percentile occupant is intended to represent a Hybrid III dummy scaled down to the size of a 5 th percentile female; the 95 th percentile occupant is a Hybrid III dummy scaled upwards. The force deflection characteristics of the simulated occupants' chests (which are not exactly the same as for a Hybrid III dummy) are:

| Inches | Pounds |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
| 0.079 | 450 |
| 2.283 | 1239 |
| 3.937 | 1349 |
| 5.906 | 4000 |

The permissible occupant body region to vehicle surface interactions were:

| Head | to | windshield, top ip, roof, seat |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Thorax | to | mid ip, seat, seat frame, floor |
| Knee | to | lower ip, floor |
| Toe, heel | to | floor |
| Hand | to | mid ip, floor |


| Hip | to | seat, seat frame, floor |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Upper leg | to | seat, seat frame, floor |
| Elbow | to | mid ip |

In addition, if the mid instrument panel reaches a height of -33.2 inches or more (in MVMA2D coordinates), a head to mid IP interaction has to be added for the 5th percentile dummy, whose head will clip the mid IP on the way forwards. This interaction appeared on some of the larger old cars.

The same generic crash pulses were to be used for all cars, as explained in Section 3.2: one for 30 mph barrier impacts and one for 25 mph. TSC has a data base of crash pulses in 30 mph barrier impacts for 27 cars of model years 1979-82 - based on actual 30 mph crash tests or on a scaling from crash tests at 35 mph . The median values for the tests were 22.1 peak g's at 67 milliseconds after impact; 20 of the 27 cars had only a single peak. The 1979 Ford Granada reached 21.7 peak g's at 68 milliseconds and had only a single peak; it was by far the closest to the median values. Therefore, the 30 and 25 mph crash pulses for the 1979 Ford Granada were used for all cars.

The 30 mph barrier crash simulation was allowed to run for 160 milliseconds and the 25 mph simulation for 192 milliseconds . At that time, occupants have completed their forward motion and are rebounding. The simulations were cut off at that point to suppress calculation of noncontact HIC during rebound, which can sometimes be unrealistically large in MVMA2D. Data lines were printed out every 2 milliseconds in the 30 mph simulations and every 3 milliseconds in the 25 mph runs. Diagrams were produced every 20 msec in the 30 mph crashes and every 24 msec in the

25 mph crashes. The printed data included:
Head and chest motion
Leg forces
Neck reaction forces
g's at the head and chest accelerometers Severity indices for head and chest
Each of the body region - vehicle surface interactions

A total of 126 simulations were successfully completed: 21 cars, with 5 th, 50 th and 95 th percentile dummies (in the fore, mid and aft positions along the seat track, respectively), at 25 and 30 mph .

Appendix $B$ presents the MVMA2D input data decks for the Celebrity with a 50th percentile dummy and for a 1976 Ford LTD with 50th, 5th and 95 th percentile dummies. The Celebrity deck, largely developed by TSC, provided many of the generic values for the other cars. Appendix $C$ shows the results for the 1976 Ford LTD in a 25 mph impact.
6. Anomalies and exceptions in the simulations Several cars required adjustments in the input data decks in order to achieve plausible simulations, as evidenced by reasonable occupant trajectories in the schematic diagrams and an absence of fatal error messages.

When the roof is less than 35.7 inches above the seat cushion, the 95th percentile dummy's head is in the roof. The contractor and TSC measurements of interior geometry resulted in roof clearances of less than 35.7 inches on 5 cars (Valiant, Dart, both Beetles, Datsun, Civic). The roof, header, windshield and instrument panels on these cars were raised, in the 95th percentile runs, until the clearance reached 35.7 inches. On
the 74 Beetle, a similar procedure was required even for the 50 th percentile dummy.

On the 66 Ford Galaxie and 69 Ford LTD it was not possible to Use the "generic" spacing of 24 inches from the mid IP to the back of the seat cushion. Since the firewall is close behind the mid IP, this put the occupants' feet through the toeboard. Instead, the same firewall to seat cushion spacing was used as in the 76 Ford LTD. This spacing is also supported by the contractor's seat location measurements and photographs.

On the 66 Plymouth Valiant and 69 Dodge Dart it was thought inappropriate to use the "generic" spacing of 24 inches from mid IP to back of seat cushion. The generic spacing is too long, since the top of the mid IP has an "eyebrow" protruding about 2 inches toward the passenger. The 24 inches should be measured from the front of the "eyebrow," not the back. The contractor's seat location measurements support this. The remedy was to use the same seat cushion to firewall measurements as in 76 Ford LTD.

On the 66 and 74 Volkswagen the generic firewall would be unreasonably far forward, resulting in occupants sliding completely under the panel. A more appropriate firewall location is obtained by having it come straight up from the floorboard/toeboard junction (at $X=58.37$ inches). Since these cars have virtually no top IP, the head to top IP interaction was suppressed.

Minor adjustments were needed to prevent error terminations of MVMA2D, such as eliminating the "breakdown" levels of deflection for the chest and the windshield and smoothing out one sharp dip in TSC's force deflection curve for the Accord mid IP.

## APPENDIX B EXAMPLES OF MVMA2D INPUT DATA DECKS

1983 Chevrolet Celebrity with 50th percentile male, 25 mph 1976 Ford LTD with 50th percentile male, 25 mph 1976 Ford LTD with 5th percentile female, 25 mph 1976 Ford LTD with 95th percentile male, 25 mph

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## APPENDIX C

## EXAMPLE OF MVMA2D SIMULATION RESULTS

1976 Ford LTD with 50th percentile male, 25 mph







| 1 | 1081 | .46,4 | 4,6,5,17 | B, 45 |  | - | * | - | - |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | 1002 | * | - ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | - | * | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3 | 1003 | -0. | 06. | 0. | -11.55 | . 025 | * | * | - | * |
| 4 | 1004 | * 40. | -499.98 | - 860 , | 0. | . 8.8 | *201 | . 5. | 4 | - |
| 5 | \$500 | - 0 | -1. | --1.5 | -76.5 | 1. | - 52 | -10. | - 0 | * |
| 6 | $\$ 501$ | -24. | 0. | * 0 . | *1. | 11. | $\bullet$ - | -1. | -0 |  |
| 7 | 1600 | - | - | - | - | - | * | - | - | - |



(POSITIONS AND VELOCITIES RELATIVE TO VEHICLE FRAME) (ACCELERATIONS RELATIVE TO INERTIAL FRANE)






PAGE $\underset{\text { MMA } 2 \mathrm{D}, \mathrm{VER}, \mathbf{V}^{2}}{ }$

|  |  | HEAD | UNFILIERED | ONS AT | ACCELEROMET CHEST | (G'S) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| time | A-P | S-1 | RESULTANT | A-P | S-1 | RESULTANT | X |
| 120.00 | 17.824 | -49.111 | 52.245 | 17.469 | 27.750 | 32.796 | -0.946 |
| 123.00 | -9.604 | -15.760 | 18.456 | 24.943 | 36.636 | 44,322 | -1.276 |
| 126.08 | 6.648 | -10.842 | 12.718 | 26.486 | 38.054 | 46.364 | -1.304 |
| 129.08 | 36.662 | 3.732 | 30.889 | 31.562 | 32.941 | 45.621 | -0.310 |
| 132.00 | 31.044 | 12.122 | 33.326 | 38.806 | 30.618 | 49.430 | -2.217 |
| 135.00 | 0.207 | 20,877 | 20.878 | 37.952 | 27.905 | 47.107 | -8.376 |
| 138.00 | -6.604 | 14.008 | 15.241 | 18.541 | 22.900 | 29.464 | -14.736 |
| 141.00 | 2.847 | 13.794 | 14.085 | 4.896 | 12.774 | 13.680 | -18.916 |
| 144.00 | 7.475 | 15.136 | 16.881 | 1.633 | 7.074 | 7.260 | -19.643 |
| 147.00 | 8.691 | 17.435 | 19.481 | -0.109 | 3.349 | 3.351 | -16.206 |
| 150.00 | 6. 183 | 18.183 | 19.205 | -0.295 | 0,713 | 0.771 | -7.589 |
| 153.00 | 12.805 | 12.998 | 17.694 | -2.765 | 0.004 | 2.765 | -6,457 |
| 156.00 | 8.972 | 13.456 | 16.173 | -1.893 | -1.240 | 2.347 | -5.951 |
| 159.00 | 7.084 | 13.542 | 15.372 | -2.015 | -1.837 | 2.727 | -2.538 |
| 162.00 | 6.224 | 14.059 | 15.375 | -3.806 | -1.955 | 4.279 | 1.988 |
| 185.90 | 5.788 | 13.326 | 14.529 | -3.391 | -2.981 | 4.667 | -2.054 |
| 168.00 | 4.231 | 12.272 | 12.981 | -1.290 | -3.780 | 3.994 | -6.738 |
| 171.00 | 9.405 | 10.277 | 13.931 | -1.296 | -2.522 | 2.793 | $-8.813$ |
| 174,00 | 11.816 | B.791 | 14.727 | 1.049 | -1.774 | 2.081 | -9.146 |
| 177.00 | 13.995 | 6.091 | 15.263 | 3.117 | -. 812 | 3.229 | -8.488 |
| 189.09 | 16.449 | 1.179 | 16.491 | 4.990 | 0.490 | 5.014 | -7.414 |
| 183.00 | 15.351 | 6.246 | 16.573 | 3.699 | 0.148 | 3.693 | -6.553 |
| 186.80 | 15.270 | 7.332 | 16.939 | 2.181 | 0.769 | 2.293 | -5.132 |
| 189.00 | 15.631 | 5.634 | 16.696 | 1.811 | 1.733 | 2.006 | -3.583 |
| 192.80 | 15.557 | 3.574 | 15.883 | 0.012 | 2.834 | 2.834 | -1.908 |


| HIP |  |
| ---: | ---: |
| $Z$ | RESULTANT |
| -9.581 | 9.628 |
| -1.279 | 1.806 |
| 4.022 | 4.228 |
| 9.220 | 9.225 |
| 7.056 | 7.396 |
| -0.078 | 8.371 |
| -5.492 | 15.726 |
| -6.763 | 28.089 |
| -4.305 | 20.109 |
| 0.178 | 16.207 |
| -1.837 | 7.808 |
| 1.851 | 6.717 |
| 8.761 | 10.591 |
| 5.592 | 6.141 |
| -0.184 | 1.996 |
| -2.143 | 2.969 |
| -1.863 | 6.840 |
| 6.233 | 8.816 |
| 2.176 | 9.400 |
| 3.374 | 9.116 |
| 3.964 | 8.467 |
| 3.614 | 7.484 |
| 2.736 | 5.816 |
| 1.835 | 4.026 |
| 1.307 | 2.313 |



\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \& \multicolumn{4}{|c|}{UPPER NECK JOINT FORCES (LB)} \& \multicolumn{4}{|c|}{LOWER NECK JOINT FORCES (LB)} \& MOMENTS \& (IN-LBS) \\
\hline (MSEC) \& \begin{tabular}{l}
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ON NECK
\end{tabular} \& COMPRESSIVE ON NECK \& \begin{tabular}{l}
SHEAR \\
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COMPRESSIVE \\
ON HEAD
\end{tabular} \& SHEAR ON NECK \& compressive ON NECK \& \begin{tabular}{l}
SHEAR \\
ON TORSO
\end{tabular} \& COUPRESSIVE ON TORSO \& UPPER NECK \& LOWER NECK \\
\hline (MSEC) \& ON NECK \& ON NECK \& ON HEAD \& ON HEAD \& ON NECK \& ON NECK 2.05 \& ON TORSO \& ON TORSO \& 0.00 \& \\
\hline 0.00
3.00 \& 0.00
-2.27 \& 0.00
9.94 \& -0.12 \& 10.20 \& -3. 26 \& 13.98 \& -3.17 \& 14.00 \& 6.83 \& 13.90 \\
\hline 6.00 \& -3.41 \& 15.68 \& -0.02 \& 16.02 \& -4.03 \& 20.94 \& -3.89 \& 20.97 \& 9.08 \& 19.73 \\
\hline 9.00 \& -2.93 \& 16.38 \& 0.59 \& 18.61 \& -2.09 \& 21.95 \& -2.82 \& 21.97 \& 12.98 \& 20.43 \\
\hline 12.00 \& -2.29 \& 14.59 \& 6.84 \& 14.75 \& -2.06 \& 20.60 \& -1.90 \& 20.02 \& 14.22 \& 18.81 \\
\hline 15.00 \& -1, 68 \& 13.00 \& 1.11 \& 13.88 \& -1.29 \& 18.14 \& -1.14 \& 18.15 \& 16.25 \& 17.88 \\
\hline 18.00 \& -1.13 \& 11.73 \& 1.38 \& 19,71 \& -0.53 \& 16.61 \& --. 38 \& 18.81 \& 20.65 \& 19.69 \\
\hline 21.00 \& -1.73 \& 10.87 \& 0. 80 \& 10.90 \& -1.27 \& 15.39 \& -1.13 \& 15.40 \& 20.98 \& 22.34 \\
\hline 24,06 \& -3.81 \& 10.03 \& -0.82 \& 10.44 \& -2,75 \& 14.19 \& -2.68 \& 14.22 \& 20.98 \& 28.61 \\
\hline 27.00 \& -4.20 \& 0.28 \& -2.17 \& 0.87 \& -4.10 \& 13.02 \& -3.96 \& 13.67 \& 21.00 \& 34.45 \\
\hline 30.00 \& -5.01 \& B. 44 \& -3.12 \& 0.31 \& -4.95 \& 11.99 \& -4.81 \& 12.04 \& 21.03 \& \(\bigcirc \quad 38.47\) \\
\hline 33.00 \& -5.39 \& 7.79 \& -3.64 \& 8.74 \& -5.26 \& 11.10 \& -5.12 \& 11.17 \& 21.09 \& 40.47 \\
\hline 36.08 \& -5.37 \& 7.26 \& -3.74 \& 0.22 \& -5.08 \& 10.42 \& -4.04 \& 16.49 \& 21.16 \& 40.58 \\
\hline 38.00 \& -4.99 \& 6.74 \& -3.48 \& 7.63 \& -4.43 \& 0.79 \& -4.29 \& 0.85 \& 21.25 \& 36.98 \\
\hline 42.00 \& -3.91 \& 7.16 \& -2.33 \& 7.82 \& -2.87 \& 10.64 \& -2.71 \& 10.68 \& 21.33 \& 33.85 \\
\hline 45.00 \& -1.33 \& 8.42 \& 0.26 \& 8.56 \& 0.34 \& 12.35 \& 0.54 \& 12.34 \& 21.45 \& 22.44 \\
\hline 48.00 \& 2.87 \& 7.82 \& 4.43 \& 7.05 \& 5.92 \& 11.51 \& 6.10 \& 11.41 \& 26.71 \& 1.23 \\
\hline 51.08 \& -0.49 \& 8.22 \& 1.22 \& 8.14 \& 1.28 \& 11.11 \& 1.43 \& 11.09 \& 2.32 \& 2.36 \\
\hline 54.00 \& -8.68 \& 10.24 \& \(-6.35\) \& 11.82 \& -8.11 \& 12.62 \& -8.92 \& 12.16 \& -16.70 \& 25.32 \\
\hline 57.60 \& -9.15 \& 7.70 \& -7.36 \& 9.43 \& -9.78 \& 8. 21 \& -9.85 \& 8.37 \& -8.77 \& 34.55 \\
\hline 68.00 \& -7.24 \& 1.48 \& -6.78 \& 2.94 \& -7.29 \& 0.57 \& -7.28 \& 0.60 \& 17.81 \& 48.13 \\
\hline 63.00 \& -10.78 \& -1.26 \& -10.81 \& 1.60 \& -12.70 \& -3.44 \& -12.76 \& -3.22 \& 23.40 \& 89.97 \\
\hline 56.00 \& -12.14 \& -4.38 \& -12.78 \& -1.82 \& -16.16 \& -7.21 \& -16.29 \& -6.98 \& 27.14 \& 80.11 \\
\hline 69.00 \& -12.62 \& -6.59 \& -13.69 \& -3.81 \& -20.84 \& -6.14 \& -20.97 \& -5.67 \& 28.95 \& 84.41 \\
\hline 72.00 \& -15.97 \& 0.17 \& -15.62 \& 3.34 \& -29.61 \& 5.76 \& -29.41 \& 6.72 \& 25.84 \& 86.23 \\
\hline 75.00 \& -28.81 \& 48.17 \& -18.67 \& 52.93 \& -47.18 \& 61.35 \& -43.81 \& 63.80 \& -14.23 \& 113.97 \\
\hline 78.00 \& -32.76 \& 58.47 \& -20.48 \& 63.82 \& -50.30 \& 71.59 \& \(-43.85\) \& 75.71 \& -8.80 \& 134.19 \\
\hline 81.00 \& -31.88 \& 36.43 \& -23.93 \& 42.02 \& -44.06. \& 43.49 \& -37.91 \& 40.04 \& 23.82 \& 160.62 \\
\hline 84,00 \& -72.92 \& 15.36 \& -68.54 \& 29.24 \& -84.38 \& 16.43 \& -79.96 \& 31.58 \& 48.53 \& 379.26 \\
\hline 67.00 \& - 128.61 \& 18.28 \& -123.75 \& 40.59 \& -136.56 \& 21.56 \& -128.48 \& 81.04 \& 129:08 \& 708.53 \\
\hline 90.00 \& -80.32 \& 6.89 \& -79.82 \& 8.95 \& -71.03 \& 3.72 \& -68.41 \& 19.49 \& 223.70 \& 559.35 \\
\hline 93.00 \& -48.68 \& 41.82 \& -48.20 \& 42.18 \& 18.76 \& -3.72 \& 17.55 \& -7.45 \& 248.40 \& 216.93 \\
\hline 96.00 \& -157.71 \& 466.98 \& -183.59 \& 457.42 \& -54.81 \& 408.36 \& 29.72 \& 410.95 \& 187.87 \& 422.21 \\
\hline 99.00

920 \& -222.98
-267.75 \& 549.06 \& -278.35 \& 523.18 \& - 585.84 \& 565.68 \& -46.57 \& 593.03 \& 211.85 \& 942,45 <br>
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116.00 \& -208.04
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391.44 \& -316.34
-373.02 \& 321.37
259.04 \& -121.54
-128.74 \& 391.89 \& -18.81 \& 409.87 \& +13.85 \& 948.57 <br>
\hline 111.00 \& -172.37 \& 421.34 \& -371.78 \& 259.04
262.72 \& -128.74
-7.62 \& 382.23
403.64 \& -29.89
97.76 \& 402.22
301.70 \& 461.27
1198.87 \& 1024.25 <br>
\hline 114.00 \& -360. 55 \& 472.12 \& -570.69 \& 184.96 \& -171.71 \& 465.63 \& 97.76
-0.02 \& 391.76
496.08 \& 1198.87

2025.00 \& $$
\begin{aligned}
& 1365.11 \\
& 2894.08
\end{aligned}
$$ <br>

\hline 117.00 \& -870.62 \& 415.65 \& -942.22 \& -207.31 \& -792.16 \& 462.54 \& -449.83 \& 716.36 \& 2925.00
2553.55 \& 2864.03
5436.92 <br>
\hline 120.00 \& -844.65 \& 572.17 \& -861.93 \& -5.34 \& -354.42 \& 543.85 \& --89.78 \& 716.36
842.91 \& 2553.55
4162.30 \& 5436.92
5753.03 <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}



IN HEAD, NECK REACTION FORCES ANO UPPER TORSO SYSTEMS

|  | UPPER NECK JOINT FORCES (LB) |  |  |  | LOWER NECK JOINT FORCES (LB) |  |  |  | MOMENTS (IN-LBS) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | SHEAR | COMPRESSIVE | SHEAR | COMPRESSIVE | SHEAR | COMPRESSIVE | SHEAR | COMPRESSIVE | UPPER NECK | LOWER NECK |
| (MSEC) | ON NECK | ON NECK |  |  | ON NECK | ON NECK | ON TORSO | ON TORSO |  |  |
| 120.08 | -644.65 | 572.17 | -861.93 | -5.34 | -354.42 | 543.85 | -89.78 | 642.91 | 4162.30 | 5753.03 |
| 123.00 | -641.45 | 721.42 | -859.30 | 107.83 | -467.58 | 681.77 | -132.34 | 818.04 | 3847.39 | 5801.19 |
| 128.00 | -346.11 | 691.64 | -712.58 | 300.64 | -231.69 | 609.41 | 22.41 | 843.17 | 2945.88 | 3883.28 |
| 129.00 | -261.10 | 454.36 | -484.85 | 198.83 | -233.44 | 361.32 | -89.48 | 420.78 | 1160.63 | 1941.12 |
| 132.00 | -320.54 | 193.82 | -374.62 | -20.59 | -278.88 | 116.85 | -219.31 | 200.81 | 839.32 | 1876.88 |
| 135.00 | -223. 51 | $\sim 164.85$ | -102.00 | -257.82 | -159.61 | -228.82 | -228.94 | -159.44 | 729.45 | 1521.86 |
| 138.80 | -136.67 | -103.29 | -62.10 | -189.66 | -84.88 | -154.19 | -128.21 | -120.57 | 730.38 | 1210.37 |
| 141.00 | -61.28 | -180.96 | 31.25 | -169.37 | -1.57 | -211.72 | -34.12 | -204.69 | 657.05 | 772.77 |
| 144.00 | -12.97 | -106.08 | 84.86 | -177.27 | 46.03 | -237.01 | 1.32 | -241.43 | 413.73 | 326.86 |
| 147.00 | 14.77 | -207. 58 | 103.34 | -188.64 | 55.78 | -233.56 | 26.55 | -238.66 | 38.89 | -105.83 |
| 150.00 | 10.55 | -196.20 | 81.26 | -178.89 | 41.30 | -212.44 | 29.14 | -214.46 | -86.76 | -134.32 |
| 153.60 | 97.14 | -172.58 | 142.98 | -136.81 | 132,65 | -183.59 | 935.58 | -181.44 | -84.32 | - 590.79 |
| 156.00 | 88.89 | -152.73 | 116.83 | -132.58 | 112, 01 | -153.26 | 123.73 | -143.96 | -157.44 | -580.96 |
| 159.00 | 89.92 | -136.09 | 100.31 | -128.63 | 105.38 | -131.76 | 121.56 | -117.00 | -210.83 | -600.34 |
| 182.00 | 98.71 | -125.05 | 92.80 | -129.50 | 116.55 | -120.75 | 129.93 | -99,59 | -249.64 | -649.60 |
| 165.00 | 111.87 | -120.91 | 89.31 | -138.41 | 118.50 | -114.29 | 140.52 | -85.79 | -280.17 | -713.36 |
| 168.00 | 89.80 | -82.97 | 63.17 | -104.68 | 66.32 | -91.91 | 88.82 | -70.65 | -748.09 | -981.93 |
| 171.00 | 133.88 | -48.52 | 109.25 | -91,33 | 124.21 | -52.56 | 134.66 | -7.55 | -686.89 | -1143.17 |
| 174.60 | 148.16 | -6.08 | 134.14 | -63.20 | 149,17 | -8.87 | 140.07 | 52,06 | -670.21 | -1223.16 |
| 177.00 | 156.19 | 30.39 | 154.18 | -39.37 | 185.19 | 30.29 | 132.55 | 103.15 | -696.71 | -1288.05 |
| 188.00 | 154.83 | 89.38 | 177.92 | 7.70 | 168.70 | 84.47 | 96.69 | 167.44 | -762.56 | -1348.27 |
| 183.00 | 162.51 | 49.23 | 165.48 | -34.03 | 172.37 | 44.81 | 118.82 | 132.67 | -794. 22 | -1404.37 |
| 186.60 | 163.93 | 48.25 | 163.33 | -47.39 | 174.44 | 39.02 | 115.14 | 131.59 | -013.83 | -1430.87 |
| 189.00 | 155.63 | 65.37 | 166.06 | -30.31 | 158.94 | 61.69 | 88.19 | 145.92 | -834.78 | -1420.50 |
| 192.00 | 141.31 | 83. 59 | 164.95 | -9.22 | 140.91 | 83,78 | 57,67 | 153.48 | -850.52 | -1377.16 |


| 16-JUL-87 | 08:58:18 | 76Fordito MMMA 20 | CRASH VICTIM SIMULA | ATION gronoda 25 mph | Unreotrained | PAGE MWM 20 . | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 6-17- }{ }^{1}, ~ \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | KINETIC | ENERGY (FT-LBS) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | HEAD | TORSO | Legs | ARNS |  |  |
| TIME | TOTAL 800 Y | ${ }_{246.08}$ | 1891.98 | 984.31 983 | 395.34 395.34 |  |  |
| 3.00 | 3516.81 | 246.31 247 | 1891.09 1885.29 | 983.86 980.18 | 395.35 |  |  |
| 6.06 | 3508.94 | 247.11 247 | 1879.31 | 974.78 | 395.37 |  |  |
| 9.60 | 3497.22 | 247.76 248.38 | 1871.68 | 969.85 | 395.38 |  |  |
| 12.08 | 3484.58 3478.97 | 248.38 248.96 | 1863.55 | 963.06 | 395.40 |  |  |
| 15.00 18.00 | 3470.97 3456.92 | 249.55 249 | 1855.63 | 956.93 050.69 | 395.41 395.41 |  |  |
| 18.00 21.09 | 3442.31 | 250.16 | 1848.04 1836.49 | 950.69 944 | 395.39 |  |  |
| 24.00 | 3427.03 | 250.79 251.45 | 1836.49 1826.34 | ${ }^{837.93}$ | 395.35 |  |  |
| 27.00 | 3411.08 3394.45 | 251.45 252.14 |  | 931.47 | 395.26 |  |  |
| 30.00 | 3394.45 | 252.14 252.82 | 1884.14 | 924.83 | 395.14 |  |  |
| 33.00 | 3376.93 3357.98 | 253.49 253.49 | 1791.85 | 917.69 | 394.05 304 |  |  |
| 36.00 30.00 | 3337.27 | 234.12 | 1778.55 | 909.89 | 394.18 394.36 |  |  |
| 42.00 | 3314.98 | 254.68 | 1764.83 1744.57 | 882.31 | 393.94 |  |  |
| 45.08 | 3280.97 3191 | 255.15 255 | 1732.17 | 810.68 | 393.41 |  |  |
| 48.68 | 3191.64 3090.28 | 255.38 255 | 1788.35 | 733.75 | 392.77 |  |  |
| 51.00 54.00 | 3098.28 3006.95 | 255.34 | 1676.60 | 683.08 635.42 | 392.81 391.13 |  | , |
| 57.08 | 2987.40 | 255.64 256.29 | $\begin{array}{r}1645.21 \\ 1615.58 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 695.21 | 390.13 |  |  |
| 60.80 | 2857.04 2799.65 | 258.29 257.19 | ${ }_{1589.32}$ | 564.16 | 388.99 |  |  |
| 63.00 | 2799.66 2753.65 | 258.88 | 1566.18 | 540.96 | 387.70 |  |  |
| 86.080 89.08 | 2888.26 | 260.49 | 1526.69 | 514.81 | 386.27 |  |  |
| 69.80 72.08 | 2550.62 | 262.47 | 1434.29 | ${ }^{469.28}$ | 384.67 |  |  |
| 75.00 | 2376.85 | 265.55 | 1310.60 1179.19 | 369.11 | 360.70 |  |  |
| 78.08 | 2199.27 | 270.27 275 | 1860.71 | 323.63 | 378.25 |  |  |
| 81.06 | 2937.66 1982.31 | 282.34 | 961.13 | 283.39 | 375.44 |  |  |
| 84.00 87.00 | 1982.31 1785.96 | 282.44 298.41 | 870.23 | 245.21 | 372.19 |  |  |
| 90.00 | 1688.53 | 316.25 | 796.21 | 269.54 184.27 | 366.53 356.12 |  |  |
| 93.00 | 1605.42 1445.53 | 309.50 220.85 | 765.33 733.69 | 184.27 155 | 335.88 |  |  |
| 96.00 99.00 | 1445.52 1269.23 | 229.85 179.38 | 692,84 | 112.88 | 284.11 |  |  |
| 102.00 | 1147.98 | 163.64 | 838.77 | 97.18 | 248.91 |  |  |
| 185.00 | ${ }^{1855.16}$ | ${ }^{131.83}$ | 591.01 553.86 | 97.29 106.95 | 235.12 229.98 |  |  |
| 188.08 | 983.66 | 92.77 57.44 | 521.92 | 108.11 | 226.22 |  |  |
| 111.00 114.00 | 913.66 843.69 | 25.23 | 492.03 | 103.78 | 222.85 |  |  |
| 117.60 | 731.58 | 19.81 | 397.12 | ${ }^{95.32}$ | 219.18 +192.59 |  |  |
| 120.00 | 600.29 | 10.61 | 388.23 | 88.86 | 192.59 |  |  |


| 16-JUL-87 <br> Hyblil 50th Malo | 08:58:18 <br> 6. 76 Ford/50hyb/mid | 76FordLTD | MMAA 20 | CRASH | ictim simu | ATION granada25mph | Unrestroined | $\begin{aligned} & \text { PAGE } \\ & \text { MMA 2D, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | KINETIC | ENERGY | (FT-LE |  |  |  |  |
|  | TOTAL BODY | HEA |  |  | torso | LEGS | ${ }_{\text {ARMS }} 192.59$ |  |  |
| $\mathrm{TIME}_{120.00}$ | TOTAL 680.29 |  | 10.61 |  | 308.23 | 88.86 85.48 | 192.59 95.62 |  |  |
| 123.08 | 438.39 |  | 3.15 2.99 |  | 254.14 209.69 | 82.48 82.29 | 36.44 |  |  |
| 126.00 | 331.41 254 |  | 2.98 2.64 |  | 269.77 169 | 75.13 | 6.69 |  |  |
| 129.00 | 254.22 240.42 |  | 3.84 |  | 151.69 | 62.19 | 23.29 40.64 |  |  |
| 135.00 | 247.58 |  | 3.46 |  | 159.15 | 44.33 27.34 | 40.64 51.93 |  |  |
| 138.00 | 263.04 |  | 5.56 |  | 178.22 183.31 | 21.73 | 58.83 |  |  |
| 141.00 | 275.94 |  | 11.16 28.67 |  | 182.48 | 34.80 | 61.17 |  |  |
| 144.00 147.00 | 299.12 337.68 |  | 31.64 |  | 183.67 | 66.40 | 62.56 |  |  |
| 147.80 | 369.79 |  | 39.82 |  | 189.13 199.55 | 72.27 82.37 | 64.18 |  |  |
| 153.60 | 386.06 |  | 48.86 58.59 |  | 199.53 185.29 | 44.73 | 84.62 |  |  |
| 156.00 159 | 350.22 319.84 |  | 58.58 68.48 |  | 179.88 | 8.75 | 64.73 |  |  |
| 162.00 | 323.23 |  | 73.31 |  | 174.83 | 10.68 24.40 | 64.61 64.28 |  |  |
| 165.00 | 337.38 |  | 79.37 |  | 169.34 166.24 | 34.40 | ${ }_{83.77} 84.21$ |  |  |
| 168.68 | 339.31 |  | 77.86 77.65 |  | 1661.77 <br> 18 | 26.68 | 63.83 |  |  |
| 171.00 174.00 | 329.13 316.36 |  | 78.12 |  | 158.49 | 19.22 | 68.53 |  |  |
| 177.08 | 308.56 |  | 77.73 |  | 158.46 | 17.93 | 54.44 |  |  |
| 180.00 | 308.55 |  | 72.44 |  | 165.58 | 33.38 | 41.64 |  | ' |
| 183.00 | 315.64 |  | 78.20 |  | 171.96 176.59 | 32.74 | 39.74 |  |  |
| 186.00 | 318.68 317 317 |  | 71.35 |  | 179.87 | 26.52 | 40.03 |  |  |
| 189.68 192.08 | 319.97 |  | 71.78 |  | 182.76 | 24.47 | 40.95 |  |  |




SEVERITY INDICES FOR UNFILTERED ACCELERATIONS (AT ACCELEROMETERS)


 rd/59nyb/mid 76FordLTD MNMA 20 CRASH VICTIM SIMULATION ronode25mpl Unrestrained PAGE
WMM $20, ~$
VER.
VE. Hybili 50 th Male 76 Ford/59hyb/mid 76 FordLTD gronodo25mph SIICK FIGURE PRINTER PLOT FRAME FOR TIME= 24.00 MSEC.





##  <br> Stick figure printer plot frame for time- 120.00 msec.



COORDIMTE RANGES FOR PLOT ARE
SCALE FACTOA IS (IN)
B.000 (IN)






| $\text { Hybiii } \begin{array}{r} 16-J u t \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 08: 58 \\ \text { ole } \end{gathered}$ | ord/50hyb/ | mid 76 | ordlti M | muta 20 C | VICTIM SIMULATION |  |  | Unreatrained |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { PAGE } \\ & \text { MNMA } 2 \mathrm{D},{ }^{10-04}{ }^{\text {VER. }} 1 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| contact interaction detween |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ELLIPSE HIP ASSUMED TO BE RIGIO |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANO |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | de seat back |  | CH is AN | Elgment of | REGION S |  | MADE | Of | SEAT MA |  |
| INITIAL LINE LENGTH $=24.09($ IN $)$ EDGE CONSTANT $=0.000$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DEFLECTION |  |  | DEFL. RATE |  | FORCE |  | CONTACT | LOCATION LINE | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  |  | CONTACT LOGATION ON BODY SEG. |  |
| TIME | LINE | ELLJPSE. | LINE | ELLIPSE | NORMAL | TANGNTL. | POSITION | RATE | $\stackrel{X}{\text { (1N) }}$ | 2 |  | ${ }^{x}$ | 2 |
| (MSEC) | (1N) | (1N) | ( IN/SEC) | (IN/SEC) | (LB) | (LE) | (NONDIM.) | (IN/SEC) | (IN) | (IN) |  | (iN) | (IN) |
| - 0.00 | 0.63 | 0.00 | a. | 0 ) | 12.8 | 0.0 | 0.935 | 0. | 26.13 | -14.07 |  | $-1.70$ | 3. 63 |
| 3.06 | 0.62 | 0.80 | -5. | 6. | 12.6 | 1.1 | 0.935 | 1. | 21.45 | -14.08 |  | $-1.70$ | 3.63 |
| 6.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | -10. | 0. | 12.2 | 2.8 | 0.935 | 3. | 22.77 | -14.08 |  | $-1.76$ | 3.63 |
| 9.00 | 0.56 | 0.00 | -16. | 0. | 11.4 | 4.6 | 0.936 | 5. | 24.08 | -14.08 |  | $-1.71$ | 3.62 |
| 12.00 | 0.50 | 0.00 | -24. | 0. | 10.2 | 6.2 | 0.937 | 8. | 25.38 | -14.08 |  | -1.71 | 3:62 |
| 15.00 | 0.41 | 0.00 | -32. | 0. | 8.5 | 6.3 | 0.938 | 11. | 26.70 | -14.e8 |  | -1.71 | 3.62 |
| 18.00 | 0.30 | 0.00 | -41. | 0. | 6.2 | 4.7 | 0.940 | 14. | 28.00 | -14.08 |  | -1.72 | 3.61 |
| 21.00 | 0.17 | 0.00 | -51. | 0. | 3.4 | 2.5 | 0.942 | 18. | 29.30 | -14.09 |  | -1.72 | 3.61 |
| 24.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.800 | 0. | 0.09 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 27.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 30.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.006 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 33.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | $\theta$ - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.09 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 36.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.80 | 0.00 |
| 39.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 8.68 |  | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| 42.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 45.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.06 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 48.00 | B.00 | 0.00 | 0. | $e$. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 51.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | - 000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 54.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | $0.0 \cdot$ | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.09 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 57.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0. 90 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 60.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.09 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 63.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 66.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 69.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 72.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 75.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 78.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 81.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 84.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 87.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.80 |  | 0.60 | 0.00 |
| 90.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 93.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.80 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 98.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 99.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 8. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 192.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 105.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.090 | $\theta$. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 108.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 111.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.80 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 114.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 117.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 |  | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 120.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.60 |  | 0.00 | -. 00 |



INITIAL LINE LENGTH $=24.69(I N)$ EDGE CONSTANT $=0.000$

|  | DEFLECTION |  | DEFL. | Rate | FORCE |  | CONTACT ON | location <br> LINE | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BCOY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIME | LINE | ELLIPSE | LINE | ELLIPSE | NORMAL | TANGNTL. | POSITION | RATE | ( ${ }_{\text {X }}$ | ( ${ }^{2}$ | X (1N) |  |
| (MSEC) | (IN) | (IN) | (IN/SEC) | (IN/SEC) | (LB) | (L8) | (NONDIM.) | (IN/SEC) | (IN) |  | (IN) | (IN) |
| \$20.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 |  |  |  |
| 123.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 126.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 129.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.090 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 132.80 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.080 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| 135.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 138.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| 141.00 | 8.80 | 0.80 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | - 0 | 0.008 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 144.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.008 | 0 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 147.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 130.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 133.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 156.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 159.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | - 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 162.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 165.08 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 168.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 171.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 174.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 177.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.900 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| 180.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 183.00 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.008 | 8. | 0.00 | 0.08 | 8.08 | 0.00 |
| 186.00 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 6.6 | 0.008 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 189.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 6. | 6. | 8.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 192.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | - | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |




INITIAL LINE LENGTH - $17.20(I N)$ EDGE CONSTANT $=0.000$

| $\begin{gathered} \text { TIME } \\ (\text { MSEC }) \end{gathered}$ | DEFLECTION |  | DEFL(INE(IN/SEC) | RATE ELLIPSE | FORCE |  | CONTACT POSITION | LOCATION LINE RATE | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BOOY SEG. |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LINE | Ellipse |  |  | normal | TANGNTL. |  |  | $x$ | 2 | x |  | 2 |
|  | (1N) | (IN) |  | (IN/SEC) | (LE) | (L8) | (NONDIM.) | (IN/SEC) | (IN) | (IN) | (IN) |  | (IN) |
| 120.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 123.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | - . 00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 126.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.60 |
| 129.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 132.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | - . 00 | 0.06 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 135.00 | 0.00 | - 00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | -. 0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 138.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | e. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.090 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.08 | 0.06 |  | 0.00 |
| 141.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | -0.00 |
| 144.00 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 147.00 | 0.00 | 0.98 | 0. | 8. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | - $0 \cdot 0$ | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 150.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | - 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 153.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 156.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 159.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 8. | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 182.08 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | - 0.00 | 0.80 |  | 0.00 |
| 165.00 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 168.00 | 8.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0. 000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.60 |
| 171.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | - . 00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | $\cdots$ | 0.00 |
| 174.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | -.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 177.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |  | 0.08 |
| 180.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 183.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | - .000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
| 186.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | -.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |  | 0.00 |
| 189.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.68 | 0.00 | 0.08 |  | 0.00 |
| 192.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | -0.00 | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |



INITIAL LINE LENGTH $=17.20($ IN $)$ EDGE CONSTANT $=0.000$

|  | DEFLECTION |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DEFL. } \\ & \text { LINE } \end{aligned}$ | RATE ELLIPSE | FORCE |  | CONTACT POSITION | location <br> LINE RATE <br> (IN/SEC) | contact location IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BODY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIME | LINE | ELLIPSE |  |  | NORMAL | TANGNTL. |  |  | $\stackrel{\mathrm{X}}{\text { (iN) }}$ | ${ }^{2}$ |  | (1N) |
| (MSEC) | (IN) | (IN) | (IN/SEC) | ( IN/SEC) |  |  | (NONDIM.) |  | (IN) | (IN) |  | (IN) |
| (0.00 | 1.59 | 0.80 | ( 8. | 0 O. | 30.8 | 8.8 | 0.825 | 0. | 35.35 | - 15.83 | 3.73 | 2.75 |
| 3.00 | 1.51 | 0.00 | 1. | 0. | 30.9 | 11.7 | 0.825 | 5. | 36.67 | -15.03 | 3.73 | 2.75 |
| 6.00 | 1.52 | 0.00 | 3. | 0. | 31.0 | 23.2 | 0.827 | 11. | 37.99 | -15.03 | 3.73 | 2.75 |
| 9.00 | 1.53 | 0.00 | 5. | 6. | 31.2 | 23.4 | 0.829 | 17. | 39.31 | -15.03 | 3.73 | 2.75 |
| 12.00 | 1.54 | 0.00 | 7. | 0. | 31.5 | 23.6 | 0.833 | 25. | 40.62 | -15.03 | 3.73 | 2.75 |
| 15.00 | 1.57 | 0.00 | 9. | 0. | 32.6 | 24.0 | 0.838 | 33. | 41.93 | -15.04 | 3.74 | 2.75 |
| 18.00 | 1.80 | 0.00 | 11. | 0. | 32.6 | 24.5 | 0.845 | 43. | 43.23 | -15.04 | 3.74 | 2.75 |
| 21.00 | 1.54 | 0.08 | 14. | 8. | 33.4 | 25.1 | 0.853 | 53. | 44.53 | -15.04 | 3.74 | 2.75 |
| 24.00 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 17. | 6. | 34.4 | 25.8 | 0.864 | 64. | 45.83 | -13.04 | 3.74 | 2.75 |
| 27.00 | 1.74 | 0.00 | 21. | 0. | 35.5 | 26.7 | 0.876 | 76. | 47.12 | -15.04 | 3.75 | 2.75 |
| 30.00 | 1.81 | 0.00 | 24. | 0. | 36.9 | 27.7 | 0.898 | 88. | 48.41 | -15.03 | 3.75 | 2.75 |
| 33.00 | 1.89 | 0.00 | 28. | 0. | 40.2 | 30.2 | 0.907 | 101. | 49.69 | -15.03 | 3.75 | 2.75 |
| 36.00 | 1.97 | 0.00 | 31. | 0. | 46.3 | 34.8 | 0.926 | 113. | 50.97 | -15.03 | 3.76 | 2.75 |
| 39.60 | 2.07 | 0.00 | 34. | 0. | 33.2 | 39.9 | 0.947 | 126. | 52.25 | -15.03 | 3.77 | 2.75 |
| 42.00 | 2.18 | 0.00 | 37. | 0. | 60.7 | 45.3 | 0.970 | 138. | 53.52 | -15.03 | 3.77 | 2.75 |
| 45.08 | 2.29 | 0.00 | 38. | 0. | 68.7 | 51.5 | 0.995 | 150. | 54.78 | -15.03 | 3.78 | 2.75 |
| 48.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | $\theta$ 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | $\theta$ e. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 51.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 54.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.090 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 57.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 60.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.68 | 0.00 |
| 63.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 86.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 6.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 69.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 72.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 75.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 78.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.006 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 81.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 84.08 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 87.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.800 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 80.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 93.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 96.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.08 |
| 99.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
| 102.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 |
| 105.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 |
| 108.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 111.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 114.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.090 | 0. | 0.60 | 8.00 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| 117.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| 120.60 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | -. 0 | 0.000 | $\theta$ - | 0.00 | - . 00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |



INITIAL LINE LENGTH $=17.20($ IN $)$ EDOE CONSTANT $=0.000$

|  | DEFLECTION |  | OEFL. RATE |  | FORCE |  | CONTACT | LOCATION LINE | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BODY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIME | LINE | ELLIPSE | LINE | ELLIPSE | NORMAL | TANGNTL. | POSITION | Rate | X | 2 | X | 2 |
| (MSEC) | (IN) | (IN) | (IN/SEC) | (IN/SEC) | (LB) | (LB) | (NONDIM.) | (IN/SEC) | (IN) | (IN) | (1N) | (IN) |
| 120.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 123.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 125.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 129.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 132.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 135.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 138.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 141.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 144.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 147.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 150.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 153.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.006 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 |
| 156.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 8.8 | 0.800 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 159.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | B. 0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 162.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 165.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 168.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 171.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 174.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.90 | 0.00 |
| 177.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | - .00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 189.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 183.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 186.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | - 0000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 189.00 192.00 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.08 8.80 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
|  | 0.00 | 6.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |




CONTACT INTERACTION BETWEEN

| ELLIPSE HEEL | ASSUMED TO EE RIGID |
| :---: | :---: |
| AND |  |
| LINE FLOORBOARO WHICH IS AN ELEMENT OF REGION FLOOR MADE OF FLOOR MATERIAL |  |

INITIAL LINE LENGTH = $\mathbf{~ 5 0 . 3 7}$ (IN) EDGE CONSTANT - 0.000

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { TIME } \\ & \text { (MSEC) } \end{aligned}$ | DEFLECTION |  | DEFL. LINE | RATE ELLIPSE <br> (IN/SEC) | FORCE |  | CONTACT POSITION | location LINE RATE (IN/SEC) | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BODY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LINE | ELLIPSE |  |  | NORMAL | TANGNTL. |  |  | X | (1) | $\boldsymbol{N}$ | (IN) |
|  | (IN) | (IN) |  |  | (te) | (LB) | (NONDIM.) |  | (IN) | (IN) | ( IN) | (IN) |
| 120.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0,000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 123.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | a. | 0.0 | 0.e | 0.000 | e. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 126.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
| 129.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
| 132.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 135.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 138.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 141.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 144.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 147.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 150.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | $\checkmark \quad 0.00$ |
| 153,00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 156.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 159.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 162.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 165.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 168.00 | 0.00 | 0. 00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.060 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 171.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8.06 |
| 174.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | -. 06 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 177.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 6.8 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 180.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 183.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 6.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.60 | -. 00 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| 186.00 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| 189.00 | 0.00 | 8.80 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 192.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 8. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | e.00 |




INITIAL LINE LENGTH $=7.05(1 N)$ EDGE CONSTANT $=0.370$

|  | DEFLECTION |  | DEFL. | RATE ELLIPSE | FORCE |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { CONTACT LOCATION } \\ \text { ON LINE } \\ \text { POSITION RATE } \\ \text { (NONOIM.) (IN/SEC) } \end{gathered}$ |  | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BOOY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIME | LINE | ELlipse |  |  | NOFMAL | TAMGNTL. |  |  |  | ( ${ }^{2}$ |  | $\left(\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ \text { (IN) } \end{array}\right.$ |
| (WSEC) | (IN) | (IN) | ( IN/SEC) | (IN/SEC) | (LD) | (L8) |  |  | (IN) | (IN) | (IN) | (IN) |
| 120.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 |  |  | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.66 | 0.00 |
| 123.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 128.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
| 129.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
| 432.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.80 |
| 135.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 9.800 | e. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 138.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 141.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.006 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 144.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | -. 0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 147.00 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0. 200 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 150.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 153.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 156.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| 159.00 | 0.60 | 0.80 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.60 |
| 162.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.004 | 0. | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 165.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.808 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 188.00 | 0.06 | 0.80 | 0. | 0. | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.006 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 171.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 174.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 177.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 180.08 | 0.98 | 0.00 | 0. | $g$. | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.800 | 0. | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 |
| 183.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 186.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 189.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 192.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | -. 0 | a.e00 | 0. | 0.0e | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |





INITJAL LINE LENGTH = 25.65 (IN) EDGE CONSTANT $=0.200$

| $\left.\operatorname{TIME}_{(\text {MSEC }}\right)$ | DEFLECTION |  | DEFL.LINE(IN/SEC) | RATE ELLIPSE <br> (IN/SEC) | FORCE |  | CONTACT ON POSITION (nONDIM.) | LOCATION <br> LINE RATE <br> (IN/SEC) | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BODY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LINE | ELLIPSE |  |  | NOPMAL | TANGNTL. |  |  | X | 2 | X | 2 |
|  | - (IN) | (IN) |  |  | (LB) | (LB) |  |  | (IN) | (IN) | (1N) | (1N) |
| 120.00 | , 9.31 | 0.06 | 81. | 0. | 850.0 | 195.0 | 0.217 | -54. | 77.59 | -29.75 | 11.77 | 1.33 |
| 123.00 | 8.57 | 0.00 | 80. | $\theta$ - | 850.0 | 195.0 | 0.212 | -33. | 77.64 | -29.87 | 11.73 | 1.46 |
| 126.00 | 9.85 | 0.00 | 96. | 0. | 650.0 | 195.0 | 0.200 | -18. | 77.73 | -30.14 | 11.68 | 1.47 |
| 129.00 | 10.11 | 0.00 | 81. | 0. | 671.8 | 182.1 | 0.207 | -9. | 77.84 | -30.28 | 11.65 | 1.53 |
| 132.00 | 10.33 | 0.00 | 65. | 0. | 715.7 | 127.6 | 0.208 | -8. | 77.92 | -30.38 | 11.61 | 1.59 |
| 135.00 | 10.50 | 0.00 | 50. | 0. | 750.2 | 106.1 | 0.208 | -5. | 77.98 | - 30.46 | 11.56 | 1.65 |
| 138.60 | 10.64 | 0.00 | 40. | 0. | 777.1 | 86.3 | 0.285 | -4. | 78.61 | -30.52 | 11.51 | 1.70 |
| 141.00 | 10.74 | 0.00 | 31. | 0. | 798.2 | 79.8 | 0.295 | -3. | 78.02 | -30.57 | 11.47 | 1.75 |
| 144.00 | 10.82 | 0.00 | 20. | 0. | 813.6 | 92.0 | 0.294 | 4. | 78.62 | -30.61 | 11.43 | 1.80 |
| 147.00 | 10.86 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 821.6 | 109.9 | 0.284 | -4. | 77.99 | -30.64 | 19.40 | 1.83 |
| 150.00 | 10.86 | 0.00 | $-5$. | 0. | 342.4 | 30.0 | 0.203 | -3. | 77.93 | -30.65 | 11.37 | 1.86 |
| 153.00 | 10.85 | 0.00 | 3. | 0. | 293.0 | 78.9 | 0. 204 | 9. | 77.89 | -30.64 | 11.35 | 1.89 |
| 136.00 | 10.86 | 0.00 | -1. | 0. | 516.8 | 155.0 | 0.205 | 21. | 77.87 | -30.60 | 11.33 | 1,91 |
| 159.08 | 10.85 | 0.00 | -14. | 0. | 252.3 | 75.7 | 0.209 | 26. | 77.87 | -30.52 | 11.32 | 1.92 |
| 162.00 | 10.77 | 0.00 | -44. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.211 | $\theta$ - | 77.78 | -30.45 | 11.29 | 1.94 |
| 165.00 | 10.58 | 0.00 | -73. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.209 | 0. | 77.57 | -30.41 | 11.25 | 1.98 |
| 168.00 | 10.32 | 0.00 | -81. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.205 | 0. | 77.29 | -30.40 | 11.20 | 2.62 |
| 171.00 | 10.05 | 0.00 | -93. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0. 202 | 0 | 76.99 | -30.38 | 11.15 | 2.06 |
| 174.00 | 9.77 | -. 06 | -94. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.199 | 0. | 76.70 | -30.34 | 11.11 | 2.10 |
| 177.68 | 8.48 | - 0.00 | -98. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.197 | 0. | 76.41 | -30.28 | 11.07 | 2.13 |
| 180.00 | 9.18 | 0.00 | -102. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0. 196 | 0. | 76.13 | -30.19 | 11.03 | 2.16 |
| 183.00 | 8.87 | 0.00 | -104. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.196 | 6. | 75.84 | -30.e8 | 11.00 | 2.18 |
| 186.00 | 8.56 | 0.00 | -98. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | -. 197 | 0. | 75.57 | -29.94 | 10.97 | 2.20 |
| 189.00 | 8. 28 | 0.06 | $-87$. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.109 | 0. | 75.35 | -20.78 | 10.96 | 2.21 |
| 192.00 | 8.64 | ©. 00 | -79. | 0 | 0.0 | -. 0 | 0.203 | - | 75.17 | $-29.60$ | 18.95 | 2.22 |






INITIAL LINE LENGTH $=17.58($ IN $)$ EDGE CONSTANT $=0.250$

|  | DEFLECTION |  | DEFL. | Rate | FORCE |  | CONTACT POSITION | LOCATION <br> LINE RATE <br> (IN/SEC) | CONTACT LOGATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BCDY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIME | LINE | ELLIPSE | LINE | ELLIPSE | NORMAL | TANGNTL. |  |  | $\stackrel{X}{\text { ( }}$ | ${ }^{2}$ | X (IN) |  |
| (MSEC) | (IN) | (1N) | (IN/SEC) | (IN/SEC) | (18) | (LB) | (NONDIM.) |  | (IN) | (1N) | (IN) | (IN) |
| 8.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | -. 0 | 0.6 | -. 000 | 6. | - 000 | - 60 | 0.00 | 6.00 |
| 3.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | $\bullet$. | - 0 | 0.8 | -. 000 | 0. | - 00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| 6.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | - | - 0 | -. 0 | 0.000 | 0. | -.00 | 0.0 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 9.00 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0. | 0. | - 0 | -. 0 | - 0000 | 0. | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.00 |
| 12.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | - | -. 0 | -. 0 | . 0000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 15.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | -. 0 | -. 0 | -.000 | 0. | 0.00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 18.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - 0 | - 0 | -. 000 | 0. | -. 00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 21.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | -.000 | - | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 24.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | - | -. 0 | 0.0 | -.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | . 60 | 0.00 |
| 27.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - 0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | -. 06 | -. 00 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| 30.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - 0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 33.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | . 6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 36.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | * 0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.06 | 6.06 | 6.00 | 0.60 |
| 39.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | *,00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 42.00 | -00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - 0 | -. 0 | 0.000 | 0. | - . 00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 45.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - 0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
| 48.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
| 51.00 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.6 | -. 800 | 0. | 0.00 | ©.68 | 0.08 | 0.06 |
| 54.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.090 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | -. 06 |
| 57.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | -. | 0.0 | 0.600 | 0. | 0.00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 60.00 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 63.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - . 0 | 0.0 | - 0000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 66.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | ¢. 0 | . 600 | 0. | 6.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.60 |
| 69.80 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | -. 6 | . 000 | 0. | 0.00 | -. 00 | 0.60 | 0.60 |
| 72.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | -. | 6.8 | - . 600 | 6. | -. 00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 75.80 | - 00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | -. 0 | -. 060 | 0. | . 8.00 | -. 0 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| 78.00 | - 0.0 | 0.06 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 0. | -. 00 | -.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 81.00 | 0.60 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | e. | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | - 60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 84.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.8 | 0.0 | -.000 | 0. | 0.00 | -.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 87.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | e.e | 0.0 | -.000 | - | 0.00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 90.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | -. | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | -.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 93.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | - . 08 | 0.00 |
| 96.08 | 0.30 | 0.06 | 372. | 0. | 204.7 | 102.3 | 1.103 | 202. | 75.03 | -14.35 | 9. 55 | -0.00 |
| 99.00 | 1.55 | 0.00 | 319. | $\bullet$. | 371.7 | 185.8 | 1.140 | 225. | 76.15 | -14.29 | 0.53 | -0.62 |
| 182.00 | 2.43 | 0.00 | 271. | 4. | 177.2 | 88.6 | 1.181 | 242. | 77.10 | -13.90 | 9.49 | -0.67 |
| 105.00 | 3.20 | -. 0 - | 246. | 0. | 49.6 | 24.5 | 1.224 | 244. | 77.05 | -13.45 | 9.44 | -0.73 |
| 108.60 | 0.00 | - .00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | -. 0 | -. 800 | 0. | 0.00 | - 60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 111.00 | 0.00 | - . 00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 114.00 | 0.00 | 0.90 | 0. | 6. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | - | 0.06 | -. 06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 117.00 | 0.00 | -. 60 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.800 | 0. | -. 00 | -. 06 | 0.80 | 0.00 |
| 120.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | -. 600 | 0. | 0.06 | *. 06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |



INITIAL LINE LENGTH = $17.58($ IN $)$ EDGE CONSTANT $=0.280$

|  | DEFLECTION |  | DEFL.(INE(IN/SEC) | RATE ELLIPSE | FORCE |  | CONTACTONPOSITION | LOCATION LINE RATE | contact location IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BOOY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIME | LINE | ELLIPSE |  |  | NORMAL. | TANGNTL. |  |  | $x$ | 2 | X |  |
| (MSEC) | (IN) | (1N) |  | (IN/SEC) | (L8) | (LE) | ( NONOIM.) | ( $\mathrm{IN} / \mathrm{SEC}$ ) | (IN) | (1N) | (1N) | (IN) |
| 120.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0. | b. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | ( 0 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| 123.00 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0. | Q | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.00e | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 |
| 126.00 | 0.60 | - 0.08 | 0. | 0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | -. 080 | 0. | 0.00 | -. 06 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 129.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | -. 060 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 132.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | $0.60{ }^{\circ}$ | 0. | 0.60 | -. 06 | 0.60 | 0.00 |
| 135.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.006 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.00 |
| 138.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | -. 00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 141.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | -.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 144.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 147.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | - . 00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 150.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 6.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 153.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 6. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| 156.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | -. 00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 159.08 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 162.06 165.00 | 0.06 0.06 | 0.00 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 168.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | -0.00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 171.00 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | -. 0 | 0.0 | 0.000 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 0.00 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.00 0.80 |
| 174.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.090 | 0. | 0.00 | $\begin{array}{r}\text { +.00 } \\ \hline .06\end{array}$ | 0.00 0.00 | 0.00 0.00 |
| 177.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.800 | 0. | 0.00 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 180.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - | 0. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | -.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 183.00 186.06 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | b. | 0.68 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 186.00 189.00 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | $0 \cdot 0$ | e. 0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.60 | -.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 189.06 182.60 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.00 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.000 | 6. | 0.60 | -.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 182.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | - 0 | 0.6 | 0.0e6 | 0. | -60 | 6.e0 | -.00 | 0.60 |




|  | DEFLECTION |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DEFL: } \\ & \text { LINE }^{+} \end{aligned}$ | RATE ELLIPSE | FORCE |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CONTACT LOCATION } \\ & \text { ON LINE } \\ & \text { POSITION RATE } \\ & \text { (MONOIM:) (IN/SEC) } \end{aligned}$ |  | CONTACT LOCATION IN SPACE |  | CONTACT LOCATION ON BODY SEG. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TJME | LINE | ELLIPSE |  |  | NORMAL | TANGNTL. |  |  | ${ }^{x}$ | 2 | $x$ | 7 |
| (MSEC) | (JN) | (IN) | (IN/SEC) | (IN/SEC) | (LB) | (L18) |  |  | (IN) | (IN) | (1N) | (IN) |
| 120.00 | 0.62 | 1.24 | 49: | 189. | 709;1 | 212.7 | 0,166 | 65. | 69.67 | -36.62 | -3. 62 | -3.54 |
| 123:06 | 0.76 | 1.75 | 39. | 151. | 879:0 | 263.7 | 0,169 | 64. | 70.19 | -36.68 | -3.48 | -3.73 |
| 126:00 | 0.88 | 2.13 | 27. | 104. | 1818.2 | 304.9 | 0.179 | 67. | 76.57 | -30.69 | -3. 28 | -3.95 |
| 129.08 | 0.96 | 2,48 | 3. | 73. | 1097.7 | 328.3 | - 190 | 76. | 70.81 | -30.80 | -3.09 | -4.15 |
| 132.08 | 0.01 | 2.54 | 1. | 22. | 1139.2 | 341.8 | 0.263 | 80. | 70.92 | -30.44 | -2.96 | -4.27 |
| 135.00 | 0.90 | 2.52 | -5. | -34. | 1074.3 | 322.3 | -. 216 | 74. | 70.87 | -30.21 | -2.08 | -4.33 |
| 138.00 | 0.88 | 2.35 | -16. | -77. | 565.7 | 169.7 | 0.229 | 75. | 76.68 | -29.94 | -2.85 | -4.37 |
| 141.00 | 0.66 | 2.67 | 0. | -111. | 178.3 | 51.1 | 0.242 | 81. | 76.38 | -29.61 | -2.80 | -4.41 |
| 144.00 | 0.86 | 1,71 | -1. | -125. | 135.6 | 46.7 | 0.257 | 85. | 70.07 | -29.26 | -2.73 | -4.47 |
| 147.00 | 0.78 | 1.41 | -32. | -102. | 163,7 | 31.1 | 0.272 | 86. | 89,73 | -28.88 | -2.64 | $-4.55$ |
| 150.00 | 0.68 | 1.10 | -33. | -105. | 71.0 | 21.3 | 0.287 | 86. | 69.38 | -28.49 | -2.51 | -4.64 |
| 153.00 | 8. 58 | 0.78 | -33. | -197. | 37.5 | 11.2 | 0.362 | 85. | 69.83 | -28.10 | -2.37 | -4.74 |
| 136.00 | 0.48 | 0.46 | -33. | -187. | 3.7 | 1.1 | -.318 | 85. | 68.09 | -27.76 | -2.20 | -4.85 |
| 159.00 | 0.31 | 0.21 | -70. | -76. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.334 | 0. | 88.36 | -27.30 | -2.62 | -4.96 |
| 162.00 | 0.10 | 0.00 | -69. | -69. | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.350 | 0. | 68.04 | -28.89 | -1.83 | -5.07 |
| 165,00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 168.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 171.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.090 | 0. | 0.90 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 174.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 177.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.00 |
| 180.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.60 | a.00 | 0.00 |
| 183.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8.06 |
| 186.00 | 0.00 | 8.08 | 8. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0 | 0.00 | -. 00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 189.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.000 | 0. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 192.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0. | 0. | 0.0 | 0.0 | -. 000 | 0. | 0.00 | -60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |





## APPENDIX D

SCATTERPLOTS OF INJURY SCORES VS. PANEL PARAMETERS



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TRNK 6, FDMIP
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R=-22\left(p_{2} 33\right)
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10:04 FRIDAY, JUNS 22,1987
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R=-.65 \quad(p=.0014)
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APPENDIX E
SCATTERPLOTS OF OBSERVED VS. PREDICTED:
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS OF INJURY SCORES vS. PANEL PARAMETERS







\section*{\(\cdots\)}
\(R=.78\)
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\(=\)

\(R=16\)


\section*{\(\because\) TRNK25 by (.85FDLIPG-.84IPL) \\ \(\because\) TRNK25 by (. 85 FDLIP6-. 84 IPL)}
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\section*{,}
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\section*{-}
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\section*{APPENDIX F}

PASSENGER CAR CURB WEIGHTS BASED ON AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, BY MAKE, MODEL AND MODEL YEAR




Cura veights facm autonotive mens almanacs


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[^0]:    *Individual injuries rated AIS 2 or greater, due to contact with the instrument panel, glove compartment area, instrument panel hardware, radio or ducts behind the panel, among persons who were hospitalized. A passenger may have up to 6 such injuries.

[^1]:    IPL=Instrument panel length
    AWSH=Windshield rake angle
    FDLIP6=Force deflection of lower IP at 6 inches

