

“U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense”

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AGENDA (slide 2)

Good Morning.

I would like to thank our hosts, particularly Deputy Minister of Defense Antonov and General Makarov, for organizing this conference and inviting me, and all of us from U.S. DOD.

I am sure this will be an interesting conference; look forward to the presentations.

As you can see from the agenda, slide 2, I will address 6 topic areas,

- First I will discuss the growing ballistic missile threat from regional actors, including North Korea and Iran
- This will be followed by a brief overview of U.S. policy on missile defense, including why the United States is pursuing missile defense capabilities generally – this will provide a foundation for the next two topics Homeland missile defense and regional missile defense; For these I will focus on the U.S. homeland missile defense capability against a limited ballistic missile threat; and then for regional missile defense, I will focus on the European Phased Adaptive Approach – the EPAA.
- Next will be a frank approach to the concerns that Russia has raised with respect to the EPAA regional missile defense

- Then I will close with a synopsis of why it is important for both countries, the United States and Russia, to cooperate together on missile defense—this would be in the interest of all parties- the U.S., NATO, and Russia. The United States continues to seek a way forward on missile defense cooperation with Russia, and it is my sincere hope that this presentation this morning will help advance that goal.

[next slide] Ballistic Missile Threat (slide 3)

The ballistic missile threat continues to advance around the world. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD pose a threat to U.S. deployed forces, and to our Allies and partners.

For threats to the U.S. homeland, we are particularly concerned about Iran and North Korea. Both countries continue to develop ICBMs directly; or ICBM capability indirectly, through space launch vehicles. The United States remains deeply concerned about the nuclear programs in both countries, and the potential for each to develop nuclear weapons that could be mated on a ballistic missile, including a future ICBM.

The regional threat is growing even more rapidly with thousands of short and medium range missiles becoming available to many countries, including North Korea and Iran.

Even though there have been failures in their programs, such as the recent failed North Korean TD-2 launch, there have also been successes, and neither country shows any sign of slowing down their development efforts.

[next slide] U.S. Policy on Missile Defense (slide 4)

The U.S. policy on ballistic missile defense was clearly set out in the report on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), published in February 2010. This document continues to guide the missile defense decisions of United States. We use it every day.....

Although here today we are primarily focused on the EPAA and on cooperation with Russia, I wanted to touch on three key BMDR priorities that are directly relevant to this topic.

1. Homeland defense:

- In the United States we worry about either Iran or North Korea launching even a single ICBM against us, and the devastation this would cause. As a result, the U.S. has deployed a system to defend the homeland against such a limited ICBM attack.

2. Regional Missile Defense

- The United States intends to defend our deployed forces, and our Allies and partners, against the regional ballistic missile threats I previously described, and against longer range ICBM threats if and as they develop. The EPAA is concrete proof of that commitment.

3. Third, it is our policy to expand international missile defense efforts:

- This includes our work on EPAA with NATO, and also includes our efforts to cooperate with Russia. →

- More missile defense partners makes missile defense more effective, more affordable, and provide more of a deterrent effect.

[next slide] BMD Supports Regional Security and Stability (slide 6)

Our Russian colleagues often ask us: “Why does the United States pursue missile defenses?”

Simply put, missile defenses support U.S. security objectives, but most importantly they enhance regional stability. We are all aware that a ballistic missile, even a short range ballistic missile is a coercive tool. Missile defenses counter that coercion. Through the deterrence provided by regional missile defense systems, deterrence is enhanced. And, if deterrence fails, regional missile defenses can help protect U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners. By providing that measure of protection, missile defenses may provide the space and time needed to prevent rapid escalation of a crisis.

[next slide] Homeland Missile Defense (slide 5)

- The United States is committed to defending our homeland against a limited ICBM attack; as we have stated in the BMDR, we will continue to improve our homeland missile defense system, relative to the threat from North Korea or Iran.
- Like Russia, we deploy a missile defense system domestically, but this system is designed to protect the US from a limited attack from states like Iran and North Korea. I should also add that today we have only 30 interceptors for homeland defense.
- It is not our intent, and it would be far too expensive, and far too destabilizing to try to build a system to defend against the large and sophisticated arsenals of Russia or China. Undermining strategic stability is not in our interest.
- (?) While not shown on this slide, the SM-3 IIB in Phase 4 of the EPAA would also help defend the U.S. homeland against a potential Iranian long range ICBM.

[next slide] Regional Missile Defense (slide 7)

Regional missile defense—the ability to protect our deployed forces, our Allies and our partners from regional ballistic missile threats—is important to the United States.

To achieve that ability, the United States is pursuing regional missile defense architectures in three key regions: Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region.

Each regional architecture will vary, because each region varies. Different geography, different geopolitics, and different threats require different approaches.

And because a regional approach is most effective with participation of the regional partners and allies, in each region we are working with our allies and partners to develop an appropriately tailored, phased and adaptive approach.

But in the EPAA, our partnership with Russia, frankly, needs work.

We hope this conference will help to further the goal of meaningful cooperation.

[next slide] EPAA Directed Against Middle East, not Russia (slide 8)

As you all know there are 4 planned phases of the EPAA:

- Phase 1 includes a radar in Turkey and a ship in the Mediterranean equipped with SM-3 Block IA interceptors.
- Phase 2 adds an Aegis Ashore site in Romania and the improved SM-3 Block I-B interceptor, both by 2015.
- Phase 3 adds a second Aegis Ashore site, this time in Poland, and introduces a more capable interceptor, SM-3 Block II-A. Phase 3 begins in 2018.
- Phase 4 deploys the SM-3 Block IIB, which is intended to defend against a potential Iranian ICBM. When this phase actually begins, depends on a number of issues, technical maturity of the system, budgets and the maturity of the threat. Based on recent Congressional budget cuts, at this point we expect that the earliest the SM-3 II-B would be available is 2021.

The map on this slide is intended to be a graphic depiction of the fact that the EPAA is not directed against Russia. Looking at this slide we can see threat range rings from current and potential ballistic missiles from outside Europe, pushing deeper and deeper into the heart of Europe. And we can clearly see that the EPAA is aligned against the threat emanating from the Middle East.

The fact that the EPAA is almost perfectly aligned against the threat from the Middle East proves that the EPAA is neither designed nor directed against Russia. And as ballistic missiles are developed that can reach deeper and deeper into

Europe, we intend to deploy assets that can defend against that increasing threat, hence the site in Poland in 2018.

Looking at these threat rings it is important to note that the threat from the Middle East threatens Russia as well-- placing much of Western Russia at risk, including key cities and millions of civilians. Yet another reason for Russia to agree to work cooperatively with us on missile defense!

[next slide] Addressing Russian Concerns (slide 9)

At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO welcomed Russian cooperation, and the NATO Russia Council agreed to “discuss pursuing missile defense cooperation.”

Russia has expressed serious reservations about the deployment of the EPAA---in particular, Russia worries that the later phases of the EPAA will be able to negate or undermine the Russian strategic deterrent – thereby undermining strategic stability.

The U.S. and Russia have had many discussions about missile defense, under the current Obama administration, under the previous administration, and under several administrations before that- going back more than two decades. Since 2010 the United States and Russia have met multiple times to discuss missile defense - in Moscow, in Brussels, in Geneva, in DC, and even once in Colorado.

In these meetings the United States has explained repeatedly that the EPAA cannot intercept Russian ICBMs targeting the United States.

We have also proposed a path towards increasingly robust cooperation that builds upon past Russian proposals, which I will outline shortly.

[next slide] EPAA Cannot Negate Russia's Strategic Deterrent (slide 10)

And now we come to the crux of the issue --- the EPAA cannot negate Russia's strategic deterrent.

To start, it is important to understand how U.S. missile defense systems actually work. Our systems require a threat missile to achieve burnout before we can calculate a firing solution.

Why? Because before burnout the threat missile continues to accelerate, and continues to adjust its direction. It is only after burnout that the threat missile is on a ballistic trajectory, and it needs to be on a ballistic trajectory for any ballistic missile defense system to calculate an intercept solution for an incoming threat missile. (x2)

That intercept solution must be sent to the interceptor so it will have a chance of successfully hitting the threat missile. Doing these calculations takes time – tens of seconds after burnout, at the very minimum(!) --- before we can launch an interceptor. It is simply not the case that U.S. interceptors can launch prior to burnout.

And we can't intercept a Russian ICBM, even if we did try to launch at a Russian ICBM headed to the U.S. Our interceptors, even the SM3-IIB, are not designed to catch a sophisticated Russian ICBM. We need the time after burnout for targeting, and the interceptors are not fast enough in any event. →

To sum up this slide—

The EPAA is not designed, or positioned to defend against Russian ICBMs. It is directed against threats from the Middle East, including potential ICBMs, but not against Russian ICBMs.

The Russian nuclear arsenal is large, varied, and sophisticated. Russia can deliver its nuclear weapons from land, air, and sea. Russia is actively modernizing its inventory of platforms and delivery systems, including ICBMs, SLBMs, SLCMs, and ALCMs. Russia has multiple possible launch points and trajectories for targeting the United States and sophisticated countermeasures and reentry vehicles.

All of this is far too much for U.S. missile defenses to cope with. We do not design our systems against the Russian arsenal --it is not in our interest to do so. In the words of former Secretary Gates, such a move would be “unbelievably expensive and enormously destabilizing.”

All told, the Russian strategic deterrent is now, and will remain, secure.

[next slide] EPAA Cannot Negate Russia's Strategic Deterrent (slide 11)

This chart illustrates my point graphically. If Russia wanted to attack the United States – and we all hope that never, ever happens – Russia has multiple trajectories available for its land based ICBMs, none of which overfly EPAA assets.

The ground traces shown on this map represent different cities being targeted in the United States – Yellow for Miami, Red for Seattle, Blue for Washington. Again, none of them crosses over the Poland or Romania sites. And none are within reach of interceptors at those sites.

And this chart shows only land based ICBMs. It does not include air and sea-based platforms. Russian SLBMs, for example, could be launched from almost anywhere in ocean.

I will say it again. The Russian strategic deterrent is now, and will remain, secure.

[next slide] Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia a Key U.S. Priority (slide 12)

Both the U.S. and Russia would benefit from an agreement on missile defense cooperation. We must keep working toward this goal.

There would be direct operational benefits--cooperation results in a more efficient and effective defense. Data sharing and data fusion between Russia and NATO would improve early warning and improve defense of all parties. This type of data sharing is what is envisioned in a NATO-Russia missile defense data fusion center.

Russia initially proposed the creation of NATO-Russia missile defense centers - an excellent idea and one we hope to be able to pursue.

In the future, we can envision interceptor coordination, which would be one of the functions of the proposed NATO-Russia Planning and Operations Center.

There would also be political benefits to cooperation. NATO and Russia working together on missile defense, would send a strong signal to regional actors that ballistic missile proliferation will not go unchallenged. It would enhance strategic stability by improving the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relationship, and could pay dividends by building habits of cooperation that might flow to other areas as well. Cooperation on missile defense could provide the assurances that EPAA cannot negate or undermine the Russian strategic deterrent.

Cooperation, not confrontation, is in the best interests of all parties.

[next slide] Conclusions (slide 13)

To wrap up, ballistic missile threats are real and continue to advance.

The U.S. will continue to develop and deploy missile defenses in response to the threat.

In Europe, the United States and NATO are deploying missile defenses to reinforce regional stability.

We know Russia has concerns. We also know that the EPAA does not have capability against the Russian strategic deterrent.

The United States looks forward to a decision by Russia to move forward on real missile defense cooperation. Cooperation is in the national security interest of all parties: the U.S., NATO, and Russia alike.

Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to the rest of the conference.