### When a Nudge Isn't Enough: Defaults and Saving Among Low-Income Tax Filers



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## **Three Motivations**

- (1) "Under-saving" by low income households?
- •Low income families typically save little.
- •Encouraging asset building among low income populations is often seen as an appropriate policy goal.
  - Why might individuals save "too little"?
    - Present-bias, lack of financial sophistication, inattention, transaction costs
  - Why it be optimal to save little: credit constraints, high MU of consumption.

## **Three motivations**

- (2) Tax time = "savable moment"?
- •Tax time is often suggested as an opportune time to encourage saving (e.g., Tufano et al. 2005).
- •A time when people have a chunk of money, a portion of which could be saved.
- •Various attempts to encourage saving refund.
  - E.g., Duflo et al. (2006) use matching grants.
  - Behavior can be influenced; decisions are improved?

### Three motivations

(3) Active choice/ default can affect savings

- •Evidence from 401(k)s:
  - Forcing active choice lead to roughly 25 percentage point increase in participation.
  - Change to automatic enrollment increased participation by 50 percentage points.

•Defaults are soft-touch, always allow opt-out

## Active Choice/ Default Effects: Mechanisms

- Exact mechanisms still unclear, several potential explanations:
  - Active choice counteracts procrastination
  - Default offer Implicitexpert recommendation
    - Reduces the complexity of the decision
    - Increases confidence about saving something.
  - Acts of commission are psychologically costly
    - If deviate from default, can only blame self for a bad decision (regret).
  - Procrastination in changing from default
    - Put off paying decision-making costs (e.g., due to hyperbolic discounting).

### **Research Question**

- Can active choice/default interventions increase saving at tax time by low income households?
- Important to investigate because:
  - Potentially low cost intervention.
  - All evidence on defaults and savings is from 401(k)s
    - Defaults in that setting some particular features that are not easily implemented in all settings.
    - Are defaults still powerful without?
    - Do defaults address the cause of low saving among low-income households at tax time?

# **Our Paper**

- Exploits new federal initiative designed to encourage saving, allowing people to buy bonds with refund.
- Presumption is that this reduces transactions costs, helps counteract under-saving.
- Two conditions:
  - Baseline: Asked if they want to buy bonds or not.
  - Treatment: Automatically save, unless decide to opt out.

## Agenda

- Introduction/Motivation
- Experiment Procedure
- Data and Results
- Discussion

## Experiment

- Study population: Low-income tax filers at 8 VITA sites in Delaware and Montgomery counties.
- Experiment implemented by volunteer tax preparers during the tax preparation session.
- Eligible participants:
  - Positive refund amount
  - Receiving refund through direct deposit
- Filers also complete a "site survey" (demographic info., etc.) at some point during their visit to the VITA site.

### **Experiment Procedure**

- Volunteer prepares taxes and calculates refund as usual.
- Once refund amount is calculated, preparer checks to see if filer is using <u>direct deposit</u> to receive refund.
- If client is using direct deposit, preparer introduces Your Refund/Savings-Bond Worksheet.
- To ensure random assignment, worksheets are in a tear-off pad that alternates between T and C versions.
- Within-preparer randomization.

### **Experiment Procedure**

- Preparer takes the worksheet off the top of the pad.
- Fills in required information and hands it to the client...

### **Baseline Version of Worksheet**



### **Treatment Version of Worksheet**



# The Nudge

- The treatment condition captures key mechanisms believed to drive default effects:
  - Reduces complexity/uncertainty by offering an implicit recommendation of a good amount to save.
  - Individual can "blame the recommendation" rather than themselves if this is a mistake (reduces potential regret).
  - Treatment harnesses "status quo bias", fundamental tendency to go with status quo.
- One feature typical of 401(k) defaults is notably missing:
  - People feel less nervous going with the default because they can change at any time; but almost never get around to changing...
  - Tax preparation setting dictates our treatment, where people must commit to the default on the spot.
  - Many other policy relevant settings may have same constraint.

### Site Survey

ns survey was provided to every clien ture. All responses will remain anony	t at this VITA site. It was designed to help us improve our services in the mous. Contact information for follow up is optional.
TE:	DATE:
UESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEH	DLD:
1: HOW DID YOU HAVE YOUR	TAXES DONE LAST YEAR?
: Here	5: Paid someone and got an instant refund
: Another free place like this	6: Paid someone without getting an instant refund
: Did my own	7: Did not file last year
Family or friend did them for free	8: Have never filed before
2: DO YOU HAVE A BANK ACC	OUNT?
30: Checking & Savings	NO: No, not interested
CH: Checking	NB: No, but would like one
A: Saving	
3: HOUSING:	
: I own my home and have a mortgage	5: I live with someone else
: I own my home without a mortgage	6: I live in a dorm or group setting
: I rent a home or apartment	7: I am currently homeless
I live with my family	8: I own my home, but my mortgage is delinquent
4: WHO HAS HEALTH COVER	AGE IN YOUR FAMILY? (SELECT ONE)
: Me only	<ol><li>Me and my children only</li></ol>
: My spouse only	<ol><li>My spouse and my children only</li></ol>
My children only	7: All of us
Me and my spouse only	S: No one
5: WHAT BILLS ARE GIVING	YOU THE MOST TROUBLE NOW? (Select One)
.: Past-due utility bills	5: Car Ioan 6: Mortrage or back rent
- Davday loan	<ol> <li>Health-insurance</li> </ol>
Back child support	8: Not having any trouble
Medical bills	· ···, ······
6: DID YOU RECEIVE PUBLIC	BENEFITS (such as Food Stamps, TANF, Medicaid, subsidized
ousing) in 2009?	
: Yes	3: No, but I am interested in
Don't recall	<ol> <li>No, not interested</li> </ol>
7: HAVE YOU DONE ANY OF T	THE FOLLOWING IN THE PAST YEAR? (Circle all that apply)
Put money in a savings account	<ol> <li>Used a check casher (instead of bank/credit union)</li> <li>Wind means to a friend or funith meansher</li> </ol>
Fut modey in a retirement account Saved money with someone other	<ol> <li>when money to a ment or family member</li> <li>Used a nandar loan</li> </ol>
than a bank or credit union	8: Used direct deposit for a paycheck
Used a money order to nay hills	9: None of the above

Cheater Microanterpise Partnership/Widener SBDC Obsets: Foldwich Canter Community Arthouses (Company) Community Arthouses (Company) Destrophysics of Delaware Valley Darty Borugh Community Development Corporation Dalco Family Contines Pathways PA WVCA Cheater United Way of Southeast Palleware County United Way of Southeast Palleware A

Educational Paralele	Fillenciel Ferdiolo
US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Stakeholder, Pertnerships, Education & Communication (SPEC) PHENND Swarthmore College Villanova University Vildener University	Franklin Mint Federal Credit Unior Citizens Bank

Q8: WHAT IS YOUR TAX FILING 1: Single 2: Single with dependents 3: Married filing jointly	STATUS? 4: Married filing separately 5: Qualified widow or widower				
Q9: ARE YOU USING DIRECT DEPOSIT TO RECEIVE YOUR REFUND? 1: Yes, and have used direct deposit before 2: Yes, this is my first time using direct deposit 3: No					
QUESTIONS FOR THE PRIMARY	EARNER:				
Q10: GENDER 1: Male	2: Female				
Q11: IN WHAT YEAR WERE YOU	BORN?				
Q12: HOW MANY DEPENDENTS I	DID YOU CLAIM ON YOUR TAX RETURN?				
Q13: HOW MANY OF THESE DEP	ENDENTS WERE CHILDREN UNDER 19?				
Q14: WHICH ONE OF THESE BES FT: Full-time	T DESCRIBES YOUR CURRENT WORK STATUS? PT: Part-time				
Q15: WHICH ONE OF THESE BES	T DESCRIBES YOUR OCCUPATION?				
1: Executive or manager	6: Service worker				
2: Professional	7: Production operative or laborer				
3: Technician	8: Construction, installation, or repair craft worker				
4: Sales worker	9: Transportation				
5: Administrative support	10: Other				
O16: HICHEST LEVEL OF EDUCA	TION COMPLETED:				
1: Loss than high school or GPD	5: Four year dama (Bachalam)				
2: High School or GED	5: Four-year degree (Bachelors) 6: Some graduate school				
3: Some college of tech school	7: Graduate derree				
4: Two-year degree (Associates)	1. Granne were				
Q17: RACE/ETHNICITY:					
AA: African American	LA: Hispanic or Latino/a				
NA: Native American/Hawaiian	CA: Caucasian				
AS: Asian/Pacific Islander	OT: Other				
HOW DID YOU HEAR ABOUT THI 1: I came here hast year 2: Radio or TV ad 3: I saw a flyer or something in the paper 4: I walked by	S PLACE? (Circle all that apply) 5: Friend or family member 6: Some else told me 7: Not sure				
I would like someone to call me to CONFIDENTIALLY follow up on my survey answers:					
Name:					

Phone Number: \_\_\_\_\_-



BACK

**DelCoAD** 

### Buy a U.S. Savings Bond with some of your refund



- Easy & No Fees Competitive Rate
- Low Minimum
   Safe & Secure
- Start with as little as \$50.00

"I used some of my tax refund to buy a savings bond."

Spend

oome

You decide what to save and what to spend!

If you use direct deposit, you can buy savings bonds today!

#### Easy & No Fees You decide what to save and what Save Safe & Secure to spend! ome Low Minimum Competitive Rate penc If you use direct deposit, Some Start with as little as \$50. you can buy bonds today!

### Buying a U.S. Savings Bond with some of your refund

#### Easy:

Buy <u>today</u> using part of your tax refund, for as little as \$50. Saves you a trip to the bank and adds to your savings today.

### Safe:

Savings protected by U.S. Government. If lost or stolen, you can get a replacement bond.

#### Fast:

You receive your paper bond in the mail within a few weeks.

#### Smart:

Pays more interest than many savings accounts and involves no fees.

### Long-Term:

A \$50 bond is worth \$50 today and is worth far more later! Helps achieve long-term goals like education or retirement. Must be held for a minimum of 1 year before it can be cashed.

#### Portable:

May be cashed at most banks and credit unions, even if you do not have an account there.

### Saving Part of Your Refund with Series I U.S. Savings Bonds



#### Easy:

Buy <u>today</u> using part of your tax refund, for as little as \$50. Saves you a trip to the bank and adds to your savings today.

#### Safe:

Savings protected by U.S. Government. If lost or stolen, you can get a replacement bond.

### Fast:

You receive your paper bond in the mail within a few weeks.

#### Smart:

Pays more interest than many savings accounts (3.36%) and involves no fees.

### Long-Term:

Pays interest for up to 30 years. Helps achieve long-term goals like education or retirement. Must be held for a minimum of 1 year before it can be cashed.

#### Portable:

May be cashed at most banks and credit unions, regardless of whether you have an account there.

# **Maximizing Preparer Fidelity**

- Randomization within preparers → crucial that preparers implement each version according to design
- Preparer training:
  - Introduce worksheet with suggested language; no reference to savings bonds.
  - Allow filer time to read and complete worksheet; help if needed but stick to reading script on worksheet.
  - Answer questions using Savings Bond FAQ sheet.
  - Do not offer advice, sales pitch, over-emphasize opt out, et cetera.
- Continuous monitoring by members of research team.

# Minimizing Chances of Contamination

- Possibility #1: Filers overhear/see another filer receiving the other presentation of savings bond decision.
  - At several sites, filing stations were private cubicles without much potential for overhearing.
  - At <u>all</u> sites, tax preparation sessions began at staggered times and took different amounts of time to reach the savings bond decision.
  - Tax filers did not appear to pay attention to other filing sessions.
- Possibility #2: Filers see the other version of the worksheet during their own tax prep session.
  - Each worksheet pad was kept inside a brown folder.
  - Preparer instructed to remove top sheet from pad and replace pad in folder before proceeding.

### Data

- 259 tax filing sessions at 8 VITA sites.
- Experiment ran from February 1 April 15.
- Average AGI of filers = approx. \$18,000.
- Approximately 10-15% have some missing demographic data.
- Also conducted a retrospective survey of tax preparers; matched to tax filers' data.

• Treatment effect on Savings Bond participation?



Point estimates for participation rates are essentially identical.

- C.I. allows for <u>maximum</u> possible treatment difference of 8 percentage points, only about 1/5 the size of 401(k) effects.

• Treatment effect on amount of Savings Bonds purchased?



- <u>No effect</u> of the treatment on take-up of savings bonds.
- Does treatment affect <u>amount</u> of bonds purchased (i.e., is there an effect on the intensive margin)?
  - Conditional on purchasing bonds, does treatment have a positive effect on amount purchased?
     No (Tobit and OLS regression results both confirm)
  - Conditional on purchasing bonds, does treatment make it more likely that filer chooses his/her "default" amount?
     Not really (see next slide)



Figure 1: Bonds Purchased Minus 10% Default, by Treatment Status

• What <u>does</u> affect participation in savings bonds?

What <u>does</u> affect participation in savings bonds? 

Filing during month of April  $\rightarrow$  positive and significant ( $\approx$ .15)

- $\rightarrow$  positive and significant effect ( $\approx$ .10). Race = Black
- Female\*(Dependents>0)  $\rightarrow$  positive and significant effect ( $\approx$ .20).
- Complying tax preparer  $\rightarrow$  positive and significant ( $\approx$ .08)

Suggests looking more closely for heterogeneous treatment effects.

But no evidence of an effect, any way you slice it...

# Conclusions

### • Key Findings

Default manipulation appears not to have had any significant effect on tax filers' decisions regarding savings bonds.

- No treatment effect at extensive margin (savings bonds participation).
- No treatment effect at intensive margin (bonds purchased, conditional on participation).
- No treatment effect
  - by month of filing
  - among subgroups of tax filers
  - among filers with "complying" or "enthusiastic" preparers

Participation rate also very low in Baseline, suggestive that active choice has little impact.

## Conclusions

- Further research is needed to sort out what elements of defaults are important.
- Why might it be particularly hard to induce saving by low income filers at tax time?
  - Particularly strong decision biases, or costs.
  - Or people opt out of default because the default does what it's supposed to, and allows people to do the optimal thing?
    - But other indications that financial decisions of low income (also 401(k) holders) not perfectly rational, well-informed?
- Further discussion on whether encouraging savings out of tax refund is a good policy goal.

Thank You!

## Informing Filers about Savings Bonds

- Wanted to ensure that filers were sufficiently informed about U.S. Savings Bonds before they were presented with the savings decision.
- Decorated sites with numerous posters and flyers, including a Spanish-language version.
- Framed flyer at each tax prep station so filer could read during "dead time" and refer to when presented with the savings decision.

### Buying a U.S. Savings Bond with some of your refund



- **Easy:** Buy today using part of your tax refund, for as little as \$50. Saves a trip to the bank and adds to your savings today.
- <u>Safe:</u> Savings protected by U.S. Government. If lost or stolen, you can get a replacement bond.
- Fast: Receive your paper bond in the mail within a few weeks.
- <u>Smart:</u> Pays more interest than many savings accounts and involves no fees.
- Long-Term: A \$50 bond is worth \$50 today and is worth far more later! Helps achieve long-term goals like education or retirement. (Must be held for at least 1 year before it can be cashed.)

**Portable:** May be cashed at most banks and credit unions, even if you do not have an account there.

### Compre un Bono de Ahorro Nacional de EEUU con parte de su reembolso



*¡Usted decida lo que quiere ahorrar y lo que debe gastar!* 

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Federal Refund Amount (\$)	1905.60	(2013.90)
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) (\$)	17990.30	(14382.40)
Amount of Savings Bonds Purchased (\$)	9.27	(37.50)
Any Savings Bonds Purchased?	0.093	(0.291)
Treatment	0.456	(0.499)
Female	0.683	(0.466)
Sex Missing	0.085	(0.279)
Age	36.9	(21.6)
Age Missing	0.131	(0.338)
Black	0.444	(0.498)
Race Missing	0.108	(0.311)
Less than High School Education	0.154	(0.362)
Completed High School or GED	0.375	(0.485)
Some College / Associates Degree	0.363	(0.482)
Bachelor's Degree or Higher	0.108	(0.311)
Filing Status Single	0.571	(0.496)
Filing Status Missing	0.120	(0.325)
Any Dependents	0.517	(0.501)
Any Dependents Missing	0.139	(0.347)
Having Trouble with Any Bills?	0.772	(0.420)
Plans to Save Some of Refund? (N=90)	0.156	(0.364)

### Table 1: Mean Characteristics of Low-Income Tax Filers in Sample

Number of Observations

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Federal Refund (thousands)	0.0175	0.0170	0.0161	0.0172	-0.0033	-0.0058
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.027)
AGI (thousands)	-0.0015	-0.0014	-0.0009	-0.0010	0.0004	0.0006
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female		-0.0037	-0.0047	0.0108	0.0021	-0.0110
		(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.095)	(0.107)	(0.117)
Age		0.0003	0.0004	0.0003	0.0005	0.0000
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Black		0.0618	0.0442	0.0444	0.0750	0.0733
		(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.079)	(0.086)
Any Dependents			0.0882	0.1256	0.0449	0.0438
			(0.090)	(0.157)	(0.185)	(0.199)
HS/GED Completer			-0.1072	-0.1093	-0.1206	-0.1557
-			(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.144)
Some College/Associates Degree			-0.1152	-0.1152	-0.1176	-0.1585
			(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.143)	(0.150)
Bachelors Degree			-0.1098	-0.1135	-0.1297	-0.1492
			(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.168)	(0.172)
Filing Status Single			0.0795	0.0798	0.0871	0.0798
			(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.104)
Female with Dependents				-0.0510	0.0973	0.1044
				(0.174)	(0.206)	(0.220)
Preparer: Savings Bonds a Good Idea					-0.1345	-0.1437
					(0.237)	(0.245)
Site dummies?	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	259	259	259	259	195	195
R-squared	0.006	0.011	0.031	0.031	0.049	0.059

### Table 2: Treatment-Control Balance Results of Regressions of Treatment Status Indicator on Observable Characteristics

Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Note: All regressions also included controls for missing age, race, education, dependent, or filing status information. None of the coefficients on these variables was statistically significant.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Treatment	-0 0054	0 0005	-0.0116	-0.0069	-0.0056	-0 0104	-0.0043	-0 0119	-0 0111	-0 0110	-0.0118
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Federal Refund (thousands)	0.0208**	0.0582***	0.0162*	0.0097	0.0057	0.0077	0.0421*	0.0069	0.0034	0.0106	0.0059
	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
AGI (thousands)	-0.0014	-0.0022	-0.0009	-0.0008	-0.0005	-0.0006	-0.0009	-0.0006	-0.0004	-0.0010	-0.0007
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female			0.0240	0.0170	-0.0383	0.0156	-0.0551	0.0157	-0.0434	0.0004	-0.0658
			(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.058)
Sex Missing			-0.1617	-0.1660	-0.2187	-0.2089	-0.2737*	-0.2022	-0.2605*	-0.2310	-0.2909**
			(0.133)	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.146)
Age			-0.0009	-0.0009	-0.0008	-0.0012	-0.0007	-0.0012	-0.0011	-0.0016	-0.0015
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age Missing			0.0897	0.1489	0.1465	0.1713	0.1822	0.1427	0.1408	0.1726	0.1443
			(0.094)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.114)
Black			0.0999***	0.1002**	0.0993**	0.1147***	0.1169***	0.1112***	0.1114***	0.1173***	0.1148***
			(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Race Missing			0.0711	0.0851	0.1106	0.0954	0.1162	0.0967	0.1202	0.0954	0.1230
Any Dependents			(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Any Dependents				0.0323	-0.1015	0.0427	-0.1320	0.0445	-0.0916	0.0421	-0.1090
Any Dependente Missing				0.1614	(0.089)	(0.053)	(0.093)	(0.053)	(0.092)	(0.053)	(0.091)
Any Dependents Missing				-0.1014	-0.1000	-0.1003	-0.1056	-0.1555	-0.1566	-0.1703	-0.1609
HS/GED Completer				0.100	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.100)	0.101)		-0.0100	(0.099)
113/GED Completer				(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.0703)	(0.0012	(0.071)	(0.0099)	-0.0109	-0.0090
Some College/Associates Degr				0.0118	0.070)	-0.0133	-0.0191	-0.0124	-0.0136	-0.0151	-0.0159
Some Conege/Associates Degre				(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.0724)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Bachelors Degree				-0.0145	-0.0012	-0.0280	-0.0115	-0.0350	-0.0182	-0.0238	-0.0119
Bachelors Begree				(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.0200	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Filing Status Single				-0.0016	-0.0027	-0.0002	-0.0020	0.0039	0.0015	0.0023	0.0030
				(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Filing Status Missing				0.1046	0.1059	0.1183	0.1144	0.1351	0.1398	0.1124	0.1326
3				(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Federal Refund Squared		-4.40E-09**		( )	( )	( )	-4.07E-09*	( )	( )	( <i>'</i>	· · ·
·		(2.13E-09)					(2.26E-09)				
AGI Squared		5.32E-06					,				
		(4.55E-05)									
Female with Dependents					0.1819*		0.2040**		0.1817*		0.2041**
					(0.098)		(0.100)		(0.101)		(0.101)
Complying Tax Preparer								0.0883**	0.0800*		0.0688
								(0.043)	(0.043)		(0.043)
March										0.0206	0.0238
										(0.043)	(0.043)
April										0.1520***	0.1532***
										(0.058)	(0.058)
Site Dummies?	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	259	259	259	259	259	259	259	259	259	259	259
K-squared	0.022	0.038	0.064	0.078	0.091	0.104	0.131	0.120	0.132	0.131	0.159

#### Table 3: Effect of Default on Savings Bond Participation Among Low-Income Tax Filers (Results from LPM/OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment - February	0.0291	0.0373	0.0262	0.0311	0.0278	0.0215	0.0294	0.0129	0.0113
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Treatment - March	-0.0313	-0.0254	-0.0415	-0.0396	-0.0385	-0.0396	-0.0354	-0.0374	-0.0377
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Treatment - April	0.0108	0.0127	0.0057	0.0212	0.0306	0.0025	0.0102	0.0111	0.0172
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.096)
March	0.0181	0.0150	0.0283	0.0333	0.0398	0.0482	0.0514	0.0383	0.0464
April	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.000)	(0.054)	(U.U30) 0.4506**	(0.000) 0.1671**	(0.000)	(0.000) 0.1505**
Арпі	0.1277	0.1200	0.1323	0.1203	(0.074)	(0.076)	0.1071	0.1422	0.1303
Federal Refund (thousands)	0.072)	0.0607***	0.0188**	0.0136	0.0094	0.0112	0.073)	0.0103	0.0065
	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)
AGI (thousands)	-0.0019	-0.0025	-0.0013	-0.0013	-0.0010	-0.0011	-0.0013	-0.0011	-0.0008
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	· · ·	. ,	0.0106	0.0047	-0.0554	-0.0022	-0.0799	-0.0003	-0.0673
			(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.058)
Sex Missing			-0.1775	-0.1786	-0.2357	-0.2369	-0.3092**	-0.2281	-0.2954**
			(0.132)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.146)
Age			-0.0011	-0.0011	-0.0010	-0.0016	-0.0010	-0.0015	-0.0014
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age Missing			0.0906	0.1520	0.1464	0.1781	0.1887	0.1534	0.1499
Dia al-			(0.094)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.115)
Віаск			0.0961**	0.0982**	0.0977**	0.11//***	0.1201	0.1138***	0.1148***
Race Missing			0.0633	0.039	0 1058	0.040)	( <b>0.040)</b> 0.1130	0.040)	( <b>0.040)</b> 0.1102
Nace Missing			(0.106)	(0 110)	(0 111)	(0 111)	(0 110)	(0.110)	(0 110)
Any Dependents			(0.100)	0.0206	-0.1242	0.0370	-0.1523*	0.0396	-0.1133
				(0.052)	(0.089)	(0.053)	(0.092)	(0.053)	(0.092)
Any Dependents Missing				-0.1647*	-0.1634*	-0.1758*	-0.1740*	-0.1617	-0.1660*
				(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.100)
HS/GED Completer				0.0135	0.0233	-0.0117	0.0004	-0.0161	-0.0078
				(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Some College/Associates Degree				0.0185	0.0193	-0.0151	-0.0211	-0.0131	-0.0147
				(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Bachelors Degree				-0.0055	0.0083	-0.0251	-0.0068	-0.0294	-0.0115
Filing Status Cingle				(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Filing Status Single				-0.0025	-0.0047	0.0000	-0.0020	0.0044	0.0011
Filing Status Missing				0.1049)	0.1055	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
				(0 1040	(0 100)	(0.102)	(0 101)	(0 102)	(0 101)
Federal Refund Squared		-0.0000**		(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.102)	-0.0000*	(0.102)	(0.101)
		(0.000)					(0.000)		
AGI Squared		0.0000					()		
•		(0.000)							
Female with Dependents		. ,			0.1973**		0.2233**		0.2047**
					(0.099)		(0.100)		(0.101)
Complying Tax Preparer								0.0779*	0.0677
								(0.043)	(0.043)
						Ň	X	X	N/
Site Dummies?	NO 0 7004	NO 0 70 47	NO 0.0007	NO 0.0500	NO 0.0550	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PIOD > F (F-lest: IEDXI=MARXI=APRXI)	0.7381	0.7247	0.0827	0.0509	0.0552	0.7435	0.7095	0.7960	0.7850
R-squared	0.047	0.064	0.089	0.102	0.117	0,133	0.163	0.145	0.160

#### Table 4: Effect of Default on Savings Bond Participation Among Low-Income Tax Filers, by Month of Filing (Results from LPM/OLS Regressions; standard errors in parentheses)

#### Table 5: Effect of Default on Savings Bond Participation among Subgroups of Low-Income Tax Filers (Results from LPM/OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses)

	(1) Full Occurrents	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variable	Full Sample	Віаск	NOT BIACK	Female	Male
Treatment	-0.0104	-0.0064	0.0023	-0.0046	0.0788
	(0.037)	(0.074)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.078)
Observations	259	115	116	177	60
R-squared	0.104	0.104	0.138	0.143	0.360

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Dependents	No Dependents	High School or Less	Some College or More	Single Filer <sup>a</sup>	Not a Single Filer
Variable						
Treatment	-0.0383	0.0632	0.0140	-0.0395	0.0053	0.0981
	(0.074)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.081)
Observations	98	125	114	122	148	80
R-squared	0.214	0.136	0.173	0.127	0.083	0.275

	(12)	(13) ACL - Median	(14) Refund - Median	(15) Refund a Modian	(16) No Bill Trouble	(17) Bill Trouble
Variable	AGI > Median	AGI < Median	Refund > Median	Refund < Median		
Treatment	0.0057	-0.0578	0.0265	0.0174	-0.0078	0.0057
	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.043)
Observations	129	130	129	130	64	195
R-squared	0.160	0.231	0.216	0.090	0.457	0.136

Note:

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

All regressions include controls for refund, AGI, gender, age, race, filing status, dependents, educational attainment, and site dummies (i.e., model (6) in Table 3). <sup>a</sup>Single here is defined as filling status = 1 ("Single") and does not include "Single with dependents" (filing status=2) or "Qualified Widow/Widower" (filing status=5).

### Table 6: Effect of Default on Savings Bond Participation Among Low-Income Tax Filers, by Preparer Traits<br/>(Results from LPM/OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses)

Variables	(2) "Compliers" (Responded and followed protocol)	(3) Preparer Thought It Was a Good Idea for Filers to Purchase Savings Bonds
Treatment	-0.0321 (0.047)	-0.0741 (0.067)
Observations R-squared	192 0.144	124 0.224

#### Note:

All regressions include controls for refund, AGI, gender, age, race, filing status, dependents, educational attainment, and site dummies (model (6) in Table 3).

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

"We'll make it easier for people to save their federal tax refunds, which 100 million families receive. Today, if you have a retirement account, you can have your refund deposited directly into your account. With this change, we'll make it easier for those without retirement plans to save their refunds as well. You'll be able to check a box on your tax return to receive your refund as a savings bond."

- President Obama, Weekly Radio Address, Sept. 5, 2009