

Joint Publication 4-05



Joint Mobilization Planning



22 March 2010



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization, as well as some additional methods of force expansion, including use of volunteers and Presidential Reserve Call-up. It also provides the context for joint participation in the planning and programming activities undertaken within the Department of Defense, especially those activities aimed at the reconstitution of military capability to deter any future threat to national security.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lloyd J. Austin III". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

LLOYD J. AUSTIN III
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) 4-05, DATED 11 JANUARY 2006

- **Incorporates consolidated content from JP 4-05.1, *Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component Callup*, which will be discontinued upon publication of this revision**
- **Replaces the previous strategic national mobilization framework of graduated response with one that emphasizes maintaining a level of mobilization that is commensurate with the threat**
- **Adds “sustainability” as a mobilization tenet**
- **Eliminates brief discussion of “national direction and control” and “military command and control”**
- **Provides updated information on mobilization roles and responsibilities within Department of Defense (DOD)**
- **Reorganizes and updates the discussion of the twelve mobilization resource areas**
- **Discusses mobilization planning implications of the latest strategic policy and planning guidance documents, particularly Guidance for Employment of the Force, Guidance for Development of the Force, Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, and the DOD Master Mobilization Guide, and adds an explanation of mobilization reporting**
- **Adds “Restoring pre-positioning ships and embarked equipment and stores” as a new recovery planning activity, and includes a new section of mobilization planner demobilization responsibilities**
- **Revises Appendix B list of automated tools to include the Defense Readiness Reporting System and the Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System**
- **Adds annexes to Appendix C providing additional information and detail on the mobilization information management plan**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses Mobilization and the National Security Strategy**
 - **Describes the Objectives of Mobilization Tenets**
 - **Covers the Roles and Responsibilities of Mobilization Planning**
 - **Discusses the Resource Areas Required for Mobilization Planning**
 - **Discusses the Planning and Execution of Mobilization**
 - **Considers the Joint Planning and Execution of Demobilization**
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Overview

Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies.

Mobilization includes assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve Component (RC) (including federalizing the National Guard), extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. There are two implied processes: The military mobilization process and the national mobilization process.

Mobilization And National Security

The National Perspective.

The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy detail national objectives and interests. Implicit is the need to maintain and improve a capability to rapidly and efficiently mobilize forces and resources to respond to threats across the range of military operations.

Global Force Management.

Global Force Management is a process that integrates force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. It provides insights into the global availability of US forces and capabilities, and a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of assigning, apportioning, and allocating forces and capabilities among combatant commands. The two key components are: Consolidated force allocation under specific joint force providers, and a quarterly Global Force Management Board.

Total Force Policy.

The Total Force Policy guides mobilization planning and the development of procedures for the employment of reserve military power. Military retirees, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and force multipliers (e.g., employer and community support) are also considered.

The Joint Military Perspective.

Mobilization and demobilization in joint planning and operations rely upon the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System as the principal system for translating policy decisions into operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives.

Mobilization Tenets

Tenets of Mobilization.

There are five mobilization tenets: objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability.

Objective.

Joint operations are directed toward clearly defined objectives. Planning for joint operations provides the basis for determining the role mobilization is required to play in order to achieve the objectives.

Timeliness.

Timely mobilization of resources is essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place, and to seizing and maintaining the initiative.

Unity of Effort.

Unity of effort in mobilization demands the integrated efforts of the nation's military and supporting resource areas toward achievement of common objectives.

Flexibility.

Flexibility is needed to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war.

Sustainability.

Mobilization sustainability is the ability to continuously provide logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion.

Roles And Responsibilities

<i>Office of the Secretary of Defense.</i>	Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) assists the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in managing mobilization by developing implementing guidance, and compiles reports on the costs of military operations.
<i>Joint Planning and Execution Community.</i>	The joint planning and execution community collectively plans for mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces.
<i>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.</i>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) prepares integrated plans for mobilization, establishes planning relationships, develops mobilization options and recommendations, general strategic guidance on industrial mobilization programs, monitors the status of mobilization and prepares required reports.
<i>The Joint Staff.</i>	The Joint Staff supports CJCS in integrating the mobilization plans of the Military Departments and DOD agencies, with the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate as the focal point.
<i>Combatant Commanders.</i>	Combatant commanders (CCDRs) organize and employ assigned and attached forces, are principally responsible for preparing OPLANs and OPORDs, and participate in developing strategies and plans; as part of operational planning, they determine mobilization requirements and schedules.
<i>Military Departments and United States Coast Guard.</i>	The Military Departments provide forces and logistic support to the CCDRs as directed by SecDef. Unless transferred to the Department of the Navy in time of war, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is under control of the Secretary of Homeland Security (SECHS). USCG units under SECHS may be assigned to a CCDR with the approval of SECHS. The Military Departments and the USCG provide trained forces to the CCDRs, prepare detailed mobilization plans identifying the forces and support to be provided and execute mobilization.
<i>Department of Defense Agencies.</i>	Five DOD agencies, referred to as combat support agencies, support joint military mobilization:

- Defense Information Systems Agency. Participates in communications system mobilization planning, collects and analyzes telecommunications requirements from these planning activities, and develops mobilization plans.
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Based on the Services' mobilization plans, develops plans to support the Military Departments and other customers with DLA-managed materiel and services.
- Defense Contract Management Agency.
- Provides worldwide contract management services.
- Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
- Helps to develop financial management annexes to OPLANs, develops guidance on personnel pay, and ensures financial systems support to mobilization.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).
- In peacetime, develops mobilization plans to ensure geospatial intelligence support to joint forces in crisis and war. In crisis and war, NGA executes plans for increased data collection and increased production and distribution of its products.

Joint Deployment Process Owner and the Distribution Process Owner.

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, is the DOD focal point to improve joint deployment processes. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), as the Distribution Process Owner, supports USJFCOM and other joint force providers in planning and execution of mobilization, and provides the strategic distribution capability to move forces and materiel.

Mobilization Planner.

The mobilization planner assists DOD, Service, and joint agencies in assigning the task of developing and promulgating policies and procedures to activate and deactivate RC personnel under peacetime and crisis response conditions.

Resource Areas

Twelve Resource Areas.

Military mobilization requires assembly and organization of resources in twelve interdependent areas: legal authorities, funding, environment, manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support (HSS), communications, and host-nation

support (HNS). Activity in any one area may have an influence on each of the others.

Enabling Resources.

Commanders and mobilization planners consider the impact of mobilization on the environment as well as requirements of legal authorities and funding to enable the timely execution of mobilization activities. These three areas are known as enabling resources.

Legal Authorities.

A range of legal authorities enable or limit mobilization and emergency actions. Many of these authorities are available to the President in any level of emergency; others only with a declaration of national emergency. Still others are reserved by Congress. Statutes providing emergency authority specify the level of emergency at which they can be invoked and action required to invoke them.

Funding.

To facilitate mobilization for unplanned military operations, it is necessary to ensure that sufficient funding is available for known obligations.

Environment.

The US has a substantial framework of environmental laws. Awareness of environmental issues, requirements, and liabilities or penalties associated with noncompliance mandate identification and resolution of environmental issues that affect mobilization.

Manpower.

Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime Active Component military end strength. Sources of manpower include members of the RC, military retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service (NPS) personnel who volunteer. In addition to the call-up of manpower from reserve and retiree manpower pools, three other actions can be taken to ensure adequate manpower during mobilization: stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution. Civilian manpower to include government service employees and contractors also must be carefully managed.

Materiel and Equipment.

This resource area includes all classes of supply. Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities grouped under two major tasks: increasing the availability of materiel and equipment, and alleviating shortages.

Transportation.

Transportation resources are required to support mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations. These assets move units and equipment. Often, these units are mobilized early to support deployment, which in turn may impact manpower resources.

Facilities.

DOD uses a wide variety of facilities to house, train, equip, and support personnel and to provide storage, maintain equipment, and conduct operations. Bases, depots, medical facilities, airfields, and seaports are examples. Facilities that can support increased workloads during mobilization are obtained from commercial facilities; unused and standby capacity at existing facilities; and new capacity developed on property acquired. Options for expanding facilities include reopening unused capacity, initiating emergency military construction projects to increase capacity at existing facilities, and acquisition of new facilities. Facilities expansion may impact other resource areas such as manpower.

Industrial Base.

The US industrial base includes commercial and government-owned production facilities. Foreign producers of essential components, parts, and ammunition are included, as foreign producers may be the only source for certain items. The Canadian defense industry is recognized as part of a single North American defense industrial base. Accelerated production or industrial base expansion may affect a number of the other resource areas.

Training Base.

The Services expand their training bases to train NPS personnel, and to provide reclassification and refresher training for those who need it. Training base output requirements are determined and compared to available capacity. If there is a shortfall, additional capacity is added by mobilizing additional assets, hiring civilian employees and/or obtaining contractor support. Each option impacts other resource areas, such as manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, HSS, and funding.

Health Service Support.

Theater, continental United States (CONUS), and aeromedical evacuation HSS are expanded to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute casualties. HSS

requirements are determined from decisions establishing the theater medical support, theater patient evacuation, and force health protection policies. Factors such as casualty rates, transportation resources, and help determine the theater HSS required. Expanding HSS may burden the manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, HNS, and legal resource areas.

Communications.

The US military uses its own communications systems to execute many requirements, but frequently relies upon commercial providers for administrative support needs. The President has authority during national emergency or war to regulate and control telecommunications resources, allowing for measures to ensure the operation and security of telecommunications services. DOD's Global Information Grid assets support DOD, and in times of crisis or war, assets supporting other departments and agencies of the US Government, may be made available. Expanding capacity in this area would likely have minimal impact on other areas.

Host-Nation Support.

Manpower, equipment, facilities, and services provided by host or allied nations can offset requirements US military resources. There are a number of agreements with allied nations and various means to create new HNS support arrangements as required. Implementing HNS agreements primarily will impact the providing nation's or nations' resource areas.

Mobilization Planning And Execution

Mobilization plans.

Mobilization plans support CCDRs' OPLANs, concept plans, OPORDs, and campaign plans, and prepared by the Military Departments and DOD agencies. They reflect requirements for force expansion and expansion of the CONUS base to sustain the mobilized force for as long as necessary. Mobilization plans explain how to accomplish force and resource expansion, and are carefully integrated among participants and the twelve resource areas.

Mobilization Planning and Operation Plans.

The Guidance for Development of the Force, Guidance for Employment of Force, and DOD Master Mobilization Plan provide SecDef guidance for

mobilization planning. The CJCS amplifies this guidance to facilitate the Military Departments and CCDRs in preparing mobilization plans that support OPLANs.

Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans.

A campaign plan has important implications for mobilization planners. Strategic objectives, force levels, and time constraints are key elements of information for executing mobilization planning and initiating force and resource expansion options.

Mobilization Estimate of the Situation.

A commander's estimate of the situation provides a logical process by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision on a course of action to accomplish the mission. A staff estimate is similar, producing a conclusion or recommendation for the commander. The mobilization estimate applies the staff estimate concept to mobilization planning.

Mobilization Planning During Contingency Planning.

During peacetime, mobilization planners participate in two main activities: maintaining a mobilization base and participating in contingency planning to develop detailed mobilization plans to support OPLANs.

Mobilization Decisions and Orders.

CJCS recommends to SecDef the assets to be called up and their planned use when RC forces are mobilized. SecDef must approve the execution of a mobilization OPORD. After the President's approval, SecDef directs the Military Departments to proceed. The Services publish mobilization orders, and OSD may issue implementation instructions and provide additional policy guidance. Some mobilization actions require the notification of Congress.

Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization.

Accurate and timely information on the status and progress of mobilization is needed at all levels. Information in each of the resource areas is analyzed and coordinated with other resource area proponents to provide recommendations for controlling, replanning, redirecting, or stopping mobilization.

Mobilization Reporting.

Reporting involves extracting information that is obtained from monitoring and providing the data to appropriate organizations. There are formal and informal reporting requirements. Formal requirements

are specified in statutes or directives, and three formal reports are generated: RC requirements from each OPLAN which lists RC requirements; the mobilization report; and (during partial mobilization) the President's report to Congress.

Subjects of Required Reporting.

Four subjects require reporting:

- Problems in providing forces;
- RC forces no longer required;
- Mobilization information to Joint Staff Director of Operations as required; and
- Demobilization schedules.

Joint Demobilization Planning And Execution

Demobilization.

Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a conflict situation or wartime military establishment and defense-based economy to a peacetime mode while maintaining national security and economic vitality.

Demobilization and National Security.

From a national perspective, the results of a successful demobilization process put the nation in a position to respond to future security challenges. Policies should be established to regulate the pace of demobilization and retain the military capability required to ensure post-conflict national security commitments.

Demobilization Planning Guidelines.

Lessons from past wars and mobilizations suggest the following demobilization guidelines:

- Mission First. Demobilization plans support the post-conflict mission as it evolves;
- Begin Planning Early. Soon after mobilization starts;
- Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies. Coordinate within and outside DOD, and have public information programs.

Planning Considerations.

The following apply to demobilization planning:

- Demobilizing the Armed Forces may range from a simple return of mobilized personnel and units to previous status, to a broader process of deactivating units and reorganizing; similar considerations apply to a demobilization of defense industry;
- Recovery activities must be planned along with demobilization;
- Demobilization planning is accomplished at the

national, theater and supporting levels; and

- The key to military demobilization is the supported geographic CCDR.

Recovery Planning.

Recovery planning is coordinated with demobilization planning, and includes reset actions in the theater and CONUS to restore force readiness and capability to respond, in the short term, to a future threat.

Beginning Demobilization.

Demobilization can begin before the end of the crisis or war but most such activity will begin after the conflict. Demobilization is mainly a Military Department responsibility, but the supported and supporting commanders help coordinate and synchronize. As with mobilization, assets in other resource areas are required to support the demobilization of manpower and equipment; but as support requirements decline, demobilization takes place in the other resource areas.

***Mobilization Planner
Demobilization
Responsibilities.***

Demobilization planning should occur during an operation and demobilization must be integrated into the redeployment, reflecting the post-conflict missions of supported commanders.

Preliminary Actions.

Preliminary actions primarily involve establishing and disseminating broad guidance that the mobilization community incorporates into mobilization plans.

***Demobilization Planning's
Two Subactivities.***

Demobilization planning is divided into two subactivities: plan the demobilization force and plan demobilization support required. This includes consideration of demobilization and redeployment activities and schedules.

Demobilization Execution.

Before demobilization starts, mobilization planners must ensure that a unit or individual will not be needed for the operation. During execution, mobilization planners constantly tailor the demobilization operation envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation.

Execution Tasks.

These tasks are inherent in demobilization execution:

- Educate the Leadership. Provide the decisionmakers with information, including the schedule of units and the number of personnel to be demobilized and units and personnel already demobilized;

- Review and Modify Demobilization Concepts and Support Plans. Monitor the existing plan to ensure accuracy and conformance to actual circumstances, and coordinate and update as needed;
- Monitor Changing Requirements and Theater Backfill Requirements. Demobilization is a fluid process, and planners continue to review changing operational requirements which may result in units' being demobilized or extended;
- Seek Demobilization Approval. The supported CCDR identifies units and individuals no longer required for operations in the redeployment plan;
- Develop Demobilization Schedule. Working closely with affected organizations and USTRANSCOM, the Services create a demobilization schedule;
- Monitor RC Mobilizations and Demobilizations. Planners track and report on RC units from the start of mobilization through demobilization;
- Highlight Critical Support Issues. By various communications means, the mobilization planner presents conflicts and critical issues to the leadership and the appropriate organizations for resolution.
- Terminate Legal Authorities. When demobilization is complete and RC forces no longer needed to support the operation, action is taken to terminate the legal authority by which RC forces were activated.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization, as well as some additional methods of force expansion, including use of volunteers and Presidential Reserve Call-up. It also provides the context for joint participation in the planning and programming activities undertaken within the DOD, especially those activities aimed at the reconstitution of military capability to deter any future threat to national security.

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CHAPTER I

MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

“The Congress shall have power . . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8

1. Introduction

a. **Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies.** Mobilization includes assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve Component (RC) (including federalizing the National Guard), extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. There are two processes implied in this description.

(1) The **military mobilization process** by which the nation’s Armed Forces are brought to an increased state of readiness.

(2) The **national mobilization process** of mobilizing the interdependent resource areas (see Chapter IV, "Resource Areas") to meet non-defense needs as well as sustaining the Armed Forces across the range of military operations.

b. From a national strategic perspective, the importance of a **responsive mobilization capability** to our national security is implicit in the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and its derivatives, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its strategies in a variety of operations. These operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and campaigns. The use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities shapes the operational environment and helps to keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. This chapter examines the relationship between mobilization and national security from both perspectives. It concludes with a discussion of demobilization, an essential first step toward maintaining national security after a crisis or war.

2. The National Perspective

a. **National Security Strategy.** As a nation, **the United States preserves its security by the judicious application of national power** to achieve national objectives derived from national interests. The President identifies national interests and objectives in the NSS of the United States. **National interests and objectives are the ends of our national security strategy.** The ways and means for achieving these ends are made apparent in broad terms by the President through the use of the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power. Programs for maintaining a strong national defense depend on our maintaining a strong economy, infrastructure, and viable network of multinational security alliances.

b. **National Defense Strategy.** **The NDS** outlines how the Department of Defense (DOD) will support the objectives outlined in the NSS, including the need to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against us, our allies, and our friends; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction; work with others to defuse regional conflicts, including conflict intervention; and transform national security institutions to face the challenges of the 21st century. The NDS acts on these objectives, evaluates the strategic environment, challenges, and risks we must consider in achieving them, and maps the way forward.

c. National Military Strategy

(1) **The National Military Strategy provides overarching policy for military objectives in support of the President’s National Security Strategy. Explicit in the military strategy is the assertion that we can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a total force** — a carefully tailored combination of Active Component (AC) and RC (including Retired Reserve), together with retired military personnel, DOD civilian employees, and DOD contractors. **Implicit in the military strategy is the need to maintain and improve the capability to rapidly and efficiently mobilize forces and resources** to respond to natural disaster challenges at the low end of the range of military operations and to deter or counter a broad spectrum of serious threats to our national security, such as threats to the homeland.

(2) Figure I-1 depicts a representative range of military commitments together with the levels of mobilization and emergency authorities available to the President when RC forces are needed for an appropriate response. **Congress has provided the President with a comprehensive menu of authorities for tailoring an appropriate response in a crisis.** Several of these are available without a declaration of national emergency. Others require Presidential or Congressional emergency declarations.

Detailed discussions of mobilization levels and emergency authorities are provided in Chapter IV, “Resource Areas,” and Chapter V, “Mobilization Planning and Execution.”

d. **Global Force Management**

(1) **Global Force Management (GFM) is a process that integrates force assignment, force apportionment, and force allocation.** It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of US military forces and capabilities, and provides senior decisionmakers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in assigning, apportioning, and allocating forces and capabilities among combatant commands. Two important attributes of GFM include being able to globally assess force sourcing risk in order to address mitigation options; and enabling global sourcing with the best force sourcing option, regardless of command, organization, or Service to which the force or personnel are assigned.

(2) There are **two key components to GFM:**

(a) Consolidated force allocation under specific joint force providers: US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) for conventional forces; US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for special operations forces and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) for mobility forces. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) acts as the joint functional manager for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and their associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination.



Figure I-1. Levels of Military Commitment

(b) A quarterly Global Force Management Board (GFMB), hosted by the Director of the Joint Staff and led by the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3), made up of general/flag officer representation from all joint force providers, combatant commands, and Services. The GFMB develops and provides strategic-level GFM guidance to enable the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to make proactive, informed force management decisions.

e. Force Sourcing—Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment

(1) Title 10, US Code (USC) delineates responsibilities for assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces. SecDef assigns forces/capabilities, allocates forces/capabilities, provides planning guidance to combatant commands, and provides overarching strategic guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

(2) **GFM’s primary role in supporting decisionmaking is its integration of the three processes of assignment, apportionment, and allocation.** This integration aligns operational forces against known apportionment and allocation requirements in advance of planning and deployment preparation timelines.

(3) The Unified Command Plan, Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum (Forces For), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), and Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, are the baseline documents that establish the policy and procedures in support of GFM. The CJCS issues Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), which further delineates GFM processes:

(a) Provides direction from SecDef regarding assignment of forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs);

(b) Includes the force/capabilities allocation process that provides access to all available military or Department of Defense resources to support combatant commands for both steady-state rotational requirements and requests for capabilities or forces in response to crises or emergent contingencies;

(c) Includes apportionment guidance provided in the JSCP; and

(d) Informs joint force, structure, and capability assessment processes.

(4) GFM informs DOD’s assessment processes by identifying sporadic or persistent under-sourced or hard-to-source forces/capabilities.

(5) USJFCOM focuses on the global allocation of combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities and forces to support combatant command requirements. USJFCOM uses GFMB-developed and approved guidance to recommend global sourcing solutions. Combatant commands, Military Departments, and the National Guard Bureau provide force/capability commitment, availability, and readiness data to

USJFCOM and its assigned Service components. Additionally, USJFCOM assesses the ability to sustain joint presence, operational commitments, and global surge capabilities over time based on allocation decision/actions in effect. Reporting on the readiness, disposition, and development of sourcing recommendations for forces/capabilities sourced by USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM will be coordinated by those combatant commands with the Services and other CCDRs to CJCS.

3. The Joint Military Perspective

a. **Total Force Policy.** The Total Force Policy is one **fundamental premise upon which our military force structure is built. Military retirees, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel,** and force multipliers (such as employer and community support considerations) are included under their umbrella to reflect the value of their contributions to our military capability. Total Force Policy guides thorough **mobilization planning** and the **development of procedures that are essential to the timely employment of reserve military power.** To further codify Total Force Policy, SecDef has issued a directive on managing the RC as an operational force.

b. **Mobilization and Demobilization in Joint Planning and Operations.** The **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEs)** is the principal system within DOD for translating policy decisions into operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. The joint operation planning process is an integral part of JOPEs, serving as an adaptive and collaborative tool in supporting contingency and crisis action planning (CAP).

Total Force Policy

The Total Force Policy was used during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and more recently, Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, which involved the largest mobilization and deployment of reserve forces since the Korean War. There was significant reliance on military retirees, Department of Defense civilian personnel, and contractor personnel for critical skills and performance of many essential tasks.

SOURCE: Various Sources

(1) Mobilization

(a) **The mobilization function includes activation** (order to active duty [other than for training] in the federal service) **of the RC, federalizing the National Guard, and surging and expanding the industrial base.** Figure I-2 illustrates levels of mobilization.




Figure I-2. Levels of Mobilization

(b) Because the most visible mobilization activity is the activation of RC members, there has been a tendency to focus planning on manpower issues. **Mobilization, however, involves much more than expanding and filling the military force with people.** The force must be equipped, trained, and sustained over time if it is to achieve and maintain its designed capability. Mobilization activities require the **support of the private sector (employers and community), DOD civilian workforce, and contractor support.** They also require **increased resources** in the areas of materiel, transportation, facilities, industrial production, training base capacity, health service support (HSS), and communications. Actions may be required to ensure continued compliance with, or obtain temporary waivers of environmental protection laws. Adequate funding and sufficient legal authorities are also required to initiate and sustain mobilization activities. **Mobilization, therefore, includes determining and satisfying**

demands for those resources required to support the total force during deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. Figure I-3 illustrates responsibilities associated with RC call-up decisionmaking.

RESERVE COMPONENT CALL-UP DECISIONMAKING							
Mobilization Planning Community	Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination	Educate Senior Leadership on RC Potential	Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Component	Confirm Pre-planned Mobilization Capabilities	Recommend Changes in Peacetime Budgeting Priorities	Mobility Demobilization Policy to Suit Contingency	Prepare Decision Packages
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify POC network Convene preliminary meetings focused on "what if" questions using current information Analyze lessons learned from similar crises Consider potential supporting requirements Manage media relations and coordinate with public affairs officer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct meetings and/or briefings on RC mobilization policies: availability, mobilization and deployment criteria, call-up procedures, and the different categories of RC and their potential use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review and modify call-up instructions and procedures Recommend modifications and exceptions to policy Coordinate with legal counsel Review policies and/or procedures for "conscientious objectors" and Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Estimate ability of mobilization activities to meet plan schedule Identify capability shortfalls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review unfunded mobilization requirements Coordinate with resource area proponents for adjustments to internal funding priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiate planning for the return of RC to civilian status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Respond to information requests as appropriate
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Become familiar with RC call-up procedures Review operation plan Be prepared to recommend level of call-up 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review legal authorities Review mobilization plans, policies, and procedures Brief leadership on call-up authorities and specific qualities of RC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify opportunities for joint use of Service mobilization assets Monitor development of RC deployment criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirm monitoring and reporting systems: coordinate reporting requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC demobilization facilities and assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare Draft Decision Package Staff Draft Decision Package with Services Forward Package to Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
POC – point of contact				RC – Reserve Component			

Figure I-3. Reserve Component Call-up Decisionmaking

(c) **Mobilization planning complements and supports joint operation planning.** It is accomplished primarily by the Services and their major subordinate commands based on SecDef guidance. It requires development of supporting plans by other federal agencies. Just as the Services mobilize their reserve organizations and individuals to augment military capability, **supporting federal agencies must oversee mobilization of the support base required to sustain the mobilized force.**

(d) The Joint Staff supports the CJCS in his role as principal military advisor to the President and SecDef; facilitates resolution of conflicts for scarce resources among the Services, CCDRs, and DOD agencies; provides input for resolution of claims for resources between the military and civil sectors in wartime; and oversees mobilization planning. To facilitate the CJCS's role in such mobilization matters, the mobilization working group (MWG) has been established. The MWG is chaired by the Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-4)/Division Chief for Sustainment, Mobilization, and Plans Division and is designed to enhance communications among the Office of the

MANAGING THE RESERVE COMPONENT AS AN OPERATIONAL FORCE

It is the Department of Defense policy that:

a. The Reserve Component (RC) provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict including under Title 10, US Code (USC), Sections 12301, 12302, 12304, and 12306.

b. The Active Component (AC) and RC are integrated as a total force based on the attributes of each component and its core competencies.

c. Homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities are total force missions. Unity of effort is maintained consistent with statutory responsibilities in operations involving federal forces and non-federalized National Guard forces with federal forces under federal command and control and non-federalized National Guard forces under state command and control.

d. The RC provides connection to and commitment of the American public.

e. The continuum of service is utilized to enhance the effectiveness of and sustain the all-volunteer force with flexible service options that are attractive to a broad population.

f. Utilization rules are implemented to govern frequency and duration of activations. Since expectation management is critical to the success of the management of the RC as an operational force, these rules enhance predictability and judicious and prudent use of the RC.

g. Voluntary duty, per Title 32, USC, Section 12301(d) and Title 32, USC, Section 502(f)(2) is encouraged to meet mission requirements.

h. The RC is resourced to meet readiness requirements per Title 10, USC, sections 3013, 5013, and 8013. RC resourcing plans shall ensure visibility to track resources from formulation, appropriation, and allocation through execution.

i. Outreach services are established and available for RC members, their families, and employers from pre-activation through reintegration.

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense
29 October 2008

Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the Services when military operations warrant the use of the RC.

Appendix D, “Mobilization Working Group,” contains specific policy and procedures related to the MWG.

(2) **Demobilization.** Demobilization is **the process of transitioning from a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality.** Implied in this description are two types of activities: those associated with reducing the percentage of the nation’s production capacity devoted to the Armed Forces and defense industry, and those undertaken to maintain national security and economic vitality. These tasks, which historically compete for resources, can make the management of demobilization even more complex and challenging than mobilization.

Demobilization planning and execution are covered in Chapter VI, “Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution.”

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CHAPTER II MOBILIZATION TENETS

"Active Component (AC) forces are ready for combat and Reserve Component (RC) forces are in a proper state of readiness for mobilization to active service."

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Introduction

As shown in Figure II-1, there are five mobilization tenets that describe the characteristics of successful mobilization and **provide the foundation for mobilization doctrine**. The tenets are: **objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability**.




Figure II-1. Mobilization Tenets

2. Mobilization Tenets

a. **Objective.** Joint operations are directed toward clearly defined, decisive, and achievable objectives. Planning for joint operations provides the basis for determining whether the mobilization of reserve forces and other resources is required to achieve the objectives. **Commanders and operational planners must clearly understand the mobilization implications associated with their plans** to ensure that needed resources are identified, mobilized, protected, and used effectively. Requirements for activating RC forces must be clearly identified, as well as the need to expand the capability or

capacity of other resource areas. **Commanders and operational and mobilization planners must coordinate their efforts** to ensure that the time necessary for mobilization actions is clearly understood, and the resulting impacts clearly identified and addressed.

b. **Timeliness.** Timely mobilization of all resources is essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place. It is also essential to seizing and maintaining the initiative. We must be able to act faster than the adversary is able to react. **Achieving effective mobilization of resources requires timely indications and warnings** of the threat and appropriate response to such indications and warning; **efficient mobilization procedures** and frequent exercises and rehearsals; **RC** forces with the resources necessary to maintain required readiness levels; a supportive employer and community base; a **civilian workforce** prepared to support military

TIMELINESS FROM 20TH CENTURY WARS

Timeliness has always been a major problem in mobilization. In World War I, industrial mobilization was geared to a projected big push planned for the summer of 1919. The surprising success of the last-ditch German offensive in the spring of 1918, followed that autumn by the climactic Allied counteroffensive, precipitated the commitment of US troops to combat armed and equipped with British and French rather than American supplies and weaponry.

In World War II, personnel mobilization could never be completely synchronized with requirements. The result was a recurrent boom and bust cycle with regard to enlisted and junior officer replacements. Partially trained troops repeatedly had to be stripped out of units in training to fill up units in combat or about to be deployed, thereby delaying the combat readiness of later deploying units.

The rapid demobilization after World War II, and neglect of military readiness in the immediate postwar period, left the United States without a viable capability for responding to a crisis that arose with little or no warning. The unfortunate result was that we were woefully unprepared for the surprise North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. We conducted a desperate delaying action, and were nearly forced off the Korean peninsula at Pusan, before reinforcing units and other resources could be mobilized and deployed to effectively counter the initial North Korean offensive.

Major mobilization decisions during Operation DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM were deliberately synchronized with United Nations resolutions and US congressional action. In so doing, these decisions not only satisfied the operational requirements of our joint military forces, they also provided clear signals of US resolve to adversaries, allies, and the US public, whose continuing policy support was critical to its success.

Various Sources

missions; **contractors** prepared for their roles; **stockpiles** of materiel and equipment to sustain the force until industrial base output can be expanded; and **synchronized plans** for the expansion of transportation, facilities, training base, HSS, communications, and other support necessary to deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, and, when appropriate, demobilize forces.

c. **Unity of Effort.** **Unity of effort in mobilization demands the integrated efforts of the nation's military and supporting resource areas** toward achievement of common objectives. **Integration is achieved through the effective use of planning and execution processes** that provide for timely and thorough coordination within the chain of command and among DOD, other federal agencies, and the private sector. A manpower call-up, without employer and community support, is not sustainable over a long period of time. The failure to integrate mobilization activities within and among the various resource areas could delay the arrival of units and individual replacements in the operational area or impair their combat effectiveness.

UNITY OF EFFORT: WORLD WAR I

The absence of unity of effort contributed to a confusing and wasteful World War I mobilization. Only the most rudimentary advance planning had been accomplished before the US declaration of war in April 1917.

There was little coordination of personnel and materiel acquisition activities. Hundreds of thousands of conscripts reported to hastily constructed training installations that would not be supplied with enough organizational clothing, equipment, and weapons to properly equip them for several months.

The Government, civilian economy, and Services competed for resources without a competent coordinating authority. War production was chaotic. Priorities for raw materials, labor, and electric power were determined in ad hoc negotiations among public and private officials. East Coast ports of embarkation were quickly overwhelmed, and inland transportation became so congested that the President was forced to nationalize the country's railroad system.

A sealift shortage, evident even before German submarines began sinking merchant ships faster than new ones could be built, cast doubts on the nation's ability to deploy forces to Europe even after they were trained and equipped. The net result was that half-trained US forces were sent to France in British vessels. The forces were largely equipped with British and French artillery, tanks, machine guns, and aircraft, and were required to undergo further training before they could be used effectively on the battlefield.

Various Sources

d. **Flexibility.** Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. **Flexibility for mobilization planning and execution has been provided for in JOPES** and in the comprehensive set of legislated emergency powers that give the President, in his constitutional role as Commander in Chief, wide latitude in crafting a response to a developing crisis. **There are substantial emergency authorities available to the President before a declaration of national emergency**, such as the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority and authorities establishing the priority of industrial production for defense needs. Other authorities are made available to the President upon a declaration of national emergency. The National Emergencies Act provides that when the President declares a national emergency, he must specify the powers he is invoking. Although the powers are limited to those specifically invoked, others may be subsequently invoked. This provides **the President the flexibility to act incrementally**

FLEXIBILITY: OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

Flexibility overcame limitations in planning, force structure, and capabilities in a number of instances during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990-1991. The availability of pre-positioned supplies and a fairly extensive host-nation infrastructure enabled the combatant commander to turn the absence of a fully developed deployment and transportation schedule to tactical advantage at the beginning of the crisis by gambling on the deployment of combat elements at the expense of logistic and administrative support units.

Forces deployed to the theater had insufficient organic transportation capability to carry out the campaign plan. Intensive efforts by the Joint Staff and the Department of State mobilized critical ground transport from host-nation and allied assets to execute the planned offensive.

The decision to deploy the US Army's VII Corps from Europe showed considerable flexibility. Besides powerful combat forces, VII Corps also included a fully structured support command, which proved extremely useful in addressing theater logistic shortfalls.

Although Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM did not provide a truly strenuous test of production surge capabilities, industry did accelerate output of critical supplies, equipment, and munitions. Perhaps the best example of flexibility in this area was the deployment of a system prototype still undergoing developmental testing, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft. Its advanced technology gave the combatant commander the capability to monitor the battlefield and look deep behind enemy lines in a way never before possible.

Various Sources

to signal US resolve in developing crises and to authorize certain preparatory actions without causing undue provocation. **JOPES also provides flexibility in mobilization** by delegating authority to the maximum extent consistent with control to promote freedom of action by subordinates and ensure continuity when communications are disrupted. **The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) also contributes to flexibility** by developing a wide range of military response options for consideration by decisionmakers. **Flexibility also demands a system for accurately monitoring the status and progress of mobilization** and the ability to replan, reprogram, and redirect mobilization activities to work around bottlenecks and resource shortfalls, and for providing protection of the force, equipment, and infrastructure being mobilized.

e. **Sustainability.** Mobilization sustainability is the ability to continuously provide logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion. Timely, rapid mobilization planning is critical to ensuring logistics sustainability. **Sustainability in joint operations provides the joint force commander (JFC) flexibility, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach.** To maintain sustainability, commanders must ensure personnel services, health services, field services, quality of life, and general supply support are adequate. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDR and subordinate Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies, and supporting commands.

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CHAPTER III ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

"Force projection allows a JFC [joint force commander] to strategically position and concentrate forces to set the conditions for mission success."

Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations

1. Introduction

This chapter describes roles and responsibilities for joint military mobilization planning and execution. These roles and responsibilities extend from the President and SecDef down through the combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies to installations for the entire process to be complete. The roles and responsibilities of the various federal agencies that mobilize national resources to support and sustain the nation's military forces in time of war are outside the scope of this publication, but it is important to understand that virtually every federal department and agency would provide significant support to DOD if warranted by an emergency situation.

2. Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense

(1) **In time of crisis and war, OSD assists SecDef in managing mobilization** by developing implementing guidance for issuance by SecDef to the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and DOD agencies. OSD assembles cost data and compiles reports on the costs of military operations, as required by law.

(2) **Basic guidance** to direct and coordinate mobilization planning within DOD **is contained in the DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG)**, which implements DOD responsibilities under the National Security Council national security emergency preparedness policy. **The MMG is the first level of mobilization planning.** It identifies mobilization responsibilities for DOD components and describes the tasks to be performed in peacetime and at the time of mobilization. It provides a common foundation for the preparation of detailed mobilization plans by the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and DOD agencies.

(3) **Mobilization planning is heavily influenced by the JSCP**, which tasks the CCDRs, their Service components, and the Military Departments to develop and refine OPLANs and supporting mobilization plans. **Another influence on mobilization planning is DOD Directive (DODD) 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces***, which specifies DOD policy regardless of component.

b. **Joint Planning and Execution Community.** The JPEC collectively plans for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces.

(1) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **prepares integrated plans** for military mobilization. Through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.13, *Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, CJCS **establishes planning relationships**. CJCS **develops mobilization options and provides mobilization recommendations** to SecDef. CJCS is also responsible for **preparing and submitting** to SecDef **general strategic guidance** for the development of industrial mobilization programs. CJCS also **monitors the status and progress** of mobilization and **prepares required reports** for submission by the President to the Congress.

(2) **Joint Staff.** The Joint Staff **supports CJCS** in integrating the mobilization plans of the Military Departments and DOD agencies. **The J-4 is the focal point in the Joint Staff** for integrating mobilization plans and coordinating mobilization execution. The mobilization responsibilities of the Joint Staff are shown in Figure III-1.

(3) **Combatant Commanders.** The CCDRs **organize and employ assigned and attached forces** and are principally responsible for the **preparation of OPLANs and OPORDs**. They participate in the **development of national military and theater strategies** and participate in the **Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process** in addition to their operation planning responsibilities. As part of their operation planning responsibilities, CCDRs **determine mobilization requirements**, identify RC forces, and schedule their deployment, and based on additional planning guidance, the CCDRs incorporate information on capabilities required into campaign plans, OPLANs, and OPORDs. The CCDRs are also responsible for training and readiness oversight for assigned RC forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training.

(a) **Supported Combatant Commanders.** Supported CCDRs are tasked in the JSCP or by other joint operation planning authority to **prepare specific plans**. They **identify the RC capabilities needed** to support the plan; **identify time-phased requirements** for RC capabilities; and **identify the RC capabilities needed** for reinforcement, for deployment and movement of the force, and for backfill of deployed capabilities. **This planning establishes the capabilities required and sustaining capabilities upon which supporting mobilization plans are based.** This planning requires extensive coordination among the supported CCDRs, supporting CCDRs, and the Services. Supported CCDRs **request invocation of emergency mobilization authorities** when ordered to execute OPORDs requiring mobilization support.

JOINT STAFF MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES	
JOINT STAFF DIRECTORATE	RESPONSIBILITIES
Manpower and Personnel, J-1	Reviews manpower-related mobilization requirements.
	Identifies options for personnel augmentation, validates augmentation requests, and recommends appropriate authorities.
	Monitors the allocation and prioritization of inductees to the Services.
	Initiates manpower mobilization reporting for the Joint Staff during a crisis and serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to manpower mobilization reporting policies and procedures.
Intelligence, J-2	Validates national intelligence augmentation support requirements for national intelligence support teams, quick reaction teams, and augmentation from national intelligence agencies that involve personnel or equipment.
Operations, J-3	Provides the combatant commander's requirements and the J-3's recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the need for mobilizing Reserve Component units.
	Presents alert and mobilization packages through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for final approval.
Logistics, J-4	Prepares joint mobilization estimates and studies.
	Prepares mobilization planning guidance for use by the combatant commanders and Services.
	Determines the adequacy and feasibility of mobilization plans to support operation plans.
	Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for legal authorities pertaining to mobilization.
	Monitors the status and progress of mobilization and prepares required reports for submission by the President to Congress.
	Develops recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the level of mobilization, emergency authorities required, and the need for induction under the Selective Service Act.
	Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, health service support, and their impact on the environment and the economy.
	Develops joint mobilization doctrine, policies, procedures, and reporting instructions.
Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5	Develops concepts for military mobilization to support strategic concepts and objectives.
	Prepares recommendations for declarations of national emergency and war.
Communications Systems, J-6	Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides Joint Staff position to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments concerning mobilization requirements for communications during mobilization.
	Ensures the design of command and control systems is capable of supporting the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Military Departments, and combatant commanders during mobilization.
Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, J-7	Plans, conducts, and evaluates mobilization exercises.
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8	Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact concerning Active/Reserve Component mix and other force and resource development issues.

Figure III-1. Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities

(b) **Supporting Combatant Commanders.** Supporting CCDRs are tasked in the JSCP or by other joint planning authority to **provide augmentation forces and other support** to designated supported CCDRs. **They may also require mobilized assets** to accomplish their respective support missions. Their supporting plans include mobilization requirements when appropriate and, when needed, supporting CCDRs should request the mobilization of resources through the supported CCDR. As noted above, extensive coordination is required to ensure that all mobilization requirements are identified.

(4) **Military Departments and United States Coast Guard (USCG).** **The Military Departments provide forces and logistic support to the CCDRs** at the direction of SecDef. In peacetime, and until transferred to the Department of the Navy in time of war, the USCG serves under the control of the Secretary of Homeland Security (SECHS). USCG units under the Department of Homeland Security control may be assigned to a CCDR with the approval of SECHS. The Military Departments and the USCG **provide trained forces to the CCDRs.** They **prepare detailed mobilization plans** identifying the actual forces and support to be provided and **execute mobilization** at the direction of SecDef. Specifically, **the Secretaries of the Military Departments have the responsibilities shown in Figure III-2.**



Figure III-2. Military Department Secretary Responsibilities

(5) **DOD Agencies.** Five DOD agencies, referred to as combat support agencies, have significant responsibilities for supporting joint military mobilization. These include Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). DISA and NGA receive operational direction from and report through CJCS to SecDef. **The following paragraphs summarize the roles and responsibilities of each of these agencies** in support of joint military mobilization.

(a) **Defense Information Systems Agency.** DISA participates in all communications system mobilization planning activities. DISA collects and analyzes the telecommunications requirements derived from these planning activities, and develops mobilization plans. **DISA modifies its mobilization plans**, if required, and ensures the responsiveness of the Defense Communications System to the actual requirements of the President, OSD, Joint Staff, CCDRs, and Services. DISA also supports the National Communications System (NCS) and employs the nation's commercial communications resources to support defense requirements.

(b) **Defense Logistics Agency.** Based on the Services' mobilization plans, **DLA develops plans to support the Military Departments and other authorized customers** with DLA-managed materiel and services. These plans include substantial industrial preparedness planning based on the CCDRs' critical item list (CIL) and extensive production base analysis conducted in coordination with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments. Across the range of military operations, **DLA provides logistic support to the Services, advises the Joint Staff and CCDRs on the status of inventories of DLA-managed items, and recommends resource allocations and production priorities** when appropriate. DLA also has a disposal, reutilization, and marketing mission, and is responsible for the disposal of hazardous waste, excess property, scrap, and demilitarized property generated by DOD activities.

(c) **Defense Contract Management Agency.** DCMA is the combat support agency that provides worldwide contract management services. With the Armed Forces' increased use of contractors in theaters, DCMA's role has become critical to formulating productive relationships with the Joint Staff, CCDRs, and senior acquisition executives to provide the best possible support.

(d) **Defense Finance and Accounting Service.** DFAS is the focal point for joint financial management issues. DFAS works with the CCDRs to develop the financial management annexes to joint OPLANs. DFAS develops guidance regarding personnel pay issues, providing entitlement and tax information to members and dependents, and ensuring that the financial systems are able to support mobilization efforts. **DFAS has formed a DFAS-wide crisis management system** to ensure that all DFAS crisis coordination centers are informed of financial management issues as they occur.

(e) **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.** In peacetime, NGA develops and maintains mobilization plans to ensure continued geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) support to joint forces under crisis and wartime conditions. NGA, in conjunction with DLA, provides the CCDRs with operational levels of geospatial information and services (GI&S) GEOINT products sufficient to meet initial mobilization requirements. In crisis and war, NGA executes its plans and procedures for increased data collection and increased production and distribution of its products.

For more discussion on GI&S and GEOINT see JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Support to Joint Operations.

c. **Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO) and the Distribution Process Owner (DPO).** USJFCOM as the JDPO serves as the DOD focal point to improve the joint deployment process. USJFCOM and other joint force providers are supported by USTRANSCOM during the planning and execution of the deployment and redeployment process. USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, provides the strategic distribution capability to move forces and materiel in support of JFC operational requirements and to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to home and/or demobilization stations. The JDPO and the DPO shall provide applicable guidance throughout the planning and deployment process.

For more information on the Joint Deployment Process Owner, see DODI 5158.05, Joint Deployment Process Owner and JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

d. **Mobilization Planner.** The role of the mobilization planner is to assist DOD, Service, and joint agencies in assigning the task of developing and promulgating policies and procedures required to activate and deactivate RC personnel under peacetime and crisis response conditions. The mobilization planner provides subject matter expertise on the sourcing and employment of RC forces in support of contingency planning and the execution of OPORDs. The mobilization planner may be an RC member activated at the outset of a contingency to augment DOD, joint, Service or combatant command staff or he/she may be an AC or RC subject matter expert already on the staff. The mobilization planner performs various roles and tasks in supporting the mobilization and demobilization of RC personnel. The roles and tasks may include: reviewing and updating projected RC requirements; coordinating reporting requirements; determining sourcing of immediate manpower augmentation; reviewing mobilization plans, policies, and procedures; monitoring the mobilization process; and monitoring force assignments against requirements.

CHAPTER IV RESOURCE AREAS

“Still unclear was the nation’s willingness to learn the war’s lessons about preparedness. It was plain that the materiel side of mobilization was the most costly, complex, and time consuming. The war, (referring to World War I) Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell said had ‘upset the previous opinion that adequate military preparedness is largely a question of trained manpower.’”

Mobilization, Center for Military History Pub 72-32

1. Introduction

a. **Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources** in twelve interdependent resource areas (legal authorities, funding, environment, manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, HSS, communications, host-nation support [HNS]). **Commanders and mobilization planners should understand the activities occurring in any one area may have an influence on each of the others** (e.g., activating additional manpower creates adverse consequences for businesses and local communities; it increases demands for additional materiel and equipment, transportation, and additional workloads at affected facilities; and may affect the mobilization timeline). Depending on the situation, activating additional manpower could also generate requirements for additional industrial production, training base capacity, HSS, communications support, and HNS. **Increasing levels of manpower and other resources may create economic shortfalls by shifting labor away from economic production and to military operations** (e.g., over 27 percent of RC pilots are employed by US airlines). **The call-up of RC pilots can adversely affect the airline industry and possible Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) support.** Some mobilization actions may be delayed until these conflicts are resolved by either complying with environmental protection standards or by obtaining temporary waivers. The appropriate legal authorities and funding would also have to be obtained to enable the call-up.

b. **This chapter provides an overview of major mobilization activities by resource area.** The discussion in each resource area includes **listing the sources of the resource, the options available to decisionmakers for using the resource, and the likely impact a mobilization decision made in one area could have on the other areas.**

SECTION A. ENABLING RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENT, LEGAL AUTHORITIES, FUNDING

2. General

Each of the twelve resource areas, discussed in the following sections of this chapter, contribute to developing, expanding, sustaining, or positioning military capability so that it may be applied to protect our national security interests in an emergency.

Commanders and mobilization planners consider the impact of mobilization activities on the environment as well as the requirements of legal authorities and funding to enable the timely execution of mobilization activities. The combatant commands, Services, and subordinate commands have an obligation to consider possible environmental effects with respect to construction, modernization, and other activities in order to facilitate mobilization and demobilization, to include obtaining environmental permits as required by applicable US law. Mobilization planners should also anticipate and plan for the impact of additional facility, training land, and range usage resulting from the influx of personnel and increased operating tempo. This section discusses, in turn, the sources of these enabling resources as well as the options available and actions necessary to obtain them.

a. **Legal Authorities**

(1) **Categories of Legal Authority.** There is a broad range of legal authority that enables or limits mobilization and emergency actions. Many of these authorities are available to the President in any level of emergency; others become available with a Presidential declaration of national emergency. Still others have been reserved by the Congress pending passage of a public law or joint resolution of national emergency or declaration of war.

(2) **Action Required to Invoke Legal Authorities.** Statutes providing emergency authority specify the level of emergency at which they can be invoked and implemented. Once invoked, the President may delegate his authority to lower levels (e.g., SecDef, Secretaries of the Military Departments, CCDRs) (Title 3, USC, Section 301). As provided in the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Title 50, USC, Section 1631, **the President must specify the authority upon which he or other officers will act and such specification must be identified** in executive orders published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. Requests to mobilize personnel generally require the identification of a specific level of emergency to trigger the applicable authority. For example, when mobilization requests are received from the Military Departments or CCDRs, the requests are integrated by the Joint Staff and forwarded with a draft executive order to SecDef as a recommendation for Presidential action. For various reasons, including international sensitivities and a policy goal of minimizing impacts upon RC members, major mobilization actions, such as involuntary personnel call-ups, are often conducted incrementally and may involve seeking legal authority on an incremental basis. **Failure to obtain the requested authority in a timely fashion could preclude or limit the desired activity in one or more resource areas.** Appendix A, “Legal Authorities,” contains a more complete description of key legal authorities relative to mobilization.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Partial Mobilization for World Trade Center and Pentagon
Attacks**

Pursuant to section 12302 of Title 10 of the United States Code and the Executive Order 13223 of September 14, 2001, entitled "Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation," I hereby delegate to the Secretaries of the Military Departments authority to order to active duty Ready Reserve members as follows:

(1) Army: not more than 10,000 members of the Army Ready Reserve to provide combat support and combat service support.

(2) Navy and Marine Corps: not more than 3,000 members of the Naval Ready Reserve and not more than 7,500 members of the Marine Corps Ready Reserve.

(3) Air Force: not more than 13,000 members of the Air Force Ready Reserve.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall coordinate their exercise of the authority delegated by this memorandum with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or his designee.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall submit to me requests for additional authority to order Ready Reserve units and personnel to active duty as necessary, after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I hereby redelegate to the Secretaries of the Military Departments the President's authorities under Sections 123, 123a, 527, 12006, 12302, and 12305 of Title 10, United States Code. The authorities delegated by this memorandum may be redelegated to civilian subordinates who are appointed to their offices by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The authorities granted herein may not be exercised to exceed general officer, field grade officer, and E-8 and E-9 enlisted personnel authorizations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy may issue such instructions consistent with the memorandum as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of this memorandum.

Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
14 September 2001

b. **Funding**

(1) **Funding considerations often require special attention.** To facilitate mobilization for unplanned military operations, it is necessary to ensure that sufficient funding is available for known obligations. At the outset of an operation, **senior decisionmakers should be aware of the magnitude of associated costs and recognize the possible impacts on other areas.** It may be necessary to seek additional appropriations or authorizing legislation to fund the mobilization. CJCS does not make funding decisions. In peacetime, CJCS assesses the impact of operational resource requests made by the Military Departments and DOD agencies in the PPBE process and recommends to SecDef how available funding should be distributed to implement the NMS. In wartime, CJCS, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may provide advice to the President and SecDef concerning funding priorities.

(2) **A major mobilization will affect virtually all resource areas, well beyond the costs of salaries, benefits, and subsistence of the personnel involved.** The costs of transportation, housing, HSS, training, personnel security investigations, and equipping the force should be included in estimating the total cost and included in supplemental or amended funding requests.

c. **Environment**

(1) **General. The US has a substantial framework of environmental laws.** Awareness of environmental issues, requirements for compliance, and the liabilities or penalties associated with noncompliance mandate the identification and resolution of environmental issues that affect mobilization. It is DOD policy to comply with applicable environmental laws and regulations although national security exemptions may be available (Department of Defense Instruction [DODI] 4715.6, *Environmental Compliance*). The implications of this policy affect several resource areas. For example, in the case of a statute that does not provide for a national security exemption, legislation may be required to provide temporary relief from regulatory requirements. Some issues regarding environmental matters in the US may require resolution through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), such as minimizing environmental impacts while making modifications to achieve compliance. **Additional manpower and other resources may be required** to ensure continued compliance with environmental protection requirements. **Military personnel who violate the criminal provisions of certain environmental statutes could be prosecuted.** DOD is responsible for complying with environmental laws applicable to the continental United States (CONUS) military locations. Overseas, US policy is to take potential environmental impacts under consideration and follow Final Governing Standards, which are based on applicable host-nation standards, the DOD Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, and applicable international agreements (such as treaties, status-of-forces agreements, or bilateral agreements), with the most stringent standards taking precedence.

(2) **Types of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization.** Figure IV-1 highlights four categories of environmental statutes which mobilization planners consider.

(a) **Compliance.** Compliance statutes require DOD facilities to meet pollution emission standards; to obtain and maintain Federal, state, and local permits to release pollutants; and to meet record keeping, training, and reporting requirements. **EPA, USCG, state, and local inspectors conduct periodic inspections for compliance.** Examples of compliance statutes include: Clean Air Act (Title 42, USC, Section 7401), Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Title 33, USC, Section 1251), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Title 42, USC, Section 6901).




Figure IV-1. Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization

(b) **Clean-up.** Certain statutes obligate DOD to protect human health and the environment from past activities that have contaminated the land (e.g., firing ranges and waste disposal sites). Included are sites DOD now owns, or has owned in the past, and non-DOD property where DOD operations have been conducted or DOD waste disposal has been arranged with the property owner. **Enforcement of clean-up statutes normally relies on clean-up orders or agreements.** DOD is required to survey

all of its property in the United States and territories for potential hazardous waste disposal sites and identify those that require clean-up. The worst cases are identified on the EPA National Priorities List, and the clean-up is regulated by EPA. Examples of clean-up statutes include the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Title 42, USC, Section 9601) and the Defense Environmental Restoration Program Act (Title 10, USC, Section 2701).

(c) **Conservation.** Conservation statutes include a wide variety of requirements for DOD, including the acquisition and use of non-DOD federal lands with specific restrictions on designated wilderness areas, wild and scenic rivers, national monuments, and coastal zones. Also included are requirements for the management and protection of wildlife and protection of historical property. **This legislation affects DOD training areas.** These statutes are predominantly federally enforced but may also be enforced through citizen suits. Examples of conservation statutes are the Endangered Species Act as amended (Title 16, USC, Section 1531) and the Coastal Zone Management Act as amended (Title 16, USC, Section 1451).

(d) **Impact Analysis.** The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Title 42, USC, Sections 4321-4361, requires that major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment be preceded by **a detailed statement by the responsible federal official.** This statement identifies environmental effects of the proposed actions that cannot be avoided and alternatives to the proposed actions. **Mobilization activities, particularly as they relate to facilities, may trigger the need for an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement. Mobilization planners should consult with staff legal counsel to determine whether planned activities constitute a major federal action or otherwise require specific actions under this law.**

(3) Options for Obtaining Relief from Environmental Requirements

(a) The potential impact that mobilization might have upon the environment should be identified in supporting mobilization plans and should provide for compliance with applicable environmental laws. If it appears compliance may not be possible, legal counsel should be consulted to determine what, if any options may be available. Possible options include negotiations with federal, state, and local agencies to develop acceptable alternative means of environmental protection; seeking a national security exemption under certain laws; and, a request for legislation may be submitted to exempt critical industries and DOD organizations from regulatory requirements. Triggers should be established during mobilization planning so that the required environmental waivers can be prepared before training of mobilized forces is jeopardized during a crisis.

(b) Planning for actions to remedy damage caused as the result of waivers or noncompliance with environmental standards during mobilization should be taken as soon as possible. For example, additional military and civilian personnel with needed

skills such as explosive ordnance disposal may be required to clean up the operational area.

(c) Response to no-notice emergencies and contingencies should not be delayed due to National Environmental Protection Act requirements. Documentation should take place as soon as possible.

For additional guidance on environmental considerations for operational planning, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineering Operations.

SECTION B. MANPOWER

“People and not things are the fundamental factor determining the outcome of war.”

**General Lo Jui-Ching
May 1965**

3. Sources of Military Manpower

Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime AC military end strength. **Sources of military mobilization manpower include members of the RC, military retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service (NPS) personnel who volunteer.** These resources are organized by law to provide responsiveness in crises. Figure IV-2 associates these sources of manpower with manpower mobilization options and the actions required to initiate a call-up. The legal authorities required for the call-up of the various manpower pools are listed with the corresponding option. All personnel augmentation requirements should be identified, validated, and sourced either through the Service components or the Joint Staff/Military Departments.

Note: Though legal authority allows Secretaries of the Military Departments to draw on Reserve Component (RC) forces (which include retirees) during times of crisis, the impact of transferring productive members of the civilian sector into the military must be carefully weighed. Commanders must prudently weigh their needs to support a crisis with RC members with the needs of the civilian sector and the impact on future RC readiness. An increasing reliance on the RC could eventually diminish employer and community support and thus RC participation.

4. Mobilization Personnel Management Policy

In addition to the call-up of manpower from reserve and retiree manpower pools, **three other actions can be taken to ensure adequate manpower during mobilization.** These are stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution actions. **Stop-loss actions** allow the Military Departments to retain personnel beyond their terms of service.

Stop-movement actions refer to a number of policy and procedural actions that can be taken by the Military Departments to stabilize AC and RC personnel and ensure the maximum number are available for assignment to high-priority duties. These activities may include canceling temporary and permanent change of station travel, changing tour length policies, and curtailing attendance at Service schools. **Redistribution actions** are also taken within the Military Departments during a crisis to ensure that high-priority units are maintained at the highest level of personnel readiness until an efficient personnel fill and replacement pipeline can be established.

5. Civilian Manpower

Civilian manpower is an integral part of the DOD Total Force Policy. Future crises will require careful management of the civilian work force.

a. In theaters, government service employees and contractors, with skills essential to support military missions, may remain after other US civilians and their families have been evacuated. The Services and DOD agencies designate these government service employees and contractors as emergency-essential and provide necessary training and other support for their crisis and wartime duties. Other government service employees and contractors with critical skills may deploy to the theater individually or with supported military units. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) determines admission requirements to the theater, and the respective Services and agencies implement those requirements for their employees. Some foreign-national civilian employees (local or third country nationals) may also remain to support the mission based on the need for their skills, level of danger, and agreements with the host country.

b. In the United States, **the Services and DOD agencies reallocate incumbent civilian personnel from peacetime to the highest priority functions** through detailing, reassignment, and cross-training. When a crisis begins, the Services and agencies activate **recruiting area staffing committees** to find local solutions for meeting these requirements. Solutions can include:

- (1) **Overtime** and extended workweek authorizations.
- (2) Implementing plans for **replacing employees ordered to active duty** because of RC or retired-military obligations.
- (3) Using **civilian retirees** and **retired military personnel** not expected to be recalled.
- (4) Using **employees on loan** from other federal, state, or local agencies.
- (5) Using **contractors**.
- (6) Advertising and allocation of **new employees** after hiring.

(7) Activating applicable crisis procedures with Office of Personnel Management regional offices and with state and local employment offices to **provide required applicants** on an expedited basis.

6. Manpower Mobilization Options

a. **Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the President and SecDef for responding to a crisis.** Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of national emergency or war as shown in Figure IV-2 and Figure I-1. **Before a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments can call for RC volunteers** who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of time. RC volunteers were used effectively during Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. In addition, both volunteer reservists and recalled retirees were used during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq. PRC authority makes up to 200,000 reservists (including up to 30,000 Individual Ready Reserve [IRR] members) available for up to 365 days (Title 10, USC, Section 12304). It was also used effectively during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and during operations in Haiti. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to mobilization. **A Presidential declaration of national emergency and invocation of the partial mobilization authority makes up to one million members of the Ready Reserve available for up to 24 consecutive months (Title 10, USC, Section 12302).** This partial mobilization authority includes members of the IRR, which is an additional source of trained manpower to be used as Service needs dictate. Like the PRC, activations under this authority can be made incrementally or all at once to meet the needs of the crisis as it develops. Full mobilization may be ordered in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[a]). Under full mobilization the Retired and Standby Reserves become available, as well as Ready Reserves not called previously. **Manpower requirements** for force expansion beyond the peacetime-authorized force structure and sustainment in a protracted conflict **may require legislation authorizing activation of the Selective Service System (SSS)** for the conscription of additional forces. Some retirees are available for recall during all levels of mobilization (Title 10, USC, Sections 688(a), 690(c), and 12307).

b. Although volunteerism is important, the mobilization planner should be judicious in exercising this course of action (COA). The use of RC volunteers is very attractive because they can fill PRC billets, but do not count against the Service's PRC personnel cap for tours of 365 days or less. As such, the use of volunteers can add significantly to a Service's ability to meet the ever-increasing requirement to support peacetime commitments and ongoing operations. However, excessive use of volunteers removes personnel from RC units, which could result in a reduction of the unit's readiness in the event of unit mobilization. Individual voluntary reserve participation affects the availability of the member in a mobilization augmentation role. Another condition mobilization planners must take into account is SecDef's dwell time policy which

MILITARY MANPOWER MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS			
SITUATION	SOURCES OF MANPOWER	MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTION REQUIRED
Domestic emergency (e.g., natural disaster, civil disturbance)	Army National Guard and Air National Guard	Federalize National Guard troops under Title 10, US Code (USC), Sections 12406 and 331-333	President publishes proclamation and an executive order.
Any level of emergency (with or without a declared national emergency)	Volunteers from the National Guard and Reserve	Call for volunteers under Title 10, USC, Section 12301(d)	Secretaries of the Military Departments solicit volunteers with needed skills and publish call-up orders.
	Regular and Reserve retirees with 20+ years of active service	Recall retirees under Title 10, USC, Section 688(a)	Secretaries of the Military Departments publish call-up orders.
	Volunteer enlistees	Enlist qualified volunteers	Military Departments accept qualified applicants in accordance with Department of Defense and Service standards and policies.
	Selected Reserve - Units - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)	Call to active duty up to 200,000 Selected Reservists (no more than 30,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve [IRR]) under Title 10, USC, Section 12304 (Presidential Reserve Call-up)	President publishes executive order. Military Departments publish call-up orders based on Secretary of Defense (SecDef) implementing instructions. President must report to the Congress within 24 hours on anticipated use of forces.
	Draftees	Initiate conscription	The President and SecDef request amendment to the Selective Service Act (Title 50, USC, Section 451) authorizing conscription.
War or national emergency	Ready Reserve - Units - IRRs - IMAs	Call to active duty up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists for up to 24 months under Title 10, USC, Section 12302 (Partial Mobilization)	Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and an executive order (or congressional declaration of national emergency). Military Departments publish call-up orders based on SecDef implementing instructions.
	Remaining Ready Reserve Retired Reserve Standby Reserve	Call to active duty remaining Reserve Component personnel under Title 10, USC, Section 12301(a) (Full Mobilization)	Passage of legislation or a joint resolution of the Congress declaring war or national emergency. Military Departments publish call-up orders.
	New units and personnel	Add new force structure and personnel necessary to achieve national security objectives (Total Mobilization)	Passage of legislation authorizing additional force structure and manpower.

Figure IV-2. Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options

establishes the length of time RC units cannot be mobilized after demobilizing from a prior mobilization/call-up.

7. Impact of Manpower Mobilization and Activation on Other Resource Areas

a. **Selected Reserve Manpower.** Mobilized Selected Reserve units create time-phased demands for all classes of supply, especially rations, fuel, and ammunition; major items of equipment; and repair parts. They also create temporary, but significant, demands for intra-CONUS transportation as they move from home stations to marshalling areas for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration with the gaining force commander. **The RC is an economical contribution to the force mix, however planners must anticipate the cost of adequate housing and proper outfitting of the RC in a contingency.** They create increased workloads at existing facilities for personnel support, energy, housing, training areas, and storage and may require construction of new facilities. They create demands for additional industrial base output of all classes of consumables and for major end-items when war reserve stocks are depleted. Mobilized Selected Reserve units and personnel may impose additional demands on the training base if some unit members are unskilled or have not completed mandatory training. They may create significant demands on HSS as they mobilize. Dependents of RC members will also impose additional workloads on CONUS base support services and health care resources.

b. **Individual Augmentees.** An individual augmentee (IA) is a United States military member assigned to a specific unit and billet for the purpose of filling in for, or augmenting, members of that unit. IAs can be used to fill shortages or when an individual with specialized knowledge or skill sets is required. As a result, IAs can include members from an entirely different branch of service. The current IA system works on a combination of ordered and volunteer assignments mirroring manning requirements.

c. **Considerations for Individual Augmentees.** Individuals mobilized from the various sources (IRR, military retirees, and Standby Reserve) place the same demands on other resource areas, as described above for Selected Reserve manpower, once they report to their assigned units. Before they are assigned to a unit, however, they create demands for intra-CONUS transportation; for an initial issue of clothing and individual equipment; and for subsistence, housing, and health care. Most individuals mobilized as IAs will need reclassification or refresher training at the training base, placing unique timeliness demands on the organizations tasked with processing and training. If assigned overseas for unit backfill or as replacements, they will place a demand for a nonunit personnel space on the strategic transportation system and require weapons, ammunition, and mobility bags.

d. **Nonprior Service Manpower.** NPS manpower (draftees and volunteers) imposes essentially the same demands as IA imposes on the other resource areas. **Because they are untrained at accession, they will impose demands on the training base** for basic and initial skills training.

e. **Civilian Manpower.** Civilian personnel create demands on resource areas based on their employment categories. **DOD civilian employees at military installations** normally live at home and only require a salary and workspace to do their jobs. **A DOD civilian or contractor employee required in the theater** may require clothing, chemical and biological defense equipment and training, passports and visas, housing, and subsistence; intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater transportation; basic battlefield survival training; and HSS, as well as becoming an additional force protection consideration. The use of DOD civilian and contractor personnel or local nationals frees military personnel to perform operation vice ancillary supporting tasks. DOD civilians, along with system support and external support contractors, are often used to augment military forces in noncombat operations. Sometimes, these personnel have critical skills that are lacking in the Services. The **Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)** provides contingency support to augment Army force structure. The **Air Force Contract Augmentation Program and global contingency construction** provide contingency support for the Air Force and Navy, respectively.

f. **Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW).** The CEW program provides a pre-identified source of civilian manpower to support DOD combat operations, contingencies, emergencies, humanitarian missions, and other expeditionary requirements. The CEW is both position-based and person-based facilitating the organizing, training, and equipping of civilians for rapid response and quick assimilation into new operational environments.

8. Employer and Community Support

The success of the nation's defense is dependent on the availability of highly trained members of the total force. **DOD has assigned the National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) the responsibility of promoting both public and private understanding of the National Guard and reserve in order to gain US employer and community support. This is accomplished through programs, personnel policies, and practices that encourage employee and citizen participation in the National Guard and reserve programs.** NCESGR's mission is to obtain employer and community support to ensure the availability and readiness of reserve/guard forces. Among their many responsibilities, the NCESGR assists in preventing, resolving, and/or reducing employer and employee problems and misunderstandings that result from National Guard or reserve membership, training, and duty requirements. This is accomplished through information services and informal mediation as well as assisting in the education of National Guard and reserve members with respect to their obligations and responsibilities to employers. This resource is available to military leaders, employers, and reservists in resolving issues impeding rapid and effective mobilization.

a. **Impact of RC Utilization on the Economy and Employers.** Employer and community support is crucial to maintaining a viable source of military manpower — RC personnel. **Mobilization impacts the economy, employers, and the community,** and that impact must be factored into the mobilization plans. Repeated call-ups may create

adverse consequences for employers and members of the RC; as do separate call-ups of different RC members in the same geographic area. Commanders and **joint mobilization planners should be aware that a local economy could be dramatically affected if Military Department Secretaries choose to recall significant numbers of RC members from the same geographic area.** Commanders and mobilization planners should also be aware that the call-ups may have an impact on key national economic segments. Critical economic segments closely related to RC call-ups include communications, transportation (especially airline services), and public services (e.g., police, fire, and medical).

b. The Military Department Secretary should not use RC call-ups as a long-term fix to active duty force structure shortfalls unrelated to the call-up contingency. It must be remembered that continued reliance on the RC requires the transferring of productive members of the economy and community into the military which may result in diminished employer and community support over time thus adversely impacting RC readiness and retention.

SECTION C. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

9. Sources of Materiel and Equipment

The materiel and equipment resource area includes all classes of supply. It includes equipment on hand in units, remain-behind equipment in theater, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the output of the depot maintenance system and industrial base. Additional sources include items in the security assistance pipelines and off-the-shelf items from domestic and foreign commercial sources. **These sources and the options and actions for obtaining them are listed in Figure IV-3.**

10. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization Options

Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities that can be grouped under two major tasks: **increasing the availability of materiel and equipment** to accommodate the needs of a larger active force, and **alleviating shortages by allocating or redistributing materiel and equipment in accordance with validated priorities.** These activities can be undertaken either separately or in combination.

a. **Increasing Materiel and Equipment Availability.** Decision options that increase materiel and equipment availability include the release of war reserve and depot stocks, accelerating the output of the depot maintenance system, diverting items from foreign military sales and other security assistance programs, accelerating production rates of existing contracts for items like clothing, ammunition, vehicles and combat systems, rations, and procurement of commercial substitutes from domestic or foreign sources. **Each of these actions increases the number of items in the supply pipeline.** Except for the diversion of items earmarked for security assistance programs, these options are exercised by the Military Departments, DLA, and other DOD agencies as they provide for the logistic needs of their forces assigned to the CCDRs. **Action to**

MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS		
SOURCES OF MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT	MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTION REQUIRED
Continental United States/in-theater equipment on hand in units	Redistribution based on emergency priorities	Military Department decisions based on supported commanders' requirements and priorities.
War reserve and pre-positioned stockpiles	Release stocks	Military Department decisions for retail items. Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board decisions for wholesale stocks insufficient to meet demands of all claimants.
Depot system	Accelerate output	Military Department decisions based on supported commanders' requirements and priorities.
Industrial base	Accelerate output	Military Departments and Department of Defense agencies act to surge production of needed materiel and equipment.
Materiel and equipment in security assistance pipelines	Divert needed equipment from security assistance pipelines	The President and Secretary of Defense decision based on a determination that national security requirements outweigh political consequences.
Domestic and foreign commercial vendors	Purchase off-the-shelf products that meet military requirements	Military Department and Department of Defense agency decisions based on Federal acquisition regulations.

Figure IV-3. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options

divert items from security assistance programs could have a significant impact on our relations with affected allies. This decision should follow discussions with the Department of State and specific chiefs of mission and country teams and **the President or SecDef action**. However, once diverted and allocated to a Military Department, they are distributed as determined by the owning Military Department.

b. **Allocating Materiel and Equipment Shortages. Shortages of Service-unique items are resolved by priority and allocation decisions** made internally by the Military Departments based on OPLAN priorities, and guided by DOD policy to equip earlier deploying units before those scheduled to deploy later, regardless of Service component. When confronted with a materiel or equipment shortage common to two or more US military claimants, SecDef, with the advice of CJCS, **determines priorities among the Services. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) executes this responsibility.** The JMPAB is chaired by the J-4, Joint Staff and includes other Joint

Staff directors as well as general or flag officer representatives from the Military Departments. In multinational operations, the United States may be responsible for providing significant materiel and equipment support to one or more allies or coalition partners. When shortages occur, **priority and allocation decisions for resolving conflicts among multinational partners, or between US claimants and multinational partners, are made by SecDef.**

SECTION D. TRANSPORTATION

11. Sources of Mobilization Transportation

Transportation resources are required to support mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations. Mobilization activities are supported principally by intra-CONUS air, rail, highway, pipeline, port facilities, and inland waterway assets of commercial firms. **These assets move units and unit equipment** through the mobilization process from home stations to marshalling areas to ports of embarkation; **individual augmentees** from their homes to reception and training sites and then to replacement centers and ports of embarkation; and **individual issue equipment** from production and storage sites to ports of embarkation. **Deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment operations are supported primarily by intertheater air lift and sealift**, which move units, nonunit personnel, and sustainment items (nonunit equipment and supplies) from the United States to the theaters. **RC transportation terminal units** provide the military interface at commercial seaports of embarkation, **deployment support units** assist with loading the equipment on commercial transportation, and **port security companies** provide security at military ocean terminals. **In many cases, these units are mobilized early to support deployment from CONUS.** The sources of additional transportation resources for mobilization and the options for mobilizing them are listed in Figure IV-4. **In some situations, additional transportation assets may be required before substantial deployments can be executed.**

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for further information on deployment and redeployment.

12. Transportation Mobilization Options

A variety of options are available for mobilization of intertheater and intratheater airlift assets. Air Mobility Command assets can quickly be expanded by the **Air National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and the airlift assets of the US Navy Reserve.** Also, **the fleet can be augmented via contract commercial charters, and through CRAF.** Limited peacetime sealift, operated by Military Sealift Command, can be augmented by voluntary or contract charter, activation of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF), chartering, requisition of US-flag and effective US-controlled shipping (US-owned but under foreign registry). The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) is the primary sealift mobilization program and was developed through a partnership between DOD, Commander, United States

TRANSPORTATION MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS			
SITUATION	SOURCES OF TRANSPORTATION AUGMENTATION	TRANSPORTATION MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTIONS REQUIRED
Any level of emergency	STRATEGIC AIRLIFT		
	Reserve Component air mobility assets	Task Air Mobility Command, gained, Air Reserve Component, and Naval Reserve assets	Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy activate units and individuals with an appropriate call-up order.
	Voluntary charter	Charter available commercial aircraft	Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) obtains commercial charter aircraft.
	Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Stage I	Activate when required to augment capacity	CDRUSTRANSCOM activates and operationally directs CRAF I assets with Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval.
	CRAF Stage II	Activate when required to augment capacity	CDRUSTRANSCOM activates and operationally directs CRAF II assets with SecDef approval.
	STRATEGIC SEALIFT		
	Commercial Sealift	Utilize available commercial vessels when required to augment US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) controlled fleet	CDRUSTRANSCOM obtains commercial shipping.
	Department of Defense (DOD) reduced operational status ships	Activate when required to augment sealift capacity	CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as required.
	Ready Reserve Force	CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as delegated by SecDef	CDRUSTRANSCOM requests through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); SecDef approves by agreement with the Secretary of Transportation (SECTRANS); Maritime Administration (National Defense Reserve Fleet) implements.
	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA)	Activate when required to augment sealift capacity	CDRUSTRANSCOM, with approval of SecDef, activates VISA with concurrence of SECTRANS.
	Voluntary Tanker Agreement	Activate when required to augment sealift (tanker) capacity	CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as required.
	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS) TRANSPORTATION		
	Commercial air, rail, highway, barge, transportation terminal unit	Activate the Contingency response program. Mobilize seaport of embarkation transportation terminal units	The Contingency response program team assembles at the call of CDRUSTRANSCOM to prevent or resolve transportation shortfalls. Secretary of the Army publishes call-up order for transportation terminal units.
National emergency or war	STRATEGIC AIRLIFT		
	CRAF Stage III	Activate when necessary to augment airlift capacity	CDRUSTRANSCOM activates and commands CRAF III assets with the approval of the SecDef.
	Foreign voluntary charters	Charter available foreign aircraft	CDRUSTRANSCOM enters into agreements with foreign carriers consistent with the Fly American Act.
	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Pre-committed Civil Aircraft Program aircraft	Request NATO resources when required to augment US airlift capacity	North Atlantic Council requests reinforcements and responds to requests for airlift.
	STRATEGIC SEALIFT		
	Requisitioned US-flag and effective US-controlled shipping vessels	Requisitioned as required to meet sealift requirements	With declaration of national emergency, SECTRANS requisitions ships at the request of SecDef.
	Naval Inactive Fleet of the National Defense Reserve Fleet	Activate when required to augment sealift capacity	With declaration of national emergency, CDRUSTRANSCOM requests through CJCS; SecDef orders activation.
	CONUS TRANSPORTATION		
Air, rail, highway, and barge	Seek priorities and allocations of domestic transportation when required to augment capacity	With declaration of national emergency, the President invokes priorities and allocations for DOD.	

Figure IV-4. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options

Transportation Command, Department of Transportation (DOT) (Maritime Administration), and the US Flag commercial sealift industry. VISA represents an improved way to meet mobilization readiness requirements. Foreign-owned flag ships are also a potential source of additional sealift through chartering. After activation of the MARAD RRF, additional ships can only be activated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet as attrition fillers or to fill additional requirements for sealift.

13. Impact of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

Mobilization of transportation resources will substantially affect the manpower resource area because highly skilled operators and crews are required, as well as maintenance cargo handling, and security personnel, at ports and trans-shipment points. The impact on **ports, airfields, highways, pipelines, railroads, and inland waterways; facilities** required for activation, maintenance, and storage; and **repair parts and materials handling equipment** may be significant. **Legal authorities and funding** are required to enable transportation resource expansion. Influence on the **training base** could be significant in a protracted conflict with high attrition rates of operator or crew personnel.

a. **Augmenting Intertheater Air Mobility.** **Each additional aircraft affects runway, throughput, marshalling, and temporary storage capacity at airfields.** These factors could become constraints at departure, en route, and arrival airfields. **Aircrews require subsistence and transient quarters,** and aircrew shortages and crew rest considerations could also become constraints. Influence on the military training base should be minimal unless commercial carriers lose their capability to conduct their respective training. **Some additional demands will be placed on the industrial base** as stocks of repair parts are depleted. Shortages of aviation fuel, lubricants, repair parts, hull and liability insurance, and qualified mechanics could become constraints.

b. **Augmenting Strategic Sealift.** In addition to applicable constraints listed above, **the charter, requisition, or activation of each additional ship draws on the available pool of licensed officers, and certified merchant seamen.** The withdrawal of commercial vessel insurance and war-risk exclusion for crew life insurance may also constrain the use of commercial vessels. To surmount this constraint, the President may authorize SecDef, acting through the Secretary of Transportation, to issue war-risk insurance under Title XII of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (Title 46, USC, Section 1285). Additionally, Title 46, USC, Section 8103(g) requires that deck and engineer officers, if eligible, be a member of the Navy Reserve if serving on vessels on which an operating differential subsidy is paid, or on vessels (except a vessel of the Coast Guard or Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation) owned or operated by the DOT or by a corporation organized or controlled by the DOT. **Crew shortages could become a constraint,** particularly if market forces and mortality rates result in a reduced pool of available private sector US merchant mariners. Also, pulling ships from normal commercial service can have adverse long-term impacts on the commercial sealift carrier's business. **Ships require berthing and anchorage space at ports,** which, together with temporary storage, staging areas, cargo handling capabilities, and

transportation mode links, determine throughput capacity. Laws governing the handling of hazardous materials, such as ammunition, limit the number of ports that can handle such loads. **Dry docks, shipyard facilities, and skilled labor are required** for activation and periodic refitting. Constraints in the other resource areas should be minimal except in extreme conditions marked by high attrition. Additionally, **shortages of stevedores** may be experienced if heavy demands are placed on multiple commercial ports within the same geographic area.

c. **Augmenting Intra-CONUS Transportation Resources.** DOD can request that DOT issue priority service or allocation orders to the commercial transportation industry to support DOD requirements. Demands in the other resource areas should not be significant, except in extreme circumstances. Spot shortages in operator, crew, or maintenance personnel could occur if large numbers of commercial carrier employees are ordered to military duty or if local transportation demands are heavy. Spot shortages of fuel, repair parts, maintenance, and trans-shipment facilities could also occur during peak periods. At some installations, capacity of railheads and spurs could be a constraint.

d. **Service-unique self-deployment.** Planners should keep in mind that some Service personnel/units (e.g., combat aircraft and aircrews) deploy to theater on board their own warfighting equipment. Sometimes combat aircraft carry a full load of weapons and/or support equipment and crew members.

SECTION E. FACILITIES

“Fleets cannot operate without bases.”

Major General John A. Lejeune, US Marine Corps
(Testimony to House Naval Affairs Committee, 13 March 1920)

14. Sources of Facilities

DOD uses a wide variety of facilities to house, train, equip, and support personnel. Facilities are also needed to provide storage, maintain equipment, and conduct operations. Military bases, depots, medical treatment facilities, airfields, and seaports are representative examples. **Facilities with the capacity for supporting increased workloads during mobilization are obtained from the following sources: commercial facilities** that support DOD in peacetime; **unused and standby capacity** at existing government facilities; and **new capacity** developed on property acquired by DOD through lease, purchase, or exercise of other legal means. These are listed in Figure IV-5, together with the options and actions for acquiring needed facilities during mobilization.

FACILITY MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS			
SITUATION	SOURCES OF FACILITIES	FACILITIES MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTIONS REQUIRED
Any level of emergency	Existing government property		
	Standby capacity	Activate standby capacity	Military Departments act within available funding
	Unused capacity	Develop unused capacity	Military Departments initiate emergency military construction projects using unobligated funds (Title 10, US Code (USC), Section 2803) or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Contingency Construction Authority (Title 10, USC, Section 2804)
	Newly acquired property	Lease, purchase, and develop as required	
		Optimize supply chain management to minimize facility requirement	
National emergency or war	Existing government property	Develop unused capacity	Military Departments initiate emergency military construction projects with additional authorities available upon declaration of national emergency
	Newly acquired property	Lease, purchase, and develop as required	-SecDef authorizes modifications to current military construction program within military construction appropriations and unobligated family housing funding (Title 10, USC, Section 2808).
	Recaptured former government property	Recapture and develop as provided by law	SecDef acts under statutory provisions for recapture of specified parcels of former federal property

Figure IV-5. Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options

15. Facilities Mobilization Options

Options for expanding facilities during mobilization include reopening unused capacity with actions short of new construction, initiating emergency military construction projects to increase capacity at existing facilities, and acquisition of new facilities through the recapture of former federal property. Facilities can include all kinds of military installations, airfields, and seaports in and outside CONUS.

a. **Initiate Emergency Military Construction.** SecDef and Secretaries of the Military Departments can initiate emergency military construction projects with unobligated balances of military construction funds, the SecDef contingency construction authority, or with a modified military construction program, enabled with a declaration of national emergency and unobligated military construction and family housing funds. Beyond these options, construction of new or expanded facilities requires a request for a supplemental military construction appropriation. Waivers or relief from environmental protection statutes and some occupational health and safety regulations may need to be requested through the appropriate chain of command.

b. **Acquire Additional Real Property and Commercial Facilities.** Under the law, hundreds of parcels of former federal property may be recaptured to provide land and improved infrastructure for conversion into needed facilities. In addition, privately owned lands may be acquired by condemnation for defense purposes, such as training or manufacturing of ammunition and other materiel. Reacquiring ex-federal property must be handled in accordance with applicable federal and military regulations before use, and this process may take some significant time and effort. For example, an environmental baseline survey will be needed to determine the condition of the property to be acquired.

16. Impact of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

Expanding facilities will require more manpower, both military and civilian, to staff tenant organizations and provide required services. The greatest impact will be on the civilian side in the form of contract construction workers and DOD personnel employed to expand tenant support services. Host-nation civilians will provide the bulk of this support overseas. **There will be a significant local demand for construction materials and equipment** — from stocks and from the industrial base. As the facility grows in capacity or expands operations, **the increased population will require more HSS and other support services.** If these resources are available, the impact on planned facilities expansion will be minimal. **Shortfalls in these areas will reduce capacity and constrain productivity.**

SECTION F. INDUSTRIAL BASE

17. Industrial Mobilization Sources

The US industrial base includes commercial production facilities and government-owned facilities. Some of the government-owned facilities are government-operated and some are contractor-operated. **Foreign producers of essential components, parts, and ammunition are included,** because foreign producers may be the only source for components of major equipment items. Because of the unique relationship existing between the US and Canada, the Canadian defense industry is recognized as part of a single North American defense industrial base. **The capabilities of Canadian industry may be included in US industrial preparedness planning.** Figure IV-6 lists these sources together with the options and actions required to expand their output.

18. Industrial Mobilization Options

Industrial base expansion includes actions to **accelerate production** within the existing industrial infrastructure, **add new production lines and factories,** and **implement provisions of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS).** Because many components of key military items of equipment are now procured from foreign sources, increased emergency procurement from these sources has become, of necessity, a major industrial mobilization option.

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS		
INDUSTRIAL BASE SOURCES	INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTIONS REQUIRED
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY		
Commercial producers of goods and services	Accelerate production from current sources of goods and services	Military Departments and Defense Logistics Agency contract for accelerated production from current producers of materiel based on planned or actual consumption rates and prioritized requirements of the combatant commanders.
	Expand production base capacity	Using the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS), Title 50, United States Code, Section 2071, obtain priority performance on Department of Defense contracts and orders.
		Using DPAS authorities and streamlined acquisition procedures, increase industrial capacity for production of materiel and equipment required to sustain the mobilized force.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE		
Government-owned/government-operated production facilities	Primary industrial base to support peacetime training, deployment, contingency operations, war, peacekeeping, antiterrorism, homeland defense, and to protect and secure the US forces' technological advantage against our adversaries. This encompasses foreign military sales and other service support.	Accelerate production rates or activate standby and laid-away production capacity at government-owned/government-operated facilities and government-owned/contractor-operated facilities.
Government-owned/contractor-operated production facilities	See above	
FOREIGN INDUSTRY		
Commercial producers of goods and services		Seek additional production from foreign suppliers.

Figure IV-6. Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options

19. Impact of Industrial Mobilization on the Other Resource Areas

a. **Expand the Industrial Base.** Surge production and industrial base expansion will require additional skilled manpower from the non-defense sectors of the national economy. **Local manpower shortages could develop** in areas hardest hit by extensive military manpower mobilization and competition between DOD contractors and others for limited numbers of the same skills. **Materiel and equipment stocks, transportation, and facilities could be significantly affected** if raw materials, finished products, tools, and test equipment become short; local and long distance hauling is not

sufficiently manned; and new construction does not meet the demand. **Additional legal authorities may be invoked or requested** from the Congress upon the determination that DOD production in a crisis is being adversely affected. **Environmental and occupational health and safety regulations may also require waivers.** Substantial additional funding may be required to enable increased production.

b. **Implement the DPAS.** The DPAS is authorized by the Defense Production Act (Title 50, USC, Section 2071) and **allows preferential treatment for contracts or orders relating to certain approved defense or energy programs** for military production and construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, and stockpiling. This authority specifically includes reordering national priorities and rationing available industrial resources (articles, materials, services, and facilities, including construction materials). The Department of Commerce is responsible for DPAS activities concerning industrial resources. Accordingly, DOD will coordinate with the Department of Commerce concerning industrial resource issues requiring resolution through DPAS.

c. **Obtain Allied Production Support.** **DOD has become increasingly reliant on foreign production** of essential components, repair parts, tools, and test equipment needed for domestic production of virtually all major weapons systems and other key items of materiel and equipment. Wartime surge and industrial base expansion can be expected to have a significant impact on foreign producers as well. **The reliability of these sources could significantly influence the ability to provide needed materiel and equipment to support and sustain operations.** Conversely, the availability of foreign production support in areas where the domestic production base can no longer expand could have substantial positive results on the manpower, materiel and equipment, and facilities resource areas. Similar to domestic source problems, foreign supplier problems should be forwarded through the DPAS chain for resolution by OSD and the Department of Commerce.

SECTION G. TRAINING BASE

20. Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity

The Services expand their institutional training bases to train NPS personnel to support and sustain an expanded force structure. **The training base also provides reclassification and refresher training** for IAs who need it. Based on the rate of force expansion and attrition due to casualties, disease, and nonbattle injuries, **training base output requirements are determined and compared to available capacity.** If there is a shortfall, additional capacity is added by mobilizing additional training organizations from the RC, by hiring DOD civilian employees, and by contracting for additional instructors and other training resources from the private sector. Sources, options, and actions for expanding training base capacity are listed in Figure IV-7.

21. Impact of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas

Training base expansion may have significant impact on the manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, HSS, and funding resource areas. It may also affect the environmental, transportation, industrial base, communications, and legal areas. It is not expected to have any measurable influence on HNS, although the training of allied military personnel, along with security assistance and other agreements, could affect the training base capacity.

SECTION H. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

22. General

Theater, US, and aeromedical evacuation (AE) HSS are expanded to serve the mobilized force and provide the capability to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute casualties in the US. HSS requirements are determined from decisions establishing the theater medical support, theater patient evacuation, and force health protection

EXPANDING TRAINING BASE CAPACITY: SOURCES AND OPTIONS			
SITUATION	SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING BASE CAPACITY	TRAINING BASE EXPANSION OPTIONS	ACTIONS REQUIRED
Any level of emergency			Military Departments act to expand their institutional training establishments.
	Wartime policies and programs of instruction	Implement wartime training policies and programs	Implement wartime programs of instruction; extend the training day and training week; increase class size.
	Reserve Component training units	Expand existing training centers and schools	Call-up Reserve Component training base augmentation units as required.
	New training centers and schools	Add new training centers and schools	Call-up remaining Reserve Component training base augmentation units; activate new training units; acquire new training facilities and support.

Figure IV-7. Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options

policies. Several factors, such as casualty rates, population at risk, availability and readiness of HSS units, transportation resources, blood supplies, and HNS assist in determining the theater HSS required. **CONUS hospital beds and facilities are increased** to accommodate the expected flow of casualties and increases in the population of the CONUS support base. **The AE system is increased** to employ the necessary contingency AE elements required to support the increased intratheater, intertheater, and CONUS evacuee requirements. **The nonactive duty beneficiary population eligible for government health care may be transferred to a managed care/TRICARE contract** as requirements for serving uniformed military beneficiaries approach the available capacity. **Military Department mobilization plans should include provisions for activating RC HSS professionals for theater medical support as required.**

23. Sources of Emergency Health Service Support

The sources of skilled HSS manpower and hospital beds to meet emergency and wartime requirements for health care are listed in Figure IV-8, together with the options and actions required to mobilize additional health care capacity.

24. Options for Mobilizing Health Service Support

a. **Options for mobilizing additional HSS professionals parallel those for other manpower skills.** In time of national emergency, the transfer of members of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) commissioned corps to DOD may also provide additional health service professionals.

b. **Theater HSS and aeromedical support is expanded** by calling up, transferring, and reassigning health service professionals AC and RC HSS units and hospital ships deployed to the theater. See JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*, for specific information on organic DOD HSS capabilities. Some mobilized RC personnel are assigned to CONUS medical treatment facilities as backfill. This enables the facilities to support care of returning casualties and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) missions.

c. **The CONUS HSS base is expanded, as necessary, to provide care for casualties returned from the theater.** In addition to expanding CONUS military hospitals, this process may also include implementing, in turn, the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)-DOD Contingency Plan and the NDMS, which provide additional beds and professional staff from DVA and commercial civilian resources.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS			
SITUATION	SOURCES OF HEALTH SERVICE SUPORT	MOBILIZATION HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT	ACTIONS REQUIRED
Any level of emergency	Reserve Component health service support units and individuals	Mobilize/activate volunteer individuals and units of the Selected Reserve	Military Departments order units and volunteer individuals to active duty within the limits of Presidential authorities invoked.
	Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals	Implement Department of Veterans Affairs Department of Defense (DOD) Contingency plan	DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs act in accordance with the Department of Veterans Affairs and DOD Health Resources Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (Public Law 97-174, as amended) when DOD requirements exceed supply of continental United States military hospitals.
	Host-nation health care systems	Activate host-nation support agreements	Geographic combatant commander requests support in accordance with agreements.
National emergency or war	Reserve Component health service support units and individuals	Mobilize remaining Reserve Component health service support units and individuals	Military Departments order Reserve Component units and individuals to active duty.
	Domestic civilian health care system	Transfer United States Public Health Service commissioned members to DOD or United States Coast Guard (USCG)	United States Public Health Service assigns members not already assigned under existing memorandums of understanding, to DOD or USCG with Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security request and Presidential executive order.
		Activate National Disaster Medical System	SecDef acts under provisions of Public Health Service Act when bed requirements exceed capacity of DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs.

Figure IV-8. Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options

25. Impact of Health Service Support Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

The process of expanding theater HSS may significantly burden the manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, HNS, and legal resource areas. Increasing the CONUS HSS base may significantly influence the manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, and industrial base resource areas. It could also affect the transportation and training base areas, and it may require expanded legal authority. The transfer of dependent and retiree health care support to the managed care/TRICARE contract may have a significant impact on funding. The impact of mobilization in the remaining resource areas is not expected to be significant.

SECTION I. COMMUNICATIONS

26. Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support

Although the US military utilizes its own communications systems to execute many national defense/crisis response requirements, it frequently relies upon commercial providers to fulfill its administrative support needs. For this reason, **the Communications Act of 1934 provides the President with substantial authority during times of national emergency or war** to regulate and control virtually every form of telecommunications resource at the national and local levels. Included within this authority are devices and stations for wire, radio, and microwave transmissions. The Department of Homeland Security, the manager of the NCS, monitors situations that could develop into emergencies, provides recommendations for the use of resources, and maintains liaison with commercial providers. In time of national emergency or war, the President may invoke special war powers under Section 706 of the Communications Act (Title 47, USC, Section 606). These powers **allow the President to take immediate measures to ensure the continuous operation and security of telecommunications services** without negotiations or the consent of those who are affected. DOD's Global Information Grid (GIG) assets support the DOD. Other NCS assets support other departments and agencies of the US Government. These other assets may be made available to DOD in crises and war when the GIG capacity is exceeded. The Joint Staff controls only a few communications assets, which are allocated during emergencies to provide additional communications in the theater.

27. Impact of Communications Mobilization Activities on Other Resource Areas

Virtually all communications resources required come from unused and redirected capacity maintained in peacetime. Some increases in personnel to accommodate additional operations, maintenance, and security needs may be required. The impact on other resource areas is expected to be minimal, except as the result of unexpected attrition or protracted operation, which would generate requirements to replace fixed infrastructure.

SECTION J. HOST-NATION SUPPORT

28. Sources of Host-Nation Support

Manpower, equipment, facilities, and services provided by host or allied nations during war or emergency can offset requirements for corresponding US military resources that are not affordable or practical to maintain in peacetime. **A number of agreements are maintained with an ever-growing array of allies for defense cooperation.** Every effort should be made through the Department of State and DOD to establish some form of **mutual support, defense cooperation, and/or acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs)** with US allies and friends around the globe. Initial cooperation can be achieved by helping to **establish a database of military and commercial capabilities available in each nation**, as well as standardized procedures to allow for rapid communication and understanding in a crisis situation. Additionally, this process enhances diplomatic efforts during peacetime and facilitates crisis management/contingency decisionmaking by quickly providing more options to US and multinational leadership. **Direct HNS can be provided by an ally's military units that are organized and equipped for that specific purpose.** Financial arrangements may have already been established on a bilateral basis with a formula spelled out formally in a defense cooperation agreement. However, other arrangements may be made based on the situation at hand, to include multinational agreements with a regional or coalition organization or the United Nations (UN). Financial reimbursement policies and procedures may be developed through the use of in and out audit surveys (UN system) or some other process. Indirect support may be provided by host-nation commercial entities with licensing agreements or permissions granted by an allied government.

29. Coordinating Host-Nation Support

a. **Implement Existing Agreements.** **Mutual support agreements, ACSAs, or defense cooperation agreements may be in effect between the US and the HN.** Such international agreements may adequately provide for support.

b. **Develop New Agreements.** The variable and uncertain nature of global security threats may create situations where it is necessary to negotiate new agreements providing for HNS. Commanders and persons responsible for mobilization should identify such needs as early as possible and consult with staff legal counsel to determine whether new agreements are required. Legal counsel should assist in the development of new agreements by coordinating with relevant combatant command staff judge advocates and by ensuring compliance with DOD and CJCS directives related to the negotiation of international agreements. The variable and uncertain nature of global security threats may create unforeseen situations where **it may be necessary to seek ad hoc HNS.** Such support is normally obtained through government-to-government negotiations or through negotiations conducted at a mutually agreed lower level.

See JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, for more details.

For North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine, ratified by the US, see the Allied Joint Publication-4 Series of publications and associated NATO standardization agreements.

30. Impact of Mobilizing Host-Nation Support on the Other Resource Areas

Implementation of existing or additional mutual support or defense cooperation agreements, depending on the nature of the support provided, **will affect the providing nation's or nations' resource areas**, particularly manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation assets, and possibly facilities. Careful consideration should be given to the impact upon the host-nation and its capabilities compared to the offset of US resource requirements.

CHAPTER V

MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

“The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of their people, took care to put into the hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression as a standing army. Their system was to make every man a soldier, and oblige him to repair to the standard of his country whenever that was reared. This made them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so.”

Thomas Jefferson
(Letter to Thomas Cooper, 1814)

1. Introduction

a. **Mobilization plans** support CCDRs’ OPLANs, concept plans, OPORDs, and campaign plans. They are detailed plans prepared by the Military Departments and DOD agencies. They are **based on policy and planning guidance** in the GEF, Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), GFMIG, DOD MMG, and in tasks specified by the CJCS in the JSCP. They **reflect requirements for force expansion** with RC units and IAs and for expansion of the CONUS base to sustain the mobilized force for as long as necessary to achieve military and national security objectives. Mobilization plans explain how force and resource expansion is to be accomplished.

b. Mobilization is a complex, time-sensitive process with many participants and activities. **Mobilization plans must be carefully integrated** among participants and the twelve resource areas. **Mobilization execution must be sequenced and carefully synchronized** to ensure that resources are available to the supported and supporting commanders when needed. **The CJCS**, supported by the Joint Staff, **integrates mobilization planning** and monitors the status and progress of mobilization execution. **CJCS advises SecDef** on establishing priorities; allocating resource shortages among claimants; and redirecting execution activities, when necessary, to eliminate bottlenecks and overcome unforeseen problems.

c. The Mobilization Information Management Plan (MIMP) provides guidance on information systems related to mobilization planning and execution. This plan identifies the flow of information related to mobilization under both contingency and crisis action planning, and is designed to provide a coherent and accurate status of mobilization efforts. Appendix C, “Mobilization Information Management Plan,” contains specific policies regarding the MIMP.

d. Opportunities to determine the validity of mobilization plans and practice mobilization procedures are provided by periodic **CJCS-sponsored worldwide command post exercises**. These exercises may involve SecDef, OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands, and other selected federal agencies. These may be augmented by field training exercises conducted by combatant commands and/or Services.

e. **This chapter provides a joint perspective of mobilization planning, execution, and reporting.** It explains the relationships between mobilization plans, OPLANs, and campaign plans. It introduces the mobilization estimate of the situation, a tool to assist the thought processes of commanders and mobilization planners. It describes the joint mobilization planning processes. It also provides an overview of the mobilization execution process.

SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING

2. Mobilization Planning and Operation Plans

a. The GEF, GDF, and DOD Master Mobilization Plan provide SecDef guidance for mobilization planning in support of joint operations. The CJCS amplifies the guidance in the JSCP.

b. CJCSI 3110.13C (Classified), *Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, guides the Military Departments and CCDRs in preparing mobilization plans that support the OPLANs developed in the contingency planning process. The planning guidance is focused on the areas of manpower and industrial mobilization. Manpower mobilization requirements derived for each contingency establish the level of mobilization assumed for each contingency and drive the determination of mobilization requirements in the twelve resource areas. The industrial mobilization guidance requires the Military Departments to conduct industrial preparedness planning and to maintain a production base that will support contingency requirements.

c. During the contingency planning process, **the Military Departments furnish mobilization-related information to the CCDRs**, who incorporate it into the OPLANs under development or revision. The major mobilization plans and planning systems are shown in Figure V-1.

d. **Manpower mobilization information** furnished by the Military Departments for inclusion in OPLANs **provides the foundation for detailed planning** in the other resource areas. This information comprises the number of AC and RC personnel required by Service and skill for each option included in the OPLAN. **The functions are:**

(1) **Direct support for each option;** i.e., units and individuals needed to augment the supported commander's combat and support force.

(2) **CONUS base;** i.e., units and individuals required for the level of CONUS-based expansion to support each option.

(3) **CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) backfill;** i.e., units and individuals required to replace those deployed to the theater.

(4) **Strategic transportation;** i.e., units and individuals needed to augment peacetime strategic air mobility and sealift capabilities.

3. Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans

A campaign plan has important implications for mobilization planners. Firm strategic objectives, force levels, and time constraints are key elements of information with which the commander and mobilization planner can **execute mobilization planning** and **initiate additional force and resource expansion options** if needed. Additional industrial mobilization and the reinstatement of the draft may be indicated in the campaign plan if there is an expectation of a long war with high materiel and personnel attrition. Conversely, if the campaign plan expects a short war with low attrition, mobilization planners can concentrate on managing mobilization at a lower level.

A more complete discussion of campaign plans is provided in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.



Figure V-1. Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems

4. Mobilization Estimate of the Situation

a. A **commander's estimate of the situation** provides a logical process of reasoning by which a **commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a COA to be taken to accomplish the mission.** A staff estimate is similar, with the major difference being that the culmination of the staff estimate process is a conclusion or recommendation communicated to the commander.

b. The mobilization estimate format in Appendix E, “Mobilization Estimate,” applies the staff estimate concept to mobilization planning. **The mobilization estimate provides a tool for mobilization planners to make a systematic appraisal of mobilization requirements and options.** Although designed from the point of view of the Joint Staff, J-4, the format may be adapted to fit the circumstances for other Joint Staff directorates and of mobilization planners on the CCDR, Service component commander, and Service headquarters staffs.

c. Like other staff estimates, **the purpose of the mobilization estimate is to determine whether the mission can be supported and which COA is best.** The mobilization estimate requires input from all functional areas of the Joint Staff, Service staffs, and the corresponding staff sections at the combatant commands. Although not every situation demands an extensive planning effort, **the mobilization process is complex and involves interactions among resource areas that may influence the outcome of the analysis.** It is important, therefore, that the mobilization proponent on a staff establishes and maintains effective communications with the other staff sections.

d. **The accuracy of the information gathered** to complete paragraph 2 of the estimate and the quality of the analysis made in paragraph 3 of the estimate **are essential to the validity of the mobilization estimate.**

(1) **In paragraph 2, a net assessment is made of the mobilization capability in each resource area.** The net assessment consists of the time-phased mobilization capability or capacity in each resource area compared to the requirements of each COA. Shortages or overages should be identified and quantified in terms of the unit of measure used in the area (e.g., number of personnel, training seats, short tons, hospital beds, days of supply).

(2) **In paragraph 3, estimates of the impacts of mobilization activities in each resource area on the other areas are made** to determine if the mobilization action is feasible. For example, when a COA requires training base expansion, the analysis process for paragraph 3 should establish that there are enough qualified instructors, facilities, equipment, and medical support for an expanded training establishment. A shortage in one or more of these areas will limit the training base expansion and may render the COA infeasible.

e. **The completed analysis should support conclusions concerning the feasibility or infeasibility of each COA** with respect to mobilization and the ultimate staff recommendation on the best COA.

5. Mobilization Planning During Contingency Planning

During peacetime, mobilization planners in the JPEC participate in two primary activities: maintaining a mobilization base and participating in the contingency planning process to develop detailed mobilization plans to support OPLANs.

a. **Maintaining a mobilization base** at resource levels adequate to support the mobilization requirements of OPLANs is a **full-time peacetime task** for mobilization planners in all resource areas. Training exercises are used to evaluate adequacy of mobilization plans, resources, and training. **The mobilization base is defined as a pool of resources that can be made available to permit force expansion and sustainment when necessary.** The two most critical resources in the mobilization base are manpower and industrial base capacity because of the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment.

(1) **Manpower Programs.** With policy and planning guidance provided by OSD, **the Military Departments manage manpower programs**, which include RC manpower pools, with the numbers of personnel and the skill mix required to meet estimated wartime sustainability requirements. The IRR and other IA pools are maintained by a combination of laws and policies, such as the 8-year military service obligation (Title 10, USC, Section 12103) and programs for recruiting and retaining skilled RC personnel. Manpower programs are funded through the PPBE process. Manpower mobilization base maintenance is also supported by the SSS, which will draw on a pool of 18- to 26-year-old registrants if a military draft is required to sustain the force and is enabled by legislation.

(2) **Industrial Preparedness Programs.** Military Department and DOD agency **objectives for materiel and equipment sustainability are to maintain war reserve stocks of critical equipment** in sufficient quantities to fulfill estimated sustainability requirements until industrial base output can be expanded to meet expected consumption rates. **The basis for industrial preparedness planning is the CCDRs' CIL.** The CIL is the accumulation of current inventory items (consumable and non-consumable) that each CCDR has identified as deficient through routine reporting in the CJCS's Joint Forces Readiness Report.

(3) **Maintaining a mobilization base in the other resource areas requires planning and investment** by the Military Departments for mobilization activities such as facilities and training base expansion, mobilization of strategic and CONUS transportation resources, and expanding HSS capabilities.

b. **Contingency planning** is planning that occurs in non-crisis situations. Mobilization planning takes place in every phase of the contingency planning process. In contingency planning, the total requirement for RC forces to support the OPLAN must be identified and documented once the plan is complete. The RC requirements summary tables list the aggregate RC support necessary for the execution of the OPLAN, and are used as the numerical justification for requesting specific legal authorities and levels of mobilization, and will be included in annex A (Task Organization). **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II: Planning Formats* establishes the standard formats and guidance for developing OPLANs.**

For further information see CJCSI 3110.13C, Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

c. **Functions of the Contingency Planning Process.** The functions of contingency planning as depicted in Figure V-2 include strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan refinement. Each step of the RC requirements process (in context with the contingency planning process) is described in subsequent subparagraphs.




Figure V-2. Contingency Planning Process

(1) **Strategic Guidance.** The GFMIG provides for the apportionment of major combat forces and selected special operations forces (SOF). These and other force requirements are broadly defined by the supported CCDR's strategic concept and **time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD)** letter of instruction (LOI) to guide plan development. Strategic guidance planning should accomplish the following:

(a) **Consider implications of RC use** that are not limited to the strategic guidance function of contingency planning. Apportioned RC combat forces and major theater combat service (CS)/combat service support (CSS) are known but visibility of smaller RC units will only occur after sourcing is complete. Provide input or feedback on RC requirements and assumptions to the staffing of high-level guidance documents such as the GEF, GDF, JSCP, and CJCSI 3110.13C, *Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

(b) **Participate in the planner's development** of the supported CCDR's TPFDD LOI and related actions to ensure that RC mobilization guidance and taskings are visible and understood for apportioned RC major combat forces, SOF units, and theater level CS and CSS units.

(c) **Review the LOI** to ensure the stated requirement for the aggregate RC requirements are contained in annex A (Task Organization) to the OPLAN.

(2) **Concept Development.** During this function, the mobilization planner becomes familiar with the CCDR's strategic concept and TPFDD LOI and checks each for consistent RC planning factors such as force structure available during the planning cycle, scheduled conversions, activations, and inactivations. If there are inconsistencies, the **mobilization planner provides immediate feedback** to the supported CCDR. The product created during concept development is the supported CCDR's total force requirement.

(3) **Plan Development.** During plan development, plan TPFDD sourcing occurs (See Figure V-2). The Services select units to meet the time-phased requirements of the supported CCDR. When the Services source a plan TPFDD, the contingency planner, with the mobilization planner's advice, adds an important dimension to the sourcing process by considering where Service capabilities reside. These selected units may be active forces, a combination of AC and RC, or even combinations that include civilian and contractor support. After requirements are determined, there must be a concerted effort to identify component sourcing, either AC or RC, to increase the accuracy of specifying the total RC units and manpower required. At the end of this phase, the draft TPFDD is available. Normally, this provides the bulk of the RC requirement and enables the supported combatant command's mobilization planner to create the draft RC requirements. At this point, the TPFDD is sourced and considered final. However, the RC requirements must still be finalized by each Service using TPFDD data. The Services and supporting CCDRs give the supported CCDR draft data that must be compiled and included in the supporting plans to complete the RC

requirement (See Figure V-3). Once a plan is completed, the original mobilization assumptions are either validated or refuted.



Figure V-3. Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements

(4) **Plan Refinement.** In plan refinement, the Joint Staff (JS) conducts a formal review of the OPLAN. The J-4 mobilization planner and other Joint Staff directorates' review the RC requirements summaries and supporting data. The supporting CCDRs and Services finalize requirements in several areas: movement of the force, mobilization and deployment support, sustainment operations, and backfill capabilities. CONUS-based and other forces supporting the deployment are not included on the TPFDD, but the requirements are identified and planned. During execution planning each requirement is justified, the RC unit is selected, and called to active duty.

d. **RC Requirements Summary Tables.** The summary tables identify RC forces and support forces required to accomplish the following: deploy to the GCC's area of responsibility (AOR); move the force; assist in mobilization, deployment, and sustainment; and backfill departing AC units and individuals. Too often, war planners are unaware of the total RC requirement to support the OPLAN under development. The CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II: Planning Formats*, JSCP; and CJCSI 3110.13C, *Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, require completion of annex A (Task Organization) to OPLANs. The RC portion of annex A (Task Organization) should contain the number of RC requirement summaries necessary to support requests for mobilization legal authorities. For instance, if the flexible deterrent option (FDO) phase of the plan requires PRC and a subsequent phase requires partial mobilization, separate RC requirements summaries must be prepared for each of these phases to support the requests for PRC and

subsequently for partial mobilization. It is not necessary to prepare a separate RC requirement summary for each OPLAN FDO. Mobilization planners analyze FDOs in the aggregate to determine the point at which PRC becomes necessary and prepare one summary to support the request. These summaries provide senior leadership with the data required to determine the level of mobilization necessary to execute various functions during planning. Figure V-4 is an example of a CCDR’s RC requirements summary to support an FDO associated with an OPLAN. This summary would be used by the mobilization planner to justify a recommendation to request a PRC. Figure V-4 is an example of a CCDR’s RC requirement summary to support OPLAN execution. The total RC requirement is over 200,000 reservists, indicating that partial mobilization authority is necessary for OPLAN execution.

(1) **RC in AOR.** During the plan development (following CCDR submission of

EXAMPLE: RESERVE COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY							
OPLAN 1234		X	FDO(s) RC26			PLAN EXECUTION	
S V C	RC IN AOR	MOVE THE FORCE	ASSIST MOB/ DEPLOY/SUSTAIN		BACKFILL		TOTAL RC PERSONNEL BY SERIVCE
			IMA	IRR/SELRES	CONUS	OCONUS	
			USA	0	1,200	310	
USN	0	300	33	1,200	600	220	2,353
USAF	0	1,300	140	1,550	990	20	4,000
USMC	0	25	60	90	270	150	595
USCG	0	0	3	15	0	10	28
TOTALS		2,825	546	3,755	2,560	750	10,436
AOR – area of responsibility				RC – Reserve Component			
CONUS – continental United States				SELRES – Selective Reserve			
FDO – flexible deterrent option				SVC – Service			
IMA – individual mobilization augmentee				USA – United States Army			
IRR – Individual Ready Reserve				USAF – United States Air Force			
MOB – mobilization				USCG – United States Coast Guard			
OCONUS – outside the continental United States				USMC – United States Marine Corps			
OPLAN – operation plan				USN – United States Navy			

Figure V-4. Example: Reserve Component Requirements Summary

total force requirements and development of a draft TPFDD), the Services calculate and provide the supported CCDR with two sets of data (RC unit and RC non-unit personnel in the TPFDD) that produce the RC manpower numbers in the “RC in AOR” column. This number is calculated to provide the best estimate of the RC portion of TPFDD non-unit personnel. This includes planned fillers and replacements, who may not all come from the AC, particularly if planning the second of two major operations or campaigns. For example, if 10,000 fillers and replacements are planned for deploying units, a planner might estimate that 2,000 of these would be RC. This could be based on predetermined assumptions such as physical location of active or RC forces; time to call-up and deploy RC forces; duration of decisive force in plan execution; or requirements to consider another major operation or campaign. Even though the plan and the TPFDD may not specify AC or RC for fillers and replacements, the mobilization planner provides the planner with assistance to define the RC portion of this requirement to complete the table.

(2) **Move the Force, Assist Mobilization, Deployment, or Sustainment, and Backfill.** During plan refinement, the Services, supporting CCDRs, USTRANSCOM, and other agencies define their non-TPFDD requirements to support complete plan execution. The Services coordinate with these organizations to identify actual RC forces needed to meet these requirements.

SECTION B. MOBILIZATION EXECUTION

6. Mobilization Decisions and Orders

a. **CJCS recommends to SecDef the assets that are to be called up and their planned use** when RC forces are to be mobilized to augment the AC. **SecDef approval is required for the execution of a mobilization OPORD.** Figure V-5 shows the mobilization execution planning process. In preparing a mobilization recommendation to the President, the following should be considered:




Figure V-5. Manpower Mobilization Execution Process

- (1) Assessments of the Services, CCDRs, and Service component commanders.
- (2) Input from the Joint Staff.
- (3) Technical advice, legal opinions, and policy considerations from OSD.

b. **After the President's decision to initiate mobilization, SecDef directs the Military Departments to proceed.** The Services publish mobilization orders in accordance with their respective procedures. OSD may issue implementation instructions and provide additional policy guidance, if required.

c. **Some mobilization actions require the President or SecDef to notify the Congress.** For example, some legal authorities require reports at specific intervals. Others require specific information on how the authority is being used and how long it will be needed. Reports on expenditures related to the crisis are also required. The CJCS and the DOD Comptroller are normally responsible for preparing these reports, which require continuous coordination throughout the JPEC. Figure V-6 illustrates the RC decision-making process.

7. Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization

Because mobilization involves interrelated activities in twelve resource areas, SecDef, OSD, CJCS, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and other members of the JPEC need accurate and timely information on the status and progress of mobilization. **Information received by proponents in each of the resource areas is analyzed and coordinated with the other resource area proponents** to provide decisionmakers with recommendations for controlling, replanning, redirecting, or stopping mobilization operations. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, provides detailed procedures and automated information to support operations planning and execution.

SECTION C. MOBILIZATION REPORTING

8. Reporting Requirements

a. Reporting involves extracting information that is obtained from monitoring activities; then, providing the data to appropriate organizations that are involved with mobilization and demobilization. The mobilization planner responds to formal and informal reporting requirements. The formal requirements are those specified in statutes or directives such as reporting to Congress, the Joint Staff, or the Services. Three formal reports are generated: RC requirements from annex A (Task Organization) of each OPLAN which lists the total RC requirements; the mobilization report (MOBREP); and during partial mobilization, the President's report to Congress. Figure V-7 illustrates the information flow for these reports.




Figure V-6. Reserve Component Decision-making Process

b. Informal or special case reporting may be required in response to congressional requests and queries. Future rotation plans, mobilization capability or status requests, limitations on reservists, seasonal or personal information, and redeployment and demobilization plans may be required to fulfill informal or special case reporting requirements.




Figure V-7. Mobilization Reporting Information Flows

c. Once the Services begin to order RC units and individuals to active duty, the joint reporting process begins. Joint reporting entails reporting on people and units. The MOBREP shows people available and/or mobilized. After direction from the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs (OASD[RA]), the Services daily (or as otherwise directed) submit the MOBREP to OASD(RA). Units update the Status of Resources and Training System database which is available for review on the local area network.

9. Four Subjects Require Reporting

a. **Problems in Providing Forces.** The Services must notify the requester and the JS if they are unable to provide RC forces by the specified dates. Then, the JS can attempt to resolve the problem. This is not a formal report, but is required promptly to ensure expeditious resolution.

b. **RC Forces No Longer Required.** All organizations monitor their missions to determine when RC capabilities are no longer required or if it is feasible to provide other means of support. Organizations with releasable RC forces inform the appropriate Service; in turn, the Service coordinates with USJFCOM/USSOCOM to determine if forces are needed elsewhere.

c. **Mobilization Information to J-3 Director of Operations As Required.** The JS J-4 coordinates with the J-3 briefing team to ascertain the information needed.

d. **Demobilization Schedules.** The Services have primary responsibility to demobilize their units and personnel. The Services will reconcile demobilization timelines with the supported CCDR's priorities and will notify CCDRs who have assigned/attached RC forces of the planned demobilization dates and corresponding timeline accounting for demobilization movement and out processing.

CHAPTER VI JOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”

**Resolution of the Continental Congress
(Disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784)**

1. Introduction

a. **Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a conflict situation or from a wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration** while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It involves more than releasing personnel from active duty, deactivating units, and reorganizing the RC. Although these activities drive the process, capability or capacity in the other resource areas must be reduced and reorganized at the same time. As in mobilization, **activities in each resource area during demobilization will affect each of the others.** For this reason, close coordination among resource area proponents is just as important during demobilization as it is during mobilization.

b. **This chapter provides the national and joint military perspectives of demobilization planning and execution.** It also provides guidelines for demobilization planning and execution and an overview of demobilization activities in the twelve resource areas.

SECTION A. DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING

2. Demobilization and National Security

a. From a national perspective, **the results of a successful demobilization process should put the United States in a position to respond to future challenges to our national security.** Policies should be established to regulate the pace of demobilization and **retain the military capability required to ensure post-conflict national security commitments.** Force structure changes are not inherent to the demobilization process. **Industrial base and other civil sector resources mobilized during the conflict will be released** to fuel the post-conflict national economy.

b. **The scope of demobilization will vary according to the extent of the preceding mobilization.** The scope of mobilization can range from a relatively brief use of a few volunteer reservists to a protracted force and resource expansion well beyond the original peacetime levels.

c. From a joint military perspective, **demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of supported GCCs** and be synchronized with plans for recovery,

reconstitution, and redeployment operations. **DOD policies for the release of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements** and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families. The demobilization personnel management programs of the Military Departments will be challenged to facilitate the return of Service members and their families to civilian life and need to provide substantive **transition assistance**, such as screening for medical care requirements and potential long-term health care support, and assistance in availing themselves of statutory reemployment rights, as members reenter the civilian workforce. National Guard and reserve units and members ordered to active duty to augment the AC will, consistent with operational requirements, receive priority for redeployment. They will be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible.

3. Demobilization Planning Guidelines

Studies of the demobilizations following the two World Wars and the Gulf War provide valuable lessons for today’s demobilization planners and have been distilled into the following **guidelines illustrated in Figure VI-1 for demobilization planning and execution**:

a. **Mission First.** Demobilization plans must support the post-conflict mission as it evolves. **The supported commander’s immediate postwar priorities should come first.** As the transition to a post-conflict state proceeds, long-range national security objectives should drive demobilization activities to ensure the Armed Forces are prepared for the next crisis.

b. **Begin Planning Early.** Demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilization starts.




Figure VI-1. Demobilization Planning Guidelines

c. **Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies.** The demobilization policies and procedures that worked best in the past were those that had been developed and coordinated by interested personnel and agencies both within and outside DOD. Public information programs that explained demobilization policies helped gain and maintain public support.

4. Planning Considerations

a. **Demobilizing the Armed Forces** could be a relatively straightforward return of mobilized/activated units and individuals to their former status. It could also be a broader process including measures such as deactivation of units, rapid discharge of individuals, and a major reorganization of the RC. Similarly, **demobilization of the defense industry** could range from an almost total reconversion of a defense-oriented industrial base to a simple reduction in the output of a few providers who surged production to meet the near-term demands of a short-lived crisis.

b. **Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization.** These include activities for restoring force readiness (reset/reconstitution) and controlling the rate of industrial base conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. As manpower is being released from the Services and industrial production is being cut back, the Services must retain or replace skilled manpower required to restore readiness and replenish war reserves and other stocks to be prepared for the next crisis.

c. **Demobilization planning is accomplished at two levels.** At the national level, the President and SecDef must decide on the rate of demobilization and the size and composition of the post-conflict force structure and its resource base. These **national-level** decisions drive demobilization planning and resource requests at the **theater and supporting levels**. They also guide the post-conflict activities of the supported and supporting commanders.

d. **The key to military demobilization is the supported GCC.** The supported GCC's mission and requirements should take precedence over all others. **Other general planning factors should include:**

- (1) The situation and requirements in other theaters. SecDef, with the advice of CJCS, should establish a priority of support.
- (2) Future missions in the theater.
- (3) Availability of strategic lift for redeployment.
- (4) CONUS reception and processing capacities for manpower and materiel.

5. Recovery Planning

a. **Recovery planning should be closely coordinated with demobilization planning.** Recovery includes the reset actions necessary in the theater and CONUS base to restore force readiness and a credible capability to respond, in the short term, to a future threat. **Included are activities such as:**

- (1) Rebuilding of major equipment items.
- (2) Restoring personnel strength and training readiness to required wartime levels for future contingencies.
- (3) Restoring war reserve stocks to acceptable levels.
- (4) Maintaining essential industrial surge and expansion capabilities.
- (5) Finalizing recovery of redeployed equipment returned to CONUS or addressing shortages created by remain-behind equipment requirements.
- (6) Terminating war-related contracts for the convenience of the government.
- (7) Reestablishing contracts at garrison or home base as troops return.
- (8) Restoring pre-positioning ships and embarked equipment and stores.

b. **The planning and resourcing of these activities are the responsibility of OSD and the Military Departments.** CJCS assists SecDef in providing strategic direction for these efforts.

SECTION B. EXECUTION

6. General

Demobilization activities can begin before the end of the crisis or war as the need for resources diminishes and assets for demobilization support become available. **Most demobilization actions, however, will commence following the conflict** when immediate post-conflict missions have been assigned by the supported GCC and requirements for military forces and resources decline. Although demobilization, like mobilization, is essentially a Military Department responsibility, **the supported and supporting commanders play coordinating and synchronizing roles.** In any event, **the CCDRs monitor the status and progress of demobilization and concurrent recovery operations** to assess the adequacy of actions to restore readiness of assigned forces to required levels for future conflicts.

7. Demobilization Execution

Following redeployment, the Military Departments deactivate units or return them to a reserve status. **Military personnel** are released from active duty or returned to reserve status. The number of **civilian employees** may be reduced. **Materiel and equipment** may be returned to bases of origin or other reserve/guard units, moth-balled, stored, distributed to other nations through foreign military sales or other security assistance programs, destroyed, sold for scrap, or turned over to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office. As with mobilization, assets in the other resource areas are required to support the demobilization of manpower and equipment; but as these support requirements decline, **demobilization activities are accomplished in the other resource areas**. Representative actions in other resource areas are listed in Figure VI-2.

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOBILIZATION ACTIONS IN RESOURCE AREAS	
RESOURCE AREA	ACTION
Material/Equipment	War reserve stocks are restored to acceptable levels and redeployed equipment returned to the continental United States (CONUS) is recovered.
Manpower	Cargo handling and port security Reserve Component (RC) are mobilized to support the redeployment of materiel and equipment returned to CONUS. Move returning activated units and personnel to homestations/demobilization sites and return them to reserve duty as appropriate.
Transportation	Strategic air mobility and sealift assets are deactivated or returned to the RC or to the private sector.
Facilities	Buildings are closed, sold, or returned to the private sector or host nations. Staffing is reduced. Contracts for services and utilities are reduced or terminated.
Industrial Base	Contracts are reduced in scope or terminated. Production capacity is laid away or converted to commercial use.
Training Base	Capacity is reduced by closing training centers or reducing staffs and other resources to provide capacity based on future demands.
Health Service Support	Hospital resources and staffs provided by the National Disaster Medical System or the Department of Veteran Affairs-Department of Defense Contingency Plan are released when no longer required. Medical force structure is deactivated or returned to a reserve status. Contracts with nongovernment and host-nation providers are terminated. Appropriate medical screening and assessment of long-term medical needs for affected personnel is undertaken.
Communications Support	National and joint assets are redeployed. Leased capacity and equipment from commercial sources are reduced in scope or terminated.
Host-Nation Support	Agreements and contracts with host governments or commercial providers are renegotiated or terminated. For specific guidance of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, refer to Department of Defense Directive 2010.9.
Environment	Military Departments and Department of Defense agencies act to meet environmental standards and regulations with cleanup and other appropriate activities.
Legal Authorities	The President informs the Congress when legal authorities invoked for the crisis are no longer needed and are revoked or rescinded.
Funding	Funding required for demobilization and recovery activities is provided in accordance with established peacetime procedures.

Figure VI-2. Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas

SECTION C. MOBILIZATION PLANNER DEMOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

8. Purpose

This section describes the mobilization planner's role in the demobilization process. Only the manpower portion of the demobilization process is discussed. RC units and individuals are released from active duty under the demobilization process. Although not as time-sensitive as mobilization, demobilization is a complex operation that requires detailed planning and execution.

a. **Demobilization planning should occur during an operation** for the following reasons: expiration of authorized service time; changes in the forces required; or political emphasis to demobilize forces. Mobilization and demobilization may occur simultaneously. Consequently, **each Service must ensure that demobilization plans are flexible, consistent, responsive, and sufficiently comprehensive to meet all contingencies.** From a joint military perspective, **demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of supported GCCs** and be synchronized with plans for **recovery, reconstitution, and redeployment operations.** **DOD policies for the release of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements** and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families.

b. Poorly planned and executed demobilization operations will have two major impacts: **degradation to supported operations and reduced support for the RC program.** Demobilization needs to be integrated into the redeployment. From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and redeployment operations. Figure VI-3 shows the demobilization activities.

c. A summary of these activities and the specific tasks the mobilization planner accomplishes is found in Annex E, "Demobilization Activities," to Appendix C, "Mobilization Information Management Plan." This summary is a reference of the tasks that must be accomplished at each organizational level to avoid poorly planned and executed demobilization operations.

9. Preliminary Actions

Preliminary actions set the stage for planning and executing a successful demobilization. Primarily, they involve **establishing and disseminating broad guidance** that the mobilization community incorporates into mobilization plans.




Figure VI-3. Demobilization Activities

a. **Establish Demobilization Concepts and Policies.** Mobilization planners assist in selecting units for demobilization, defining the process, and integrating demobilization into the joint operation planning and execution system. **DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves***, establishes demobilization policy. This directive states that “Units and individuals of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty without their consent shall be kept on active duty no longer than absolutely necessary. They shall be released from active duty as promptly as possible, consistent with operational requirements.” This directive includes the following additional policies:

- (1) Units activated as a unit should be demobilized as a unit;
- (2) Medically cleared personnel should be demobilized with their unit; and

(3) To the extent feasible and consistent with operational requirements, follow on missions should be assigned to active component forces rather than call-up of demobilized RC units. Figure VI-4 gives examples of demobilization policy issues and Appendix F, “References,” lists other documents that provide mobilization guidance.

b. **Provide Input to the JSCP on RC Forces Demobilization.** Mobilization planners address issues such as demobilization support requirements, assumptions on release of forces, RC support of redeployment operations, and times necessary to conduct demobilization. Broad references to demobilization may be appropriate for inclusion in the JSCP while more detailed assumptions and guidance should be included in the classified document, CJCSI 3110.13C, *Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (U)*, published subsequent to each JSCP.




Figure VI-4. Demobilization Policy Issues

10. Planning

Demobilization planning involves **reviewing policies** and **establishing procedures** to demobilize. Planners determine operational support requirements and identify the forces to demobilize and those to support the demobilization operations. The planning function is divided into **two subactivities**: plan demobilization force and plan demobilization support (See Figure VI-5).

a. **Plan Demobilization Force.** This activity establishes the **criteria for selecting forces** for demobilization, selecting units, and developing a time-phased schedule. This is essentially the same thought process followed during execution. **Tasks in planning the demobilization force include:**

(1) **Determine Redeployment and Demobilization Strategy.** The Services develop broad concepts for demobilization that are the basis for subsequent detailed planning. These areas include ports, demobilization stations, equipment return policies, medical processing and follow-up, personnel support requirements, and equipment disposition.

For additional guidance on redeployment, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.





Figure VI-5. Demobilization Planning Functions

(a) Mobilization planners must consider carefully those functional areas where most, if not all, of the capability is in the RC. If additional units must be mobilized, shortages of the capability could exist. For example, units may not be available to provide a rotational base in the functional area; in that case, with the onset of another operation, the RC may not be able to support both contingencies.

(b) **Equipment retrograde has manpower implications.** Equipment may be returned from the mission location directly to the unit or may be sent to a processing center for refurbishment. Sometimes equipment may remain in the theater or be transferred to other nations. These considerations may cause personnel from demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment. The mobilization planners must incorporate these decisions into demobilization plans.

(2) **Develop Tentative Demobilization Schedule.** The Services create a tentative demobilization schedule based on the assumed level of mobilization. This schedule is used to develop more detailed plans and to estimate resource requirements. Likewise, the commands where the RC forces will be assigned develop schedules to determine support requirements and to ensure the continuation of specific capabilities. Mobilization planners must ascertain if replacement units are required; if they are, the mobilization planners then coordinate with force planners to schedule the overlap with the replacement units.

b. **Plan Demobilization Support.** In this second subactivity mobilization planners consider the specific forces, such as medical, logistic, and transportation, needed to



Equipment retrograde considerations may cause personnel from demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment.

support demobilization; also, they develop more detailed demobilization procedures. During this effort, the mobilization planners must address the support issues such as backfill, ports, demobilization stations, equipment retrograde, processing, and redistribution, outprocessing procedures, and leave policies. **Demobilization support tasks include:**

(1) **Determine Redeployment Support Requirements.** Having determined the RC forces required to support the redeployment of units and individuals, supported CCDRs coordinate with force planners to incorporate these additional requirements into the TPFDD. Other organizations coordinate their requirements with the Services.

(2) **Determine Required Outprocessing.** The Service mobilization planners allot the time and resources necessary for personnel, finance, legal, and medical processing accomplished at the transportation hubs and demobilization stations. They ensure that these factors are integrated into planned movement schedules and that organizations with RC forces are given the information. Service mobilization planners also plan for the homecoming support and ceremonies.

(3) **Determine, Source, and Approve Forces Needed to Support Demobilization.** The Services and CCDRs develop and source the additional manpower needed to support the redeployment; to backfill for departing units; and to support homecoming activities within CONUS. After the Services approve the additional requirements, these must be integrated with all other mobilization resources to ensure that ceilings are not violated.

11. Execution

a. Before demobilization is executed, mobilization planners must ensure that a unit or individual will not be needed for the operation. Politically, recall of units once demobilized will be difficult to justify; therefore, the Services should be conservative in releasing forces, especially if they involve unique units or skills. In assessing the continuing need for the RC forces, the mobilization planners must consider the entire DOD response, since an RC unit not needed by one component may be useful to another organization.

b. During execution, mobilization planners constantly tailor the demobilization operation envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation. They staff recommendations and obtain decisions regarding units and individuals to be demobilized and adapt the demobilization support structure.

c. Mobilization planners participate in the following execution tasks:

(1) **Educate the Leadership.** Provide the decisionmakers with information on demobilization plans and policies, including the schedule of units and the number of personnel to be demobilized and those units and personnel already demobilized. When staffing demobilization recommendations, the mobilization planners ensure that both

public and congressional affairs are included in the actions. The mobilization planners should alert their leadership that RC call-ups may continue through all phases of an operation to provide an evolving logistics operations support system which must continue after the combat or crisis phase is complete. It is particularly important to ensure that the leadership does not prematurely recommend ending the emergency which may provide the legal basis for the mobilization of needed RC forces.

(2) **Review and Modify Demobilization Concepts and Support Plans.** The mobilization planners need to update the existing demobilization plan, created in the planning environment, to ensure that the demobilization concepts, policies, and supporting plans are accurate and reflect actual circumstances. They staff the demobilization plans with the appropriate organizations to verify that the users understand the demobilization concept and to enable them to modify their plans and operations.

(3) **Monitor Changing Requirements and Theater Backfill Requirements.** Since demobilization is a fluid process, the mobilization planners continue to review changing operational requirements which may result in units' being demobilized or extended. The supported CCDR must notify the Services, JS, and supporting CCDRs when units or individuals are no longer required or when it is feasible to use alternative manpower sources. If the requirement continues to exist, the appropriate Services, supported CCDR, and supporting CCDRs must request authority to extend the active duty period or obtain rotational units for replacement.

(4) **Seek Demobilization Approval.** The supported CCDR identifies units and individuals no longer required to support operations in the redeployment plan. Based on the redeployment plan, each Service will develop a demobilization list which is then disseminated within the Service for action. Authority to approve the demobilization list will depend on the Service and the particular operation that may be delegated.

(5) **Develop Demobilization Schedule.** Working closely with the affected organizations and USTRANSCOM, the Services create a demobilization schedule. The schedule includes forces to be demobilized, specific demobilization times, and projected release dates from theater, ports, and demobilization stations. When the schedule is complete, the Services ensure that organizations with RC forces review the schedule and update their supporting plans.

(6) **Monitor RC Mobilizations and Demobilizations.** The mobilization planners start monitoring and reporting on RC units from the beginning of mobilization and these activities continue through demobilization. This tracking is necessary to obtain information to keep the leadership and Congress apprised of RC actions during the operation. Chapter V, "Mobilization Planning and Execution," Section C, "Mobilization Reporting," covers this function in detail.

(7) **Highlight Critical Support Issues in Situation Reports (SITREPs) and Other Forums.** Using the SITREPs, other JOPES reports, and special functional reports

or news groups, the mobilization planner presents conflicts and critical issues to the leadership and the appropriate organization. The mobilization planners' early action enables the responsible individuals and commands to resolve issues expeditiously before they become roadblocks to further activities.

(8) **Terminate Legal Authorities.** Once RC forces are no longer needed to support the operation, demobilization of remaining RC forces will occur. Upon complete demobilization the JS will inform the SecDef that there is no longer a need for RC forces in support of the operation. The SecDef may terminate the authorization to order RC forces to active duty (if such authorization was granted or delegated to the SecDef), direct the Services to terminate the order to activate RC forces, or inform the President so that the Presidential authorization may be withdrawn. This authority automatically is terminated if the President or Congress retracts the original declaration of national emergency. The same legislation that authorizes mobilization implements certain emergency authorities and capabilities. These depend upon the original mobilization authority continuing for their enforcement. Examples of this legislation include those which suspend certain laws pertaining to the promotion, separation, and retirement of active duty personnel (stop loss) and the suspension of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Until the need for supporting or related authorities is eliminated, planners should urge the SecDef, through the CJCS, not to rescind the order or declaration authorizing the call-up.

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APPENDIX A LEGAL AUTHORITIES

1. General

a. Flexible and adaptive mobilization planning requires a range of options available both before and after a national emergency is declared. A broad range of legal authorities support mobilization actions ranging from mobilization for contingency operations, which does not require a declaration of national emergency, as well as full-scale war or other national emergencies. Due to the highly specific nature of legal authorities supporting mobilization actions, it is important that the JPEC and commanders responsible for mobilizing reserve forces consult frequently with staff legal counsel to ensure specific actions are implemented consistent with legal requirements.

b. Mobilization legal authority is available without a declaration of national emergency when invoked by the President or, upon delegation, SecDef, Secretary of a Military Department, or authority designated by the Secretary concerned under the provisions of Title 10, USC, Section 12301. Examples of such authorities are the PRC pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 12304; the President's option to suspend any provision of law pertaining to promotion, retirement, or separation of a Service member during an RC activation (the stop-loss authority) pursuant to Title 10, Sections 123 and 12305; the Military Department Secretaries' authority to recall regular and reserve military retirees pursuant to Title 10, USC, Sections 12307 and 12308; and authorities requiring priority performance on defense contracts pursuant to Title 50, USC, Section 2071.

c. A national emergency can be declared by the President, the Congress, or both. Current law regarding national emergencies is contained in the National Emergencies Act of 1976 (Title 50, USC, Sections 1601-1651). The act provides that when the President declares a national emergency, the specific authorities must be included in the declaration, or by one or more contemporaneous or subsequent executive orders. Presidential powers are limited to those authorities invoked until the President subsequently announces the invocation of additional specified authorities (Title 50, USC, Section 1631). Congress may terminate the President's declaration at any time with a concurrent resolution and must review the declaration and situation every six months (Title 50, USC, Section 1622).

d. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 greatly reduced the risk that a declaration of national emergency would send overly provocative signals of US intent to adversaries and unduly alarm allies. With the same broad range of emergency powers, the President can now tailor the national response in a crisis, without undue provocation, and convey more accurate signals of US intent to allies as well as adversaries.

e. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (Title 50, USC, Sections 1541-1548) is a statute, enacted over Presidential veto, that attempts to impose limits upon the President's authority as Commander in Chief over the armed forces to introduce the Armed Forces of the United States into hostilities or potentially hostile situations. Presidents have consistently maintained that the law unconstitutionally intrudes upon Presidential

authority. Among other things, the statute attempts to impose consultation and reporting requirements related to the introduction of armed forces into hostilities. While no President has accepted the limitations imposed by the WPR, Presidents have directed the DOD to prepare reports “consistent” with the reporting provisions of the WPR. Accordingly, while the statute itself does not control mobilization, the President may require the preparation of a report, “consistent with the provisions of the WPR,” regarding the status of the US forces, including mobilized RC forces, involved in hostilities.

f. The “Digest of War and Emergency Legislation Affecting the Department of Defense, 2003” lists nearly 400 emergency authorities available for mobilization and crisis planning. This appendix identifies and briefly describes or provides excerpts of many legal authorities relevant to those emergency authorities most likely to affect joint mobilization planning and execution. Additional resources with mobilization authorities include the “Selected Defense-Related Laws” (Vol II - as amended through December 31, 2003), published by the Committee on Armed Services of the US House of Representatives. These references should assist planners, but do not eliminate the need to consult with staff legal counsel.

2. Manpower

Individual and unit members of the RC and retired personnel may be ordered to active duty voluntarily or involuntarily under authorities provided in Title 10, USC. Figure A-1 illustrates RC accessibility.

a. **Voluntary Order to Active Duty.** The Military Department Secretaries may order any member of the RC, under their jurisdiction, to active duty with the consent of the member (National Guard [Title 32, USC] also requires consent of the state governor) at any time (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[d]). Funding is the limiting factor for the use of this authority. RC members who are voluntarily on active duty for over three years, or a cumulative more than three years over a four-year period, will be counted against AC end strengths. RC personnel are exempted from certain officer and enlisted grade limits.

b. **Presidential Reserve Call-up.** The President may activate any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve or any member of the IRR (designated as essential under regulations prescribed by the Military Department Secretary concerned) without their consent for periods of up to 365 days when it is determined necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission (Title 10, USC, Section 12304). Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the IRR may be on active duty under this section at any one time, of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the IRR. Specifically, the law provided the authority for the President “to order a unit or member to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction; or a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the US that results, or could result, in significant loss of life or property.” The 365-day limit (increased in Section 522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007) is tied to

UNITED STATES CODE – RESERVE COMPONENT ACCESSIBILITY						
Title 10, US Code (USC)	Armed Forces					
Statute	Execution	Action	Member Consent Required?	Pax Limit?	Duration	Comment
Title 10, USC, Section 12301(a)	In time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned	Order any unit or member not assigned to a unit to active duty	No	No	War, emergency + 6 months	Includes activation of member for training
Full Mobilization/Ready Reserve						
Title 10, USC, Section 12301(b)	At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned	Order any unit or member not assigned to a unit to active duty	No	No	No more than 15 days/year	
Title 10, USC, Section 12301(d)	At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned	Order or retain a member on active duty	Yes	No	No limit	Army National Guard and Air National Guard requires consent of governor concerned
Volunteers/Entire Reserve Force						
Title 10, USC, Section 12302	In time of national emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law	Order any unit or member not assigned to a unit to active duty	No	Yes. No more than 1M.	No more than 24 consecutive months	
Partial Mobilization/Ready Reserve						
Title 10, USC, Section 12304	President determines it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission or to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving a terrorist attack or use of weapons of mass destruction (actual or threatened), then he authorizes the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to call to active duty	Order any unit or member not assigned to a unit to active duty	No	200K overall from Selected Reserve and individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (up to 30K from IRR [must be in special IRR category to be available])	Up to 365 days	Includes activation of member for training. May not be used to provide assistance to US Government or a State for a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe unrelated to terrorism.
Presidential Reserve Call-Up/Selected Reserve						
Title 10, USC, Section 12306	In time of emergency when additional capabilities are required as authorized by section 12301 of this Title, the Secretary concerned with approval of SecDef	Order units and members of the Stand-by Reserve	Yes (but can be superseded by the SecDef based on need)	Defined within Title 10, USC, Section 12301	Within parameters of Title 10, USC, Section 12301 above	Includes activation of member for training
Title 10, USC, Section 12307	At any time – including war, national emergency declared by Congress – the Secretary concerned	Order qualified Retired Reservist to active duty	No	Defined within Title 10, USC, Section 12301	See Title 10, USC, Sections 688 and 12301(a)	Includes activation of member for training
Title 32, USC	The National Guard (Provides federal funding for qualifying duties performed under the command and control of Governor of State/Commonwealth/Territory).					
Title 14, USC	Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary					

Figure A-1. United States Code – Reserve Component Accessibility

each unit or individual and starts with the day that particular unit or individual is called up (therefore rotations are feasible as long as the cap is not exceeded and no personnel

are retained involuntarily on active duty in excess of 365 days). PRC automatically brings the operation within the Title 10, USC definition of a “contingency operation.” Presidential declaration of a national emergency is not a prerequisite to authorizing PRC. Recalled reservists do not count against active duty end strengths.

c. **Partial Mobilization Authority.** Following a Presidential declaration of national emergency, the President may order to active duty (other than for training) up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve, without their consent, for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months (Title 10, USC, Section 12302) (24 cumulative months by DOD policy). As with PRC, the clock starts for each unit or individual as of the time they enter involuntary active duty.

d. **Full Mobilization Authority.** The President, upon a congressional declaration of national emergency or war may authorize the Military Department Secretaries, or their designees, to order to active duty any member of the RC, without their consent, for the duration of the emergency or war plus six months (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[a]). Members in inactive or retired status are not recallable under this provision without the approval of SecDef.

e. **Total Mobilization Authority.** The President, upon a congressional declaration of national emergency or war, and with passage of legislation authorizing force expansion, may authorize the Services to add new forces and personnel necessary to achieve national security objectives.

f. **Active Duty Retiree Recall.** Under Title 10, USC, Section 688 and regulations established by SecDef, the Military Department Secretaries are authorized, at any time, to recall (without their consent) retired members of the ACs, members of the Retired Reserve who were retired under Title 10, USC, Sections 1293, 3911, 3914, 6323, 8911, or 8914, or members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Reserve (this includes reserve members who retired from active duty with less than 20 years under Temporary Early Retirement Authority). This authorization does not require a declaration of national emergency or war.

g. **Retired Reserve Recall.** Reserve members in a retired status (other than those who fall under the provisions of Active Duty Retiree Recall described above) may be recalled involuntarily to active duty only in time of war or national emergency as declared by the Congress. This authority requires that the Military Department Secretaries, with the approval of SecDef, first determine that there are not enough qualified reservists, available in the required categories, to fill the required billets (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[a]).

h. **Recall of the Standby Reserve.** Units and members in the Standby Reserve may be ordered to active duty (other than for training) only as provided in Title 10, USC, Sections 12301(a) and 12306. In addition, this authority requires that the Military Department Secretaries first determine that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve in the required categories who are readily available.

i. **Call to Active Duty of Delayed Entry Program Personnel.** Qualified personnel with no prior military service may be enlisted as untrained members of the IRR for up to 365 days before reporting for active duty under Title 10, USC, Section 513. All such persons may be ordered to active duty under all provisions of the law and regulations applying to the IRR.

j. **Stop-Loss Authority.** This authority stops normal attrition of experienced military personnel through expiration of enlistments, retirements, and other routine releases from active duty. With this authority, during any period RC members have been involuntarily ordered to active duty, the President may suspend any provision of law relating to retirement, promotion, separation of military personnel determined to be essential to the national security (Title 10, USC, Section 12305).

k. **Conscription.** If Congress deems it necessary under the Selective Service Act (Title 50, USC, Sections 451-473), the SSS can begin involuntarily drafting eligible, nonexempt men for military service. Repeal of Title 50, USC, Section 467(c) is necessary before the SSS may initiate an involuntary draft of NPS personnel.

l. **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).** USERRA (Title 38, USC, Sections 4301-4335) is a federal law intended to ensure that persons who serve or have served in the Armed Forces (AC or RC) or other “uniformed services” are:

- (1) not disadvantaged in their civilian careers because of their service;
- (2) promptly reemployed in their civilian jobs upon their return from duty; and
- (3) not discriminated against in employment based on past, present, or future military service.

m. The Service member’s Civil Relief Act provides a number of statutory protections for activated military members, especially for members of the National Guard and reserve forces. Examples include a 6% rate cap on obligations, a 90 day stay of proceedings, and the right to terminate auto and residential leases under certain circumstances. Members should contact their servicing staff judge advocate for further information.

3. The Defense Production Act of 1950

Authority for expanding capability or capacity in the materiel and equipment, transportation and industrial base resource areas is provided by the Defense Production Act. This act (Title 50, USC, Sections 2061-2171), which has been periodically revised and renewed by Congress, provides the basis for the DPAS. It authorizes the President, in peace, conflict, and war, to divert national resources deemed critical to the national defense from civil to military use, and reorder economic priorities to provide for the

national defense and national security. Specifically, the President may require private sector providers of materials and services, identified as essential and critical to national defense, to give priority performance to defense contracts and orders. The President may also authorize government agencies, like DOD, DOT, and Department of Commerce, to guarantee loans needed by defense contractors to expedite production, deliveries, or service.

4. Facilities

There are three fundamental emergency authorities available to facilitate construction projects required to expand facilities during mobilization.

a. **Emergency Construction Authority.** The Secretary of a Military Department is authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 2803 to execute emergency military construction projects if the Secretary determines: the project is vital to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment; and the requirement for the project is so urgent that to defer it for the next military construction authorization act would be inconsistent with national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment. Per Title 10, USC, Section 2803 the maximum amount a Secretary may obligate in any fiscal year is \$50 million, taken from the unobligated balances of funds appropriated for military construction.

b. **Contingency Construction.** SecDef is authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 2804 to execute contingency military construction projects, before a declaration of national emergency, upon determination that the deferral of the projects would be inconsistent with national security or national interest. Specific funding limits can change each year. Members should consult with staff judge advocate to determine current contingency construction limits and requirements.

c. **Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency.** In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency requiring use of the Armed Forces, SecDef may undertake construction projects needed to support the Armed Forces without specific legislative authorization. Such projects, however, must be able to be completed within the total amount of unobligated military construction funds, including funds appropriated for family housing per Title 10, USC, Section 2808.

d. **Recapture and Condemnation of Real Property.** There are more than 60 permanent laws in the USC authorizing the President, SecDef, or specified Secretary of a Military Department to recapture specific parcels of former federal property for defense purposes. In general, the availability of these authorities is contingent on a declaration of national emergency by the President or Congress or the existence of a state of war. As a practical matter, many of these sites have been rendered virtually unusable for defense purposes, because of commercial development undertaken over the years since some of these laws were enacted (some as early as 1925). The US Army Corps of Engineers, however, maintains a list of properties still usable for national defense purposes. In

addition, Title 10, USC, Section 2663 authorizes Secretaries of the Military Departments to bring condemnation proceedings, in courts with appropriate jurisdiction, to acquire land or facilities deemed necessary for a variety of defense purposes including construction of training sites, and production of explosives or other munitions of war.

5. Training Base Expansion

There are no legal authorities specifically directed to expansion of the military training base in connection with mobilization. Training base expansion activities, however, may require activation of RC training units and individual manpower, expansion of facilities, equipment, and transportation resources, under emergency authorities pertaining to these resource areas. Training base expansion plans must also take into account the provision of Title 10, USC, Section 671, which requires a minimum of 12 weeks of basic training (or its equivalent), with some exceptions, before assigning any member of the Armed Forces to duties OCONUS. The intent of this law is to ensure that no Service member is assigned overseas without essential battlefield survival skills.

6. Health Service Support

a. Activation of RC HSS units and individuals is governed by the same authorities for mobilizing other manpower skills as discussed in paragraph 2 above.

b. The President is authorized by Title 42, USC, Section 217 to declare the commissioned corps of the USPHS a military service in time of war or national emergency.

c. Under the provisions of the DVA and Department of Defense Health Resources Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (Title 38, USC, Section 8110[a]), the DVA will make beds available to DOD for the care of military casualties.

d. The NDMS, established and administered by the Department of Health and Human Services under the authority of Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities," provides backup support to DOD and DVA HSS in caring for military casualties. Although not legally obligated, nonfederal public and private hospitals have agreed to provide about 100,000 beds to augment DOD and DVA resources, if needed in an emergency. This commitment is triggered when SecDef determines military casualties threaten to overburden the DOD and DVA systems.

7. Communications

Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Title 47, USC, Section 606) authorizes the President, during times of emergency or war, to exercise extraordinary management or control over national telecommunications resources to meet requirements for telecommunications services beyond those normally provided by individual commercial suppliers or government agencies.

8. Host-Nation Support

Authorities for obtaining HNS manpower and services are provided for in various treaties and other international agreements to which the US is a signatory, including numerous logistic agreements.

Refer to JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, for further HNS information.

9. Environment

Major environmental protection statutes affecting mobilization are discussed in Chapter IV, "Resource Areas." While the President has the authority, when in the national interest, to authorize an exemption from certain environmental laws, seeking such an exemption would require highest-level action within DOD. Executive Order 12088 and DOD policy require full compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations, unless an authorized exemption or exception is obtained.

10. Funding

The following emergency authorities are available to DOD to provide essential funding for mobilization and other emergency defense expenditures.

a. **Budget Supplemental.** SecDef may submit additional appropriations requests to Congress to meet urgent requirements.

b. **Budget Amendment.** SecDef may submit budget revisions to Congress before the congressional appropriations process has been completed.

c. **Reprogramming.** SecDef may reprogram funds within appropriations thresholds established by Congress to meet the requirements of any emergency. Reprogramming actions above established thresholds must be submitted to Congress for approval.

d. **Transfer Authority.** Authority and thresholds for transferring funds between appropriations are established in the current appropriations act. Transfers that exceed thresholds require congressional approval.

e. **Deficiency Authority (Food and Forage Act).** Title 41, USC, Section 11 permits DOD to obligate funds in excess of amounts authorized and appropriated to cover necessities of the current year, under circumstances in which appropriations for clothing, subsistence, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and hospital supplies are exhausted. This authority ensures the availability of sufficient funds to care for the unexpected increases in DOD personnel strength as a result of a crisis and mobilization.

APPENDIX B AUTOMATED TOOLS

1. General

The JPEC:

- a. Prepares systems to monitor forces and phases of the crisis or mobilization.
- b. Plans for information management systems to consolidate automated data processing (ADP) support for all functional areas of a mobilization, thereby reducing the total number of varying systems carrying similar data.
- c. Reduces administrative functions to meet mobilization surge requirements.
- d. Reviews ADP procedures that stimulate development of effective communications system capabilities for enhanced crisis response.
- e. Designs and tests mobilization-related ADP systems to ensure their ability to operate effectively.

2. Planning

The Services mobilize, train, equip, and prepare forces, including the RC, for movements in CONUS to meet scheduled deployment and employment dates. Movement of mobilized RC units from home station to mobilization station may be a support installation responsibility. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, a USTRANSCOM component command, is responsible for planning intra-CONUS movements to support mobilization and deployment using OPLAN TPFDD files and intra-CONUS movement data. The Services and DOD agencies will provide significant RC mobilization-related movement requirements to USTRANSCOM. The supported CCDR prioritizes and validates requirements to USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM then coordinates with the support installation and supported CCDR to resolve movement constraints and advises CJCS of transportation capabilities in CONUS. During deployment, USTRANSCOM monitors the movement of forces and materiel by common-user lift from home station to the destination. In this circumstance, USTRANSCOM will immediately be able to identify a conflict so resolution can be obtained from CJCS and the appropriate CCDR.

3. Reporting Systems Supporting Mobilization

- a. **JOPEs Deployment Database.** JOPEs is the primary system for use in planning joint military operations. It consolidates policies and procedures for developing, coordinating, disseminating, reviewing, and approving joint OPLANs and bridges the gap between contingency planning and the CAP process. In most cases, data derived from JOPEs are also used during execution. The CAP procedures contained in JOPEs delineate the procedures for developing response actions under time-constrained conditions.

b. **Joint Medical Analysis Tool (JMAT).** The Joint Staff, J-4 is tasked to coordinate the HSS mission for the GCCs and the CONUS sustaining base. The tool approved for HSS planning is the JMAT. JMAT is an automated application program that takes Service-specific casualty figures, using a contingency planning theater patient movement policy, merges those figures to provide joint requirements, and projects the impact of an operation on the force health protection HSS system. JMAT produces credible medical requirements estimates for such things as beds, patients to be moved (evacuated), Class VIII (both medical resupply and blood), losses to be replaced, and numbers of hospital admissions to NATO Role 3 facilities. In addition, JMAT provides medical requirements estimates for population-at-risk reports, planning factors used and bed capabilities as compared to bed requirements report. The JMAT will also “pull and load” a population-at-risk report from the TPFDD and merge Service scenarios to create a joint scenario.

c. **Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP).** JIMPP is the generic term for the planning and analytic process to be used by the Services, DOD agencies, and Joint Staff to:

(1) Prepare industrial mobilization plans linked to contingency and crisis action planning procedures, development, and execution.

(2) Provide the analytical framework to perform the industrial analyses required by the Joint Strategic Planning System and OSD.

(3) Establish baseline national industrial base capability assessments tied to potential military demand.

(4) JIMPP is used during contingency planning to conduct capability and risk assessments, emergency procurement budget mechanisms, time-phased requirements lists, and narrative COAs. Output may be forwarded to OSD and other federal agencies for use in broader industrial mobilization planning. As an analytical tool, JIMPP allows planners to address “what if” questions from both the supply and demand sides. Expected outputs of the process include supply-side option summaries for level of mobilization, estimates of a mobilizable force, and assessments of plan feasibility. JIMPP consists of three components: a requirements module, which produces weapons and munitions requirements, associated shortfalls, replacement of losses, and consumption rates; a vendor-level module for specific options and capabilities (compares each item requirement with its production rate and produces surge and mobilization requirements and shortfalls); and an industry-level module for a macroeconomic sector-level analysis of mobilization requirements and capabilities for 240 industrial sectors.

d. **Logistic Sustainment Analysis and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE).** LOGSAFE provides planners the capability to estimate the logistical requirements of an OPLAN and to determine logistic supportability for various COAs. LOGSAFE performs a series of three activities: generate general and sustainment requirements plus supply

buildup, compare sustainment requirements with available stockages for logistical sustainability assessment, and provide decision aid outputs and interface of suitable data for various transportation models.

e. **Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System (JEPES).** JEPES provides a common automated system for the civil engineer planners at the combatant commands and their components to determine the feasibility of the civil engineering force, construction material, and facilities to support OPLANs. Further, it is used to:

(1) Generate time-phased facility requirements based on an OPLAN.

(2) Analyze and assess engineering support by comparing facility requirements to in-theater facility assets and host nation, contract, and troop engineering capability.

(3) Provide facility feasibility assessment, manpower, materiel, and nonunit cargo requirements for other processes.

f. **Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST).** JFAST provides rapid analysis of the transportation feasibility of OPLANs and COAs before validation by the supported combatant command and transportation acceptance by USTRANSCOM.

g. **Department of Defense Emergency Authorities Retrieval and Analysis System (DEARAS).** DEARAS is a specialized computer-assisted legal research system for items such as statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions defining DOD legal authority to act in an emergency.

h. **Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems Automated Message Preparation System (JAMPS).** JAMPS provides automated aids to reduce operator training times for creation of tactical messages, reduce errors in message creation, and speed message generation and transmission. Message preparation and formats are standardized to expedite message traffic across the Services.

i. **Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS).** GSORTS is an information management system designed to support the decision-making process of the President, SecDef, and CJCS. GSORTS supports the registration of units, reporting of basic unit identity elements, monitoring of unit status, and distribution of unit information throughout the JPEC. Distributed information includes unit location, strength, readiness factor, and category levels for equipment and personnel. Individual units update the GSORTS database by a Defense Information Systems Network communications link. The system constitutes the single automated tool for maintaining and updating unit status.

j. **Global Decision Support System (GDSS).** GDSS is the worldwide command and control system for the execution of strategic airlift and air refueling during peacetime, contingencies, and war. GDSS is used to monitor and manage all operational

DOD air mobility missions throughout the world including all organic, commercial, and air refueling missions.

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, Appendix A, Enabler Tools, for more information on enabler tools.

k. **Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).** DRRS is a mission-focused, capabilities based internet application that provides the CCDRs, Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other key DOD users a collaborative environment in which to evaluate the readiness and capability of the Armed Forces to carry out assigned tasks. This enables users to find units which are both ready and available for deployment in support of a given mission.

l. **Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System (ESORTS).** ESORTS feeds DRRS and provides a more complete readiness assessment system by directly measuring outputs – the ability to conduct a task or mission to the prescribed standard – along with inputs. The system is designed to come much closer to the goal of understanding “ready for what?” ESORTS provides a vehicle for each organization from individual units to combined forces to report on its ability to achieve the performance standard of its mission –essential tasks under the conditions of the assignments.

APPENDIX C

MOBILIZATION INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLAN

1. General

a. When circumstances dictate the formation of an MWG, a MIMP will be developed. The MIMP is designed to provide guidance on information systems used in mobilization planning and execution. It identifies the flow of information related to mobilization during a crisis action.

b. Misconceptions regarding the mobilization process and the resultant procedures are as prevalent as are the abundant sources of information. This plan identifies the various sources and uses of existing mobilization data to enhance awareness and understanding of this data.

c. The MIMP is published separately by the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4).

2. Information Holders

Each Service has visibility over its personnel as the entry-point for mobilization processing. Additionally, numerous DOD components track mobilization activities data, such as the following:

a. **Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-1).** As the proponent for manpower and personnel policies and procedures, the JS J-1 receives personnel status reports from the Services. This report provides daily visibility of the number and category of RC personnel called up under Title 10, USC authority.

b. **J-4.** As the proponent for mobilization activities of the Joint Staff, manages mobilization ceilings associated with partial mobilization and PRCs, and requisite reporting to Congress.

c. **Assistants to CJCS for National Guard Matters and Reserve Matters.** Established as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1998, these two assistants advise the CJCS on National Guard and reserve matters, respectively.

d. **Joint Staff (J-39).** Joint Staff Deputy Directorate for Global Operations, Readiness Division (J-39). The Joint Staff office of primary responsibility for all readiness reporting applications and systems.

e. **CJCS Legal Counsel.** Maintains visibility over proper application of statutory requirements as they pertain to mobilization.

f. **CJCS Legislative Assistant.** Maintains visibility over mobilization activities to support congressional inquiries.

g. **CJCS Public Affairs.** Maintains visibility over mobilization activities to support media inquiries.

h. **OSD (Reserve Affairs).** Maintains visibility over RC members called to active duty under Title 10, USC authority.

i. **DFAS.** Maintains visibility of all Service members for pay purposes.

j. **Defense Manpower Data Center.** Maintains visibility of all Service members for congressional and other special interest reporting purposes.

3. Information Flow

a. The flow of mobilization information depends on the operational environment – crisis or noncrisis.

b. When in a crisis environment such as a wartime or other scenario, information related to mobilization activities typically flows through the current operations team/current action team.

c. During a noncrisis scenario, information related to mobilization activities typically flows through legislative affairs or public affairs channels and then to the Service Manpower and Reserve Affairs departments for resolution. Public affairs issues will be presented at the DOD level.

4. Information Tools

A wide array of recurring products are created by the information holders, containing data specific to mobilization. The MIMP identifies the specific mobilization reports generated by the various information holders to expand awareness of these products in managing mobilization activities. Information holders are encouraged to inform the Joint Staff J-4 of any changes regarding recurring products related to mobilization activities to allow the MIMP to remain current.

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Mobilization Planning Community	Develop Concept	Develop Plan	Develop Supporting Plan	Analyses
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide pre-planning input • Provide CCDR strategic concept feedback • Plan participation 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determine levels of mobilization necessary to support projected RC force requirements • Answer questions on the justification of RC call-ups • Validate or refute defense planning guidance and/or JSCP planning assumptions
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm tasking for RC requirements summary 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review completed OPLAN and most probable FDO
Service		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Source specific RC units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RC in AOR • RC unit personnel in TPFDD • RC non-unit personnel in TPFDD • Move the force, assist mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment • Backfill 	
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draft, coordinate, and issue the TPFDD LOI 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comply with requirements for operation plan • FDO determination 	
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components JTF			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Move the force • Assist mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment • Backfill 	
AOR – area of responsibility CCDR – combatant commander FDO – flexible deterrent option JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan JTF – joint task force		LOI – letter of instruction OPLAN – operation plan RC – Reserve Component TPFDD – time-phased force and deployment area USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command		

Figure C-A-1. Planning Activities

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C

RESERVE COMPONENT CALL-UP DECISION-MAKING ACTIVITIES

Mobilization Planning Community	Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination	Educate Senior Leadership on RC Potential	Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components	Confirm Pre-planned Mobilization Capabilities	Recommend Changes in Peacetime Budgeting Priorities	Modify Demobilization Policy to Suit Contingency	Prepare Decision Packages
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify POC network Convene preliminary meetings focused on "what if" questions using current information Analyze lessons learned from similar crises Consider potential supporting requirements Manage media relations and coordinate with public affairs officer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct meetings and/or briefings on RC mobilization policies: availability, mobilization and deployment criteria, and the different categories of RC and their potential use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review and modify call-up instructions and procedures Recommend modifications and exceptions to policy Coordinate with legal counsel Review JAG policies and/or procedures for "conscientious objectors" and Soldiers and Sailors Act 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Estimate ability of mobilization activities to meet plan schedule Identify capability shortfalls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review unfunded mobilization requirements Coordinate with resource area proponents for adjustments to internal funding priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiate planning for the return of RC to civilian status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Respond to information requests as appropriate
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Become familiar with RC call-up procedures Be prepared to recommend level of call-up 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review legal authorities in Title 10, USC Review mobilization plans, policies, and procedures Brief leadership on call-up authorities and specific qualities of RCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify opportunities for joint use of Service mobilization assets Monitor the development of RC deployment criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirm monitoring and reporting systems: coordinate reporting requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC demobilization facilities and assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare Draft Decision Package Staff Draft Decision Package with Services Forward Package to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review monitoring and reporting requirements Consider sources of immediate manpower augmentation Start planning for demobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review Service mobilization doctrine for unit and individual call-up Review civilian mobilization plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop deployment criteria consistent with the needs of the CCDR Review Service Readiness Processing policies Validate policies for use of civilians, contractors, and other non-DOD agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validate projected RC requirements of OPLAN within DOD guidance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate with program assessment and budget office to raise visibility of unfunded mobilization requirements Recommend changes to eliminate shortages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment criteria for RC unit equipment and personnel Coordinate with National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate on Draft Decision Package
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure RC OPLAN support requirements are projected 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure theater-unique requirements are known to force providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review mobilization doctrine and policy Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validate projected RC requirements of OPLAN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support efforts to adjust funding priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop redeployment priorities and schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate on Draft Decision Package
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review RC requirements projected by CCDR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review RC requirements to move force, backfill displaced units, and assist in the mobilization and deployment process Brief leadership on RC mobilization doctrine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review mobilization doctrine and policy Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validate projected RC requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support efforts to adjust funding priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review demobilization doctrine Support redeployment and/or demobilization operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate on Draft Decision Package Begin to evaluate need for subsequent RC augmentation
CCDR – combatant commander DOD – Department of Defense JAG – Judge Advocate General OPLAN – operation plan				POC – point of contact RC – Reserve Component USC – United States Code USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command			

Figure C-B-1. Reserve Component Call-Up Decision-making Activities

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX C MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

Mobilization Planning Community	Execution
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate with public affairs officer • Monitor unit and individual mobilization schedules • Review missions needed to be supported to ensure all requirements have been met
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor force requirements • Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance
Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance • Monitor and adjust call-up procedures for individuals • Manage call-up against ceilings • Ensure that TPFDD is updated as combatant commander requirements change • Notify Congressional Delegations for call-up prior to public affairs announcement
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure theater-unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force providers • Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change • Ensure unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force protection
USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command RC – Reserve Component TPFDD – time-phased force and deployment data	

Figure C-C-1. Mobilization Activities

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**ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C
MONITORING AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES**

Mobilization Planning Community	Monitoring	Reporting
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor the status of mobilization • Monitor unit and individual demobilization schedules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather information to respond to various requests • Report RC forces no longer needed
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor force requirements • Determine any special information requirements and assign reporting requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct Services provide input for Report to Congress (partial mobilization) • Prepare Report to Congress • Provide mobilization information as required • Review military manpower mobilization and accession status report
Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor force requirements • Monitor sourcing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enter data into RC Apportionment tables • Submit MOBREP to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff • Report on problems in providing forces • Submit input data to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Presidential Report to Congress
Supported Commands		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enter data into RC Apportionment tables
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force		
MOBREP – mobilization report RC – Reserve Component USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command		

Figure C-D-1. Monitoring and Reporting Activities

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX C DEMOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

Mobilization Planning Community	Preliminary Actions	Planning		Execution
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish demobilization concepts and policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide guidance 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Educate the leadership Review and modify demobilization concepts and support plans
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide input to the JSCP 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations Validate support and rotational requirements Resolve any conflicts in resource alignment Propose that the SecDef rescind legal authorities
Service		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment and demobilization strategy Develop demobilization schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine required outprocessing Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations Monitor changing requirements and theater backfill requirements Execute demobilization schedule Estimate and source support and rotational requirements Seek demobilization approval Solve or adjudicate conflicting resource claims
Supported Command		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop tentative demobilization schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment support requirements Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offer candidates for demobilization Estimate and source support and rotational requirements Highlight critical support issues in SITREPs
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop tentative demobilization schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment support requirements Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offer candidates for demobilization Estimate and source support and rotational requirements Highlight critical support issues in SITREPs
<p>JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan SecDef – Secretary of Defense RC – Reserve Component SITREP – situation report USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command</p>				

Figure C-E-1. Demobilization Activities

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APPENDIX D MOBILIZATION WORKING GROUP

1. Purpose

a. When circumstances dictate, the CJCS will establish an ad hoc MWG. The MWG is designed to enhance communications between OSD, the Joint Staff, CCDRs, and Services when military operations warrant the use of involuntarily recalled RC forces and/or the federalization of National Guard units.

b. The MWG will be chaired by the J-4 and will convene to address mobilization issues resulting from military operations.

c. Members are encouraged to raise issues in the forum of the MWG as appropriate to enhance a DOD-wide approach regarding the mobilization of RC forces and/or the federalization of National Guard units.

2. Participants

a. The MWG will be chaired by the J-4.

b. The following offices/components are requested to provide at least one representative to the MWG:

(1) J-1, J-4, assistants to CJCS for National Guard and reserve matters, Legal Counsel, and Public Affairs.

(2) OSD (Reserve Affairs).

(3) CCDR liaison officers as required.

(4) Services – Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard (when considered for Title 10, USC mobilization as a service in the Department of the Navy), as required.

(5) National Guard Bureau representatives.

(6) USPHS representatives.

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APPENDIX E MOBILIZATION ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Organization
Place of Issue
Date-Time Group, Month, Year

Mobilization Estimate Number _____

References: a. Maps and Charts.

b. Other Pertinent Documents.

1. () Mission. State the CCDR's missions, taken from the mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements. (Look specifically for Reserve Component and federalized National Guard unit missions.)

2. () Situations and Considerations

a. () Assumptions

b. () Mobilization Situation

(1) () Availability of Manpower.

(2) () Transportation.

(3) () Equipment/Materiel.

(4) () Health Service Support.

(5) () Facilities.

(6) () Industrial Base.

(7) () Training Base.

(8) () Communications.

(9) () Host-Nation Support.

(10) () Environment.

(11) () Legal Authorities.

(12) () Funding.

(13) () Security issues.

3. () Mobilization Analysis of Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the manpower, equipment/materiel, transportation, health service support/health force protection, industrial, training bases, communications, and legal authority resource areas that affect the proposed courses of action to determine the manner and degree of that effect. The objective of this analysis is to determine whether the mobilization requirements can be met and to isolate the implications that should be considered by the Ccdr in the commander's estimate.

a. () Analyze each course of action from a mobilization point of view.

b. () The mobilization factors in subparagraph 2b are the factors to be analyzed for each course of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that may affect the mobilization course of action.

c. () Throughout the analysis, keep mobilization considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all applicable mobilization factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. () Comparison of Courses of Action

a. () List the impact that manpower mobilization for each level, including Presidential Reserve Call-up has on the other resource areas from a logistic directorate's point of view.

b. () Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all resource areas based on the mobilization decision.

5. () Conclusions

a. () State whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a mobilization standpoint.

b. () State which mobilization course of action can best be supported from a transportation, equipment/materiel, and health service support/force health protection standpoint.

c. () Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the attention of the Ccdr. Provide recommendations from the Services as to the methods to eliminate or reduce the impact of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____

APPENDIX F REFERENCES

The development of JP 4-05 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Legal Authorities

- a. The Constitution of the United States.
- b. Title 10, United States Code.
- c. Title 14, United States Code.
- d. Title 32, United States Code.
- e. Title 37, United States Code.
- f. Title 42, United States Code.
- g. Title 46, United States Code, Chapter 27.
- h. Title 50, United States Code.

2. Department of Defense

- a. *Guidance for Deployment of the Force.*
- b. *Guidance for Employment of the Force.*
- c. DODD 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.*
- d. DODI 1215.06, *Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories.*
- e. DODD 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces.*
- f. DODI 1235.09, *Management of the Standby Reserve.*
- g. DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve.*
- h. DODI 1235.11, *Management of Individual Mobilization Augmentees.*
- i. DODD 1235.13, *Management of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive National Guard.*
- j. DODD 1250.1, *National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR).*

k. DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises*.

l. DODI 4715.6, *Environmental Compliance*.

m. DODI 5158.05, *Joint Deployment Process Owner*.

n. DODI 8260.03, *Organization and Force Structure Construct for Global Force Management*.

o. DOD 4500.54-G, *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*.

3. Joint Staff

a. CJCSI 1301.01C, *Individual Augmentation Procedures*.

b. CJCSI 3100.01B, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.

c. CJCSI 3110.13, *Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

d. CJCSM 3122.01C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*.

e. CJCSM 3122.02C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution)*.

f. CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II – Planning Formats*.

g. CJCSM 3150.13B, *Joint Reporting Structure Personnel Manual*.

h. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

i. JP 1-0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.

j. JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*.

k. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

l. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.

m. JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.

n. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

o. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.

p. JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations*.

q. JP 4-08, *Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*.

r. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

4. Service

a. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System.

b. Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan.

c. Marine Corps Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan.

d. Air Force War and Mobilization Plan.

e. Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction, M3061.1, *Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan*.

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APPENDIX G
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the Director for Logistics J-4. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics J-4.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*, 11 January 2006; and JP 4-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-up*, 11 November 1998, is cancelled.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: electronically to the Lead Agent, with information copies sent to the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division and to the US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group, and info the Lead Agent the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
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5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1 R, *Information Security Program*.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at <https://jdeis.js.mil> (NIPRNET), and <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil> (SIPRNET) and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3,200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.

GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADP	automated data processing
AE	aeromedical evacuation
AOR	area of responsibility
CAP	crisis action planning
CCDR	combatant commander
CEW	Civilian Expeditionary Workforce
CIL	critical item list
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
COA	course of action
CONUS	continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CS	combat service
CSS	combat service support
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DEARAS	Department of Defense (DOD) Emergency Authorities Retrieval and Analysis System
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPAS	Defense Priorities and Allocation System
DPO	distribution process owner
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
DVA	Department of Veterans Affairs
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ESORTS	Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System
FDO	flexible deterrent option
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GDF	Guidance for Development of the Force
GDSS	Global Decision Support System
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GFM	Global Force Management

GFMB	Global Force Management Board
GFMIIG	Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
GIG	Global Information Grid
GI&S	geospatial information and services
GSORTS	Global Status of Resources and Training System
HNS	host-nation support
HSS	health service support
IA	individual augmentee
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
JAMPS	Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) automated message preparation system
JDPO	joint deployment process owner
JEPES	joint engineer planning and execution system
JFAST	Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC	joint force commander
JIMPP	joint industrial mobilization planning process
JMAT	joint medical analysis tool
JMPAB	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPEC	joint planning and execution community
JS	the Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LOGSAFE	logistic sustainment analysis and feasibility estimator
LOI	letter of instruction
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MIMP	Mobilization Information Management Plan
MMG	DOD Master Mobilization Guide
MOBREP	mobilization report
MWG	mobilization working group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCESGR	National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve
NCS	National Communications System
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NDS	national defense strategy

NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NMS	National Military Strategy
NPS	nonprior service
NSS	National Security Strategy
OASD(RA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
PRC	Presidential Reserve Call-up
RC	Reserve Component
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECHS	Secretary of Homeland Security
SITREP	situation report
SOF	special operations forces
SSS	Selective Service System
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
UN	United Nations
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USPHS	United States Public Health Service
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
WPR	War Powers Resolution

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

activation. Order to active duty (other than for training) in the federal service. See also active duty; federal service. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

active duty. Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This includes members of the Reserve Component serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty. Also called AD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

Armed Forces of the United States. A term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when mobilized under Title 10, United States Code to augment the Navy). (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 1 as the source JP.)

availability date. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02)

consumption rate. The average quantity of an item consumed or expended during a given time interval, expressed in quantities by the most appropriate unit of measurement per applicable stated basis. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

contingency operation. A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 101[a][13]). It is a military operation that: a. is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force; or b. is created by definition of law. Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 101 (a)(13)(B), a contingency operation exists if a military operation results in the (1) call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under certain enumerated statutes (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 688, 12301[a], 12302, 12304, 12305, 12406, or 331-335); and (2) the call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under other (non-enumerated) statutes during war or national emergency declared by the President or Congress. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

delayed entry program. A program under which an individual may enlist in a Reserve Component of a military service and specify a future reporting date for entry on active duty that would coincide with availability of training spaces and with personal plans such as high school graduation. Also called DEP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

demobilization. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. See also mobilization. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

draft. 1. The conscription of qualified citizens in military service. See also active duty. (JP 4-05) 2. The depth of water that a vessel requires to float freely; the depth of a vessel from the water line to the keel. (JP 4-01.6) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP for Definition 1.)

dwelt time. 1. The time cargo remains in a terminal's in-transit storage area while awaiting shipment by clearance transportation. (JP 4-01.6) 2. The length of time a target is expected to remain in one location. (JP 3-60) 3. The period of time between the release from involuntary active and the reporting date for a subsequent tour of active duty pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, Section 12302. Such time includes any voluntary active duty performed between two periods of involuntary active duty pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, Section 12302. (DODD 1235.10) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-01.6, JP 3-60, and DODD 1235.10 as the source publication for Definition 1, 2, and 3 respectively.)

federal service. A term applied to National Guard members and units when called to active duty to serve the United States Government under Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Title 10, United States Code, sections 12401 to 12408. See also active duty; Reserve Component. (Approved for replacement of "Federal service" and its definition in JP 1-02.)

force shortfall. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

home station. The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve Component units (e.g., location of armory or reserve center). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

Inactive National Guard. Army National Guard personnel in an inactive status not in the Selected Reserve who are attached to a specific National Guard unit but do not participate in training activities. Upon mobilization, they will mobilize with their units. In order for these personnel to remain members of the Inactive National Guard, they must muster once a year with their assigned unit. Like the Individual Ready Reserve, all members of the Inactive National Guard have legal, contractual obligations. Members of the Inactive National Guard may not train for retirement credit or pay and are not eligible for promotion. Also called ING. See also Individual Ready Reserve; Selected Reserve. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

individual mobilization augmentee. An individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is preassigned to an Active Component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual mobilization augmentees train on a part-time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization.

Inactive duty training for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills a year. Also called IMA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

individual mobilization augmentee detachment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Individual Ready Reserve. A manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had some training or who have served previously in the Active Component or in the Selected Reserve, and may have some period of their military service obligation remaining. Members may voluntarily participate in training for retirement points and promotion with or without pay. Also called IRR. See also Selected Reserve. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

industrial mobilization. The transformation of industry from its peacetime activity to the industrial program necessary to support the national military objectives. It includes the mobilization of materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and contributory items and services essential to the industrial program. See also mobilization. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

industrial preparedness. The state of preparedness of industry to produce essential materiel to support the national military objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

industrial preparedness program. Plans, actions, or measures for the transformation of the industrial base, both government-owned and civilian-owned, from its peacetime activity to the emergency program necessary to support the national military objectives. It includes industrial preparedness measures such as modernization, expansion, and preservation of the production facilities and contributory items and services for planning with industry. Also called IPP. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

initial active duty for training. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system of joint policies, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and computer systems, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPEs. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating

all or part of the Reserve Component as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories: a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. full mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units and individuals in the existing approved force structure, as well as all retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Also called MOB. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

mobilization base. The total of all resources available, or that can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels, state of training, modernization of equipment, mobilization materiel reserves and facilities, continuity of government, civil defense plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness of the people, international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion, and standby legislation and controls. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

mobilization exercise. An exercise involving, either completely or in part, the implementation of mobilization plans. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

mobilization site. The designated location where a Reserve Component unit or individual mobilizes or moves after mobilization for further processing, training, and employment. This differs from a mobilization station in that it is not necessarily a military installation. See also mobilization; mobilization station; Reserve Component. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

mobilization staff officer. The action officer assigned the principle responsibility or additional duties related to Reserve Component mobilization actions. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

mobilization station. The designated military installation to which a Reserve Component unit or individual is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping, training, and employment and from which the unit or individual may move to an aerial port of embarkation or seaport of embarkation. See also mobilization; mobilization site; Reserve Component. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

national emergency. A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28)

nonprior service personnel. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Presidential Call-up. Procedures by which the President brings all or a part of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard to active federal service under Title 10, United States Code, Section 12406, and Chapter 15. See also active duty; federal service; Presidential Reserve Call-up. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Presidential Reserve Call-up. Provision of a public law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve), for not more than 365 days to meet the requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PRC. See also Individual Ready Reserve; mobilization; Presidential Call-up; Selected Reserve. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

production base. The total national industrial production capacity available for the manufacture of items to meet materiel requirements. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard liable for active duty as prescribed by law (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 10142, 12301, and 12302). See also active duty; Inactive National Guard; Individual Ready Reserve; Selected Reserve. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

remain-behind equipment. Unit equipment left by deploying forces at their bases when they deploy. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

Reserve Component. The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists of: a. the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. the Navy Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the United States; f. the Air Force Reserve; and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called RC. (Approved for replacement of “Reserve Components” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

Reserve Component category. The category that identifies an individual’s status in the Reserve Component. The three Reserve Component categories are Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Each reservist is identified by a specific Reserve Component category designation. (Approved for replacement of “reserve component category” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

Retired Reserve. All Reserve members who receive retirement pay on the basis of their active duty and/or Reserve service; those members who are otherwise eligible for retirement pay but have not reached age 60 and who have not elected discharge and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve. See also active duty; Ready Reserve; Standby Reserve. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

Selected Reserve. Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. Selected Reservists actively participate in a Reserve Component training program. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty for training. See also Ready Reserve. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05)

Selected Reserve strength. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)


Standby Reserve. Those units and members of the Reserve Component (other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve) who are liable for active duty only, as provided in Title 10, United States Code, Sections 10151, 12301, and 12306. See also active duty; Ready Reserve; Reserve Component; Retired Reserve. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

stop-loss. Presidential authority under Title 10, United States Code, Section 12305 to suspend laws relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the Armed Forces determined essential to the national security of the United States (“laws relating to promotion” broadly includes, among others, grade tables, current general or flag officer authorizations, and E8 and 9 limits). This authority may be exercised by the President only if reservists are serving on active duty under Title 10, United States Code authorities for Presidential Reserve Call-up, partial mobilization, or full mobilization. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

training and readiness oversight. The authority that combatant commanders may exercise over assigned Reserve Component forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training. As a matter of Department of Defense policy, this authority includes: a. Providing guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department training and readiness programs; b. Commenting on Service component program recommendations and budget requests; c. Coordinating and approving participation by assigned Reserve Component forces in joint exercises and other joint training when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for training; d. Obtaining and reviewing readiness and inspection reports on assigned Reserve Component forces; and e. Coordinating and reviewing mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned Reserve Component forces. Also called TRO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

training unit. A unit established to provide military training to individual reservists or to Reserve Component units. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 4-05** is in the **Logistics** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

