
Life science research: opportunities and risks for public health

E. Tuerlings, O. Cosivi, M. Chu, N. Previsani, C. Roth Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response World Health Organization Geneva, Switzerland

Actions Taken on Events





World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Organization Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

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Laborator y Accidents and Bio-Risks



SARS: Singapore, 2003

• SARS: Taiwan, 2003

• SARS: China, 2004

Tularaemia: USA, 2004

• Ebola: Russia, 2004

Bio-Risk s from deliberat e use



- Low probabilit y, high consequence
- New technology


biotechnology and genetic engineering


Bio-Risk

Reduction

Prevention

Recovery










Bio-Risk Reduction





Response

Epidemic m **Outbreak alert** and Intelligence response operations





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
Public Health Response

Follow-up

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C





Recovery





Guidance for public health preparedness

Managing the health risks of the deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radioactive material:
Guidance on capacity assessment being finalized

Global Laborato ryNetwor ks Directory

molecular typing and high consequence agent laboratory networks

 Identify and link assets of public health,

 Develop a benefits package for networks such as training on biosafety,


standardized developing surge capacity

templates, protection of intellectual property

> Coordinated multi-centre studies to encourage working together and

Bio-Risk







WHO Biosafety Activitie

- Laborator
 y Biosafety
 Manual, 3

 Edition
 (2004)
- Laborator y Biosecurity Guidelines

(being finalized)

- Coordination of global biosafetynetworks
- WHO Biosafety Advisory Group (BAG)
- UN Model Regulations
- Transport of infectious substances
- Visits to the smallpox repositories

The implications of life science R&D for global health security

The importance of a public health perspective

- Life science
 R&D can have
 both benefits and
 risks for public
 health.
- Control mechanisms for

managing the risks couldhinder further development.

- Strong public confidence must be maintained in science, and scientific advice for policymakingmust be supported.
- The levels of information and experience varyamong WHO Member States.

WHO Statements on

Health-Sci ence-Secu rity

World Health
 Assembly
 resolution
 WHA20.54 (1967)

"scientific achievements, and particularly in the field of biology and medicine – that most humane science – should be used only for mankind's benefit, but never to do it any harm"

• Genomics and World Health (2002). Report of the advisorycommittee on health research.

"The potential misuse of genomics for the purposes of biowarfareis of particular importance".

The biomedical research community should take "a much more proactive role in controlling the hazards associated with the misuse of genomics for biowarfare" as well as to examine "the risk—benefit ratios of some

of its current genetic engineering procedures" and the adequate containment and monitoring ofits work.

World Health Assembly resolution 55.16 (2002)

"Global public health response to natural occurrence, accidentalrelea se or deliberate use of biological and chemical

agents or radionuclear material that affect health"

The implications of life science R&D for global health security

Phase 1 completed in 2005*

- Background paper "Mapping the issues" (available on the web)
- International network of individuals and

institutions

- In-house network:
 - Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response
 - Ethics, Trade, Human Rights and Health Law
 - Research Policy & Cooperation:
 - Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases

Advisory Committee on HealthResearch (ACHR)

* Funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, New York, USA

WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2005.20

Life science research: opportunities and risks for public health

Mapping the issues



The implications of life science R&D for global health security

Contents

- 1. Introduction
- Definitions and WHO involvement 2.1Some working definitions
 2.2WHO involvement
- 3. Review of selected life science R&D, related techniques and their associated risks

- 3.1Genetic engineering 3.2Genomics,functional genomics and proteomics3.3Bioinformatics 3.4Related techniques
- 1. Opportunities and risks for public health
- 2. Risks of misuse of life science R&D
 - 5.1Monitoring the risks by research 5.2Monitoring the risks as a responsibility of individuals and scientists
- 1. Conclusions and further considerations
- 2. References
- 3. Further reading

WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2005.20

Life science research: opportunities and risks for public health

Mapping the issues



The risks for the public health community

- Poorly
 designed controls
 would slow down
 theproduction of
 knowledge that is
 beneficial for human
 health and welfare.
- "Over-regulation" could stifle research and the opportunities for

- developing countermeasures, or beexpensive to implement and reduce the attractiveness of certain areas of medicine.
- **Tightening control** (vetting publications, classifyingresearch results) might affect the conduct of life science research, distort the fundamental mechanisms of disseminating scientific knowledge and endangerboth the quality and quantity of research being done onpublic health issues and development of new medicalproducts.



Questions and challenges

- Are the current measures adequate to manage risks OR are new measures needed?
- Would rules and regulations be able to manage



riskswithout impairing benefits of R&D?

• Is it realistic to expect consistency among thewide array of controlmeasures suggested?

Public health community should be aware of and actively participate in these discussions

