

January 18, 2002

EA-01-261

Mr. Howard Bergendahl
Vice President - Nuclear, Davis-Besse
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 North State Route 2
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-346/01-15

Dear Mr. Bergendahl:

On December 31, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 3, 2002, with you and members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Christine A. Lipa, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-346/01-015

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H. Bergendahl

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cc w/encl: B. Saunders, President - FENOC
Plant Manager
Manager - Regulatory Affairs
M. O'Reilly, FirstEnergy
Ohio State Liaison Officer
R. Owen, Ohio Department of Health
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

cc w/encl: B. Saunders, President - FENOC
Plant Manager
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-346
License No: NPF-3

Report No: 50-346/01-15(DRP)

Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: 5501 North State Route 2
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

Dates: November 14 through December 31, 2001

Inspectors: D. Simpkins, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
P. Loudon, Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton NPS
G. Hausman, Senior Engineering Specialist
L. Collins, Project Engineer
D. Schrum, Engineering Specialist
S. Sanchez, Acting Senior Resident, Perry NPP
H. Peterson, Senior Operations Engineer
J. Belanger, Security Specialist

Approved by: Christine A. Lipa, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000346-01-15, on 11/14-12/31/2001, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Integrated Inspection Report.

This report covers a 6-week routine inspection conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialists. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant operated at 100 percent power throughout most of the inspection period. Exceptions were for brief power reductions to about 93 percent for turbine testing, and to 90 percent at the request of the system dispatcher.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown inspection of the #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) when the #2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump was unavailable due to planned surveillance testing. The inspectors used valve checklists provided in procedure DB-OP-06316, "Diesel Generator Operating Procedure" to verify the EDG was in the proper lineup to support a loss of power event. Additional documents were reviewed as well.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down selected risk significant areas looking for any fire protection issues related to: the control of transient combustibles, ignition sources, fire detection equipment manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities, automatic suppression capabilities, and barriers to fire propagation. Areas walked down were the #1 and #2 Electrical Penetration Rooms, Spent Fuel Pool Areas, Auxiliary Building Ventilation Rooms and Low Level Radiological Waste building. Fire protection documents were reviewed as well.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Review of Open Items (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-office review of records to evaluate corrective actions for an unresolved item (URI) discussed in the Findings Section below.

For the unresolved item, the inspectors evaluated the quality and level of effort expended to resolve the issue in accordance with requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

b. Findings

(Closed) URI 50-346/00-012-01: This unresolved item involved the apparent lack of evaluating all senior reactor operators (SROs) in all applicable licensed positions for an SRO.

The inspectors identified that licensed SROs were not always evaluated in all SRO licensed control room positions during the annual requalification examination. Specifically, the SROs were not always evaluated in the Shift Supervisor-Assistant (SSA) position, the licensed position of implementing and directing activities of Abnormal Operating Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures. The facility's requalification training program procedure P-OPS-4, "Development and Conduct of Simulator Evaluations," Revision 7, restricted evaluation of SROs who were qualified as either Shift Supervisor (SS) or Shift Manager (SM) in only those two identified positions. Specifically, an SRO qualified as a SS or SM may not be evaluated in the SSA position during the annual requalification operating test evaluations.

After further review, the inspectors determined that the facility may rotate an individual qualified as a SS or SM into the SSA position for the purpose of simulator evaluation if the crew make up was lacking a qualified SSA. As a result, 36 percent of the SRO's qualified as either SS or SM were evaluated in the SSA position. This practice was considered adequate to place all SROs at risk of being evaluated in all SRO licensed positions, and hence was sufficient to meet applicable regulations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the facility's revised procedure P-OPS-4, "Development and Conduct of Continuing Training Simulator Evaluations," Revision 8, which, in part, described the new practice of conducting simulator evaluations of all SROs. The revised procedure stated that all SROs should have a simulator evaluation conducted biennially, at a minimum, while in the Unit Supervisor position, previously designated as the SSA. The facility's new procedure revision ensured satisfactory evaluation of all licensed SROs. These actions were considered reasonable, and no findings of significance were identified. This issue is closed.

.2 Licensed Operator Requalification Training (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator training program to evaluate operator performance in mitigating the consequences of a simulated rod ejection event. The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the activities:

- Communication clarity and formality
- Timeliness and appropriateness of crew actions
- Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- Correct use and implementation of procedures
- Oversight and direction provided by the shift manager and control room supervisor

Training documents were reviewed as well.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

.1 Biennial Evaluation (71111.12B)

a. Inspection Scope

- Verify the periodic evaluation was completed within the time restraints defined in 10 CFR 50.65 (once per refueling cycle, not to exceed two years). Ensure that the licensee reviewed its goals, monitored Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) performance, reviewed industry operating experience, and made appropriate adjustments to the maintenance rule program as a result of the above activities;
- Verify the licensee balanced reliability and unavailability during the previous refueling cycle, including a review of safety significant SSCs;
- Verify (a)(1) goals were met, that corrective action was appropriate to correct the defective condition, including the use of industry operating experience, and that (a)(1) activities and related goals were adjusted as needed; and
- Verify the licensee has established (a)(2) performance criteria, examined any SSCs that failed to meet their performance criteria, and reviewed any SSCs that have suffered repeated maintenance preventable functional failures including a verification that failed SSCs were considered for (a)(1).

The inspectors examined the periodic evaluation report completed for the time period of May 1998 through April 2000. To evaluate the effectiveness of (a)(1) and (a)(2) activities, the inspectors examined a number of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Condition Reports (CR). In addition, the CRs were reviewed to verify that the threshold for identification of problems was at an appropriate level and the associated corrective actions were appropriate. Also, the maintenance rule program documents were reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Quarterly Inspection (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed equipment issues, surveillance failures, documents and other performance problems for the high risk importance systems listed below. The inspectors reviewed whether the components were properly scoped in accordance with the Maintenance Rule, whether the failures were properly characterized, and whether the performance criteria were appropriate.

- Station and Instrument Air
- Service Water
- Reactor Coolant System
- Instrument Isolation Valves
- Containment Gas Monitoring (Hydrogen Analyzer)
- Essential and Miscellaneous AC Power (4.16 kV, 480 V)
- #2 EDG (during unexpected surging)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed documents, evaluated the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance was conducted, and verified how risk was managed for the planned and emergent work activities listed below:

- Evaluation of actions taken to reduce the reactor average coolant temperature in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles"
- Control room emergency ventilation compressor #1 failure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

- The inspectors reviewed station personnel preparations, operator performance and documents for a reduction in average coolant temperature in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles." This review was to determine if personnel actions were appropriate to the evolution and in accordance with procedures and training.
- The inspectors verified that another action taken per the licensee's response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, regarding a dedicated operator was implemented through training and procedures. This action involved a dedicated operator that was trained and prepared to perform manual actions to switch emergency injection to the emergency sump under certain scenarios.
- The inspectors reviewed personnel performance during activities involved with the reracking of the spent fuel pool. Activities included removal of old racks, preparation of the pool liner and installation of the new racks. Documents related to this activity were also reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's list of control room deficiencies and operator workarounds, dated December 18, 2001, to evaluate the cumulative effect of these issues on the reliability, availability, or potential for misoperation of a system. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's guidance for identifying and tracking deficiencies and workarounds contained in Work Process Guideline - 2, "Operations Equipment Issues." Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether the aggregate effect of these issues could impact operator response during an abnormal or emergency event.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the post-maintenance test procedures and test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability for the following risk significant activities:

- AF-68 reverse flow test
- Core flood tank pressure indication repair
- EHC hydraulic power test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the following surveillance tests and/or reviewed applicable test data, to verify that the subject risk-significant SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety function. The inspectors conducted reviews of TS, USAR, and licensee procedure requirements and evaluated the tests for potential preconditioning, effects on plant risk, clear and adequate acceptance criteria, operator procedural adherence, test data completeness, test frequency, test equipment range and accuracy, and post-test equipment restoration:

- Monthly Exercising of PT-2000, Containment Pressure Transmitter to SFAS Channel 1
- Monthly Exercising of PT-2002, Containment Pressure Transmitter to SFAS Channel 3
- Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Time of RCP Monitor (RC3601) to SFRCS LCH 1 and RPS CH 1
- Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Time of RCP Monitor (RC3603) to SFRCS LCH 3 and RPS CH 3
- AFW Train 1 Level Control, Interlock and Flow Transmitter Test

- Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Monthly Valve Verification
- AF-68 reverse flow test (IST)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. **OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)**

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports and unit log entries to determine if the Performance Indicators for Safety System Unavailability, Auxiliary Feedwater System and Emergency AC Power System were accurately and completely reported to the NRC by the licensee. The previous 12 months of data were inspected.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 Violation of 10 CFR 50.7 "Employee Protection" (EA-01-261)

From March 5, 2001 to August 23, 2001, the NRC's Office of Investigations (OI) conducted an investigation to determine whether a nuclear security officer at the Davis-Besse facility was deliberately discriminated against by security management for raising safety concerns relating to the lack of training on a new security monitoring system and a potential fitness-for-duty procedure violation. Based on the information developed during this investigation by OI, the NRC concluded that a security officer was discriminated against for engaging in protected activities within the scope of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection." A security supervisor subjected the officer to a fact-finding meeting on January 12, 2001, and placed a copy of the documentation from the meeting in the security officer's personnel file.

The NRC determined that these actions were taken, at least in part, as a result of the security officer engaging in protected activity when he identified and documented in the condition report the potential security department training deficiency.

The NRC issued a Notice of Violation by letter dated December 20, 2001, requiring a response by the licensee (VIO 50-346/01-15-01). The licensee's response is pending.

40A6 Meetings

Exit Meetings

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Bergendahl and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 3, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

Senior Official at Exit:	W. J. Bentley, Superintendent, Operations
Date:	November 29, 2001
Proprietary:	No
Subject:	Maintenance Rule Implementation - Periodic Evaluation
Change to Inspection Findings:	No

Senior Official at Exit:	Dave Lange, Senior Nuclear Training Advisor, Requalification Program Lead
Date:	December 13, 2001
Proprietary:	No
Subject:	Closure of URI
Change to Inspection Findings:	No

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

G. Campbell, Site Vice President
H. Bergendahl, Plant Manager/Site Vice President
C. Ackerman, Supervisor, NQA
S. Coakley, Outage Manager
R. Cook, Compliance Engineer
L. Dohrmann, Manager, Quality Services
D. Eschelman, Director, Support Services
R. Fast, Plant Manager
C. Gale, System Engineering
D. Geisen, Manager, DBE
D. Imlay, Supervisor, Operations Training
D. Lange, Senior Nuclear Training Advisor, Requalification Program Lead
D. Lockwood, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
A. McAllister, Supervisor, Equipment Reliability
P. McCloskey, Manager, Chemistry
G. Melssen, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
J. Messina, Director, Work Manager
D. Miller, Supervisor, Compliance
S. Moffit, Director, Engineering
W. Mugge, Manager, Nuclear Training
R. Pell, Manager, Operations
R. Rishel, PRA Analyst
J. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering
P. Schultz, Radiation Protection Manager
G. Skeel, Security Manager
H. Stevens, Manager, QA
M. Stevens, Maintenance Manager
T. Swim, Supervisor, Design Basis Engineering
G. Wolf, Senior Licensing Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

50-346/01-15-01	VIO	SL IV Violation of 10 CFR 50.7 (Section 40A5)
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Closed

50-346/00-012-01	URI	Apparent lack of evaluating all senior reactor operators (SROs) in all applicable licensed positions for an SRO (Section 1R11.1)
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AFW	Auxiliary Feedwater
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
DB	Davis-Besse
DBNPS	Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
MR	Maintenance Rule
NPS	Nuclear Power Station
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OA	Other Activities
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SM	Shift Manager
SRO	Senior Reactor Operator
SS	Shift Supervisor
SSA	Shift Supervisor Assistant
SSC	Systems, Structures, and Components
TS	Technical Specifications
URI	Unresolved Item
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R04 Equipment Alignments

SD-003B	Emergency Diesel Generators	Rev. 3
USAR Figure 9.5.8	EDG Auxiliary Systems	Rev. 1
OS-041A, Sheets 1&2	EDG Systems	Rev. 18, 15
P&ID M-017A	Diesel Generators	Rev. 16
P&ID M-017B	Diesel Generator Air Start	Rev. 32

1R05 Fire Protection

	Pre-Fire Plan	
	NRC Information Notice 2001-04: Neglected Fire Extinguisher Maintenance Causes Fatality, dated April 11, 2001	
	NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189: Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants	
	Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Rev. 14
Drawings A221F-A226F	Fire Protection General Floor Plan	

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

DB-OP- 00000	Conduct of Operations	Rev. 4
	Drill Scenario	
	Licensed Operator Training Schedule	
P-OPS-4	Development and Conduct of Continuing Training Simulator Evaluations	Revision 8

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

	Third Quarter System Health Report dated October 2001	
USAR 5.0	Reactor Coolant System	
M-030A Sh. 1	Reactor Coolant System	
M-030B Sh. 2	Reactor Coolant System	
OS-19A Sh. 1	Instrument Air System	Rev. 20

OS-19A Sh. 2	Instrument Air System	Rev. 14
OS-19B Sh. 1	Station Air System	Rev. 14
OS-19B Sh.2	Station Air System	Rev. 18
OS-20 Sh. 1	Service Water System	Rev. 54
OS-20 Sh. 2	Service Water System	Rev. 23
CR 01-2207	Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Expansion Tank Level Rising	August 27, 2001
CR 01-2127	Air Bubble Formed or Leaked into the Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Closed Cooling Loop	August 17, 2001
CR 01-2657	Station Air Compressor #2 Tripped After Start	October 8, 2001
CR 01-3394	Service Water Pump #1 Motor Oil Foaming	December 15, 2001
CR 01-3017	Oil Added to Breather Port on Top of Service Water Pump Motor	November 8, 2001
CR 01-2050	Bus EF6 Tie Breaker Tripped Open	August 9, 2001
CR 01-2124	Bus F6 Tie Breaker Failed to Close	August 16, 2001
CR 01-2446	Bus E1 Normal Feed Breaker Failed to Close	September 19, 2001
CR 01-3450	#2 EDG Surging	December 20, 2001
	Periodic Maintenance Assessment Report for Cycle 11 (June 2, 1996 to May 23, 1998)	December 1998
	Cycle 12 Periodic Maintenance Effectiveness Assessment Report (May 23, 1998 to April 1, 2000)	October 2000
CR 01-1687	AFW Status Changing to Category (A)(1) Per Maintenance Rule	July 5, 2001
CR 00-1129	Multiple PT Indications in the Valve Body Casting on Seal Weld of ICS 38A Valve Seat	April 23, 2000
CR 00-2418	Limiting Particle Diameter to the AFW Bearing Cooler	October 6, 2000
CR 01-1518	Common Inlet Damper to Both EDG Room Supply Fans Inoperable	June 12, 2000
CR 01-1050	#2 EDG Inoperable Due to the Lockout Relay Tripping	April 12, 2001
CR 00-1520	Check Valve MS735 Banging	May 26, 2000
PCAQR 98-1646	EDG Room Temperature Can Exceed 120F When Outdoor Temperature is 95F	October 2, 1998

SR-01-ENGR G-11	Davis-Besse Nuclear Quality Assessment Surveillance Report - Plant Engineering	October 23, 2001
DB-SA-01-01 17	DBNPS Self-Assessment Report Engineering Technical Support Group	October 11, 2001
	Davis-Besse System Health Report 2nd Quarter 2000	
	Davis-Besse System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2000	
	Davis-Besse System Health Report 4th Quarter 2000	
	Davis-Besse System Health Report 1st Quarter 2001	
	Davis-Besse System Health Report 2nd Quarter 2001	
	Davis-Besse System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2001	
	Predictive Maintenance Level 1 Equipment Concerns	November 8, 2001
	Systems Added or Removed From the MR Program	November 27, 2001
	List of Functional Failures From 5/19/00 to 11/14/01	November 14, 2001
	Maintenance Rule - Performance Criteria	November 1, 2001
MRPM 06	Maintenance Rule Program Manual	October 27, 2001
DB-PF-00003	Maintenance Rule Administrative Procedure	June 8, 2000
	Performance Criteria Changes for MR SSCs	November 2001
C-NSA-99.16 -20	Maintenance Rule Unavailability and Reliability Sensitivity Analysis	April 2, 1999
	Maintenance Rule Systems and Status	November 15, 2001

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

NRC Bulletin 2001-01	"Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles"	August 3, 2001
	Davis-Besse Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles"	September 4, 2001
	Supplemental Information in Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles"	October 17, 2001
	Responses to Requests for Additional Information Concerning NRC Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles"	October 30, 2001

	“Transmittal of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Risk Assessment of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Cracks”	November 1, 2001
	NRC Letter to Davis Besse, “Meeting Summary of October 24, 2001, to Discuss the Licensee’s Response to Bulletin 2001-01”	November 6, 2001
	NRC Letter to Davis Besse, “Meeting Summary of November 14, 2001, to Discuss the Licensee’s Response to Bulletin 2001-01”	November 19, 2001
	“Supplemental Information in Response to the November 28, 2001 Meeting Regarding the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01 “	November 30, 2001
	NRC Letter to Davis-Besse, “Summary of November 27, 2001, Public Meeting to Discuss the Licensee’s Response to Bulletin 2001-01”	December 12, 2001
CR 01-3463	#1 CREVS Compressor Failed to Start After Low Suction Pressure Trip	December 26, 2001

1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions

CR 01-1465	Spent Fuel Pool FME Review	June 4, 2001
CR -1-1986	Debris in the Spent Fuel Pool	August 5, 2001
CR 01-2221	SFP Rerack Readiness Enhancements	August 28, 2001
CR 01-2309	Leakage in SFP Floor Zone 6	September 6, 2001
CR 01-2757	Underwater Survey Probe Lodged in Support Struts for SFP	October 18, 2001
CR 01-2897	Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Hose Sucked Into SFP Cooling Suction Line	October 30, 2001
CR 01-3180	SFP Rerack Diving Suspended due to Elevated Temperatures in SFP	November 27, 2001
NG-DB-00201-C-1	Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests and Evolutions	Rev. 1
DB-OP-06902	Power Operations	Rev. 4
TM 01-0026	Temporary Modification 01-0026 RCS Tave Reduction	December 13, 2001
DB-OP-06001	Boron Concentration Control	

DB-OP-06401	Integrated Control System Operating Procedure	
DB-OP-06402	Control Rod Drive Operating Procedure	
NG-EN-00313-C-3	Control of Temporary Modifications	Rev. 1
	50.59 Evaluation 01-01033	December 12, 2001
	Letter to Davis-Besse from Framatome ANP, "Verification Report for Operation of Cycle 13 with Reduced Tavg	December 11, 2001

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

WPG-2	Work Process Guideline - 2, "Operations Equipment Issues"	
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1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

DB-PF-3162	AF-68 Reverse flow test	Rev. 02
DB-SS-4164	EHC Hydraulic Power Test	

1R22 Surveillance Testing

DB-MI-03101	Monthly Exercising of PT-2000, Containment Pressure Transmitter to SFAS Channel 1	Rev. 2
DB-MI-03103	Monthly Exercising of PT-2002, Containment Pressure Transmitter to SFAS Channel 3	Rev. 2
DB-MI-03205	Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Time of RCP Monitor (RC3601) to SFRCS LCH 1 and RPS CH 1	Rev. 5
DB-MI-03206	Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Time of RCP Monitor (RC3603) to SFRCS LCH 3 and RPS CH 3	Rev. 6
DB-SP-03152	AFW Train 1 Level Control, Interlock and Flow Transmitter Test	Rev. 6
DB-SP-03153	Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Monthly Valve Verification	Rev. 1
T.S. 3.3.2.2	Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Instrumentation	
	Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Business Plan Monthly Performance Report	August 2001
	Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Business Plan Monthly Performance Report	September 2001

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Key Work Activities and Surveillances

1st, 2nd and 3rd Quarter 2001 Davis-Besse System Health Reports

2000 Davis-Besse System Health Reports

Unit Logs