

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II SAM NUNN ATI ANTA FEDERAL CENTER

SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

October 22, 2004

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. ATTN: Mr. H.L. Sumner, Jr. Vice President - Hatch Project P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2004004, 05000366/2004004, AND 07200036/2004002

Dear Mr. Sumner:

On September 25, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 8, 2004, with Mr. George Frederick and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public

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Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/**RA**/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366, 72-36 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000321/2004004 and 05000366/2004004, and 07200036/2004002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:	50-321, 50-366, 72-36
License Nos:	DPR-57, NPF-5
Report No:	05000321/2004004, 05000366/2004004, and 07200036/2004002
Licensee:	Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:	Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Location:	P.O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515
Dates:	June 27, 2004 - September 25, 2004
Inspectors:	 D. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector J. Hickey, Resident Inspector C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer (Section 1R06) S. Shaeffer, Senior Project Engineer (Sections 1R04, 1R15, and 1R19) R. Cortés, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R12) M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17) J. Lenahan, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17) D. Mas-Penaranda, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17) R. Taylor, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17) T. Kolb, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11) M. Bates, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11) J. Kreh, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2 thru 1EP5 and 4OA1)
Approved By:	Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2004004, 05000366/2004004, 07200036/2004002; 06/27/2004 - 09/25/2004; Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.; Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Temporary Plant Modifications.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a senior project engineer and announced inspections by reactor inspectors, operations engineers, and a emergency preparedness inspector. One Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. <u>NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings</u>

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

 <u>SLIV</u>. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for failing closed the residual heat removal service water pump minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report.

As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of system function. (Section 1R23)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near full rated thermal power with the exception of planned maintenance and testing during the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near maximum operating power during the inspection period with the exception of planned maintenance and testing, and the first day of a planned shutdown for the repair of a safety relief valve.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Impending Adverse Conditions Review. The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's response to a high wind conditions for the following two adverse weather events to verify the licensee's actions were in accordance with licensee procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally Occurring Phenomena. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Hurricane Charley
- Hurricane Frances
- b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six changes to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), or procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The inspectors reviewed full evaluations and additional information, such as calculations, supporting analyses, the UFSAR, and drawings to confirm that the licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes could be accomplished without obtaining a license amendment. The six evaluations reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspectors also reviewed samples of changes for which the licensee had determined that evaluations were not required, to confirm that the licensee's conclusions to "screen"

out" these changes were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The twenty one "screened out" changes reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspectors also reviewed a recent audit and self assessment of the 10 CFR 50.59 process and selected corrective action items, and work orders to confirm that problems were identified at an appropriate threshold, were entered into the corrective action process, and appropriate corrective actions had been initiated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

<u>Partial System Walkdowns</u>. The inspectors performed partial walk-downs of the following five systems when the redundant trains were removed from service. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions as appropriate to evaluate the operability of the redundant trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Train A during a 2B RHR pump repair
- Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Train B during a 1A RBCCW heat exchanger repair
- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B during a 1C EDG outage
- EDGs 1A and 1C during a B EDG outage
- EDGs 2A and 2C during a B EDG outage
- b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

<u>Fire Area Tours</u>. The inspectors toured the following 12 plant areas to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment and to verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Fire Protection Program, and conducted area walk-downs to assess the licensee's control of transient combustibles. The inspectors also reviewed the Site Fire Hazards Analysis and applicable Pre-fire Plan drawings to verify the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, were in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- DC Switchgear Rooms 1B, 1A, 2B, 2A
- Transformers 1CD and 2CD
- 600 volt Switchgear Rooms 1C, 1D, 2C, 2D
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Annunciator Rooms
- EDG Switchgear Room 1E
- EDG 1C
- Control Building 130' Elevation: Unit 2 Southeast Corridor, Unit 1 East Cableway and Foyer, Reactor Protection System and Cable Tray Rooms, Health Physics Filter Room
- EDG 2A and Oil Storage Tank Room 2A
- EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tanks
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tanks
- EDG 2C and Oil Storage Tank Room 2C
- EDG Battery Rooms 1A and 1B
- b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measure

a. Inspection Scope

<u>External Flooding Review</u>. The inspectors reviewed plant design features that protect against external flooding and related licensee procedures to verify the licensee's flood mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed the material condition of flood protection barriers and exterior walls. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's condition report and maintenance work order database to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification

a. Inspection Scope

<u>Quarterly Resident Observation</u>. The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LR-SE-00008-17. The scenario included a loss of the "A" core spray system, "A" reactor feed pump trip, recirculation pump runback, main turbine trip, failure of most control rods to insert, and standby liquid control injection. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.

Biennial Program Review. The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in preparation for this inspection. During the week of September 20-24, 2004, the inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of operating tests associated with the licensee's operator regualification program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the effectiveness of the licensee in implementing regualification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators' Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator regualification guidelines established in NUREG 1021. Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, Licensed Operator Regualification Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985. The inspectors observed two crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, licensed operator gualification records, watchstanding and medical records, simulator modification request records and performance test records, the feedback process, and remediation plans. The records were inspected using the criteria listed in IP 71111.11. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

<u>Resident Quarterly Review</u>. The inspectors reviewed the following two maintenance activities associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification. For the equipment problems identified below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated Condition Reports (CRs), Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs) and the licensee's procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule (MR). The review was to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Local Power Range Monitor failures
- 2L Safety Relief Valve leakage

<u>Biennial Review</u>. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's most recent MR periodic assessment, "Plant Hatch Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, June 2004," covering the period of June 2002 through June 2004. The report was issued to satisfy paragraph (a)(3) of 10 CFR 50.65, and covered the period indicated for the two units. The inspection was to determine the effectiveness of the assessment, the periodicity of

issuance and to verify the evaluation for balancing reliability and unavailability, (a)(1) activities, (a)(2) activities, and use of industry operating experience. To verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors reviewed selected MR activities covered by the assessment period for the following MR systems and equipment: high-pressure coolant injection system (HPCI), station batteries, emergency diesel generators, plant service water system (PSW), and residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system . Specific procedures and documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.

The inspectors reviewed the site MR implementing procedures, relevant corrective action reports, operations event log information, self-assessment procedures, system health reports, and discussed issues with cognizant system engineers. Operational event information was evaluated by the inspectors in its use in MR functions. The inspectors selected system health reports and other corrective action documents of risk significant systems recently removed from 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) status and those in (a)(2) status for some period to assess the justification for their status. The documents were compared to the site's MR program criteria, and MR (a)(1) evaluations and scoping documents. The inspectors also reviewed corrective actions and acceptance criteria for systems in a(1) such as RHRSW Unit 1 and PSW Unit 2 to verify proper thresholds of criteria and timeliness commensurate with risk significance in resolving problems with the systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following six Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. The inspectors reviewed risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.

- POD for Week of 7/10-16
- POD for Week of 7/31-8/6
- POD for Week of 8/7-13
- POD for Week of 8/14-20
- POD for Week of 8/28-9/2
- POD for Week of 9/11-17

b. <u>Findings</u>

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

For the event described below, the inspectors observed operator actions and reviewed licensee procedures, operator logs, computer data, and strip chart data recordings as applicable to verify plant responded as expected and that proper operator actions were taken. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 1A Recirculation Pump Runback on July 7, 2004

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specifications and the UFSAR to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform it's intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition.

- CR 2004102373, Crack-like indications on the Unit 1 Core Shroud
- CR 2004102673, 1C EDG Battery positive leads posts bulging
- CR 2004107948 and 2004107982, 1C EDG ground
- CR 2004107568, Marginal performance verification of the 1B RHRSW pump
- CR 2004107848, Unit 1 RCIC Trip and Throttle Valve
- b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

<u>Resident Review</u>. The inspectors reviewed the following two permanent plant modifications to determine if they adversely affected the reliability or functional capability of the associated systems. The inspectors reviewed the applicable UFSAR sections and the 10CFR50.59 assessment associated with each modification to determine if the design basis of the system was affected, as well as the implementing procedures and MWOs. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Implementation of a Reactor Coolant System 10 PSI pressure increase to fully implement the power uprate for Unit 2
- An Equivalency Determination SC-04-1-0038 which evaluated the acceptability of replacing obsolete switches 1C82-S002A and 1C82-S002B in Remote Shutdown Panel 1H21-P176.

<u>Biennial Review</u>. The inspectors evaluated engineering design changes (DCR) for the following nine modifications to evaluate for adverse affects on system availability, reliability, and functional capability. The modifications and the associated attributes reviewed are as follows:

- DCR 1H-03-033, Unit 1 Reactor Building Overhead Crane Upgrade Reviewed: Seismic, Structural, Heavy loads (NUREG-0612), Plant Document Updating - design and licensing documents
- DCR 01-033, Intake Structure Supports Reviewed: Materials/Replacement Components - material compatibility, Seismic, Structural
- DCR 03-026T, PSW Supply to 1B EDG Reviewed: Materials/Replacement Components - functional properties, Operations procedures, Pressure Boundary, Flowpaths, Structural, Process Medium - pressures and flow rate
- DCR 01-045, RHRSW Motors' Oil Cooler Flushing Valve Reviewed: Materials/Replacement Components - material compatibility and functional properties, Flowpaths, Structural
- DCR-02-015, RHRSW 1C Cutter Pump Modification Reviewed: Materials/Replacement Components - functional properties, Environmental Qualification, Process Medium - pressures and flow rate, Post Modification Testing design assumptions or test acceptance criteria
- DCR-00-018, Main Control Room Pressure Control Replacement Reviewed: Materials/Replacement Components - material compatibility, Plant Document Updating - design and licensing documents, Flowpaths, Process Medium pressures and flow rate
- DCR-03-001, 4160V Breakers Replacement Reviewed: Post Modification Testing - design assumptions and test acceptance criteria, Materials/Replacement Components - functional properties, Seismic & Environmental Qualification, Plant Document Updating - design and licensing documents
- DCR-03-010, MOV 2E51-F008 Cable Replacement, Unit 2

Reviewed: Materials/Replacement Components - functional properties, Seismic & Environmental Qualification, Plant Document Updating - design and licensing documents, Post Modification Testing - design assumptions and test acceptance criteria

 DCR-00-040, GE14 Fuel as an acceptable reload fuel type Reviewed: Materials/Replacement Components - functional properties and material compatibility, Plant Document Updating - design and licensing documents, Heat Removal, Process Medium - pressures and flow rate

For selected modification packages, the inspectors observed the as-built configurations. Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modification design and implementation packages, work orders, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the living UFSAR, supporting analyses, Technical Specifications, and design basis information.

The inspectors also reviewed selected self-assessments and corrective action documents associated with modifications to confirm that problems were identified at an appropriate threshold, were entered into the corrective action process, and appropriate corrective actions had been initiated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures listed in the Attachment of this report and observed personnel performance for the following six maintenance and testing activities to verify procedural requirements were met. The inspectors also reviewed the activities to determine if the scope of testing demonstrated that the work performed was correctly completed and the affected equipment was functional and operable. Following the maintenance activities, the inspectors reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- EDG B following a system outage
- 1C EDG after repairing a ground on the motor windings
- 2C EDG Battery Cells #1 and #2 replaced
- 1C Station Service Air Compressor outage
- 1D Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Motor replacement
- 1B Control Rod Drive Water Pump replacement

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following six surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre- and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Test procedures either reviewed or witnessed included the following:

Surveillance Tests

- 57SV-C11-002-1, Scram Discharge Volume Level (Thermal Sensors) Functional Test and Calibration
- 34SV-T46-003-1, Standby Gas Treatment Ventilation and Operability
- 57CP-CAL-015-1, Standby Liquid Control Meter Relay Calibration (GE Type 195, 196 & 197 Meter Relay Calibration)
- 34SV-E51-002-1, RCIC Pump Operability
- 34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability

In-Service Tests

- 34SV-E11-004-1, Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Operability Check
- b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two temporary modifications (TMM) and assessed each evaluation using criteria defined in licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-018-0S, Temporary Modification Control. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were assessed using the design basis information provided in the UFSAR to verify the modifications did not affect the safety functions of these systems. The inspectors also verified the modifications were installed in accordance with the TMM requirements.

- TMM 1-04-021, Gagging Closed the RHRSW Minimum Flow Valves
- TMM 1-04-017, Unit 1 Main Transformer Fault Protection Pressure Relay Disconnected

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW pump minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

Description. Following functional testing of the RHRSW pumps, the licensee identified that the RHRSW pumps would not produce the required flow at minimum river level if the minimum flow valves failed open. The licensee documented this condition in CRs 2004106411 and 2004107568. To prevent the minimum flow valves from failing open the licensee closed the minimum flow valves, but used only a caution tag to document this action. After further review, the inspectors concluded this action was actually a configuration change to a safety related system. The licensee's configuration change process required a 10 CFR 50.59 screening for this action. The screening would have identified that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required since the function of the minimum flow valves, which was listed in UFSAR Section 10.6.8.1, was changed. The inspectors concluded that closing the minimum flow valves closed could cause the RHRSW pumps to overheat if run against shutoff head. When guestioned by the inspectors, the licensee performed a 10 CFR 50.59 screening and determined a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required based on the function being described in the UFSAR. The licensee then completed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation which justified closing the minimum flow valves closed.

<u>Analysis</u>. As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, and short or long term corrective actions. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of system function.

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) requires, in part, that a written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that a change, test or experiment does not require a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). Contrary to the above, on August 26, 2004, the licensee failed to conduct the required written evaluation for closing the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This violation is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2004108456. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A. of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000321,366/2004004-01, Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's testing and maintenance programs for the alert and notification system (ANS) to determine whether those programs were being implemented in accordance with commitments in the Emergency Plan (Section E and Appendix 3). The review included the licensee's annual reports for 2002 and 2003 on ANS installation, maintenance, and testing activities. As of September 1, 2004, the ANS comprised approximately 3535 tone-alert radios (TARs) provided by the licensee to residences, businesses, and schools located within the ten-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). The inspectors selectively reviewed the licensee's TAR database and recent examples of monthly listings of new service connects and disconnects provided by the local electric cooperatives. The testing program involved weekly activation tests (initiated by the National Weather Service) as well as an annual telephone survey (conducted by the licensee) to determine whether the ANS met the acceptance criteria established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The maintenance of the ANS was administered primarily by means of an annual mailing (sample package reviewed by the inspector) to all addresses of radio installations, providing a replacement battery and emergency information calendar and soliciting feedback regarding any TAR operability problems. The inspectors examined the new onsite ANS radio transmitters installed in January 2003. A sample of corrective actions was evaluated to determine their effectiveness in addressing ANS problems. The review of this program area encompassed the period March 2002 through August 2004. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the maintenance and testing of the licensee's capability to staff emergency response facilities in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency Plan (found in Table B-1; in Section B, under Emergency Organization; and in Section F, under Activation and Staffing of Emergency Facilities). The inspectors evaluated the primary and backup systems used for notification and call-out of the ERO. Records of four ERO notification drills were reviewed; these involved reporting of availability and estimated travel time to the plant by ERO personnel interfacing telephonically with the computer-based notification system. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed changes to the augmentation system and process implemented during the past two years, including several interim changes necessitated by damage to the primary call-out system ("Autodialer") as a result of a lightning strike on August 6, 2004. Follow-up

activities for a sample of problems identified through ERO augmentation testing were evaluated to determine whether appropriate corrective actions were implemented. The review of this program area encompassed the period March 2002 through August 2004. Licensee procedures, records, and other documents reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

No changes had been made to the Emergency Plan since the last inspection in this program area, conducted in August 2003. The revision level of the Emergency Plan was Version 18.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the efficacy of licensee programs that addressed weaknesses and deficiencies in emergency preparedness. The procedure governing the plant corrective action program was reviewed for applicability to the emergency preparedness program. Since the last inspection of this program area (March 2002), two emergency declarations were made by the licensee; documentation associated with these events was reviewed in detail. Reports on the last three annual QA audits, performed in accordance with 10CFR 50.54(t), and two self-assessments were reviewed. The inspectors evaluated selected drill scenarios and associated critiques to determine whether the licensee had properly identified failures to implement regulatory requirements and planning standards. A sample of weaknesses and deficiencies identified by means of these licensee processes was evaluated to determine whether corrective actions were effective and timely. Licensee procedures, drill and event records, and other documents reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Rev. 2 and licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, Preparation And Reporting Of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.

Initiating Events Cornerstone

Reactor Coolant System Leakage

Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

- Safety System Unavailability, Heat Removal/RCIC
- Safety System Unavailability, RHR & RHRSW

The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected since July, 2003 for each of the indicators identified and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, and the individual PIs were calculated correctly.

Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

- ERO Drill/Exercise Performance
- ERO Drill Participation

For the July 1, 2003, through June 30, 2004, the inspectors examined data reported to the NRC and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and exercise records. The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The inspectors also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting and evaluating the PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

1. <u>Daily Condition Report Review</u>.

a. Inspection Scope

As required by IP 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs or accessing the licensee's computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. <u>Annual Sample Review</u>

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of CRs 2004106411 and 2004107568. These CRs documented the results of 42IT-TET-019-0, RHRSW Pump Performance Verification, which was performed as a corrective action from a previously failed inservice test on the RHRSW pumps. The review was performed to ensure the full extent of the testing was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CRs against the licensee's corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. However, the inspectors did identify that the licensee failed to implement these changes in accordance with the licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-018, Temporary Modification Control. Furthermore, the final 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation did not take into consideration the single failure criteria as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 34, Residual Heat Removal, in relation to a stem-disk separation of the RHR Heat Exchanger outlet valve, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The inspectors determined both of these conditions were violation of NRC requirements; however, these violations were minor and not subject to enforcement. These issues were placed in the licensee's corrective action program.

40A5 Other

Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Installation

a. Inspection Scope

Inspectors reviewed the normal operations of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Inspectors verified through a review of selected records that the licensee has properly identified each fuel assembly placed in the two latest casks which have been placed on the ISFSI pad. Inspectors also verified that the fuel placed in these casks met the requirements of the Technical Specifications. Inspectors also walked down both ISFSI pads to assess the material condition of the casks, the installation of security equipment, and the performance of the monitoring systems. Inspectors verified that the required records are being retained for the ISFSI pad and duplicate records are being kept at a separate location.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On October 8, 2004, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. George Frederick and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

- R. Varnadore, Engineering Support Manager
- V. Coleman, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
- R. Dedrickson, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
- G. Frederick, General Manager Nuclear Plant
- M. Googe, Maintenance Manager
- J. Hammonds, Operations Manager
- J. Dixon, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- J. Lewis, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Madison, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations
- R. Reddick, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
- K. Underwood, Performance Analysis Supervisor
- P. Underwood, Outage and Planning Supervisor

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000321,366/2004004-01 NCV

Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59

Evaluation (Section 1R23)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

34SO-E11-010-1, Residual Heat Removal System 34SO-E11-010-2, Residual Heat Removal System 34SO-P41-001-1, Plant Service Water System 34SO-P41-001-2, Plant Service Water System

Section 1R02: Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments

Administrative Procedures 17MS-MMS-002-OS, DCP Processing, Rev. 3.5 40AC-ENG-003-OS, Design Control, Rev. 9 20AC-MTL-003-0, Commercial Grade Dedication, Rev. 5.2

Full Safety Evaluations DCR-1H03-009, Reactor Building Overhead Crane Upgrade DCR 03-026T, PSW Supply to 1B EDG LDCR 2003-069, 24 Month Cycles LDCR 2002-064, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsules DCP-98-046. GE Micro Versa RMS-9 Trip Devices DCR 99-049 and 050, Unit 1 and 2 SPDS Replacement

Screened 50.59 Reviews DCR 01-033, Intake Structure Supports DCR-02-010, Shroud Head Bolts DCR-98-048, Hotwell Fill and Spill Control LDCR-2003-009, Circulating Water Flood Analysis ED 02-9098, Replacement of Diaphragm (1E41-F382) Minor Design Change 1039501401, Varistor Across SCRAM Reset Relays DCR 01-045, RHRSW Motors' Oil Cooler Flushing Valve LDCR 2002-088, Revise Unit 2 Turbine Building Temperature Pirmary Containment Isolation Set Point Minor Design Change 1039501101, Reroute the reference leg for the Unit 1 HPCI torus Level Transmitter 1E41-N062D DCR-01-031, Remove RCIC F058 DCR-01-032, Remove HPCI valves F3003/3007 DCR-01-063 and 02-063, FW Flow Measurement DCR-02-015, RHRSW 1C Cutter Pump Modification ED-03-9003, Utilization of Core Spray motor for RHR Pump DCR-00-018, Main Control Room Pressure Control Replacement DCR-00-043 and 44, Breaker Trip Device Replacement, Unit 1 and 2, respectively DCR-02-034, HPCI Oil Level Switch Fuses, Unit1 DCR-00-037, Fuel Zone RX Water Level Instrumentation, Unit 1 DCR 00-041 GE14 Fuel DCR 1H02-022T, Leak Repair for 1E11-F060A ED 02-9124, Replacing Existing Engine Turbochargers on Emergency Diesel Generator 1R43-S001A

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

MWO 1040717501 34SO-E11-010-2, Residual Heat Removal System Drawings: H-26015, H-11037, H-21074 34SO-R43-001-1, Diesel Generator Standby AC System 34SO-R43-001-2, Diesel Generator Standby AC System

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Pre-Fire Plan Drawing A-43966 Sheets: 8B, 11B, 15B, 17B, 18B, 20B, 22B, 24B through 32B, 34B, 34D, 35B through 41B, 43B, 44B, and 73B

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification

Focused Accredited Training Program Self-Assessments SA03-TEP-03, Objectives 1 and 6 SA04-TEP-01, Objectives 3 and 4 SA04-TEP-02, Objectives 2 and 5

Comprehensive Accredited Training Program Self-Assessments SA03-TEP-02, Team Assessment

SA04-TEP-01, Team Assessment

Licensed Operator Medical Records

Badge Access Transaction Reports

2003 Requalification Biennial Exams: SRO-B, RO-B, SRO-C, RO-D, SRO-D, SRO-E, SRO-G Open Simulator Change Requests

Simulator Fidelity Documents

DI-TRN-37-0787, Simulator Configuration Control

DI-TRN-28-0286, Review, Routing and Incorporation of Event Reports, DCRs and Procedures Simulator Certification Annual Report 2000

Simulator Certification Annual Report 2003

Simulator Certification Core/Vessel Upgrade Test Report 2001

TRACG Simulations of Hatch 1 Events for Runback and Feedwater Controller Modification,

GE-NE-A22-00129-01-01P, Rev. 0, Class III, January 2002.

Remedial Training Records: LR 03-6, LR 03-7

Job Performance Measures: LR-JP-04.18-12, LR-JP-34.08-11, LR-JP-06.02-14, LR-JP-28.

26-10, LR-JP-10.16-11, LR-JP-10.02-14

Simulator Examinations

LR-SE-00008-18, Main Turbine Trip / ATWS / SBLC Injection

LR-SE-00031-11, High Torus Level / SRVPLL / Drywell Spray

LR-SE-00001-18, Steam Leak in Turbine Building / Loss of High Pressure Feed / Drywell Spray LR-SE-00010-16, RWCU Line Break / Failure to Isolate / LOSP

Lesson Plan, LR-LP-10026-00, Component Positioning Training

Section 1R12: Maintenance Rule Implementation

CR's: 2003: 10865, 11343, 11439, 11708, 12153, 13135, 13173, 13409 CR's: 2004: 00019, 01545, 01645, 02885, 02661, 02886, 03046, 03077, 03078, 03081, 03101, 03104, 03444, 03674, 03790, 03807, 04025, 04473, 04527, 04760, 04791, 04861, 04867, 05061, 05086, 05185, 05494, 05689, 05929, 06505, 06714, 07187, 07526, 07552, 08010, 8550, 8631, 8720

MWO's: 1022026, 1030291101, 1040095701, 1040000701, 1020202601, 1040523701, 1040559901, 1040579901, 1040571901, 1040880901, 1041025701, 104220801, 1040364801 GE Services Information Letter #564, Revision 1

Condition Reports

2002011317, Found pieces of metal in the inlet air side of both EDG turbochargers.

2002001645, Received high crank case pressure alarm on B EDG.

2003003966, 2P41-F063 PSW Reactor Building outlet isolation valve is not operating properly.

2003110260, Failure of DC control power breaker for the 2D RHRSW pump motor.

2003110267, Failure of the manual valve operator on 1E11-F012A.

2003111703, Battery charger 2J, 2R42S032C tripped.

2003112832, Control room A/C compressor shutdown with the control switch in run position.

2004100463, Start failure of 2A EDG during semi-annual test.

2004104283, Flange gasket installed with inadequate pressure rating for the application.

2004104424, 2B Turbine Building chiller tripped on high head pressure.

2004104711, Turbine Building A cooling tower was overflowing.

2004106236, Turbine Building B chiller tripped on high head pressure.

2004105860, 1Z41-B003A control room HVAC tripped for no apparent reason.

Attachment

Administrative Procedures

40AC-ENG-020-0S, Maintenance Rule (10CFR 50.65) Implementation and Compliance, Rev. 3.1

NMP-GM-003, Self-Assessment Procedure, Rev. 2.0

Health Reports

1R20DC-2R20DC, First quarter 2004 Health Report for Station Batteries system. 1R20DC-2R20DC, Second quarter 2004 Health Report for Station Batteries system.

1P41-2P41, First quarter 2004 Health Report for Plant Service Water system.

1P41-2P41, Second quarter 2004 Health Report for Plant Service Water system.

1E11-2E11, First quarter 2004 Health Report for Residual Heat Removal system.

1E11-2E11, Second quarter 2004 Health Report for Residual Heat Removal system.

1E41-2E41, First quarter 2004 Health Report for High Pressure Coolant Injection system.

1E41-2E41, Second quarter 2004 Health Report for High Pressure Coolant Injection system.

1R43-1R43, First quarter 2004 Health Report for Emergency Diesel Generators system.

1R43-1R43, Second quarter 2004 Health Report for Emergency Diesel Generators system.

Miscellaneous

997-876-2, Series V43 Pilot Operated Pressure Water Regulating Valve Installation manual, Rev. 1

2-1/2" Flowserve 2-way Direct Acting Valve Principles of Operation.

Response to NRCIN 2004-009, Corrosion of steel containment and containment liner, dated 08/05/2004

Response to NRCIN 2004-001, Auxiliary feedwater pump recirculation line orifice fouling, dated 08/30/2004

Response to SIL 646, Target rock safety relief valve failure to fully open, dated 04/17/2003 Response to 10 CFR 21 NS&C File 2003-02, ABB 4KV breaker failure to close and latch, dated 06/13/20034004

MSV-04220, Plant Hatch Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, dated 06/2002 NOE-03536, Plant Hatch Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, dated 06/2004

Section 1R14: Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

CR's: 2004107089, 2004107051, 2004107052 34GO-OPS-005-1, Power Changes

Section 1R17: Permanent Plant Modifications

DCR 2041421201, 1040113801, 2040113901 57SP-060104-IJ-2-2, Version 1.1 57SP-060104 -IJ-1-1, Version 1.1 MWO 1040113802, 1040113803 CR's: 2004107135, 2004108031, 2004108234, 2004108356, 2004108443 Drawings: H-13586, H-19611, H-17781, H-17782, H-19571

Administrative Procedures

17MS-MMS-002-OS, DCP Processing, Rev. 3.5 40AC-ENG-003-OS, Design Control, Rev. 9 20AC-MTL-003-0, Commercial Grade Dedication, Rev. 5.2 Other Documents

REA HT-98665, Determine Material Condition in Plant service water Intake Structure Valve Pit Calculation number SMNH-03-002, Circulating Water System Flooding Analysis

Drawing Number S-01-033-C001, Rev. A, Repairs to Intake Structure Supports Drawing Number S-01-033-M001, Rev. A, Repairs to Intake Structure Supports CR 2002003190, Shroud Hold Down Bolt Deficiencies

CR 2002011894, Unit 1 Reactor Building Overhead Crane Tripping

CR 2003000389, Unit 1 Reactor Building Overhead Crane Inspection Deficiencies

GE Report # GENE B13-01903-01, Rev. 0, Shroud Head Bolt Evaluation, Hatch Units 1 & 2 Commercial Grade Dedication Plan No. CGDP 98-0056, Rev. 1, Metal Oxide Varistor CR 204103957, Valve 1P41-F1600D will not rotate

CR 20044101251, Tracking Turbine Building Temperature Setpoint Design Change; LCDR 2002-088 relates

Calculation Number SINH 02-064, Establish Setpoints for 24 Month Fuel Cycles, 1E11 42IT-TET-012-1S, Plant Service Water and RHR Service Water Piping Inspection Procedure, Rev. 2 ED 2

Drawing D-11004, RHR Service Water Outside Building, Unit 1, Rev. 39

NRC to President - Nuclear Hatch Project Letter - Edwin I. Hatch Plant, Unit 1 and 2 RE: Issuance of Amendments (TAC NO. MB6106 and MB6107), dated March 10, 2003

Drawing A-16237, Sheet 61A, Suppression Chamber Level Instrument Unit 1, Rev. 1 Drawing H-16332, HPCI System P&ID, Sheet 1, Rev. 58

Electrical System Health Report Long Range Plan, Issue 039, Switchgear Circuit Breaker Reliability, dated 7/20/04

Work Order 10200151, System R22, breaker S020, Unit1 600V SWGR with Micro Versa Trip Plus trip unit

Procedure 34SO-E41-001-1, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, Section 7.4.6, Swapping HPCI Suction Source, Rev. 21.1

Procedure 31EO-EOP-100-1, Miscellaneous Emergency Overrides, Section 3.5, HPCI High Torus Level Suction Swap Override, Rev. 3.1

SS-2105-6, Plant Service Water & RHR Service Water Pumps, Rev. 3

SS-6005-9, Plant Service Water & RHR Service Water Pumps, Rev. 3

EJ-0269, Is Unit 2 Specification 2105-6 acceptable for modifying Unit 1 RHRSW pump CR2003012330, RHRSW Root Cause Determination Rev 0.

SINH 94-005, Main Steam Line High Flow Setpoint Allowable Value Determination, Rev. 5

SINH 94-006, Main Steam Line High Flow Setpoint Allowable Value Determination, Rev. 4

SINH 02-036, Technical Specification 3.3.6.1-1(1.c) Setpoint Determination for 24 month cycles 2B21, Rev. 3

ED-02-9105, Replacement of Yoke Nut to Gate Valve, Rev. 0

H-16332, HPCI System P & ID Sheet No.1, Rev. 58

H-16891, Plant Service Water System in Control Building, Rev. 4

H-44046, 1P41 Plant Service Water In Control Building Stress Isometric, Rev. 1

CR2004107452, Inadequate CR closure, 07/22/2004

LDCR 2001-042 SPDS Replacement impact on FSAR (DCR 99-049)

EDC-32868P, GE14 Compliance with Amendment 22 of NEDE-24011-P-A (GESTAR II), Rev. 1

Core Operating Limits Report, Unit 1 Cycle 21, Rev. 0

Core Operating Limits Report, Unit 2 Cycle 18, Rev. 1

AIT 2002201367, Engineering Support - Develop plan to repair 1E11F060A with no Pressure Seal Replacement (DCR 1H02-022T)

CR 2002004405, Condition Report on Drywell Floor Drain In Leakage in Unit 1 Reactor (DCR 1H02-022T)

AIT 2002201601, Drywell Floor Drain Leakage Exceeded TS (DCR 1H02-022T)

Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing

MWO's: C041797601, 1041908001, 1040702301, 1042065001, 1041265801, 2041408901, 1020368701 52SV-R43-001-0, Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection 34SV-R43-005-2S, Diesel Generator 1B Semi-Annual Test

57CP-R43-012-0, Westinghouse Type DGF Generator Field Ground Detection Relay Calibration

42EN-R42-001-0S, Individual Cell Isolation and Load Testing

51GM-MNT-002-0S, Maintenance Housekeeping and Foreign Material Control

52PM-E11-005-1, Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump and Motor Maintenance

52PM-E11-002-0, RHR Service Water Pump Mechanical Seal Maintenance

52IT-MEL-003-0, High Potential and Megger Testing of Electrical Equipment and Cables 34SV-R43-003-1, Diesel Generator 1C Monthly Test

52PM-P51-001-0, Instrument Air and Service Air Compressors and Auxiliaries CR's: 2004107966, 2004107968, 2004107948, 2004109094

52IT-MEL-003-0, High Potential and Meggar Testing of Electrical Equipment and Cables 52PM-C11-005-0, Control Rod Drive Pump, Motor & Gearbox Maintenance Drawings: H13529, HL16065

Sections 1EP2 - 1EP5: Emergency Preparedness

<u>Plans and Procedures</u> Hatch Emergency Plan, Version 18 NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Version 1.0

Records and Data

2002 Annual Report of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant EPZ Prompt Notification Program 2003 Annual Report of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant EPZ Prompt Notification Program Public Alert and Notification System for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (FEMA-43 Report), June 1985

E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Response Position Matrix, 08/06/2004 Plant Hatch Callout List, 08/31/2004

Documentation of Off-Hour ERO Response Drills conducted on 05/07/2002, 09/24/2002, 12/01/2003, and 07/27/2004,

- Documentation packages (scenario/time line/drill notification forms/critique report) for ERO drills on 05/21/2003 and 05/12/2004
- Documentation package (Control Room log/event time line/event notification forms/critique report) for Alert declaration on 04/02/2002
- Documentation package (Control Room log/event time line/event notification forms/critique report) for Notification of Unusual Event declaration on 01/06/2004

Audits and Self-Assessments

QA Audit Report No. 02-EP-1, Audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program, 04/15/2002 QA Audit Report No. 03-EP-1, Audit of Emergency Preparedness, 05/09/2003

QA Audit Report No. H-EP-2004, Audit of Hatch Emergency Preparedness, 07/07/2004 Self-Assessment Report No. NOT-03843, ERO Augmentation, 09/20/2002

Self-Assessment Report No. SA03-TEP-01, EP Change Management Process, 09/2003

Condition Reports

CR No. 2002003343, Multiple annunciators on Main Control Room alarm panels unexpectedly began alarming, resulting in entry into an Alert emergency [review included associated Root Cause Determination Report], 04/02/2002

CR No. 2002003346, Problems with audibility of plant page announcements during Alert emergency, 04/02/2002

CR No. 2002003351, Safety Parameter Display System link could not be established from the Technical Support Center during Alert emergency, 04/02/2002

CR No. 2002003823, Problems encountered in RWP/Access Control process during Alert emergency, 04/10/2002

CR No. 2002003822, During the Alert emergency, the initial public-address announcement was made without the areas outside the Protected Area being merged, 04/10/2002

CR No. 2002005066, During the 005/07/2002 unannounced staff augmentation drill, five ERO support positions were not filled at the desired staffing levels, 05/08/2002

CR No. 2003008560, Several residences were identified within the EPZ south of the plant that were not reflected on the monthly "new electrical connection" report provided by Satilla EMC, 07/25/2003

CR No. 2004100126, Notification of Unusual Event was declared because a fire within the Protected Area lasted longer than ten minutes from discovery, 01/06/2004

CR No. 2004104594, Objective regarding timely issuance of Protective Action

Recommendations to State and local authorities was not successfully demonstrated during 04/14/2004 exercise, 04/14/2004

CR No. 2004104976, Objective regarding timely and accurate issuance of news releases was not successfully demonstrated during 04/14/2004 exercise, 04/23/2004

CR No. 2004107592, "Group Page" feature for ERO pagers did not work as expected during the 07/27/2004 staff augmentation drill, 07/27/2004

CR No. 2004107940, Computer boards connected to the phone lines used in the EP Autodialer are damaged, rendering the Autodialer inoperable, 08/06/2004

Section 40A1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures, Records, and Data

Documentation package (scenario/time line/event notification forms/critique report) for ERO drills on 04/14/2004, 05/12/2004

Documentation package (Control Room log/event time line/event notification forms/critique report) for Notification of Unusual Event declaration on 01/06/2004

Documentation of DEP opportunities from Operations Simulator Evaluations on 07/21/2003, 07/31/2003, 08/06/2003, 08/14/2003, 08/21/2003, 08/28/2003, 09/11/2003