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**AUTHORITY AND CONTROL IN THE  
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT**

*Submitted by the*  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.*

*Concurred in by the*  
**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

*on 8 August 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.*

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Nº 437

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# AUTHORITY AND CONTROL IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

## THE PROBLEM

To assess the cohesion of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and among the parties of the world Communist movement, to identify trends in the degree of Soviet control, and to estimate the future implication of these trends.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

### *General Considerations*

1. According to Communist doctrine, it would be impossible for conflicts of interest to disturb in any basic way the relations between Communist parties in the international movement. This is so, it is argued, because the class interests which are the source of international conflict among non-Communist states have been suppressed by the new social order, and have been replaced by the fundamental identity of views and harmony of interests of the "classless" society. In fact, however, the appearance of unity in the Communist movement has been due, not so much to the absence of conflicts of interest, as to the overwhelming authority exercised by Moscow. This authority has rested on the great military and economic power of the USSR, on its historical precedence as the first Communist state, on the long personal ascendancy of Stalin over the international Communist movement, and on the tradition of dictatorial

centralism in that movement. (*Paras. 13-18*)

2. In the period since World War II a number of developments have demonstrated the falsity of the simplistic Communist theory of natural harmony among Communist parties. When the Communist parties of Eastern Europe achieved state power they naturally acquired new interests and attitudes different from those they had reflected as small conspiratorial groups wholly dependent on the protection and support provided by Moscow. Yet they were small states in Moscow's immediate sphere of power; therefore, whatever pretensions to independence they may have had were bound to be extremely circumscribed. The achievement of state power by the Chinese Communists was a different matter, however, because it meant that for the first time Communist theory on state relations had to be applied to the relations between two great powers. (*Paras. 14-16*)

3. Beyond this, there was in the postwar period a considerable growth in the number and in the size of Communist parties all over the world. Among them there were wide variations in the cultural and political environments in which they operated, in their tactical problems, and in the degree of their Marxist-Leninist sophistication and training. Over the years, moreover, there has been a tendency for a number of the more important non-Bloc parties to be increasingly concerned to see that their own local points of view are considered in policy deliberations of the international movement. (*Paras. 14, 39-40*)

4. All these developments have tested not only the theory of unity, but also the authority of the Soviet Party over other parties which was the practical reality on which the appearance of unity was built. In the best of circumstances it was bound to become increasingly difficult for Moscow to maintain the unity of so large and varied a movement with so wide a range of differing views and interests. In addition, these events have aggravated the frequent conflicts between the requirements of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and those of the international Communist movement. Altogether, it is evident that Communist political institutions, like all other institutions, are subject to pressures for change and are in fact changing. (*Paras. 13-21, 34-40, 59*)

#### *Disciplinary Problems in the Communist Movement*

5. Stalin's authority over the international Communist movement was tested almost as soon as the new Communist states came into existence at the end of World War II. Challenged by Yugoslavia

in 1948, he failed either to impose discipline or to prevent Yugoslavia's subsequent survival as an independent Communist state. When the Chinese Communists achieved state power in 1949—like the Yugoslavs, largely by their own efforts—they inevitably acquired a special status in the Bloc. After Stalin died and his awesome aura of personal authority over the parties disappeared, his less eminent successors attempted to overcome the abuses of his brutal and open control by substituting a more flexibly exercised but still decisive influence. These experiments were cut short, however, by the Eastern European upheavals of 1956, which showed that the balance between influence and outright control would be a difficult one to strike. (*Paras. 13-15, 19-21*)

6. Since 1956, when Peiping helped Moscow to restore its badly shaken authority in Eastern Europe, China has become an increasingly important factor in the direction of the movement, and has developed pretensions as an authoritative source of Communist doctrine. When the Chinese leaders resorted in 1960 to open polemics in their policy disagreements with Moscow, and also lobbied openly among Communists against Soviet policies, the Soviets responded by, in effect, putting the Chinese on trial before the other parties, first at Bucharest and later at the November conference in Moscow. Nevertheless, during the Sino-Soviet dispute of 1960 the Chinese were able to bring a successful challenge to Soviet authority and to establish the formal principle of mandatory consultation among the parties on matters of general Communist policy. (*Paras. 16, 21-28*)

*Prospects for Soviet Authority*

7. Since the 81-party conference of November 1960, the Soviets and the Chinese have continued, within limits, their separate efforts to preserve and expand their own authority in the movement. It seems to us unlikely that the two major parties will be able for some time to come to resolve their differences and achieve a stable arrangement for directing the Communist movement. On the other hand, an open rupture between them appears to us equally unlikely. We believe that the course of their relations will be erratic, cooperative at some times and places, competitive at others. (*Paras. 35, 38, 59-62*)

8. In this situation the Soviet Party possesses enormous advantages, because of its greater military and economic power, and also because of its traditional authority and prestige within the movement. The ability of the Chinese Party to contend for leadership is currently limited by China's serious internal difficulties. The Soviets retain some opportunity to exert pressure by virtue of China's relative economic and military weakness, though this apparently was not very effective in the dispute of 1960. Because of the present preponderance of Soviet power, Moscow will probably be able, though with increasing difficulty, to maintain its primacy in the Communist movement for some time to come. The Soviet leaders will endeavor to maintain the substance of their former authority by exercising pressure and influence bilaterally upon other parties, by confronting their rivals with strong majority coalitions at international gatherings, and sometimes by shrewd adjustments of Soviet policies in order to undercut Chinese

criticisms. Because the role of personalities has figured in some degree in the Soviet-Chinese difficulties, the appearance of new leaders in either country could have an important influence on the further course of their relations. (*Paras. 60-62*)

9. In these circumstances, the other parties will almost inevitably be tempted to bargain between Moscow and Peiping in order to obtain greater advantages for themselves. Within certain parties which develop serious prospects of achieving power, and which therefore must make important tactical choices, conflicting brands of advice may tend to intensify factionalism. In the long run, some of the parties in Eastern Europe, or factions within them, may attempt to develop further the autonomy conceded by Stalin's successors. In the Asian satellites, where Chinese influence is already strong and has a good prospect of increasing if China's power continues to grow, the regimes will be better able to bargain with both Communist great powers for economic and political support. (*Para. 63*)

*Implications for Policy Toward the West*

10. It is evident that the international Communist system, for decades little more than an instrumentality of Soviet policy, is being changed, because of the forces of nationalism and diversity within it, into a movement reflecting an appreciable diffusion of power. While the altered relationships within the Communist movement and the decline in Soviet authority have not altered the fundamental hostility of the Communists toward the non-Communist world, we believe that these developments are having

an important influence on Communist policy. They have already diminished to some extent the flexibility of Soviet policy towards the West, and the Soviet Party will probably encounter increasing difficulties in its efforts to coordinate general Communist policy. These difficulties may not be as serious in times when events generally favor Communist interests, but they may again erupt into open polemics during periods of adversity, or even at times when fundamental decisions are required for the exploitation of unfolding opportunities. (Paras. 59, 65)

11. The development of the relationship between the USSR and China, and the evolution of the international Communist movement generally, will obviously be of profound significance for the security and interests of the West. In the long run Chinese power, assertiveness, and self-interest might increase so far as greatly to impair the common policy with the USSR, and even lead the Soviets to believe that they had more in common with the ideological enemy than they have today. For some time to come, however, the most likely prospect is that the USSR and

China will maintain their relationship in something like its present form. It will be an alliance which is from time to time troubled and inharmonious, but which nevertheless preserves sufficient unity to act in concert against the West, especially in times of major challenge. However, present trends as described in this paper point to an increasing complexity, diversity, and interplay of forces within the Communist system, and to a remarkable survival of old-fashioned impulses of nationalism. (Para. 67)

12. These trends may have various effects. They may from time to time result in more aggressive anti-Western policies intended to hold the forces of disunity in check. They may enable certain parties, free from the restrictions of a rigid, general Communist line, to pursue more effective policies in local situations. But eventually, if such trends persist, they may considerably diminish the effectiveness of the Communist movement as a whole. This would give the West opportunities for maneuver and influence which could provide important advantages in the world struggle. (Para. 68)

## DISCUSSION

### I. DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS AMONG THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

#### A. The Comintern Period

13. The Comintern (Third International) was at the outset, for a brief period, a collection of independent parties and groups which shared a bond of unity in dedication to common revolutionary goals. Immediately after the Russian Revolution and the end of World War I, Communists lived in the expectation of imminent revolutions in Western Europe, and even Lenin anticipated that his own party

would share leadership of the international movement with the victorious parties of Western Europe. As these illusions died, however, the Soviet Party was not long in establishing its ascendancy, and in making the Comintern over in its own Bolshevik image. In the twenties, international Communist policy was increasingly subordinated to the needs of Soviet foreign policy, and the parties were gradually placed under increasingly stringent supervision by Moscow through the vast international bureaucracy of the Comintern. Subsequently, through repeated purges and

other means of pressure, Stalin acquired almost complete control over all the parties except the Chinese. At the same time, he dispensed more and more with formal institutional organs, and in the mid-thirties distrust and suspicion moved him to decimate the entire headquarters apparatus of the Comintern. Long before it was formally abolished in 1943, the Comintern had in fact lost its practical importance, though Stalin's tight control of the Communist movement remained unimpaired.

#### B. The Emergence of New Communist States

14. World War II, which disrupted party communications with Moscow, nurtured autonomous tendencies among the parties and helped the French, Italian, and several East European parties to develop greater mass support in the partisan struggles and to become increasingly self-reliant. The most important effect of the war, however, was the fundamental alteration it wrought in the Communist movement by the creation of new Communist states outside the Soviet Union. Previously, Soviet control over the movement had been relatively simple, involving only parties out of power whose very existence often depended on Moscow's political and financial support. Now the Communist system, still based on a single source of power and authority, had to embrace not just parties, but also national states, each of which had its own particular national interests.

15. Stalin was not disposed to give much play to these national interests. As soon as the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe were securely established in power, he took steps to impose complete, all-pervasive control, tying the new states tightly to Moscow and treating them as mere extensions of the Soviet state system. The Yugoslav Party, however, refused to submit to such treatment, and subsequently was able to survive expulsion from the Cominform and to establish itself as a continuous, glaring contradiction of Soviet claims that membership in the Bloc best serves the national interests of its individual members. In the rest of Eastern Europe, despite the ensuing crackdown, secret police

methods of rule could only repress, but not eliminate, disaffection and nationalist resentment which often infected the local parties as well as the population.

16. The establishment of Communist control in China created an additional problem for Moscow, but one of far greater magnitude. By virtue of its size, population, and the traditional influence of its civilization, China was a great power. Moreover, the Chinese Party, unlike most parties in Eastern Europe, achieved its revolutionary victory largely by its own efforts and established its own basis of power in a country far too large and remote to make the imposition of direct control practicable for Moscow. Its leader, Mao Tse-tung, knew from experience that Stalin had little comprehension of local problems in China, which differed greatly from those in the Soviet Union. He did not hesitate to interpret Communist doctrine independently to suit the needs of Chinese internal policy; thus even before Stalin's death Mao gained the reputation of a doctrinal innovator. Thus, whatever Stalin's wishes may have been, China inevitably acquired a special status in the Bloc.

#### C. The Death of Stalin

17. Nevertheless, until the death of Stalin, Soviet authority was largely unquestioned, and the Soviet Party possessed manifold assets for asserting its control. It had been the first party, and for decades the only one, to achieve power and provide a secure base for the international movement. It had built a powerful state, developing in the process an internal system which came to be the model of socialism for other parties. Its ideological pronouncements had become dogma, and its publications served as the basic indoctrination material for Communists everywhere. The other parties were in great part dependent upon the USSR for psychological and financial support, while those which had been brought to power in Eastern Europe knew that Soviet military might was their sole guarantee of survival against a hostile populace. The leaders of the more important parties were usually selected by the Soviets,



trained in Soviet Party schools, and then installed and maintained in positions of leadership by the Soviets; frequently they were also purged or liquidated by the Soviets.

18. This system of control depended on Stalin's enormous personal authority, an element of great strength but also one which concealed a major vulnerability. It was Stalin who determined policy, who defined socialism, who pronounced doctrine, who selected leaders. Soviet prestige among Communists was in great part identical with the respect and genuine regard which they felt for Stalin personally. None of his colleagues had a following among the other parties; in fact, the only man who approached him in prestige was in the Chinese Party. Thus his death in early 1953 diminished at a stroke Moscow's authority within the Communist movement, and this at a time when China's power was rising, and when difficulties were accumulating in Eastern Europe.

#### D. Khrushchev's New Approach

19. Even before his death, some of Stalin's lieutenants were acutely conscious of the deleterious effects of his policies toward the other Communist parties and of the necessity to adopt a new approach which would combine less direct, though still effective methods of control with toleration of a limited amount of local autonomy. The intent behind Khrushchev's new approach was not to allow genuine autonomy, but to employ a more flexible policy in order to maintain the maximum amount of *effective* Soviet control.

20. This new approach had the effect in Eastern Europe of releasing pent up forces crying for reform, as well as repressed bitterness over Soviet arbitrary treatment and exploitation, stimulated still further by the reversal of Stalin's policy toward Yugoslavia and the acknowledgment of a Communist party's right to follow a "separate road." The destruction of the Stalin myth, which severed an important thread of authority and caused confusion and soul-searching among the parties, was the final blow. The result in Poland was a resurgence of nationalist feeling which swept a party leader to power who personified this

outlook and which led Moscow to grant Poland an important measure of bona fide internal autonomy. In Hungary, the result was a deep division within the party which opened the way to revolt. Though the military repression in Hungary abruptly checked the trend toward liberalization in Eastern Europe and made it clear that the Soviets would deal ruthlessly with any attempted defection from the Bloc, the Communist movement as a whole was badly shaken and there was a clear need for authoritative political and ideological guidance. It required strenuous Soviet efforts, including substantial economic aid and concessions to injured nationalist feelings in Eastern Europe, before the Moscow Conference of November 1957 could meet this need with an agreed reaffirmation of basic principles of "socialist development" for Communist countries, based on Soviet experience.

#### E. China's Entry into Bloc Affairs

21. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists perceived in the upheavals of 1956 both a problem and an opportunity. They were fully as concerned as the Soviets to restore unity and stability to the Bloc. But at the same time they found themselves, in the wake of Soviet mistakes, in a position to influence the reestablishment of that unity on a new basis. Having built up their own strength and confidence since coming to power in 1949, and already exercising some influence over the Asian Parties within and outside the Bloc, they were now in a position to contribute significantly to the Soviet effort to restore order in Eastern Europe while at the same time increasing the weight of their own influence in the movement as a whole. Thus, both in their important doctrinal statements of this period and Chou En-lai's tour of the European Satellites, they managed to convey the idea that Soviet leadership should be respected because they, the Chinese, said so. The result, despite Peiping's public insistence upon Moscow's primacy, was to nudge both the Bloc and the international movement toward a greater sharing of leadership, and to show that Chinese influence and authority in the movement were now considerable.

## II. CURRENT RELATIONS AMONG THE BLOC PARTIES

### A. The Sino-Soviet Dispute of 1960

22. We have in previous estimates examined the causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the issues to which it has given rise.<sup>1</sup> During 1958 and 1959, both sides limited themselves, at least in public, to setting forth their positions in seemingly abstract ideological discussions, which in fact reflected policy disagreements over a growing range of specific issues. In the spring of 1960, however, China finally dropped this restraint and by June was openly lobbying against the USSR among the delegates to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) meeting in Peiping. Moscow responded sharply by, in effect, putting the Chinese on trial at a meeting of a number of the Communist Parties in Bucharest later in the month. The Chinese held fast, and even obtained open support from the Albanian Party. The two sides agreed finally to a plenary session of the entire Communist movement at which disputed matters would be debated again when all the parties sent representatives to the November celebration in Moscow.

23. Between June and November, each side became increasingly aggressive. Both tried to line up support by circularizing the entire movement with lengthy attacks on the other. With Moscow employing all its powers of influence and control, most parties fell readily into line behind the USSR, but a few stayed on the fence or leaned toward China on certain issues. Meanwhile, polemics in the Bloc press became increasingly explicit, and the USSR exerted strong pressure on China in various aspects of their state relations.<sup>2</sup> All these

<sup>1</sup> Paragraphs 122-130 in NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," dated 1 December 1960; NIE 100-3-60, "Sino-Soviet Relations," dated 9 August 1960.

<sup>2</sup> This pressure included the withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet technicians at the end of July (an estimated 2,000 to 3,000), suspension of Chinese publications in the USSR, diplomatic protests, the expulsion of certain Chinese officials, and ominous warnings in the press. There is also considerable evidence suggesting border difficulties between the two countries during this period.

measures failed to deter the Chinese, and the November meeting became a direct confrontation. What was at stake there was not only a range of disputed policy issues, but the more fundamental question of how and by whom Communist policy was to be determined—in other words, the question of leadership in the international movement.

24. In the most general sense, therefore, the question of authority was involved in every issue debated at the Moscow proceedings. The final document in general gave preference to Soviet propositions on world strategy and internal Communist policy, and in signing it the Chinese subscribed to many formulations which they had vigorously contested in the preceding months. But in order to obtain this Chinese agreement, the Soviets had at many points to allow Peiping to include its formulations as well, although these usually received less prominence than the Soviet statements. The result was a compromise document which stated both sides of numerous questions and thereby clearly conveyed to the other parties that Chinese demands for a real voice in policymaking for the Communist movement had, however reluctantly, been granted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

25. But the issue of authority was joined even more directly in a series of proposals designed specifically to assert Soviet primacy and bind the Chinese to future obedience. Foreswearing any aspirations to truly Stalinist leadership, but confident that they could still command a majority in the international movement, the Soviets fell back on a proposal for majority rule as a means of forcing the Chinese into formal submission. In another maneuver, they sought to have the document acknowledge their leading role by endorsing the decisions of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, which had been called into question by the Chinese. Again, they proposed that the parties formally condemn "factionalism," a clear reference to Chinese efforts to form anti-Soviet coalitions with other parties, and "national communism," a phrase injected to

lay the basis for future attacks upon Chinese deviations.

26. Although the Chinese had been willing to compromise on points of doctrine, they proved adamant in their opposition to these disciplinary proposals. They insisted that neither they nor any other party should be bound by the decisions, even if they were correct, of Soviet Party Congresses. They contended that majority rule, while correct for the individual parties, was intolerable for the movement and that only unanimous decisions of all the parties could have universal validity. Lastly, they refused to agree to the condemnations of "factionalism" and "national communism."

27. In the end, the Chinese prevailed on these central issues of authority because the Soviets found no way of imposing their will upon the Chinese. The two offending phrases were excluded from the document. The Soviet Congresses were praised, but only in limited terms, and the contributions of "other parties" were commended in the same breath. As for the mechanism for international decisionmaking, the USSR had to abandon majority rule in favor of a formal undertaking to observe those decisions which were "jointly worked out" at bilateral and multilateral conferences, a formulation which came close to providing a veto power to the Chinese or any other party.

28. Thus, despite the commanding majorities which the Soviets had, they failed to gain their major points on what is to them a vital issue—the USSR's dominating role in the Communist world. The measure of this failure was actually greater than the textual compromises and losses which they had to accept in producing a unanimous statement. Not only did they fail to coerce the Chinese, but in the voting they were actively opposed by Albania and on several occasions lost the support of North Korea, North Vietnam, and a number of other Asian parties. In addition, they had to undergo, in full view of the entire movement, the unprecedented experience of free-wheeling debate and even outright vilification of their leader.

#### B. Effect of the Dispute on the European Bloc Parties

29. The Sino-Soviet dispute produced widespread uneasiness within the Bloc. The USSR had the support of most Communists in the Satellites, but some sympathy for certain Chinese methods and attitudes had been manifested in 1958-1959 in the Bulgarian, East German, and Czech Parties. This ambivalence quickly disappeared, however, as soon as the Soviets invoked their authority in coming out directly against the Chinese. The performance of all the East European Communists at the Moscow Conference, except the Albanians, was thoroughly obedient.

30. Albania, however, turned out to be a dramatically different case. The Albanian Party is in the hands of unreconstructed Stalinists who are obsessed with the fear that Yugoslavia will re-establish its former tutelage over the Albanian Communist movement. Accordingly, this leadership was gravely alarmed when, in 1955 and 1956, Khrushchev launched his attack upon Stalin, including in the indictment Stalin's attempts to subvert Yugoslavia, and took up the cultivation of Tito. Even after the post-Hungarian hardening of Soviet policy, the Albanians continued to see a threat to their independence in Khrushchev's advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" and his reluctance to accede to an all-out attack on Tito. Thus, when the Chinese appeared as the champions of a hard, antirevisionist line, Albania broke ranks and during meetings of the Communist Parties in 1960, openly joined the Chinese side with virulent attacks upon the CPSU.

31. Chinese support offers some protection for the Albanians, since the USSR must recognize that direct moves against Tirana risk the further worsening of its already delicate relations with Peiping. The Albanians enjoy two other advantages, however, which are probably more important in the defense of their new anti-Soviet stance. One is their physical separation from the Bloc, which makes it difficult for the USSR to apply physical force without greatly damaging its international position. The other is the unity of

the Albanian top leadership, dating from war-time partisan combat and secured by a series of purges which cleansed it first of members sympathetic to its former mentor, the Yugoslav Party, and then, in 1960, of pro-Soviet elements. As a result, the Soviets have had to restrict themselves to indirect methods which thus far have proven embarrassingly ineffectual. Moscow's failure to punish the defiance of another Communist state is especially ignominious in view of Albania's size and hitherto complete subordination.

### C. The Asian Satellites

32. Among the Asian Satellites, Peiping has cultural and geographic advantages which enable it to compete with the Soviets on a nearly equal basis. As a result, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia have found themselves in a position between the two great Communist powers that is delicate, but at the same time rewarding. In North Vietnam, most of the top leaders are Soviet-trained, but Communist China played an important role in advising, training, and supplying the Vietminh revolution against the French. Furthermore, the geographical location of North Vietnam and the similarity of many of its problems make close cooperation with Peiping a natural course for Hanoi. On the other hand, the North Vietnamese leaders appreciate that the only way for them to avoid being completely dominated by their giant neighbor is to retain a strong Soviet presence in North Vietnam. These conflicting tendencies have not impaired the essential unity with which Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi have pressed their objectives in Laos.

33. The Outer Mongolian and North Korean Communist regimes were both placed in power by the Soviets before there was a Communist China. During the past decade both regimes have undergone purges that were apparently aimed, at least in part, against leaders who looked toward Peiping for guidance or support. At present Soviet dominance seems secure in Outer Mongolia in spite of Peiping's considerable efforts to enhance its influence there. Even though the present leaders of North Korea are nearly all Moscow-trained,

they exhibited a pronounced affinity for Peiping's forced-draft industrialization and commune programs in 1958 and 1959. Subsequently the party backed away from emulating Chinese methods when the Soviets indicated their displeasure. At the present time Soviet influence probably continues to exceed that of China.

34. Outer Mongolia did not back any of the Chinese positions during the Sino-Soviet dispute. North Korea and North Vietnam sought to steer a middle course supporting most of the Soviet propositions, but joining the Chinese on the critical issue of discipline. The fact that these two Asian states no longer automatically and unhesitatingly follow all Soviet leads constitutes a considerable setback to Moscow's authority. In addition, Peiping and Moscow appear to have become engaged in a competition to win support by pumping economic aid into the three Asian Satellites.

### D. Continued Strain in Bloc Relations

35. Despite Soviet and Chinese efforts after the Moscow conference to portray interparty harmony and fraternal solidarity, it is evident that important differences of view persist. Each party has made its own tendentious interpretation of the December Statement, stressing those portions which correspond most closely with its views during the dispute. The Chinese, moreover, are making the most of the advantages gained in Moscow by stressing the special responsibilities of the "two largest parties" in the movement. Differences also continue to be apparent in the interpretation of contemporary world developments.

36. The Albanians have been by no means as restrained as their Chinese allies since the conference. They have gone to great lengths to endorse the anti-Soviet behavior of their leaders at Moscow and to affirm that their party line had been correct before, during, and after the dispute. They continue to criticize in indirect but unmistakable terms contemporary Soviet policy, especially toward Yugoslavia. Continued strain in Sino-Soviet relations, moreover, was most clearly indicated at the Albanian Party Congress, held in Febru-

ary, which became the occasion for another confrontation, though on a far lesser scale, of parties in the movement who endorsed the Soviet or Albanian-Chinese positions.

37. Following this Congress, Albania has continued to receive staunch support from China, including extensive economic aid, while relations with Moscow have steadily deteriorated. A show trial staged in Tirana, involving Albanian naval officers among others, and ostensibly directed at a Greek-Yugoslav-US plot, was in fact an anti-Soviet demonstration. It was followed by the evacuation by the Soviets of their important submarine base at Valona.

38. There have been few indications that the many serious problems in Sino-Soviet state relations which were evident in 1960 have been resolved. Though a trade agreement was signed in April which eased China's debt burdens appreciably, the Soviet commitments under the agreement were far from generous, especially in view of China's serious economic problems. Moreover, the Chinese economy continues under the handicap created by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and there is no evidence of any agreement to send them back in their former numbers. The lack of detail in the June communique following the talks on economic, technical, and scientific cooperation suggested that, though some Soviet assistance would continue, there is little likelihood that the former degree of economic cooperation will be restored.

### III. THE NON-BLOC PARTIES

#### A. General

39. World War II and its aftermath brought about substantial and in some cases radical changes in the circumstances of Communist Parties outside the Bloc. In Western Europe, the French and Italian Parties developed considerable popular support and some independent financial resources, and even in the smaller countries the parties became an established part of the local political landscape. During the same period, in the countries which first gained independence after the war, many Communist parties rapidly came to ac-

quire real domestic prospects and, therefore, became more preoccupied with problems of domestic politics.

40. These advances were, of course, gratifying to the Soviet leaders. At the same time, the USSR has continued to pursue its own interests in ways which have often conflicted with those of local Communist parties; in particular, Khrushchev has made it a major point of policy to court newly independent governments, even when the local parties are seeking to discredit and replace them. The non-Bloc parties have thus become increasingly concerned to have their own interests considered in the formulation of the movement's policies. China's success has probably given them some encouragement in this endeavor. Equally important, China's rise has weakened the concept of monolithic authority in the individual parties, making it easier for differences within these parties to develop into open factionalism.

#### B. Western Europe and the US

41. The Western European Parties, still led by tested veterans of the Comintern period who have always maintained a firm Soviet orientation, have remained responsive to Soviet control. Nevertheless, the relationship of the individual parties to the CPSU has changed considerably since the days of the prewar period. The widespread discrediting of parliamentary democracy before the war and the underground struggles of World War II enabled the parties to develop such strength that a number of them were later able to withstand prolonged adversity and political isolation.

42. The altered status of these parties was not particularly apparent until 1956, when Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech had a profound effect causing demoralization and in some cases large-scale defections. The response of the leaders of the Italian and French Parties provided a clear measure of the change which had occurred. Togliatti reacted to the Khrushchev speech by openly advocating "polycentrism" in the movement, by which he meant autonomy for the parties. The French

leaders responded in a different way, by asking Khrushchev to tone down his denigration of Stalin. Though Togliatti soon ceased to advocate his proposal, both initiatives, different as they were, showed an assertiveness which would have been inconceivable in Stalin's time.

43. Khrushchev's speech also stimulated short-lived demands for increased autonomy in the other West European parties, especially in the Danish Party, where a faction under Aksel Larson took a more extreme position even than Togliatti, and finally had to be expelled. An effect of these developments was that the Soviet leaders subsequently were more attentive to the local problems and desires of the parties. At the same time, the Soviets recognized that greater autonomy was necessary if these parties were to play their role in the "peaceful coexistence" strategy. Thus the Rome conference of Western European parties in 1959 resulted in a policy agreement giving the individual parties considerable leeway in implementing the general line.

44. Despite this loosening of discipline, the Western European parties have been among Moscow's strongest supporters in the dispute with Peiping, and Chinese attempts to influence them were unavailing. These parties have been greatly assisted in their internal campaigns by the Soviet line on nonviolent methods of achieving power and the avoidance of war, and they saw China's advocacy of violence and high risks as threatening their prospects for winning popular support. Some groups within these parties have at times sought to use various Chinese arguments for factional purposes, but at the Moscow Conference the interventions of the West Europeans were all in support of Soviet positions. However, their leaders did not behave at Moscow in the obsequious manner of former days and even showed some evidence of resenting Soviet pressure. They showed reluctance to commit themselves to accept future Soviet guidance unreservedly, and were bolder than they had ever been before in urging the movement to give greater heed, in working out general policy, to their own local problems.

45. With its traditional deference to Soviet guidance, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), gave the Soviet Union its unqualified support at the Moscow Conference. In addition, the CPUSA has enthusiastically supported Soviet "peaceful coexistence" tactics as most favorable to its efforts in the US. Adoption of the more militant, revolutionary Chinese position would place the party under still more handicaps in operating in the US. At present, there appears little prospect that the Chinese position will gain any significant support in the CPUSA.

### C. The Middle East

46. The Communist movement in the Middle East historically has been under close Soviet direction, especially those parties which, banned at home, are forced to operate from bases within the Bloc and thus are completely dependent upon Soviet support. In recent years, however, signs of friction have become visible in the Syrian and Iraqi Parties. Both these parties were strong enough to nourish immediate political ambitions, and both have been hampered by Soviet cultivation of their domestic opponents, the "national bourgeois" regimes of Nasser and Qasim.

47. The formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 was facilitated by the danger of an imminent Communist bid for power in Syria. Since that time, Syrian Communist leader Bakdash has been unable fully to reconcile himself to Soviet policy toward Nasser and has resisted acceptance of the Syro-Egyptian union. In Iraq, traditional factionalism in the Communist Party became bitter in 1959 when the Communists overreached themselves in a campaign of violence, bringing on a governmental repression from which the party still has not recovered. The USSR disapproved of this tactic, regarding it not only as premature but as likely to spoil its own relations with Qasim. The Chinese, however, probably encouraged it and thereby gained the sympathy of the radical faction within the Iraqi Party. Chinese attempts to broaden their influence among Middle Eastern Communists have, however, brought few results to date. At the Moscow meeting Bakdash, the

most influential Communist in the area, expressed his resentment of Chinese attempts to proselytize members of his own party, and violently criticized Chinese disobedience. The other parties also lined up behind the Soviet position.

#### D. The Asian Parties

48. Among the non-Bloc parties of Asia, Soviet authority is far less secure. Among the smaller parties Chinese influence is strong and in a few cases outweighs that of the USSR. The larger ones, those of India, Indonesia, and Japan, contain pro-Chinese elements and, in addition, are reluctant to come out openly against the major Communist power of the region. When put to the test at the Moscow Conference, some of the Asian parties extended a degree of support to the Chinese, and none of them lined up solidly behind the Soviets in the manner of their European and Arab colleagues. Further, this pattern was repeated at the Albanian Party Congress in February 1961.

49. In Japan, after the Communist Party had thoroughly discredited itself in the eyes of the Japanese public by its violent and illegal activities between 1950 and 1953, the post-Stalin trends in Soviet foreign policy have favored the efforts of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to rehabilitate itself. The party can the more convincingly portray itself to the people as independent, and in favor of peaceful accession to power, and thus pursue its current strategy of advocating a broad national front against American imperialism and domestic monopoly capitalism. Support for China exists among minority elements within the Communist Party and among certain radical student and trade union groups outside the party. The JCP is likely to retain its pro-Soviet orientation as long as the present leaders remain in control of the Japanese Party. However, recent Soviet and Chinese moves suggest that each is seeking to strengthen its influence in the JCP.

50. The domestic position of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is unique. It is one of the largest Communist parties outside the Bloc, has an important popular following, and

enjoys the protection of Sukarno, who has drawn it, along with the anti-Communist Army, into the national leadership. Thus the Soviet line on the nonviolent, parliamentary road to socialism is far better suited to the PKI's needs than the more radical and revolutionary approach advocated by China, which at this stage could only serve to forfeit Sukarno's protection against the army and diminish the party's popular support as well. Soviet foreign policies—cultivation of Sukarno, provision of economic and military aid, and support of Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea—harmonize ideally with the PKI's internal tactics and enhance its domestic position. Despite all those factors, a Chinese-oriented faction does exist within the party, and had sufficient strength to influence the conduct of the PKI delegation in Moscow.

51. Soviet foreign policy has had a much more mixed effect upon the prospects of domestic Communists in India, where Moscow's aid and encouragement has been extended to a government which treats the local party as an opponent rather than a partner. While Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" tactics have given communism some respectability in India, it has been difficult for the local party to reconcile Soviet courtship of Nehru with his ousting of the Communist Government in Kerala and the current trend of Indian foreign policy, which the party regards as pro-Western. These tactics have intensified the traditional factionalism in the Indian Party, with a minority frankly sympathetic to China and anxious to steer the party to a more revolutionary course. This minority received a severe check, however, when the Tibetan revolt and the Sino-Indian border dispute aroused Indian national feelings against China and placed the Communists in an exceedingly awkward position. Suslov, attending the Indian Party Congress in April 1961, found it more important to keep the Indian Party together behind a vague and generally moderate political line than to try to impose discipline on the pro-Chinese faction, and as a result the party remains uncertain, divided, and subject to serious disputes in the future.

52. In contrast with the larger parties, the interests of a number of the smaller Asian parties—for example, those of Malaya, Burma, and Australia—are not in their view furthered by gradualist tactics generally advocated by Moscow. For many of them prospects for achieving power via parliamentary methods are exceedingly remote. They therefore feel frustrated by Soviet “peaceful coexistence” and “united front” tactics, and are anxious to abandon this approach for more direct revolutionary methods. The effect of this attitude was evident during the discussions in Moscow in November, and afterward, at the Albanian Congress, where several of these parties sided with the Chinese against the Soviet positions.

#### E. Africa

53. The Communist movement in Africa is still insignificant, and the focus of Soviet strategy there is the radical nationalist leadership with which the USSR can cooperate in antiwestern policies. The longer term Communist objective is the conversion of radical nationalist states to communism, and the Bloc has devoted much more effort to this than to the buildup of Communist parties from scratch. While the Sino-Soviet clash over strategy in underdeveloped areas is potentially significant for the African Communist movement, there is at present little specific evidence of rivalry or friction. There have been vague reports, for example, that at the November 1960 Moscow Conference, the Soviet and Chinese delegates clashed over specific details of African policy, but the nature of these differences—if they actually exist—is not known. The four African parties represented at Moscow (South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan) all appear to have supported the Soviet side of the ideological dispute with China.

#### F. Latin America

54. The leaders of the Latin American parties are in nearly all instances veteran Communists who were trained in the USSR and still must look to Moscow for material support. After Stalin's death the Soviets began to take a more active hand in directing Communist activities in Latin America. At the Moscow

Conference of November 1957, and again at the 21st CPSU Congress in January 1959, the Latin American parties were given direct, detailed instructions on tactics in support of the “peace campaign” in their countries.

55. In recent years the Chinese Communists have enlarged their efforts to acquire influence among these parties. They have been handicapped by their lack of official representation in most of the Latin American countries. By bringing Latin American Communists to Peiping for visits and extended training, however, and by greatly stepping up their propaganda in the area, they have succeeded in making known their divergent views. Chinese revolutionary tactics have won some admiration, particularly among younger Communists, but Chinese influence has to date not become an important factor within these parties.

56. As the Sino-Soviet dispute developed, Soviet-oriented party leaders managed to minimize the differences and to prevent discussion among their memberships. During the early stages of the Moscow Conference, there were some indications of support for Chinese views in some of the smaller parties (Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru) which felt that they had no prospects for achieving power by nonviolent means, and a serious split developed in the Uruguayan Party. On the other hand, the important Cuban and Brazilian parties were among the strongest Soviet supporters on the key issue of discipline within the international movement. In the last analysis, all the Latin American parties, in certain cases under some pressure, stood firm in support of the Soviets against the Chinese.

57. The success of the Cuban revolution has introduced a new factor of major importance into the structure of Communist authority and control in Latin America. Cuba is heavily dependent upon Soviet material support, and the Cuban Communists look primarily to Moscow rather than Peiping. At the same time, the Cuban Communists apparently feel that their revolutionary success had unique features which allow them a certain pride and independence, and they also consider that their success in Cuba has provided a model and



inspiration for the other parties in Latin America. At the Moscow Conference, both the Cubans and the Brazilians initially voiced reservations about the Soviet concept of a "national democratic state"—of which Cuba is the first example—showing reluctance to bind themselves to any rigid policy formulation which might not fit future conditions elsewhere in Latin America.

58. Havana has a special importance as a secure base for Communist activities in Latin America. For one thing, it has provided the Chinese with a point of entry into an area where they have found it difficult to obtain a foothold. For another, it has become the logical meeting place and training ground for Latin American Communists. Some of these, however, apparently are concerned that the great prestige of the Cubans in their own parties may weaken their own leadership, and they may suspect their Cuban comrades of ambitions to lead the movement in the area. Thus the future interaction of Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban aspirations and interests in the Communist movement of Latin America is at present far from clear.

#### IV. THE OUTLOOK

59. It is evident from the foregoing account that the international Communist movement, for decades little more than an instrumentality of Soviet policy, is being changed, because of the forces of nationalism and diversity within it, into a movement reflecting an appreciable diffusion of power. The real distribution of authority is at present uncertain and shifting. We believe that in spite of the present show of harmony the Soviet and Chinese leaders are not agreed upon the future structure of relations among the parties. The Chinese have carefully avoided making any claim to primacy and have insisted only upon an enlarged role for themselves with the CPSU in the direction of the movement. But it is not at all certain that their ambitions end at that point. During the struggles of 1960, it appeared that the Chinese were making a bid for codetermination of policy in the Communist movement, in part because they believe that they have better preserved the purity of

Communist doctrine. We believe that, though in future they may exercise more judicious tactics, they will miss few opportunities to advance their claims. For the present, however, they are refraining from open challenges to the CPSU, but are nonetheless continuing to develop their coterie of supporters among the other parties.

60. The Soviets, for their part, are finding it difficult to reconcile themselves to the impairment of their control over the Communist movement. At the same time they recognize that the rise of Communist China, the proliferation of non-Bloc parties, and the drawbacks of Stalin's coercive techniques require them to adopt a new approach to the problem of authority and control in the Communist movement. They have experimented with looser methods of supervision, especially in Eastern Europe, and have tried to establish the idea that there exists a "comity" of equal Communist nations. But in all this they have merely been seeking new forms for maintaining their authority undiminished. Thus they did not hesitate, when confronted with a direct challenge, to use coercion in state relations with China and Albania and, on a party level, to try to railroad through international meetings their views on ideology and global strategy. Though they have renounced formal leadership of the movement, they hope to retain the substance of their former authority by exercising pressure and influence bilaterally upon other parties and by confronting their rivals with strong majority coalitions at international gatherings.

61. It seems to us unlikely, therefore, that the Soviet and Chinese parties will soon find a way to resolve their differences and achieve a stable arrangement for directing the Communist movement. For one thing, the relations between the two states are already cluttered with a series of political, economic and military issues which keep mistrust alive. For another, there appears to be no intimacy, and little regard, between the leaders of the two powers. Most important, however, each has strongly-held views on the strategy which can best serve both its own interests and those of

the movement, and the differences in these views go deeper than personal jealousies.

62. On the other hand, each side is aware of the immense damage that would result from an open rupture. It may be that both will take the events of 1960 as a warning not to allow their relations to become so openly bitter in the future. But, we believe that the course of these relations will be erratic, cooperative at some times and places, competitive at others. This course will also be influenced by external and even fortuitous factors. Western policy, for example, might act either to drive the USSR and China closer together or to widen the breach between them. Again, a major change in the leadership of either party, while it probably would not affect the fundamentals of their relationship, could alter the vigor with which one or the other prosecutes its claims.

63. Under these circumstances, with authority diffused and both Peiping and Moscow soliciting their support, the other parties will almost inevitably be tempted to bargain between them in order to obtain a greater measure of independence for themselves. Some of the parties in Eastern Europe, or factions within them, may attempt to develop further the autonomy conceded by Stalin's successors. In this connection, Yugoslavia, which stands as an example of a successful Communist state enjoying full independence, would exercise an increasingly strong attraction, particularly if Khrushchev's policies toward Belgrade belie the formal proscription of Yugoslavia as deviationist. In the Asian Satellites, where Chinese influence is already strong and has a good prospect of increasing, the regimes will be better able to bargain for economic and political support.

64. The parties outside the Bloc, even those still closely tied to Moscow, will also find their positions affected by Sino-Soviet competition. Some of these parties, particularly those which are less doctrinaire and less accustomed to close Soviet tutelage, will be inclined to select from differing Soviet and Chinese tactical advice whatever happens to fit their particular needs of the moment. Those smaller parties

of Asia, in which pro-Chinese inclinations are already strong, will probably tend to solidify their ties with Peiping. The sharpest effects will probably be felt in those parties in the underdeveloped countries, such as India and Indonesia, which enjoy real political prospects and therefore must make important tactical choices. The two brands of advice, often sharply different, now being urged upon those parties will probably intensify the factionalism which already plagues their ranks.

#### A. Policy Effects

65. While the altered relationships within the Communist movement and the decline in Soviet authority have not altered the fundamental hostility of the Communists toward the non-Communist world, we believe that these developments are having an important influence on Communist policy. The Chinese Party, through the disputes of the past year, has already diminished to some extent the flexibility of Soviet policy toward the West, and the Soviet Party will probably encounter increasing difficulties in coordinating general Communist policy. Soviet and Chinese differences of view on general tactics for the parties as well as the differences in the national interests of the two states, are important enough to make the working out of an agreed course of policy more, rather than less, complicated. These difficulties may not be as serious in times when events generally favor Communist interests, but they may again erupt into open polemics during periods of adversity, or even at times when fundamental decisions are required for the exploitation of unfolding opportunities. This would be especially true if the Chinese thought the Soviets showed signs of making concessions to the West on important matters, or if the Soviets felt that Chinese actions threatened to involve the USSR in war.

66. The hardening of Soviet policy over the past year or so almost certainly owes something to the CPSU's desire to counter Chinese charges of insufficient revolutionary zeal. We think that this effort is partly responsible, for example, for the vigor with which the Soviets have attacked the West on the issues of

colonialism and the structure of the UN. It may have played a part in their reversal of position in the nuclear test talks and their total subordination of disarmament policy to political struggle. This is not to say the Chinese can now exercise a veto power over Soviet policy. Moscow's present tactics appear to be guided by much the same calculations of risk which the Chinese earlier criticized as overly cautious. Nor has Khrushchev been deterred from renewing personal diplomacy with the US or reviving contacts with Yugoslavia, leaving Peiping to swallow its objections. But the Chinese probably have succeeded in limiting somewhat the USSR's freedom to engage the West on any basis other than militancy.

67. The development of the relationship between the USSR and China, and the evolution of the international Communist movement generally, will obviously be of profound significance for the security and interests of the West. In the long run Chinese power, assertiveness, and self-interest might increase so far as greatly to impair the common policy with the USSR, and even lead the Soviets to believe that they had more in common with

the ideological enemy than they have today. For some time to come, however, the most likely prospect is that the USSR and China will maintain their relationship in something like its present form. It will be an alliance which is from time to time troubled and inharmonious, but which nevertheless preserves sufficient unity to act in concert against the West, especially in times of major challenge. However, present trends as described in this paper point to an increasing complexity, diversity, and interplay of forces within the Communist system, and to a remarkable survival of old-fashioned impulses of nationalism.

68. These trends may have various effects. They may from time to time result in more aggressive anti-Western policies intended to hold the forces of disunity in check. They may enable certain parties, free from the restrictions of a rigid, general Communist line, to pursue more effective policies in local situations. But eventually, if such trends persist, they may considerably diminish the effectiveness of the Communist movement as a whole. This would give the West opportunities for maneuver and influence which could provide important advantages in the world struggle.