

EVACUATION OF VIETNAM:

LATE MONDAY AFTERNOON (ABOUT 1730) 28 APRIL 1975 TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT CAME UNDER "VC" BOMBING AND ROCKET/ARTILLERY ATTACK. THE PRIME TARGET WAS OBVIOUSLY VNAF ASSETS AND THE FIRST ATTACK CONTINUED FOR ABOUT 1½ HOURS. INTERMITTENT ROCKET/ARTILLERY ATTACK CONTINUED BUT FREQUENT SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS OF FUEL AND AMMO FROM THE INITIAL ATTACK GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF CONTINUOUS "VC" SHELLING. ABOUT 2230 PILOTS, EXCEPT FOR STANDBY CHOPPER CREWS, AND GROUND STAFF SECURED WITH THE GENERAL BELIEF THAT THE EVENING ATTACK WAS THE FIRST OF "SOFTENING UP" ATTACKS THAT COULD BE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW IN THE DAYS AHEAD. CAPT. WINSTON REMAINED AT THE AIRPORT TO KEEP ON TOP OF THE SITUATION AND ENSURE THAT STANDBY CREWS WERE PROMPTLY LAUNCHED TO PICK UP OTHER CREWS AND CONCERNED STAFF SHOULD SUCH BE NECESSARY DURING THE NIGHT. IT WAS EXPECTED THE 24-HOUR CURFEW, IMPOSED ABOUT 1900, WOULD CONTINUE EXCEPT FOR A SHORT BREAK THE FOLLOWING DAY TO ENABLE SAIGON RESIDENTS A BRIEF SHOPPING OPPORTUNITY.

INTERMITTENT SHELLING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT WITH ONE ROCKET LANDING ON OUR NORTHEAST PARKING RAMP IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS. THE ROCKET HIT BY THE WALLED BOUNDARY FENCE NEAR OUR PARKED HELICOPTERS. AFTER A BRIEF INSPECTION CAPT. WINSTON REPORTED FOUR AIRCRAFT WERE UNFLYABLE AND POSSIBLY A FIFTH. ABOUT 0400 29 APRIL 1975 INCOMING FIRE BECAME INTENSE AND BY DAYBREAK IT WAS EVIDENT AN ALL OUT ATTACK WAS IN PROGRESS. TWO VNAF GUNSHIPS (1 C-130 AND 119S) ORBITING THE AIRFIELD WERE SHOT DOWN REPORTEDLY SA-7S.

IT WAS ABOUT 0830 BEFORE IT WAS CLEAR THE OPERATION OF ANY AIRCRAFT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT BEING SUBJECTED TO VNAF

APPROVED FOR
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VAR GREEN

FIRE ---- GROUND OR AIR.

THE AIRPORT STANDBY HELICOPTER CREW WAS LAUNCHED TO PICK UP FLIGHT CREWS AND BY ABOUT 0945 MOST FLIGHT AND GROUND PERSONNEL HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO THE AIRPORT. EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO PROCEED BY CAR TO THE AIRPORT UNDER MISSION WARDEN ESCORT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. ADDITIONAL ROUNDS LANDED IN THE AIR AMERICA AREA BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC FURTHER DAMAGE TO COMPANY AIRCRAFT. MEANWHILE ONE OF THE DAMAGED [UH-1HS] HAD BEEN REPAIRED LEAVING ONLY [4 DAMAGED UH-1HS] NOT OPERABLE. [SEVERAL HELICOPTERS] WERE STOLEN BY VNAF PILOTS AS NO AUGMENTED SECURITY WAS PROVIDED BY THE MISSION AND COMPANY GUARDS "FADED INTO THE WOODWORK" WHEN THE ATTACK BEGAN 28 APRIL. (AND DID NOT RETURN TO THEIR POSTS).

ABOUT [1100 DAO] REPORTED THE [MARINE SECURITY FORCE (M-SF)] WAS INBOUND AND WOULD ARRIVE AT THE AIR AMERICA RAMP WITHIN 15 MINUTES. THIS REPORT PROVED TO BE ERRONEOUS AS THE [MAIN MSF] MOVEMENT WAS CANCELLED, BUT THE REPORT PROMPTED A MORE HURRIED DEPARTURE FROM THE AIR AMERICA AREA THAN WOULD HAVE OTHERWISE BEEN MADE. THE CONSIDERATION BEING THAT HAD THE SECURITY FORCE LANDED, TAXIWAYS AND POSSIBLY THE RUNWAYS AS WELL WOULD LIKELY BE BLOCKED/CLOSED AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT WOULD BE UNABLE TO DEPART. ADDITIONALLY, THE SAME REPORTS STATED THE [MSF] WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO SECURE THE AIR AMERICA AREA IN WHICH CASE IT WAS EVIDENT THE AREA WOULD BE INUNDATED BY ARMED VNAF PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS DEMANDING TO BE EVACUATED. ACCORDINGLY THE DECISION WAS MADE TO LAUNCH ALL FIXED WING AIRCRAFT FOR OVERSEAS DESTINATIONS AND HELICOPTERS TO [DAO] AND IDENTIFIED PADS FROM WHICH WE WERE TO PICK UP EVACUEES UNDER THE ESTABLISHED CONTINGENCY

PLAN. EXCEPT FOR [TCN MECHANICS] AND AMERICAN CREWS/GROUND STAFF AND OTHER EMPLOYEES AT THE AIRBASE WERE LOADED AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT WERE LAUNCHED. SIMULTANEOUSLY ROTOR WING AIRCRAFT SHUTTLED REMAINING STAFF [TO DAO] AND THE AIR AMERICA AREA WAS VACATED. OPERATIONS CONTROL WAS RE-ESTABLISHED AT [DAO] WHERE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN PREPARED.

[VTB 77Z] WAS LEFT BEHIND FOR LACK OF A PILOT. ORIGINALLY MANNED BY [CAPT. ADAMS] THE AIRCRAFT WAS LEFT WHEN [C-46 #984] ASSIGNED CREW [BUSSART] HAD NOT ARRIVED AT THE AIRPORT AND [CAPT. ADAMS] LEFT [VTB 77Z] TO FLY OUT THE [C-46] BELIEVING [CAPT. ROBERTS] WOULD ULTIMATELY SHOW TO FLY OUT [77Z] [ROBERTS] WAS NOT LOCATED IN TIME AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS LEFT BEHIND. AS [ACP/FW CAPT. ROBERTS] WAS THE KEY TO PILOT ASSIGNMENTS AND LAUNCHING OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. ENROUTE KITS INCLUDING MONEY FOR FUEL/LANDING FEES WERE PREPARED AND HELD BY [ROBERTS] FOR DISTRIBUTION. WHEN HE FAILED TO SHOW IT LEFT A VOID IN ADMINISTRATION CAUSING CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION.

ALSO LEFT BEHIND WERE [ELEVEN PORTERS.] [ONE WAS OPERATIONAL AND THE OTHERS (WITHOUT ENGINES) WERE IN VARIOUS PHASES OF TEAR-DOWN AND PACKING FOR SHIPMENT.] [HELICOPTERS] CONSIDERED FLYABLE WERE MANNED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE EVACUATION. AT CUSTOMER INSISTENCE [FOUR HELICOPTERS] RATED AT [CAN THO] COMPLETING ASSIGNED MISSIONS THERE BEFORE JOINING IN THE [EVACUATION OF SAIGON.] A TOTAL OF [20 AIRCRAFT] WERE RECOVERED TO SHIPS BY LATE 29 APRIL INCLUDING TWO STOLEN AND FLOWN THERE BY VNAF PILOTS.

HAVING VACATED THE AIR AMERICA AREA FUEL WAS NO LONGER AVAILABLE FROM COMPANY-PREPARED STORES. FURTHERMORE, EMERGENCY

ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE "CONTINGENCY PLAN COMMITTEE" FAILED TO MATERIALIZE; THUS NO FUEL WAS AVAILABLE TO CARRY OUT OUR PART OF THE EVACUATION PLAN. AFTER EXHAUSTING EFFORTS TO GET FUEL OR SECURITY FOR THE AIR AMERICA RAMP PILOTS WERE INSTRUCTED TO LOAD UP WITH EVACUEES AND PROCEED [TO SHIPS] FOR OFFLOADING AND REFUELING. OPERATIONS THEN INVOLVED CITY ROOFTOP [TO DAO] SHUTTLES, TO THE EXTENT FUEL PERMITTED, THEN A RUN [TO SHIPS] WITH EVACUEES AND FOR REFUELING.

THE ABOVE CITED OPERATIONS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. (29 APRIL). THE AIR AMERICA EMERGENCY COMMAND CENTER WAS MANNED UNTIL ABOUT 1730 AT WHICH TIME PILOTS WERE INSTRUCTED TO CLEAR EVACUEES TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE FROM IDENTIFIED YET UNCLEARED "PADS" DEPARTING [THE SAIGON AREA] IN TIME TO REACH SHIPS BY LAST LIGHT. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT [MARINE SHUTTLES FROM DAO] AND THE [EMBASSY ROOFTOP] WOULD CONTINUE THROUGH THE NIGHT AND THAT PROBABLE "STRAGGLER" CITY [ROOFTOP PICKUPS] THE FOLLOWING DAY WOULD BE AIR AMERICA'S ASSIGNED FOLLOW-ON TASK. ACCORDINGLY ON ARRIVAL OF THE AIR AMERICA MANAGEMENT TEAM AT THE [U.S.S. HANCOCK] EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE [THROUGH THE SHIP'S COMMAND] TO IDENTIFY OURSELVES AND CAPABILITY/ AVAILABILITY FOR WHAT WAS BELIEVED WOULD BE A FOLLOW-ON REQUIREMENT.

ON THE MORNING OF 30 APRIL THE EVACUATION WAS DECLARED COMPLETED [BY THE FLEET COMMANDER] AND THE EXPECTED FOLLOW-ON REQUIREMENT DID NOT MATERIALIZE. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE DESIGNATED PICKUP PADS WERE SUCCESSFULLY CLEARED OF U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYEES BEFORE LEAVING THE AREA 29 APRIL 1975. A REQUEST FROM THE

[EEC TO PICKUP 3 AMERICANS FROM THE "GREY HOUSE"] WAS NOT COMPLETED AS NO AMERICANS APPEARED FOR PICKUP ON TWO OCCASIONS [WHEN HELICOPTER CREWS WERE ASSIGNED THE TASK]

DESPITE CONFUSION, NON-AVAILABILITY OF EMERGENCY FUEL SUPPLY AND NO COORDINATED GUIDANCE/DIRECTION FROM TOP ECHELONS OF THE U.S. MISSION AIR AMERICA SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT ITS ASSIGNED MISSION UNDER THE CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLAN. AIR AMERICA PERFORMANCE (AND WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS THAT OF ITS PERSONNEL) CONFORMED IN EVERY WAY WITH THE HIGH STANDARDS FOR WHICH THE COMPANY IS NOTED:

HELICOPTER PILOTS, EXCEPT FOR [CAPT. CARPENTER] RESPONDED TO THE CALL AS IN THE PAST UTILIZING THEIR EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE TO AGAIN COMPLETE THE ASSIGNED MISSION UNDER MOST DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. IN PARTICULAR THOSE PILOTS WHO READILY ACCEPTED ADDED ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEADERSHIP DUTIES ARE COMMENDED AND RESPONDED QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY UNDER THE DIRECT LEADERSHIP OF [CAPT. WINSTON, CAPT. REID, CAPT. COLLARD, CAPT. BURKE AND CAPT. HUTCHINSON]

TO MY KNOWLEDGE FIXED WING PILOTS [EXCEPT FOR ROBERTS MENTIONED EARLIER AND BUSSART WHO DID NOT FOR UNKNOWN REASONS MAKE THE AIRPORT IN TIME TO FLY OUT HIS ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT] ALSO RESPONDED AS CITED ABOVE. [CAPT. ADAMS] IS ESPECIALLY COMMENDED FOR HIS PERFORMANCE INCLUDING ACTIONS WITH GROUND STAFF IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE AIR AMERICA RAMP FROM BEING OVERRUN WITH VIETNAMESE DESIRING TO LEAVE.

SOME QUESTIONS REMAIN OVER THE ACTIONS OF SOME GROUND STAFF BUT FOR THE MOST PART THEY RESPONDED TO THE CALL AND

PERFORMED EFFICIENTLY. FAILURE (FOR UNKNOWN REASONS) OF [MFA TWIFFORD TO DEPART INDIA PAD ON EARLY MORNING HELICOPTERS TO THE AIRFIELD RESULTED IN ABANDONMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL CASH FUNDS IN THE SAFE.] [MSY WHO ALSO HAD THE COMBINATION MADE NO ATTEMPT TO RECOVER CASH BUT WAS NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE AWARE OF JUST HOW MUCH CASH WAS INVOLVED. IN ADDITION TO THE TWO OF US BASE ADMINISTRATIVE/SUPERVISORY STAFF REMAINING AT DAO THROUGH THE DAY'S OPERATION WERE:

MESECHER
HUSTER
SIMPSON
WENGENROTH
DISCUILLO
LEICHTY
CHASE
ANDREWS
BRAU]

[ALL EXCEPT CHASE WERE SENT TO SHIPS BY MID-AFTERNOON WHEN IT WAS CLEAR LITTLE MORE OF SUFFICIENT NEED TO JUSTIFY THEIR STAY COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. CAPT. REID, FILIPPI, WINSTON, CHASE AND OURSELVES WERE LAST TO LEAVE. CAPT. REID FLYING UH-1H-162 STOPPED FIRST AT THE BLUE RIDGE, COMMAND SHIP, TO DROP OFF A MARINE GENERAL AFTER WHICH WE PROCEEDED TO THE U.S.S. HANCOCK.]

THE FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL POINTS I FEEL SHOULD BE MADE:

1. RESPONSE AND RESPONSIBLE DIRECTION FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS STAFF FAILED COMPLETELY DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF OPERATIONS. THE BREAKDOWN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE RESULTED FROM A "HEAD IN THE SAND" ASSESSMENT OF RAPIDLY CHANGING EVENTS. FACTS APPEARED TO BE IGNORED IN FAVOR OF A MANIA THAT "POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" WOULD PROVIDE ALL THE TIME

NEEDED FOR THE U.S. TO EVACUATE ITS CITIZENS AND SELECTED SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND ON A U.S. ESTABLISHED SCHEDULE. CONFUSION PREVAILED WITH [DAO] "EVACUATING" AT THE SAME TIME THE U.S. EMBASSY WAS HOLDING THE LINE OF "BUSINESS AS USUAL". SUCH RESULTED IN UNNECESSARY EXPOSURE OF FLIGHT AND GROUND CREWS AND EQUIPMENT. YOU WILL RECALL THE RESPONSE OF THE [SAAFO] [JACOBSON] WHEN THE RETENTION OF [HELICOPTERS AT CAN THO] WAS CHALLENGED. I DEEM THE [SAAFO'S] ACTION AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NOT ONLY WERE FOUR HELICOPTERS WITHDRAWN FROM THE CITED FLEET COMMITTED TO THE "CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLAN" BUT EACH AIRCRAFT WAS CREWED WITH TWO CAPTAINS MEANING POTENTIALLY ABOUT 1/3 OF OUR HELICOPTERS WOULD BE UNAVAILABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN. THE SAAFO EVEN STATED THE HELICOPTERS MUST BE LEFT AT CAN THO "EVEN IF LOST". [IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY WE WERE (APRIL 27) AT THE POINT OF IGNORING THE ORDER AND RETURNING THE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS TO SAIGON WHEN A MISSION TO EVACUATE ALL U.S. CITIZENS FROM THE DELTA WAS ORDERED.] [BELIEVING THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE ACHIEVED AIRCRAFT WERE LAUNCHED ONLY TO FIND THAT ALL DAY SHUTTLES WERE USED TO EVACUATE VIETNAMESE ONLY. DUE TO POOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH CAN THO IT WAS LATE 28 APRIL WHEN FACTS BECAME CLEAR AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER BOMBING OF TAN SON NHUT BEGAN.] I STRONGLY BELIEVE THE CITED MISSION WAS LIKELY INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENTED.

2. THE ALL IMPORTANT MATTER OF SECURITY FOR THE AIR AMERICA AREA WAS DENIED. FROM THE VERY START SECURITY OF

THE AIR AMERICA AREA WAS CITED AS A PRE-REQUISITE TO OUR SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION IN ANY EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN. UNTIL MIDDAY 28 APRIL WE WERE ASSURED THE [MSF] WOULD SECURE OUR AREA AT THE SAME TIME THE MAIN MSF SECURED THE DAO AREA.] WHEN SUCCESS OF ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A REVERSAL OF [GEN. CAREY'S] DECISION APPEARED IN DOUBT A LETTER TO THE SAAFO WAS FINALIZED TO CHALLENGE THE DECISION AND SEEK REVERSAL THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR.] [THE MONDAY (28 APRIL) [TAN SON NHUT BOMBING] PRECLUDED DELIVERY OF THIS LETTER.

[CAPTAIN WINSTON] EMPHASIZED THE CITED REQUIREMENT FOR THE SECURITY WHEN THE "CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLAN" COMMITTEE WAS ESTABLISHED (LATE MARCH). [CAPT. FILIPPI, AS THE AIR AMERICA FULL TIME REPRESENTATIVE] ON THE COMMITTEE REPEATEDLY RESTATED THIS REQUIREMENT. YOU REPEATED THE REQUIREMENT DURING THE MEETING CHAIRED BY [COL. MCCUNDY] WHEN THE "PLAN" WAS REVIEWED AND WE EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT AGAIN DIRECTLY TO [GENERAL CAREY] WHEN HE VISITED US IN MY OFFICE ABOUT ONE WEEK BEFORE THE "FALL". WE ALSO EMPHASIZED THIS REQUIREMENT TO THE [SAAFO] WHEN WE CALLED ON HIM ABOUT 10 DAYS BEFORE THE "FALL". IT WAS INDEED A SHOCK WHEN SECURITY WAS DENIED AND EVENTS PROVED OUR ASSESSMENT CORRECT, AS WITHOUT THIS SECURITY, AIRCRAFT WERE STOLEN AND OUR AREA LEFT WITH NO SECURITY TO PRECLUDE VIETNAMESE FROM INUNDATING THE RAMP FROM THE VNAF SIDE OF THE FIELD RENDERING OUR AREA OPERATIONALLY UNSTABLE. ACCORDINGLY ACCESS TO PREPARED EMERGENCY STORES OF POL, PARTS AND ORDERLY OPERATING SUPPORT

STAFF WITH GOOD COMMUNICATIONS WAS DENIED.

3. LOSS OF RECORDS - ALTHOUGH A PLAN WAS IMPLEMENTED, RECORDS SORTED AND MANY SHIPPED OUT ALL IMPORTANT CURRENT RECORDS WERE LOST IN THE SUDDEN EVACUATION. CURRENT OPERATIONS, FINANCE, SUPPLY, FLYING DEPARTMENT, PERSONNEL AND MEDICAL RECORDS WERE ALL IN THE FINAL STAGES OF BOXING FOR SHIPMENT TO ~~[HKG/TNN] ON [C-46 83N]~~ INBOUND TO SAIGON 29 APRIL. ALTERNATE ACT AND REPORT OPERATING PLANS WERE TO BE IMPLEMENTED ON SHIPMENT OF CURRENT RECORDS. ALL OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. LACK OF REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND DIRECTION FROM THE U.S. MISSION IS IN MY VIEW LARGELY IF NOT TOTALLY THE REASON FOR THE MIS-CALCULATION OF A REALISTIC SHIPPING SCHEDULE AND FOR LOSS OF THE CITED ALL IMPORTANT RECORDS.

4. FINANCE - ROUTINE BANK TRANSFERS TO MEET OPERATING EXPENSES CEASED IN LATE MARCH. BY MID-APRIL IT WAS EVIDENT THIS METHOD COULD NOT BE DEPENDED ON TO PROVIDE FUNDS. THANKS TO YOUR PRESENCE AND ACTION ALTERNATE ARRANGEMENTS WERE QUICKLY MADE. CASH REQUIREMENTS WERE HIGH DUE TO TERMINAL PAYMENTS DUE VIETNAMESE STAFF. IT WAS ALSO DECIDED TO PAY THE IDENTIFIED AMOUNT OF THE OUTSTANDING "ARBITRATION COURT DECISION" AMOUNTING TO ABOUT \$43,000. CONSIDERING PAYMENTS TO STAFF AND OTHER LOCAL EXPENSES (INCLUDING THE CRATING OF ~~[PORTER AIRCRAFT]~~ AND PAYMENT FOR PERSONAL EFFECTS) UPWARDS OF \$400,000 EQUIVALENT WAS THE INDICATED IN EARLY APRIL. TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF CASH BEING HANDLED AT ONE TIME LOCAL STAFF

WERE PAID 1/2 TERMINAL BENEFITS WITH THE EARLY APRIL PAYROLL. HALF OF THE REMAINING TERMINAL BENEFITS PLUS THE AMOUNT DUE FROM THE ARBITRATION COURT DECISION WERE PAID 26 APRIL. TO MY UNDERSTANDING LOCAL STAFF WERE PAID ALL MONIES DUE THEM EXCEPT AMOUNTS DUE FOR 1/4 OF SEPARATION PAY AND PAY FOR THE REMAINING DAYS WORKED IN APRIL. WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE "FALL" WOULD OCCUR PRIOR TO THE NEXT REGULAR PAY PERIOD INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO PAY LOCAL STAFF FULL TERMINAL BENEFITS. IT IS DOUBTFUL EVENTS PERMITTED THIS INSTRUCTION TO BE CARRIED OUT. ONLY AMFA WILL BE ABLE TO CONFIRM EXACTLY HOW MUCH WAS PAID.

THE ABANDONMENT OF HIS POST BY [MFA KRELL] ABOUT 12 APRIL PLACED ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD ON [AMFA] WHO RESPONDED TO THE CALL. HE IS COMMENDED FOR HIS WORK UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING THREATS ON HIS LIFE OVER CONVERSION OF PIASTERS TO DOLLARS.

TOO LITTLE TIME WAS AVAILABLE TO ASSESS [MR. TWIFFORD'S] PERFORMANCE ALTHOUGH HE HAD GOOD LIAISON WITH THE EMBASSY AND A WELCOME ADDITION IN FUNDING MATTERS THROUGH THE EMBASSY. HE WAS ALSO PRESENT DURING MUCH OF THE FINAL PAY AND CONVERSION ACTION GIVING NEEDED SUPPORT TO AMFA AND ACCOUNTING PAYROLL STAFF. DURING OTHER PERIODS HE APPEARED OVERLY ABSORBED IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS "LOCAL FAMILY" TO DEPART.

REQUIREMENTS FOR US\$ CASH WERE INCREASED BY A DECISION TO PAY LOCAL STAFF IN PIASTERS BUT THOSE EVACUATING WOULD

BE ALLOWED TO CONVERT PIASTERS INTO DOLLARS TO A LIMIT OF \$500,00 OR THE AMOUNT OF THEIR SEPARATION PAY WHICHEVER WAS LESS. [MR. TWIFFORD DREW MONIES (BOTH PIASTERS AND DOLLARS)] WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO TURN IN PIASTERS EXCHANGED TO THE EMBASSY FOR U.S. DOLLARS. THE CONCEPT WAS GOOD BUT EVENTS PRECLUDED EXECUTION AND BOTH UNEXPENDED U.S. DOLLARS AND PIASTERS WERE ABANDONED LOCKED IN THE [MFA SAFE.]

5. LOSS OF EQUIPMENT - OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT LOST IN THE EVACUATION MOST ALL HIGH VALUE COMPANY OWNED PARTS AND EQUIPMENT WERE SHIPPED OUT. SOME ITEMS OF VALUE WORTH SHIPPING WERE ABANDONED BUT ABSENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO SELL IN PLACE MOST ITEMS WOULD HAVE BEEN ABANDONED IN ANY CASE. ATTEMPTS TO TURN IN SURPLUS GFE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL AND ALL [GFE] WAS ABANDONED ON SITE. REQUESTS THAT A PROPERTY CONTROL OFFICER BE APPOINTED TO WORK WITH US ON DISPOSAL OF ALL GFE REMAINED OUTSTANDING. A MEETING WAS HELD IN HONG KONG ON 19 MAY WITH [MR. BUDRIS] AND IT IS BELIEVED ACCEPTABLE CLOSE-OUT CONCEPT HAS OR WILL BE INITIATED BY HIM (THROUGH HIS ARMY BOSS IN OKI) TO DA. DETAILS WILL BE DISCUSSED ON MY ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON IN EARLY JULY. ON THIS ISSUE I FEEL [DTS] SHOULD PARTICIPATE AS HE HAS FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORIGINAL ACCEPTANCE OF [GFE] AND I HAVE ALERTED HIM TO PLAN A SHORT VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY JULY WHEN CALLED.

6. THERE MAY BE OTHER DETAILS YOU MAY DESIRE WHICH WILL BE FURNISHED ON MY ARRIVAL. SHOULD YOU NEED ANYTHING MORE

BEFORE THEN, I CAN BE REACHED BY PHONE --ENISCOLA 103.
TRUST YOU HAVE BEEN GIVEN AT LEAST A LITTLE TIME TO
"UNWIND AND REST". AGAIN LET ME SAY HOW MUCH I
APPRECIATED YOUR PRESENCE (PERSONALLY AND PROFESSIONALLY)
DURING THE "LAST DAYS". ON THE SPOT DECISION MAKING
MADE THE DIFFERENCE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD HAVE ENDED
IN A MUCH LESS FAVORABLE LIGHT.

VAR M. GREEN
VICE PRESIDENT-SOUTH VIETNAM DIVISION
AIR AMERICA, INC.