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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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BLOC STATEMENTS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY

Statements by Soviet and East German leaders over the past two weeks suggest that the bloc is preparing the way for a formal diplomatic initiative to renew negotiations on the German and Berlin questions. Moscow took advantage of the tensions over Cuba and Laos to issue a pointed reminder to the West that it still considers these questions priority issues.

Responding to the communiqué issued by President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer, Moscow published an authoritative "Observer" article in Izvestia on 20 April which stressed the urgency of a German peace settlement and a revision of Berlin's status. Commenting on the communiqué's references to self-determination for Germany, the article repeated the familiar proposals for a peace treaty with East and West Germany, the creation of a free city in West Berlin, and the formation of a German confederation. "The most sensible thing," it stated, "is to recognize that there exist the German Democratic Republic, the German Federal Republic, and West Berlin, whose status demands a special definition, since it is situated in the territory of the GDR and all its communications run through this territory."

Izvestia reiterated Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and warned that the Soviet Union "cannot delay it any longer because all reasonable time limits have elapsed." At the same time, however, it appealed to Bonn to take the initiative in order to provide "a weighty word" on the question of a peace treaty.

Moscow also sought to focus attention on the peace treaty question in a statement, given the British on 26 April, protesting the proposed use of facilities in the UK for the West German forces. The statement warned that British policy sharpened tensions and made it more difficult to conclude a German peace treaty.

In an interview with Walter Lippmann on 10 April, Khrushchev stressed his intention to raise the German question soon. Lippmann received the impression, however, that the Soviet leader was not thinking of any immediate action. In explaining the various alternative solutions, Khrushchev appeared to emphasize an interim or temporary agreement on Berlin as the most likely. He said a peace treaty with both Germanys was the ideal solution, but acknowledged that the West would not be likely to accept this.

As a "fall-back" position, Khrushchev referred to the interim agreement as proposed by the USSR at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference in 1959. Such a solution, however, would be strictly limited in time and clearly conditional on the lapse of Western occupation rights at the end of the interim period. According to Lippmann, Khrushchev mentioned a period of two to three years, which may indicate that Moscow will extend its earlier formal proposal for a two-year agreement.

As a third alternative, Khrushchev repeated the threat to conclude a separate treaty with the East Germans, transfer to them controls over Allied

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As a third alternative, Khrushchev repeated the threat to conclude a separate treaty with the East Germans, transfer to them controls over Allied access, and use force to oppose

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any Western attempts to reopen access rather than submit to East German controls.

In speeches on 21 and 23 April, East German party leader Ulbricht also called for the conclusion of the "long overdue" peace treaty, which he described as necessary to confirm existing frontiers, establish a free city in West Berlin, and settle the international relations of the two German states. He warned that "in the long run" the East German regime did not intend to tolerate the use of West Berlin to subvert and corrupt East German citizens or to wait for a peace treaty until Bonn had completed its nuclear rearmament.

Ulbricht declared, however, that access to West Berlin could be guaranteed by means of "normal" treaties between East Germany and the demilitarized free city of West Berlin and other

states interested in transit traffic. Neither speech, however, gave any indication of imminent action against Berlin.

The increased public attention to the Berlin and German issues was explained by a Soviet diplomat as necessary to keep world public opinion from coming to believe that Moscow was satisfied with the existing situation. The secretary general of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs told a Western ambassador in early April that these issues were very difficult and that it would be necessary to proceed gradually in seeking a solution. This line, together with Khrushchev's remarks to Lippmann, suggests that Moscow still prefers to negotiate a solution rather than provoke a new crisis by unilateral action. [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

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