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JCSM-431-61 26 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

- 1. Reference is made to a memorandum from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense, dated 13 June 1961, subject as above, in which he requested answers to questions posed by Mr. Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.
- 2. The three studies were prepared on a priority basis. They are responsive to Mr. Acheson's questions on the above request which states, in part: "These questions do not reflect any policy decisions, but are posed to create an analytical framework which would be helpful in review of the Berlin problem." Consideration was given to the views developed jointly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Mr. Dean Acheson and General Norstad during the discussions held on 14 June 1961.
- 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate concern is to influence Soviet decisions on Berlin before they are taken this summer or fall. United States preparations for a Berlin crisis in the US, in Europe, and worldwide should be taken in both nuclear and nonnuclear military areas concurrently. In this connection the requirement for modernizing, strengthening, and improving the US and Allied military posture worldwide has been recognized; however, the basic consideration remains the need for re-establishing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our Allies must have confidence and the USSR must be made to believe that the United States has the will and determination to use nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO, Berlin or the US position worldwide, as necessary, rather than submit to Soviet abrogation of US and Allied rights or position. Berlin is the immediate concern, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the questions posed by Mr. Dean Acheson are contained herein.

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4. The conclusions to the three appended studies, which are based on the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be employed by either side, are summarized as follows:

a. Military Measures Worldwide

- (1) The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war.
- (2) The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). United States action alone is feasible only to the extent that the Allies will permit the use of their national territories and that the action contemplated does not involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination and leadership which could be expected not only to influence the Soviet decision-making process, but also to restore the confidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain their full cooperation and support.
- (3) Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state of readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in Europe), it is doubtful that US Allies, in the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of general war.
- (4) The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the Soviets might react by taking military counteractions to pre-empt US

and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin. For this reason, the United States must be prepared for general war.

- b. Types and Amount of Offensive Nonnuclear Force for Certain Contingencies
 - (1) When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no substantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces. However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measurement (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin. This size force is based on the assumption that political limitations restrict military operations to the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive operations only.
 - (2) When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation, the hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder-Neisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required to achieve this objective.
 - (3) To allow the Communists time and opportunity to change their decision to block access. If the action begins with Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only, a balanced seven divisional force with adequate air support would provide, during the first five days, time and opportunity for the Communists to change their decision to block access. In the event that the Soviets entered the operation at any time, the situation described in paragraph 4b(2) would pertain. The Allied force of seven divisions already committed to the operation could avoid destruction.

c. Adequacy of Capabilities

(1) After a mobilization period of four months, the United States, or the US and its European Allies, has the capability

of deploying sufficient ground and air forces to Europe to restore access to Berlin if opposed only by GDR. This same size force could avoid destruction for a period of five days or 15 days if opposed by GDR and Russian forces.

- (2) Due to the inability to determine the quality of European Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence that all European Allies and the United States will commence full mobilization four months prior to an anticipated incident in Berlin, it is considered that there would not be sufficient forces in Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.
- (3) Because of the need for air bases, staging areas and assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to consider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required, and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient forces in Europe in a four-month period to restore access against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.
- (4) Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war for any extended period with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases, mobilization of the Allied countries requires 15 months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained (one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet forces.
- 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the desirability of providing viable alternatives to general war in the event the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A fail to deter the Soviets from denying Allied access to Berlin and limited ground force action is unsuccessful. In this connection, consideration must be given to other measures that will forcibly demonstrate on a rising scale US determination to achieve its objective of restoring access to Berlin. Possible measures could include consideration of actions such as the use of nuclear weapons on purely military targets in a manner which will forcibly drive home to the Soviets the seriousness with which the United States views the situation.

6. It is recommended that you note the enclosed studies and forward them to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as requested by him, for use by Mr. Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

APPENDIX A

MILITARY MEASURES WORLDWIDE

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine preparations of mounting seriousness which	1
could be taken by the United States in the CONUS, in Europe,	2
and worldwide to provide a basis for the threat and use of	3
military force to restore access to Berlin by application of:	4
a. Substantial nonnuclear force in successive stages.	5
b. General nuclear war.	6
ASSUMPTIONS	
2. Assumptions for this study include those set forth in	7
paragraph 2 of the basic paper plus the following:	8
a. The purpose of the preparatory steps envisaged in	9
this study are twofold:	10
(1) To influence Soviet decisions before they are	11
taken this summer or fall	12
(2) Provided the preparations envisaged in this	13
study fail to have the desired deterrent effect, to	14
create no later than October 1961 the best capability	15
for application of substantial nonnuclear force to	16
restore ground access against GDR forces alone, or	17
against total Soviet Bloc capabilities which can be	18
brought to bear in East Germany for periods of 5 to 15	19
days before resort is made to the use of nuclear weapons.	20
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM	
3. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated	21
6 June 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the "Check-	22
list of Military and Non-Military measures in the Berlin	23
Crisis", forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960,	24

TOP SECRET-JCSM-431-61 Appendix A

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World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	
Defense dated 13 April 1961, as well as in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated 28 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist" together with the premise on which it is based, i.e., accepting the risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	2
for the Secretary of Defense dated 28 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist" together with the premise on which it is based, i.e., accepting the risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	}
Chiefs of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist" together with the premise on which it is based, i.e., accepting the risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	ł
with the premise on which it is based, i.e., accepting the risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	5
risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	5
framework for the development of plans for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	7
response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	3
World access thereto. 4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).)
4. For additional facts see Annex A. DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	10
DISCUSSION 5. For discussion see Annex B. CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	11
CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	12
CONCLUSIONS 6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	13
6. It is concluded that: a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	14
a. The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	15
measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	16
time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	17
would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	18
regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	19
if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	20
them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	21
is the acceptance of the risk of general war. b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	22
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in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	24
Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	25
greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).	26
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that the Allies will permit the use of their national	31
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involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are
designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination
and leadership which could be expected not only to influence
the Soviet decision making process, but also to restore the
confidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain
their full cooperation and support.

c. Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state of readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in Europe), it is doubtful in the extreme that US Allies, in the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of general war.

d. The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to 16
Appendix A, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect 17
on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the 18
Soviets might react by taking military counteractions to 19
pre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin. 20
For this reason the United States must be prepared for 21
general war.

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Appendix A

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

The fundamental difference in the concept envisaged in	1
this study and the concept envisaged in the "Checklist of Mili-	2
tary and Non-Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis" is as	3
follows:	4
a. In this study selected measures would be implemented	5
progressively over the next few months with a view to	6
enhancing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and	7
improving US and Allied non-nuclear capabilities in Europe	8
by 31 October 1961 in order to deter the Soviet Bloc from	9
attempting a blockade of West Berlin and at the same time	10
to prepare for the eventuality of general war.	11
b. The Concept of the "Checklist" envisages progressive	12
application of measures after a Berlin incident has occurred	13
while the measures listed in Annex C to Appendix A are	14
designed to deter a Berlin crisis by adequate preparation	15

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Annex A to Appendix A 16

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A

DISCUSSION

1. In accordance with the assumptions in this study, it is	1
envisaged that a number of actions, particularly military	2
measures, could be implemented immediately as a deterrent to	3
possible Soviet Bloc attempts to develop a Berlin crisis in	4
the near future. The concept of initiating some measures of	5
the type envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A to gain a deterrent	6
effect prior to an anticipated Berlin incident was recommended	7
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to the Secre-	8
tary of Defense, dated 13 April 1961, subject, "The Status of	9
Berlin Contingency Plans".	10
2. Although no immediate action was taken by the US Coordinat-	-11
to do not be a superior to the share was amounted an of the Toint	70

- 2. Although no immediate action was taken by the US Coordinat-II ing Group to implement the above recommendation of the Joint 12 Chiefs of Staff, some of the measures recommended for early im- 13 plementation have, in effect, been executed. For example, 14 the existence of the Tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, 15 France) military planning staff (LIVEOAK) has become known as a 16 result of some recent newspaper articles.
- 18 3. As the Berlin situation has developed without a major incident since Premier Khruchchev's threats in November 1958, 19 20 it has become increasingly clear that the Soviets remain as intransigent even with regard to their objectives of making 21 permanent and irrevocable the division of Germany and the com-22 plete incorporation of West Berlin into their East German 23 satellite. This Soviet position was most recently reaffirmed 24 at the recent meeting in Vienna between President Kennedy and 25 Premier Khrushchev. 26
- 4. Accordingly, this study focuses primarily on those military reinforcement measures and preparations which could be 28

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Annex B to Appendix A

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recommended to the President for implementation in order both to restore the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and to achieve as early as possible a military posture which would permit the United States and its Allies or the United States unilaterally, to apply substantial nonnuclear force against any Soviet Bloc attempt to blockade ground access to Berlin; and concurrently to prepare for the ultimate risk of general war which such actions involve.

- 5. The sequence of military actions which are envisaged is set forth in Annex C together with corresponding political actions and pertinent remarks with regard to implementation.
- 6. An inspection of the sequence of events in Annex C readily indicates that the actions envisaged amount to a "crash" program within the time limits assumed within this study (i.e., 31 October 1961). However, this aspect does not invalidate the over-all deterrent effect which may be expected from implementation of these measures.
- 18 7. While the execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A, whether on a US unilateral basis or 19 20 Allied basis, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect on the Soviets, conceivably it could have an adverse and 21 opposite effect on the Soviet Bloc, i.e., instead of deterring 22 23 them from a blockade of West Berlin, it could cause them to take military counteractions to pre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin.
- 26 8. For example, if the United States and its Allies mobilize and deploy additional nonnuclear ground forces to 27 28 Europe, as a minimum it may be expected that the Soviet Bloc will respond in kind. In addition, it may be expected that the 29 30 Soviet Bloc will accuse the United States and the West of 31 deliberately preparing for aggressive war in Central Europe for the purpose of destroying the German Democrat Republic (GDR) 32

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Annex B to Appendix A

and reunifying Germany by force. In addition they are certain	1
to raise the spectre of a resurgent and militant West Germany	2
seeking to aggress against the Communist states under the pre-	(1)
text of liberating East Germany and Berlin. Moreover, all of	1
these moves are certain to cause serious repercussions in other	-
parts of the world. For example, the fixation of United States	6
and Allied attention on and the provision of additional resources	7
to Western Europe could motivate the CHICOMs to attempt to	8
achieve their objectives of liberating Taiwan and overrunning	9
Southeast Asia by overt military force.	LC
9. It is also obvious from an examination of Annex C that	1]
full Allied, including NATO, cooperation is not only desirable	12
but essential if the full deterrent effectiveness of the	13
measures envisaged is to be realized. In the absence of an	14

but essential if the full deterrent effectiveness of the

measures envisaged is to be realized. In the absence of an

overt Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, it is most improbable

that the United States could count on full Allied cooperation

in implementing a series of measures such as those envisaged

in Annex C. Forceful US leadership, however, and US unilateral

preparations to resort to force, if necessary, could have a

catalytic effect on our allies in stimulating them to take

appropriate corresponding actions.

10. That is not to say that United States Allies, including 22 the FRG, would not fight for West Berlin. It is to say, 23 however, that the people and governments of Western Europe 24 may remain loath to engage in such deterrent preparatory 25 actions without a clear demonstration of US leadership. 26

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Annex B to Appendix A

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A

POSSIBLE MEASURES TO DETER A BERLIN CRISIS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this list of actions is to demonstrate a United States resolve to employ military force, to include the use of nuclear weapons if necessary, to prevent the Soviets from taking action to deny allied rights in Berlin.

2. Time Phasing.

The actions to be taken are keyed to Khrushchev's pronouncements to sign a separate treaty with the GDR by the end of 1961,
and are phased into three time groupings: D-6 MOS to D-4 MOS; D-4
MOS to D-2 MOS; D-2 MOS to D-DAY (31 DEC 1961). Although this
assumed time frame would not complete preparations by 31 October
1961, it would constitute as much progress as could be realistically
expected in a 4-month period assuming an approximate 1 July 1961
starting date.

3. Implementation.

Although measures are listed in a generally ascending order of severity within the assumed time frame, the implementation of any measure listed is dependent upon the circumstances which may develop rapidly over the next few weeks. Accordingly, the measures could be executed in any order required.

4. Political Measures.

Opposite each military measure is listed corresponding political actions required for implementation. The political measures column is not intended to cover all corresponding appropriate political actions but only the most obvious ones required for military action. Of primary importance is the requirement for allied, particularly tripartite, agreement and cooperation for the full effectiveness of many measures.

5. Covert actions.

Although not listed herein, it is assumed that covert activities in support of all appropriate measures will be provided by the CIA and other government agencies concerned.

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Annex C to Appendix A

d. None.

Policy is necessary.

d.. Executive action to modify U.S.

d. None.

A. TIME PERIOD: D-6 to D-4 MONTHS (Assume D-Day is 31 December 1961

CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

cop sheaking

weapons forward in proximity to forces. (e.g., forward forces by moving additional nuclear dispersed in CONUS.) USCINCEUR land-battle missile warheads now a. Enhancing posture of nuclear capable

Restore credibility of the deterrent by:

Restore Credibility of Deterrent

MILITARY MEASURES

produce a land-based MRBM for NATO. b. Instituting development progrem to

France. c. Providing nuclear assistance to

> could be sustained indefinitely. Soviets capacity. Using available logistical transport and temporary augmentation at weapon storage augmentation if necessary. retain option for timely withdrawal of weapon and storage facilities, forward dispersal could increase their nuclear dispersals to increased nuclear weapon dispersal authority, European satellites, but net advantage would a. Will require Presidential approval of

development program. b. DOD action required to initiate MRBM

information to France required. c. Executive action to release nuclear

a. None

Revocable at will. Counter to existing USSR program. b. Can be sustained indefinitely.

Communist response in kind doubtful information given cannot be withdrawn. (i.e. China). Action irrevocable; c. Can be sustained indefinitely.

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Annex C t Appendix A to TOP SECRET

REMARKS

Increase Readiness

Increase state of readiness of US forces world-wide, but particularly in Europe. amphibious ships. tional forces such as B-47 wings and inactivation and/or retirement of opera-This should include discontinuance of

> POLITICAL MEASURES CORRESPONDING

readiness of British Army of The Rhine (BAOR) bat service support units and strategic and RAF/Germany to include movement of comexample, urge the UK to improve the state of Urge our allies to do the same. For

REMARKS

reserves from UK to continent.

would be the following: . Among appropriate measures

- and combat procedures. b. Deploy northern atomic task a. Step-up and practice alert
- area. force wholly or partially to BAOR c. Implementation by unified
- and specified commanders on a tive alert plans. measures contained in their respecperiodic basis of selected alert
- units from CONUS. area with replacement of this force with ment of this force to the Helmsted access operation. Consider deployto execute Berlin probe and ground force, US or tripartite, selected e. Increase readiness to execute d. Intensified training of

demolition and mining plans in Central TOP SECRET JCSM-431-61

Europe.

Annex C o Appendix A SECRET 11((1)1)

3

Begin to bring US forces in Europe up to full strength and step-up pace of modernization. Reinforcement of US Forces

POLITICAL MEASURES CORRESPONDING

vision of new weapons and equipment. In increase in the monthly draft call. addition, this measure will necessitate an increase in size of Armed Services and pro-Requires Congressional authorization for

national emergency followed by support-Presidential declaration of a limited ing Congressional resolution of a full

Initiate appropriate mobilization.

4. Mobilization

national emergency.

Alternative to declaration of national measures from Congress. emergency is to seek new enabling

6.

0 Request NATO partners, particularly control and return of French Army return of the French fleet to NATO action. Of particular importance is UK, France and FRG to take comparable divisions to Europe.

REMARKS

deployment of personnel from CONUS units. To bring current US forces in Europe Replacement of such personnel within to wartime strengths would require CONUS units would be necessary.

A necessary degree of industrial mobilization would be required to significantly increase rate of modernization within -month period.

a. Appropriate mobilization will be required mobilized for a sufficient period to accomplish active forces; most reserve Army units would ready for immediate integration into the reserves and NG are generally considered Navy and Marine organized reserves, AF to enhance credible general war posture. absence of a Presidential declaration of require more time. More importantly, in the accordance with current mobilization plans. the objective. Forces would be generated in emergency, reserve and NG units could not be

0 None b. None

11

mnex C to Appendix

TOP SECRET

5. Further Reinforcement of US Forces Deploy additional forces to Europe and other critical areas as required.

CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

REMARKS

d. Extend draft law and increase draft calls. d. None.

additional forces. Promulgation of possible, precede movement to Europe of Bilateral and NAC consultation should, if Emergency. Presidential declaration of National

may be required. within a thirty day period. Augmentaof a National Emergency the followtion by Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Without a Presidential declaration ing units could be deployed to Europe

- (1) 3 STRAC Divisions.
- (2) Air Force forces as required up to a maximum of 41 squadrons.

Fleet Marine Forces augmentation

(4) 2d Fleet to Eastern Atlantic; augment 6th Fleet by one ASW Group to Mediterranean (1 Div/Wing Team). and one CVA.

pons to the FRG is a particularly sensitive East Germans. point with Premier Khrushchev and the The provision of nuclear capable wea-

obtaining rapid agreement on these negotiations for the purpose of Arrange for additional bilateral

to insure their combat effectiveness.

with nuclear capable weapons, and provide Step-up arming of FRG army and air forces

Reinforcement of FRG

them with sufficient logistical assistance

POLITICAL MEASURES CORRESPONDING

REMARKS

MILITARY MEASURES

Air Actions

taken to demonstrate US resolve and determina-Air Force and Naval Air actions which can be

- fighter escort when appropriate. to Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet with a. Conduct air operations through corridors
- Greenland-Iceland-UK line. lance and an ASW barrier patrol along the b. Establish continuous air surveil-
- deemed necessary. c. Augment SAC airborne alert as
- around Sino-Soviet periphery d. Increase ELINT and photographic sortics
- e. Resume U-2 flights
- in Berlin air corridors. f. Increase reconnaissance flights
- stations. g. Fly-over of Soviet Siberia and Arctic
- Bloc aircraft which attempt to interfere with our operations. h. On selective basis, destroy Soviet

- cease adherence to self-imposed restrictions upon use of corridor airspace. a. Executive approval required to
- Faroes portion of the line. support in providing coverage for UKof US forces in the Atlantic, and UK b. Will require some augmentation
- c. None.
- taken. quired depending upon action to be d. - h. Executive approval re-

- terception and possible attrition of aircraft. Equal possibility transit would be unchallenged. a. Could provoke Soviet in-
- air, or submarine penetrations of this line. b. Enhance warning of hostile
- provide strategic indication of c. Enhance deterrence and
- mination and improved US intelligence. public opinion risks offset by US will derive net advantage, with over Arctic and Europe. On balance, Soviets could respond in kind gain in UN and world opinion. nel. Risk of Soviet propaganda and possible capture of US person-Effort can be sustained for proincreased respect for US detertracted period or terminated at d. - h. Risk of attrition

forces.

Should the situation deteriorate in spite of measures now being undertaken, deploy organized

Deployment to South Vietnam

MILITARY MEASURES

8. Demonstration of Intent

Conduct exercises, preferably tripartite but US alone if necessary, in the vicinity of Helmstedt readily identifiable as an action related to restoration of ground access.

World-Wide Actions

Intervention in Laos

Implement US or SEATO plans if necessary to regain control of LAOS.

CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

Seek full UK/French/FRG cooperation.

REMARKS

Will demonstrate Allied cohesiveness and resolve with respect to the use of force.

Presidential decision required to restore control of Laos to Royal Laotian Government; to eliminate communist supported and augmented Pathet Lao/Kong Le units as a cohesive force and main obstacle to RLG control.

tinued employment of US forces.
Expansion - may entail additional operations against North Vietnam, CHICOM intervention, support for Burma, Thailand, E. Pakistan. Response in kind - in addition to Soviet moves against countries above, may induce similar Soviet sponsored action against S. Korea, Taiwan. Revocability: Once committed and faced with Soviet responses indicated above, there would be no acceptable alternative to sustained action until military victory achieved, or until the opposition agreed to negotiate a settlement on terms acceptable to the US.

None

Obtain Diem's request.

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Annex C to Appendix A

Measures against Cuba

internal, resistance to Castro regime. broadcasts, and encouraging intensification of pounding all Cuban assets in US, jamming Cuban harassment, cessation of all transportation to Castro regime in Cuba, to include naval and air and from Cuba, reconnaissance over-flight, im-(1) Undertake punitive measures against

tary action to overthrow the Castro regime. (2) Alternatively, take direct mili-

intervention required.

Presidential decision for direct military

POLITICAL MEASURES CORRESPONDING

penetration of Western Hemisphere. use forceful measures to overcome Communist assistance, and demonstrate US resolve to Castro regime by isolation from external Presidential decision required to weaken

Solicit OAS cooperation.

REMARKS

could be outweighed by respect verse reaction likely, but it immediately, at US option. strength. Effective Cuban response for positive US indication of indefinitely, or cancelled infeasible. Could be sustained c. Some Latin American ad-

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Annex C to Appendix A

Resume Nuclear Tests.

MILITARY MEASURES

Suspend normal military rotation policy

5. Rotation Policy Suspended

to and from Europe; stop dependent travel

to Eurppe and other forward areas.

Begin withdrawa of non-essential person-

Personnel

Commencement of Withdrawal of

nel, including dependents from Europe and

other forward areas.

SACEUR and SACLANT hold special meetings

3. Meeting of Military Commanders.

with subordinate commanders.

B. TIME PERIOD: D-4 to D-2 Months (Assume D-Day is 31 December 1961)

IF NOT ALREADY EXECUTED, FOR IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW ALL THE FOREGOING FOR CONTINUATION, REITERATION, OR,

CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

produced acceptable results. Soviets to come to reasonable terms at the intentions justified on basis of refusal by Initiate if Geneva talks have not Preannounce

air defense and reinforce ADIZ measures. Advance the state fo readiness of NATO

2. NATO Air Readiness.

None.

Notify Allies and explain reasons. Restrict tourist travel

Notify Allies of planned policy.

continued Soviet procrastination and military disadvantage accruing from public opinion that US refuses to risk Demonstrate to Soviet Bloc and world relative to those of the USSR. Soviets intransigence in Geneva. Test for could start tests as well . improvement of our nuclear capabilities

operations in the air access corridors to Europe. Soviets could interfere with air Would enhance the air defense posture in Would indicate allied support of US position.

ordinary activities of key military commanders. To highlight the continuance of extra-

will be determined in coordination with commencement of evacuation of dependents conditioned to this step. Exact timing of Domestic public opinion will have to be USCINCEUR.

experienced personnel in the area. Will increase force readiness by retaining

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4. Autobahn Traffic
Organize all military autobahn traffic

two-way communications equipment. escorted by armed MP's equipped with to and from Berlin in tripartite convoys

> C. TIME PERIOD: D-2 Months to D-Day (Assume D-Day is 31 December 1961)

IF NOT ALREADY EXECUTED, FOR IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW ALL THE FOREGOING FOR CONTINUATION, RETTERATION, OR,

CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

Allied support and agreement required.

German military forces.

Complete evacuation of dependents and

2. Completion of Withdrawal of

Personnel

hospital patients from forward areas

in Europe.

3. Squadron Dispersal Execute USAFE/NATO squadron dispersal

pran.

Request reinforcement and movement

1. Allied Reinforcement

WILLIARY MEASURES

into position of British, French, and

State Department complete evacuation of non-essential US nationals.

REMARKS

use force to maintain access to Berlin and demonstrate Allied willingness to To increase NATO defense capabilities

nominal time. Soviets would counter Soviets. Move by organic equipment and Important signal of determination to Dispersal of force to improve survivability. Preposition forces in optimum position. with similar deployment. Can be retheater airlift. Can remain deployed tion of requirement. turned to normal readiness upon comple-

in kind would not effect US operations. definitely, and discontinued with reduction in tensions. Soviet response Convoy procedure can be maintained in-

Allied agreement required.

Regulate the movement of Bloc

sioning, etc.)

ships in Allied ports.

MILITARY MEASURES

Request active patrolling by Italian submarine activities. to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with particular attention to light forces in Straits of Ontranto 5. Naval Patrolling

Italian agreement required.

POLITICAL MEASURES CORRESPONDING

& UK submarines and Turkish forces in Conduct submarine exercises with US 6. Submarine Exercise

Black Sea and along Turkish coast within terms of Montreaux Convention.

> required. British and Turkish agreement

Advise Allies.

Ignore Soviet protests.

Soviet and GDR shipping as follows:

Protracted delay of ship's

servicing (bunkering, provi-

Execute naval countermeasures against

8. Naval Countermeasures

patrolling at the Straits of Gibraltar Execute ASW surveillance with visible

7. ASW Surveillance

and in the Turkish Straits.

REMARKS

activities of US forces in Meditersurveillance. Would improve ASW To inform Soviets that their military decision, upon reduction of tensions. decision, or unilateral Italian duration and discontinued on US-Italian ranean. Can be sustained for moderate posture and deployments are under

can be maintained in area indefinitely condition. In position to close strength in area in war fighting decision and on short notice. Bosphorous if appropriate. Forces To alert Soviets to US and UK naval Redeployment can be effected by only if adequate back-up available.

US firmess of purpose. Will give evidence of increasing

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- 0 Refuse to charter shipping to and repairs in Allied ports. for bunkering, lightering, piloting Increase charges to Bloc shipping
- Intensify surveillance of Soviet and North Pacific. fishing fleets in North Atlantic Bloc countries.

0

Be prepared to close rapidly the naval exits from the Baltic and Black Seas.

9. Restrictions on Bloc Air Prohibit Soviet Bloc air operations, Allied territory. including civil, over and into US and

tions system will be required. Satellite transportation and communica-Political decision to restrict Soviet and

CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

REMARKS

aids. Denies international use of navigational

Notify all user nations.

11. Navigational Precautions
Encode LORAN and CONSOL navigational aids.

10. Dispersal of CONUS Forces Execute dispersal plan for CONUS

based forces.

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and procedural guises. Soviet response complished under various administrative support is obtainable. May be ac-Sustainable to the degree that Allied

would create problems. Revokable by

degrees or instantaneously.

12. Airborne Alert Direct SAC to execute airborne alert.

13. Offensive Operations Conduct military operations in accordance with current plans as required.

CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

None.

Be prepared to present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government in coordination with principal Allies.

Put general war strike force in optimum position for strike.

REMARKS

US and Allied plans are in being and under constant review and refinement. Several plans include precut messages of implementation requiring only decision to undertake the military action.

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Annex C to Appendix A

APPENDIX B

TYPES AND AMOUNT OF OFFENSIVE NONNUCLEAR FORCE FOR CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the type and amount of offensive nonnuclear	1
force which would have to be applied in Europe in order to:	2
a. Restore access to Berlin if the Soviets opposed it	3
with German Democratic Republic (GDR) forces alone.	4
b. Permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces at	5
successively higher levels as readily available USSR and GDR	6
forces were encountered.	7
c. Allow the communists time and opportunity to change	8
their decision to block access by avoiding destruction of	9
the force without use of US nuclear weapons for a period of	10
(1) five days, (2) 15 days, during which negotiations could	11
be undertaken, looking to restoration of access.	12
ASSUMPTIONS	
2. a. Assumptions for this consideration include those set	13
forth in paragraph 2 of the basic paper.	14
b. That the preparatory measures as outlined in Appendix	15
A have been taken.	16
c. That the operations envisaged for these situations	17
are confined to the area of East Germany.	18
d. That any aggressive action conducted in Western Europe	19
would invoke the NATO alliance and that the problem then	20
becomes one of NATO at war with the Soviet Bloc and,	21
therefore, outside the scope of this paper.	22
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM	
3. See Annex A to Appendix A	23

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Appendix B

DISCUSSION

4. For discussion, see Annex hereto.	
CONCLUSIONS	
5. Under the assumption that the USSR does not employ nuclear	2
weapons, the estimated forces required are:	3
a. When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of	2
Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition	
from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no sub-	6
stantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces.	7
However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measure-	8
ment (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is	9
considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported	10
by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin.	11
This size force is based on the assumption that political	12
limitations restrict military operations to the axis of the	13
Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive	14
operations only.	15
b. When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces	16
in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation the	17
hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlin	18
corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to	19
meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany	20
with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder-	21
Neisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions	22
and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be	23
required to achieve this objective.	24

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Appendix B

c. To allow the communists time and opportunity to change	1
their decision to block access. If the action begins with	2
Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only, a balanced seven	3
divisional force with adequate air support would provide,	4
during the first five days, time and opportunity for the	5
communists to change their decision to block access. In the	6
event that the Soviets enter d the operation at any time the	7
situation described in paragraph 4 b (2) would pertain. The	8
Allied force of seven divisions already committed to the	9
operation could avoid destruction.	10

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Appendix B

ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

DISCUSSION

1. Proceeding on the hypothesis that preparatory measures have	1
been taken, the US and Allied forces in Europe can be considered	2
to be on a war-time basis and in a high state of readiness. As	3
the United States Allied action to use military force to reopen	4
ground access to Berlin threatens to overcome the German	5
Democratic Republic (GDR) forces, the Soviets must decide either	6
to permit the GDR forces to be defeated or to come to the aid of	7
the GDR.	8
2. Assuming the Soviets come to the aid of the GDR, the opera-	9
tions could not be limited to a corridor along the Helmstedt-	10
Berlin axis, but rather would be a major war in East Germany.	11
The forces which the Soviets have readily available for employ-	12
ment in West Europe would require an Allied attack to defeat	13
the Bloc forces in East Germany and to hold this area by occupy-	14
ing positions along the Oder-Neisse River line. Actually, in	15
this operation, the objective of Berlin becomes secondary and	16
the primary issue becomes the unification of Germany. To defeat	17
the Bloc forces in this course of action would require on the	18
order of 50 divisions together with the air forces and freedom	19
of air action commensurate with the magnitude of the ground	20
operations. The following assumptions prevail:	21
a. That an initial force of seven divisions have attacked	22

- a. That an initial force of seven divisions have attacked along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis against GDR forces only and that at some point in the operation the Soviets entered the conflict in order to prevent the defeat of the GDR forces.
- b. The attack of the Soviets is limited to the Allied 26 forces operating in East Germany and that bases and forces 27 in Western Europe are not attacked. 28

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25

(1) That the Soviets will reinforce their forces until	1
approximately 60 divisions are employed in East Germany	2
and Western Poland.	3

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Annex to Appendix B

TAB TO ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF ACTION AND SOVIET REACTION

1. The preparations of mounting	seriousness taken by the	1
United States and Allies will have	alerted the Communist Bloc and	2
they will have intensified efforts	to determine the number and	3
disposition of additional US troop	p units in Europe.	4

- 2. Since the action taken to block access would most probably 5 be taken subsequent to the signing of a peace treaty between 6 USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the question of 7 the location of Soviet divisions is important. It is possible, 8 after the signing of the treaty for the Soviets, with much fan-9 fare, to move its divisions out of the GDR. This is unlikely 10 because the existence of the GDR regime appears dependent upon 77 the presence of Soviet divisions, and also because it puts the 12 Soviets in a less advantageous posture for combat in Western 13 Europe. Therefore, it should be assumed that Soviet divisions 14 presently in the GDR will remain generally in their present 15 locations. 16
- 3. The study forwarded to the Secretary of Defense* on 28 17 April 1961, gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff views of the possible18 sequence of US action and Soviet reaction. Although this con-19 cerned a two-division force probe, the sequence could remain 20 substantially unchanged. It is assumed that the Soviets will sign21 a peace treaty with the GDR before the GDR adopt an intransigient22 attitude over access to Berlin. This appears to be the most 23 likely course of action. However, access to Berlin may not be 24 denied by the GDR for some time after a GDR-Soviet treaty and 25 the United States must be prepared for such an eventuality. 26

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Tab to Annex to Appendix B

27

4. The sequence of actions and reactions are outlined	d below:	1
a. The decision to enter nuclear war if necessary	will have	2
been made at the start of the action to reopen ground	d access.	3
b. Allied preparations.		4
c. Soviets sign a peace treaty with GDR and decla	re that	5
GDR will control access into Berlin.		6
d. GDR representatives refuse entry at the Helmst	edt check	7
point, by physical force in the form of armed border	police.	8
e. A small military probe has been tried and is f	orcibly	9
blocked by what appears to be only GDR forces.		10
f. The United States commits a seven division for	ce against	11
the GDR forces. The GDR forces initially fight a de	laying	12
action, but subsequently as the US force advances, a	ttempts	13
to strike the rear and flanks of the US force. The	US force	14
has prepared against this and, therefore, its progre	ss toward	15
Berlin continues.		16
g. At this point it must be realized that the Sov	viets are	17
furnishing at least logistic and technical assistance	e to the	18
GDR. Some manned aircraft may be furnished, either	from	19
Soviet Air Force or from satellites.		20
h. Increased advance of the US Forces indicates t	to the	21
Soviets that additional forces are necessary to rein	force the	22
GDR. At this point Soviets may:		23
(1) Launch an assault on Western Europe with t	che	24
divisions located with the GDR.		25
(2) Commit the Soviet divisions within GDR in	support	26
of GDR forces effort to halt and destroy the US F	Force	27
advancing toward Berlin.		28
(3) Commit only a small portion of the Soviet	divisions	29
in the GDR, to strengthen defenses just enough to	counter-	30
halance the strength of the US Force.		31

	(4) Conduct nonnuclear air operations against US instal-	1
	lations in Western Europe. This can be combined with any	2
	of the above courses of action, or can be conducted ini-	3
	tially as the sole course of action.	4
	(5) Initiate submarine action against allied shipping	5
	and mining in allied waters.	6
5	. The decision to initiate general nuclear war might be made	7
unde	r any of the following situations:	8
	a. When the Soviets cross the West German border with comba	t 9
f	orces.	10
	b. When the Soviets conduct air bombardment (even though	11
n	onnuclear) of US bases, airfields, and installations in West	12
G	ermany.	13
	c. When the Soviets enter the conflict in support of the	14
G	DR forces blocking access to Berlin.	15
	d. If West Berlin is seized by East Germans or by Soviets	16
i	n any action, including para-military, masked as a civil	17
d	isturbance.	18
	e. If the US Force proceeding along the Helmstedt-Berlin	19
а	xis is in danger of annihilation because of heavy Soviet	20
a	ir-ground attack.	21

· APPENDIX C

ADEQUACY OF CAPABILITY

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the adequacy of our capability to prosecute	1
by 31 October 1961, the course of action described in Question	2
#2, assuming the preparations referred to in Question #1 have	3
been made. If the 31 October 1961 capability is judged inade-	21
quate for effective execution, how long would it take to create	5
the required capability? This adequacy to be considered from	6
the viewpoint of full Allied cooperations, including West	7
German participation, and also as a unilateral US action.	8
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM	
2. See Annex A to Appendix A.	9
DISCUSSION	
3. For discussion, see the Annex hereto.	10
CONCLUSIONS	
4. After a mobilization period of four months the US, or	11
the US and its European allies, has the capability of deploying	12
sufficient ground and air forces to Europe to restore access to	13
Berlin if opposed only by GDR. This same size force could	14
avoid destruction for a period of five days or 15 days if	15
opposed by GDR and Russian forces.	16
5. Due to the inability to determine the quality of European	17
Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence	18
that all European Allies and the United States will commence	19
full mobilization four months prior to an anticipated incident	20
in Berlin, it is considered that there would not be sufficient	21
forces in Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin	22

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Appendix C

against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance. 23

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6. Because of the need for air bases, staging areas, and
assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to con-
sider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full
cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required
and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain is also
required. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient
forces in Europe in a four month period to restore access
against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

7. Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases mobilization of the Allied countries requires 15 months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained (one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet forces.

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Appendix C

ANNEX TO APPENDIX C

- 1. Summary of Requirements. A summary of the forces required is included in Appendix B. Since Berlin is located in the central area and since the primary involvement of US forces will take place in the central area, a detailed study of requirements and adequacy of capabilities will be limited to this area. However, it must be most strongly emphasized that since the actions outlined in these studies could lead to general war it is most important that the north area and south area be reinforced. If this is not accomplished the central area can be outflanked and the entire NATO position in central Europe be placed in jeopardy. Summary of the requirements for Central Europe are:
 - a. To restore access if opposed only by the GDR. Seven Allied divisions and four tactical air wings would be required.
 - b. To permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces as successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance were encountered. Forces on the order of magnitude of 50 Allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required.
 - c. Navy. Since it is assumed that the actions contained in this study are taken prior to commencement of hostilities, it follows as a corollary that Army and Air Force units sealifted to Europe would be moved administratively under peacetime conditions. Under actual conditions, this assumption might not prove to be valid in view of Soviet capability to initiate submarine warfare at any time of their choice. Preparations must be made to insure the

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Annex to Appendix C

Safety of seaborne movements against Soviet interference. Navy mobilization should be concurrent with the other Services to bring ships to wartime complements and to provide the planned ASW augmentation in ships and aircraft from Ready Reserve.

2. Summary of Capabilities

a. Present forces in Europe are as follows:

Country	Army Forces	Air Force Forces
US	5 divisions	15 wings
UK	4 divisions (reduced strength)	15 wings
France	4 divisions	10 wings
FRG	12 divisions (reduced strength)	10 wings

The forces of UK, France and FRG have a capability for limited defensive operations and little or no offensive capability.

- b. The current JSCP indicates that during the first four months of full mobilization after declaration of a national emergency by the President the US has the capability of moving 10 Divisions to Europe, including the three STRAC Divisions and one Marine Div/Wing Team which can be moved at any time but which normally would be moved during the first 30 days after mobilization.
- c. The US Air Force would move 23 squadrons to Europe during the first 30 days after mobilization. This includes the CASF which can be moved at anytime. During this same period of time Allied contributions to the air force in Central Europe would amount to an estimated additional 6 wings.
- d. It is estimated that by M+4 months our principal Allies in Western Europe could make the following additional forces available:

Country	Army Forces	Air Force Forces
UK	6 divisions	4 wings
France	2 divisions	2 wings
FRG	8 divisions	none
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e. Bas	sed on the abo	ve	figures, the total U	S and Allied	1
forces av	vailable by M+	4 а	re estimated to be:		2
Cou	intry	Arm	y Forces	Air Force Forces	3
U	JS	13	divisions	22 wings	4
U	ж	10	divisions	19 wings	5
Fr	rance	6	divisions	12 wings	6
F	FRG	20	divisions	10 wings	7
TO	TAL	49	divisions	63 wings	8
f. The	e Navy indicat	es	that the 10 MSTS tra	insports now	9
in operat	tion in the At	lan	tic can move a total	of 148,400	10
troops du	uring a four m	ont	h period. Since it i	s assumed that	11
this is a	n administrat	ive	move, not forceably	opposed by	12
the Russi	lans, the move	men	nt of additional men	and cargo is	13
only cont	tingent on the	ch	marter, requisition,	and reactivation	14
of additi	ional bottoms	to	carry the required p	personnel and	15
tonnage.	The sealift	cap	pability can be incre	eased to more	16
than meet	the total co	nte	emplated lift require	ements. Air-	17
lift woul	ld be availabl	e t	o handle priority mo	ovements and	18
advance e	echelons.				19
3. Soviet	t Capabilities	<u>.</u>	The Russians present	cly have 20	20
Divisions in	n East Germany		It is estimated that	they have the	21
capability o	of reinforcing	; th	neir forces in East 0	dermany at the	22
rate of four	r Divisions pe	er d	ay for the first ter	n days and	23
three Divisi	lons per day f	or	the remainder of the	e first month	24
after D-Day	for a total o	of a	about 128 Divisions.	Additionally	25
these Divisi	ions would be	sup	oported by 1000 tacti	lcal aircraft	26
positioned i	in East German	ny a	and backed by another	2500 tactical	27
type aircraf	ft located in	Wes	stern USSR alone.		28
4. In vie	ew of the fore	egoi	ing, the following po	oints are	29
considered a	appropriate:				30
a. It	is impossible	e fo	or the US to carry ou	at this operation	31
without n	necessary Alli	Led	cooperation. In add	dition to pro-	32
viding a	united front	to	the Soviets with the	e attendant	33

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psychological advantages it is necessary to have the use of ports, airbases, staging areas, and assembly areas. As a minimum we must obtain approval by the Federal Republic of Germany and at least tacit agreement by the French and British. It is very apparent that it is to our advantage to obtain the cooperation and participation of as many of our NATO Allies as possible in this operation.

- b. Another factor which would seriously affect the current capability of the Allied forces, particularly the US Forces, is that capability and concept are based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons rather than matching the Soviets man for man. If the use of these weapons is denied to our own forces, the conventional bomb and artillery support which could be made available for this operation would be far below levels that were employed and considered necessary in Europe during World War II.
- are earmarked in current mobilization plans for deployment 18 to Europe. In addition to these forces the United States 19 has both ground and air forces which are now earmrked for 20 deployment to other areas. These additional forces could 21 be sent to Europe; however, this would have an adverse 22 effect on our world-wide general war posture. 23
- 24 d. The equipment and related material needed to 25 initially outfit the additional mobilized forces required 26 in this study must necessarily be drawn from war reserve stocks which are inadequate for a force of this size. 27 28 Additionally logistical support of deployed forces of this 29 magnitude engaged in an extended nonnuclear war would create 30 further critical shortages in certain conventional weapons 31 and ammunition. No reliance can be placed on the war production base for major items of combat equipment that are not 32 33 in production on M-Day and in most categories in which

anition? when	
critical shortages exist a period of from one to two years	
would be required to balance production and consumption	2
requirements.	-
roduri cincilos.	3
A The division of the	
e. The divisions of the UK, France and FRG are practical]	Ly 4
all understrength, logistic support is marginal, and they	5
	-
should not be considered in terms of capability of US	6
divisions.	
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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning met under the chairmanship of Mr. Kohler, Department of State, on 16 August 1960. The group gave consideration to a JCS-prepared checklist of possible military and non-military measures related to Berlin Contingency Planning which had been revised and submitted to you as a result of your memorandum of 10 June 1960 on the same subject. The primary purpose of this checklist is to provide the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group with a basis for recommending specific actions, establishing responsibility for their execution and presenting an approximate idea of the time required for execution.

The checklist was agreed to be of great assistance. However, the group decided that a further review must be made to isolate those measures which must be dealt with on a tripartite basis and those which are strictly for U.S. implementation. This will be done with a view to a paper being ready for tripartite consideration in approximately two weeks; it being intended to call a meeting of the Tripartite Coordinating Group at that time.

The Department of State agreed to inquire at this time whether the British and French had authorized their commanders to prepare the necessary unilateral supporting plans for restoring ground access to Berlin, in view of General Horstad's approval of CINCBACR's basic plan. It was considered that since the British and French were being asked at this time, they should be able to report the status of their plans at the next tripartite meeting.

The group recognized that two particular areas which would require further examination are non-military global countermeasures and measures to be taken in the event of possible Soviet or East German harassment of civilian access to Berlin.

The first of these areas, global countermeasures, will be reviewed by the Department of State, using already existing papers prepared on this subject. Again it is hoped that early British and French discussion of global countermeasures can be initiated. To date there has been little tripartite progress in this area.

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Civilian access problems were referred to Bonn for study after the Paris Summit (Tripartite Ambassadorial Mesting, 7 June). Bonn has done little and has pointed out the problem of conducting such an examination during the European holiday period. However, State has been informed that a study group began work at Bown this week.

In summary, real progress has been achieved in Berlin Contingency Planning in the area of specific plans and actions related to military measures. However, a similar statement cannot be made in the equally important ancillary areas of civilian access and non-military countermeasures.

Frepared: European Region

OASD (ISA)



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1961 MAY 26 15 28

Refer to I-14453/61
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SECUR

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B Mr. Gilpatric

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent (S)

At your 24 May meeting with Mr. Acheson, you suggested several military movements as suitable and timely steps toward forestalling a Berlin crisis. Ambassador Thompson's reports of his conversation with Khrushchev (Tab A) make the need for such measures even more pointed.

Important That you ned three carefully.

A directive to study but not prepare such movements is attached. Its execution would have important foreign policy and budgetary implications, among others. Because of the danger of possible leakage, however, the study has not been discussed beyond the Joint Staff, ISA, and Mr. Acheson.

In my judgment, these or similar measures would help materially to deter the USSR from provoking a Berlin crisis. Unless Khrushchev takes an unexpected conciliatory approach at the Vienna talks, I shall recommend that measures such as these be carried out.

Recommend you sign the attached directive to JCS and other interested OSD staff elements.

2 Attachments

1. Amb Thompson's reports (Cables 2887, 2888, 2889, dated 24May61) (Tab A)

2. Memo directive to JCS and OSD staff elements

cc: Mr. Gilpatric

Faul H. Vitze

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