

15 July 1961

## SELECTED STATEMEN'SS BY KHRUSZCEEV ON BERLIN

10 November 1958 - Speech in Moscon to a Polisi delegation headed by Gomulka (speech in which Karushchev get forth vew najor proposals on Berlin):
"...It is time to understand that the days when the imperialists could act with impunity from the position of strength have gone beyond recall.... Tiney cannot forget the geographical situation of West Germany which, under the present military techaiques, would not last a day in a modern war....
"No powers have the right to interfere in the interual affairs of and to dictate their will to the GDR.... "The signing of : the German peace treaty would inelp mormalize tine wiole situation in Germany and in all Europe. The Soviet Dnion has been proposing and proposes to tackle tids matter whout delay.... "The Soviet Union, for its part, will hand over to the sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are still exercized by Soviet organg. I thinis that this would be the correct thing to do.
Approved for Relasea
Date $\quad$ OCT 1992

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"Let the United States, France, and Britain form their own relations with the GDE and come to an agreement with her themselves if they are interested in certain questions connected with Berin. As for the Soviet Union, we shall sacredly observe our obligations as allies of the GDR, that is, those ovligations which stem Irom the Warsaw treaty and which we have confirmed, to the GDR many times.
"Should any aggressive forces come out againgt the GDR, Which is an equal partner of the Warsaw treaty, then we will consider it as an attack on the Soviet Union, on all the countries which belong to the Warsaw treaty...." 27 Nodember 1958 --Soviet note to the US, UK, and France stated that "the Soviet government finds it possible for the question of Western Berlin to be settled for the time being by making Western Berlin an independent, demilitarized free city"; the Soviet Government "propones to make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic of the USA, Great Britain, and France from West Berlin to the FRG for half gear. If the above mentioned period is not utilized to reach an adequate agrement, the Soviet Union will then carry out the planned measures...."

27 January 1959 --Opening speech to 2lst Congress of CPSU: "...The German problem would be fundamentally solved with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. -2-

That would mean a big step forward toward German reunification....
"A peace treaty with Germany would also serve to solve the Berlin problem on a peaceful and democratic basis ind insure West Berfin's conversion into iree city with tine necesmary guarantee of nouinterference in its affalrs. The UN organization should be deputized to enforce this guarantee. We want negotiations on all these problems so as to find a sensible solution for thein....
"since there are two sovereign states today and neither can be eliminated without touching off a world war, Germany's reunification can be achieved only through negotiations between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany. There 1s no other way....
"We have never objected to free elections. But again, the issue must be settied by the Germans themselves....."

2 February 1959 - Khrushchev stressed
: that his Berlin proposal was not an ultiuatum and that the USSR was ready to examine Weatern counterpro-


17 February 1959 --Speecin at Tula:
"...Some Western leaders say that should the land routes to West Berlin be closed, they would arrange an alrifft. The flinsiness of this attitude is obvious. For if a peace treaty is signed with tine two German states, or with one of them-and the foviet Union and some other states whicil fougint against Hitierite Germany are prepared to sign such a treaty--then the GDR will acquire all the rights and will be bound by all the obligations of a sovereign state. And these rights of the GDR will be guaranteed by international law....."

7 Karch 1959 --Speech at Leipzig:
"...The most reasonable way out would be to sign a peace treaty with the two German republics. In the present circumstances that would be the most correct solution of the, question. The signing of a peace treaty, Without alteriag anything that came into being after the war, by finally determining the existing gituation in Central Kurope, would represent a decisive step toward normalizing the international situation.... n....it would be better to gign the treaty with the two existing Gerinan states but should this not take place, we $\begin{gathered}\text { will sign a'peace treaty with GDR.... }\end{gathered}$
"We stand for German unity, and the German people need it." But reunification, "though important, is not a fundamental question.....t

5 Kay 1959 --Interview with West German socialist editors:

- "...And once a pepace treaty vith the GDR has been signed, the Western powers will lose their right to keep their occupation troops in West Berlin, as all existing occupation statutes relating to Berlin will cease to be valid....."

19 March 1959 - Press conference in Moscow:
"...But since the note which contained our proposal for the normalization of the situation in Berlin was sent on November 27, 1958, the six months period expires on May 27, this year. But this is not an ultinatum, it is an approximate date....
"Yes, I believe, that the United States, Britain, and France have lawful rights for their stay in Berlin. These righte flow from the fact of the German surrender as a result of our joint struggle against Nazi Germany. But 14 years have elapsed eince the end of the war, and there is no need for the further occupation of West Beriin....

NIf the Western countries do not want to sign a peace treaty with Germany, the Soviet Union will still sign
a peace treaty with the GDR. The rights flowing from the surrender of Nazi Germany, extending to the territory of GDA, too, will then cease to operate.... "We do not intend to hurt the population of West Berlin by abolishing their way of life, and that is why, by agreement with the Government of the GDR, we propose that West Berlin should enjoy tine status of a demilitarized f́ree city....."

19 June 1959 --Speech to Enst German delegation:

- "...We have never stated that the time limit indicated in our proposals was the main question, a question of principle...."

23 June 1959 --US Embassy in Moscow reported that Khrushchev, In a private conversation with Harriman on 23 June, took an uncompromising position on Berlin, boasted of goviet military strength, iand in effect, wrined that the USSR was prepared to face a showdown over the Berlin issue. He bluntly asserted that the USSR was determined to iiquidate the West's rights in Berlin, and that if the West insisted on perpetuating or prolonging its rights


29 September 1959 -Answer to TASS correspondent, Moscow: "...br. Zisenhower, the US President, correctly described the essence of the agreement reached by us. We have -6-
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indeed agreed that negotiations on the Berlin issue should be resuined and that no time limit should be fixed for them, but that they siould not be protracted indefinitely...."

1 December 1959 --Speech at Hungarian Party Congress: *...Ve are doing our utmost to make the Soviet proposals acceptable. We do not impose then, but wish to reach agreement through negotiations, though we have every right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not wish to gign a peace treaty....
;' "We do not speed up a solution of the problem of West Berlin, we set no deadiines, present no ultimatums, but at the same time we will not relax our energy in striving for agreement with our allies...."r

18 January 1960 -Khrushchev told he was prepared to arrange for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland and Hungary and at some later stage even from Eagt Germany. Be declared that the "iree city" and peace treaty proposals were still the best solution for West Berlin, but said he was ready to consider any other temporary arrangement if the "occupation basis"



25 April 1960 --Speech in Baku:
"...If in spite of all our efforts, the Western powers siow themselves unwilling to seek together with the Soviet Union an agreed solution of the question of a peace treaty, and, contrary to common sense, ignore this question, then we shall of course go our own wey and will conclude a pence treaty witis the German Democratic Republic....I must warn such hotheads that When appeal is not made to right and law, when force is invol:ed, it is natural that force should be opposed by the force of the other side....
"But West Berlin lies within the territory of the GDR, and obviously when peace treaty is signed, the GDR will exercise sovereign rights over its entire state territory. If, therefore, the Western powers mhould not wish to sign a peace treaty with tine GDR, that would not preserve for them the rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air...."

5 May 1960 - Khrushchev speech to USSR Supreme Soviet: "...Finally, it should not be forgotten that the forces of the Western powers, are stationed in West berilu

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according to an agrement between the allied powers and not at the request of the population of West Berin. This fact reimoves any legal grounds from the attempt to present the question of the presence of the forces of the Western powers in Vest Berlin as question Which should be made dependent on the opinion of the West Berlin population. If one were to take the interests of the Germans into consideration seriously, then under the present conditions, when in West Berlin, which is siturted in the center of the GDR, there exists regime differing from the GDR, the only true solution of the insue concerning West Berlin would ile in its converaion to a free city...."
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20 Hay 1960 --Speech in East Berlin while en route to Moscow from abortive "summit" in Paris:
"...Naturally the USSR and all peace-loving countrien now have the complete moral right to solvethy question without further' delay, by signing the peace treaty with the GDR, thereby solving the Nest Berlin question. A question arises: Has the time come to conclude a pace treaty with the GDR?....
"We believe that regardless of the digruption of the sunmit conference by the forces of reaction, the ever growing struggle of the peace-loving forces to mtrengthen peace and settle disputed international questions by -9-
way of negotiations will be crowned by their victory over the forces of war and reaction. We believe that the summit conference will take place in six to elght months time. In these conditions it maires sense to wait a little and to try; by joint efforta of all the victorious pöwers, to find solution to tine question, which has long been ripe, of signing a peace treaty with the two existing German atates. We are not losing sight of the matter. Let us wait till things mature more....
"Therefore, regarding the German peace treaty and thus the question of West Berlin, the existing situation will evidently have to be maintained until tine meeting of the heads of government which, it should be assumed, will take place in six to eight months' time...."

3 June 1960 -Press conference in Hoscow: n...Obviousiy some people think that if there is no summit conference the question of concluding a peace treaty with Germany and solving the West Berlin problem arising from it will be postponed indefinitely. If such people exist, they are wrong....."

8 July 1960 --Press conference in Vienaa:
"...If Fest Germany and the GDR and their governments declared their neutrality, we would hold this the
greatest fortune for all peoples in the world. We personally would hail and appreciate this neutrality.... "The best solution for Berlin is the solution of the German question. The solution of the German question is the conclusion of a peace treaty with both Germanies. The soviet Union and the socialist countries will sign this peace treaty, and thus the question of West-Berlin will be automatically solved-weat Berlin 25 a free city. And so I repeat for Mr. Brandt: he must do everything he can to improve relations with Grotewohl, with Comrade Grotewohl and Comrade Ulbricht, because, whatever happens, it is they with whom he will have to deal because West Berlin is located on the territory of the GDR, because all roads to Beriln pase through GDR territory and there is no other soiution. Perhaps when the Bundestag assembles in Berlin, at the same time a peace treaty will be signed with East Germany, and thus all Bundestag deputies will have to obtain a visa from Grotewohl to be able to leave Berinn for Bonn.

4 August 1960 - Letter to British Prime Minister Macmilian: ut...II later, too, the Soviet Government does not meet with understanding and if hindrances are put in the path of reaching agreement on these questions,

tinen $I$ assure you, 4 . lirime zaiuister, that we shall embark on the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR...."
4. October 1960 -Khrusinchev, on 4 October I $9 G 0$, agreed tinat a suminit conference on Eerlin should not be held until the new US administration was firmly installed, and suggested February or Harch. He again repeated his warning on a separate peace treaty.


18 October 1960 --Khrushchev told


Hzen that summit negotiations on Berlin should be held by April at the latest. He ruled out the pos; sibility of delaying until the West German elections in September. He also insisted on the permanent nature of the Oder-Neisse line and the necessity of a peace treaty with boch German states, warning that a peace conference would be called to sign a separate treaty.


20 October 1960 -Speech in Hoscow:
"...No sober poilitician expects that anyone will give up or renounce the achievements of socialism in the GDR, nor does anyone think that West Germany will today renounce its political and social systems. Therefore

It is necessary to give de facto recognition to the situation that has already taken shape and to place it on record in an appropriate treaty. This question must be settled, and it must apparentiy be settied in 1961. It 1s necessary; therefore, as we agreed with the Western countries after the uS brought about the failure of the Paris conference, that no steps should be taken which would have the effect of exacerbating relations. We proposed a summit meeting after the presidential election in the $0 S$ so that fresh efforts could be made to settle the issues in dispute to reach agreement on the concluaion of a peace treaty with the two German states and, under that tranty to solve the question of West Berin by making it a free city. We abide by these positions. But if another policy is forced on us, the responsibility for this will rest with the imperinlist powers of the West...."

31 December $1960-$ Khrushchev told
bhat the Berlin question must be raised, but that as long 2 negotiations were in progress nothing would be done to alter the status of Berinn.


6 January 1961 --Speech in koscow:
"...The positions of the United States, Great Britain, and France have turned out to be particularly vulnerable in West Berlin. These powers are still trying to cling to the old statutes.... It is essential to continue, step by step, to bring the aggressive imperialist circles to their senses, to compel them to take the actual position into account. If they are stubborn, we will adopt decisive measures. We will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR becaume we are fully determined to insure the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany at last, to do away with the ocoupational regime in West Berlin, and, thus, to eradicate this splinter from the heart of Europe.

9 March 1961 -Ambassador Thompson reported tlagt Karushchev, in a conversation with him on 9 March 1961, showed some flexibility in his discussion of the Berin problem and asserted that the USSR would provide any guarantees necessary to preserve the interual situation in West Berlin and assure the US that its prestige would not suffer as a result of a settlement. khrushohev reiterated his intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with a clause providing for a free city of Weat Berlin $1 f$ the Weat did not agree to a peace treaty with both Germin states, but le set no deadilne for action.



10 April 1961 -Walter Lippmann reported that Khrushchev in a conversation with him at Sochi on 10 April 1961, envisaged three solutions for the German problem. The idenl solution Khrushchev said, would be a peace treaty with both Germanies; but Khrushchev said, he realized that this was impossible of attainment. The iecond possibility was a temporary arrangement along the lines discussed at the yay 1959 Big Four Foreign uinisters' meeting at Geneva, but with a clear understanding that at the end of the temporary period the occupation regime would end. The third possibility was a separate treaty with Eagt Germans. Although Khrushchev insisted the Germap problem wes overripe for solution, he /said several times he realized that he must give Preaident Kennedy time to consolidate lif position.

23 May 1961 - Khrushchev summoned Ambasasdor Thompson to a revue at the Ice palace in koscow for an impromptu discus- $s$ sion of his then-forthconing meeting with President Kennedy. He warned that if the meeting failed to arrive at an understanding on Berlin, the USSA would sign a separate treaty With the GDR in the fall or winter; after the West German elections and probabiy after the soviet party congreas. Such a treaty, Ghrushchev warned, would end Allied occupation rights and mean East German control of communications between Berlin and the Federal Republic. It would $-15$.


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treaties with the two German states. He said he knew
that we would not agree to this, and he would sign a
separate treaty. Shrushchev denied a solution to the
problems of a German peace treaty and Berlin could be
postponed as part of a "package proposal." He repented
that the problens could not wait, that they "spoil"
all US-USSR relations. Moreover, he said, an agreement
On disarmament is impossible so long as the Berlin prob-
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lem exists. Finally, reverting to earlier Soviet pro-
posals for Berlin, Khrushchev said that the USSR agke
to gtation only "symbolic" Soviet forces in West Berlin
and rejected Thompson's suggestion that it might be
feagible to arrive at an all-Berlin solution.
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that Murushchev and kikoyan had made the fullowing points in receat talle with Aubassadora Thompson and Roberts:
(1) The USSR now includes Adenauer among those Western statemen i: believed do not desire German reunification; (2) the USSR stipuiates a Berlin solution 28 a condition for progress in disarinament; and (3) the USSR stresses settlement of the frontiers as the principal reason for attaching urgency to a German settlement.


15 June 1961 -Radio-Television speech reporting to Soviet people on meeting with President Kennedy:
"...A peace treaty with Germany is indispensible. ...there can be no question of any new changes of borders. West Berlin, which is situated on GDR territory will, after the signing of the peace treaty, be free of all the conditions established as a result of $s$ the capitulation of $\mathrm{Hitl}^{\mathrm{t}} \mathrm{E}^{\prime} \mathrm{E}$ Germany.... The granting to West Berlin of the status of a free city would mean that all countries of the world wishing to maintain economic and cultural ties with this city would have the right and opportunity to freely exercise these ties. Of course, agreement would have to be reached with the country across whose territory the communications tiat link West Berlin-with the outside world pass.
"If any country violates the peace and crosses the borders -- ground, air, or water -- of another it will assume full responsibility for the consequences of the aggression and will receive a proper rebuff...."

21 June 1961 --Speech in Koscon:
"...Soviet people do not want war. what is precisely why we are sécing to remove the cause of its outbreak. For the sake of this we, together with other peaceloving states, will at the end of this year sign a peace treaty with the GDR...
"As for West Berinn, we propose the status of a free city. We certainly do not intend to change the social and political system of West Berin. That is an internal matter for its population. Neither the Soviet Union nor the GDR intend to restrict contacts between Fest Berlin and all the countries of the world. But the sovereign rights of the GDR, across whose territory communications run between Fest Berlin and the outside world, must be respected in accordance with international law.... We propose to conclude a peace treaty with Germany which would not curtail the rights and interests of any party, which would not put some states atan advantage over others. The Soviet Union proposes merely to recognize the situation which came into existence along ago, and which exists in
actual fact. We propose de jure consolidation of the existing frontiers of Germany.
"Concerning those who are trying to threaten us with war if we sign a peace treaty with the GDR, they will take upon themselves all responsibility for their actions...." 4 July 1961 -Khrushchev told
that he is viling to negotiate on Berinn, but that the USSA will not begin where the Foreign Ministers left off at Geneva in 1959. He emphasized the importance of concluding a peace treaty this year, warning that the USSR has its own "prestige" to consider and cannot tolexate What he described as Festern efforts to block a "regulariza'tion" of relations between Hoscow and the GDR. Khrushchev told Jthat a separate peace treaty would terminate access rights to Fest Berlin, forcing the US, UK, and France to negotiate directly with the East German regime. Moscow would regard any attempt to push troops through the GDR as an act of war and would support the Fiet Germans.

8 July 1961 -Speech in Koscow:
"...One must call for peace, not to war. One must not make the atmosphere white-hot, not bring matters to a conflict. Let us set around a table and discuss all questions calmly, without resorting to threats. We propose that peace
conference be called and we shall come to it with our draft treaty....
"We propose such a solution: That West Berlin be given the status of a free city, that it be provided with a guarantee by the four great powers--United Staies, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, or by neutral countries, or by the United Nations., If the vestern powers have a better version of guarantees, let them propose it,
"It is quite natural, however, that any decision on West Berlin must take into account the fact that it is in the center of a sovereign state, and that all communications of West Berlin with the outside world run across the terri-
/ tory of that state....
"The Soviet Union will be obliged to reach an agreement with the GDR and those countries that wish to conclude peace treaty with this peace-ioving German state." (TASS's version of this sentence subsequently broadcast in Eaglish read: "The Soviet Union will be confronted with the need of reaching agreement with the GDR and the countries that wish to conclude a peace treaty with the peace-loving Geiman state.") "The procedure of signing a peace treaty with the GDR will adhere strictly to existing international practice and custom. Aiter the signing of the treaty, the Soviet Onion will relinquish ali obligations wich it previously has been fulifilling in respect to comunications with liest Eeriin....
"We shall sign a peace treaty and we shall five our armed forces the order that any aggressor, shouid de raise his hand against the Soviei Union or its friends, receive a worthy rebuff...."

## ORIG: OCI GENERAL DIVISION

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