# . INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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	53	SECRET		<b>*</b>	
	Action INR	-		Control: Rec'd:	AUGUST 7, 1961
	Info	FROM: BONN			4:25 PM
	SS G	TO: Secretary of	State		
	SB SO	NO: 286, AUGUST	7,7 PM		
	EUR SA	ACTION DEPARTMENT 286, INFORMATION BERLIN 82,  RE DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTION CW-631.			
	P US IA NSC				
•	CIA NSA OSD	EMB SUBMITS FOLLOW JOINT COMPOSITION [ NO DIFFERENCES OF			UCTION. IT IS REPARATION OF WHICH
	IAVY AIR	QUOTE			
ASSUME OPEN FORMS. AN GOVT, INCREASED REFUGI PROBLEM. INCREASED ST HAVE BEEN FORCED TO IN UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS ST V DRASTIC MEASURE WHICH PRESENT RESTRICTIONS OF THE SERIOUS MATTER, TEST POPULATION, AND POINT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECT MEASURES COME CLOSE TO AND WITH ACCESS TO AND CATIONS. THUS, DANGES GREATER EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLIED TO SUCH AND SHARPEN TENSION BEFORE			DEMONSTRATED GROWING CRISIS IN EAST GERMANY SAFFECTION LONG CONSTANT HAS BEGUN ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT ONLY IRRITANT PLAGUING UGEE FLIGHTS DURING JULY POSE MOST URGENT STEPS TO HALT THIS FLOW WHICH AUTHORITIES INSTITUTE APPEARED TO HAVE REACHED ALMOST S BY AUG 1. THEY CAN ONLY BE VIEWED AS CH REGIME WOULD PREFER TO HAVE POSTPONED. IS ON TRAVEL CONFIRM THAT REFUGEE FLIGHT TESTIFY TO REGIME'S INABILITY TO WIN OVER NT UP POPULAR REFUSAL ACCEPT COMMUNIST CTIVES ON BERLIN. FURTHERMORE, NEW TO TAMPERING WITH MOVEMENT WITHIN BERLIN AND FROM CITY WITH ALL ITS SERIOUS IMPLI- IGER EXISTS THAT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SS, RESTRICTIONS MIGHT HAVE TO BE SO TIGHTENED ORE THE SOVIETS WOULD WISH OR EXPECT IT.		
	·	NONETHELESS, REFUG	EE FLIGHT IS ONLY S		ITS
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ITS IMMEDIATE DISRUPTIVE IMPACT ON EAST GERMAN ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ("PEACE TREATY") AIMS, IT IS PROBABLY NOT VIEWED AS SERIOUSLY AS ACCOMPANYING BROAD-BASED POPULAR DISCONTENT WHICH IS NOW BEGINNING TO MANIFEST ITSELF.

IMMEDIATE REASON FOR THIS SHARPENING DISCONTENT APPEARS TO BE UNPOPULAR SOVIET BERLIN POLICY WITH IMPLICATION THAT THE ESCAPE HATCH WILL SOON BE CLOSED OFF. POPULAR MOOD WILL PRESUMABLY CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE UNTIL PRESENT BERLIN CRISIS HAS BEEN RESOLVED OR AT LEAST SOME DECISION ON NEGOTIATIONS IS ANNOUNCED. PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PROBABLY ALLAY, BUT NOT DISSIPATE, FRESENT DISCONTENT.

FROM FOREGOING, EMB WOULD JUDGE THAT REGIME BELIEVES ITS POLITICAL (SED) CONTROL APPARATUS IS IN DISORDER AND MUST THEREFORE RESORT TO USING POLICE AND OTHER ARMED FORCES IN DISPROPORTIONATE AMOUNT AND IN RESTRICTED LOCALITY AROUND BERLIN. PRESENT DISPOSITIONS AROUND BERLIN REFLECT DEFENSIVE ACTION WHICH IMPLIES ALREADY DETERIORATING SITUATION. IMPLICATIONS AND EXPENSE ATTENDANT TO THIS ACTION WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR REGIME TO KEEP IT AT PRESENT INTENSITY AND SCOPE FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD. CURRENT DISCONTENT IS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY, MOREOVER, THE LONGER SPECIAL POLICE ACTIONS AGAINST REFUGEES AND BORDER CROSSERS CONTINUES. REGIME THUS FACES SERIOUS DILEMMA SINCE PRESENT COURSE WILL PROBABLY ENSURE CONTINUOUS COMPLICATED CONTROL PROBLEMS.

EAST GERMAN MILITARY ARE CONSIDERED RELIABLE ON OFFICER LEVEL BUT NOT AMONG ENLISTED RANKS. NONETHELESS, SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY NOT COMPLETELY DEPEND UPON THE GERMAN OFFICER CORPS. SO FAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED, RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMAN AND SOVIET FORCES ARE GOOD. GDR FORCES ARE THOROUGHLY CONTROLLED BY SED AND SSD THROUGH POLITICAL COMMISSAR SYSTEM AND COMPLETE SECURITY POLICE INFILTRATION. AVERAGE SOLDIER IS APOLITICAL, THOUGH HE MAY AT TIMES BE IMPATIENT WITH

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EXCESSIVE INDOCTRINATION TO WHICH HE IS SUBJECTED. MATERIAL BENEFITS PROVIDE CERTAIN INCENTIVE TO REMAIN IN UNIFORM. VARIOUS POLICE FORCES, EXCEPTING SSD AND CERTAIN OTHER SPECIAL UNITS, INCLUDE SOME DISCONTENTS, AS IS EVIDENT FROM DEFECTIONS TO WEST.

REGIME ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL DISAFFECTION BY COMBINING CAREFUL POLICE VIGILANCE WITH VARIOUS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE POPULATION TO SUPPORT SED, E.G., PROPAGANDA EXHORTING THEM TO BE MORE ON GUARD AGAINST "AGENTS, SLAVE TRADERS," ETC., AND RELAXATIONS IN COMMUNIZATION. SECURITY ORGANS HAVE EFFECTIVE AND EXTENSIVE INFORMER NETWORK. SO FAR AS IS KNOWN, SSD POLICE CORPS COMPRISES RELIABLE INDIVIDUALS.

IN SHARP CRISIS POPULATION MIGHT WELL ENGAGE IN ISOLATED SPONTANEOUS ANTI-REGIME OUTBREAKS. MAJOR CONCERTED EFFORT SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, HOWEVER, SINCE THERE IS NEITHER POPULAR LEADERSHIP NOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF POPULATION. MOST REOPLE WOULD PROBABLY REACT WITH SOME CYNICISM TO ANY WESTERN EXHORTATIONS TO REVOLT. REMEMBERING WEST'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT EITHER 1953 UPRISING OR HUNGARIANS IN 1956. AN APPEAL FROM WEST COUPLED WITH CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. HOWEVER, MIGHT RESULT IN EXTENSIVE OUTBREAKS, ESPECIALLY ALONG EAST-WEST GERMAN FRONTIER. IPPEALS FOR ANTI-REGIME ACTION WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE HEEDED BECAUSE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE CONCERTED EFFORT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IN EVENT THAT SIZEABLE DISTURBANCES OCCURRED ALONG EAST-WEST GERMAN BORDER, SOVIET FORCES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT FRONTIER WAS EFFECTIVELY SEALED OFF. EAST GERMAN BORDER GUARDS AND ARMY UNITS WOULD PROBABLY NOT PROVE RELIABLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. ANY OTHER POSSIBLE OUTBREAKS, WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE MINOR, COULD PROBABLY BE EFFECTIVELY HANDLED BY GDR SECURITY FORCES.

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IN MEETING ANY DISTURBANCES, THE GDR CAN BE EXPECTED TO C. UP ITS KAMPFGRUPPEN UNITS BUT IS NOT LIKELY WHOLLY TO RELY UPON THEM. SPECIAL ALERT POLICE (BEREITSCHAFTSFOLIZEI) AND SSD FORCES WOULD BE QUICKLY MOVED TO TROUBLE AREAS TO ENSURE FIRM CONTROL.

### UNQUOTE

COMMENT: FOREGOING DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY MILITARY COMMENTS. SINCE ALL AGENCIES WILL PARTICIPATE IN FORMULATING ESTIMATE, EMB ASSUMES DOD HAS ISSUED PARALLEL INSTRUCTIONS, AND ACCORDINGLY DID NOT APPROACH USAREUR FOR COMMENTS ON PARAS D, E, F, AND G.

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