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			SEP 1961	
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	MEMORANDUM FOR: The Depar	Director of Intelligen	ice and Research	
		Chrushchev's Intention		,
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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

National Indications Center

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates


Assistant Director for Current Intelligence


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





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UNTRY	:	USSP.	
BJECT	:	 Khrushchev's Intentions Re A Summit Conference, Iran, 	and Turkey
		2. Realignment of Soviet Mili and Cancellation of Senior	tary Commanders Officer Leaves
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1. The treaty with East Germany will be signed. Khrushchev hopes this will happen without a shot's being fired, as he thinks NATO countries will retreat on this question and will settle all questions with East Germany through neutral representatives.

2. Khrushchev is planning to conduct the impending highest level talks on the Berlin problem in the following vay if they take place. He intends to be firm and unyielding. Khrushchev vill declare: "The Soviet Government in its notes, messages and





memoranda on Germany and the Berlin question has expressed all its views, advice and proposals. We have nothing to add. We are ready to consider new proposals for realization of our thoughts and desires concerning Germany and Berlin. If you, gentlemen, are obstinate and do not want to recognize the correctness of our proposals, then I have nothing to say to you on this question. The Soviet Government will do what it has already declared. Goodbye." Khrushchev will then leave the room.


3. On 10 August 1961 Marshal Konev flew to East Germany. Col. Gen. Yakubovskiy vill be his deputy. Army General Batov will command the Southern Group of Forces. Marshal Chuykov will command one of the frontier districts 'n Asia or the Caucasus and Marshal Golikov will be appointed Commander of Ground Forces. Marshals Zhukov and Sokolovskiy have been invited to play the part of principal military advisers attached to the Supreme Commander-In-Chief, Khrushchev. Sokolovskiy has replied in the affirmative and Zhukov is thinking about it. Leaves of high-ranking officers have been cancelled.


4. The Soviet Government has information to the effect that the United States is now carrying out intensive military preparations in Iran and Turkey, in connection, allegedly, with the Berlin problem.

5. In relation to this activity on the part of the United States, Khrushchev has decided to deliver an ultimatum to Iran and Turkey in September or October demanding of these governments removal of troops and liquidation of American bases in their countries. Otherwise, Khrushchev has decided, on the basis of the existing treaty with Iran, to move Soviet troops into Iranian territory.

6. This clarifies the preparation of world opinion by publication of the CENTO plans for nuclear destruction of countries in the Middle East. After events in Iraq and the seizure of power by Quasim, the archives fell into the hands of the latter, who passed them to Enrushchev. Among the material in the archives were these plans. They were withheld from publication for a long time and now, in launching the offensive against the prestige of the United States, they have been published for preparation of subsequent "firm" demands.

7. At the reception for visiting Rumanians in Moscov /11 August 19617 Khrushchev said if necessary he will not stop at anything, he will use space for military purposes: "I will send





a rocket into space with a bomb equivalent to one megaton and will land it wherever I please."

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8. By insolence and threats he wants to win for himself a series of victories in a peaceful way, reckoning NATO will not go to war at present. He himself does not want a major war, but nevertheless thinks about striking first, not against the whole of capitalism at once, but against its leaders, the United States and England, calculating that with the destruction of these countries the remaining NATO countries will, as a result, become more obedient and he will get them in his hands by other means.

9. Khrushchev stated at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council: "Cut down a tree, and the boughs will fall off - destroy the United States, and with it England, and the other capitalist fortresses will surrender."

10. Particularly at this time, Khrushchev and his government, as well as the governments of Soviet satellites, have decided to undermine the prestige of the United States as the leader of the imperialistic powers by vigorous actions, to cause contradictions and splits among members of NATO, thereby endeavoring to split off individual countries from NATO, getting them to leave the organization.

11. Khrushchev and his supporters consider that the actions of the Kennedy government show contradictions, which are the result of the instability of the position of the United States and of the new interrelation of forces.

12. Any peaceful actions and proposals from President Kennedy and other leaders of NATO countries, such as willingness to carry on negotiations with the USSR regarding Laos, West Berlin and the prohibition of nuclear tests, disarmament talks, meeting in Vienna and inactivity with regard to Cuba, are regarded by Nurushchev as weakness on the part of the United States, and concessions to his pressure. Any proposals by the West, however reasonable and just, is twisted at every opportunity by Khrushchev as being a concession to him, because he has, supposedly, spoken about it or demanded it at one time or another.

13. Khrushchev at present is passing through senility: having evolved a policy of course pressure and alackmail, he has decided to attack, indulging in grandiose thoughts of the tractability of NATO countries.

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